Prolegomena




Manuscript: Nachl. Johann Gottfried Herder XX.188 (8°, 4 pp., Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin – Preußischer Kulturbesitz).


The following text comes from the so-called Blaues Studienbuch (Blue Notebook), an octavo volume, 230 pp. (10 x 17 cm.), with ribbed paper and a pale blue cover. Many sheets have come loose from the binding, including the paper covers. The inner title-page reads, in Herder’s hand: “Ascetische Sachen.” (On the blue cover, but not in Herder’s hand: “Eigene Poesien und Excerpta.”) Many pages are blank and others include drawings and doodles. The ink is usually light brown, and finely written. Pages are numbered in pencil in the top outer corners. During and after WW II the notebook was housed in the Tübingen depot. Printed at Irmscher [1964, 51-56] and AA 28: 155-58.

Blaues Studienbuch

Blaues Studienbuch
(Nachl. Joh. Gottfr.
Herder XX.188)


Only four pages (123, 122, 121, 120) have text that plausibly stems from the metaphysics lectures, but other text is concerned with related issues in metaphysics, and some concerns physics (possibly from Kant’s lectures) and thus is of interest; the transcription from these additional pages can be found at Varia (Physics) (notebook pages 110, 113-14, 116-17, 119) and Varia (XX.188) (notebook pages 2-10, 24-25, 46-47, 179, 187).


This notebook is primarily devoted to poetic exercises, but it also includes various reflections on philosophical topics. Quite often, but not always, these notes on philosophy were written upside down (i.e., Herder turned the book upside down, and wrote from back to front) – presumably he was adding these notes to an already full notebook, adding them at the bottom of pages where there was still space, and turning the book upside down so as to better keep the two groups of notes separate. This means that the pagination of the philosophy material often appears to run backwards. For instance, the text transcribed at AA 28: 155-66 has marginal pagination running 123, 122, 120, 121, 119, 117, 116, 113, 114, 110. Irmscher observes that this text might stem from two different courses.

The text on pp. 123-120 is all written in the upside-down orientation and appears to belong together as a single unit. If it comes from Kant’s metaphysics lectures, then it is likely not a Mitschrift, although there is considerable revision occuring on the pages. Perhaps it is a re-organization of his lecture notes, given its highly ordered structure.


The text does not concern material found in Baumgarten and so the lack of references to Baumgarten is not surprising, but this is precisely the sort of material that one finds at the beginning of the other sets of notes that we have from Kant’s lectures on metaphysics, all of which tend to involve some brief overview of cognition in general followed by a discussion of the history and use of metaphysics — see the L1 notes of the late 1770s (AA 28: 171-77), the Mrongovius notes of 1782/83 (AA 29: 747-84; but see the proper ordering of the notes, as found in Ameriks/Naragon 1997, 109-39), the Volckmann notes of 1784-85 (AA 28: 355-90), the von Schön notes of the mid-1780s (AA 28: 463-69), the brief discussion in the L3.2 notes of 1790-91 (AA 28: 540-42), the Dohna notes of 1792/93 (AA 28: 615-21), the K2 notes of the early 1790s (AA 28: 709), the Vigilantius notes of 1794-95 (AA 29: 945-59).

We find a similar introductory discussion at the beginning of the long Ont/Cos manuscript (A1-A3), and one open question is how these two texts are related. The Ont/Cos manuscript is clearly a Reinschrift, but A1-A3 bear no appearance of being a later draft of Prol (1-4); thus they likely stem from different semesters (if these current notes are indeed from Kant’s metaphysics lectures). The comparison of Wolff and Crusius at Prol-2 differs from that at Ont/Cos-A1/A2: both Wolff and Crusius are criticised in the latter, but only Wolff in the former. On this same page of the notebook we find a four-part “new plan” being announced for the upcoming course of lectures, but its interpretation is unclear. It appears to suggest that the order of topics will be: (1) nature (cosmology), (2) the soul (psychology), (3) things in general (ontology), and finally (4) metaphysics in general. It is not clear where natural theology would fit into this scheme but, in any event, the notes as we have them from Herder do not fit this ordering, since the long Ont/Cos manuscript clearly has the ontology precede the cosmology (viz., the same ordering as in the Baumgarten text). It is entirely possible that this “new plan” is simply intended for Herder’s own eventual lectures.


[XX.188(123)] ms 1



   Erkentnis

Wir haben ℵ Begriffe[1]

1) non fundament.alia

2) fundament.alia princip.ia sensu incomplexo

a) aut derivat.iva

b) aut primit.iva princip.ia pr.ima

   A) [a] respective

     1) ˚.auf ˚die Fähigk.eiten des Kopfs: ‹(ich kann es derivativa ¿¿¿ ¿¿r›[b]

     2) ˚.auf ˚eine gewiße Wissensch.aft ˚.Exempel ˜Gott in ˚der Moral

     3) ˚.auf ˚einen Zweck: gemeine Leb:en

[c] B) absolut.e – dantur – multae – irresolubiles

                 a) [d] total.es

                 b)   partial.es

⁅Wir haben⁆ ℶ Urtheile[2]

sowohl

1) Unmittelb.ar

2) Mittelb.ar

   d.i. Schlüße

1) non fund:amentalia

2) fundam:entalia h.oc e.st principia sensu complexo

  a) derivat.iva

  b) primit.iva

   A respect.ive

    1) ˚.auf ˚die Fähigkeit: Sprüchwörter für ˚den gem.einen Mann

    2) ˚.auf ˚die Wißenschaft: Es ist ˚.ein ˜Gott: ist in ˚der Moral princ.ipium pr.imitivum dom:inans

    3) ˚auf ˚einen Zweck.

   B) absolute – dantur – multae – indemonstrab.iles

Metaph.ysik [e] lehrt

   1) object.ive

˚die princip.ia: [f] entweder nach ˚der Ordnung

da [g] princip.ia absol:uta prima vor˚aus:gehen (so in all.en Wißensch.aften, ˚weil s.ie ˚die leichtsten sind in˚sonderh.eit Mathem.atik

   2) subject.ive

erst derivat.iva – dann etc. erst ʾconcreta dann abstracta: So [h] sollte ˚die Met:aphysik abgehandelt s.ein

    Methode

1) ‹˚nicht› synthet:isch [i] ˚.wie in ˚der

   a) Mathem.atik in ˚der willkührl.iche Begriffe soll.en erkl.ärt ˚werden: daher [j] irrt s.ie nie

   b) in ˚der Philos:ophie ˚wenn Begriffe grammatisch erkl.ärt ˚werden soll.en

  ˚sondern

2) analyt.isch

[k]In der Metaphys.ik bey gegeben verworren, ˚die ˚die Anal.ysis[l] notionum, um ˚das übrige herzuleiten

    1) ‹deutlich[m] macht,

    2) ‹‹Math.ematische Zeichen[n] vollständig, ˚.und also Def.initionen

     diese ˚.auf unmittelb.aren Axiom.en beruhend.

Histor.ie ˚der Metaph.ysik.[3] Anfang ist ungewiß:

als

1) Doctrin war s.ie in ˚den blühenden Staaten Griechenl.ands

Pythagoras, Sophisten, Pyrrho, Plato[4]

2) Disciplin:

Aristotel.es Scholastiker, Petr.us Ramus[5]

3) Wißenschaft[o]

  1) Engell.and Bacon, Locke, Clarke,[p] Hume,[6] doch mehr ‹Phys.iker

  2) Frankr.eich Descart.es[q] mehr ˚.ein Phys.iker Alemb.ert Diderot, Condillac[7] ‹sind selten[r]

[Datum: 10.09.2013 / 13.06.2014 / 25.06.2017]


[XX.188(122)] ms 2



3)

Deutschl.and: ist dazu geneigt

a) Leibniz, Wolf, Rüdiger, Hoffm.ann Crus.ius[1]

[a]Beurteilung des Wolf ˚.und Crus.ii Systems[2]

  1) Wolf

   A) [b] Fehler

    a) ˚daß er ˚keine un˚auflösl.ichen Begr.iffe erk.ennt ˚.und alles def.inirt

    b) ˚daß ⁅er⁆ ˚nicht ˚viele Princip:ia material.ia ‹prima› ⁅erkennt⁆[c] ˚.und 1) alles[d] demonstr.iert: da

                   doch ˚die Metaph.ysik ohne

                   Zeichen ˚nicht Math.ematisch dem:onstrirt

                 2) falsch dem:onstrirt ˚.aus ˚dem                    princ:ipium ʾcontrad.ictionis

   B) Nutzen: s.ie schärft uns.er Bestreb.en def.iniren zu könen.

2) Crus.ius

  1) [e] Nutzen

   a) er [f] erk:ennt ˚die un˚auflösl.ichen Begr.iffe ˚und ˚die natürl.iche Klarh.eit

   b) ⁅er erk:ennt⁆ ˚viele Princ:ipia materialia ‹prima›[g]

                 1) ˚daß s.ie indemonst.rabel wären

                 2) ˚daß s.ie ˚nicht ˚aus ˚dem princ.ipio ʾcontradictionis                    hergeleitet ˚werden könen

2) Fehler: in ˚der Math:ematik da er unrechte[h] 1ste Grundsazze aninmt

Nutzen ˚der Metaph.ysik[3]

1) Object:ive a) s.ie enthält ˚die 1sten Grundfesten des Menschlichen Erk.ennens

         b) ˚der Tadel blos ˚die Methode, ˚.und selbst ˚durch Metaph.ysik

2) Subj.ective gibts ˚.auch ˚eine rechte?

   1) Einwurf: s.ie ist ‹das›[i] ungewißste: ˚.Exempel Leibn.iz ˚und Clarke:[j][4] etc. etc.

         ʾResponsio liegt an ˚der Methode: ˚.ein jeder glaubt, ganz recht zu haben, hält ˚den andern blos f.ür Gegner

           da er doch s.einen Irrth.um erkl.ären sollte.

   2) ⁅Einwurf⁆: s.ie ist Trock.en. ʾResponsio Ja, ˚weil s.ie sehr abstrakt ist: Aber

         1) ihr Vergnügen ist vernünft.ig

         2) s.ie ˚.hat a.n sich [k] reitzende Mat:erien ˚.vom Unendl.ichen Schönheit etc.

   3) ⁅Einwurf⁆: s.ie ist eine Pest ˚der Seel.en. ʾResponsio Ja übel vorgetragen

   4) ⁅Einwurf⁆: sie ist schwer ʾResponsio Ja! schwerer als ˚die Algebra, ˚die sich ˚der Zeichen bedient aber

         1) s.ie ˚wird ˚durch ˚die Methode erleichtert

         2) s.ie ist [l] gefast desto angenehmer.

Neuer Plan[5]

1) Metaph:ysische Anfangsgründe ˚der Naturl.ehre

2) ⁅Metaph:ysische Anfangsgründe⁆ ˚der Seelenl.ehre

3) ⁅Metaph:ysische Anfangsgründe⁆ aller Dinge überhaupt: da vom Ursprung ˚der Dinge

4) Metaphys.ik überhaupt.[m]

[Datum: 10.09.2013 / 13.06.2014 / 25.06.2017]


[XX.188(121)] ms 3



Alle Urteile sind[1][a]

b) mittelb.ar gewiß ʾper notam intermed.iam

a) unmittelb.ar ⁅gewiß ʾper⁆ (princip.ia prim:itiva[b] diese ˚sind aut

1)

formalia

1) identic:a [c], das das Wesen jedes bejahenden

  Urteils bestimmt: ˚weil bejahen heißt: ˚.ein Merkmal

  für [d] ident.isch ˚.mit ˚den Merkm.al ˚der Sache

  ˚ausgeben. Diese ident:ität ist

   a) aut totalis – ˚.ein Mensch ist ˚.ein Mensch

   b) ⁅aut⁆ partialis

  stehen unmittelbar a) aut explicita: in indemonstr:abilia

   mittelbar b) ⁅aut⁆ implicita: da ˚durch Hülfe ˚einer notae

     intermediae Ident:itas implic.ita muß

     z.ur explic:ita gemacht ˚.und also bewiesen ˚werden

2) contrad:ictoria in ˚den verneinenden Urteil.en

  ʾcontradictio est

     a) vel explicita: ˚der Saz steht unmittelbar

     b) ⁅vel⁆ im⁅plicita: der Saz steht⁆ mittelbar unter ˚den pr.incipio

       contrad:ictionis ˚durch ˚die notam interm.ediam

       ˚die in ˚einem princip.io material.i liegt

2)

materialia, unmittelb.ar Erkante Grundsäzze in ˚einer Sache,

˚die z.um Grunde ˚der ʾ.Definition liegen, ˚.und quoad form.am doch noch

unter ˚den formal.ia stehen[e]

[Datum: 11.09.2013 / 13.06.2014 / 25.06.2017]


[XX.188(120)] ms 4



   Un˚auflösl.iche Begriffe:

A ˚Das seyn: ˚das ˚.man ˚durch ˚nichts s.ein ˚.hat erkl.ären wollen.

  ˚Das ˚waz ist: ist Etwas: – ‹anders›[a] ist ˚waz da ist, ohne es ˚nicht ˚dasselbe ist

B) a) neben ˚.einander

  b) nach ⁅˚.einander

  c) ˚durch ˚.einand.er[b]

[Datum: 12.09.2013 / 13.06.2013 / 25.06.2017]


Explanatory Notes
[Prol]

ms 1


[1] [Begriffe] This basic division of cognition into concepts and judgments, both derived and primitive, etc., is found in Refl. #3709 (AA 17: 249-50) dated to 1762-63 and written alongside the “Preface” in Kant’s copy of Baumgarten. It bears the heading “Prolegomena Metaphysicorum”:

“In unserm gesammten Erkentiße müsse einige Erkentniße andern [250] zum Grunde liegen. Vielen Begriffen liegen andre Begriffe und vielen Urtheilen andere Urtheile zum Grunde. Dem gemeinsten Begriffe einer Uhr liegt der Begriff der Zeit, einer Bewegung, und der Ausmessung zum Grunde. Wer das Wort Freundschaft nennt, stützet sich auf die Begriffe der Liebe, der Redlichkeit u. u. Ebenso ist es mit den Urtheilen bewandt. […]”

We find this same division of concepts into absolute and relative in the “Prolegomena” section of the L1 metaphysics notes (AA 28: 172), dated to lectures given in the late 1770s.

[2] [Urtheile] See the related discussion at Prol-3.

[3] [Historie der Metaphysik] An historical overview of philosophy can also be found in the fragmentary logic notes from Herder (37-1), where the survey is somewhat longer. Other histories in the metaphysics notes can be found in Pölitz 1 (AA 28: 175-77), Mrongovius (AA 29: 757-64), Volckmann (AA 28: 367-80), von Schön (AA 28: 466-68), Pölitz 3.2/L2 (AA 28: 535-40), Königsberg/K2 (AA 28: 709-10), Dohna (AA 28: 618-20), and Vigilantius (AA 29: 956-59).

[4] [Pythagoras … Plato] Pythagoras (c.570-480 BCE) was a Greek philosopher who founded a religious community on the Italian peninsula; the Sophists were a loose collection of pre-Socratic philosophers known for their teaching of rhetoric; Pyrrho (c.360-270 BCE) was a Greek skeptical philosopher; Plato (428-348 BCE) was an Athenian philosopher, who founded his Academy in Athens. Formey’s Concise History of Philosophy gives a section to each of these except the Sophists, with the majority of pages devoted to Pythagoras. All are discussed in Zedler’s Lexikon: Pythagoras (vol. 29, cols. 1861-62), the Sophists (vol. 38, cols. 879-82), Pyrrho (vol. 29, cols. 1851-52), and Plato (vol. 28, cols. 706-16).

[5] [Aristoteles … Ramus] Aristotle (384-322 BCE) was a student and then colleague of Plato, eventually forming his own school in Athens, known as the Lyceum. Kant briefly discusses Aristotle in the logic notes at 37-2 and 37-3.

In the narrower sense, the Scholastics were the Aristotelian professors in the universities of the 13th-17th centuries, but by the early modern period many of these professors were no longer Aristotelian, and Kant will use the term in a broader sense to refer to those philosophers with a systematic and deductive approach to philosophy and an insistence on the precise articulation of its concepts; much of the shift away from Aristotelianism during the 16th and 17th centuries was the perceived failure of it not being scholastic enough (in this broader sense). The non-Aristotelian textbooks used by Kant (Wolff on mathematics, Baumgarten on metaphysics, Meier on logic) were all scholastic in this sense. Kant also contrasts the scholastic with the pragmatic and the popular.

Peter Ramus (1515-1572) was a French Protestant logician and educational reformer, a staunch critic of Aristotelianism as well as a “scholastic” in Kant’s use of the term.

[6] [Bacon … Hume] Francis Bacon (1561-1626) was an English philosopher and politician; John Locke (1632-1704) an English philosopher; Samuel Clarke (1675-1729) an English philosopher and Anglican cleric most famous for his correspondence with Leibniz (see the passage at Prol-2); David Hume (1711-1776) a Scottish philosopher.

[7] [Descartes … Condillac] René Descartes (1596-1650) was a French philosopher, mathematician, and natural scientist, although most of his adult life was spent in the Netherlands; Jean le Rond D’Alembert (1717-1783) was a French mathematician and philosopher; Denis Diderot (1713-1784) was a French philosopher, poet, and editor-in-chief of the Encyclopédie (1751-1772); Étienne Bonnot de Mably de Condillac (1714-1729) was a French philosopher in the empiricist tradition of John Locke, developing a radical empiricism often referred to as ‘sensationism’.

ms 2


[1] [Leibniz … Crusius] Both Gottfried Leibniz (1646-1716) and Christian Wolff (1679-1754) were German philosophers and mathematicians, although Leibniz published very little during his lifetime while Wolff published an inordinate amount, including two series of textbooks, one in German, one in Latin. Wolff was understood as continuing and systematizing Leibniz’s thought. Andreas Rudiger (1673-1731) studied under Christian Thomasius (1655–1728) at Halle, Adolph Friedrich Hoffmann (1707-1741) studied under Rüdiger at Leipzig, and Christian August Crusius (1715-1775) studied under Hoffmann at Leipzig – and as a philosophical lineage they formed an important Pietist counterpoint to the Wolffian rationalism sweeping the German universities.

[2] [Beurteilung des … sSystems] This discussion is much more critical of Wolff, and not at all of Crusius, in contrast with the parallel discussion at Ont/Cos-A1.

In the history of philosophy survey in Herder’s logic notes (37-2) we find:

“Wolf war Ali gegen Mahomet — Crusius geht ganz in der Methode ab. Überhaupt, kein Philosoph kann ein Wolfianer etc. sein weil er selbst denken soll. Wolf, Crusius müßen alles definieren, demonstrieren etc. Und da sie Exempel solcher Irrthümer vor sich hatten, behaupteten sie doch ihren eigenen Irrthum.” (AA 24: 4)

Wolff and Crusius were paired in other sets of notes as well, such as the Von Schön metaphysics notes from the late 1780’s:

“Unter den neueren philosophischen Systemen ist besonders Crusius und Wolff merkwürdig. Wolff nimmt Grundsätze der reinen Vernunft an, sucht sie auch zu beweisen, untersucht aber nicht den Ursprung derselben. Er geht mathematisch und dogmatisch aber nicht kritisch zu Werke. Er ist also mehr Künstler der menschlichen Vernunft als Prüfer — Crusius dagegen neigte sich zum mystischen; gieng aber bis zum Fanatischen. Das Mystische des Plato bestand in dem sogenannten Anschauen der Gottheit, dagegen seines in dem Anschauen andrer Geister. Dennoch wagte er es über die Quellen der menschlichen Erkenntnis Untersuchungen anzustellen und nahm Ideas connatas an so z.E. alles was wird und vorher nicht war, hat eine Ursache. Ein jedes Ding ist irgendwo und irgendwann; sind Sätze die wir annehmen müßen.” (AA 28: 467)

Crusius’s mysticism is mentioned in the logic Nachlaß. Refl. #1642 (AA 16: 63), written on p. 3 of Kant’s copy of Meier’s logic text, where he associates Wolff with the mathematical, Locke with the empirical, and Crusius with the mystical, and also in the Volckmann metaphysics notes, where Wolff and Crusius are mentioned and then dismissed:

“Es ist nicht nöthig, daß hier vom Unterschiede des Wolffischen und Crusiusschen Systems geredet werde, denn beyde haben keine Critic der Vernunft angewendet” (AA 28: 372, 379).

This is similar to the slightly earlier Mrongovius metaphysics notes, where Wolff and Crusius are mentioned and dismissed:

“Die ganze Metaphysic ist nichts anderes als eine Kette von aufgebauten und umgestürzten Systemen. […] Man wird einwenden, daß Wolf und Crusius Metaphysicen herausgegeben. Man sehe nur, ohne die Sache selbst zu prüfen, auf den Erfolg. Sie sind schon all eingestürzt. Einige Sätze waren wahr, das Ganze aber nicht.” (AA 29: 779)

[3] [Nutzen der Metaphysik] See the related discussion at Ont/Cos-A2.

[4] [Leibniz und Klark] This appears to be a reference to the correspondence between Gottfried Leibniz and Samuel Clarke, initiated by the controversy between Leibniz and Newton, with Clarke taking up Newton’s cause; Leibniz’s death ended the discussion. The correspondence took place between November 1715 and October 1716, and was published by Clarke in London the following year. An early, perhaps the first German translation of the correspondence, was by Heinrich Köhler: Des Freyherrn von Leibnitz kleinere Philosophische Schriften, with a preface by Christian Wolff (Leibniz 1740, 101-352).

[5] [Neuer Plan] It is not clear how to understand this “new plan”. One would expect this to be a sketch of how the topics will be presented in the semester: Metaphysical foundations of (1) the theory of nature, (2) the theory of the soul, (3) of all things in general, ending with (4) metaphysics in general. These first three items would seem to correspond to the cosmology, psychology, and ontology sections in Baumgarten, although that leaves open the material to discuss in (4).

A passage at RP/NT 763-C5b might be relevant:

“[Natural theology] belongs to metaphysics, since this contains (1) anthropology, (2) physics, (3) ontology (of all things; but more than now), (4) origin of all things: God and the world, therefore theology — the last real ground, and is the highest metaphysics, since it considers the real grounds.”

This suggests that “(3) the metaphysical foundations of all things in general: from the origin of things” corresponds to natural theology, and that “(4) Metaphysics in general” is the ontology. That might be the correct understanding of the new plan, although it must then be noted that, first, it deviates from the arrangement just quoted above, and second, Herder’s own notes do not support this arrangement. Instead, we find that ontology is followed by cosmology (this transition occurs within the scope of the Ont/Cos manuscript) and rational psychology is followed by natural theology (as can be seen in both the RP/NT 763 and the RP/NT 796 notes). In other words, the notes themselves suggest that Kant was following the order of presentation found in the Baumgarten text.

ms 3


[1] [Alle Urteile sind] See the related discussion at Prol-1.


Textual Notes
[Prol]

[Here is a mark-up key for the transcription.]

ms 1


[a] An 'absol:' is crossed out.

[b] '(ich kann es derivativa / ¿¿¿ ¿¿r' is written, in two lines, above several crossed out words: '@gemeine ???n@'.

[c] An 'ℶ Urtheile 1) non fund' is crossed out here, with 'B) absolut.' written over part of this. Beneath the crossed out '1) non fundam' is similarly crossed out: '2) fundam: / a) derivat.iva / b) primativa'

[d] A '@prin@' is crossed out (a space preceding 'partial.' in the line below is left blank for the insertion of this otherwise deleted word).

[e] A '¿' is crossed out. Three lines below, an 'Ihre' is crossed out just before 'Methode'.

[f] A 'prima' is crossed out.

[g] An 'aber' is crossed out.

[h] A 'nicht Mathem.' is crossed out.

[i] A 'in ˚der Mathem' is crossed out.

[j] A 'K.' here appears to be deleted.

[k] Five lines of text are crossed out, and replaced with the text that follows. The deleted text reads: 'in ˚der Metaphys.ik da ˚die gegebene Begr.iffe ʾprin analyt.ic notionum deutl.ich g¿¿¿. ˚werden soll.en' and written above this line, at the end: '˚oder wo ¿¿¿¿ ¿¿¿¿¿¿¿'. […]

[l] The text was corrected here, and has the appearance of 'Aalal.'.

[m] 'Klar' is crossed out and 'deutlich' written above it. After 'macht,' are the following crossed out words: 'blos das übrige herzul.eiten'.

[n] 'Math.ematische Zeichen' is written above the crossed out words: 'wo mogl.ich'.

[o] The line below this is crossed out: 'Bacon, Deskartes, Lock, Klark'.

[p] Reading 'Klarke' as 'Clarke'.

[q] Reading 'Deskart.' as 'Descartes'.

[r] 'sind selten' is written at the bottom of the opposite page.

ms 122


[a] Preceding 'Beurtheilung' is an @'Autor'/'Unter'@ that is either underlined or crossed out.

[b] The right-parens is added after 'A', and an undecipherable word is crossed out.

[c] 'erk.ennt' replaces a dash under the same word in the line of text above. prima is written above the dash; the 'p' is a conjecture.

[d] '˚.und 1) alles' could be crossed out, but it appears that these words might have been written over a long dash meant to duplicate some of the text in the line above..

[e] A 'Erk' is crossed out.

[f] An @'erk¿¿'/'fehl'@ is crossed out.

[g] 'prima' is written over a crossed out '¿¿¿¿¿'.

[h] The 'be' of 'unberechte' is crossed out.

[i] '˚das' is written above a crossed out '@erst@'.

[j] Reading 'Klark' as 'Clarke'.

[k] A 'Mat' is crossed out here.

[l] A 'desto' is crossed out.

[m] The bottom one-fourth of the page is blank. Written in ink next to the pencilled page number and in the right-side up orientation: 'doch auf'. This appears to be an isolated fragment as no text at the top or bottom of p. 121 is written in this orientation.

ms 3


[a] The text immediately following is crossed out: 'a) unmittelb gewiß, prcp. primit.' Directly beneath this are the two items, but listed 'b) and then 'a)'. Presumably this second item was meant to replace the crossed out first line, and this was done to accomodate the additional items that followed under 'a)'.

[b] Or else 'prima'?

[c] '@um die Beziehung@' is crossed out here.

[d] '˚.ein Merkmal' is crossed out here.

[e] The remainder of the page, about one-half, is blank.

ms 4


[a] 'anders' is written above a 'Verschieden' that is crossed out. An undecipherable abbreviation preceding 'anders' appears to be crossed out.

[b] The remainder of the page is blank.