[2014]  Kant Bibliography 2015  [2016]

Please send corrections or additions to: Steve Naragon.

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[top]Kant    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Editions and translations of the writings of Immanuel Kant

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[See also the items listed under Collections]

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“Concerning Sensory Illusion and Poetic Fiction” (1777)

 ——. “Sobre la ilusión poética y la poética de la ilusión (Esbozo de un discurso “Sobre las ficciones poéticas”) [AA 15: 22, 903-935].” [Spanish] Translated, with an introduction and notes, by Salvador Mas. Con-Textos Kantianos 1 (2015): 235-52. [M][online]

Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1781)

 ——. Критика чистого разума / Kritika chistogo razuma. [Russian] Translated by N. O. Losskii. Moscow: Eksmo, 2015. [734 p.] [WC]

 ——. Naqd-i ʻaql-i muḥaṣṣ [Persian] Translated by Bihrūz Naẓarī. Tehran: Intishārāt-i Quqnūs, 2015. [732 p.] [WC]

 ——. 순수이성비판. [Korean] Translated by Chung Myoung Oh. Seoul: East and West Cultural History, 2015. [ p.] [WC]

 ——. نقد الʻقل المحض. [Arabic] Translated by Moses Wehbe. Beirut/Cairo: Enlightenment, 2015. [504 p.] [WC]

Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysic, die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können (1783)

 ——. Protes Metaphysikés Archés tes Physikes Epistemes. [Greek] Edited and translated by Haris Tasakos. Athens: Ekdóseis Printa, 2015. [186 p.] [WC]

“Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht” (1784)

 ——. Idea per una Storia Universale in Prospettiva Cosmopolitica. [Italian] Edited by Roberto Mordacci, translated by Stefano Bacin and Francesca Pongiglione. Milan: Mimesis, 2015. [109 p.] [WC]

“Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?” (1784)

 ——. Qu'est-ce que les Lumières? 1784: suivi d'une analyse critique et d'un dossier sur la notion de liberté. [French] Translated by Jean-Michel Muglioni. city: publisher, 2015. [127 p.] [WC]

Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (1785)

 ——. 道德底形上學 / Dao de di xing shang xue. [Chinese] Translated by Minghui Li. Tai bei shi : Lian jing, 2015. [482 p.] [WC]

“Was heißt: sich im Denken orientieren?” (1786)

 ——. Che Cosa Significa Orientarsi nel Pensiero? [Italian] Translated by Fabrizio Desideri and Mariagrazia Portera. Milan: Mimesis, 2015. [53 p.] [WC]

Kritik der praktischen Vernunft (1788)

 ——. Critique of Practical Reason. [English] Revised edition. Translated by Mary Gregor; introduction by Andrews Reath. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015. [xli, 141 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: A volume in the series Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy.

 ——. Crítica da razão prática. [Portuquese] Translated by Valério Rohden. São Paulo: Folha de São Paulo, 2015. [238 p.] [WC]

 ——. Kritikk av den praktiske fornuft. [Norwegian] Translated by Øystein Skar and Bjarne Hansen; foreward by the translators, afterword by Skar. Oslo: Aschehoug Fondet, 2015. [238 p.] [WC]

Kritik der Urteilskraft (1790)

 ——. 判断力批判 / Handanryoku hihan. [Japanese] Translated by Sumihiko Kumano. Tokyo: Sakuhinsha, 2015. [590 p.] [WC]

 ——. Kritika Soudnosti. [Czech] Edited by Tomáš Koblížek, translated by Vladimír Špalek and Walter Hansel. Praha: Oikoymenh, 2015. [343 p.] [WC]

 ——. Phê phán năm lúc phân đoạn: Mỹ học và mục đích luận. [Vietnamese] Translated by Bui Van Nam Son. Ho Chi Minh City: NXB Tri Thuc, 2015. [583 p.] [WC]

“Über den Hang zur Schwärmerei und die Mittel dagegen” (1790)

 ——. “Apresentação da carta de Kant à Borowski.” [German/Portuguese; Presentation of a letter from Kant to Borowski] Translated, and an introduction, by André Renato de Oliveira and Luís Gustavo das Mercês Muniz. Kant e-Prints 10.3 (2015): 1-8. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Letter is dated between March 6 and 22, 1790 (AA 11: 141-43).

“Über das Misslingen aller philosophischen Versuche in der Theodicee” (1791)

 ——. “Sobre o fracasso de toda tentativa filosófica na teodiceia: comentário, tradução e notas.” [Portuguese] Translated, with commentary and notes, by Joel Thiago Klein. Studia Kantiana 13.19 (2015): 153-76. [M] [online]

Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft (1793)

 ——. La Religion dans les Limites de la Simple Raison. [French] Edited and translated by Laurent Gallois. Paris: Classiques Garnier, 2015. [302 p.] [WC]

 ——. 이성의 한계 안에서의 종교. [Korean] Translated by Chong-hyŏn Paek. Kyŏnggido, P'aju-si: Ak'anet, 2015. [522 p.] [WC]

Zum ewigen Frieden (1795)

 ——. Eien Heiwa no tame ni. [Japanese] Translated by Osamu Ikeuchi. Tokyo: Shueisha, 2015. [114 p.] [WC]

 ——. On Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch. [English] Edited by Brian Orend, translated by Ian C. Johnston. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 2015. [133 p.] [M] [contents]

 ——. 영원한 평화를 위해. [Korean] Translated by Young-Young Kang[??]. Seoul, 2015. [116 p.] [WC]

 ——. Ikuiseen Rauhaan Valtio-oikeudellinen Tutkielma. [Finnish] Translated by Jaakko Tuomikoski. Helsinki: Helsinki Into, 2015. [144 p.] [WC]

Die Metaphysik der Sitten (1797)

 ——. Dao de di xing Shang Xue. [Chinese] Translated by Minghui Li. Taipei: Lianjing, 2015. [482 p.] [WC]

 ——. Metafizyka moralności. [Polish] Translated by Marek Jan Siemek; preface and notes by Ewa Nowak. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 2015. [xxxix, 385 p.] [WC]

Der Streit der Facultäten (1798)

 ——. Le Conflit des Facultés et Autres Textes Sur la Révolution. [French] Edited and translated by Christian Ferrié. Paris: Payot, 2015. [395 p.] [WC]

Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht abgefaßt (1798)

 ——. Hvad er mennesket? Antropologi i pragmatisk perspektiv. [Danish] Edited and translated by Claus Bratt Østergaard. Copenhagen: Information, 2015. [285 p.] [WC]

Über Pädagogik (1803)

 ——. Pedagogia. [Italian] Translated, with introduction and commentary, by Nicola Abbagnano. Milan: Luni, 2015. [130 p.] [WC]

Lecture Notes

 ——. Lecciones de Antropología. Fragmentos de estética y antropología. [Spanish] Edited and translated by Manuel Sánchez Rodríguez. Granada: Editorial Comares, 2015. [272 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Translations into Spanish of the Collins, Parow, Friedländer, Menschenkunde, Pillau, Mrongovius, and Busolt student notes from Kant's anthropology lectures.

 ——. “Do Génio.” [Portuguese; on genius]. Translated and introduced by Fernando M. F. Silva. Estudos Kantianos 3.2 (2015): 211-32. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Translation of a passage on genius from the an-Starke 1 (or Menschenkunde) anthropology lectures stemming from 1781-82 (AA 25: 1055-66).

 ——. “«Do engenho e da faculdade de julgar» (Lição de Antropologia de Kant. Anthropologia Mrongovius).” [Portuguese; «On Wit and Faculty of Judgment» (Kant’s Anthropology Lecture. Anthropologie Mrongovius)] Translated and with an introduction by Fernando M. F. Silva. Con-Textos Kantianos 2 (2015): 324-46. [M] [online]

Miscellaneous

 ——. “Kant. Ensayos sobre Kästner.” [Spanish; Kant. Essays on Kästner]. Translated, and an introduction, by Diego Sanhueza Jerez. Ideas y Valores 64.159 (2015): 259-68. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Translated into Spanish of an unpublished essay by Kant (AA 20: 410-23) on a set of essays written by the German mathematician Abraham Gotthelf Kästner and published in J. A. Eberhard's Magazine; Kant then sent his text to Johann Schultz to incorporate into the latter's review of Eberhard's Magazine.

 ——. “Carta de Kant a Christian Garve (Kant: Briefwechsel, AA XII, Brief 820, An Christian Garve, seite 256-258).” [German/Portuguese; Letter from Kant to Christian Garve, 21 September 1798] Translated by Márcio Tadeu Girotti. Studia Kantiana 13.19 (2015): 177-80. [M] [online]

 ——. “A importância das Reflexões sobre o otimismo para o desenvolvimento intelectual kantiano.” [Portuguese; The significance of Reflections on optimism for Kant’s intellectual development] Translated, and an introduction, by Bruno Cunha. Studia Kantiana 13.18 (2015): 206-26. [M] [online]

Collections

[García Morente 2015] Crítica del Juicio, Contestación a la pregunta: ¿Qué es la Ilustración?; Idea para una historia Universal en clave cosmopolita; Probable inicio de la historia humana; El fin de Todas las Cosas; El Conflicto de las Facultades en tres Partes. [Spanish] Edited and translated by Manuel García Morente. Madrid: RBA, 2015. [494 p.] [WC]

[Welin 2015] Om Fysiska Förhhållanden hos Jorden och Månen. [Swedish; On the physical conditions of earth and moon] Edited and translated by Gunnar Welin. Möklinta: Gidlunds förlag, 2015. [144 p.] [WC] [contents]

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[top]A    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Abela, Paul. “Kant, Naturalism, and the Reach of Practical Reason.” The Transcendental Turn. Eds. Sebastian Gardner and Matthew Grist (op cit.). 56-73. [M]

Ackeren, Marcel, and Martin Sticker. “Kant and Moral Demandingness.” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18.1 (2015): 75-89. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: We discuss the demandingness of Kant's ethics. Whilst previous discussions of this issue focused on imperfect duties, our first aim is to show that Kantian demandingness is especially salient in the class of perfect duties. Our second aim is to introduce a fine-grained picture of demandingness by distinguishing between different possible components of a moral theory which can lead to demandingness: (i) a required process of decision making, (ii) overridingness and (iii) the stringent content of demands, due to a standpoint of moral purity. This distinction allows a specification of the sources of demandingness in Kant. The most characteristically Kantian form of demandingness springs from overridingness and purity and comes as a constant threat that an agent might find herself in a situation in which, due to no fault of her own, she is required to sacrifice everything for little to no non-moral goods. Our third aim is to discuss whether Kant has the resources to reply to those who criticize his ethics based on its demandingness. For this purpose we discuss Kant's notion of 'rationalizing' (Vernünfteln) in the context of various types of current conceptions of demandingness and calls for moderate ethical theories.

Addison, Daniel. The Critique’s Contradiction as the Key to Post-Kantianism: Longuenesse and the Collapse of Kant’s Distinction between Sensibility and the Understanding. Aurora, Colorado: Noesis Press, 2015. [xii, 205 p.] [M]

Adkins, Brent. “What is a Literature of War? Kleist, Kant and Nomadology.” At the Edges of Thought: Deleuze and Post-Kantian Philosophy. Eds. Craig Lundy and Daniela Voss (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015). 85-102. [WC/JSTOR]

Afeissa, Hicham-Stéphane. L’habitant du monde: éléments d'une philosophie de l’environnement à partir de Kant et de Husserl. Paris: PUF, 2015. [501 p.] [WC]

Agazzi, Elena. Rev. of Die Bestimmung des Menschen (1748-1800). Eine Begriffsgeschichte, by Laura Anna Macor (2013). [Italian] Con-Textos Kantianos 1 (2015): 303-8. [M] [online]

 ——. Rev. of Die Bestimmung Des Menschen (1748-1800). Eine Begriffsgeschichte., by Laura Anna Macor (2013). [Italian] Kant e-Prints 10.1 (2015): 113-18. [M] [online][Appears to be identical to the previous entry]

Agostini, Igor. “Assiomi surrettizi e chimere nella dissertazione De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis (1770).” [Italian] Estudos Kantianos 3.2 (2015): 51-72. [M] [online]

Alam, Justin. “Kantian Radical Evil and Sartrean Bad Faith.” Comparing Kant and Sartre. Ed. Sorin Baiasu (op cit.). 158-75. [PW]

Alberg, Jeremiah. “Metaphysics as Kant’s Coquette: Rousseau’s Influence on Dreams of a Spirit-Seer.” Kantian Review 20.3 (2015): 347-71. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant’s notes known as Remarks in the ‘Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime’ reveal a deep concern with the way in which the human drives to equality and unity lead inevitably to a drive for honour and its attendant delusions. He developed his thinking about these problems in the context of his reading of Rousseau. In his published Dreams of a Spirit-Seer, Kant tries to overcome the influence of the drive for honour by appealing to a metaphysics that is critical of itself. The problem is how to distinguish what is grounded in reason when that reason is so easily influenced by others.

 ——. “What Dreams May Come: Kant’s Träume eines Geistersehers Elucidated by the Dreams of a Coquette.” Kant-Studien 106.2 (2015): 169-200. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant’s Dreams of a Spirit-Seer Elucidated by the Dreams of Metaphysics (1766) drew a mixed reaction from Kant’s contemporaries, many of whom were confused by its tone. More recent commentators still find it difficult to identify Kant’s precise position on a number of important issues. This article uses Remarks in the “Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime” as the key to understanding Dreams. Kant was “set right” by Rousseau, and this setting right involved Kant’s entering into a dynamic of attraction and repulsion with Rousseau’s insights – a dynamic that results in one’s finding one’s place. This dynamic of attraction and repulsion is best understood in terms of R. Girard’s mimetic theory.

Allais, Lucy. Manifest Reality: Kant’s Idealism and His Realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. [viii, 329 p.] [WC] [review]

 ——. “What Properly Belongs to Me.” Journal of Moral Philosophy 12.6 (2015): 754-71. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant has a number of harsh-sounding things to say about beggars and giving to beggars. He describes begging as “closely akin to robbery” (6:326), and says that it exhibits self-contempt. In this paper I argue that on a particular interpretation of his political philosophy his critique of giving to beggars can be seen as part of a concern with social justice, and that his analysis makes sense of some troubling aspects of the phenomenology of being confronted with beggars. On Kant's view, without absolute poverty relief, the poor persons' external freedom is subject to the arbitrary choices of those who have means. But the legitimacy of the state is based on ensuring that no one's basic freedom is subject to the arbitrary choices of another. This means that in a legitimate state public structures must ensure that there is unconditional poverty relief. Having your basic needs met through private charity wrongs you. Kant's analysis is that when you encounter someone in a public space who asks you for money to meet their basic survival needs, you are being asked to solve a public problem in a private interaction, and there is no rightful way for you to do this.

Allison, Henry E. Kant’s Transcendental Deduction: An Analytical-Historical Commentary. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. [xv, 477 p.] [WC]

 ——. “From Transcendental Realism to Transcendental Idealism: The Nature and Significance of Kant’s ‘Transcendental Turn’.” The Transcendental Turn. Eds. Sebastian Gardner and Matthew Grist (op cit.). 20-34. [M]

Alloa, Emmanuel. “The Most Sublime of All Laws: The Strange Resurgence of a Kantian Motif in Contemporary Image Politics.” Critical Inquiry 41.2 (2015): 367-89. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In recent years, the claim of the unrepresentability of the 'Shoah' has stirred vivid debates, especially following the strong positions taken by the French filmmaker Claude Lanzmann and author of Shoah (1986). This claim of unrepresentability, it can be shown, draws part of its attraction from the fact that it oscillates undecidedly between a claim of logical impossibility ("the Shoah can't be represented") and a normative demand ("the Shoah shouldn't be represented"). This essay analyzes the argumentative structure of the advocates of the unrepresentability and shows why the often made connection to Kant is flawed. Although his Critique of the Power of Judgment affirms indeed that the prohibition of representation is the "perhaps most sublime passage in the Jewish Law", turning the prohibition of representation into a supposedly Kantian claim does not hold grounds. The essay reconstructs the political framework of the debate, situates the Kantian passage in its precise philosophical context and then successively assesses the main arguments put forward by Jean-Luc Nancy, Jacques Rancière and Georges Didi-Huberman in their critique of Lanzmann's categorical imperative. While showing why the rhetorics of the "unrepresentable" bear troubling structural analogies to what they want to fight (i.e., the politics of erasure, which always also include the erasure of the traces of erasure), a certain notion of the "unrepresentable" is rescued nevertheless at the end of the essay. Representation, so it is argued by returning to a Kantian distinction, is not a matter of Kanon, but a matter of Organon, which then puts the debate about the sublime (which took place between Lyotard and Rancière in the 90's) into a new perspective.

Almeida, Guido Antônio de. “Kant and the Cognitive Function of Imagination.” Kant and the Metaphors of Reason. Ed. Patricia Kauark-Leite, et al. (op cit.). 11-26. [M]

Almeida Assumpção, Gabriel. “Crítica do juízo teleológico e organismo em Kant e Schelling.” [Portuguese; Critique of teleological judgment and organism according to Kant and Schelling] DoisPontos 12.2 (2015): 123-35. [ASP]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The Critique of Judgment (1790) was enthusiastically received by the German Idealists. In the case of Friedrich Schelling, both divisions of the work were influent, thus resulting that not only Kantian aesthetics, but also the teleology was a landmark in his philosophical itinerary. We attempt to observe how the philosopher of Leonberg receives, in the Introduction to the Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature (1797), the Kantian conception of organism as endowed with self-causality, but at the same time thinks it within the frame of a post-Kantian philosophy, leaving aside the reflective judgment and also the idea of nature as a product of art (Natur als Kunst) in order to think the organism. How does Schelling connect this notion with the proposal to think the unity between nature and spirit based on the own subject, and not on something external to it? How would Kant react to such a proposal?

Altman, Matthew C. Rev. of The Teleology of Reason: A Study of the Structure of Kant’s Critical Philosophy, by Courtney D. Fugate (2014). Journal of the History of Philosophy 53.4 (2015): 788-89. [M]

Altmann, Sílvia. “Note on the Matter and Concept of Concepts.” Kant’’s Lectures/Kants Vorlesungen. Eds. Bernd Dörflinger, et al. (op cit.). 61-71. [M]

 ——. “Liberté et moralité dans les Fondements et la Critique de la raison pratique.” Kant, la raison pratique: concepts et héritages. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Margit Ruffing, and Ricardo Ribeiro Terra (op cit.). 73-81. [M]

Álvarez Ramírez, William. “Las formas de la imaginación en Kant.” [Spanish; Forms of the imagination in Kant] Praxis Filosófica 40 (2015): 35-62. [PW] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article introduces the concept of imagination in Kant according to their function in the system of cognitive faculties and mind. Imagination acts schematization a priori categories of understanding. In its connection with sensible intuition produces the forms of representation: the scheme and the image as units of subjective formal expression. Imagination, in its spontaneity, is the foundation of a triple synthesis. Spontaneity is the basis of the link as synthetic unity of perception, and allows the synthesis of apprehension sensitivity is, necessarily, according to the synthesis of apperception is intellectual. Thus the imagination acts as the common root between sensitivity and understanding.

Alves Fernandes, Darley. “Agindo por ‘razões’.” [Portuguese; Acting on “reasons”] Studia Kantiana 13.18 (2015): 5-18. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this article explore an idea presented shortly in the Transcendental Dialectic, namely, that of “determinant reason”, applying it in the context of the theory of action. Such conception is presented in contrast to the conception of “determinant cause”, which is a cause in the causal sense that it explains an action but does not justify it, while “reasons for action” does justify an action and the way of proceeding of the agent. The aim is to understand the meaning of this conception and the role it plays in an action. To achieve this aim we approach the practical-deliberative structure of actions so as to indentify what are “reasons for action” and their normative and motivational properties.

Ambrożewicz, Zbigniew. “Filozoficzne korzenie jednostki i osoby. Personalizm i indywidualizm wobec kantyzmu.” [Polish; The Philosophical Roots of Individuals and Persons. Personalism and Individualism against the Background of Kant] Diametros 46 (2015): 1-29. [PW] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the paper I argue that Kant’s philosophy underlies both contemporary individualism and personalism. The Kantian categorical imperative may be, in my opinion, interpreted in an anti-egotistical way and in an entirely individualistic one. The first kind of interpretation not only made a contribution to the emergence of numerous and manifold kinds of personalism, but it also inspired many critics of individualism. The second kind of interpretation, together with the Kantian analyses of human self, became essential to the conceptualization of modern individualism. I argue that Kantian tradition in many respects appears to be close to Thomism as far as the conception of person and human individual is concerned. As the dispute between American Thomists, discussed in the paper, reveals, Thomistic personalists found, in Kant’s philosophy (broadly conceived) issues which filled some gaps in the scholastic heritage, especially in anthropology, ethics, and social problems.

Ameriks, Karl. “On Reconciling the Transcendental Turn with Kant's Idealism.” The Transcendental Turn. Eds. Sebastian Gardner and Matthew Grist (op cit.). 35-55. [M]

 ——. “Kantian Metaphysics: A Personal History of its Recent Return” Das neue Bedürfnis nach Metaphysik / The New Desire for Metaphysics. Ed. Markus Gabriel (op cit.). 79-86. [WC]

Andaluz Romanillos, Ana María. “Armonía en la dualidad frente a monismo naturalista: Kant y Habermas.” [Spanish; Harmony in Duality versus Naturalist Monism: Kant and Habermas] Con-Textos Kantianos 2 (2015): 128-50. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper tries to articulate the Critique of Judgement within the contemporary debate on the issues of determinism and freedom. From this perspective, it sustains, against Habermas’s ideas, that the duality between the two worlds did not prevent Kant to lay the foundations of a coherent vision of the world which included man as a natural being. The paper is structured in two parts. The first is dedicated to the study of Habermas’s proposal of combining an epistemological dualism with a non-scientific naturalist monism (weak naturalism), as a suitable channel for a coherent picture of the world. The second part is dedicated to Kant. It emphasises that the Critique of Judgement, through a perception of nature and the place of man in it, ensued as a biological organism, achieves, from a thoughtful judgement, an image of man as a natural being in harmony with freedom. We, therefore, may characterize Kant’s proposal as a harmony in duality.

Anderson, R. Lanier. The Poverty of Conceptual Truth: Kant’s Analytic/Synthetic Distinction and the Limits of Metaphysics. Oxford/New York City: Oxford University Press, 2015. [xviii, 408 p.] [WC][review]

Anderson, Travis T. “Artistic Freedom in Kant and Hegel: Prolegomena to a Critique of Artistic Judgment.” Philosophy in the Contemporary World 22.1 (2015): 69-79. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Current controversies manifest an inherent tension between artistic freedom and moral constraint—a tension exacerbated by our reluctance or inability to define modem art. This paper maintains that Kant and Hegel are two of the pivotal figures with which any reflections on the ground, nature, and limits of artistic freedom must begin. Both phdosophers, for example, explicitly argue that artist and audience alike require a certain kind and a certain degree of freedom in order to carry out their respective projects, be they creative, cognitive, or aesthetic. While Kant's interest in art is limited mostly to its aesthetic affects, i.e., the faculty-driven feelings associated with beauty and the sublime, Hegel rejects feelings of any kind as constituting a proper subject-matter for philosophy, and so reaffirms the classical conception of art as essentially an expression of truth. Despite these fundamental differences, the two phdosophers' respective explanations of art and artistic autonomy must both be considered if we are to understand properly modem and post-historical forms of art, which for all their novelty and differences (both real and apparent) draw heavily on both the Kantian and Hegelian traditions for theh justification. So, while Kant and Hegel may not supply us with direct or decisive ways to think through contemporary issues involving artistic freedom or questions concerning the moral legitimacy of art, they can help us map out the historical landscape of philosophical thought on art and artistic autonomy and thereby provide us with the prolegomena to such an effort

Andrzejewski, Bolesław. “Die kopernikanische Wende und ihre Einwirkung auf die Sprachphilosophie.” Immanuel Kant und die kopernikanische Wende in der Philosophie. Ed. Tomasz Kupś (op cit.). 123-32??. [WC]

Ang, Jennifer Mei Sze. “Kant and the Responsibility to Protect .” International Journal of Applied Philosophy vol (2015): 37-51. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Since the World Summit endorsed the Responsibility to Protect document (R2P) in 2005, a growing number of governments have begun to shape their foreign policies with R2P in mind. This paper seeks to clarify the basis, the nature, and the extent of our duty-to-others in the situations specified by R2P by bringing together current concerns and discussions surrounding the conceptualization of R2P as an imperfect duty. I begin by demonstrating that our imperfect duties to others are not optional, that Kantian imperfect duty is relevant to the discussion on R2P if read correctly, and that R2P must not be converted to perfect duties for meritorious deeds and what it mean to be a virtuous person to remain meaningful. Next, I discuss the scope of our duty-to-others, primarily regarding the limitations that we ought to observe when framing specific R2P operational duties. I argue that Kantian ethics must guide political and military responses to human catastrophes in order to ensure humanitarian ends are achieved.

Anthony, Zoe. Rev. of Kant and the Meaning of Religion, by Terry F. Godlove (2014). Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review, 54.4 (2015): 795-97. [PW]

Aquila, Richard E. “The Transcendental Idealisms of Kant and Sartre.” Comparing Kant and Sartre. Ed. Sorin Baiasu (op cit.). 217-62. [PW]

 ——. Rev. of Kant’s Anatomy of the Intelligent Mind, by Wayne Waxman (2014). Philosophical Review 124.4 (2015): 583-89. [PW]

Aramayo, Roberto R. “Le souverain Bien à la lumière de ‘l’impératif de l’espoir’ chez Kant: dialogue avec Spinoza et Rousseau.” Kant, la raison pratique: concepts et héritages. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Margit Ruffing, and Ricardo Ribeiro Terra (op cit.). 365-73. [M]

Araujo Figueiredo de, Virginia. “Imaginari Aude ou dos Limites da Metáfora Jurídica em Questões de Gosto.” [Portuguese] Kant and the Metaphors of Reason. Ed. Patricia Kauark-Leite, et al. (op cit.). 377-95. [M]

Araujo, Saulo de Freitas, and Diego Azvedo Leite. “Psicologia empírica e antropologia no pensamento crítico de kant: a década de 1780.” [Portuguese; Empirical Psychology and Anthropology in Kant’s Critical Thought: The decade of 1780] Estudos Kantianos 3.2 (2015): 141-61. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Although the relationship between empirical psychology and pragmatic anthropology is widely recognized in the specialized literature, there is no consensus over the precise nature of this relationship. The present work aims to investigate this topic in Kant’s critical period during the 1780s, in order to contribute to a further clarification of this point. More specifically, we seek to understand Kant’s statement in the Critique of Pure Reason (1781) regarding the inclusion of empirical psychology in a detailed anthropology. Our analysis suggests that in the 1780s the link between empirical psychology and the theoretical point of view of man’s knowledge is maintained. This explains Kant’s statement. It means that empirical psychology should be considered scholastic (theoretical) anthropology and should be further developed to constitute an autonomous research field. In addition, we show that there is also a strong link between theoretical knowledge of empirical psychology and anthropology considered from the pragmatic point of view.

 ——, ed. See: Kauark-Leite, Patricia, Giorgia Cecchinato, Virginia de Araujo Figueiredo, Margit Ruffing, and Alice Serra, eds.

Arias-Albisu, Martín. “Las prescripciones metodológicas de la función regulativa de la razón téorica en la "Crítica de la razón pura" de Kant.” [Spanish; The Methodological Prescriptions of the Regulative Function of Theoretical Reason in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.] Kant e-Prints 10.1 (2015): 64-93. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The aim of this article is to offer a unified study of the three dimensions that I consider the most important of the methodology of empirical knowledge (ordinary and scientific) presented by Kant in the “Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic” of his Critique of Pure Reason and in other passages from this work and from the Jäsche Logic. My examination gives the same importance to each one of these dimensions and aims to reconstruct the relationships between them in order to show that they can be integrated in a single and consistent theory. These three dimensions are: (1) the requirement to introduce theoretical concepts and objects; (2) the necessity to use criteria for the formation, admission and evaluation of hypotheses of empirical laws in general and the theoretical and empirical concepts these laws refer to; (3) the demand of systematicity for the knowledge of the understanding. The connection between (1) and (2) lies in the fact that theoretical concepts and objects demanded by (1) need to be assessed according to the criteria required by (2). As regards (3), the demand for systematicity can also be understood as one of the criteria required by (2), though it is more complex than the others and presupposes them.

Arndt, Martin. Rev. of Nichtideale Normativität. Ein neuer Blick auf Kants politische Philosophie, by Christoph Horn (2014). Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte 67.3-4 (2015): 328-30. [PW]

Arroyo Garcia, Francisco Manuel, and Marcos Jaén Sánchez. Kant ¿qué podemos saber y qué debemos hacer? En busca de los límites del conocimiento y de la moral. [Spanish] Barcelona: RBA, 2015. [157 p.] [WC]

Audi, Robert. Means, Ends, and Persons: The Meaning and Psychological Dimensions of Kant’s Humanity Formula. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. [xvi, 171 p.] [WC]

Aufderheide, Joachim, and Ralf M. Bader, eds. The Highest Good in Aristotle and Kant. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. [ix, 245 p.] [WC] [review]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: See especially the following...
Robert B. Louden (‘The end of all human action’/‘The final object of all my conduct’: Aristotle and Kant on the Highest Good),
Stephen Engstrom (The Complete Object of Practical Knowledge),
Rachel Barney (The Inner Voice: Kant on Conditionality and God as Cause),
Ralf M. Bader (Kant’s Theory of the Highest Good),
David Sussman (The Highest Good: Who Needs It?),
Jens Timmermann (Why Some Things Must Remain Unknown: Kant on Faith, Moral Motivation, and the Highest Good).

Auweele, Dennis vanden. “Kant on Religious Moral Education.” Kantian Review 20.3 (2015): 373-94. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: While scholars are slowly coming to realize that Kant’s moral philosophy has a distinctive theory of moral education, the import of religion in such education is generally neglected or even denied. This essay argues that Kant’s reflections on religion in parts II and III of Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason interpret religion specifically as one aspect of moral education, namely moral ascetics. After first clearly distinguishing between a cognitive and a conative aspect of moral education, I show how certain historical religious practices serve to provide the conative aspect of moral education. Kant defines this aspect of moral education as practices that render the human agent ‘valiant and cheerful in fulfilling his duties’ (MS, 6: 484). By this it is meant that certain practices can inspire moral interests either by justifying rational hope in living up to a certain standard of moral perfection (Christology) or by endeavouring to unite human beings in a universal, invisible ethical community that inspires cooperation rather than adversity (ecclesiology).

Ayas Onol, Tugba. “Reflections on Kant’s View of the Imagination.” Ideas y Valores 64.157 (2015): 53-69. [PW] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The paper elaborates the theory of imagination in Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and Critique of Judgment. From the first Critique to the third Critique, the imagination emerges under different titles such as reproductive, productive or transcendental imagination. The paper shall try to decide whether its functions suggested in the first Critique and its performance in the third Critique are contradictory or developmental with respect to Kant’s critical philosophy. Thus, it will examine of the power and the scope of the imagination in the first Critique and of its status and performance in the third Critique.

Azevedo, Marco Antonio. “The Place of the Patient’s Autonomy in the Kingdom of Ends.” Morality and Life: Kantian Perspectives in Bioethics. Eds. Darlei Dall’Agnol and Milene Consenso Tonetto (op cit.). 67-94. [M]

 ——, ed. See: Dörflinger, Bernd, Claudio La Rocca, Robert Louden, and Ubirajara Rancan de Azevedo Marques, eds.

[top] B    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Baas, Bernard. “Ulysse en Baltique.” Filozofski vestnik (Ljubljana) 36.2 (2015): 11-32. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Is Ulysses, tied to the mast of his boat and resisting the song of the Sirens, an allegorical figure of the Kantian subject required by the moral imperative if he is to resist the temptations of sensitivity? Kant himself suggested the analogy. But we can also see in this Homerian episode “the paradigmatic narrative of a defence against the excessive jouissance”. The question to be asked then is that of knowing what is the subject of this jouissance, and what jouissance precisely. The confrontation with the Flying Dutchman, the hero of the Wagnerian drama, can open up the possibility to answer this question, which is, as shown by Alenka Zupancic, also the Kantian question.

Bachour, Omar. Rev. of Kant’s Lectures on Anthropology: A Critical Guide, ed. by Alix Cohen (2014). Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review (online 11 Dec 2015). [PI]

Bacin, Stefano. “Kant’s Idea of Human Dignity: Between Tradition and Originality.” Kant-Studien 106.1 (2015): 97-106. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper focuses on the relationship between Kant and the traditional view of dignity. I argue that some amendments to Sensen’s description of the traditional paradigm enable us to see more clearly both where Kant adheres to the latter and where his view is original. First, a consideration of Pufendorf’s use of dignity suggests (1) that, contrary to Sensen’s reconstruction, the traditional paradigm does not entail a connection between dignity and duties to oneself, and (2) that Pufendorf’s understanding of dignity as a kind of esteem, as opposed to price, provides a crucial mediation between the traditional view and Kant’s view. Finally, I argue that the traditional understanding of dignity also includes a subordinate justificatory element that helps to explain Kant’s use of dignity in the Doctrine of Virtue.

 ——. “On Kristi Sweet’s Kant on Practical Life: From Duty to History.” Critique (blog posted: date) n.p. [PW] [online]

 ——. “Kant’s Lectures on Ethics and Baumgarten’s Moral Philosophy.” Kant’s Lectures on Ethics: A Critical Guide. Eds. Denis, Lara, and Oliver Sensen. (op cit.). 15-33. [M]

 ——, ed. See: Willaschek, Marcus, Jürgen Stolzenberg, Georg Mohr, and Stefano Bacin, eds.

Baciu, Claudiu. “Ființă și funcție la Immanuel Kant și Constantin Noica.” [Romanian; Immanuel Kant and Constantin Noica on Being and Function] Studii de istoria filosofiei universale 23 (2015): 237-49. [RC]

 ——. “Lˊêtre et fonction dans la philosophie dˊImmanuel Kant et de Constantin Noica.” [French; Being and Function in the Philosophy of Immanuel Kant and Constantin Noica] Revue Roumaine de Philosophie 59.1 (2015): 85-98. [RC/PW]

Bader, Ralf M. “Kant’s Theory of the Highest Good.” The Highest Good in Aristotle and Kant. Eds. Joachim Aufderheide and Ralf M. Bader (op cit.). 183-213. [M]

 ——, ed. See: Aufderheide, Joachim, and Ralf M. Bader, eds.

Bagnoli, Carla. “Moral Objectivity: A Kantian Illusion?” The Journal of Value Inquiry 49.1-2 (2015): 31-45. [PW]

Baiasu, Sorin. “(Transcendental Unity of Aperception and Non-reflective Consciousness of Self.” Comparing Kant and Sartre. Ed. Sorin Baiasu (op cit.). 21-44. [PW]

 ——, ed. Comparing Kant and Sartre. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. [ix, 262 p.] [PW] [review]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents: (essays listed separately)
Jonathan Head, Anna Tomaszewska, Jochen Bojanowski, Alberto Vanzo, and Sorin Baiasu (Kant and Sartre: Existentialism and Critical Philosophy),
Sorin Baiasu (Transcendental Unity of Aperception and Non-reflective Consciousness of Self),
Daniel Herbert (Kant and Sartre on Temporality),
Thomas R. Flynn (Kant and Sartre: The Quiet Power of the Imaginary),
Christian Onof (Drawing on Sartre’s Ontology to Interpret Kant's Notion of Freedom),
Leslie Stevenson (Self-Knowledge in Kant and Sartre),
Peter Poellner (Action, Value, and Autonomy: A Quasi-Sartrean View),
Justin Alam (Kantian Radical Evil and Sartrean Bad Faith),
Michelle Darnell (The Pursuit of Happiness),
Katherine Morris (Sartre’s Method: Philosophical Therapy or Transcendental Philosopher?),
Richard Aquila (The Transcendental Idealisms of Kant and Sartre).

 ——. See: Head, Jonathan, Anna Tomaszewska, Jochen Bojanowski, Alberto Vanzo, and Sorin Baiasu.

Banham, Gary, Dennis Schulting, and Nigel Hems, eds. The Bloomsbury Companion to Kant. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015. [xviii, 432 p.] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This is an expanded second edition, having originally been published as The Continuum Companion to Kant (2012).

Barbosa, Ricardo. “O problema do universalismo estético em Kant e Bourdieu.” [Portuguese; The problem of aesthetic universalism in Kant and Bourdieu] Studia Kantiana 13.18 (2015): 134-47. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article presents Kant’s defense of the universal validity of aesthetic judgements, Bourdieu’s critique of “pure taste” and the aporia of his position towards the transcendental difference between sociological and philosophical analysis.

Barney, Rachel. “The Inner Voice: Kant on Conditionality and God as Cause.” The Highest Good in Aristotle and Kant. Eds. Joachim Aufderheide and Ralf M. Bader (op cit.). 158-82. [M]

Baron, Marcia. “The Supererogatory and Kant’s Imperfect Duties.” Reason, Value, and Respect. Eds. Mark Timmons and Robert N. Johnson (op cit.). 215-31. [M]

Barry, Peter Brian. “The Kantian Case Against Torture.” Philosophy 90.4 (2015): 593-621. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: There is a decided consensus that Kantian ethics yields an absolutist case against torture – that torture is morally wrong and absolutely so. I argue that while there is a Kantian case against torture, Kantian ethics does not clearly entail absolutism about torture. I consider several arguments for a Kantian absolutist position concerning torture and explain why none are sound. I close by clarifying just what the Kantian case against torture is. My contention is that while Kantian ethics does not support a variety of moral absolutism about torture, it does suggest a strong version of legal absolutism.

Basile, Giovanni Pietro. “‘Argument ontologique révisé’ et unité de la raison dans le dernier Kant. La raison pratique dans l’Opus postumum d’après François Marty.” Kant, la raison pratique: concepts et héritages. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Margit Ruffing, and Ricardo Ribeiro Terra (op cit.). 123-34. [M]

Basso, Elisabetta. “A Response to the Paper of Maurizio Ferraris” Das neue Bedürfnis nach Metaphysik / The New Desire for Metaphysics. Ed. Markus Gabriel (op cit.). 133-35. [WC]

Basterra, Gabriela. The Subject of Freedom: Kant, Levinas. New York: Fordham University Press, 2015. [197 p.] [WC][review]

 ——. “Unconditioned Subjectivity: Immanent Synthesis in Kant’s Third Antinomy.” Journal of Speculative Philosophy 29.3 (2015): 314-23. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant's third antinomy introduces freedom as the unconditioned cause that allows reason to form a synthesis of causal linkage. What different thinking conditions, I ask, does this antinomy open up for reason even to entertain any possibility of success? Reason's ability to form a synthesis depends on acknowledging the role in Kant's argument of a subject that does not need to be envisioned as a standpoint — whether intelligible or empirical, as Kant's explicit solution has it — but, rather, as the site of a relationship between the series and its outside. We may call it "unconditioned subjectivity," clarifying from the outset that subjectivity in this sense names a structural position that plays an exceptional role in the series: it is the element that exceptionally introduces a boundary, a fleeting moment of closure. Unconditioned subjectivity would name the relationship and boundary that anchor the phenomenal series time and again. I argue, moreover, that the synthesis of causality forming here coheres as a dynamic system that is not stable or self-contained but, rather, contingent and "in progress." Perhaps unexpectedly, the potential of this antinomy to form this dynamic system hinges on the fact that its antithesis denies freedom.

Baum, Manfred. “Kants ‘Möglichkeit der Erfahrung’.” Urteil und Erfahrung: Kants Theorie der Erfahrung. Ed. Rainer Enskat (op cit.). 151-67. [M]

 ——. “Praktische Erkenntnis a priori in Kants Kritik der praktischen Vernunft.” Crítica y metafísica: Homenaje a Mario Caimi. Ed. Claudia Jáuregui, et al. (op cit.). 11-26. [M]

Baxley, Anne Margaret. “Virtue, Self-Mastery, and the Autocracy of Practical Reason.” Kant’s Lectures on Ethics: A Critical Guide. Eds. Denis, Lara, and Oliver Sensen. (op cit.). 223-38. [M]

 ——. Rev. of Self-Improvement: An Essay in Kantian Ethics, by Robert N. Johnson (2011). Kantian Review 20.1 (2015): 133-37. [PI]

Beade, Ileana P. “On Kant’s Characterization of the Academic Conflict between the Faculties as a Political Dispute: Metaphorical or Literal Sense?” Kant and the Metaphors of Reason. Ed. Patricia Kauark-Leite, et al. (op cit.). 331-45. [M]

 ——. Rev. of The Teleology of Reason. A Study of the Structure of Kant’s Critical Philosophy, by Courtney Fugate (2014). [Spanish] Con-Textos Kantianos 2 (2015): 360-64. [M] [online]

Beck, Gunnar, and Tao Huang. Fei xi te he Kang de lun zi you, Quan li he fa lü. Translation of Fichte and Kant on Freedom, Rights, and Law (2008) into Chinese by Tao Huang. Beijing: Shang wu yin Shu guan, 2015. [279 p.] [WC]

Beckenkamp, Joãosinho. “Kant und Gerard über Einbildungskraft.” Kant’’s Lectures/Kants Vorlesungen. Eds. Bernd Dörflinger, et al. (op cit.). 133-142. [M]

 ——. “A Razão Critica e suas Metãforas.” [Portuguese] Kant and the Metaphors of Reason. Ed. Patricia Kauark-Leite, et al. (op cit.). 107-19. [M]

Belás, Ľubomír. “Kant und das Problem der Revolution. Ein Versuch der Annäherung an historische Wahrheit.” Immanuel Kant und die kopernikanische Wende in der Philosophie. Ed. Tomasz Kupś (op cit.). 101-16??. [WC]

 ——. “Kantova praktická filozofia v kontexte súcasnosti.” [Slovak; Kant's practical philosophy in the present context] Studia Philosophica Kantiana 2 (2015): 3-15. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Der vorliegende Beitrag befasst sich in der Einführung mit der Definition der grundlegenden Bestimmungen der praktischen Philosophie Kants. Die orientiert sich auf diejenigen philosophischen Stellungsnahmen, die zur Beurteilung der vielfältigen Formen der menschlichen Tätigkeit führen. Sie stammen aus den möglichst mannigfaltigen Motiven, Absichten oder Zwecken, die, wie es Kant beweist (Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft usw.), oftmals zum unmoralischen, aber auch gesetzlosen Handeln führen, wobei die Freiheit und Menschenwürde sowohl der Einzelperson als auch vieler Sozialschichten und -gruppen angegriffen werden. Daran knüpft das Bemühen des Autors um die mögliche Beurteilung des Krisenzustandes der gegenwärtigen Gesellschaft durchgeführt durch das normative Potenzial seiner praktischen Philosophie.

Benson, Bruce Ellis. “Escaping the Blackmail of the Enlightenment: Kant, Foucault, and Gadamer on the Meaning of Maturity.” Common Ground Journal 12.2 (2015): 77-88. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: What exactly might it mean to be 'mature'? At least for Kant, maturity (which is to say 'enlightenment') comes about when one is able to think for oneself. Contrary to Kant, and even contrary to Michael Foucault, who writes a nearly equally famous response to Kant's essay, maturity is something that goes beyond the stage which Kant labels 'enlightenment'. In the end, the problem with both Kant and Foucault is not that they are too critical. Rather they are not critical enough.

Berger, Larissa. “Der »Zirkel« im dritten Abschnitt der Grundlegung — Eine neue Interpretation und ein Literaturbericht.” Kants Begründung von Freiheit und Moral in Grundlegung III: neue Interpretationen. Ed. Dieter Schönecker (op cit.). 9-81. [M]

Bernardini, Sandro. Lezioni di sociologia: Vico e Kant. Rome: Armando, 2015. [156 p.] [WC]

Beyleveld, Deryck. “Korsgaard v. Gewirth on Universalization: Why Gewirthians are Kantians and Kantians Ought to be Gewirthians.” Journal of Moral Philosophy 12.5 (2015): 573-97. [ASP]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Christine Korsgaard claims that Gewirth's argument for morality fails to demonstrate that there is a categorically binding principle on action because it operates with the assumption that reasons for action are essentially private. This attribution is unfounded and Korsgaard's own argument for moral obligation, in its appeal to Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument to establish that reasons for action are essentially public, is misdirected and unnecessary. Gewirth's attempt to demonstrate a strictly a priori connection between a moral principle and the concept of being an agent as such is essentially Kantian, and recognizing that the Principle of Hypothetical Imperatives is categorically binding requires Kantians to accept that Gewirth's Principle of Generic Consistency is the supreme practical principle.

 ——, and Paul Ziche. “Towards a Kantian Phenomenology of Hope.” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18.5 (2015): 927-42. [ASP]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The aim of this paper is to examine the extent to which Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment (CPoJ) can be, or otherwise ought to be, regarded as a transcendental phenomenology of hope. Kant states repeatedly that CPoJ mediates between the first two Critiques, or between the theoretical knowledge we arrive at on the basis of understanding and reason’s foundational role for practical philosophy. In other words, exercising the power of judgment is implicated whenever we try to bring together the ethical issue of strictly determining our actions on the one hand and the necessity to act in the physical world on the other. We will argue that this mediating function is properly understood only if the ideations produced by self-understanding are characterized as objects of rationally required hope or fear.

Biasetti, Pierfrancesco. “From Beauty to Love: A Kantian Way to Environmental Moral Theory?” Environmental Philosophy 12.2 (2015): 139-60. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper, I set myself what many people would consider an unfeasible task: finding a Kantian way to an environmental moral theory. The paper is divided in four parts. In the first part I show why looking at Kant’s moral theory in order to build an environmental theory is like trying to get blood out of a stone. I then show how it should be, instead, possible to build an environmental theory by bridging Kant’s account of aesthetic value with love of nature. In the last two parts of the paper I deal with some possible criticisms and sketch the contours of the environmental stance born from Kant’s aesthetic treatment of nature

Bickmann, Claudia. “Kants Metaphysik der ‘Einen Erfahrung’. Analyse der formalen und der materialen Bedingungen ihrer Möglichkeit.” Urteil und Erfahrung: Kants Theorie der Erfahrung. Ed. Rainer Enskat (op cit.). 273-96. [M]

Binkelmann, Christoph, and Nele Schneidereit, eds. Denken fürs Volk? Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2015. [xix, 232 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents:
Christoph Binkelmann and Nele Schneidereit (Einleitung),
Rainer Godel (Zur Funktion der Öffentlichkeit in Christian Thomasius' 'Monatsgesprächen' und 'Händeln'),
Christoph Böhr (Die Philosophie und ihr Publikum: Johann Jakob Engel über Aufklärung im Anspruch der Welt),
Gideon Stiening (Von Despoten und Kriegern: Literarische Reflexion auf den sensus communis politicus bei Christoph Martin Wieland und Johann Karl Wezel),
Nele Schneidereit (Wahrscheinlichkeit und Evidenz: zur Bedeutung von Alltagswissen für die Metaphysik Moses Mendelssohns),
Cristiana Senigaglia (Die Projektdimension der Popularphilosophie bei Kant und Fichte),
Christoph Asmuth (Von "Seichtigkeit" und "Pedanterie". Popularität und Öffentlichkeit in der Philosophie zwischen Kant und Fichte),
Benedetta Bisol (Fichte und Platner und die Frage nach dem Sitz der Seele: Bedeutung und Probleme der öffentlichen Funktion der Philosophie),
Christoph Binkelmann (Philophronie des Gemeinsinns. Aus Obereits Denken in der Dachkammer),
Ansgar Lyssy (Kant für Jedermann. Über F.A. Bouterweks Versuch, Kants kritische Philosophie populär darzustellen),
Ezequiel L. Posesorski (Philosophy as consensus. Hülsen's reconciliation of the critical and popular approaches),
Christoph Binkelmann ("Die Zeit der Popularität ist gekommen". Gemeinsinn und Enthusiasmus in der Philosophie nach Schlegel),
Temilo van Zantwijk (Rechthaben und Rechtbekommen. Popularphilosophie in systematischer Absicht).

Bird, Graham. “Consciousness in Kant and William James.” Pragmatism, Kant, and Transcendental Philosophy. Eds. Gabriele Gava and Robert Stern (op cit.). 177-95??. [WC]

Biss, Mavis. “Kantian Moral Striving.” Kantian Review 20.1 (2015): 1-23. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper focuses on a single question that highlights some of the most puzzling aspects of Kant’s explanation of the duty of moral self-perfection. What kinds of activity count as striving for purity in one’s disposition to duty, or strength of will? I argue that a dominant strand of Kant’s approach to moral striving does not fit familiar models of striving. I seek to address this problem in a way that avoids the flaws of synchronic and atomistic approaches to moral self-discipline by developing an account of Kantian moral striving as an ongoing contemplative activity complexly engaged with multiple forms of self-knowledge.

 ——. Rev. of The Highest Good in Aristotle and Kant, edited by Joachim Aufderheide and Ralf M. Bader (2015). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (Dec 2015, #11). [M] [online]

Blomme, Henny. “Kant’s Conception of Chemistry in the Danziger Physik.” Reading Kant’s Lectures. Ed. Robert R. Clewis (op cit.). 484-501. [M]

 ——. “La notion de ‘système’ chez Wolff, Lambert et Kant.” Estudos Kantianos 3.1 (2015): 105-26. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant’s conception of a ‘system’ doesn’t correspond to that of his predecessors, nor has it much in common with the actual meaning of systematicity. We discuss the particularities of Kant’s account by showing how it differs from Wolff’s and Lambert’s and how it is closely linked with his understanding of the structure of synthetic a priori cognition. We then argue that the idea of system functions as a leading threat in the Opus postumum, by illustrating how it reappears in each of the thirteen evolving projects that constitute Kant’s last “work”. This brings us to a reconsideration of the role of the transcendental ideas. Although the latter do lack objective reality, they are not without value for objectivity. Indeed, the human quest for knowledge can only lead to objective cognitions if the latter are embedded in a system that is ultimately grounded on an idea of reason itself.

Blöser, Claudia. “Degrees of Responsibility in Kant’s Practical Philosophy.” Kantian Review 20.2 (2015): 183-209. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: It has been argued that Kant’s practical philosophy cannot allow for degrees of responsibility for one’s actions. However, it would be uncompromising to allow for only two possibilities: either full responsibility or none. Moreover, in the Metaphysics of Morals Kant himself claims that there can be degrees of responsibility, depending on the magnitude of the obstacles that have to be overcome when acting. I will show that this claim is consistent with Kant’s theory as a whole and thereby make transparent how degrees of responsibility are possible for Kant. The solution is based on the distinction between two senses of responsibility: taking oneself to be an accountable person is an all-or-nothing affair, whereas praise- or blameworthiness for a particular action can still be a matter of degree.

Bodas Fernández, Lucía. “La problematización de la relación entre Kant y Schiller. Reflexiones en torno a “Renovando el canon filosófico. Schiller antes, después y más allá de Kant”, de Laura Anna Macor.” [Spanish; The Problematization of the Relationship Between Kant and Schiller. Reflections on Laura Anna Macor’s “Renewing the Philosophical Canon. Schiller Before, After and Beyond Kant”] Con-Textos Kantianos 2 (2015): 310-23. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Within philosophical hermeneutics, it is not easy to find a work that addresses the thought of the poet, playwright and philosopher Friedrich Schiller with the respect of Laura Anna Macor’s. If her work stands out within what Valerio Rocco has called an authentic historiographic revolution, it is because is one of the few approaches to the Schillerian work that makes a deliberate effort to take its philosophical relevance seriously, independently of Schiller’s adhesion to Kant’s transcendental philosophy. Opposite to analysis as the one of Frederick Beiser, one that on the other hand deserves a great recognition for its meticulous study and defense of Schillerian philosophy, Macor dives in the young Schiller’s medical, poetical and dramatic production, finding there genuinely philosophical content, with the intent not only of stating the intimate coherence of his thought, but also his philosophical quality before, after and beyond Kant. The most interesting part of her approach is that, opposite to most of Schiller’s readers, Macor does not address the hybrid character of Schiller’s thought in a condescending way, but assuming it as a source of multidisciplinary richness that does not hierarchically organize the knowledges. A richness that, on top of that, is a clear sign of the actual relevance of Schiller’s thought.

Bohnet, Clayton. Logic and the Limits of Philosophy in Kant and Hegel. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. [vii, 270 p.] [review] [WC]

Bojanowski, Jochen. “Categories of Freedom as Categories of Practical Cognition.” Kantian Review 20.2 (2015): 211-34. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant famously claims that the table of the categories of freedom does not require explanation, ‘since it is intelligible enough of itself’ (Critique of Practical Reason 5: 67). Kant interpreters have been baffled by this claim, and the disagreement among the increasing number of studies in more recent years suggests that the table is not as straightforward as Kant took it to be. In this article I want to show that a coherent interpretation of the table depends essentially on a clarification of what have been taken to be three fundamental ambiguities in Kant’s presentation of the table. This assumption about ambiguities in Kant’s text is, I argue, rooted in a hybrid conception of practical rationality assumed by his interpreters. I believe the task of disambiguating the table in all three cases can be completed. But it will require spelling out Kant’s moral cognitivism in such a way that he emerges as holding what I will call a unitary account of practical rationality.

 ——. “Kant on Human Dignity.” Kant-Studien 106.1 (2015): 78-87. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In his book, Kant on Human Dignity, Oliver Sensen argues that the standard interpretation of Kant’s conception of human dignity as an absolute value property is mistaken. According to Sensen, the standard interpretation is based on the assumption that Kant endorses Moorean moral intutionism. This leads to the false view that we must first perceive that other human beings have value and then infer that we ought to respect them. Against this standard interpretation Sensen claims that Kant endorses moral prescriptivism. According to this view a value statement is “nothing more than a (rational) prescription that commands what we should value”. If we interpret Kant’s moral epistemology along these lines, we will come to see that dignity is in fact a relational concept.
In this paper I want to agree with Sensen that Kant was not a moral intuitionist. In thinking that objectivity in morality would require that the moral law “exists” independently of rational cognizers the moral intuitionist presupposes a conception of objectivity rather than arguing for it. The unargued presupposition is that the object has to be something other than the cognizing subject itself. However, the fact that intuitionism is not the adequate account does not imply that the standard interprtation of Kant’s conception of human dignity is mistaken. In other words, the claim ‘intuitionism is false’ and ‘human dignity is an absolute value property’ are compatible. I believe that Sensen ultimately does not sufficiently appreciate the fact that the moral law is the form of practical cognition. Prescriptivism only claims that a certain action is rational, but it does not explain why we perform it. Since the inner worth of a good action as well as the inner worth of humanity as such depends on practical cognition a priori, I do not see any reason why we should resist the claim that Kant ascribes an absolute or inner metaphysical value property both to humanity and to particular morally good actions. My paper comes in three parts. I first want to show why Kant is neither a moral intuitionist nor a prescriptivist but that his view is best described as a view I call ‘moral idealism‛. I then argue that moral constructivism does not have the voluntarist or subjectivist implications Sensen takes it to have, and that is much closer to the position he sympathizes with. Finally I show on textual grounds why Kant did in fact ascribe an absolute value to humanity and to morally good actions.

 ——. “Die Deduktion des Kategorischen Imperativs.” Kants Begründung von Freiheit und Moral in Grundlegung III: neue Interpretationen. Ed. Dieter Schönecker (op cit.). 83-108. [M]

 ——. See: Head, Jonathan, Anna Tomaszewska, Jochen Bojanowski, Alberto Vanzo, and Sorin Baiasu.

Bolduc, Carl R. Kant et Spinoza: Rencontre paradoxale. Paris: Le Félin, 2015. [140 p.] [WC]

Bonaccini, Juan A. “Kant’’s Account of Miracles in his Lectures on Metaphysics.” Kant’’s Lectures/Kants Vorlesungen. Eds. Bernd Dörflinger, et al. (op cit.). 247-260. [M]

 ——. “Ontología, epistemologia y semántica: Sobre la teoría kantiana acerca de la estructura objetual del mundo.” [Spanish] Crítica y metafísica: Homenaje a Mario Caimi. Ed. Claudia Jáuregui, et al. (op cit.). 27-46. [M]

Bonella, Alcino Eduardo. “Kantian Utilitarianism and Euthanasia.” Morality and Life: Kantian Perspectives in Bioethics. Eds. Darlei Dall’Agnol and Milene Consenso Tonetto (op cit.). 111-26. [M]

Bonnet, Christian. “Le retour à Kant de Friedrich Albert Lange.” Crítica y metafísica: Homenaje a Mario Caimi. Ed. Claudia Jáuregui, et al. (op cit.). 47-60. [M]

Books, Julie N. The Supersensible in Kant’s Critique of Judgment. New York: Peter Lang Verlag, 2015. [112 p.] [WC]

Borges, Maria. “Passions as Cancerous Sores for Pure Practical Reason.” Kant and the Metaphors of Reason. Ed. Patricia Kauark-Leite, et al. (op cit.). 243-51. [M]

Bornmüller, Falk. Rev. of Willensstruktur und Handlungsorganisation in Kants Theorie der praktischen Freiheit, by Saša Josifović (2014). Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 63.3 (2015): 617-23. [M]

Bouillon, Hardy, ed. Freiheit, Vernunft und Aufklärung: Ein Immanuel-Kant-Brevier. Zürich: Verlag Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 2015. [118 p.] [WC]

Boxill, Bernard, and Jan Boxill. “Servility and Self Respect: An African-American and Feminist Critique.” Reason, Value, and Respect. Eds. Mark Timmons and Robert N. Johnson (op cit.). 19-41. [M]

Boxill, Jan. See: Boxill, Bernard, and Jan Boxill.

Boyle, Matthew. “Die Spontaneität des Verstandes bei Kant und einigen Neokantianern.” Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 63.4 (2015): 705-26. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant famously characterizes our human understanding as a “spontaneous” faculty, but what can this mean? I criticize some recent interpretations of Kant’s claim and suggest that we can only understand what Kant means by “the spontaneity of understanding” if we recognize certain basic differences between how Kant conceived of cognition and how philosophers commonly think of it today. I go on to argue that Kant’s conception of cognition represents an appealing alternative to the unsatisfying options that contemporary ways of thinking seem to force on us.

Bozzo, Alexander. Rev. of The Cambridge Companion to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, edited by Paul Guyer (2010). Kant-Studien 106.1 (2015): 136-42. [PW]

Brandom, Robert B. From Empiricism to Expressivism. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015. [viii, 289 p.] [JSTOR]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: See especially...
Ch. 1: "Categories and Noumena: Two Kantian Axes of Sellars’s Thought" (pp. 30-98)
Ch. 4: "Modality and Normativity: From Hume and Quine to Kant and Sellars" (pp. 145-73)
Ch. 6: "Sortals, Identity, and Modality: The Metaphysical Significance of the Modal Kant-Sellars Thesis" (pp. 216-35).

Brandt, Reinhard. “Kants Revolutionen.” Kant-Studien 106.1 (2015): 3-35. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In Kantian philosophy (between 1787 and 1798), the concept of revolution is used in the context of theoretical knowledge (geometry, physics, astronomy), metaphysics (his own critique) and morals (right, ethics). A revolution leads to a fundamental change: where the subject once had to follow external determinations, he now subdues objects via his own legislation. Heteronomy becomes autonomy. Kant organizes the revolutions in an order that follows not the empirical facts of history, but the structure of philosophical reason. The two most important texts are the Preface to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason (1787) and the second chapter of the Conflict of the Faculties (1798).

 ——. Rev. of Nichtideale Normativität. Ein neuer Blick auf Kants politische Philosophie, by Christoph Horn (2014). Kant-Studien 106.4 (2015): 685-94. [PW]

Brauer, Daniel. “La Critica de Hegel a la Estética Trascendental de Kant.” Crítica y metafísica: Homenaje a Mario Caimi. Ed. Claudia Jáuregui, et al. (op cit.). 61-74. [M]

Braverman, Charles. “The Kantian Legacy in French Empiricism During the Early Nineteenth Century.” Kant Yearbook: Kant and Empiricism 6 (2015): 1-22. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Although one may hope to gain a better understanding of Kantianism through a discussion of Kantian arguments against empiricism, my paper will rather be devoted to the study of the ‘images’ of Kant which were spread in France at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Those images did not faithfully depict Kantianism but they described what French philosophers knew about Kant and they had some influence on the development of French philosophy at the time. Actually, I will show that the study of this reception of some images of Kant contributes to reveal what I call a ‘French empiricism’ but also a renewal of the attitude of some French philosophers toward experience. This French empiricism (which was in my opinion defended by the French Ideology and especially by its leaders: Destutt de Tracy and Cabanis) was characterised by a legacy from English philosophers (especially Bacon and Locke) and from Condillac’s sensualism. It was influenced by the genetic approach in order to explain all our ideas from experience, by the interpretation of experience as conscious effects of senses and also by the necessity of making and classifying experimentations. French empiricism was then especially characterised by a physiological and medical approach very interested in conscious efforts which were regarded as the beginning of the genesis of human intelligence. The French reception of Kantianism and its opposition to it reveal those characteristics of a French empiricism. However, this reception of Kantian philosophy was not only made of oppositions. Degérando, for instance, used some images of Kant and especially the idea of the activity of the subject in order to criticise what he saw as a traditional empiricism and to defend a ‘true’ ‘philosophy of experience.

Breazeale, Daniel. “The ‘Synthetic-Genetic Method’ of Transcendental Philosophy: Kantian Questions/Fichtean Answers.” The Transcendental Turn. Eds. Sebastian Gardner and Matthew Grist (op cit.). 74-95. [WC]

Breitenbach, Angela. “Beauty in Proofs: Kant on Aesthetics in Mathematics.” European Journal of Philosophy 23.4 (2015): 955-77. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: It is a common thought that mathematics can be not only true but also beautiful, and many of the greatest mathematicians have attached central importance to the aesthetic merit of their theorems, proofs and theories. But how, exactly, should we conceive of the character of beauty in mathematics? In this paper I suggest that Kant's philosophy provides the resources for a compelling answer to this question. Focusing on §62 of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment, I argue against the common view that Kant's aesthetics leaves no room for beauty in mathematics. More specifically, I show that on the Kantian account beauty in mathematics is a non‐conceptual response felt in light of our own creative activities involved in the process of mathematical reasoning. The Kantian proposal I thus develop provides a promising alternative to Platonist accounts of beauty widespread among mathematicians. While on the Platonist conception the experience of mathematical beauty consists in an intellectual insight into the fundamental structures of the universe, according to the Kantian proposal the experience of beauty in mathematics is grounded in our felt awareness of the imaginative processes that lead to mathematical knowledge. The Kantian account I develop thus offers to elucidate the connection between aesthetic reflection, creative imagination and mathematical cognition.

Bresolin, Keberson. “Kant e a ideia da Aufklärung.” [Portuguese; Kant and the idea of Enlightenment] Studia Kantiana 13.18 (2015): 19-36. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This study will develop the hypothesis that the concept of Kantian enlightenment is an individual and untransferable process. The process is conceptualized as the exit of the self-incurred immaturity (Unmündigkeit). This process is fundamental because it will allow humanity lead rationally itself, the structures that builds and manages under the auspices of reason. Correlated with the first hypothesis, the work also develops the interpretation that the Aufklärung is an idea, that is, even though we cannot realize it completely in the empirical world, it still preserves its normative value. In the same way, the individual, which completely made the process of Aufklärung, named here aufgeklärter Kritiker, is the ideal to which all individuals should try to bring to the world.

Bristow, William. “On Sally Sedgwick’s Hegel’s Critique of Kant.” Critique (blog posted: 12 Jan 2015) n.p. [PW] [online]

Brook, Andrew. “On Corey Dyck’s Kant and Rational Psychology.” Critique (blog posted: 22 Jun 2015) n.p. [PW] [online]

Brum Torres, João Carlos. “Notes on the Kantian Concept of ‘Empirical Concept’.” Kant’’s Lectures/Kants Vorlesungen. Eds. Bernd Dörflinger, et al. (op cit.). 73-90. [M]

 ——. “‘Stem’ and ‘Source’ as Metaphors of the Transcendental Doctrine of Elements.” Kant and the Metaphors of Reason. Ed. Patricia Kauark-Leite, et al. (op cit.). 41-57. [M]

Bruno, G. Anthony. “Varieties of Transcendental Idealism: Kant and Heidegger Thinking beyond Life.” Idealistic Studies 45.1 (2015): 81-102. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In recent work, William Blattner claims that Heidegger is an empirical realist, but not a transcendental idealist. Blattner argues that, unlike Kant, Heidegger holds that thinking beyond human life warrants no judgment about nature’s existence. This poses two problems. One is interpretive: Blattner misreads Kant’s conception of the beyond-life as yielding the judgment that nature does not exist, for Kant shares Heidegger’s view that such a judgment must lack sense. Another is programmatic: Blattner overstates the gap between Kant’s and Heidegger’s positions, for both are ontological, not ontic. I solve these problems by showing that Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein contains the core of Kant’s argument for transcendental idealism: the apriority of space and time. I conclude that Heidegger exemplifies Kant’s view that empirical realism just is transcendental idealism.

 ——. “Epistemic Reciprocity and Schelling’s Late Return to Kant.” Rethinking Kant: Volume 4. Eds. Pablo Muchnik and Oliver Thorndike (op cit.). 75-92. [WC]

Buchheim, Thomas. “Die Idee des Existierenden und der Raum: Vernunfthintergründe einer Welt äußerer Dinge nach Schellings Darstellung des Naturprocesses von 1843/44.” Kant-Studien 106.1 (2015): 36-66. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Schelling’s Presentation of the Natural Process (1843/44), which traces back to a Berlin lecture manuscript, constitutes the only example of an elaborated natural philosophy of Schelling’s latest creative period. Thereby, certain ontological main features of subject-independently existing things and beings, such as the feature of being based on an ontology of spatially existing bodies, and being descended from an evolving overall context of causally connected processes, are speculatively derived from the initial idea of existence that is to be presupposed to all sciences. For, according to that, bodies are to be conceived of as ontologically fundamental, Schelling needs to critically incorporate Kant’s transcendental argumentation for space as a merely subjective form of intuition that does not permit any inference to the nature of things-in-themselves, and to invalidate it at the same time, in order to transform it into a novel theory of space, according to which space and spatiality of the therein occurring objects need to be considered as real conditions of actually existing beings that are a priori and even prior to the subject.

Bueno, Vera Cristina de Andrade. “A Faculdade de Filosofia e a Prática do Uso Público da Razão.” [Portuguese] Estudos Kantianos 3.1 (2015): 169-76. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Having as background Fred Rauscher’s “The Institutionalization of Reason”, the paper draws attention to the important role that, in accordance to Kant, the faculty of philosophy plays concerning the practice of what Kant calls the “public use of reason”. The paper stresses that, it is in the effort of well exposing in public its own ideas, that reason can develop itself concernig its growing autonomy.

Bunke, Simon, and Katerina Mihaylova, eds. Gewissen: Interdisziplinäre Perspektiven auf das 18. Jahrhundert. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2015. [407 p.] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: See essays by... (listed separately)
Katerina Mihaylova (Gewissen als Pflicht gegen sich selbst. Zur Entwicklung des forum internum von Pufendorf bis Kant),
Oliver Sensen (Kants Begriff des Gewissens),
Karen Feldman (Riven Sovereignty and Jewish Responsibility: On Conscience, Kant and Judith Butler).

Burbulla, Julia. Kunstgeschichte nach dem Spatial Turn: Eine Wiederentdeckung mit Kant, Panofsky und Dorner. Bielefeld: transcript, 2015. [372 p.] [WC]

Busch, Kevin R. “Reason, Induction, and the Humean Objection to Kant.” Kant Yearbook: Kant and Empiricism 6 (2015): 23-46. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: While Kant does not address the problem of induction often attributed to Hume, he does, by way of a transcendental deduction of an a priori principle of reflecting empirical judgment, address a distinct problem Hume raises indirectly. This problem is that induction cannot be justified so long as it presupposes some empirical concept applying to or some empirical principle true of more than one object in nature, a presupposition neither determined by nor founded on reason. I draw on Hume’s positive account of induction to motivate the following objection to Kant: in so far as induction can be justified, there is reason to doubt that it would be so in virtue of any a priori feature.

Byrd, B. Sharon. “The Elusive Story of Kant’s Permissive Laws.” Kant’s Lectures on Ethics: A Critical Guide. Eds. Denis, Lara, and Oliver Sensen. (op cit.). 156-69. [M]

[top] C    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Cacciola, Maria Lúcia. “La question de la liberté chez Kant.” Kant, la raison pratique: concepts et héritages. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Margit Ruffing, and Ricardo Ribeiro Terra (op cit.). 135-43. [M]

Cachel, Andrea. “Belo natural e moralidade na Crítica da faculdade do juízo.” [Portuguese; Natural beauty and morality in the Critique of the Power of Judgment] Kant e-Prints 10.2 (2015): 38-53. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article intends to indicate the connection between natural beauty and morality, under adressed by Kant, in the Critique of the Power of Judgment. It consists to show that the ethical sense assumed by the natural beauty involves the possibility of the expression of the reason’s superiority in relation to sensitivity, from the notion of disinterest, the representation of systematic knowledge of nature, based on the idea of free play between imagination and knowledge, and the suggestion of a supersensible substrate of nature, through the extension of our way of looking at nature. As to the remission of the supersensible substrate of nature, it will be object of this text point out the relations between aesthetic judgment and teleological judgment, by the point of view of the relation between these judgments with morality in Kant. Thus, in what extent the idea of systematicity permeates the analysis of the natural beauty and how the moral sense of this systematicity involves the issue of the encounter between the multiplicity of intuition and the legality of knowledge, also present in the analysis of teleological judgment, it will be one of the privileged themes on display. Similarly, as the natural beauty allows the analogy with art and in what extent this involves or do not involves the presumption of an external intentionality to nature, it will be the subject of this discussion. Finally, in the comparison between aesthetic and teleological judgment, we will point out how the notions of organized organism and final cause, causes that required by the reflective judgment to explain these natural species as distinct of mechanisms, authorizes the assumption of a finality in beauty forms, which has certain consequences for some important aspects of Kant's moral philosophy which we bottom to expose.

Caimi, Mario. “Der Schematismus der reinen Verstandesbegriffe.” Urteil und Erfahrung: Kants Theorie der Erfahrung. Ed. Rainer Enskat (op cit.). 201-37. [M]

 ——. “Aeternitas, Necessitas Phaenomenon: O Esquema da Categoria de Necessidade-Contingência.” [Portuguese] Kant and the Metaphors of Reason. Ed. Patricia Kauark-Leite, et al. (op cit.). 27-39. [M]

Cajthami, Martin. “Otázka mravní hodnoty emocí se zřetelem k Aristotelovi, Kantovi a von Hildebrandovi.” [Czech] Studia Neoaristotelica 12.3 (2015): 5-25. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The aim of the article is to compare and critically evaluate Kant’s, Aristotle’s, and von Hildebrand’s approach to the question of the moral accountability of emotions. Notoriously, Kant, in his practical philosophy, leaves hardly any place for the moral value of emotions. The only emotion that he acknowledges to possess a moral value is “Achtung für’s Gesetz”. According to Aristotle, emotions can be object of praise and blame in so far as they are formed by good or bad habits (moral virtues and vices). Von Hildebrand, not objecting to this approach of Aristotle, off ers a fi ne phenomenological analysis of how a “morally conscious” person modifi es emotions while experiencing them by either “sanctioning” or “disavowing” them. This analysis implies that emotions can be morally good or bad in still diff erent sense than the one considered by Aristotle.

Calábria, Olavo. “The Imagination in Kant’s Philosophy and Some Related Questions.” Estudos Kantianos 3.1 (2015): 139-58. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: By means of an interpretation we have recently elaborated about the Kantian conception of the faculty of imagination, was obtained with the decisive aid of the Anthropology in a pragmatic point of view (1798), which determines the place it occupies in the set of mental capacities, identifies the tasks and functions that it can achieve and registers the types of operations it performs, as well as the products it offers in different fields of his philosophy, and we show how this idea can support cogent solutions to problems frequently identified in transcendental idealism, as the reason for Kant have wrote two versions of the Deduction of the categories, the motivation and consequences of the distinction between two types of objects for us (the appearances [Erscheinungen] and the phenomena [Phaenomena]), the relationship between the triple synthesis (KrV-A) and three sensible authorship capacities (Anthropology), the meaning of “blind intuitions” (KrV: A51/B75) and its relationship with some kinds of view, the distinction between the “knowing” [kennen] of the animals and human knowledge [Erkenntnis], some basic aspects of the doctrine of schematism involved in the constitution of objects of experience (nature), and the roles played by the imagination in the theoretic and aesthetic domains.

Calhoun, Cheshire. “But What About the Animals?” Reason, Value, and Respect. Eds. Mark Timmons and Robert N. Johnson (op cit.). 194-212. [M]

Callanan, John J. Rev. of Kant and the Creation of Freedom: A Theological Problem, by Christopher J. Insole (2013). Religious Studies 51.4 (2015): 587-93. [PW]

Caranti, Luigi. “Defending Kant after Darwin: a Reassessment of Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose.” Estudos Kantianos 3.1 (2015): 67-74. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The paper argues that Kant’s teleology in Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose can be salvaged only if the mechanism of social unsociability, considered as the true center of the essay, is a) detached from the ‒ by contemporary standards ‒ hardly defensible notion of ‘natural dispositions’ and b) understood in conjunction with general premises that Kantdoes not make explicit, but rather takes as self-evidently true. In this perspective, Kant’s teleology is reduced to the affirmation that, given certain constant features of human beings (mainly, limited benevolence and ability to see their best interest through experience) as well as relatively constant objective circumstances of the world we live in (mainly, availability of finite yet sufficient resources and sustainable growth in a competitive yet peaceful system), an approximation of human affairs towards the ‘cosmopolitan constitution’ is the most likely outcome. The paper moves the first steps towards a defense of this thesis by reformulating Kant’s argument in a way to make it compatible with contemporary science.

Carl, Wolfgang. “Kant über Bewußtsein und Selbstbewußtsein mit einem Blick auf die gegenwärtige Diskussion.” Crítica y metafísica: Homenaje a Mario Caimi. Ed. Claudia Jáuregui, et al. (op cit.). 75-92. [M]

Carson, Emily, and Lisa Shabel, eds. Kant: Studies on Mathematics in the Critical Philosophy. London: Routledge, 2015. [vii, 292 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Contributions by the editors and Thomas Land, Daniel Smyth, John J. Callanan, Jeremy Heis, Tyke Nunez, Katherine Dunlop, Daniel Sutherland, Alison Laywine, and Courtney Fugate. These chapters originally appeared as articles in an issue of the Canadian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 44 (2014), and are listed separately in the 2014 bibliography.

Caruso, Francisco and Roberto Moreira Xavier. “On Kant’s First Insight into the Problem of Space Dimensionality and its Physical Foundations.” Kant-Studien 106.4 (2015): 547-60. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this article it is shown that a careful analysis of Kant’s Gedanken von der wahren Schätzung der lebendigen Kräfte und Beurtheilung der Beweise leads to a conclusion that does not match the usually accepted interpretation of Kant’s reasoning in 1747, according to which the young Kant supposedly establishes a relationship between the tridimensionality of space and Newton’s law of universal gravitation. Indeed, it is argued that this text does not yield a satisfactory explanation of space dimensionality, and actually restricts itself to justifying the tridimensionality of extension.

Carvalho, Fábio Tenório de. “L’élaboration et l’évaluation d’hypothèses d'après la philosophie critique de Kant.” Kant and the Metaphors of Reason. Ed. Patricia Kauark-Leite, et al. (op cit.). 177-91. [M]

Carvalho Chagas, Flávia. “Normatividade e valor moral: sobre a necessidade do sentimento moral em Kant.” [Portuquese; Moral Normativity: on the Necessity of Moral Feeling in Kant] Con-Textos Kantianos 1 (2015): 97-113. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: One of the most obscure problems in universalists ethics, in general, and in Kantian ethics, in particular, consists in a justification of a objectively valid principle from the connection between the question of the epistemology and the moral motivation. From this, our purpose in this paper is to try to clarify how the feeling of respect connects figures as practical reason, moral value and autonomy, both from a historical perspective as hermeneutics of Kantian texts.

Cauchi, Mark. “Unconditioned by the Other: Agency and Alterity in Kant and Levinas.” Idealistic Studies 45.2 (2015): 125-47. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Much philosophy of the last few decades has witnessed a turn toward otherness and a corresponding calling into question of the autonomy of the agent. In my paper I attempt to re-conceive what agency is in light of this emphasis placed on otherness. I undertake this reconsideration through an analysis of the concepts of unconditionality in Kant and of conditioning by the other in Levinas. Through these analyses I arrive at a new concept: the unconditioning of the agent by the other. I then provide some description of this concept by considering the interpretation of the theological concept of creation in Augustine, Kant, and Levinas.

Cavallar, Georg. Kant’s Embedded Cosmopolitanism: history, philosophy, and education for world citizens. Boston/Berlin: De Gruyter, 2015. [x, 215 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kantstudien Ergänzungshefte, vol. 183.

 ——. Rev. of Kant’s Politics in Context, by Reidar Maliks (2014). British Journal for the History of Philosophy 23.5 (2015): 1003-6. [PW]

 ——. Rev. of Geschichte, Ethik und Religion im Anschluss an Kant: Philosophische Perspektiven ‘zwischen skeptischer Hoffnungslosigkeit und dogmatischem Trotz’, 2 vols., by Rudolf Langthaler (2014). Kantian Review 20.1 (2015): 174-77. [PI]

Cebolla, Lorena. See: Williams, Howard, and Lorena Cebolla.

Cecchinato, Giorgia. “Liebe macht die Welt schön. Menschenliebe als Analogon des ästhetischen Schönen in Kants Metaphysik der Sitten.” Kant and the Metaphors of Reason. Ed. Patricia Kauark-Leite, et al. (op cit.). 253-62. [M]

 ——, ed. See: Kauark-Leite, Patricia, Giorgia Cecchinato, Virginia de Araujo Figueiredo, Margit Ruffing, and Alice Serra, eds.

Chaly, Vadim. “An Interpretation of Rawls’ “Kantian Interpretation.” Con-Textos Kantianos 1 (2015): 142-55. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Calling Kant a liberal philosopher requires important qualifications. Much like his theoretical philosophy, his political transcendentalism was and remains a great enterprise of navigating between the extremes of liberalism and conservatism, of balancing the “empirical” and the “pure” in human society, as well as in human mind. Of all the attempts to enlist Kant among the classics of liberalism, John Rawls’ is the most impressive and thorough. However, it is hardly a success. The reason for this lies in a profound difference in their answering the fundamental (and therefore vague) question “What is Man?”. This paper is an attempt to revise the debate about the extent of Rawls’ Kantianism and to compare the meanings of basic concepts of what could be called “pure political anthropology” in Kant and in Rawls.

Chance, Brian A. “Locke, Kant, and Synthetic A Priori Cognition.” Kant Yearbook: Kant and Empiricism 6 (2015): 47-72. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper attempts to shed light on three related issues that bear directly on our understanding of Locke and Kant. The first is whether Kant believes Locke merely anticipates his distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments or also believes Locke anticipates his notion of synthetic a priori cognition. The second is what we as readers of Kant and Locke should think about Kant’s view whatever it turns out to be, and the third is the nature of Kant’s justification for the comparison he draws between his philosophy and Locke’s. I argue (1) that Kant believes Locke anticipates both the analytic-synthetic distinction and Kant’s notion of synthetic a priori cognition, (2) that the best justification for Kant’s claim draws on Locke’s distinction between trifling and instructive knowledge, (3) that the arguments against this claim developed by Carson, Allison, and Newman fail to undermine it, and (4) that Kant’s own justification for his claim is quite different from what many commentators have thought it was (or should have been).

 ——. “Kant and the Discipline of Reason.” European Journal of Philosophy 23.1 (2015): 87-110. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant's notion of ‘discipline’ has received considerable attention from scholars of his philosophy of education, but its role in his theoretical philosophy has been largely ignored. This omission is surprising since his discussion of discipline in the first Critique is not only more extensive and expansive in scope than his other discussions but also predates them. The goal of this essay is to provide a comprehensive reading of the Discipline that emphasizes its systematic importance in the first Critique. I argue that its goal is to establish a set of rules for the use of pure reason that, if followed, will mitigate and perhaps even eliminate our tendency to make judgments about supersensible objects. Since Kant's justification for these rules relies crucially on claims he has defended in the Doctrine of Elements, I argue further that, far from being a dispensable part of the Critique as commentators have tended to claim, the Discipline is, in fact, the culmination of Kant's critique of metaphysics.

Chevalier, Jean-Marie. “Forms of Reasoning as Conditions of Possibility: Peirce’s Transcendental Inquiry Concerning Inductive Knowledge.” Pragmatism, Kant, and Transcendental Philosophy. Eds. Gabriele Gava and Robert Stern (op cit.). 114-32??. [WC]

Chmieliński, Maciej. “Kosmopolityczny realizm oświeceniowej koncepcji Immanuela Kanta.” [Polish] Filozofia Oswiecenia: Radykalizm, Religia, Kosmopolityzm. Eds. Maciej Chmielinski, Justyna Miklaszewska, and Anna Tomaszewska (op cit.). 485-516??. [WC]

 ——, Justyna Miklaszewska, and Anna Tomaszewska, eds. Filozofia Oswiecenia: Radykalizm, Religia, Kosmopolityzm. [Polish; The philosophy of the enlightenment: radicalism, religion, cosmopolitanism] Kraków: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellonskiego, 2015. [558 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: See especially the following articles (listed separately):
James Schmidt (Niemieckie oświecenie, pp. 65f.)
Jakub Szczepański (Odpowiedź Kanta na pytanie: czym jest oświecenie?, pp. 95f.)
Howard Williams (Oświeceniowa krytyka Dialektyki oświecenia, pp. 109f.)
Anna Tomaszewska (Bóg Spinozy w pismach przedkrytycznych Kanta, pp. 305f.)
Marek Drwięga (Zło w epoce rozumu. Wolter i Kant, pp. 429f.)
Jens Timmermann (Kant – konserwatysta czy radykał?, pp. 443f.)
Kenneth Westphal (Oświecenie, rozum i uniwersalizm: intuicje krytyczne Kanta, pp. 456f.)
Maciej Chmieliński (Kosmopolityczny realizm oświeceniowej koncepcji Immanuela Kanta, pp. 485f.).

Cholbi, Michael. “Kant on Euthanasia and the Duty to Die: Clearing the Air.” Journal of Medical Ethics 41.8 (2015): 607-10. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Thanks to recent scholarship, Kant is no longer seen as the dogmatic opponent of suicide that he appears to be at first glance. However, some interpreters have recently argued for a Kantian view of the morality of suicide with surprising, even radical, implications. More specifically, they have argued that Kantianism (1) requires that those with dementia or other rationality-eroding conditions end their lives before their condition results in their loss of identity as moral agents and (2) requires subjecting the fully demented or those confronting future dementia to non-voluntary euthanasia. Properly understood, Kant's ethics have neither of these implications. (1) wrongly assumes that rational agents’ duty of self-preservation entails a duty of self-destruction when they become non-rational, (2) further neglects Kant's distinction between duties to self and duties to others and wrongly assumes that duties can be owed to rational agents only during the time of their existence.

Chung, Jihae. “Kant im Kino: Eine filmphilosophische Analyse des Filmisch-Erhabenen in Into the Wild (2007).” Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 63.1 (2015): 92-132. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Using a detailed analysis of scenes from Into the Wild (2007), this study aims to demonstrate how the theory of the sublime, particularly Kant’s theory, can be applied to film. To this purpose, the sublime will be referred to in the film heuristically as the Cinematic Sublime. My basic assumptions here are as follows: First, Kant’s theory of the sublime can be seen as a philosophical and aesthetic emotion-oriented teaching. Second, the emotional-sensory experience of the sublime is always manifested in the interconnection of both the film’s technical apparatus as well as its physical and mental perception. So the different modes of experiencing of the Cinematic Sublime can be described as filmic emotions. As a consequence, the phenomenon of the Cinematic Sublime is a textually constructed sensation, which can be analyzed with the help of textual analysis. Third, the Cinematical Sublime can be experienced through intersubjective activities of the audience during film reception, requiring a high degree of imagination, empathy and constitutive perception. Thus, I am undertaking a film-philosophical investigation that can be described as an analysis of film emotions based upon the textuality of film.

Cicatello, Angelo. “Il diritto di visita entro i limiti della semplice ragione Note a margine del cosmopolitismo di Kant.” [Italian] Estudos Kantianos 3.2 (2015): 73-89. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The right to visit of which Kant speaks in the “Third definitive article on perpetual peace” requires, precisely because of its theoretical framework, to be inscribed in a broader register, that is to say one that does not only concern the specifically political and legal aspects of the cosmopolitical project, but makes reference to the issue concerning the very sense in which the possession of reason can legitimately be referred to man. Only thus is it possible theoretically to access in an informed way the main sense of the Kantian cosmopolitical project and the theme of universal hospitality. And this is perhaps the way in which Kant himself, in responding to the urgent issues of his day, can indirectly provide us too with decisive suggestions for working out concrete proposals on the issue of hospitality and pacific cohabitation among peoples

Clewis, Robert R. “Editor’’s Introduction.” Reading Kant’s Lectures. Ed. Robert R. Clewis (op cit.). 1-36. [M]

 ——. “Kant’s Natural Teleology? The Case of Physical Geography.” Reading Kant’s Lectures. Ed. Robert R. Clewis (op cit.). 526-52. [M]

 ——. “The Place of the Sublime in Kant’s Project.” Studi Kantiani 28 (2015): 149-70. [PW]

 ——, ed. Reading Kant’s Lectures. Berlin / Boston: De Gruyter, 2015. [xv, 608 p.] [M] [review]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents: (listed separately)
Steve Naragon (Reading Kant in Herder’s Lecture Notes),
Courtney D. Fugate (The Unity of Metaphysics in Kant’s Lectures),
Dennis Schulting (Transcendental Apperception and Consciousness in Kant’s Lectures on Metaphysics),
Corey W. Dyck (Beyond the Paralogisms: The Proofs of Immortality in the Lectures on Metaphysics),
Huaping Lu-Adler (Constructing a Demonstration of Logical Rules, or How to Use Kant’s Logic Corpus),
Riccardo Pozzo (Kant’s Latin in Class),
Oliver Sensen (The Supreme Principle of Morality),
Faustino Fabbianelli (Kant’s Concept of Moral Imputatio),
Paul Guyer (Play and Society in the Lectures on Anthropology),
Alix Cohen (From Faking It to Making It: The Feeling of Love of Honor as an Aid to Morality),
Werner Stark (Immanuel Kant’s On Pedagogy: A Lecture Like Any Other?),
Susan Meld Shell (Reading Kant’s Lectures on Pedagogy),
John Zammito (Philosophy for Everyman: Kant’s Encyclopedia Course),
Frederick Rauscher (Did Kant Justify the French Revolution Ex Post Facto?),
Günter Zöller (“Without hope and fear”: Kant’s Naturrecht Feyerabend on Bindingness and Obligation),
Stephen R. Palmquist (Kant’s Lectures on Philosophical Theology – Training-Ground for the Moral Pedagogy of Religion?),
Norbert Fischer (Kant as Pastor),
Antonio Moretto (Herder’s Notes on Kant’s Mathematics Course),
Christian Onof (Kant’s Lectures on Physics and the Development of the Critical Philosophy),
Henny Blomme (Kant’s Conception of Chemistry in the Danziger Physik),
Robert B. Louden (The Last Frontier: Exploring Kant’s Geography),
Robert R. Clewis (Kant’s Natural Teleology? The Case of Physical Geography).

Coelho Fragelli, Isabel. “Explicar ou interpretar? Kant e Herder, entre a filosofia e a ciência.” [Portuguese; Explication or Interpretation? Kant and Herder, between the philosophy and the science] DoisPontos 12.2 (2015): 67-78. [ASP]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The present article proposes a comparative study of Kant’s and Herder’s works, intending to show how each of them understood the relations (namely, the differences and the similarities) between the scientific and the philosophical speeches. In order to elucidate the specificities of each of those speeches in both author’s thoughts, we shall assume, as the starting point of our analysis, the distinction between “explication” and “interpretation” made by Gérard Lebrun in his book Kant and the End of Metaphysics. On one side, we shall see how Kant draws the line between the “explicative” speech of scientific knowledge and the “interpretative” speech of philosophical knowledge; on the other side, we’ll try to show how Herder dissolves this distinction by affirming a continuity between all human faculties (thus opposing himself to the dualism of the critical philosophy).

Coenen, Ludwig. Der Mensch — ein Animal Rationabile? Eine neue Spurensuche zur Chronologie der anthropologischen Thesen (1759-1803) von Immanuel Kant. Berlin: LIT, 2015. [112 p.] [WC]

Cohen, Alix. “From Faking It to Making It: The Feeling of Love of Honor as an Aid to Morality.” Reading Kant’s Lectures. Ed. Robert R. Clewis (op cit.). 243-56. [M]

 ——. “Le rôle des sentiments moraux dans l’éthique kantienne: le complément nécessaire à la raison pratique.” Kant, la raison pratique: concepts et héritages. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Margit Ruffing, and Ricardo Ribeiro Terra (op cit.). 145-53. [M]

Colomer, José Luis. “Kant’s Theory of Law and the Principle of Freedom.” Kant’s Theory of Law. Eds. Jean-Christophe Merle and Alexandre Travessoni Gomes Trivisonno (op cit.). 21-34. [M]

Conant, James F. “Kants Kritik des Schichtenmodells des menschlichen Geistes” Das neue Bedürfnis nach Metaphysik / The New Desire for Metaphysics. Ed. Markus Gabriel (op cit.). 137-50??. [WC]

Consenso Tonetto, Milene. “Principled Autonomy and Individual Autonomy.” Morality and Life: Kantian Perspectives in Bioethics. Eds. Darlei Dall’Agnol and Milene Consenso Tonetto (op cit.). 95-108. [M]

 ——. “The Concept of Right in Kant and the Metaphor of the Wooden Head.” Kant and the Metaphors of Reason. Ed. Patricia Kauark-Leite, et al. (op cit.). 287-99. [M]

 ——, ed. See: Dall’Agnol, Darlei, and Milene Consenso Tonetto, eds.

Cornell, Drucilla. “The role of the Kantian imagination in realization-focused comparison.” Philosophy & Social Criticism 41.1 (2015): 21-28. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this article I review Amaryta Sen¹s powerful critique of transcendental institutionalism and his own "realization-focused comparison" as an alternative way to think about justice. While deeply sympathetic with his critique of John Rawls I also argue that the role of the Kantian imagination is extremely important in figuring ideals of justice, which must guide "realization-focused comparison"". To do so I turn to Kant¹s Critique of Judgment and his development of what he calls "aesthetic ideas" as ways of representing the great ideals such as freedom and equality, which can be aesthetically represented but never fully known

Cosio, Sonia. Il Rispetto in Kant. Un Sentimento Particolare. [Italian] Milan: AlboVersorio, 2015. [78 p.] [WC]

Costa Rego, Pedro. “Choix et imputabilité dans la philosophie pratique de Kant.” Kant, la raison pratique: concepts et héritages. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Margit Ruffing, and Ricardo Ribeiro Terra (op cit.). 83-91. [M]

 ——. “L’idéalisme réfugié: la réfutation de 1781 et le scepticisme ontologique.” Kant and the Metaphors of Reason. Ed. Patricia Kauark-Leite, et al. (op cit.). 147-59. [M]

Croitoru, Rodica. “La troisième antinomie de la raison pure, soutien épistémique de l’action pratique.” Kant, la raison pratique: concepts et héritages. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Margit Ruffing, and Ricardo Ribeiro Terra (op cit.). 155-61. [M]

 ——. “Al XII-lea Congres Internațional Kant și al Universității Viena. Natură și libertate.”[Romanian] Revista de Filosofie 62.6 (2015): 844-48. [RC]

 ——. “Al XII-lea Congres Internațional al Societății de Studii Kantiene de Limba Franceză. Anul 1784. Drept și filosofia istoriei, Mainz, 28 sept.-2 oct.” [Romanian] Revista de Filosofie 62.6 (2015): 841-43. [RC]

 ——. “Invertirea datoriei și legii kantiene în Fenomenologia spiritului.” [Romanian; Kant’s Duty and Law Inverted in the Phenomenology of Spirit] Studii de teoria categoriilor 7 (2015): 31-37. [RC]

 ——. “Sufletul ca eu gânditor în critica psihologiei raționale.” [Romanian; The Soul as Thinking I within the Critique of Rational Psychology] Studii de istoria filosofiei universale 23 (2015): 59-82. [RC] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The study focuses on the thinking I as a cognitive segment, corresponding to the transcendental apperception, as it appears in the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason. It is argued the part the critique of rational psychology plays as a short view on the whole transcendental system, making openings to the following two Critiques, and even to the Religion in the Bounds of Mere Reason. And last, but not least, it opens the way to the mind philosophy, at the crossroads of psychology of brain and philosophy of cognition.

 ——. “La quatrième antinomie préfigurée: (La Religion dans les limites de la simple raison).” Diotima 43 (2015): 105-11. [RC]

 ——. “Reconsiderarea paradigmei kantiene a imperiului scopurilor.” [Romanian; The revaluation of Kant’s Paradigm of the Kingdom of Ends] Filosofie și viață. In honorem Alexandru Boboc. Eds. M.A. Drăghici, O. Vasilescu (Bucarest: Ed. Academiei Române, 2015). 221-26. [RC]

 ——. “Le citoyen-philosophe et le philosophe-citoyen (Platon versus Kant).” La citoyenneté: actes du XXXIVème Congrès de l'Association des Sociétés de Philosophie de Langue Française (ASPLF). Ed. Jean-Michel Counet (Louvain-la-Neuve: Éditions de l'Institut superieur de philosophie, 2015). 437-44. [RC]

Cubo, Óscar. “Respondenz zum Beitrag von Chong-Fuk Lau” Das neue Bedürfnis nach Metaphysik / The New Desire for Metaphysics. Ed. Markus Gabriel (op cit.). 113-18??. [WC]

 ——. Rev. of Ethik gegen Machtpolitik. Immanuel Kants Friedensschrift im Kontext des Zeitalters der Aufklärung, by Peter Streit (2011). Kant-Studien 106.2 (2015): 352-54. [PW]

Cunha, Bruno. “Wolff e Kant sobre Obrigação e Lei Natural: a Rejeição do Voluntarismo Teológico na Moral.” [Portuguese; Wolff and Kant on obligation and natural law: the rejection of theological voluntarism in ethics] Trans/Form/Ação: Revista de Filosofia 38.3 (2015): 99-115. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper highlights the debate around the concepts of obligation and natural law, with reference to the controversial modern discussion involving intellectualism and voluntarism. Firstly, we highlight Wolff’s rejection of the voluntarism of Pufendorf and Wolff’s orientation toward the intellectualism of Leibniz. For intellectualism, a theory of natural law should not ground the concept of obligation in the authority of laws (established as an arbitrary decree of God) and in their coercive power (interpreted as fear of punishment), but in the idea of moral necessity, understood as an expression of the universal natural connection of rational beings with duty. We then present the effects of this discussion on Kant’s early thought. Kant undertook to go beyond Wolff and Baumgarten through a conceptual review of the problem, which culminated in the assumptions of his mature ethics.

Cunico, Gerardo. “Unità e concordanza teleologica del mondo in Kant.” [Italian; Teleological World Unity and Harmony in Kant] Con-Textos Kantianos 2 (2015): 115-27. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The paper deals with Kant’s conception of harmony in its fundamental ontological meaning, i.e. in terms of that teleological harmony which was central for the dogmatic metaphysics and Kant will critically deconstruct and reconstruct not in a speculative-theoretical, but in a moral-teleological way. The basic arguments of this reconstruction are presented and discussed by examining the manner in which Kant re-elaborates the notion of the world as the unity of finite beings, conceivable only as a purposive harmony.

Cureton, Adam. “Making Room for Rules.” Philosophical Studies 172.3 (2015): 737-59. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kantian moral theories must explain how their most basic moral values of dignity and autonomy should be interpreted and applied to human conditions. One place Kantians should look for inspiration is, surprisingly, the utilitarian tradition and its emphasis on generally accepted, informally enforced, publicly known moral rules of the sort that help us give assurances, coordinate our behavior, and overcome weak wills. Kantians have tended to ignore utilitarian discussions of such rules mostly because they regard basic moral principles as a priori requirements that cannot be tailored to human foibles and limitations. I argue that Kantian moral theories should incorporate public moral rules as mid-level moral requirements for embodied and socially embedded human agents. I explain how certain specific moral judgments about how we ought to act are justified by public moral rules, which are themselves justified by more fundamental moral requirements.

[top] D    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Dadlez, E. M. See: Woolwine, Sarah, and E. M. Dadlez.

Dall’Agnol, Darlei. “Respect for Persons: Rawls’ Kantian Principles and Genetic Policies.” Morality and Life: Kantian Perspectives in Bioethics. Eds. Darlei Dall’Agnol and Milene Consenso Tonetto (op cit.). 127-45. [M]

 ——, and Milene Consenso Tonetto, eds. Morality and Life: Kantian Perspectives in Bioethics. Pisa: Edizioni ETS, 2015. [206 p.] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Papers originally presented at a conference held at the Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Brazil (2014).
José Nicolau Heck (Man’s Destination: A Kantian Study),
Thomas Mertens (Kant and the Ends of Life),
Cinara Nahra (Kant: Suicide and Euthanasia),
Marco Antonio Azevedo (The Place of the Patient’s Autonomy in the Kingdom of Ends),
Milene Consenso Tonetto (Principled Autonomy and Individual Autonomy),
Alcino Eduardo Bonella (Kantian Utilitarianism and Euthanasia),
Darlei Dall’Agnol (Respect for Persons: Rawls’ Kantian Principles and Genetic Policies),
Alessandro Pinzani (Between the Natural and the Artificial: How Kantian are Habermas’ Remarks on Positive Eugenics?),
Delamar José Volpato Dutra (Dworkin on Abortion: Rights or Intrinsic Value?),
Roberto Mordacci and Alberto Pirni (Intersubjectivity and Respect in Kant’s Categorical Imperative: A Bioethical Perspective).

Dancy, Jonathan. “More Right than Wrong.” Reason, Value, and Respect. Eds. Mark Timmons and Robert N. Johnson (op cit.). 101-18. [M]

Darwall, Stephen. “Respect as Honor and as Accountability.” Reason, Value, and Respect. Eds. Mark Timmons and Robert N. Johnson (op cit.). 70-86. [M]

Darnell, Michelle. “The Pursuit of Happiness.” Comparing Kant and Sartre. Ed. Sorin Baiasu (op cit.). 176-94. [PW]

De Araujo Figueiredo, Virginia, ed. See: Margit Ruffing, Patricia Kauark-Leite, Alice Serra, and Giorgia Cecchinato, edsRuffing, Margit, Patricia Kauark-Leite, Virginia De Araujo Figueiredo, Alice Serra, and Giorgia Cecchinato, eds.

De Bianchi, Silvia. “When series go in indefinitum, ad infinitum and in infinitum concepts of infinity in Kant’s antinomy of pure reason.” Synthese 192.8 (2015): 2395-2412. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the section of the Antinomy of pure Reason Kant presents three notions of infinity. By investigating these concepts of infinity, this paper highlights important ‘building blocks’ of the structure of the mathematical antinomies, such as the ability of reason of producing ascending and descending series, as well as the notions of given and givable series. These structural features are discussed in order to clarify Ernst Zermelo’s reading of Kant’s antinomy, according to which the latter is deeply rooted in the tendency of the mind of producing “creative progress” and “inclusive closure”. The aim of this paper is to explain in which sense and why Kant’s treatment of the antinomies attracts the attention of Zermelo in the early 1900s and which aspects of his second axiomatic system have been inspired by Kant’s philosophy. Thus, by reading Kant’s antinomy ‘through Zermelo’s eyes’—with emphasis on the concept of regressive series in indefinitum and on that of regressive series ad infinitum – this paper identifies the echoes of Kant’s work in the making of the ZFC set theory.

De Boer, Karin. “The Vicissitudes of Metaphysics in Kant and Early Post-Kantian Philosophy.” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 71.2-3 (2015): 267-86. [JSTOR]

 ——. “The Vicissitudes of Metaphysics in Kant and Early Post-Kantian Philosophy.” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 71.2-3 (2015): 267-86. [PW]

De Duve, Thierry. “Aesthetics as the Transcendental Ground of Democracy.” Critical Inquiry 42.1 (2015): 149-65. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This essay discusses the Critique of Judgment, a work by German philosopher Immanuel Kant which deals with beauty, aesthetic judgment, and purposiveness in nature, among others. Topics covered include the preamble of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the similarity of the postulate contained in the preamble of the UDHR with the Critique of Judgment, and the other major works of Kant, such as Critique of Pure Reason and Critique of Practical Reason.

De Haro Romo, Vicente. Duty, Virtue and Practical Reason in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals. Translated into English by Erik Norvelle. Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 2015. [342 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Originally a doctoral thesis (Universidad Panamericana, Mexico, 2012).

 ——. “Una defensa de los deberes para con uno mismo en Kant y algunas observaciones respecto de su replanteamiento en Fichte.” [Spanish; A defense of duties to oneself in Kant and some remarks on their reformulation in Fichte] Signos Filosóficos 17.34 (2015): 36-57. [MUSE]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: One of the most frequently criticized elements of Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals is the possibility of ethical duties to oneself. In this article I consider the most common arguments against these duties (from the standpoint of Utilitarianism) and I show how they can be refuted using Kant’s argumentation itself. Afterwards, I point out how Fichte, in his Doctrine of Morals, accepts the duties to oneself, but relocates them within the system of duties. Finally, I suggest that the Fichtean reinterpretation emerges from a confusion over the role of the first-person moral agent in the Kantian ideal of the Kingdom of ends.

De Quincey, Thomas. Los últimos días de Kant. Edited and translated into Spanish by Edmundo González-Blanco. Valladolid: Trasantier, 2015. [150 p.] [WC]

De Warren, Nicolas, and Andrea Staiti, eds. New Approaches to Neo-Kantianism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015. [322 p.] [WC] [review]

Dean, Richard. “A fórmula da humanidade como um fim em si mesmo.” [Portuguese; The formula of humanity as an end in itself] Studia Kantiana 13.19 (2015): 127-51. [M] [online]

Deleuze, Gilles. Kants Kritiska Filosofi: Doktrinen om Förmågorna. Translation of La philosophie critique de Kant (1963) into Swedish by Carl Montan. Göteborg: Glänta, 2015. [138 p.] [WC]

Denis, Lara. “Proper Self-Esteem and Duties to Oneself.” Kant’s Lectures on Ethics: A Critical Guide. Eds. Denis, Lara, and Oliver Sensen. (op cit.). 205-22. [M]

 ——, and Oliver Sensen. “Introduction.” Kant’s Lectures on Ethics: A Critical Guide. Eds. Denis, Lara, and Oliver Sensen. (op cit.). 1-12. [M]

 ——, and Oliver Sensen, eds. Kant’s Lectures on Ethics: A Critical Guide. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015. [xix, 289 p.] [M] [review]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents:
J. B. Schneewind (Foreword)
Lara Denis and Oliver Sensen (Introduction)
Stefano Bacin (Kant’s Lectures on Ethics and Baumgarten’s Moral Philosophy)
Patrick R. Frierson (Herder: Religion and Moral Motivation)
Manfred Kuehn (Collins: Kant’s Proto-Critical Position)
Jens Timmermann (Mrongovius II: a Supplement to the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals)
Robert B. Louden (Vigilantius: Morality for Humans)
Stephen Engstrom (Ancient Insights in Kant’s Conception of the Highest Good)
Allen W. Wood (Kant’s History of Ethics)
Oliver Sensen (Moral obligation and Free Will)
B. Sharon Byrd (The Elusive Story of Kant’s Permissive Laws)
Joachim Hruschka (On the Logic of Imputation in the Vigilantius Lecture Notes)
Paul Guyer (Freedom, Ends, and the Derivation of Duties in the Vigilantius Notes)
Lara Denis (Proper Self-Esteem and Duties to Oneself)
Anne Margaret Baxley (Virtue, Self-Mastery, and the Autocracy of Practical Reason)
Jeanine Grenberg (Love)
Houston Smit and Mark Timmons (Love of Honor, Emulation, and the Psychology of the Devilish Vices).

 ——. Rev. of Kant’s Defense of Common Moral Experience: A Phenomenological Account, by Jeaning Grenberg (2013). Journal of the History of Philosophy 53.1 (2015): 163-64. [M]

 ——. Rev. of Kant’s Observations and Remarks: A Critical Guide, edited by Susan Meld Shell and Richard Velkley (2012). German Studies Review 38.2 (2015): 414-16. [PI]

Diaconu, Mircea. “Categoriile kantiene și interpretarea lui noica.” [Romanian] Yearbook of George Baritiu Institute of History in Cluj-Napoca 13 (2015): 313-20. [ASP]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Our study presents the ontological interpretation given by Constantin Noica to the table of categories in his main work „Becoming within Being". The main stages of interpretation are being followed, while pointing out the lack of rigor in the Kantian critical discourse regarding certain matters. These matters are related to the category of limitation or the disjunctive judgment and the category of community. At the same time we will put forward some objections concerning Romanian philosopher's interpretation showing that the problem of ontological interpretation of the categorical table remains open to newer, more determined and rigorous approaches.

Dias, Maria Cristina Longo Cardoso. “O direito e a ética em bentham e kant: uma comparação.” [Portuguese; Law and ethics in Bentham and Kant: a comparison] Trans/Form/Ação: Revista de Filosofia 38.1 (2015): 147-66. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The aim of this work is to formulate a comparison between Bentham’s and Kant’s conceptions of ethics and law. The position taken in this paper is that, for Bentham and Kant, law is grounded in the same principles which are the basis of ethics. For Kant it is the categorical imperative which is the basis of ethics, while the principle of utility is the basis of Bentham’s theory of law and ethics. Although both authors have established only one principle on which to ground ethics and law, there are several differences between the two fields and between the theories of the two philosophers. Among these differences, we mention the epistemological origin of principles and their prescriptions.

Díaz Marsá, Marco. “Antropología Crítica y Lenguaje Común o del Suelo Lingüístico de la Experiencia Antropológica en la Lectura Foucaultiana de Kant1.” [Spanish; Critical Anthropology and Common Language or about the Linguistic Ground of the Anthropological Experience in Foucauldian Reading of Kant] Estudos Kantianos 3.1 (2015): 93-103. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article presents Kant’s ApH foucauldian lecture, focused from the question of language as an anthropologicalcritical dimension. From these perspective the linguistical-dialogic, and not so the psychological, it is to be revealed like the true floor of the anthropological experience. In the context of this foucauldian analysis the investigation program of man as “Weltbürger”, that is, as a being that talks and makes of language its form of residence in the world, will develop, without contradiction, as an analysis of the “Gemüt”, understanding this as an open and moving structural totality, that finds its essence, its certainty and its principle enlivening in the uses of common language

DiCenso, James. “Grace and Favor in Kant’s Ethical Explication of Religion.” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 78.1 (2015): 29-51. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper discusses Kant’s assessment of the religious idea of grace in relation to autonomous ethical practice. Following Kant’s own explanation of his methods and goals in interpreting religious ideas, my focus is on the ethical import of inherited religious concepts for human beings, rather than on literal theological dogmas concerning supernatural matters. I focus on how Kant’s inquiry into the ethical significance of the idea of grace is intertwined with another less recognized concept, that of favor (Gunst). The latter concept plays a crucial role in understanding Kant’s analyses, because it establishes a criterion by which to adjudicate historically-formed ideas of grace. Insofar as grace is understood in ways that assimilate it to endeavors to win favor, it works against our capacity to follow the moral law. On the constructive side, insofar as the concept of grace is understood to support ethical practice based on the moral law, it can be a vehicle for what Kant calls rational religion. This two-sided analysis of grace is a key component of the project of the Religion and other related writings, wherein Kant offers both critical and constructive investigations of historically-formed religious ideas found in scripture, ecclesiastical institutions and other sources.

 ——. Rev. of Kant and the Meaning of Religion, by Terry F. Godlove (2014). International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 78.1 (2015): 143-47. [PW]

 ——. Rev. of Kant’s Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason: A Critical Guide, edited by Gordon E. Michaleson (2014). Religious Studies 51.1 (2015): 125-30. [PI]

Dillon, Robin S. “Humility, Arrogance, and Self-Respect in Kant and Hill.” Reason, Value, and Respect. Eds. Mark Timmons and Robert N. Johnson (op cit.). 42-69. [M]

Dobe, Jennifer K. Rev. of Art and Ethics in a Material World: Kant’s Pragmatist Legacy, by Jennifer McMahon (2013). Kantian Review 20.2 (2015): 336-41. [PW]

Doran, Robert. The Theory of the Sublime from Longinus to Kant. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015. [xiii, 313 p.] [WC] [review]

Dörflinger, Bernd. “Zum Entwicklungsstand der Rationaltheologie Kants in seiner Vorlesung im Wintersemester 1783/84.” Kant’s Lectures/Kants Vorlesungen. Eds. Bernd Dörflinger, et al. (op cit.). 275-288. [M]

 ——. “Kants Kritik religiöser Gefühle.” Vernunftreligion und Offenbarungsglaube. Eds. Norbert Fischer and Jakub Sirovátka (op cit.). 219-31. [M]

 ——. “Diskrete und kontinuierliche Zeit. Ein verborgener Widerstreit bei Kant.” Crítica y metafísica: Homenaje a Mario Caimi. Ed. Claudia Jáuregui, et al. (op cit.). 93-105. [M]

 ——, Claudio La Rocca, Robert Louden, and Ubirajara Rancan de Azevedo Marques, eds. Kant’s Lectures/Kants Vorlesungen. Berlin / Boston: De Gruyter, 2015. [xiv, 288 p.] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents: (essays listed separately)
Stark, Werner (Versuch eines summarischen und pointierten Berichts über die Vorlesungen von Immanuel Kant),
Vázquez Lobeiras, María Jesús (Warum sind die Logikvorlesungen Kants interessant?),
González, Catalina (Kant, Cicero, and «popularity» in the Lectures on Logic),
Altmann, Sílvia (Note on the Matter and Content of Concepts),
Brum Torres, João Carlos (Notes on the Kantian Concept of «Empirical Concept»),
Faggion, Andrea (Can Mere Intuitions Represent Objects?),
Santos, Leonel Ribeiro dos (Economy and the Teleology of Evil in Kants Lectures on Anthropology (1775-1784)),
Silva, Fernando M. F. («Zum Erfinden wird Witz erfordert». On the Evolution of the Concept of Witz in Kants Anthropology Lectures),
Beckenkamp, Joãosinho (Kant und Gerard über Einbildungskraft),
Klemme, Heiner F. (Knowing, Feeling, Desiring Self-Possession. Reflections on the Connection between the Faculties in Kant's Doctrine of the Categorical Imperative),
Madrid, Nuria Sánchez (Prudence and the Rules for Guiding Life. The Development of Pragmatic Normativity in Kants Lectures on Anthropology),
Louden, Robert B. (Moralität für Menschen: Ethische Theorie in Kants Vigilantius-Vorlesung),
Zöller, Günter (»[O]hne Hofnung und Furcht«. Kants Naturrecht Feyerabend über den Grund der Verbindlichkeit zu einer Handlung),
Rosales, Jacinto Rivera de (Kant: die theoretische Welt der Metaphysik L1 (1776-1778)),
Lorini, Gualtiero (The Contribution of Kants Lectures on Metaphysics to a Better Comprehension of the Architectonic),
Bonaccini, Juan A. (Kants Account of Miracles in his Lectures on Metaphysics),
Azevedo Marques, Ubirajara Rancan de (On Epigenesis: Historical and Philological Remarks),
Dörflinger, Bernd (Zum Entwicklungsstand der Rationaltheologie Kants in seiner Vorlesung im Wintersemester 1783/84).

Dorrien, Gary J. Kantian Reason and Hegelian Spirit: The Idealistic Logic of Modern Theology. Chichester/West Sussex: Wiley Blackwell, 2015. [x, 605 p.] [WC]

Dotti, Jorge E. “El tiempo en Kant: de la Disertacion a la Estética Trascendental.” [Spanish] Crítica y metafísica: Homenaje a Mario Caimi. Ed. Claudia Jáuregui, et al. (op cit.). 106-39. [M]

Drăghici, Marius Augustin. “O perspectivă epistemologică privind raportarea lui Kant la scepticism.” [Romanian; An Epistemological Perspective Regarding Kantˊs Relation to Skepticism] Studii de istoria filosofiei universale 23 (2015): 83-127. [RC]

Driver, Julia. “Kantian Complicity.” Reason, Value, and Respect. Eds. Mark Timmons and Robert N. Johnson (op cit.). 256-66. [M]

Drwięga, Marek. “Zło w epoce rozumu. Wolter i Kant.” [Polish; Evil in the age of reason: Wolter and Kant] Filozofia Oswiecenia: Radykalizm, Religia, Kosmopolityzm. Eds. Maciej Chmielinski, Justyna Miklaszewska, and Anna Tomaszewska (op cit.). 429-42??. [WC]

Dufour, Éric. Leçons sur Nietzsche: Héritier de Kant. Paris: Ellipses, 2015. [286 p.] [WC]

Dumitrescu, Petre. “Conceptul de cetățean la Immanuel Kant.” [Romanian; Immanuel Kant’s Concept of Citizen] Filosofie și viață. In honorem Alexandru Boboc. Eds. M.A. Drăghici, O. Vasilescu (Bucarest: Ed. Academiei Române, 2015). 157-62. [RC]

Dunn, Nicholas. “A Lawful Freedom: Kant’s Practical Refutation of Noumenal Chance.” Kant Studies Online (2015): 149-77; posted September 30, 2015. [M] [pdf]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper asks how Kant’s mature theory of freedom handles an objection pertaining to chance. This question is significant given that Kant raises this criticism against libertarianism in his early writings on freedom before coming to adopt a libertarian view of freedom in the Critical period. After motivating the problem of how Kant can hold that the free actions of human beings lack determining grounds while at the same maintain that these are not the result of ‘blind chance,’ I argue that Kant’s Critical doctrine of transcendental idealism, while creating the ‘conceptual space’ for libertarian freedom, is not intended to provide an answer to the problem of chance with respect to our free agency. I go on to show how the resources for a refutation of chance only come about in the practical philosophy. In the 2nd Critique, Kant famously argues for the reality of freedom on the basis of our consciousness of the moral law as the law of a free will. However, Kant also comes to build into his account of the will a genuine power of choice, which involves the capacity to deviate from the moral law. I conclude by showing that this apparent tension can be resolved by turning to his argument for the impossibility of a diabolical will. This involves a consideration of the distinct kind of grounding relationship that practical laws have to the human will, as well as the way that transcendental idealism makes this possible.

Düsing, Klaus. “Zeit und Substanz in Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft.” Crítica y metafísica: Homenaje a Mario Caimi. Ed. Claudia Jáuregui, et al. (op cit.). 140-63. [M]

Duverney, Claude. Lire Kant: Visite Guidée de la Critique de la Raison Pure. Genève: Slatkine Érudition, 2015. [196 p.] [WC]

Dyck, Corey W. “Beyond the Paralogisms: The Proofs of Immortality in the Lectures on Metaphysics.” Reading Kant’s Lectures. Ed. Robert R. Clewis (op cit.). 115-34. [M]

 ——. “Response to Lorini.” Estudos Kantianos 3.2 (2015): 242-46. [M] [online]

 ——. “Reply to My Critics.” Critique (blog posted: 26 Jun 2015) n.p. [PW] [online]

[top] E    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Earle, Robert. “Is Natural Beauty the Given?” Environmental Ethics 37 (2015): 3-19. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The contemporary interpretation of the history of the aesthetics of nature has been analyzed by Allen Carlson, Ronald Hepburn, Theodor Adorno, and others. According to their interpretation, it has been maintained that pre-Kantian accounts of beauty (taken generally) prioritized natural beauty over art and that Kant was either the last to follow this model or the first to “humanize” aesthetics for reasons pertaining to his ethical system. This interpretation can be called into question via an analysis of the moral and cultural aspects of pre-Kantian and Kantian aesthetics of nature, appealing, in particular, to the works of Lord Shaftesbury, John Dennis, and Joseph Addison. The main focus is on an explication of what this common contemporary interpretation of aesthetic history has to say about contemporary aesthetic theory. The pre-Kantian aesthetics of nature is so radically different from the work of these recent theorists that it is inaccurate to link members from those periods together as allies. Rather, this commonly depicted history of the aesthetic of nature, in which mid-twentieth century figures discuss a “turning away from nature,” is both historically problematic and in keeping with a general twentieth-century nostalgia for an idyllic past.

Edgar, Scott. “On Corey Dyck’s Kant and Rational Psychology.” Critique (blog posted: 25 Jun 2015) n.p. [PW] [online]

 ——. Rev. of The Genesis of Neo-Kantianism: 1796-1880, by Frederick Beiser (2014). British Journal for the History of Philosophy 23.5 (2015): 1009-12. [PW]

Ehrsam, Raphael. “De la raison pratique à la raison historique au sujet de la structure de l’Idée d’une histoire universelle au point de vue cosmopolitique.” Kant, la raison pratique: concepts et héritages. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Margit Ruffing, and Ricardo Ribeiro Terra (op cit.). 275-84. [M]

Eisfeld, Jens. Erkenntnis, Rechtserzeugung und Staat bei Kant und Fichte. Tubingen: Mohr Seibeck, 2015. [ix, 467 p.] [WC]

Elaković, Simo. Kant naš savremenik kritika etosnog, uma kao orijentaciju u mišljenju i delovanju. [Serbian] Belgrade: Zavod za udzbenike, 2015. [237 p.] [WC]

Elismar, Alves dos Santos. Religião, Moral e Teologia na Obra de Immanuel Kant. [Portuguese] Novas Edições Acadêmicas, 2015. [120 p.] [WC]

Engstrom, Stephen. “Ancient Insights in Kant’s Conception of the Highest Good.” Kant’s Lectures on Ethics: A Critical Guide. Eds. Denis, Lara, and Oliver Sensen. (op cit.). 103-19. [M]

 ——. “The Complete Object of Practical Knowledge.” The Highest Good in Aristotle and Kant. Eds. Joachim Aufderheide and Ralf M. Bader (op cit.). 129-57. [M]

 ——. “Reflection and Reason in Hume and Kant.” Hegel Bulletin 36.1 (2015): 15-32. [PW]

Enskat, Rainer. “¿Espontaneidad o circularidad de la autoconciencia? Kant y el centro cognitivo de la subjetividad que juzga.” [Spanish; Spontaneity or circularity of self-consciousness? Kant and the cognitive centre of a judging subjectivity] Anuario Filosofico 48.3 (2015): 443-68. [ASP]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Self-consciousness is the consciousness of its subject to unite absolutely by him-/herself, i.e. spontaneously (sua sponte, καθ’αὑτόν), logically disparate representations into forms of judgements as such. The so-called circularity of self-consciousness is irrelevant to this form of self-consciousness. This logical spontaneity is in structural conformity with practical autonomy: it is the ability of its subject to judge absolutely by him-/herself (καθ’αὑτόν), i.e spontaneously, the harmony of the practical character of his/her actions in relation to maxims with nomological practical criteria.

 ——. “Einleitung: Kants Paradoxie der Erfahrung.” Urteil und Erfahrung: Kants Theorie der Erfahrung. Ed. Rainer Enskat (op cit.). 9-46. [M]

 ——, ed. Urteil und Erfahrung: Kants Theorie der Erfahrung. Berlin / Boston: De Gruyter, 2015. [304 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents: (essays listed separately)
Rainer Enskat (Einleitung: Kants Paradoxie der Erfahrung),
Patricia Kitcher (Apperception as the Supreme Principle of the Understanding),
Robert Schnepf (Transzendentale Argumente und die Probleme der kantischen Urteilstafel),
Marcus Willaschek (The Sensibility of Human Intuition: Kant’s Causal Condition on Accounts of Representation),
Manfred Baum (Kants "Möglichkeit der Erfahrung"),
Alejandro G. Vigo (Kategoriale Synthesis und Einheit des Bewusstseins. Zu Kants Lehre vom Verhältnis zwischen Wahrnehmung und Erfahrung),
Mario Caimi (Der Schematismus der reinen Verstandesbegriffe),
Dieter Scheffel (Kants Idee der kopernikanischen Wendung),
Claudia Bickmann (Kants Metaphysik der "Einen Erfahrung": Analyse der formalen und der materialen Bedingungen ihrer Möglichkeit).

Erdle, Birgit R. Literarische Epistemologie der Zeit: Lektüren zu Kant, Kleist, Heine und Kafka. Paderborn: Wilhelm Fink, 2015. [313 p.] [WC]

Eremeev, Veniamin Gennad’evic. Immanuil Kant – nas Zemljak i Sovremennik. [Russian; Immanuel Kant – our fellow-countryman and contemporary] Kalinigrad: Smartbooks, 2015. [239 p.] [WC]

Espinoza, Tania. “The Ethics of Psychoanalysis Encore, Beyond the Limits of Speculative Reason.” Filozofski vestnik (Ljubljana) 36.2 (2015): 33-53. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The essay reads Jacques Lacan’s Seminar XX, Encore as a transcendental reflection on feminine sexuality that confronts the scepticism of the biology of sex with the dogmatism of idealised femininity, leaving the realm of the ‘beyond experience’ of the Kantian noumenon, or the ‘beyond the phallus’ of the Lacanian feminine jouissance as an ethical ‘room for faith’ onto which feminism can project its horizon. For this, it reconstructs a hypothetical dialogue between Jacques Lacan and Mary Jane Sherfey, an American psychiatrist who, in 1966, presented the theory that civilization was founded on the suppression of women’s insatiable sexual drive. Comparing this insatiability to reason’s natural tendency towards the absolute, I propose a reading of the relationship between Kant’s antinomy of pure reason and Lacan’s formulas of sexuation that revises Joan Copjec’s reading. If Encore invites a passage from a masculine to a feminine position within discourse, this involves moving from the mathematical to the dynamic class of conflicts in the antinomy, from the point of view of the theoretical or speculative to that of practical reason.

Esteves, Julio. “Some Implications from the Primacy of the Good Will.” Estudos Kantianos 3.1 (2015): 27-38. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: There are two opposed tendencies in the interpretation of the good will: the interpreters consider either the value of the gifts of nature and fortune in isolation or apart from their combination with a good will or the value of the good will completely apart from its relation to the gifts. I dealt with the first interpretative tendency in a previous paper. Here I draw some implications from my thesis of the primacy of the good will in order to deal with the second interpretative tendency, which can be seen in authorized Kant’s interpreters, such as Karl Ameriks and Allen Wood.

Euler, Werner. “Kants Kritik der teleologischen Urteilskraft als Fachlogik der Biologie.” Studi Kantiani 28 (2015): 19-64. [PW]

 ——. “Kants kopernikanische Revolution in der Ästhetik.” Immanuel Kant und die kopernikanische Wende in der Philosophie. Ed. Tomasz Kupś (op cit.). 55-70??. [WC]

 ——. “Liberdade moral, justiça e cidadania em Kant.” [Portuguese; Moral Freedom, Justice and Citizenship in Kant] Studia Kantiana 13.19 (2015): 7-37. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this article, I pretend to interconnect systematically three essential ideas of Kant’s practical philosophy. These are the ideas of moral freedom, justice and citizenship. My first references in Kant’s work are the Critique of Practical Reason and the Metaphysics of Morals. Through the demonstration of that fundamental relationship I will examine and comment critically on some kantian theses belonging to the centre of his theory of right and state. Moreover, I will defend his position against some recent interpretations proposed by modern authors, concerning the systematic linkage and independence between right and ethics. In my opinion, the critique of those authors are based on misunderstandings and cannot be justified completely. The aim of my investigation is to mark out the subjective and the objective limits of Kant’s theory of morality.

 ——. Rev. of Kants „Kategorien der Freiheit“, by Stephan Zimmermann (2011). Kant-Studien 106.2 (2015): 326-35. [PW]

[top] F    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Fabbianelli, Faustino. “Kant’s Concept of Moral Imputatio.” Reading Kant’s Lectures. Ed. Robert R. Clewis (op cit.). 200-22. [M]

Faggion, Andrea. “Kant and the Night-Watchman State.” Kant and the Metaphors of Reason. Ed. Patricia Kauark-Leite, et al. (op cit.). 321-30. [M]

 ——. “Can Mere Intuitions Represent Objects?” Kant’’s Lectures/Kants Vorlesungen. Eds. Bernd Dörflinger, et al. (op cit.). 91-103. [M]

 ——. “Remarks on ‘the Only Original Right Belonging to Every Man by Virtue of His Humanity’.” Estudos Kantianos 3.1 (2015): 57-65. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant compares a merely empirical doctrine of right to the wooden head in Phaedru’s fable, i. e. a head that has no brain (MS AA 06: 229). An a priori right may be acquired or innate. According to Kant, there is only one innate right (MS AA 06: 237). That only one innate right is freedom. In that context, freedom means “independence from being constrained by another’s choice” (MS AA 06: 237). As a moral right, such a right implies reciprocity. This being so, it is a right to be held “insofar as it can coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law” (MS AA 06: 237). The reason why it is an innate right is that it is a “right belonging to every man by virtue of his humanity” (MS AA 06: 237). This paper aims to clarify a few issues regarding our innate right to freedom. To start with, we need a deeper understanding of the meaning of freedom as independence from being constrained by another’s choice. I will claim that such an independence should be understood as absence from fraud and violence. Following, it is in order to analyze the condition according to which freedom is a right: coexistence with the freedom of every other in accord with a universal law. I will claim that such a condition does not imply political authority. Finally, we have to handle the connection between the innate right to freedom and our humanity. I will claim that the innate right to freedom cannot be disconnected from the second formula of the categorical imperative.

Fahmy, Melissa Seymour. Rev. of Reading Onora O’Neill, edited by David Archard, Monique Deveaux, Neil Manson, and Daniel Weinstock (2013). Kantian Review 20.1 (2013): 140-45. [PI]

Falduto, Antonino. “Sentiment moral et raison pratique dans la ‘Doctrine de la vertu’ de la Métaphysique des moeurs.” Kant, la raison pratique: concepts et héritages. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Margit Ruffing, and Ricardo Ribeiro Terra (op cit.). 163-71. [M]

Falkenbach, Tiago Fonseca. “O caráter irrestrito do princípio kantiano de causalidade.” [Portuguese; The unrestricted universality of Kant’s principle of causality] Kant e-Prints 10.2 (2015): 1-23. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: n this paper, I offer an ontological interpretation of Kant‟s argument for the principle of causality, as presented in his „Second Analogy‟ of Experience (Critique of Pure Reason, A199-201/B244-6). By an ontological interpretation I understand a reconstruction of the argument which tries to justify the principle by means of considerations about the reality or nature of time, rather than through considerations about the semantic or epistemic relations to this reality. The emphasis on time is given to Kant‟s thesis that the analogies of experience are rules of general time-determination. I shall argue that the ontological interpretation is preferable to the more usual, semantical and epistemological varieties, because

Fantasia, Francesca. Il tempo dell'agire libero: Dimensioni della filosofia pratica di Kant. Pisa: ETS, 2015. [310 p.] [WC]

Feldhaus, Charles. “Dever e inclinação em Kant e Schiller.” [Portuguese; Duty and Inclination in Kant and Schiller] ethic@ 14.3 (2015): 395-414. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This study deals with the debate between Kant and Schiller about the role of the inclinations and the duty in morality. Based on an epigram of Schiller many critics of the ethics of Kant said that Kant offers no place to feelings in ethics. However, this scenario has changed in recent years with several members of the Kant-Forschung highlighting the role that Kant gives virtue and feelings in his later works. Now it is a commomplace to identify the position of Schiller regarding the ethics of Kant with what Schiller said in his work Über Anmut und Würde. Therefore, this study seeks to show how duty and inclination plays an important role in the ethical conceptions of Schiller and Kant. Moreover, Schiller raises some objections against the ethics of Kant and this study aims to outline some answers from Kant to these objections in works such as The Metaphysics of Morals, Vorarbeiten zur Religion and Vorlesungen zur Moralphilosophie.

Feldman, Karen. “Riven Sovereignty and Jewish Responsibility: On Conscience, Kant and Judith Butler.” Gewissen: Interdisziplinäre Perspektiven auf das 18. Jahrhundert. Eds. Simon Bunke and Katerina Mihaylova (op cit.). 389-99. [M]

Feloj, Serena. “La Zweckwidrigkeit e la definizione dell'organismo: i limiti della conoscenza matematica di fronte all'anomalia naturale.” Studi Kantiani 28 (2015): 105-116. [PW]

Fenves, Peter. “From Nietzsche’s Philosophy of History to Kant’s – and Back.” History and Theory 54.2 (2015): 277-86. [ASP]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Reflecting on Anthony Jensen’s Nietzsche’s Philosophy of History, this essay describes Jensen’s account of the three-stage development of Nietzsche’s historiographical practices and metahistorical positions: from his early philological writings, through The Birth of Tragedy, and into the mature philosophy of history that Jensen uncovers in Toward the Genealogy of Morality and Ecce Homo, which, so Jensen argues, consists in ontological realism combined with representational anti-realism. While Jensen notes the importance of a like-minded readership for the success of Nietzsche’s historiographical projects, the essay asks whether Nietzsche did in fact have such a readership and further emphasizes that the Genealogy and Ecce Homo are structured in such a way that they seek to create one. A similar structure is identified in Kant’s “Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Perspective.” The essay concludes by reflecting on the significance of this similarity in light of the doctrines of eternal recurrence that are expressed in both Nietzsche’s late writings and Kant’s youthful cosmology.

 ——. “Ações, causas e razões: Kant e a racionalização da ação.” [Portuguese; Actions, causes and reasons: Kant and the rationalization of the action] Kant e-Prints 10.1 (2015): 49-63. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper we will articulate the notions of actions, causes and reasons in order to explain the importance of “causes” and “reasons” in the context of the explanation and justification of the actions from the Critique of Pure Reason. The basic premise for that distinction is the Kantian defense of the necessity of regarding the human action from the twofold point of view, empiric concerning the effects of action e intelligible with regard the causes.

Ferraguto, Federico. Rev. of Kant et le pouvoir réceptif. Recherches sur la conception kantienne de la sensibilité, by Anselmo Aportone (2014). [Italian] Con-Textos Kantianos 2 (2015): 415-19. [M] [online]

Ferrara, Alessandro. “Varieties of Transcendence and Their Consequences for Political Philosophy.” European Legacy 20.2 (2015): 109-19. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this essay I argue that the notion of religious transcendence was a latecomer in human evolution. It did not appear before the Axial Age, and in its extreme form as a realm of ultimate meanings beyond human reach it had only a locally and temporally bounded existence. Once it appeared, however, the idea of religious transcendence set an evolutionary dynamic in motion, which soon led to various forms of immanent transcendence, starting from the Papal Revolution and continuing with the Reformation, the Enlightenment, the Kantian notion of the transcendental and its Hegelian and Habermasian modifications. In my conclusion I briefly discuss two alternative versions of modern immanent transcendence ‹cognitive and exemplary‹ and their consequences for political philosophy.

Ferrara, Luca. “Principio di ragione, giudizio e intelletto negli scritti precritici di Kant.” [Italian] Intelletto e ragione in Kant e Schopenhauer. Ed. Giuseppe Giannetto (op cit.). 67-116??. [WC]

Ferrari, Jean. “‘Préface’ de la Critique de la raison pratique. Étude et commentaire.” Kant, la raison pratique: concepts et héritages. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Margit Ruffing, and Ricardo Ribeiro Terra (op cit.). 15-31. [M]

 ——. Rev. of La raison et son Dieu. Étude sur la théologie kantienne, by Robert Theis (2012). Kant-Studien 106.2 (2015): 360-62. [PW]

Ferrarin, Alfredo. The Powers of Pure Reason: Kant and the Idea of Cosmic Philosophy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015. [xvi, 325 p.] [WC][review]

Ferraris, Maurizio. “Ding an sich” Das neue Bedürfnis nach Metaphysik / The New Desire for Metaphysics. Ed. Markus Gabriel (op cit.). 119-32??. [WC]

Ferreira, Arthur Arruda Leal. “A Crítica da Razão Pura e a História da Psicologia: de objeto histórico a instrumento de análise.” [Portuguese; The Critique of Pure Reason and the History of Psychology: from a historical object to an analytical device] Estudos Kantianos 3.2 (2015): 181-94. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The aim of this article is to propose a dialogue between Kantian thought (The Critique of Pure Reason) and the field of the history of psychology. For that the text will be divided in two parts. In the first part we will examine the contributions of Kantian critique to the constitution of a psychological project: psychology as a science of experience, referring to the work developed in the first psychological laboratories in the end of the 19th century. The hypothesis proposed is that the Kantian critiques of 18th century psychology are more important to the psychology of the 19th and 20th century than his positive assessments regarding this field. The second part of the text will introduce the contributions of authors such as Luís Cláudio Figueiredo and Michel Foucault, which used The Critique of Pure Reason to analyse modes of knowledge and experiences that constitute modern psychological knowledge and practices. At the conclusion we propose a discussion of the political sense of these critical appropriations in the history of psychology.

Ferreira, Pedro G. See: Saraiva, Marcelo H., and Pedro G. Ferreira.

Feuerhahn, Niels. Rev. of Critique of Practical Reason, by Immanuel Kant, translated into English by Mary Gregor (revised edition)(2015). Dialogue, published online (20 Nov 2015). [PI]

Fichant, Michel. “Raison pratique et système.” Kant, la raison pratique: concepts et héritages. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Margit Ruffing, and Ricardo Ribeiro Terra (op cit.). 33-52. [M]

Fidalgo Da Silva, Cláudia Maria. Rev. of Regresso a Kant – Ética, Estética, Filosofia Política, by Leonel Ribeiro dos Santos (2012). [Portuguese] Con-Textos Kantianos 2 (2015): 380-88. [M] [online]

Fierens, Christian. “Logique de la vérité et logique de l’errance chez Kant et chez Lacan.” Filozofski vestnik (Ljubljana) 36.2 (2015): 55-85. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Four fundamental concepts (the Freudian concepts of repetition, unconscious, drive, and transference) articulate not just psychoanalytical theory, but also its practice. They relate directly to the phenomena that are present in the treatment; in this sense, they come under the first part of the Kantian transcendental logic, i.e. the logic of truth or the transcendental analytic of pure reason. Psychoanalysis cannot be satisfied by exploring the field of possibilities given in and by the phenomenology of these fundamental concepts without being confronted with the impossible; it must take into account that it bumps against something impossible for each of these Freudian concepts (the invention of the “object a” and its four forms by Lacan and Kant’s table or nothing) and this opens the infinite field of suppositions that go far beyond the phenomenological field; nevertheless these suppositions are very effective. The logic of noumenon, the logic that guides us, or the logic of these pure suppositions does not respond only to the research of truth, but to an approach of the Real and it corresponds to the logic of an erring or to Kant’s transcendental dialectic in the Critique of Pure Reason. The latter entails another three Lacanian concepts (besides the “object a”): the subject and its questioning (corresponding to the paralogisms of the psychological idea of Kant), the phallus and its functioning (corresponding to the cosmological ideas of Kant), and finally the big Other and its ex-sistence outside every existence (corresponding to the theological idea of Kant).

Fincham, Richard Mark. “Reconciling Leibnizian Monadology and Kantian Criticism.” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 23.6 (2015): 1033-55. [ASP]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper (written for the ‘300 Year’s of Leibniz’s Monadology’ conference) explores systematic parallels between the criticisms of Kantian cognitive dualism provided by Salomon Maimon within his ’Essay on Transcendental Philosophy’ of 1790 and F.W.J. Schelling within his ’General Overview of the Most Recent Philosophical Literature’ of 1797. It discusses how both Maimon and Schelling suggest that the difficulties with Kant’s cognitive dualism are so severe that they can only be resolved by recourse to a Leibnizian position, in which sensibility and understanding, and matter and form, arise from one and the same cognitive source. It thus shows how Maimon and Schelling – within 1790 and 1797, respectively – sketch systems of transcendental philosophy explicitly modelled on the Leibnizian philosophy, which both of them interpret as claiming that God is immanently contained within the human soul.

Fine, Robert. Rev. of Grounding Cosmopolitanism: From Kant to the Idea of a Cosmopolitan Constitution, by Garrett Wallace Brown (2013). Perspectives on Politics 13.1 (2015): 179-80. [PW]

Finkelde, Dominik. Exzessive Subjektivität. Eine Theorie tathafter Neubregründung des Ethischen nach Kant, Hegel, und Lacan Freiburg: Verlag Karl Alber, 2015. [408 p.] [WC] [review (of English translation)]

Firestone, Chris L. Rev. of Kant on Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, by Lawrence R. Pasternack (2014). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (Sep 2015, #21). [M] [online]

Fischer, Norbert. “Kant as Pastor.” Reading Kant’s Lectures. Ed. Robert R. Clewis (op cit.). 392-407. [M]

 ——. “Hinführung zum Thema ‘Vernunftreligion und Offenbarungsglaube’.” Vernunftreligion und Offenbarungsglaube. Eds. Norbert Fischer and Jakub Sirovátka (op cit.). 5-34. [M]

 ——. “Glaube und Vernunft. Zu ihrem Verhältnis bei Augustinus, Meister Eckhart und Immanuel Kant.” Vernunftreligion und Offenbarungsglaube. Eds. Norbert Fischer and Jakub Sirovátka (op cit.). 52-83. [M]

 ——. “Kant als Seelsorger. Die Vorlesungen über die philosophische Religionslehre und der Zweck der Schöpfung.” Vernunftreligion und Offenbarungsglaube. Eds. Norbert Fischer and Jakub Sirovátka (op cit.). 348-64. [M]

 ——, and Jakub Sirovátka, eds. Vernunftreligion und Offenbarungsglaube. Zur Erörterung einer seit Kant verschärften Problematik. Freiburg: Herder, 2015. [xiii, 570 p.] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Vol. 16 of Forschungen zur europäischen Geistegeschichte. Select essays:
Norbert Fischer (Hinführung zum Thema ‘Vernunftreligion und Offenbarungsglaube’),
Norbert Fischer (Glaube und Vernunft. Zu ihrem Verhältnis bei Augustinus, Meister Eckhart und Immanuel Kant),
Ludger Schwienhorst-Schönberger (Schrifthermeneutik und Rationalität des christlichen Glaubens bei Origenes — mit einem Ausblick auf Kant),
Friedo Ricken (Offenbarung und Vernunftreligion in der Philosophie Kants: ein vielfach differenziertes Verhältnis von Mittel und Zweck),
Bernd Dörflinger (Kants Kritik religiöser Gefühle),
Rudolf Langthaler (Das Christentum als ‘wundersame Religion’ und die ‘durch hergebrachte fromme Lehren erleuchtete praktische Vernunft’ nach Immanuel Kant),
Thomas Hanke (Kants Philosophie der Offenbarung. Ein Itinerarium der ästhetisch-reflektierenden Urteilskraft in religionsphilosophischer und vernunfttheoretischer Absicht),
Ruben Schneider (Negative Theologie und analoge Gotteserkenntnis in Kants theoretischer Philosophie. Kantische und Thomanische Analogielehre im Vergleich),
Ludmila Kryshtop (Das Ideal der Heiligkeit in der praktischen Philosophie Kants),
Andrej K. Sudakow (Zwischen Herzensglauben und Vernunftfrömmigkeit: Wie Kant nicht zum Offenbarungsphilosophen geworden ist),
Norbert Fischer (Kant als Seelsorger. Die Vorlesungen über die philosophische Religionslehre und der Zweck der Schöpfung),
Alexei Krouglov (Die erste Rezeption der Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft in Rußland: Der Fall J. W. L. Mellmann (1795)),
Pedro Jesús Teruel (Zur Wurzel des Bösen. Das Problem der Erbsünde zwischen geoffenbarter Religion und Vernunft, von Kant und Schelling bis Freud: ein Versöhnungsvorschlag).

Fisher, Naomi. Rev. of Kant and Rational Psychology, by Corey Dyck (2014). Review of Metaphysics 68.3 (2015): 651-53. [M]

Flach, Werner. Kant zu Geschichte, Kultur und Recht. Edited by Wolfgang Bock. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2015. [xii, 301 p.] [WC]

Fleischacker, Sam. “Kant’s Enlightenment.” Con-Textos Kantianos 2 (2015): 177-96. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: I urge here that Kant’s essay “What is Enlightenment?” be read in the context of debates at the time over the public critique of religion, and together with elements of his other writings, especially a short piece on orientation in thinking that he wrote two years later. After laying out the main themes of the essay in some detail, I argue that, read in context, Kant’s call to “think for ourselves” is not meant to rule out a legitimate role for relying on the testimony of others, that it is directed instead against a kind of blind religious faith, in which one either refuses to question one’s clerical authorities or relies on a mystical intuition that cannot be assessed by reason. Both of these ways of abandoning reason can be fended off if we always submit our private thoughts to the test of public scrutiny: which is why enlightenment, for Kant, requires both free thinking, by each individual for him or herself, and a realm of free public expression in which individuals can discuss the results of their thinking.

Fleitas González, Martín. “¿Solo hay realismo o constructivismo moral dentro del neokantismo contemporáneo? Notas para una fundamentación moral kantiana con base en la idea de libertad.” [Spanish; Does Contemporary Neo-Kantianism Only Allow for Moral Realism or Constructivism? Elements for a Kantian Grounding of Morality Solely on the basis of the Idea of Freedom] Ideas y Valores 64.159 (2015): 131-53. [PW] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article carries out a reflection on the sources of normativity in contemporary Neo-Kantianism, which has divided Neo-Kantians into realists and constructivists. After analyzing the constructivist Kantianism of Christine Korsgaard, we propose an alternative: that of grounding normativity solely on the idea of freedom, as an internal value or non-normative absolute, as Kant understands it. This proposal makes it possible to outline a Neo-Kantianism that articulates constructivist and realist models on the sole basis of the idea of freedom.

Flynn, Thomas R. “Kant and Sartre: The Quiet Power of the Imaginary.” Comparing Kant and Sartre. Ed. Sorin Baiasu (op cit.). 62-76. [PW]

Foessel, Michaël. Kant et l'équivoque du monde. Paris: CNRS Éditions, 2015. [332 p.] [WC]

Foreman, Elizabeth. “The Object of Respect.” Environmental Ethics 37.1 (2015): 57-73. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Although it is widely held that we do not owe basic respect to nonhuman animals, a close examination of why we owe this respect to human beings leads to the conclusion that we owe it to nonhuman animals as well. While Kant’s basic notion of respect for persons is intuitively plausible, Kant’s two arguments for why respect is owed to human beings ultimately fail, and a reconsideration of which feature of human beings actually grounds the respect that humans are owed is called for. Ultimately, it is not the robust rational autonomy that Kant suggests, but rather the basic subjectivity that underlies it (being the subject-of-a-life). Since this subjectivity is shared by nonhuman animals, they are owed respect as well.

Forgione, Luca. “Kant on de re: some aspects of the Kantian non-conceptualism debate.” Kant Studies Online (2015): 32-64; posted May 25, 2015. [M] [pdf]

Forster, Michael. Rev. of The Impact of Idealism: The Legacy of Post-Kantian German Thought, vol. I: Philosophy and Natural Sciences, edited by Karl Ameriks (2013). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (Aug 2015, #22). [M] [online]

Foster, Jay. “Kant’s Machiavellian Moment.” Con-Textos Kantianos 2 (2015): 238-60. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: At least two recent collections of essays – Postmodernism and the Enlightenment (2001) and What’s Left of Enlightenment?: A Postmodern Question (2001) – have responded to postmodern critiques of Enlightenment by arguing that Enlightenment philosophes themselves embraced a number of post-modern themes. This essay situates Kant’s essay Was ist Aufklärung (1784) in the context of this recent literature about the appropriate characterization of modernity and the Enlightenment. Adopting an internalist reading of Kant’s Aufklärung essay, this paper observes that Kant is surprisingly ambivalent about who might be Enlightened and unspecific about when Enlightenment might be achieved. The paper argues that this is because Kant is concerned less with elucidating his concept of Enlightenment and more with characterizing a political condition that might provide the conditions for the possibility of Enlightenment. This paper calls this political condition modernity and it is achieved when civil order can be maintained alongside fractious and possibly insoluble public disagreement about matters of conscience, including the nature and possibility of Enlightenment. Thus, the audience for the Aufklärung essay is not the tax collector, soldier or clergyman, but rather the sovereign. Kant enjoins and advises the prince that discord and debate about matters of conscience need not entail any political unrest or upheaval. It is in this restricted (Pocockian) sense that the Enlightenment essay is Kant’s Machiavellian moment.

Franceschet, Antonio. “The International Criminal Court’s Authority Crisis and Kant’s Political Ethics.” International Criminal Law Review 16.2 (2015): 201-15. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The International Criminal Court (ICC) faces a profound authority crisis. This article explores the underlying conditions and ethical implications of this crisis in light of Immanuel Kant’s (1724–1804) political theory. The ICC’s authority crisis is twofold: First, having been constructed as a purely legal actor, the Court’s inevitable role in politics has undermined perceptions of its legitimacy. Second, having been constructed as a supranational substitute for domestic legal authority, the ICC has been subverted by other, political branches of the state, such as the executive. These problems have been particularly salient in Africa where states have vociferously challenged the Court’s investigations and prosecutions. Kantian political ethics show that the ICC’s authority crisis is an intractable moral problem that must be addressed collectively and coercively by sovereign states acting upon a larger, cosmopolitan duty to enforce universal rights.

Franzel, Sean. Rev. of Lektüren der Erinnerung: Lessing, Kant, Hegel, by Peter Gilgen (2012). Eighteenth-Century Studies 48.4 (2015): 551-53. [MUSE]

Freudenthal, Gideon. Rev. of Salomon Maimon, Essay on Transcendental Philosophy, translated by Nick Midgley, Henry Somers-Hall, Alistair Welchman, and Merten Reglitz (2010). Kant-Studien 106.1 (2015): 142-45. [PW]

Friedlander, Eli. Expressions of Judgment: An Essay on Kant’s Aesthetics. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2015. [xii, 117 p.] [WC] [review]

Friedmann Michael. Kant ve Kesin Bilimler. [Turkish; Kant and the Exact Sciences] Translated from the English by Sibel San Öget. Istanbul: Alfa Basim Yayim, 2015. [444 p.] [WC]

Frierson, Patrick R. “Herder: Religion and Moral Motivation.” Kant’s Lectures on Ethics: A Critical Guide. Eds. Denis, Lara, and Oliver Sensen. (op cit.). 34-50. [M]

 ——. Rev. of The Free Development of Each: Studies of Freedom, Right and Ethics in Classical German Philosophy, by Allen W. Wood (2014). Kantian Review 20.3 (2015): 506-12. [PW]

 ——. Rev. of The Free Development of Each: Studies of Freedom, Right and Ethics in Classical German Philosophy, by Allen W. Wood (2014). Kantian Review 20.3 (2015): 506-12. [PW]

Frühauf, Manfred. “Der Löbenicht’sche Kirchturm: Guo Moruo trifft Immanuel Kant.” Kant-Studien 106.2 (2015): 286-325. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Guo Moruo is one of the most controversial intellectuals of China in the first half of the 20th century and a famous translator of the works of Goethe, Shakespeare, Nietzsche etc. Having immersed himself in Western conceptions of aethetics, literature, social sciences, politics, and philosophy while living in Japan, he introduced this newly acquired knowledge to the Chinese reading public. After his self-pronounced conversion to Communism in 1924 he published a short story titled The Steeple of Löbenicht Church, describing a day in the life of the German philosopher Kant. Irrespective of his political attitude, in his opinion Kant’s ideas offered sound advice and urgently needed new standards in the endeavour to modernize China.

 ——. “The Unity of Metaphysics in Kant’s Lectures.” Reading Kant’s Lectures. Ed. Robert R. Clewis (op cit.). 64-88. [M]

Fugate, Courtney D. “On a Supposed Solution to the Reinhold/Sidgwick Problem in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals.” European Journal of Philosophy 23.3 (2015): 349-73. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to challenge the suggestion that Kant offers a solution to the Reinhold/Sidgwick Problem in his Metaphysics of Morals. The problem, briefly, is about how Kant can hold moral evil to be imputable when he also seems to hold that freedom is found only in moral actions. After providing a new formulation of this problem under the title ‘Objection R/S’ and describing the popular strategy for addressing it through reference to this text, the paper recounts some of the history relevant to interpreting the passage in question. The paper then argues that this strategy is not supported by the text and indeed proves to be contrary to other arguments that are central to Kant's moral thought. The closing section briefly considers other possible ways of addressing the Objection R/S.

Funaba, Yasuyuki, ed. See: Kenkyukai, Kanto, Yasushi Kato, and Yasuyuki Funaba, eds.

[top] G    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Gabriel, Markus, ed. Das neue Bedürfnis nach Metaphysik / The New Desire for Metaphysics. Berlin / Boston: De Gruyter, 2015. [ix, 292 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: See the essays by:
Birgit Sandkaulen (Letzte oder erste Fragen? Zum Bedürfnis nach Metaphysik in einer Skizze zu Kant und Jacobi),
Laura Anna Macor (Woher oder wohin? Der bidirektionale Weg des Menschen zum Unbedingten: Respondenz zum Beitrag von Birgit Sandkaulen),
Karl Ameriks (Kantian Metaphysics: A Personal History of its Recent Return),
Thomas Khurana (Which Metaphysics? Notes on the Modest and Reflexive Character of Karl Ameriks' Metaphysics),
Chong-Fuk Lau (Die Ambition der Kantischen Metaphysik: Entwurf einer transzendental-funktionatistischen Interpretation),
Óscar Cubo (Respondenz zum Beitrag von Chong-Fuk Lau),
Maurizio Ferraris (Ding an sich),
Elisabetta Basso (A Response to the Paper of Maurizio Ferraris),
James F. Conant (Kants Kritik des Schichtenmodells des menschlichen Geistes),
Guido Kreis (Kant und das Problem des Gegebenen: Antwort auf James Conant).

Gagliano, Giuseppe. La Filosofia Politica Kantiana. Rome: Armando Editore, 2015. [123 p.] [WC]

García-Quero, Fernando, and Jorge Ollero-Perán. “Is Neoclassical Economics Scientific Knowledge Detached from Ethics? A Kantian Answer, an Institutionalist Alternative.” Review of Radical Political Economics 47.1 (2015): 56-69. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper aims to criticize the common idea which sustains that current neoclassical economics is detached from ethics, and therefore is scientific knowledge. Using Kantian critical philosophy, we argue, on the contrary, that neoclassical economics is based on certain ethical postulates, and thus it cannot obtain the status of science. Although ethics is but one of the many institutions that affect economics, it plays a major role in setting the basis on which to build its entire theoretical structure. Approaching the analysis from institutionalism places ethical issues at the forefront of economic debate, thus opening the door to future dialogue between disciplines and analytical approaches.

Gardner, Sebastian. “German Idealism, Classical Pragmatism, and Kant’s Third Critique.” Pragmatism, Kant, and Transcendental Philosophy. Eds. Gabriele Gava and Robert Stern (op cit.). 22-45??. [WC]

 ——, and Matthew Grist, eds. The Transcendental Turn. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. [viii, 380 p.] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: See especially ...
Henry E. Allison (From Transcendental Realism to Transcendental Idealism: The Nature and Significance of Kant's 'Transcendental Turn'),
Karl Ameriks (On Reconciling the Transcendental Turn with Kant's Idealism),
Paul Abela (Kant, Naturalism, and the Reach of Practical Reason),
Daniel Breazeale (The 'Synthetic-Genetic Method' of Transcendental Philosophy: Kantian Questions/Fichtean Answers).

 ——. “Transcendental Idealism at the Limit: On A. W. Moore’s Criticism of Kant.” Philosophical Topics 43.1-2 (2015): 63-85. [MUSE]

Garrido Miñambres, Germán. “Correspondencia o armonía. La literatura en la distinción kantiana de las bellas artes.” [Spanish; Correspondence or harmony. Literature within Kantian distinction of fine arts] Con-Textos Kantianos 2 (2015): 100-14. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The Critique of Judgment provides poetry with a distinction within fine arts that finds no basis in the critique of aesthetic judgment: if the Analytic relates the feeling of pleasure, typical of the beautiful, to the harmonic relationship among the faculties of knowledge, the very thing that distinguishes literature is the affinity that its representative medium holds with the faculty of understanding. The primacy of poetry in the CJ needs to obey a prior aesthetic theory that equates the taste with the correspondence between sensitivity and reason consubstantial to any judgment of knowledge. This work outlines the continuity of the classicist poetics in Kant´s work confronting the notion of correspondence (Übereinstimmung) adopted by his first aesthetic theory with its delimitation in regards to the notion of harmony introduced by the third critique.

Garrido Wainer, Juan Manuel. “A Kantian Account of the Knowledge of Life and the Life Sciences.” Idealistic Studies 45.3 (2015): 355-79. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper offers an interpretation of Kant’s philosophy of biology in the context of current debates concerning experiment and causality in scientific practice. My interpretation is strongly indebted to Neo-Kantian contributions, and does not intend to provide a historically exhaustive reconstruction of Kant’s philosophy of biology. My aim is to show that the third Critique offers a relevant theoretical framework to explore the limits and scopes of experimental practice in life sciences. From a Kantian (and Neo-Kantian) point of view, biology is causal research that objectifies causal systems; it neither proposes nor presupposes a theoretical understanding of the idea of “life.” Therefore, fundamental concepts such as “program,” “gene,” “organicism,” etc., should be referred to causal entities or processes that have no meaning outside concrete experimental contexts. Kantian and Neo-Kantian approaches reject any mode of knowing living nature based on vitalistic intuitions of inner life and indirect lived experience.

Garthoff, Jon. “The Salience of Moral Character.” Southern Journal of Philosophy 53.2 (2015): 178-95. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this essay I review an underappreciated strand of thought according to which the best Kantian moral theory has less in common with paradigmatically deontological theories and more in common with virtue theories than is standardly maintained. I then argue this program should be continued further, to provide not only a virtue-based account of moral judgment but also a virtue-based account of moral worth. I make a case that this fusion of Kantian theory with virtue theory provides the best account of moral rules, and I close by suggesting that it generates a promising new understanding of moral rights.

Gaus, Gerald. “Private and Public Conscience (Or, Is the Sanctity of Conscience a Liberal Commitment or an Anarchical Fallacy?)” Reason, Value, and Respect. Eds. Mark Timmons and Robert N. Johnson (op cit.). 135-56. [M]

Gava, Gabriele. “The Fallibilism of Kant’s Architectonic.” Pragmatism, Kant, and Transcendental Philosophy. Eds. Gabriele Gava and Robert Stern (op cit.). 46-66. [M]

 ——. “Kant's Synthetic and Analytic Method in the Critique of Pure Reason and the Distinction between Philosophical and Mathematical Syntheses.” European Journal of Philosophy 23.3 (2015): 728-49. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article addresses Kant's distinction between a synthetic and an analytic method in philosophy. I will first consider how some commentators have accounted for Kant's distinction and analyze some passages in which Kant defined the analytic and the synthetic method. I will suggest that confusion about Kant's distinction arises because he uses it in at least two different senses. I will then identify a specific way in which Kant accounts for this distinction when he is differentiating between mathematical and philosophical syntheses. I will examine Kant's arguments in the Critique of Pure Reason with the latter sense of the distinction in mind. I will evaluate if he uses the analytic or the synthetic method and if the synthetic method is able to identify, without a previous consideration of some sort of given knowledge, sufficient conditions for deriving some aspects of our knowledge.

 ——, and Robert Stern. “Introduction.” Pragmatism, Kant, and Transcendental Philosophy. Eds. Gabriele Gava and Robert Stern (op cit.). 1-21. [M]

 ——, and Robert Stern, eds. Pragmatism, Kant, and Transcendental Philosophy. New York: Routledge, 2015. [vii, 297 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents: (essays listed separately)
Sebastian Gardner (German Idealism, Classical Pragmatism, and Kant’s Third Critique),
Gabriele Gava (The Fallibilism of Kant’s Architectonic),
David Macarthur (A Kant-Inspired Vision of Pragmatism as Democratic Experimentalism),
Cheryl Misak (Peirce, Kant, and What We Must Assume),
Daniel Herbert (Peirce and the Final Opinion: Against Apel’s Transcendental Interpretation of the Categories),
Jean-Marie Chevalier (Forms of Reasoning as Conditions of Possibility: Peirce’s Transcendental Inquiry Concerning Inductive Knowledge),
Marcus Willaschek (Kant and Peirce on Belief),
Robert Stern (Round Kant or Through Him? On James’s Arguments for Fredom, and Their Relation to Kant’s),
Graham Bird (Consciousness in Kant and William James),
James R. O’Shea (Concepts of Objects as Prescribing Laws: A Kantian and Pragmatist Line of Thought),
Sami Pihlström (Subjectivity as Negativity and as a Limit: On the Metaphysics and Ethics of the Transcendental Self, Pragmatically Naturalized),
Wolfgang Kuhlmann (A Plea for Transcendental Philosophy),
Boris Rähme (Transcendental Arguments,Epistemically Constrained Truth,and Moral Discourse).

Geiger, Ido. “How Are the Different Formulas of the Categorical Imperative Related?” Kantian Review 20.3 (2015): 395-419. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article defends three claims regarding the relation between the different formulas of the categorical imperative. (1) On its prevailing reading, FUL gives different moral guidance than FH; left answered, this problem is an argument for adopting a competing perspective on FUL. (2) The prohibitions and commands of the formulas should be taken to be extensionally the same; but FKE adds a dimension missing from the others, gained by uniting their perspectives, namely, bringing the variety of moral laws into systematic unity. (3) The grammatically ambiguous phrase in GMS, 4: 436.9–10 claims that FA alone unites the other formulas in itself.

 ——. “How Do We Acquire Moral Knowledge? Is Knowing Our Duty Ever Passive? – Two Questions for Martin Sticker.” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 23.5 (2015): 990-97. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Martin Sticker's discussion of the common moral agent contains much that I find insightful, true and significant. As a response to his paper, I focus on two important issues that nevertheless separate us: (1) Sticker claims that knowing our duty can be mere passive awareness and that it indeed is passive as awareness of the special status of humanity. I deny that knowing our duty is ever passive. (2) He further claims that the common universalization test is the paradigmatic way active agents acquire moral knowledge. I argue that Sticker appears to construe universalization as a formal test that presupposes no moral knowledge and that so construed the test cannot serve for acquiring moral knowledge.

 ——. “How Are the Different Formulas of the Categorical Imperative Related?” Kantian Review 20.3 (2015): 395-419. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article defends three claims regarding the relation between the different formulas of the categorical imperative. (1) On its prevailing reading, FUL gives different moral guidance than FH; left answered, this problem is an argument for adopting a competing perspective on FUL. (2) The prohibitions and commands of the formulas should be taken to be extensionally the same; but FKE adds a dimension missing from the others, gained by uniting their perspectives, namely, bringing the variety of moral laws into systematic unity. (3) The grammatically ambiguous phrase in GMS, 4: 436.9–10 claims that FA alone unites the other formulas in itself.

Gerhardt, Volker. 伊曼努尔·康德 : 理性与生命 / Yi man nu er Kang de: Li xing yu Sheng ming. [Chinese; Immanuel Kant: Reason and Life] Translated from the German by Yuanzhao Shu. Beijing: Zhong guo she hui ke xue chu ban she, 2015. [298 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Originally published as Immanuel Kant. Vernunft und Leben (Stuttgart: Reclam Verlag, 2002).

Gerlach, Burkhard. Rev. of Kants Grundlegung einer kritischen Metaphysik, edited by Norbert Fischer (2010). Kant-Studien 106.4 (2015): 695-99. [PW]

German, Andy. “Speculari Aude: The Platonic Path of Metaphysics in Dieter Henrich.” The Review of Metaphysics 69.2 (2015): 347-72. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: What form can metaphysics still take in a philosophical modernity that has been decisively shaped by the impact of Kant’s critical project? This question has exercised Dieter Henrich, one of Kant’s greatest living interpreters. This paper focuses on Henrich’s intricate argument that metaphysical thinking, albeit of a new kind, remains indispensable especially in an age for which self-consciousness is a first principle. Henrich seeks a form of thought that can justify and preserve what he views as modernity’s greatest achievement, its conception of the free, self-determining subject. Yet his description of this metaphysics for a new era reveals its surprisingly Platonic affinities. The paper focuses on those affinities, both in order critically to assess Henrich’s own work on subjectivity, but also because they reveal a fundamental and philosophically significant continuity that underlies all forms of comprehensive thinking, even in forms as divergent as those of Plato and Kant.

Giannetto, Giuseppe. “L'intelletto fra l'unità analitica e l'unità sintetica della coscienza in Kant.” [Italian] Intelletto e ragione in Kant e Schopenhauer. Ed. Giuseppe Giannetto (op cit.). 15-66??. [WC]

 ——, ed. Intelletto e ragione in Kant e Schopenhauer. [Italian] Naples: La scuola di Pitagora, 2015. [201 p.] [WC]

Gilicka, Magdalena. “Blaustein vs Kant und Husserl. Konzept der Erscheinungswelt.” Immanuel Kant und die kopernikanische Wende in der Philosophie. Ed. Tomasz Kupś (op cit.). 133-44??. [WC]

Ginsborg, Hannah. The Normativity of Nature: Essays on Kant’s Critique of Judgement. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. [ix, 364 p.] [WC] [review]

Godioli, Alberto. “The World as a Continuum: Kantian (and Dantean) Echoes in Gadda’s Pasticciaccio.” The Modern Language Review 110.3 (2015): 694-703. [JSTOR]

Goldberg, Nathaniel Jason. Kantian Conceptual Geography. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2015. [xiii, 271 p.] [WC] [review]

Golob, Sacha. “Subjectivity, Reflection and Freedom in Later Foucault.” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23.5 (2015): 666-88. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper proposes a new reading of the interaction between subjectivity, reflection and freedom within Foucault’s later work. I begin by introducing three approaches to subjectivity, locating these in relation both to Foucault’s texts and to the recent literature. I suggest that Foucault himself operates within what I call the ‘entanglement approach’, and, as such, he faces a potentially serious challenge, a challenge forcefully articulated by Han. Using Kant’s treatment of reflection as a point of comparison, I argue that Foucault possesses the resources to meet this challenge. The key, I contend, is to distinguish two related theses about reflection and freedom: Foucault’s position is distinctive precisely because he accepts one of these theses whilst rejecting the other. I conclude by indicating how this reading might connect to the longstanding question of Foucault’s own right to appeal to normative standards.

Gondek Hans-Dieter. Angst, Einbildungskraft, Sprache ein verbindender Aufriß zwischen Freud – Kant – Lacan. München: Boer, 2015. [356 p.] [WC]

Gondim, Elnora, and Osvaldino Marra Rodrigues. “Kant (1747-1766): Desenvolvimento do problema da relação entre a alma e o corpo.” [Portuguese; Development of the problem of the relationship between soul and body] Ciências da Religião: História e Sociedade vol (2015): 33-49. [ASP]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The objective of this work is to analyze the problem of the relation bet- ween soul and body in Kant’s pre-critical period both in Kant’s own works as the analysis of the context in which the Kantian found himself inserted.

González, Ana Marta. “Emoción, Sentimiento y Pasión en Kant.” [Spanish; Emotion, Feeling, and Passion in Kant] Trans/Form/Ação: Revista de Filosofia 38.3 (2015): 75-97. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this article I analyze Kant’s distinction between feeling (Gefühl) and emotion (Affekt), on the one hand, and emotion and passion (Leidenschaft), on the other. The objective is to show: 1) that by the term “emotion” he understands organic affection, deprived of cognitive content, although preceded and followed by representations; 2) that emotion so understood constitutes for Kant an integral part of “feeling” (Gefühl), by which Kant designates the subjective dimension of experience, in a broad sense, which is not limited to empirical affection; 3) that his negative approach to passion justifies the sharp distinction between emotion and passion introduced in scientific studies of emotion.

González, Catalina. “Kant, Cicero, and ‘popularity’ in the Lectures on Logic.” Kant’’s Lectures/Kants Vorlesungen. Eds. Bernd Dörflinger, et al. (op cit.). 47-59. [M]

González-Blanco, Edmundo. See: De Quincey, Thomas.

González Fisac, Jesús. “The paradoxes of Enlightenment. A rhetorical and anthropological approach to Kant’s Beantwortung.” Studia Kantiana 13.18 (2015): 37-58. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper consists of two parts. In the first part (section 1), I shall expound the kantian concept of paradox and its three different senses, the anthropological, the rhetorical and the metaphysical. In the second part (sections 2-6), I shall examine the presence of these senses of paradox in Kant’s texts about Enlightenment (with special attention on the Beantwortung). The paradox of immaturity consists of the fact that we are responsible, as human beings, and non-responsible, as subjects of a State, of the exit from it. Another formulation of the same paradox, but in dynamical and metaphysical terms (which will specifically occupy section 3), is that of heautocracy, the paradox of self constraint, which implies that the subject is at the same time active and passive. Finally, the opposition between public and private use of reason also seems paradoxical, since private use seems to be a prejudiced use (and it is not, actually) while public use seems to be free and reasonable as such (although the freedom implied in Enlightenment is only methodical and is subject to rules).

 ——. Rev. of Kant’s Elliptical Path, by Karl Ameriks (2012). [Spanish] Con-Textos Kantianos 2 (2015): 420-25. [M] [online]

González Vallejos, Miguel. “¿Podemos esperar el auxilio divino? La autoimumía moral y el recurso a la gracia en la religión dentro de los límites de la mera razón.” [Spanish] Tópicos. Revista de Filosofía 48 (2015): 115-39. [ASP]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this article, the author analyses the concept of grace developed by Kant in Religion within the Boundaries o f Mere Reason and com­ pares it to the principle of autonomy. The central thesis maintains that Kant develops a restricted concept of grace which is compatible both with the core theses o f the second critique and with Christianity under­ stood as moral religion.

Gordon, Paul. Art as the Absolute: Art’s Relation to Metaphysics in Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel and Schopenhauer. New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015. [xv, 195 p.] [WC]

Görg, Erdmann. “Zum Gravitationsgesetz bei Newton, Kant und Fries.” Kant-Studien 106.2 (2015): 259-75. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article examines the development of the law of gravitation in the writings of Isaac Newton, Immanuel Kant and Jakob Friedrich Fries. Fries was a philosopher, mathematician and physicist who stood in the Kantian tradition, but who nevertheless had empiricist leanings. Whereas the development of the law of gravitation is well explored as regards Newton and Kant, the heuristic interpretation of the Kantian ‘fundamental forces’ carried out by Fries has not yet received the scholarly attention it deserves. In the following, I will elaborate on how Newton, Kant and Fries developed the law of gravitation and how it was incorporated in their natural philosophies.

Goria, Giulio. “Kant e il Fondamento Cercato del Sapere. A Partire Dalla Polemica con Eberhard.” [Italian]  Estudos Kantianos 3.1 (2015): 127-38. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In On a Discovery Kant returns to the claim of the Critique that the indispensable starting point for any scientific metaphysics is an investigation of the possibility of synthetic judgements a priori and only after that is it possible to conclude that the fundamental features of truth – “universality” and “necessity” – must also be able to be displayed and thereby made known in the form of the transcendental judgement. In this paper I examine in detail the debate between Eberhard and Kant concerning synthetic judgements a priori in order to consider the double formulation of the judgement’s logical form, as observed by M. Gram and H. E. Allison. By examining and comparing texts from On a Discovery and the Analytic of Principles, I aim to demonstrate that two theories of predication are not only compatible but also needful to each other.

 ——. “Kant e la disciplina della ragion pura. Le proposizioni trascendentali sintetiche e la loro dimostrazione.” [Italian] Estudos Kantianos 3.2 (2015): 119-30. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the second chapter of Analytic of Principles, Grundsätze are exhibited as synthetic judgements of pure understanding. In the explanation of the possibility of synthetic judgements there is at stake a special delimitation guaranteed on «principles that could effect a necessary renunciation of the right to dogmatic assertion» (A 768 B 796). A renunciation that will be completely reached at the time that the transcendental logic of truth will be articulated in the whole of pure principles, without which any empirical judgement or scientific knowledge will lose its objective connection and thus its truthful content. This necessary attribute is expressed by the definition of the pure rules of understanding, that are not only the unities influencing every unification of manifold, but «are rather even the source of all truth». By examining and comparing the second chapter of An. of Pr. and the Discipline of pure reason, my purpose is to note the specific ostensive nature of the proofs of transcendental and synthetic propositions and to demonstrate why this character is really meaningful in order to be able to articulate the faculty of pure reason making experience possible.

Gorner, Paul. Rev. of Kant, Kantianism, and Idealism: The Origins of Continental Philosophy, edited by Thomas Nenon (2010). Kantian Review 20.2 (2015): 3313-36. [PW]

Gottschlich, Max. “The Necessity and Limits of Kant’s Transcendental Logic, with Reference to Nietzsche and Hegel.” Review of Metaphysics 69.2 (2015): 287-315. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article examines the views of the philosopher Immanuel Kant, focusing upon his thoughts on transcendental logic. Particular focus is given to how his observations relate to those of the philosophers Friedrich Nietzsche and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. Additional topics discussed include epistemology, the book Critique of Pure Reason and self-determination and self-relation

Goy, Ina. “The Antinomy of Teleological Judgment.” Studi Kantiani 28 (2015): 65-88. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The antinomy of teleological judgment is one of the most controversial passages of Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment. Having developed the idea of an explanation of organized beings by mechanical and teleological natural laws in §§ 61-68, in §§ 69-78 Kant raises the question of whether higher order mechanical and teleological natural laws, which unify the particular empirical laws of organized beings, might pose an antinomy of conflicting principles within the power of judgment. I will argue against alternative views that this antinomy is neither a conflict between objective constitutive principles of the determining power of judgment nor a conflict between an objective constitutive principle of the determining power of judgment and a subjective regulative maxim of the reflecting power of judgment nor does it consist in a confusion of a pair of subjective regulative maxims of the reflecting power of judgment with a pair of objective constitutive principles of the determining power of judgment, but does consist in an apparent conflict between mechanical and teleological natural laws as subjective regulative maxims of the reflecting power of judgment. I will further argue that Kant’s resolution of the antinomy consists in the regulative idea of a supersensible that represents the unity of both kinds of natural laws and justifies the unification of both kinds of natural laws in the human power of judgment. Kant uses three notions when he talks about the supersensible – the regulative idea of a divine artisan, the regulative idea of a divine intuitive understanding, and the regulative idea of an underdetermined, supernatural ground of nature. I will show how each of these notions accounts for the unity of both kinds of natural laws and will discuss possible correlations between them. I will then explain how the unity of both kinds of natural laws in the regulative idea of a supersensible accounts for the unification of both kinds of natural laws in the human power of judgment. While the divine intuitive understanding is perfect and uncreated and, thus, capable of a representation of the unity of both kinds of natural laws, the human discursive understanding is imperfect and created; it is capable only of the representation of the unification of both kinds of natural laws in form of a hierarchy of laws.

Goyard-Fabre, Simon. “L’horizon transcendantal du droit selon Kant.” Con-Textos Kantianos 1 (2015): 77-96. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant has found the pattern of his critical philosophy in the jurisdictional process. In the Rechtslehre (1796), he uses his critical method and, to answer to the question Quid juris?, he examines the categories and concepts of law (in occidental thought, but without interrogation upon the British Common Law). He explains that, before the critical Court of reason, the “transcendental deduction” discovers the rational and pure Idea which is the a priori principle of law. But as all the “Ideas of reason”, this sublime Idea of law does not belong to our world. Then, it is necessary today to revise the notion of “transcendental” and to transform the structures of our reason.

Graband, Claudia. Klugheit bei Kant. Boston/Berlin: De Gruyter, 2015. [xi, 322 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kantstudien Ergänzungshefte, vol. 185. Originally appeared as the author’s Ph.D. dissertation (Munich, 2014).

Grandjean, Antoine. “Parler du tout, parler de rien: L’inconsistance de toute cosmologie rationnelle et la quatrième antinomie de la raison pure.” Kant-Studien 106.4 (2015): 581-95. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This study points out four important weaknesses in the construction of the Fourth Antinomy of Pure Reason, which reveal its intrinsic instability. The analysis shows that these argumentative weaknesses do not stem from contingent awkwardness. They prove the insubstantial nature of a cosmological theme which, when the question is about modality, cannot support any real dialectic. The rational quest for absolute necessity, which indeed arises in a cosmological context, can only lead to a theological question – which breeds an illusion too, but a much more substantial one.

Grapotte, Sophie. “L’accusation de formalisme et le problème de l’application ‘morale’: la réponse de la ‘Typique’.” Kant, la raison pratique: concepts et héritages. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Margit Ruffing, and Ricardo Ribeiro Terra (op cit.). 93-101. [M]

 ——, Margit Ruffing, and Ricardo Ribeiro Terra, eds. Kant, la raison pratique: concepts et héritages. Paris: J. Vrin, 2015. [426 p.] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Proceedings of the 11th Congress of the Société d'Études Kantiennes de Langue Française, held in Salvador de Bahia, Brazil, in October 2013. Papers include:
Ferrari, Jean (‘Préface’ de la Critique de la raison pratique. Étude et commentaire),
Fichant, Michel (Raison pratique et système),
Zöller, Günter (L’intelligible en nous. Liberté transcendantale et chose en elle-même dans l‘’Élucidation critique de l’analytique de la raison pratique pure’ de Kant),
Critique de la raison pratique
Altmann, Silvia (Liberté et moralité dans les Fondements et la Critique de la raison pratique),
Costa Rego, Pedro (Choix et imputabilité dans la philosophie pratique de Kant),
Grapotte, Sophie (L’accusation de formalisme et le problème de l’application ‘morale’: la réponse de la ‘Typique’),
Hulshof, Monique (‘L’énigme de la Critique’ et sa ‘prétention paradoxale’: sur le concept de noumène dans la Critique de la raison pratique),
Ruffing, Margit (La méthodologie de la raison pure pratique),
Concepts pratiques
Basile, Giovanni Pietro (‘Argument ontologique révisé’ et unité de la raison dans le dernier Kant. La raison pratique dans l’Opus postumum d’après François Marty),
Cacciola, Maria Lúcia (La question de la liberté chez Kant),
Cohen, Alix (Le rôle des sentiments moraux dans l’éthique kantienne: le complément nécessaire à la raison pratique) Croitoru, Rodica (La troisième antinomie de la raison pure, soutien épistémique de l’action pratique),
Falduto, Antonino (Sentiment moral et raison pratique dans la ‘Doctrine de la vertu’ de la Métaphysique des moeurs),
Autonomie avec et contre théonomie: Kant et Levinas sur la généalogie de la loi morale),
Jesus, Paulo Renatus (Autonomie avec et contre théonomie: Kant et Levinas sur la généalogie de la loi morale),
Lequan, Mai (L’émergence de la distinction entre raison pratique et raison théorique dans la Recherche (1762-1764)),
Nadai, Bruno (L’éducation morale et les exemples dans la philosophie pratique de Kant),
Notturni, Loris (Schwarmerei et raison pratique: l’aspect programmatique des Träume de 1766),
Rivero, Gabriel (Le concept d’obligation comme concept premier de la philosophie pratique. Sur le développement de la raison pratique kantienne),
Roldán, Concha (Universalité, autonomie et égalité: limites sociopolitiques de la morale kantienne),
Sánchez Madrid, Nuria (La politesse comme moyen de civilisation: l’opacité du coeur humain et la lente moralisation de l’espèce humaine chez Kant),
Thisted, Marcos A. (Sagesse et métaphysique dans les Progrès de la métaphysique),
Tommasi, Francesco Valerio (La raison pratique, analogon de la raison théorique. Ou vice versa?),
Westra, Adam (Kritik ist Pflicht: La dimension éthique de la Critique de la raison pure),
Droit, politique et philosophie de l’histoire
Ehrsam, Raphael (De la raison pratique à la raison historique au sujet de la structure de l’Idée d’une histoire universelle au point de vue cosmopolitique),
Keinert, Maurício Cardoso (Histoire et critique: le mécanique et le systématique chez Kant),
Marey, Macarena (La liberté comme source de la normativité. Droit et contrainte dans Einleitung du cours sur le droit naturel de 1787 Naturrecht Feyerabend),
Nunes Chaib, André (La position du sujet de droit chez Kant),
Piché, Claude (Guerre et paix. Les deux acceptions du droit des peuples en 1797),
Seixas da Silva, Mitieli (L’usage public de la raison et la ‘condition d’indépendance’),
Terra, Ricardo (1784 — une année extraordinaire),
Tourinho Peres, Daniel (La philosophie kantienne de l’histoire entre la rhétorique et la connaissance objective),
Trevisan, Diego Kosbiau (L’influence du droit dans la genèse de la philosophie morale critique de Kant),
L’héritage de Kant,
Aramayo, Roberto R. (Le souverain Bien à la lumière de ‘l’impératif de l’espoir’ chez Kant: dialogue avec Spinoza et Rousseau),
Hadj Abderrahmane, Naïma (Kant entre nos ‘ibâdât et nos mu‘âmakit),
Kaipl, Esteban, and Élisabeth Lefort (La question du droit et de la morale: lecture croisée de Kant, Kelsen et Luhmann),
Morais, Marceline (Les divergences entre Kant et Herder au sujet de la signification de l’Aufklarung),
Panknin-Schappert, Helke (Le concept de l’angoisse. Emmanuel Kant et Soren Kierkegaard),
Seyler, Frédéric (De Kant à Fichte: La moralité et son destin dans la synthèse quintuple).

 ——. Rev. of Raison pratique et normativité chez Kant, edited by Jean-François Kervégan (2010). Kant-Studien 106.2 (2015): 338-43. [PW]

Greisch, Jean. “Le «grand jeu de la vie» et ses enjeux: «religion» et «métaphysique».” Archives de sciences sociales des religions 60.169 (2015): 85-103. [JSTOR]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant's metaphor of the "big game of life", to which all bumans partake insofar as they are Citizens of the world confronted witb the four fundamental questions: "What can I know?, What ought I do?, What may I hope for?" and, last but not least: "What is man?", tvhich according to Kant summarize the major interests of Human reason in a cosmo-political perspective, offers an excellent thread for analyzing the complex relationships between Religion and Philosophy. As opposed to what many contemporary thinkers pretend, we have not yet finished pondering the "meta function" in its fourfold dimensions: "trans-ascendance", "transdescendance", "trans-passibility" and "trans-possibility" which, although they find a différent expressions in the religions field and in the field of philosophical thought, invites to rethink both religion and philosophy.

Grenberg, Jeanine. “Response to Ware and Moyar.” Kantian Review 20.2 (2015): 313-30. [PW]

 ——. “Self-deception and self-knowledge: Jane Austen’s Emma as an Example of Kant’s Notion of Self-Deception.” Con-Textos Kantianos 2 (2015): 162-76. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper, I address the theme of harmony by investigating that harmony of person necessary for obtaining wisdom. Central to achievement of that harmony is the removal of the unstable, unharmonious presence of self-deception within one’s moral character.

 ——. “Love.” Kant’s Lectures on Ethics: A Critical Guide. Eds. Denis, Lara, and Oliver Sensen. (op cit.). 239-55. [M]

 ——. Rev. of Kant on Mind, Action, and Ethics, by Julian Wuerth (2014). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (Jul 2015, #9). [M] [online]

Gressis, Robert. Rev. of Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Kant on Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, by Lawrence Pasternack (2014). Kantian Review 20.2 (2015): 341-45. [PW]

Grey, Colin. Justice and Authority in Immigration Law. Oxford/Portland: Hart Publishing, 2015. [x, 241 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This book provides a new and powerful account of the demands of justice on immigration law and policy. Drawing principally on the work of Adam Smith, Immanuel Kant, and John Rawls, it argues that justice requires states to give priority of admission to the most disadvantaged migrants, and to grant some form of citizenship or non-oppressive status to those migrants who become integrated. The book also argues that states must avoid policies of admission and exclusion that can only be implemented through unjust means. It therefore refutes the common misconception that justice places no limits on the discretion of states to control immigration.

Groot, Yorick. See: Kompanje, Erwin and Yorick Groot.

Guenova, Ludmila. Rev. of Kant’s Organicism: Epigenesis and the Development of Critical Philosophy, by Jennifer Mensch (2013). British Journal for the History of Philosophy 23.1 (2015): 202-5. [PW]

Gün, Özge Ekin. Rev. of Contemporary Kantian Metaphysics. New Essays on Space and Time, edited by Roxana Baiasu, Graham Bird, and A. W. Moore (2012). Kant-Studien 106.4 (2015): 717-21. [PW]

Gutiérrez Aguilar, Ricardo. Rev. of Las armonías de la razón en Kant. Libertad, Sentimiento de lo bello y Teleología de la naturaleza, by Ana María Andaluz Romanillos (2013). [Spanish] Con-Textos Kantianos 2 (2015): 401-5. [M] [online]

Guyer, Paul. “Play and Society in the Lectures on Anthropology.” Reading Kant’s Lectures. Ed. Robert R. Clewis (op cit.). 223-42. [M]

 ——. “Die Beweisstruktur der Grundlegung und die Rolle des dritten Abschnittes.” Kants Begründung von Freiheit und Moral in Grundlegung III: neue Interpretationen. Ed. Dieter Schönecker (op cit.). 109-35. [M]

 ——. “Freedom, Ends, and the Derivation of Duties in the Vigilantius Notes.” Kant’s Lectures on Ethics: A Critical Guide. Eds. Denis, Lara, and Oliver Sensen. (op cit.). 187-204. [M]

 ——. “The Scottish Reception of Kant: Common Sense and Idealism.” Scottish Philosophy in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. Ed. Gordon Graham (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2015). 118-53. [M]

 ——. Rev. of The Theory of the Sublime from Longinus to Kant, by Robert Doran (2015). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (Aug 2015, #33). [M] [online]

 ——. Rev. of The Genesis of Neo-Kantianism: 1796–1880, by Frederick C. Beiser (2014). Kantian Review 20.3 (2015): 483-92. [PW]

[top] H    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Hadj Abderrahmane, Naïma. “Kant entre nos ‘ibâdât et nos mu‘âmalat.” Kant, la raison pratique: concepts et héritages. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Margit Ruffing, and Ricardo Ribeiro Terra (op cit.). 375-84. [M]

Hajdini, Simon. “What’s the Difference? Kant and Lacan.” Filozofski vestnik (Ljubljana) 36.2 (2015): 87-109. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In line with the aim of this issue of Filozofski vestnik, which proposes to rethink the importance of Kantian philosophy for contemporary debates on the concepts of the subject and the object, I attempt to develop the consequences of one of Kant’s “conceptual monsters”, namely that of transcendental reflection. Initially, I will follow Kant’s line of thought, which – however – will immanently lead to a certain theoretical deadlock, or “contradiction”, which in turn will open up the possibility of a passage from (Kantian) reflection to (Hegelian-Lacanian) speculation, and thus also to a notion of the subject that is at odds with Kant’s argument but comes to light the moment we push the argument to the extreme of its consequences.

Hall, Bryan Wesley. The Post-Critical Kant: Understanding the Critical Philosophy through the Opus postumum. New York: Routledge, 2015. [x, 220 p.] [WC][review]

 ——. “The Two Dogmas without Empiricism.” Kant Yearbook: Kant and Empiricism 6 (2015): 73-96. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In Two Dogmas of Empiricism W.V. Quine begins his attack on the analytic/ synthetic dogma by criticizing Immanuel Kant’s conception of analyticity. After dismissing Kant’s interpretation as well as others, he articulates a view of the analytic/synthetic distinction that connects it to the other dogma of empiricism, reductionism. Ultimately, Quine rejects both dogmas in favor of a new form of empiricism which subscribes to neither one. Just as Quine believes it is possible to accept empiricism without the dogmas, I will argue that the Kantian can accept both dogmas while avoiding the forms of empiricism that Quine considers in his article. The paper is broken into four sections. First, I offer a brief overview of the two dogmas and their relationship to one another before examining Quine’s argument against ‘radical reductionism’, i.e., the position that every meaningful sentence is translatable into a sentence about immediate experience that is either true or false. The second section shows how one of Kant’s arguments from the Critique of Pure Reason anticipates the crux of Quine’s argument against radical reductionism. What is left after this argument is only an ’attenuated form’ of reductionism that Quine believes is identical to the analytic/synthetic distinction. In the third section, I explain how Kantians can draw the analytic/ synthetic distinction in a way that is consistent with this attenuated form of reductionism while avoiding the objections that Quine lodges against the two dogmas. I argue that this allows the Kantian to accept the dogmas while avoiding both the radically reductive form of empiricism as well as the form of empiricism that Quine endorses (web-of-belief holism). Finally, I will consider how this Kantian version of the analytic/synthetic distinction can be extended beyond the theoretical domain to practical and aesthetic sentences

Hamm, Christian. “‘Jogo livre’ e a ‘sensificação de ideias’ na Crítica do juízo de Kant.” [Portuguese; [Free play and the sensification of ideas in Kant’s Critique of judgment] Studia Kantiana 13.19 (2015): 89-103. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the discussion of the systematic relation between the various theorems explained in the First Part of Critique of Judgment, the question of the connection of aesthetic judgment with e certain type of its possible objects, that is: with the works of art, is very important, but not sufficiently cleared up by Kant. In spite of the fact that – owing to the determination of the judgment of taste on the basis of a genuinely “aesthetic” (receptive) activity, i.e. determined by a free play of the cognitive faculties – any form of objective orientation remains strictly ruled out, the introduction of the (productive) figure of “aesthetic idea”, in the context of the subsequent “art of genius”, seems to undermine this former principle, since with that enters a new constitutive element, namely the reason, which was explicitly excluded in the initial discussion of the activity of aesthetic reflection., characterized as a free play between understanding and imagination only. – In this paper, my aim is to analyze this problematic constellation and try to find a way to reconcile the two systematic elements, apparently inconsistent, based on Kant´s later assertion (§ 60) that taste, “in fact”, is no more than “a capacity for judgment with regard to the sensualization of moral ideas, by means of a certain analogy of reflection”.

Hanhijärvi, Tommi Juhani. Dialectical Thinking: Zeno, Socrates, Kant, and Marx. New York: Algora Publishing, 2015. [x, 173 p.] [WC]

Hanke, Thomas. “Kants Philosophie der Offenbarung. Ein Itinerarium der ästhetisch-reflektierenden Urteilskraft in religionsphilosophischer und vernunfttheoretischer Absicht.” Vernunftreligion und Offenbarungsglaube. Eds. Norbert Fischer and Jakub Sirovátka (op cit.). 277-96. [M]

 ——. Rev. of Ästhetik der Lebendigkeit. Kants dritte Kritik, by Jan Völker (2011). Kant-Studien 106.4 (2015): 709-13. [PW]

Hanna, Robert. Cognition, Content, and the A Priori: A Study in the Philosophy of Mind and Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. [xii, 477 p.] [WC]

Harry, Chelsea C. “In Defense of the Critical Philosophy: On Schelling’s Departure from Kant and Fichte in Abhandlungen zur Erläuterung des Idealismus der Wissenschaftslehre (1796/1797).” Journal of Speculative Philosophy 29.3 (2015): 324-34. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article considers the second treatise of Schelling's Abhandlungen zur Erläuterung des Idealismus der Wissenschaftslehre (Treatises Explaining the Idealism of the Science of Knowledge, 1796/97), a lesser-known work from the early Schelling. Here, Schelling proposes to defend the critical position insofar as it purports to be a system based on human reason, but instead he issues a backhanded critique of the assumption on behalf of the critical philosophers to try and limit the bounds of pure reason by means of their own use of reason. Schelling then offers an alternative way to think about the relationship of mind (Geist) and matter in nature. This article argues that Schelling's actual explanation of the critical philosophy as a position founded by reasonable minds ultimately belies his promise to defend it, thus calling into question that Schelling's thought prior to 1800 was a mere reiteration of Kantian/Fichtean transcendentalism.

 ——. “On the Fundamental Dissimilarity of Aristotelian and Kantian Time Concepts.” Idealistic Studies 45.3 (2015): 329-38. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In Aristotle’s Physics iv 10–14, Aristotle argues for a time concept derived with, on a weak version, sense perception, and, on a strong version, from sense perception along with intellection (nous), from change in nature. On both accounts, actualized time for Aristotle requires cognitive faculties. Aristotle’s time concept has thus been linked with Kant’s treatment of time in the Transcendental Aesthetic of his First Critique. More importantly, the conclusion that time is “unreal” for Aristotle elicits charges of adulterating Aristotle’s conclusions by reading Aristotle’s Physics with a Kantian lens. In this paper, I examine the context of Kant’s conclusions about time and, by way of a contrast between the Aristotelian and Kantian projects, argue for a fundamental dissimilarity of their accounts. And yet, I reserve the possibility that one both ascent to this fundamental dissimilarity and hold that Aristotle was not a temporal realist.

Hauser, Dominik. Das Noumenon und das Nichts: zur Atemporalität der Willensfreiheit bei Kant und Schopenhauer. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2015. [206 p.] [WC]

Head, Jonathan, Anna Tomaszewska, Jochen Bojanowski, Alberto Vanzo, and Sorin Baiasu. “Kant and Sartre: Existentialism and Critical Philosophy.” Comparing Kant and Sartre. Ed. Sorin Baiasu (op cit.). 3-18. [PW]

Hebbeler, James. “Kant on Necessity, Insight, and A Priori Knowledge.” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 97.1 (2015): 34-65. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: There is clear evidence in the Critique of Pure Reason and in other works that Kant holds a thesis that asserts the coextensiveness of necessity and apriority. What has remained unclear and a subject of controversy in the literature is the exact content of this thesis and why Kant holds it. I argue for a new reading that explains the connection between the necessary and the a priori as Kant understands them and in a way that makes this thesis applicable to all the knowledge claims that Kant deems a priori. I begin by analyzing Kant’s conceptions of apodictic judgment and of necessity in its empirical use. I then offer an analysis of his conception of knowing as a specific epistemic attitude and the key notion of insight that belongs to it. Finally, I show how Kant’s explanations of these features of his epistemology make the claims of modern natural science, as Kant describes them, relevant examples of his conception of synthetic a priori knowledge. By approaching the question of the synthetic a priori through examples from natural science and not through those from mathematics or transcendental philosophy, as in the dominant approach to this problem, I offer a fresh perspective on Kant’s view that also allows us to question the overly demanding requirements that have come to be associated with it.

Heck, José Nicolau. “Man’s Destination: A Kantian Study.” Morality and Life: Kantian Perspectives in Bioethics. Eds. Darlei Dall’Agnol and Milene Consenso Tonetto (op cit.). 13-31. [M]

Heidemann, Dietmar H. “Zwei Formen der Identität in Lockes Theorie der Person.” Crítica y metafísica: Homenaje a Mario Caimi. Ed. Claudia Jáuregui, et al. (op cit.). 164-75. [M]

 ——, ed. Kant Yearbook: Kant and Empiricism. Berlin: de Gruyter, 2015. [170 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Kant Yearbook vol. 7 (2015). Contents:
Charles Braverman (The Kantian Legacy in French Empiricism During the Early Nineteenth Century), Kevin R. Busch (Reason, Induction, and the Humean Objection to Kant), Brian A. Chance (), Bryan W. Hall (The Two Dogmas without Empiricism), Morganna Lambeth (An Objection to Kant’s Second Analogy), Peter Sperber (Empiricism and Rationalism: The Failure of Kant’s Synthesis and its Consequences for German Philosophy around 1800), Udo Thiel (Unities of the Self: From Kant to Locke),

Heikes, Deborah K. “Race and the Copernican Turn.” Journal of Mind & Behavior 36.3-4 (2015): 139-63. [ASP]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The Enlightenment is said to be an era of moral equality, but the historical evidence suggests that few men, and even fewer women, were ever actually equal. The racism and sexism evident throughout much of modern philosophy has been ignored or dismissed as unfortunate but are, in fact, relevant to central philosophical claims of the period. Despite the hope that such offensive attitudes are simply a product of their authors' personal biases, good reasons exist to believe that modern racist attitudes are as much an outgrowth of the epistemic difficulties those philosophers encountered and are, consequently, grounded in core philosophical doctrines. The Cartesian turn inward toward ideas of the mind creates a situation in which epistemic objectivity is necessarily grounded in a radical subjectivism. As a result, philosophers such as Hume and Kant find it necessary to grant epistemic authority only to those who reason according to proper methodologies, which, in turn, has consequences for moral agency. The result is that, by the end of the Enlightenment, rationality and personhood are no longer the possession of every human being.

Heintel, Peter. Rev. of Kant und die Aporetik moderner Subjektivität. Zur Verschränkung historischer und systematischer Momente im Begriff der Selbstbestimmung, by Michael Städtler (2011). Kant-Studien 106.1 (2015): 155-59. [PW]

Hems, Nigel, ed. See: Banham, Gary, Dennis Schulting, and Nigel Hems, eds.

Henning, Tim. “Moralischer Partikularismus und die moralischen Grundsätze Kants und Scanlons.” Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 69.1 (2015): 84-90. [PW]

Henrich, Nikolaus. Das Emissionsrecht als Sachenrecht: Begründung, Erwerb, Inhalt und Grenzen in rechtsphilosophischer Auseinandersetzung mit den Privatrechtskonzeptionen John Lockes und Immanuel Kants. Hamburg: Verlag Dr. Kovac, 2015. [xiv, 342 p.] [WC]

Herbert, Daniel. “Peirce and the Final Opinion: Against Apel’s Transcendental Interpretation of the Categories.” Pragmatism, Kant, and Transcendental Philosophy. Eds. Gabriele Gava and Robert Stern (op cit.). 94-113??. [WC]

 ——. “Kant and Sartre on Temporality.” Comparing Kant and Sartre. Ed. Sorin Baiasu (op cit.). 45-61. [PW]

Herszenbaun, Miguel Alejandro. “Cualidad y realidad en la tesis de la segunda antinomia.” [Spanish; Quality and reality in the second antinomy thesis] Studia Kantiana 13.18 (2015): 86-111. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper analyses the thesis of the second antinomy. First, I intend to demonstrate that the thesis and its proof can only be referred to simple material parts of extended bodies in space and not to immaterial simple substances. Then, I intend to demonstrate that in the thesis and its proof both a pure categorial and an empirical synthesis are involved, which correspond to the category of quality. I claim that the proof of the thesis does not proceed by mere concepts, but introduces some reference to intuition. This reference will be explained through the empirical synthesis of reality and will confirm that the thesis deals with simple material parts.

 ——. Rev. of Kant´s B Deduction, by Mario Caimi (2014). [Spanish] Con-Textos Kantianos 2 (2015): 370-88. [M] [online]

Hill, Jr., Thomas E. “Looking Back: Main Themes and Appreciation.” Reason, Value, and Respect. Eds. Mark Timmons and Robert N. Johnson (op cit.). 269-96. [M]

Hiltscher, Reinhard. “Stellt Kants Moralphilosophie eine „Ontologie des Intelligiblen“ dar?” Kant-Studien 106.2 (2015): 276-85. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: An ontology of the intelligible world cannot explain the phenomenon of a „free will“, which is able to decide between good and evil. It follows that a Moralontologie also cannot explain an agent's freely determining his actions as good or evil.

Hinske, Norbert. “Das Naturrecht Feyerabend und die Versäumnisse der Akademie-Ausgabe.” Studi Kantiani 28 (2015): 171-76. [PW]

 ——. “Kants Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung? im Spiegel des Naturrechts Feyerabend.” Crítica y metafísica: Homenaje a Mario Caimi. Ed. Claudia Jáuregui, et al. (op cit.). 176-82. [M]

Hirsch, Philipp-Alexander. Rev. of Kant’s Doctrine of Right. A Commentary., edited by B. Sharon Byrd and Joachim Hruschka (2010). Kant-Studien 106.2 (2015): 347-51. [PW]

Hoeltzel, Steven. “The Unity of Reason in Kant and Fichte.” Kant, Fichte, and the Legacy of Transcendental Idealism. Eds. Halla Kim and Steven Hoeltzel (op cit.). 129-52. [M]

 ——. See: Kim, Halla, and Steven Hoeltzel.

Hoene-Wronski, Józef Maria. Recepcja filozofii Immanuela Kanta w filozofii polskiej w poczatkach XIX wieku. Cz. 2, Filozofia krytyczna odkryta przez Kanta, oparta na ostatecznej zasadzie poznania. [Polish; Critical philosophy discovered by Kant, based on the ultimate principle of cognition] Torun: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Mikolaja Kopernika, 2015. [161 p.] [WC]

Holtman, Sarah. “Autonomia e o Reino dos fins.” [Portuguese; Autonomy and Kingdom of Ends] Studia Kantiana 13.19 (2015): 105-26. [M] [online]

Hooker, Brad. “ Must Kantian Contractualism and Rule Consequentialism Converge?” Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 4 (2015): pages. [PW]

Horn, Christoph. “Das Bewusstsein, unter dem moralischen Gesetz zu stehen. Kants Freiheitsargument in GMS III.” Kants Begründung von Freiheit und Moral in Grundlegung III: neue Interpretationen. Ed. Dieter Schönecker (op cit.). 137-56. [M]

Houlgate, Stephen. “Hegel’s Critique of Kant.” Aristotelian Society Supplemary Volume 89.1 (2015): 1-20. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper discusses the significance for the philosophy of perception and aesthetics of certain productions of the ‘offline brain’. These are experienced in hypnagogic and other trance states, and in disease- or drug-induced hallucination. They bear a similarity to other visual patterns in nature, and reappear in human artistry, especially of the craft type. The reasons behind these resonances are explored, along with the question why we are disposed to find geometrical complexity and ‘supercolouration’ beautiful. The paper concludes with a plea on behalf of neuroaesthetics, but with a caution or two.

Houser, Kevin. Rev. of The Subject of Freedom: Kant, Levinas, by Gabriela Basterra (2015). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (Dec 2015, #6). [online][M]

Hruschka, Joachim. Kant und der Rechtsstaat und andere Essays zu Kants Rechtslehre und Ethik. Freiburg: Verlag Karl Alber, 2015. [264 p.] [WC]

 ——. “On the Logic of Imputation in the Vigilantius Lecture Notes.” Kant’s Lectures on Ethics: A Critical Guide. Eds. Denis, Lara, and Oliver Sensen. (op cit.). 170-83. [M]

Huang, Tao. See: Beck, Gunnar.

Hulshof, Monique. “‘L’énigme de la Critique’ et sa ‘prétention paradoxale’: sur le concept de noumène dans la Critique de la raison pratique.” Kant, la raison pratique: concepts et héritages. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Margit Ruffing, and Ricardo Ribeiro Terra (op cit.). 103-9. [M]

Hüning, Dieter. “Kant a téza o doux commerce.ˇO vztahu obchodného ducha, práva a mieru v Kantovej filozofii dejín.” [Slovak; Kant and the thesis of doux commerce. On the connection between the spirit of trade, law, and peace in Kant's history of philosophy] Studia Philosophica Kantiana 1 (2015): 25-36. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In seiner Schrift Zum ewigen Frieden zeigt sich Kant als Anhänger der Lehre vom ‚doux commerce‘; er ist davon überzeugt, dass der „Handelsgeist [...] mit dem Kriege nicht zusammen bestehen kann“. Die Lehre vom doux commerce besagt, dass überall dort, wo sich Handelbeziehungen ausbreiten, Prozesse der Verfeinerung, Kultivierung, Verrechtlichung, Moralisierung und Pazifizierung der gesellschaflichen Verhältnisse in Gang kommen, die zugleich Rückwirkungen auf die Sicherung der persönlichen Freiheit der einzelnen haben. Ich werde in meinem Beitrag versuchen, die spezifische Rolle, die der ‚Handelsgeist‘ in Kants Geschichts- und Rechtsphilosophie spielt, sowie den argumentativen Kontext, in dem Kant auf denselben zu sprechen kommt, näher zu bestimmen. Gezeigt werden soll vor allem der systematische geschichtsphilosophische Ort dieser Überlegungen. Zu diesem Zweck werde ich zunächst einige der Argumente der Debatte um den doux commerce, die für Kant relevant waren, thematisieren (II). Im Anschluss daran werde ich auf Kants Schrift Zum ewigen Frieden eingehen (IV) und abschließend die politische Stoßrichtung der Kantischen Geschichtsphilosophie andeuten (V).

Huseyinzadegan, Dilek. “Kant’s Political Zweckmässigkeit.” Kantian Review 20.3 (2015): 421-44. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: While Kant’s political writings employ a teleological language, the exact benefit of such language to his politics is far from clear. Against recent interpretations of Kant’s political thought, which downplay or dismiss the role of teleology, I restore Zweckmässigkeit to its place in Kant’s politics as a theoretically and practically useful material principle, and show that a teleological perspective complements the perspective stipulated by the formal principle of Recht. By means of a systematic reconstruction of what I call ‘political Zweckmässigkeit’, we gain a fuller portrayal of and a valuable insight into Kant’s political thought.

 ——. Rev. of Kantianism, Liberalism, and Feminism: Resisting Oppression, by Carol Hay (2013). Kantian Review 20.1 (2015): 150-55. [PI]

Hutter, Alex. “Kant and the Project of the Metaphysics of Enlightenment.” Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 36.1 (2015): 59-74. [PW]

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Insole, Christopher. “On Lawrence Pasternack’s Kant on Religion.” Critique (blog posted: 1 Jul 2015) n.p. [PW] [online]

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Jaén Sánchez, Marcos. See: Francesco Arroyo, and Marcos Jaén Sánchez.

Jaffe, Aaron. “Towards a Kantian Moral Psychology or the Practical Effects of Self-Predicating Judgements of Sublimity.” Critical Horizons 16.1 (2015): 88-106. [ASP]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This essay develops an account of the link between Kant’s aesthetics and his ethics. It does so by articulating a Kantian account of moral psychology by way of aesthetic reflective judgements of sublimity. Since judgements of sublimity enrich the picture of a Kantian subject by forcefully revealing the unbounded power of the faculty of reason, I investigate the possibility that judgements of this kind could serve as a basis for moral motivation. The paper first shows how judgements of sublimity help a subject recognize reason’s unbounded nature, and proceeds to analyse the practical effects of a subject judging itself sublime. When judgements of sublimity have as their object the unbounded and unsythesizable power of reason, they may thereby serve as the basis for both the recognition of our moral vocation, and the grounds for determining the will to act from respect for it. Since a judgement of sublimity produces for Kant the experience of an enlivening emotion and an outflowing of vital forces, the paper then develops Kant’s concept of ‘‘life’’ motivated by a recognition of its practical orientation. In this way sublimity rather than beauty can be interpreted as symbolic hypotyposis of morality. The paper then takes up less favourable interpretations of the practical effects of self-predicated judgements of sublimity, and constructs critical responses to such positions. I conclude, following Adorno, by stressing the historical and social dimension of the capacities for both making sublime judgements, and being morally enlivened by them.

Jáuregui, Claudia. “Kant y Hume: sobre los alcances de la demostración del principio de la segunda analogía de la experiencia.” [Spanish] Crítica y metafísica: Homenaje a Mario Caimi. Ed. Claudia Jáuregui, et al. (op cit.). 183-97. [M]

 ——, Hernán Pringe, Marcos Thisted, and Fernando Moledo, eds. Crítica y metafísica: Homenaje a Mario Caimi. Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 2015. [460 p.] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: A volume in the Olms series: Studien und Materialien zur Geschichte der Philosophie.
Contents (includes a bibliography of Mario Caimi (pp. 451-60):
Manfred Baum (Praktische Erkenntnis a priori in Kants Kritik der praktischen Vernunft),
Juan A. Bonaccini (Ontología, epistemologia y semántica: Sobre la teoría kantiana acerca de la estructura objetual del mundo),
Christian Bonnet (Le retour à Kant de Friedrich Albert Lange),
Daniel Brauer (La Critica de Hegel a la Estética Trascendental de Kant),
Wolfgang Carl (Kant über Bewußtsein und Selbstbewußtsein mit einem Blick auf die gegenwärtige Diskussion),
Bernd Dörflinger (Diskrete und kontinuierliche Zeit. Ein verborgener Widerstreit bei Kant),
Jorge E. Dotti (El tiempo en Kant: de la Disertacion a la Estética Trascendental),
Klaus Düsing (Zeit und Substanz in Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft),
Dietmar H. Heidemann (Zwei Formen der Identität in Lockes Theorie der Person),
Norbert Hinske (Kants Beantwortung der Frage: Weis ist Aufklärung? im Spiegel des Naturrechts Feyerabend),
Claudia Jáuregui (Kant y Hume: sobre los alcances de la demostración del principio de la segunda analogía de la experiencia),
Heiner F. Klemme („als ob er frei wäre". Kants Rezension von Johann Heinrich Schulz’ Versuch einer Anleitung zur Sittenlehre für alle Menschen, ohne Unterschied der Religionen),
Claudio La Rocca (La sfera e il circolo. L’architettonica nella Methodenlehre della Critica della ragion pura),
Daniel Leserre (La función semántica del lenguaje en la deducción transcendental de la Critica de la razón pura),
Bernd Ludwig (,Notwendigkeit ist nichts als jene Existenz, die durch die Möglichkeit selbst gegeben ist.’ — Die Epistemologie des Übersinnlichen bei Leibniz und bei Kant),
Macarena Marey (El rol sistemático de los fines en la metafisica de las costumbres),
Fernando Moledo (Nöthigung, necessitatío, necesitación. Sobre el significado de un concepto kantiano de la filosofia práctica),
Hernán Pringe (Metafisica, lógica y probabilidad cuánticas),
Alberto Rosales (La teoría de la apercepción en el capítulo de los paralogismos),
Jacinto Rivera de Rosales (Kant: gusto y reflexión. La presencia del concepto en la experiencia estética),
Margit Ruffing (Gedanke, Sprache, Ton — Bemerkungen zu Kants ,Sprachkritik’),
Ricardo Terra (Transformações na filosofia da história kantiana na década de 1780),
Marcos A. Thisted (La Weisheitslehre en los Fortschritte der Metaphysik),
María Jesús Vázquez Lobeiras (Juicio, conciencia y autoconciencia en el pensamiento de Immanuel Kant),
Roberto J. Walton (La articulación kantiana de la fenomenología de Husserl).

Jesus, Paulo Renatus. “Autonomie avec et contre théonomie: Kant et Levinas sur la généalogie de la loi morale.” Kant, la raison pratique: concepts et héritages. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Margit Ruffing, and Ricardo Ribeiro Terra (op cit.). 173-82. [M]

 ——. “‘I think’ as Form and Action: Kant’s Self beyond Time and Substance.” Estudos Kantianos 3.2 (2015): 163-79. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: If permanence or abiding presence is a common quality shared by transcendental apperception and pure time, this does not imply that one should identify them, in accordance with Heidegger’s daimon, as connatural structures; instead, it might be more illuminating to uncover the underlying mediation that surpasses their original heterogeneity. This mediating role can be assigned to substance, conceived by Kant himself in a quite Leibnizian vein, as a self-founded force and, hence, an autonomous centre of ever-lasting activity. In a Kantian perspective, however, substance appears to be a fragile mediation, especially as one moves from the Lectures on Metaphysics of the 1770’s to the first Critique, in so far as an essential asymmetry emerges within this triadic community. Thus, whereas pure time and substance remain consistently linked – though space will tend to relate more immediately to substance than time –, the thinking self and its activity no longer signify the paradigmatic expression of real substantiality and real duration but “only a substance in Idea”. Located beyond time and substance, the I think comes to a sort of inner instability oscillating between static timelessness and dynamic production of time, pure self-representation and pure self-(re) presenting activity, logical form and logical act, transcendental unity and actual unification. Indeed, how can Myself “function as if” I were a substance without being so and, consequently, without being incorporated into a mere form? In other terms, how is one to grasp “activity” without using the idiom of substance and, at the same time, without inactivating it? Form and act must be envisaged, respectively, as the reduced and realized states of the same process, that is, mind or self in its determining motion.

 ——. “The Poetics of Moral Selfhood: On Believing and Hoping As-If.” Kant and the Metaphors of Reason. Ed. Patricia Kauark-Leite, et al. (op cit.). 263-76. [M]

Jiménez, Alba. “Una reconstrucción del problema del juicio reflexionante a la luz de las Lecciones de Antropología.” [Spanish; A reconstruction of the problem of reflective judgment in the light of Lectures on Anthropology] Rev. of Kant, Lecciones de Antropología. Fragmentos de estética y antropología, translated by Manuel Sánchez Rodríguez (2015). Con-Textos Kantianos 2 (2015): 397-400. [M] [online]

Johnson, Robert N., ed. See: Timmons, Mark, and Robert N. Johnson, eds.

Johnston, James Scott. “Afterword. On Enlightenment and the Most Difficult Problem of the Human Species.” Con-Textos Kantianos 2 (2015): 280-86. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this Afterword, I discuss the papers contained in the dossier in regards to a central issue for Kant: leadership. The issue for Kant is the paradox of the human species’ need for a master that is human yet morally perfect. This of course is an as-yet unobtainable requirement that Kant thinks can only be properly met through a civil constitution. The issues of elitism and the tension between a ‘maximal’ and ‘minimal’ Enlightenment in light of Kant’s requirement will be discussed.

Jorge Filho, Edgard José. “Sobre a exposição metafísica dos conceitos de espaço e tempo.” [Portuguese; On the metaphysical exposition of the concepts of space and time] Studia Kantiana 13.18 (2015): 59-68. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant concludes that space and time are forms of sensibility and pure intuitions. In this work we examine the metaphysical exposition of the concepts of space and time, relating it with the conception of extensive magnitudes, of the Transcendental Analytic, and also the procedure adopted in the Transcendental Aesthetic in order to obtain those results. We do not intend to consider the whole Kantian argument, but only some of its points, raising questions about these. It seems that Kant’s assertion that the pure intuition of space contains in itself the representations of limited spaces is problematic and disagrees with the procedure that he proposes to follow in the Transcendental Aesthetic. It seems that the same conclusion is valid regarding time.

 ——. “Virtude e fé moral, em Kant.” [Portuguese; Moral virtue and faith in Kant] Síntese: Revista de Filosofia 42.133 (2015): 229-50. [ASP]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This study starts from the Kantian conception that it is theoretically impossible to know freedom, the immortality of the soul and the existence of God, and that to assent to the moral law is an immediate practical knowledge. We sustain that freedom has a double meaning and status: on the one hand, as the ratio essendi of the moral law, it is the object of an immediate practical knowledge; on the other hand, as a postulate of pure practical reason, it is the object of moral faith. We sustain that such a faith is the apanage of those who have a moral disposition, i. e. virtue. The existence of God and the immortality of the soul are also considered as postulates of pure practical reason and objects of a moral faith which is also conditioned by the moral disposition. Finally, we argue that, due to the radical evil of human nature, there is a universal hindrance to moral faith which can, nonetheless, be overcome by the conversion to the good, whose possibility we try to elucidate.

Josephson, Jason Ananda. “Specters of Reason: Kantian Things and the Fragile Terrors of Philosophy.” J19: The Journal of Nineteenth-Century Americanists 3.1 (2015): 204-11. [MUSE]

Josifović, Saša. “Das „Kanon-Problem“ in Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft.” Kant-Studien 106.3 (2015): pp. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant presents the sketch of a theory of practical freedom which is “grounded on” the idea of transcendental freedom (CPR, B 561) and which, surprisingly, “can be proved through experience” (CPR, B 830). This is especially noteworthy because transcendental freedom “seems to be contrary to […] all possible experience” (CPR, B 831). This paper dissolves the so-called canon problem, according to which Kant’s theory of practical freedom in the CPR is inconsistent. It is argued that the concept of “experience” refers to a subject’s ability to become aware of the process of autonomous self-necessitation and thereby constitute herself as an agent. The action, in this case, represents the appearance of intelligible causality and a potential object of experience.

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Kahn, Samuel. “ Is the Final Chapter of the Metaphysics of Morals also the Final Chapter of the Practical Postulates?” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 89.2 (2015): 309-32. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper I trace the arc of Kant’s critical stance on the belief in God, beginning with the Critique of Pure Reason (1781) and culminating in the final chapter of the Metaphysics of Morals (1797). I argue that toward the end of his life, Kant changed his views on two important topics. First, despite his stinging criticism of it in the Critique of Pure Reason, by the time of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant seems to endorse the physico-theological argument. Second, some time around the publication of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant seems to move away from the argument for the practical postulates.

 ——. “Kant’s Theory of Conscience.” Rethinking Kant: Volume 4. Eds. Pablo Muchnik and Oliver Thorndike (op cit.). 135-55. [WC]

Kaipl, Esteban, and Élisabeth Lefort. “La question du droit et de la morale: lecture croisée de Kant, Kelsen et Luhmann.” Kant, la raison pratique: concepts et héritages. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Margit Ruffing, and Ricardo Ribeiro Terra (op cit.). 385-93. [M]

Kalscheuer, Fiete. “Human Dignity as Justice in the Face of Injustice: On Kant’s Supplementary Function of Human Dignity in Law.” Kant’s Theory of Law. Eds. Jean-Christophe Merle and Alexandre Travessoni Gomes Trivisonno (op cit.). 9-19. [M]

Kang, Ji Young. Die allgemeine Glückseligkeit: zur systematischen Stellung und Funktionen der Glückseligkeit bei Kant. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2015. [x, 189 p.] [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Kantstudien Ergänzungshefte, vol. 184. Originally appeared as the author’s Ph.D. dissertation (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, 2014).

Kannisto, Toni. “On Corey Dyck’s Kant and Rational Psychology.” Critique (blog posted: 23 Jun 2015) n.p. [PW] [online]

Karásek, Jindřich. “Äusserer Sinn, Innerer Sinn und Apperzeption. Zum Verhältnis von Subjektivität und Zeitlichkeit.” Immanuel Kant und die kopernikanische Wende in der Philosophie. Ed. Tomasz Kupś (op cit.). 71-80??. [WC]

Kaśkiewicz, Kinga. “Friedrich Schillers Verständnis „eine schöne Seele“ als Kritik Kantischer Ethikpflicht.” Studia Philosophica Kantiana 4.1 (2015): 50-59. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Das Ziel des Referates ist das Darstellen der Spezifizität „eines wunderschönen Geistes“, den Friedrich Schiller erwähnt. Der Begriff ist für mich aus zwei Gründen interessant. Zuallererst als ein Vorschlag eines alternativen ethischen Modells im Vergleich zu der Kant-Philosophie (zugleich als eine kritische Sichtweise auf die Aufteilung von Ethik und Ästhetik, die von dem königsberger Philosophen eingeführt worden ist). Andererseits ist das Ideal von der Kalokagathie selbst interessant, es war ein sehr wichtiges Element bei der Bildung und Bewertung von Kunstwerken. Der Begriff „der große Geschmack“, der aus der Doktrine des französischen Klassizismus herkommt, korrespondiert sehr stark mit dem Ideal „eines wunderschönen Geistes“ von Friedrich Schiller, wie auch mit dem von ihm besprochenen Phänomenen des Charmes und der Würde, die zu außerordentlich bedeutenden Themen in der Kunst des 18. Jhs. werden.

Kato, Yasushi, ed. See: Kenkyukai, Kanto, Yasushi Kato, and Yasuyuki Funaba, eds.

Katz-Buonincontro, Jen. “Implications of Kant's Theories of Art for Developing Creative Identity in Students.” The Journal of Aesthetic Education 49.4 (2015): 1-18. [JSTOR]

Kauark-Leite, Patricia. “Redefining the Curvature of the Arc: Transcendental Aspects of Quantum Rationality.” Kant and the Metaphors of Reason. Ed. Patricia Kauark-Leite, et al. (op cit.). 561-77. [M]

 ——, Giorgia Cecchinato, Virginia de Araujo Figueiredo, Margit Ruffing, and Alice Serra, eds. Kant and the Metaphors of Reason. Zurich/New York/Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 2015. [611 p.] [M] [contents]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Most of these papers stem from the IV Kant Multilateral Colloquium held at Tiradentes, Minas Gerais, Brazil (August 11-14, 2013). Contributors:
PART I: METAPHORS OF THEORETICAL REASON
Guido Antonio de Almeida (Kant and the Cognitive Function of Imagination),
Mario Caimi (Aeternitas, Necessitas Phaenomenon: O Esquema da Categoria de Necessidade-Contingência),
João Carlos Brum Torres (‘Stem’ and ‘Source’ as Metaphors of the Transcendental Doctrine of Elements),
Ferdinando Luigi Marcolungo (Abgrund: Métaphores de l’Inconditionné en Immanuel Kant),
Gualtiero Lorini (Kant’s Metaphor by Analogy between Ontology and Transcendental Philosophy),
Davide Poggi (Standing in front of the Ocean: Kant and the Dangers of Knowledge),
Joãosinho Beckenkamp (A Razão Critica e suas Metãforas),
Maria Jesús Vázquez Lobeiras (Die Vernunft und die parteiischen Richter),
Jean-Christophe Merle (What Exactly Does the Court of Justice as Kant’s Metaphor of Reason Mean?),
Pedro Costa Rego (L’idéalisme refugie: la réfutation de 1781 et le scepticisme ontologique),
Orlando Bruno Linhares (The Awakening from the Dogmatic Slumber and the Great Light from 69 in Kant),
Fábio Tenório de Carvalho (L’élaboration et l’évaluation d’hypothèses d'après la philosophie critique de Kant),
PART II: METAPHORS OF PRACTICAL REASON
Margit Ruffing (Kants ‘Stimme der Vernunft’ - Analyse einer unauffälligen Metapher),
Heiner F. Klemme (Kant on Moral Self-Determination and Self-Knowledge in 1787),
Werner Stark (Moraltheologie und Cosmologischer Beweis. Hinweise und Überlegungen zu einer übersehenen Reflexion von Immanuel Kant),
Maria Borges (Passions as Cancerous Sores for Pure Practical Reason),
Giorgia Cecchinato (Liebe macht die Welt schön. Menschenliebe als Analogon des ästhetischen Schönen in Kants Metaphysik der Sitten),
Paulo Jesus (The Poetics of Moral Selfhood: On Believing and Hoping As-If),
Natalia Lerussi (On the Analogy between Organic Nature and (Practical) Reason: towards a Bio- and Ecological Ethics in Kant's Critique of Teleological Judgment),
Milene Consenso Tonetto (The Concept of Right in Kant and the Metaphor of the Wooden Head),
PART III: METAPHORS OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
Günter Zöller (Mechanism or Organism: Kant on the Symbolic Representation of the Body Politic),
Andrea Faggion (Kant and the Night-Watchman State),
Ileana P. Beade (On Kant's Characterization of the Academic Conflict between the Faculties as a Political Dispute: Metaphorical or Literal Sense?),
PART IV: METAPHORS OF THE POWER OF JUDGMENT
Leonel Ribeiro dos Santos (From Metaphor to the Principle of Taste in Kant’s Philosophy),
Virginia de Araujo Figueiredo (Imaginari Aude ou dos Limites da Metáfora Jurídica em Questõesde Gosto),
Jacinto Rivera de Rosales (Kant: the Beautiful Alliance between Imagination and Reason),
Silvia del Luján Di Sanza (Die Natur als Kunst und die Kunst als Natur in Kants dritter Kritik),
Manuel Sánchez Rodríguez (Die pragmatische Dimension des Geschmacks im aufgeklärten Bildungsprogramm der Anthropologie Kants),
PART V: METAPHORS OF THE ANTROPOLOGY, GEOGRAPHY AND HISTORY
Daniel Omar Perez (The Possibility of an Anthropological Study of Human Nature in Kant),
Nuria Sánchez Madrid (Instinct and Reason. Animal Metaphors in Kant’s Practical Philosophy),
Robert B. Louden (Die Entdeckung von Kants Geographie: das letzte Neuland),
Joel Thiago Klein (The Use of Metaphor in Kant’s Philosophy of History),
PART VI: POST-KANTIAN PERSPECTIVES
Alice Mara Serra (Affektion, Selbstaffektion, Heteroaffektion: Modulationen eines quasi-Begriffs bei Kant und Husserl),
Marita Rainsborough (Grenze und Überschreitung: Michel Foucaults Kantrezeption im Spiegel der philosophischen Metaphern),
Tommaso Tuppini (La Metafora, la Libertà: Kant, Derrida e il Tono della Filosofia),
Patricia Kauark Leite (Redefining the Curvature of the Arc: Transcendental Aspects of Quantum Rationality).

Kaur, Gagan. “Kant and the simulation hypothesis.” AI and Society 30.2 (2015): 183-92. [ASP]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Computational imagination (CI) conceives imagination as an agent's simulated sensorimotor interaction with the environment in the absence of sensory feedback, predicting consequences based on this interaction (Marques and Holland in Neurocomputing 72:743-759, ). Its bedrock is the simulation hypothesis whereby imagination resembles seeing or doing something in reality as both involve similar neural structures in the brain (Hesslow in Trends Cogn Sci 6(6):242-247, ). This paper raises two-forked doubts: (1) neural-level equivalence is escalated to make phenomenological equivalence. Even at an abstract level, many imagined and real actions turn out to be dissimilar. More so, some imagined actions have no corresponding real actions and vice versa, even though neural regions involved in imaginings and real action-perception are the same (Sect. 1). (2) At the implementation level, the hypothesis presents a mutually exclusive view of imagination and perception whereby imagination functions in the absence of the sensory feedback and is action based. Both these issues are contested here: Neither imagination functions in the absence of perception nor all forms of imaginings are action based; it is, rather, about conceiving possibilities which emerge during the perceptual stage itself (Sect. 2). For the modal aspect to arise, it is submitted that an integrative framework is required which Kant can provide for whom imagination is an indispensable part of perception. Kant's views on concept-formation are presented here to illustrate this aspect (Sect. 3). The Paper is concluded with emphasizing the relevance of Kant's views to the problems identified in the two sections.

Kaye, Lawrence J. Kant’s Transcendental Deduction of the Categories: Unity, Representation, and Apperception. Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Book, 2015. [vii, 253 p.] [WC]

Keinert, Maurício Cardoso. “Histoire et critique: le mécanique et le systématique chez Kant.” Kant, la raison pratique: concepts et héritages. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Margit Ruffing, and Ricardo Ribeiro Terra (op cit.). 285-93. [M]

Kenkyukai, Kanto, Yasushi Kato, and Yasuyuki Funaba, eds. Kanto to Gendai Tetsugaku. [Japanese; Kant and modern philosophy] Kyoto: Koyoshobo, 2015. [164 p.] [WC]

Kerr, Orin S. “Enlightenment Error.” Harper’s Magazine (September 2015): 16-19. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article discusses the influence of philosopher Immanuel Kant on evidentiary approaches in Bulgaria in the eighteenth century [concluding that there was none]. Topics discussed include Kant's influence in Bulgarian philoso­phers, legal systems of Bulgaria derived from sharia law, feudal system, and customary law, and Kant's writing on republican constitution and democratic government.

Kersting, Wolfgang. Kants Rechts-, Staats- und Geschichtsphilosophie. Hagen: FernUniv, 2015. [130 p.] [WC]

Kervégan, Jean-François. La raison des normes: Essai sur Kant. Paris: Vrin, 2015. [192 p.] [WC] [review]

Khurana, Thomas. “Which Metaphysics? Notes on the Modest and Reflexive Character of Karl Ameriks’ Metaphysics” Das neue Bedürfnis nach Metaphysik / The New Desire for Metaphysics. Ed. Markus Gabriel (op cit.). 87-92??. [WC]

 ——. Rev. of Kant and Colonialism: Historical and Critical Perspectives, edited by Katrin Flikschuh and Lea Ypi (2014). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (Aug 2015, #42). [M] [online]

Kikuchi, Kenzo. Kanto to Dorikigaku no Mondai. [Japanese; Kant and the problem of dynamics] Tokyo: Shobunsha, 2015. [199 p.] [WC]

Kim, Halla. Kant and the Foundations of Morality. Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2015. [xxxiv, 285 p.] [WC]

 ——. “Kant, Pistorius, and Accessing Reality.” Kant, Fichte, and the Legacy of Transcendental Idealism. Eds. Halla Kim and Steven Hoeltzel (op cit.). 53-76. [M]

 ——, and Steven Hoeltzel, eds. Kant, Fichte, and the Legacy of Transcendental Idealism. Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2015. [xxxvii, 244 p.] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Essays include:
Jeffrey Edwards (Self-Love, Sociability, and Autonomy: Some Presuppositions of Kant’s Account of Practical Law),
Günter Zöller (The Virtuous Republic: Rousseau and Kant on the Relation between Civil and Moral Religion),
Halla Kim (Kant, Pistorius, and Accessing Reality),
Tom Rockmore (Kant, Fichte, and Transcendental Idealism),
Steven Hoeltzel (The Unity of Reason in Kant and Fichte).

Kitcher, Patricia. “Apperception as the Supreme Principle of the Understanding.” Urteil und Erfahrung: Kants Theorie der Erfahrung. Ed. Rainer Enskat (op cit.). 47-70. [M]

 ——. Rev. of The Normativity of Nature: Essays on Kant’s Critique of Judgement, by Hannah Ginsborg (2015). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (Oct 2015, #16). [M] [online]

Klar, Samuel. “Kants Begründung des Privateigentums und das Scheitern der Deduktion.” Zeitschrift für kritische Sozialtheorie und Philosophie 2.1 (2015): 200-15. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In paragraphs 1 to 17 of the Rechtslehre (1797) Kant wants to proof that private property can be justified reasonably. He wants to demonstrate that each thing may be and may become private property, i. e. that it is allowed to exclude all others of their use – and the criterion for this being the moral respectively legal law. A detailed analysis of Kant’s “deduction” will show that it fails: The possession or appropriation of each object of the free will as private property is (according to Kantian terms) unreasonable and unlawful, because it contradicts the categorical imperative respectively the rational law. The Kantian right of ownership is not the expression of reasonable social relations, but justifies class-structures. Consequently, there is no duty (in Kant’s sense) to respect civil societies based on private ownership.

Klein, Joel Thiago. “The Use of Metaphor in Kant’s Philosophy of History.” Kant and the Metaphors of Reason. Ed. Patricia Kauark-Leite, et al. (op cit.). 497-512. [M]

 ——. “Liberdade e religião: reflexões kantianas sobre a não coercitividade, a veracidade e a publicidade na relação entre religião e política.” [Portuguese; Freedom and Religion: Kantian reflections on non-coercivity, truthfulness and publicity on the relationship between religion and politics] ethic@ 14.2 (2015): 222-51. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: According Kantian philosophy there are three principles that should regulate how politics relates to religion, namely, the principle of non-coercivity of religious belief, the moral requirement of truthfulness in professions of belief and the inability of maxims with religious content to conform itself with the political and legal principle of publicity. The objective of this paper is to present, explain and justify the application of these three principles with regard to religion and to indicate how they could help to solve political and moral issues regarding religious intolerance that continues to plague contemporary societies.

 ——. “Freedom of the Press: a Kantian Approach.” Estudos Kantianos 3.1 (2015): 83-92. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper presents an interpretation of the Kantian concepts of public and private use of reason in relation to the topic of the legitimacy of freedom of the press. In this case, I intend not only an interpretation of the Kantian texts but also an update of Kantian philosophy in a sense that tries to recontextualize some arguments and concepts for thinking about the modern question of freedom of the press in democratic societies.

Klemme, Heiner F. “Knowing, Feeling, Desiring— — Self Possession. Reflections on the Connection between the Faculties in Kant’’s Doctrine of the Categorical Imperative.” Kant’’s Lectures/Kants Vorlesungen. Eds. Bernd Dörflinger, et al. (op cit.). 143-161. [M]

 ——. “„die vernünftige Natur existirt als Zweck an sich selbst.“: Überlegungen zu Oliver Sensens Interpretation der Menschheitsformel in der Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten.” Kant-Studien 106.1 (2015): 88-96. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: I argue that ‘end in itself’, as Kant uses it in the Groundwork, is foremost a normative concept, and not mainly a descriptive one, as Oliver Sensen claims in his book Kant on Human Dignity. Sensen is right in arguing that dignity is not a value concept that signifies some obscure property. But he does not acknowledge the basis of dignity that lies in a relation to ourselves in which we stand in determining ourselves as willing subjects. Although dignity is not the reason why the moral law is binding on us, it is of vital importance to understand the nature of Kant’s conception of obligation. Dignity denotes the normative priority of freedom and of the law of freedom as against the law of nature.

 ——. “Kant on Moral Self-Determination and Self-Knowledge in 1787.” Kant and the Metaphors of Reason. Ed. Patricia Kauark-Leite, et al. (op cit.). 205-25. [M]

 ——. “„als ob er frei wäre“. Kants Rezension von Johann Heinrich Schulz’ Versuch einer Anleitung zur Sittenlehre für alle Menschen, ohne Unterschied der Religionen.” Crítica y metafísica: Homenaje a Mario Caimi. Ed. Claudia Jáuregui, et al. (op cit.). 198-209. [M]

Klempe, Sven. “Thinking in Early Modernity and the Separation Process Between Philosophy and Psychology.” Integrative Psychological & Behavioral Science 49.1 (2015): 44-52. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: One of the big questions in psychology is when and how psychology disentangled from philosophy. Usually it is referred to the laboratory Wundt established in Leipzig in 1879 as the birth for psychology as an independent science. However this separation process can also be traced in other ways, like by focusing on how the two sciences approach and understand thinking. Although thinking and language were not included in the research in this laboratory, Wundt regarded thinking as the core of psychology. As a commentary to Papanicolaou (Integr Psychol Behav Sci doi:10.1007/s12124-014-9273-3), this paper investigates the differences in how psychology and philosophy conceptualized thinking in early Western modernity. Thus one of the findings is that the separation process between the two was more or less initiated by Immanuel Kant. By defining thinking in terms of the pure reason he excluded the psychological understanding of thinking because psychology basically defined thinking in terms of ideas derived from qualia and sensation. Another finding is that psychology itself has not completely realized the differences between the philosophical and the psychological understanding of thinking by having been influenced by Kant’s ideal of the pure reason. This may also explain some of the crises psychology went through during the twentieth century.

Klingner, Stefan. “Kant und der Monotheismus der Vernunftreligion.” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 97.4 (2015): 458-80. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: While Kant refutes the traditional proofs for the existence of God he uses the traditional monotheistic notion of God for his own moral teleological conception of rational religion. The essay discusses Kant’s implicit claim that the monotheistic notion of God is an integral part of (moral) rational religion. Against Kant’s strong approach the essay reveals monotheism as a mere possibility of representing the notion of God legitimately for rational religion – beside adjusted forms of nontheism and polytheism. Nonetheless, Kant’s arguments for a monotheistic representation seem to be appropriate from a pragmatic point of view.

Kloos, Ingomar. “Biographische Rätsel um den halleschen Kantianer Johann Heinrich Tieftrunk sind gelöst.” Kant-Studien 106.4 (2015): 626-31. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Johann Heinrich Tieftrunk belongs to the group of true Kant-followers of the “closed Kantian” (“geschlossen kantische”) period [Gerhard Stammler] of earlier Kantianism in Halle (approx. 1770–1817). Except for his philosophy of religion, his philosophical work has thus far been ignored. Significant in this regard is our lack of biographical data on Tieftrunk. Some puzzles, however, such as his date of birth, have now been solved.

 ——. Frühkantianer an der Academia Fridericiana Halensis: Ludwig Martin Träger, Christian Gottfried Schütz, Ludwig Heinrich von Jakob, Johann Heinrich Tieftrunk, Jakob Sigismund Beck, Johann Gebhard Ehrenreich Maass, Johann Christoph Hoffbaue. Halle (Saale): Medienwerker Prius Schenk Verlag, 2015. [181 p.] [WC]

Kobe, Zdravko. “Epigenesis der Moralität: Kants Moralphilosophie zwischen dem Kanon und der Grundlegung.” Filozofski vestnik (Ljubljana) 36.2 (2015): 111-38. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The paper examines the development of Kant’s moral philosophy at the time of Critique of Pure Reason. By relying mostly on the so-called reflections, it argues that in the middle of the 1770s Kant was in possession of a rather comprehensive theory of morality as worthiness to be happy, built upon the universalisation of happiness and leading immanently to a moral theology. Even before the publication of Critique this conception was, mainly due to a closer definition of the concept of happiness that now included intellectuality, freedom, and self-satisfaction, reformulated into a system of the epigenesis of happiness out of the laws of freedom. The reflections from the early 1780s suggest the existence of yet another phase, as this conception was further developed into a system of the epigenesis of pure morality which, by drawing a pronounced parallel between cognition and action, now tried to establish the unconditional obligation by examining the a priori conditions of the unity of the willing of a finite rational being. Although the project appears highly promising, inherently consistent, and outwardly in complete agreement with the framework of a critical theory of cognition, it was unexpectedly given up – presumably under the influence of Rousseau and possibly as an overreaction to Garve. But since according to the author the final version of Kant’s moral theory basically implies a pre-critical subject of action, the paper concludes by suggesting that a truly consequent reconstruction of critical moral philosophy requires a reintroduction of the elements once given up by Kant.

Koch, Lutz. Rev. of Julius Ebbinghaus, Philosophische Studien aus dem Nachlass, edited by Udo Rameil, in collaboration with Manfred Baum (2013). Kant-Studien 106.2 (2015): 362-67. [PW]

Kohl, Markus. “Kant on the Inapplicability of the Categories to Things in Themselves.” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 23.1 (2015): 90-114. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper addresses the question of what we can legitimately say about things in themselves in Kant's critical doctrine. Many Kant scholars believe that Kant allows that things in themselves can be characterized through the unschematized or ‘pure’ concepts of our understanding such as ‘substance’ or ‘causality’. However, I show that on Kant's view things in themselves do not conform to the unschematized categories (given their standard discursive meaning): the pure categories, like space and time, are merely subjective forms of finite, discursive cognition. I then examine what this interpretation might entail for central aspects of Kant's system such as his doctrine of noumenal freedom.

 ——. “Kant on Freedom of Empirical Thought.” Journal of the History of Philosophy 53.2 (2015): 301-26. [M]

 ——. “Kant and ‘Ought Implies Can’.” Philosophical Quarterly 65 (2015): 690-710. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Although Kant is often considered the founding father of the controversial principle 'Ought Implies Can' (OIC), it is not at all clear how Kant himself understands and defends this principle. This essay provides a substained interpretation of Kant's views on OIC. I argue that Kant endorses two versions of OIC: a version that is concerned with our physical capacities, and a version that posits a link between moral obligation and a volitional power of choice. I show that although there are important senses in which Kant's conception of OIC differs from the way in which OIC is discussed in recent philosophy, his account raises important issues for contemporary theory: for instance, it highlights the extent to which acceptance or rejection of OIC reflects convictions about the sources of normativity.

 ——. “Kant on Determinism and the Categorical Imperative.” Ethics 125.2 (2015): 331-56. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: I provide a sympathetic reconstruction of Kant’s motivation for endorsing incompatibilism about human freedom. On my interpretation, Kant holds that if all the determining grounds of our actions were subject to natural necessity, we would never be free to respect or defy laws of practical reason, and for Kant such freedom is a condition for the possibility that our actions are governed by categorical imperatives. I argue that his view rests on a gripping construal of the rational imperfection that afflicts the human will.

 ——. Rev. of Kant on Spontaneity, by Marco Sgarbi (2012). Kantian Review 20.3 (2015): 479-83. [PW]

Komaki, Osamu. Kanto. [Japanese; Kant] Tokyo: Shimizushoin, 2015. [260 p.] [WC]

Kompanje, Erwin and Yorick Groot. “Immanuel Kant’s Categorical Imperative and the Brain-Dead Patient.” Intensive Care Medicine 41.6 (2015): 1153. [PI]

Kosbiau Trevisan, Diego. “Isolating Reason. Kant’s Way to the Critical Moral Philosophy.” Kant Studies Online (2015): 103-31; posted September 9, 2015. [M] [pdf]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The development of Kant’s moral philosophy, more particularly its transition from the pre-critical to the critical period, can be characterized as a progressive 'purification' of its supreme principle. This paper intends to show how a well-marked empirical foundation, present, for instance, in the time period of the Inquiry concerning the distinctness of the principles of natural theology and morality, is gradually replaced by an approach based on an initial outline of transcendental idealism. This is firstly sketched in the Dreams of a spirit-seer elucidated by dreams of metaphysics, then brought to theoretical consistency in the Inaugural Dissertation. As part of a radical critique of central presuppositions of rationalist metaphysics and in close relation to wider plans for a Critique of Pure Reason, Kant begins a process of purifying the basis of his moral doctrine, locating the spring of moral normativity in the pure reason, that is, the reason 'isolated' from empirical data.

 ——. “Disciplina como educação negativa da razão pura. Sobre uma possível influência de Rousseau na formação da filosofia Crítica de Kant.” [Portuguese] Estudos Kantianos 3.2 (2015): 107-18. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In opposition to a certain reading of the Discipline of Pure Reason that interprets it merely in the light of the Kantian reception of the German logic tradition of the 18th century (Reimarus, Baumgarten, Wolff and Meier), it is argued in this paper that the Kantian concept of discipline should be understood as a sort of negative and preventive education which is preparatory to a positive, autonomous and emancipated use of reason. This concept of discipline can be traced back to the reception of Rousseau by Kant in the 1760s and especially in the 1770s, when the idea of a Critique of Pure Reason was beginning to take shape in Kant’s intellectual development.

 ——. “Kant e a metafísica “crítica” da natureza.” [Portuguese; Kant and the 'critical' metaphysics of nature] DoisPontos 12.2 (2015): 45-65. [ASP]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper aims to discuss Kant’s Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, a pivotal work for the interpretation of the philosophies of nature in German idealism, as a disciplin contained in the ‘Architectonic of Pure Reason’, that is, as an applied metaphysics of corporeal substance. In order to do so we initially discuss the distinction made in the preface to the work between a transcendental and a metaphysical-specific part of metaphysics of nature. As result we come to the conception of matter, taken as something moveable in space, as a minimal empirical concept for constituting the object of a metaphysics of corporeal substance. Further the opposition between transcendental and metaphysical principles is addressed as a key for understanding how the transcendental principles of the Critique of Pure Reason become the principles of Newtonian physics. Finally, we analyse how the metaphysics of nature exemplifies the idea of realization of the transcendental principles understood as the transition to the empirical realm.

Kosch, Michelle. “Fichtean Kantianism in Nineteenth-Century Ethics.” Journal of the History of Philosophy 53.1 (2015): 111-32. [ASP]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper aims to establish a historical fact that is both surprising and universally overlooked: that J.G. Fichte's 1798 System of Ethics was seen, in the German-language philosophy of the first half of the nineteenth century, as the most important exemplar of systematic normative ethics on non-theological foundations. "Kantianism" during this period was taken to be better exemplified by Fichte's System of Ethics than by any of Kant's own works; and Fichte was both the starting point for proponents, and the chief target for opponents, of the Kantian project. After surveying the literature of the period with a view to establishing this fact, I draw from it three points of consensus about the relative merits of Kant's and Fichte's ethical writings that seem to explain Fichte's status. Two of these concern substantive philosophical disagreements between Kant and Fichte about how best to articulate the basic Kantian project, and they illustrate the enduring interest of Fichte's System of Ethics, which today is largely (and unjustly) neglected by historians of moral philosophy.

Kozak, Piotr. “Kant i trudny problem pojęć.” [Polish; Kant and the Hard Problem of Concepts] Diametros 46 (2015): 159-70. [PW] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Review of Anna Tomaszewska’s The Contents of Perceptual Experience: A Kantian Perspective, De Gruyter Open, Warsaw/Berlin 2014.

Kozak, Piotr. Co to jest myslenie?: Pojecia, Sady, Percepcja w Perspektywie Kantowskiej. [Polish] Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, 2015. [285 p.] [WC]

Krasnoff, Larry. “Kant, Immanuel.” The Cambridge Rawls Lexicon. Eds. Jon Mandle and David A. Reidy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). 395-98. [M]

Kreimendahl, Lothar. “Eine neue Hypothese zu Kants früher philosophischer Entwicklung? Erwiderung auf Wolfgang Kienzler.” Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 69.1 (2015): 43-60. [PW]

Kreis, Guido. Negative Dialektik des Unendlichen: Kant, Hegel, Cantor. Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2015. [490 p.] [WC]

 ——. “Kant und das Problem des Gegebenen: Antwort auf James Conant” Das neue Bedürfnis nach Metaphysik / The New Desire for Metaphysics. Ed. Markus Gabriel (op cit.). 151-60??. [WC]

Kreuzer, Albrecht. Prinzipien der Aufklärung und ihre Bedeutung für die Sozialphilosophie: Kant — Fénelon — Hegel. Frankfrut/Main: Peter Lang, 2015. [153 p.] [WC]

Krijnen, Christian. The Very Idea of Organization. Social Ontology Today: Kantian and Hegelian Reconsiderations. Leiden/Boston: Brill Academic Publication, 2015. [ix, 225 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Critical Studies in German Idealism, vol. 16.

Krouglov, Alexei N. “Die erste Rezeption der Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft in Rußland: Der Fall Mellmann (1795).” Vernunftreligion und Offenbarungsglaube. Eds. Norbert Fischer and Jakub Sirovátka (op cit.). 365-76. [M]

 ——. “Historische Quellen und philosophische Ursprünge des Vergleichs Kants mit Kopernikus.” Immanuel Kant und die kopernikanische Wende in der Philosophie. Ed. Tomasz Kupś (op cit.). 35-54??. [WC]

Kryshtop, Ludmila. “Das Ideal der Heiligkeit in der praktischen Philosophie Kants.” Vernunftreligion und Offenbarungsglaube. Eds. Norbert Fischer and Jakub Sirovátka (op cit.). 318-27. [M]

 ——. “Postulate als die unmittelbare Folge der kopernikanischen Wende bei Kant.” Immanuel Kant und die kopernikanische Wende in der Philosophie. Ed. Tomasz Kupś (op cit.). 81-94. [WC]

Kuehn, Manfred. “Kant’s Proto-Critical Position.” Kant’s Lectures on Ethics: A Critical Guide. Eds. Denis, Lara, and Oliver Sensen. (op cit.). 51-67. [M]

Küplen, Mojca. Beauty, Ugliness and the Free Play of Imagination: An Approach to Kant’s Aesthetics. Cham: Springer, 2015. [x, 152 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This book presents a solution to the problem known in philosophical aesthetics as the paradox of ugliness, namely, how an object that is displeasing can retain our attention and be greatly appreciated. It does this by exploring and refining the most sophisticated and thoroughly worked out theoretical framework of philosophical aesthetics, Kant's theory of taste, which was put forward in part one of the Critique of the Power of Judgment. The book explores the possibility of incorporating ugliness, a negative aesthetic concept, into the overall Kantian aesthetic picture. It addresses a debate of the last two decades over whether Kant's aesthetics should allow for a pure aesthetic judgment of ugliness. The book critically reviews the main interpretations of Kant's central notion of the free play of imagination and understanding, and offers a new interpretation of free play, one that allows for the possibility of a disharmonious state of mind and ugliness. In addition, the book also applies an interpretation of ugliness in Kant's aesthetics to resolve certain issues that have been raised in contemporary aesthetics, namely the possibility of appreciating artistic and natural ugliness and the role of disgust in artistic representation. Offering a theoretical and practical analysis of different kinds of negative aesthetic experiences, this book will help readers acquire a better understanding of his or her own evaluative processes, which may be helpful in coping with complex aesthetic experiences. Readers will gain unique insight into how ugliness can be offensive, yet, at the same time, fascinating, interesting and captivating

Kuhle, Bernd. Freiheit und Determinismus bei Kant: Die Unvereinbarkeit zweier Philosophischer Konzepte. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2015. [196 p.] [WC]

Kuhlken, Julie. “Kant and Gender: On Part II.” Southwest Philosophy Review 31.2 (2015): 33-38. [PW]

Kuhlmann, Wolfgang. “A Plea for Transcendental Philosophy.” Pragmatism, Kant, and Transcendental Philosophy. Eds. Gabriele Gava and Robert Stern (op cit.). 239-58??. [WC]

Kuliniak, Radoslaw, and Dorota Leszczyna. Spory wokól Polskich Przekladów Dziel Immanuela Kanta z lat 1795-1918. [Polish] Wroclaw: Atut, 2015. [211 p.] [WC]

Kuplen, Mojca. “The Sublime, Ugliness and Contemporary Art: A Kantian Perspective.” Con-Textos Kantianos 1 (2015): 114-41. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The aim of this paper is twofold. First, to explain the distinction between Kant’s notions of the sublime and ugliness, and to answer an important question that has been left unnoticed in contemporary studies, namely why it is the case that even though both sublime and ugliness are contrapurposive for the power of judgment, occasioning the feeling of displeasure, yet that after all we should feel pleasure in the former, while not in the latter. Second, to apply my interpretation of the sublime and ugliness to contemporary art, and to resolve certain issues that have been raised in accounting for the possibility of artistic sublimity. I argue that an experience of a genuine artistic sublimity is an uncommon occurrence. I propose that the value of contemporary art can be best explained by referring to Kant’s notion of ugliness and his theory of aesthetic ideas.

Kupś, Tomasz. “Der „religiöse“ Kontext Kantischer Idee des „ewigen Friedens“.” Studia Philosophica Kantiana 1 (2015): 37-49. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Die Elemente „des ewigen Friedens“ sind mit Sicherheit schon in den frühen geschichts-philosophischen Schriften von Kant enthalten, die vor dem Jahre 1795 veröffentlicht worden sind. Trotzdem ist der „religiöse“ Charakter dieses Konzeptes (sein philosophischer Chiliasm) in diesen Etappen des Schaffens erheblich stärker hervorgehoben. Aus diesem Grunde war die Berufung auf Kant, als einen Gegner der aggressiven Besetzungspolitik von Preußen, noch vor der Veröffentlichung von Zum ewigen Frieden möglich gewesen (davon zeugt die im Jahre 1794 geschriebene polemische Abhandlung gegen die Teilung Polens: Untersuchungen über die Rechtmässigkeit der Teilung Polens).

 ——, ed. Immanuel Kant und die kopernikanische Wende in der Philosophie. Torun: Wydawnictwo Naukowe UMK, 2015. [154 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: The following papers concern Kant directly:
Alexei N. Krouglov (Historische Quellen und philosophische Ursprünge des Vergleichs Kants mit Kopernikus),
Werner Euler (Kants kopernikanische Revolution in der Ästhetik),
Jindřich Karásek (Äusserer Sinn, Innerer Sinn und Apperzeption. Zum Verhältnis von Subjektivität und Zeitlichkeit),
Ludmila Kryshtop (Postulate als die unmittelbare Folge der kopernikanischen Wende bei Kant),
Dariusz Pakalski (Voraussetzung und Erkenntnis in der Metaphysik Kant),
Ľubomír Belás (Kant und das Problem der Revolution. Ein Versuch der Annäherung an historische Wahrheit),
Sandra Zákutná (Kant’s Reform in Thinking and Civil Society),
Boleslaw Andrzejewski (Die kopemikanische Wende und ihre Einwirkung auf die Sprachphilosophie),
Magdalena Gilicka (Blaustein vs Kant und Husserl. Konzept der Erscheinungswelt).

 ——. Rev. of Kants Opus postumum und seine Rezeption, by Giovanni Pietro Basile (2013). [English] Ruch Filozoficzny 71.4 (2015): 227-29. [M]

Kyslan, Peter. “Kant a Herder: kozmopolitizmus a multikulturalizmus.” [Slovak; Kant and Herder: Cosmopolitanism and Multiculturalism] Studia Philosophica Kantiana 2 (2015): 81-93. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The paper aims to philosophically compare and critically analyse philosophical heritage of Immanuel Kant and Johann Gottfried Herder. Primary comparison focuses on philosophical concepts of history and culture. Competitive philosophical and historical concepts of both German philosophers represent the basis of modern theories of cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism. The analysis focuses mainly on incompatibility and dissimilarity of Kant’s idea of cosmopolitanism and Herder’s culturalism. On the one hand, there is Herder’s naturalistic, anti-metaphysical, empirical concept of history and ethnic-aesthetic understanding of culture, on the other hand there is Kant’s history of freedom and culture as a process of humanisation. One of the main theoretical problems of multiculturalism is its historical and philosophical connection with Herder’s understanding of culture, i.e. a transition from an evaluative notion of culture towards the analytical one.

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La Rocca, Claudio. “La sfera e il circolo. L’architettonica nella Methodenlehre della Critica della ragion pura.” [Italian] Crítica y metafísica: Homenaje a Mario Caimi. Ed. Claudia Jáuregui, et al. (op cit.). 210-24. [M]

 ——, ed. See: Dörflinger, Bernd, Claudio La Rocca, Robert Louden, and Ubirajara Rancan de Azevedo Marques, eds.

Łaciak, Piotr. “Pojęcie przesądu w filozofii krytycznej Kanta i fenomenologii Husserla.” [Polish; The concept of prejudice in Kant's critical philosophy and Husserl's phenomenology] Studia Philosophiae Christianae 4 (2015): 1-27. [ASP]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article examines the concept of prejudice (Vorurteil) in Kant's and Husserl's theories. According to Kant, prejudices must be distinguished from provisional judgments that may be called anticipations or maxims for all inquiry. We form a provisional judgment (vorläufiges Urteil) of a thing before we recognize it with definitive judgment (bestimmendes Urteil). Prejudices, by contrast, are provisional judgments (or opinions) wrongly taken as definitive judgments, namely judgments which are adopted as principles without research of the conditions of their truth. Thus, Kant's notion of prejudice has the negative connotations and the aim of the critical philosophy is to overcome all prejudices. In contrast to Kant, Husserl makes distinction between positive and negative prejudices: positive prejudice is understood as a pre-judgment (Vor-Urteil) in the form of presumptive pre-knowledge (Vorwissen) and corresponds to Kant's concept of anticipation belonging to provisional judgment, while objectivistic (naturalistic) naïveté appears to be negative prejudice. The aim of phenomenology is to suspend all prejudices and this suspension makes it possible to research of their origins. In the article author shows that Husserl's conception of prejudice as a pre-judgment is similar to Gadamer's rehabilitation of prejudice as a pre-understanding. Therefore, it is possible to indicate similarities between Kant's concept of provisional judgment, Husserl's idea of pre-knowledge and Gadamer's conception of pre-understanding.

Lambeth, Morganna. “An Objection to Kant’s Second Analogy.” Kant Yearbook: Kant and Empiricism 6 (2015): 97-114. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the Second Analogy of the Critique of Pure Reason (CPR), Kant attempts to address Hume’s causal skepticism. Kant argues that the concept of cause must be employed in order to identify objective changes in the world, and that, therefore, all events are caused. In this paper, I will challenge Kant’s argument in the Second Analogy, arguing that we can identify objective changes without using the concept of cause, but by using the concept of logical condition instead. Rather than objectively ordering our perceptions through the idea that one thing that was perceived is the cause of the next thing that was perceived, the first necessitating the second, we can objectively order our perceptions through the idea that the first thing perceived is the logical condition of the second. In terms of Kant’s debate with Hume, I find that, though my objection undermines some of Hume’s own conclusions, it does allow Hume to avoid Kant’s argument against his causal skepticism.

Lampert, Jay. “Deleuze’s ‘Power of Decision’, Kant’s = X and Husserl’s Noema.” At the Edges of Thought: Deleuze and Post-Kantian Philosophy. Eds. Craig Lundy and Daniela Voss (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015). 272-92. [WC/JSTOR]

Land, Thomas. “Nonconceptualist Readings of Kant and the Transcendental Deduction.” Kantian Review 20.1 (2015): 25-51. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: I give an argument against nonconceptualist readings of Kant’s First Critique, according to which one can enjoy a Kantian intuition without possessing any concepts, and present an alternative reading. The argument is that nonconceptualist readings are forced to construe the Transcendental Deduction in one of three ways, none of which is acceptable: The Deduction is seen either (i) as inconsistent with the Transcendental Aesthetic; or (ii) as addressing a question of fact rather than a question of legitimacy; or (iii) as articulating a position that Kant himself criticizes as a form of scepticism. Consideration of the third alternative, in particular, shows that a more promising construal of the Deduction must be based on a different interpretation of Kant’s claim that intuitions and concepts constitute two distinct kinds of representation than is assumed by proponents of nonconceptualist readings. I present such an interpretation and outline the alternative reading of the Deduction that results.

 ——. “No Other Use than in Judgment? Kant on Concepts and Sensible Synthesis.” Journal of the History of Philosophy 53.3 (2015): 461-84. [M]

Landes, Donald A. “Between Sensibility and Understanding: Kant and Merleau-Ponty and the Critique of Reason.” Journal of Speculative Philosophy 29.3 (2015): 335-45. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Whether explicitly or implicitly, Kant's critical project weighs heavily upon Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception. This article argues that we can understand Merleau-Ponty's text as a phenomenological rewriting of the Critique of Pure Reason from within the paradoxical structures of lived experience, effectively merging Kant's Transcendental Aesthetic and Transcendental Analytic. Although he was influenced by Husserl's and Heidegger's interpretations of Kant's first version of the Transcendental Deduction, Merleau-Ponty develops a unique position between Kant, Husserl, and Heidegger via an embodied and lived synthesis that collapses Kant's distinction between sensibility and the understanding, and that makes sense of temporality and subjectivity as a paradoxical trajectory.

Landmann, Tino. Der Begriff des Pflichtzwecks in der Tugendlehre Immanuel Kants: Das Verhältnis von Form und Materie im Projekt einer Ethik als Metaphysik der Sitten. Hamburg: Kovac, 2015. [xv, 245 p.] [WC]

Landy, David. Kant’s Inferentialism: The Case Against Hume. New York/Abingdon: Routledge, 2015. [xi, 308 p.] [M] [review]

Langthaler, Rudolf. “Der »Kritizismus der praktischen Vernunft« und die »durch hergebrachte fromme Lehren erleuchtete praktische Vernunft«: Kantische Aspekte einer »Selbstbegrenzung der praktischen Vernunft«.” Vernunftreligion und Offenbarungsglaube. Eds. Norbert Fischer and Jakub Sirovátka (op cit.). 232-76. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: The title of this essay as listed in the table of contents (“Das Christentum als ›wundersame Religion‹ und die »durch hergebrachte fromme Lehren erleuchtete praktische Vernunft« nach Immanuel Kant”) differs from that given in the text; the title given here follows the text.

Langton, Rae. “Humility and Coexistence in Kant and Lewis: Two Modal Themes with Variations.” A Companion to David Lewis. Eds. Barry Loewer and Jonathan Schaffer (Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley Blackwell, 2015). 491-503. [M]

Lara, María Pía. Rev. of Immanuel Kant, Antropología en sentido pragmático, translated by Dulce María Granja, Gustavo Leyva, and Peter Storandt (2014). [Spanish] Signos Filosóficos 16.34 (2015): 150-59. [M] [online]

Lateș, Titus. “Traducerile lui Traian Brăileanu din Kant.” [Romanian; Traian Brăileanu’s Translations of Kant] Revista de Filosofie 62.3 (2015): 320-34. [RC]

 ——. “Kant dans la philosophie roumaine. Les premières 150 années.” [French; Kant in the Romanian Philosophy. The First 150 Years] Revue Roumaine de Philosophie 59.1 (2015): 63-72. [RC/PW]

Lau, Chong-Fuk. “Transcendental Concepts, Transcendental Truths and Objective Validity.” Kantian Review 20.3 (2015): 445-66. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant insists that the use of concepts must be subject to empirical conditions if they are to have objective validity. This article analyses Kant’s principle of objective validity, focusing particularly on its application to transcendental concepts such as those of sensibility, understanding and transcendental apperception. It distinguishes between two orders of objective validity, based on Kant’s distinction between empirical and transcendental truths. Since transcendental concepts are pure concepts without spatio-temporal content, their objective validity is of the same second-order kind as that of unschematized categories. This characteristic of transcendental concepts implies that the cognitive powers picked out by them are not particular psychological mechanisms, but rather abstract functional structures. Transcendental concepts owe their objective validity to the realizability of the functional structures by empirical cognizers like humans. This relation in turn helps to explain the nature of transcendental truths.

 ——. “Die Ambition der Kantischen Metaphysik: Entwurf einer transzendental-funktionatistischen Interpretation” Das neue Bedürfnis nach Metaphysik / The New Desire for Metaphysics. Ed. Markus Gabriel (op cit.). 93-112??. [WC]

Lauer, Christopher. Rev. of The Palgrave Handbook of German Idealism, edited by Matthew C. Altman (2014). CSCP/SCPC (Canadian Society for Continental Philosophy) (online: 22 Jul 2015). [M] [online]

Lee, Sae-Hee. “Finding the Universality Beyond Language and Culture: Comparative Political Theory and the Cosmopolitanism of Wang Yangming and Immanuel Kant.” The Cosmopolitan Ideal: Challenges and Opportunities. Eds. Darren O’Byrne and Sybille de la Rosa (London: Rowan & Littlefield International, 2015). 61-79. [M]

Leech, Jessica. “Logic and the Laws of Thought.” Philosophers’ Imprint 15.12 (2015): 1-27. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: An approach to explaining the nature and source of logic and its laws with a rich historical tradition (particularly Kant and Frege) takes the laws of logic to be laws of thought. This view seems intuitively compelling, after all, logic seems to be intimately related with how we think. But how exactly should we understand it? And what arguments can we give in favour? I will propose one line of argument for the claim that the laws of logic are laws of thought. I will motivate the claim that there is a certain phenomenon, namely, that there are logical principles which are immune to rational doubt. I will then give an argument to the best explanation; I will argue that the best explanation of this phenomenon is to take the laws of logic to be constitutive-normative laws of thought. The proposal, and some responses to potential objections, will have a notably Kantian flavour.

Lefort, Élisabeth. See: Kaipl, Esteban and Élisabeth Lefort.

Lehman, Robert S. “Expressions of Judgment: An Essay on Kant’s Aesthetics.” Critical Inquiry 42.1 (2015): 221-23. [PI]

Leite, Diego Azevedo. See: Araujo, Saulo de Freitas, and Diego Azvedo Leite.

Lemos, John. “A Kantian Defense of Libertarian Blame.” Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics 3.1 (2015): 251-63. [PW] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Libertarianism is the view that free will exists and it is incompatible with determinism. As such, libertarians believe that at least some of our free willed acts must be undetermined. Many contemporary libertarians admit that there is not adequate epistemic justification for the view, yet they endorse the view and the practices of praise/blame and reward/punishment which they ground on the presumption of libertarian free will. This article considers a moral objection to this aspect of libertarianism and responds to it with a kind of Kantian pragmatic defense.

Leonard, Miriam. Socrates and the Jews: Hellenism and Hebraism from Moses Mendelssohn to Sigmund Freud. Chicago/London: University of Chicago Press, 2015. [xiv, 245 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: See chapter one: "Socrates and the Reason of Judaism: Moses Mendelssohn and Immanuel Kant".

Lequan, Mai. “L’émergence de la distinction entre raison pratique et raison théorique dans la Recherche (1762-1764).” Kant, la raison pratique: concepts et héritages. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Margit Ruffing, and Ricardo Ribeiro Terra (op cit.). 183-95. [M]

Lerussi, Natalia Andrea. “On the Analogy between Organic Nature and (Practical) Reason: Towards a Bio- and Ecological Ethics in Kant’s Critique of Teleological Judgment.” Kant and the Metaphors of Reason. Ed. Patricia Kauark-Leite, et al. (op cit.). 277-86. [M]

 ——. “Acerca de una consideración naturalizada de la filosofía de la historia de Immanuel Kant: Epigénesis e historia universal.” [Spanish; On a naturalized way of understanding Immanuel Kant’s philosophy of history: Epigenesis and universal history] Cadernos de Filosofia Alemã: Crítica e Modernidade 20.1 (2015): 93-105. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the paper I show that universal history ́s conceptual matrix that I. Kant uses in his Idea of an Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View is the same by which the philosopher explains the production of variations in the organic beings in natural history, the epigenesis theory (according to the sections §§80 y 81 of the Critique of the Power of Judgment). Consequently I defend a naturalized conception of Kant ́s philosophy of history

 ——. “Hacia una revisión del antropocentrismo kantiano. Argumentos para una consideración ética de la naturaleza (orgánica) según la Crítica de la Facultad de Juzgar Teleológica.” [Spanish; Towards a Revision of Kantian Anthropocentrism Arguments for an Ethical Consideration of (Organic) Nature According to the Teleological Critique of Judgment] Ideas y Valores 64.148 (2015): 123-41. [PW] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The “Teleological Critique of Judgment” is analyzed to revise, using three lines of argument, the supposed Kantian anthropocentrism according to which the ends of man define the ends of nature in such a way that relegates nature to a mere instrument. The first line of argument shows how the treatment of nature as a means has been limited by morality. The other two advance beyond anthropocentric ethics to trace elements of an ethics oriented toward (organic) nature in which all of its members are also defined as ends, that is, as morally worthy.

Leserre, Daniel. “La función semántica del lenguaje en la deducción transcendental de la Critica de la razón pura.” [Spanish] Crítica y metafísica: Homenaje a Mario Caimi. Ed. Claudia Jáuregui, et al. (op cit.). 225-45. [M]

Leszczyna, Dorota. See: Kuliniak, Radoslaw.

Leutgöb, Andreas. Der Begriff Race und seine wissenschaftlichen Wurzeln bei Immanuel Kant. Eine Zeitreise in die Epoche der Aufklärung und seiner Rassismusdebatte. Norderstedt: Books on Demand, 2015. [168 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Immanuel Kant, gilt als „der“ Philosoph, im deutschen Sprachraum schlechthin. Seine Impulse zum Völkerbund, die Gedanken zum Weltbürgertum sowie sein Anstoß zu den Menschenrechten werden als Meilensteine einer humaneren Gesellschaft betrachtet. Weniger beachtet werden seine naturphilosophischen und anthropologischen Schriften. Seine Entwürfe zur Rassentheorie, die im angloamerikanischen Raum schon längere Zeit zu Kontroversen führen, beginnen nun auch im deutschen Sprachraum rezipiert zu werden. Kant ist der Erfinder eines wissenschaftlichen Rassenbegriffs, dessen Konzept der unveränderlichen, hierarchisch gegliederten Rassen, der Blutsmischung entspringt und in der Hautfarbe ihren Ausdruck findet. Wie und ob sich diese Theorien mit Kants Moralphilosophie, und seiner politischen Philosophie vereinbaren lassen, soll diese Arbeit zeigen.

Levin, Yakir. “Kant, McDowell, and the 'Identity of Identity and Nonidentity'.” Acta Analytica 30.4 (2015): 347-62. [ASP]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The problem of the 'identity of identity and nonidentity' (IINI), which haunted German idealism, has two closely related aspects. The first, epistemological aspect concerns the possibility of knowledge of an objective world. The second, transcendental aspect, concerns the question of how thoughts can be directed towards the world. Reconstructing McDowell's Kantian account of intentionality as a purported resolution of the transcendental aspect of IINI, I pose the following dilemma for McDowell's account: Either (1) part ways with Kant's purported resolution of IINI at a crucial point, thereby being driven towards an approach that McDowell firmly opposes, indeed cannot accept, or (2) follow Kant to the letter, and then face, head-on, a deep problem that Kant's purported resolution of IINI faces. Parting ways, as I show, with Kant's purported resolution of IINI, McDowell finds himself impaled upon the first horn of this dilemma. Were he, however, to respond by following Kant to the letter, McDowell would find himself impaled upon the second horn. Thus, I conclude, McDowell's account of intentionality fails.

Lima Filho, José Edmar. “Da metafísica transcendental à ideia teórica de Deus na "Crítica da razão pura" de Kant.” [Portuguese] Kant e-Prints 10.2 (2015): 24-37. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article defends the thesis that the passage of the dogmatic metaphysics transcendental to the Critique of Pure Reason of Kant, parallel to the need to delineate the contours of the epistemic limits of the knowing subject, is that the very transcendental philosophy can be understood as certain post-metaphysical metaphysics. This methodological change is what allows Kant to thematize the idea of God as a maximum logic required by the internal constitution of transcendental subjectivity; the argument is not sufficient to ensure it is a proof of the existence of God or otherwise, but certainly sets this idea of reason as ineliminable metaphysical condition of all possible knowledge.

Lindemann, Gesa. “From the Critique of Judgment to the Principle of the Open Question.” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18.5 (2015): 891-907. [ASP]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The relevance of Kant to Plessner’s work was long all but ignored and there is hardly any mention of Plessner in the Kant literature. The Plessner renaissance beginning in the 1990s, however, has brought with it a stronger focus on the methodological construction of his theory, so that the Kant connection has at least been acknowledged, but the particular relevance of Kant’s Critique of Judgement (Kant 1790/2007) has not been systematically explicated. In this essay, I investigate the connection between Kant’s notion of reflective— specifically teleological—judgment and Plessner’s theory. I begin by setting out the character- istics of teleological judgment, with two points being of particular importance: the temporal structure of the final cause and Kant’s reference to an understanding other than the human, that is, to an ordering power other than the human. In a second step, I work out Plessner’s conceptualization of the spatiotemporal appearance of organisms and the way he understands the other of human understanding as nature’s—or history’s—historically evolved and mutable capacity for self-order. He arrives at these conclusions by way of a methodologically controlled process of questioning derived from Kant, which he calls the “principle of the open question.”

Linhares, Orlando Bruno. “The Awakening from the Dogmatic Slumber and the Great Light from 69 in Kant.” Kant and the Metaphors of Reason. Ed. Patricia Kauark-Leite, et al. (op cit.). 161-75. [M]

Lockhart, Jennifer Ryan. “Kant and Kierkegaard on Inwardness and Moral Luck.” Philosophical Investigations 38.3 (2015): 251-75. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The traditional understanding of Kant and Kierkegaard is that their views on the good will and inwardness, respectively, commit them to denying moral luck in an attempt to isolate an omnipotent moral subject from involvement with the external world. This leaves them vulnerable to the criticism that their ethical thought unrealistically insulates morality from anything that happens in the world. On the interpretation offered here, inwardness and the good will are not contrasted with worldly happenings, but are instead a matter of worldly happenings that exhibit a particular temporal structure. Kant and Kierkegaard should not be understood as denying moral luck.

Lopes da Silva, Hélio. “O jogo livre da imaginação é compatível com a dedução kantiana das categorias?” [Portuguese;; Is the free play of imagination compatible with the Kantian deduction of the categories?] Studia Kantiana 13.18 (2015): 182-205. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: We intend in this paper to examine the seemingly incompatibility between the third Kantian Critique’s concept of the free play or harmony of the faculties Imagination and Understanding, and the Kantian first Critique’s Transcendental Deduction of the Categories, as long as the former seems to imply that Imagination can perceive “without concepts” an intuited object, and this last one tried to submit all such kind of perception to an a priori possession of a concept. We will, in order to do this, consider the positions assumed by some of the most outstanding interpreters of the Kantian philosophy.

López Flores, Moisés. Rev. of Foundations for Moral Relativism, by David Velleman (2013). [Spanish] Con-Textos Kantianos 1 (2015): 287-96. [M] [online]

Lord, Beth. “Deleuze and Kant’s Critique of Judgment.” At the Edges of Thought: Deleuze and Post-Kantian Philosophy. Eds. Craig Lundy and Daniela Voss (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015). 105-22. [WC/JSTOR]

Lorini, Gualtiero. “Harmonia in commercio vs Harmonia absque commercio. Kant’s eclectical dealing with causality.” Con-Textos Kantianos 2 (2015): 32-47. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The present paper aims to provide an overview on Kant’s dealing with the main theories of causality which were proposed and discussed in his time. The goal is to show that, since the pre-critical period, he has never simply accepted the theories of causality that he could find in second-scholastic sources, but has always tried to develop an original position. Starting from a general acceptance of the theory of the “physical influx”, Kant tries to amend this theory, as it had been roughly provided by Knutzen and Crusius. This emendation is carried out through elements coming from the Leibnitian tradition. But neither in this field Kant totally embraces the Wolffian, as well as the Baumgartenian model. The paper tries also to shed light on the way in which the critical conception of space allows Kant to fulfill his original theory of causality as an amended version of the physical influx.

 ——. “The Contribution of Kant’s Lectures on Metaphysics to a Better Comprehension of the Architectonic.” Kant’’s Lectures/Kants Vorlesungen. Eds. Bernd Dörflinger, et al. (op cit.). 233-245. [M]

 ——. “Kant’s Metaphor by Analogy between Ontology and Transcendental Philosophy.” Kant and the Metaphors of Reason. Ed. Patricia Kauark-Leite, et al. (op cit.). 71-85. [M]

 ——. Rev. of Kant and Rational Psychology, by Corey W. Dyck (2014). [English] Estudos Kantianos 3.2 (2015): 233-41. [M] [online]

 ——. Rev. of La raison des normes. Essai sur Kant, by Jean-François Kervégan (2015). [German] Con-Textos Kantianos 1 (2015): 267-73. [M] [online]

Louden, Robert B. “Moralität für Menschen: Ethische Theorie in Kants Vigilantius-Vorlesung.” Kant’s Lectures/Kants Vorlesungen. Eds. Bernd Dörflinger, et al. (op cit.). 179-194. [M]

 ——. “The Last Frontier: Exploring Kant’s Geography.” Reading Kant’s Lectures. Ed. Robert R. Clewis (op cit.). 505-23. [M]

 ——. “Die Entdeckung von Kants Geographie: das letzte Neuland.” Kant and the Metaphors of Reason. Ed. Patricia Kauark-Leite, et al. (op cit.). 471-96. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Translation into German of “The Last Frontier: Exploring Kant’s Geography.”

 ——. “Vigilantius: Morality for Humans.” Kant’s Lectures on Ethics: A Critical Guide. Eds. Denis, Lara, and Oliver Sensen. (op cit.). 84-99. [M]

 ——. “‘The end of all human action’/‘The final object of all my conduct’: Aristotle and Kant on the Highest Good.” The Highest Good in Aristotle and Kant. Eds. Joachim Aufderheide and Ralf M. Bader (op cit.). 112-28. [M]

 ——, ed. See: Dörflinger, Bernd, Claudio La Rocca, Robert Louden, and Ubirajara Rancan de Azevedo Marques, eds.

Lowe, Chun-yip. Zum ewigen Frieden: Die Theorie des Völkerrechts bei Kant und Rawls. Frankfurt/Main: Peter Lang, 2015. [186 p.] [WC]

Lu-Adler, Huaping. “Constructing a Demonstration of Logical Rules, or How to Use Kant’s Logic Corpus.” Reading Kant’s Lectures. Ed. Robert R. Clewis (op cit.). 137-59. [M]

Ludwig, Bernd. “‘Die Kritik der reinen Vernunft hat die Wirklichkeit der Freiheit nicht bewiesen, ja nicht einmal deren Möglichkeit.’: Über die folgenreiche Fehlinterpretation eines Absatzes in der Kritik der reinen Vernunft.” Kant-Studien 106.3 (2015): 398-417. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: A famous passage in the first Critique (A 557 f.) often gives rise to the belief that Kant had not yet delivered a full treatment of freedom in 1781 and intended to shift this treatment to future writings. However, a closer inspection of the passage reveals that, to the contrary, Kant claims that due to the limitations of human reason his critical account of freedom given thus far must be considered complete. And indeed, this account reappears unchanged in the Groundwork. When considered in this light, not only do the exact achievements of the first Critique concerning Kant’s doctrine of freedom become evident, but so too does the further development of this doctrine. In 1785, the Groundwork supplies a new conceptual link between freedom and the moral law (and with it an explanation of the possibility of categorical imperatives). And thanks to this very link, Kant is able, in the second Critique (1787/88), to remedy a ‘dogmatic’ mistake (discovered by a reviewer in 1786) in his 1781/85 account of freedom.

 ——. “‘Notwendigkeit ist nichts als jene Existenz, die durch die Möglichkeit selbst gegeben ist.’ — Die Epistemologie des Übersinnlichen bei Leibniz und bei Kant.” Crítica y metafísica: Homenaje a Mario Caimi. Ed. Claudia Jáuregui, et al. (op cit.). 246-74. [M]

Lueck, Bryan. “Tact as Ambiguous Imperative: Merleau-Ponty, Kant, and Moral Sense-Bestowal.” Epoché 20.1 (2015): 195-211. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: I argue in this paper that some of the most basic commitments of Kantian ethics can be understood as grounded in the dynamic of sense that Maurice Merleau-Ponty describes in his Phenomenology of Perception. Specifically, I argue that Merleau-Ponty’s account supports the importance of universalizability as a test for the moral permissibility of particular acts as well as the idea that the binding character of the moral law is given as something like a fact of reason. But I also argue that Merleau-Ponty’s account of reversibility suggests an important dimension of moral experience that is given in the experience of contact and that is underthematized in moral philosophies like Kant’s that emphasize the role of universalizability.

Luft, Sebastian. The Space of Culture: Towards a Neo-Kantian Philosophy of Culture (Cohen, Natorp, and Cassirer). New York: Oxford University Press, 2015. [x, 262 p.] [WC]

Luján Di Sanza, Silvia del. “Die Natur als Kunst und die Kunst als Natur in Kants dritter Kritik.” Kant and the Metaphors of Reason. Ed. Patricia Kauark-Leite, et al. (op cit.). 415-28. [M]

Lutterbeck, Klaus-Gert. Rev. of Johann Georg Sulzer (1720‒1779). Aufklärung zwischen Christian Wolff und David Hume, edited by Frank Grunert und Gideon Stiening (2011). Kant-Studien 106.3 (2015): 538-42. [PW]

Lyotard, Jean-François. Leçons sur l’analytique du sublime. Paris: Klincksieck, 2015. [223 p.] [WC]

[top] M    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Macarthur, David. “A Kant-Inspired Vision of Pragmatism as Democratic Experimentalism.” Pragmatism, Kant, and Transcendental Philosophy. Eds. Gabriele Gava and Robert Stern (op cit.). 67-84??. [WC]

Macor, Laura Anna. “Renovando el canon filosófico. Schiller antes, después y más allá de Kant.” [Spanish; Renewing the Philosophical Canon. Schiller Before, After and Beyond Kant] Con-Textos Kantianos 2 (2015): 287-309. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Friedrich Schiller (1759-1805) belongs to that category of authors which can be approached from both a literary and a philosophical angle. His work consists of poetry and novels, but also philosophical dialogues and essays, and his range has always challenged disciplinary distinctions, thus necessarily raising methodological issues. Scholars have yet to agree upon his position within the canon: whereas his role as a leading poet in the late Enlightenment and Weimar Classicism is justly undisputed, his inclusion in the philosophical canon requires a great deal more investigation. Schiller has variously been viewed as a mere philosophical dilettante who owes everything to Kant, or as an independent thinker who challenges Kant on equal terms, and these two different attitudes have obviously led to similarly different views on his role in the canon. Be that as it may, the only writings of his to have received scholarly attention are those relating to Kant’s work, which he composed and published in the 1790s. Hence the conviction that Schiller as a philosopher exists only in virtue of Kant. The aim of this paper is to question this thesis by showing the depth of Schiller’s early philosophy and pointing to the continuity of his concerns before, after and beyond Kant.

 ——. “Woher oder wohin? Der bidirektionale Weg des Menschen zum Unbedingten: Respondenz zum Beitrag von Birgit Sandkaulen” Das neue Bedürfnis nach Metaphysik / The New Desire for Metaphysics. Ed. Markus Gabriel (op cit.). 59-62. [WC]

Madore, Joël. “When Reason Began to Stir… — Kantian Courage and the Enlightenment.” Con-Textos Kantianos 2 (2015): 217-37. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In his answer to the question “What is Enlightenment?”, Kant argues that we must have the courage to use our own reason and imputes failure to do so on laziness and cowardice. Why exactly does the call for emancipation require resolve? This paper follows Foucault in defining Enlightenment as a modern ethos that adopts the ephemeral as a way of being. Contrary to the French philosopher, however, we argue that this permanent critique of oneself and of the world creates a void that leaves us trembling before nothingness. If Enlightenment requires courage, then, it is precisely to urge us to remain steadfast in the practice of freedom and to not shy away from the dangers it imposes. Courage, in short, is resolve before the abyss of freedom. Too long have we confined Kant to an ossified, rationalistic framework, thankfully impervious to human anguish for some, regretfully incapable of it for others. If anything, this paper wants to uncover the deep, existential tones of his conclusions on modernity, and it will do so through an examination of his account of courage.

Malet, André. Une Transcendance Finie: cours sur Heidegger. Volume 2, Kant et le Problème de la Métaphysique., annotated by Pierre-Yves Ruff. Paris: Théolib, 2015. [176 p.] [WC]

Malpas, Jeff. “Self, Other, Thing: Triangulation and Topography in Post-Kantian Philosophy.” Philosophy Today 59.1 (2015): 103-26. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Topography or topology is a mode of philosophical thinking that combines elements of transcendental and hermeneutic approaches. It is antireductionist and relationalist in its ontology, and draws heavily, if sometimes indirectly, on ideas of situation, locality, and place. Such a topography or topology is present in Heidegger and, though less explicitly, in Hegel. It is also evident in many other recent and contemporary post-Kantian thinkers in addition to Kant himself. A key idea within such a topography or topology is that of triangulation -- an idea that appears explicitly in the work of Donald Davidson. Triangulation captures the idea of the topographical domain as constituted through the mutual relatedness of the elements within it, and as only to be understood through the mapping out of such relatedness -- in the case of the topographical domain that is the world, through the relatedness of self, other, and thing.

Mamulea, Mona. “Un monisme neutre sur la base de Kant: Constantin Rădulescu-Motru.” [French; A Neutral Monism Based on Kant: Constantin Rădulescu-Motru] Revue Roumaine de Philosophie 59.1 (2015): 73-84. [RC/PW]

 ——. “Măcar câteva întrezăriri: Petrovici și realitarea în sine.” [Romanian; At least some Glimpses: Petrovici and the Reality in Itself] Filosofie și viață. In honorem Alexandru Boboc. Eds. M.A. Drăghici, O. Vasilescu (Bucarest: Ed. Academiei Române, 2015). 173-80. [RC]

Marcolungo, Ferdinando Luigi. “Abgrund: Métaphores de l’Inconditionné en Immanuel Kant.” Kant and the Metaphors of Reason. Ed. Patricia Kauark-Leite, et al. (op cit.). 59-70. [M]

Marey, Macarena. “La liberté comme source de la normativité. Droit et contrainte dans Einleitung du cours sur le droit naturel de 1787 Naturrecht Feyerabend.” Kant, la raison pratique: concepts et héritages. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Margit Ruffing, and Ricardo Ribeiro Terra (op cit.). 295-303. [M]

 ——. “El rol sistemático de los fines en la metafisica de las costumbres.” [Spanish] Crítica y metafísica: Homenaje a Mario Caimi. Ed. Claudia Jáuregui, et al. (op cit.). 275-91. [M]

Marques, António. A filosofia e o mal. Banalidade e radicalidade do mal de Hannah Arendt a Kant. [Portuguese] Lisbon: Relógio d'Água, 2015. [126 p.] [WC]

Marques, Ubirajara Rancan de Azevedo. “On Epigenesis: Historical and Philological Remarks.” Kant’s Lectures/Kants Vorlesungen. Eds. Bernd Dörflinger, et al. (op cit.). 261-272. [M]

 ——. “Os tons harmônicos e o “fundamento das representações”. Breve comentário a uma anotação de Kant sobre uma metáfora musical de Eberhard.” [Portuguese; Harmonics and the “ground of representations”. Kant on a musical metaphor from Eberhard. A brief commentary] Con-Textos Kantianos 2 (2015): 48-61. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the Vorarbeiten to the Streitschrift against Eberhard there is an annotation of Kant's with a relative abundance of vocables taken from the music. These four lines are preceded by mention of a page interval from an unidentified text. This paper, revealing the source to which Kant alludes indirectly, comments a musical “example” from Eberhard against critical philosophy, precisely the same that gave rise to this annotation of the philosopher. After some philological considerations on the musical vocabulary employed by both authors, I proceed to an analysis of the metaphor and their argumentative effectiveness.

Marra Rodrigues, Osvaldino. See: Gondim, Elnora, and Osvaldino Marra Rodrigues.

Marshall, Colin. “On Corey Dyck’s Kant and Rational Psychology.” Critique (blog posted: 24 Jun 2015) n.p. [PW] [online]

 ——. Rev. of Kantian Conceptual Geography, by Nathaniel Jason Goldberg (2015). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (Aug 2015, #27). [M] [online]

 ——. See: Paulson, Spencer and Colin Marshall.

Martínez, Luciana. Rev. of Kant’s Lectures on Ethics: a Critical Guide, edited by Lara Denis and Oliver Sensen (2015). [Spanish] Con-Textos Kantianos 2 (2015): 389-93. [M] [online]

Massimi, Michela. Rev. of Kant: Natural Science, edited by Eric Watkins (2012). Philosophy 90.1 (2015): 143-46. [PW]

Masuyama, Hiroto. Kanto no Sekairon: Baumugaruten to Hyumu ni Taisuru oto. [Japanese] Sapporo: Hokkaidodaigakushuppankai, 2015. [ix, 224 p.] [WC]

 ——, ed. See: Heit, Alexander, Harald Matern, and Enno Edzard Popkes, eds.

Matherne, Samantha. “Images and Kant’s Theory of Perception.” Ergo 2.29 (2015): 737-77. [M] [pdf]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: My aim in this paper is to offer a systematic analysis of a feature of Kant’s theory of perception that tends to be overlooked, viz., his account of how the imagination forms images in perception. Although Kant emphasizes the centrality of this feature of perception, indeed, calling it a ‘necessary ingredient’ of perception, commentators have instead focused primarily on his account of sensibility and intuitions on the one hand, and understanding and concepts on the other. However, I show that careful attention to what he says about the nature of images, their connection to the imagination, and their role in perception in his Metaphysics Lectures, as well as in the Deduction and Schematism chapters of the first Critique reveals that Kant is working with a richer, more nuanced framework for perception than is often attributed to him. I contend that it is only once we have a revised framework for Kant’s theory of perception in place that we will be able to make further headway in debates, e.g., about whether or not he is a conceptualist about perception.

McBay, Melissa Merritt. “Varieties of Reflection in Kant’s Logic.” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 23.3 (2015): 478-501. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: For Kant, ‘reflection’ (Überlegung, Reflexion) is a technical term with a range of senses. I focus here on the senses of reflection that come to light in Kant's account of logic, and then bring the results to bear on the distinction between ‘logical’ and ‘transcendental’ reflection that surfaces in the Amphiboly chapter of the Critique of Pure Reason. Although recent commentary has followed similar cues, I suggest that it labours under a blind spot, as it neglects Kant's distinction between ‘pure’ and ‘applied’ general logic. The foundational text of existing interpretations is a passage in Logik Jäsche that appears to attribute to Kant the view that reflection is a mental operation involved in the generation of concepts from non-conceptual materials. I argue against the received view by attending to Kant's division between ‘pure’ and ‘applied’ general logic, identifying senses of reflection proper to each, and showing that none accords well with the received view. Finally, to take account of Kant's notion of transcendental reflection I show that we need to be attentive to the concerns of applied logic and how they inform the domain-relative transcendental logic that Kant presents in the first Critique.

McDowell, John. Die Welt im Blick Aufsätze zu Kant, Hegel und Sellars. Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2015. [450 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: German translation of Having the World in View: Essays on Kant, Hegel, and Sellars (2009).

McLear, Colin. “Two Kinds of Unity in the Critique of Pure Reason.” Journal of the History of Philosophy 53.1 (2015): 79-110. [M]

 ——. Rev. of The Poverty of Conceptual Truth: Kant's Analytic/Synthetic Distinction and the Limits of Metaphysics, by R. Lanier Anderson (2015). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (Oct 2015, #22). [M] [online]

McMahon, Jennifer A. Art and Ethics in a Material World: Kant’s Pragmatist Legacy. New York/Oxfordshire: Routledge, 2015. [xi, 234 p.] [WC]

McMullin, Irene. “A Response to Mark D. White’s ‘A Modest Comment on McMullin: A Kantian Account of Modesty’.” Journal of Philosophical Research 40 (2015): 7-11. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In response to Mark D. White’s Kantian critique of my article “A Modest Proposal: Accounting for the Virtuousness of Modesty,” I argue that invoking Kant’s notions of dignity and respect in order to provide an egalitarian account of modesty brings with it conceptual commitments that are not always easy to reconcile with the moral phenomenology of that virtue. In light of this I question White’s claim that a Kantian account of modesty offers a better explanation than the existential phenomenological approach that I endorse.

McNulty, Michael Bennett. “Rehabilitating the Regulative Use of Reason: Kant on Empirical and Chemical Laws.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Part A 54 (2015): 1-10. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In his Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Kant asserts that laws of nature “carry with them an expression of necessity” (A159/B198). There is, however, widespread interpretive disagreement regarding the nature and source of the necessity of empirical laws of natural sciences in Kant's system. It is especially unclear how chemistry — a science without a clear, straightforward connection to the a priori principles of the understanding — could contain such genuine, empirical laws. Existing accounts of the necessity of causal laws unfortunately fail to illuminate the possibility of non-physical laws. In this paper, I develop an alternative, ‘ideational’ account of natural laws, according to which ideas of reason necessitate the laws of some non-physical sciences. Chemical laws, for instance, are grounded on ideas of the elements, and the chemist aims to reduce her phenomena to these elements via experimentation. Although such ideas are beyond the possibility of experience, their postulation is necessary for the achievement of reason's theoretical ends: the unification and explanation of the cognitions of science.

McQuillan, J. Colin. “Reading and Misreading Kant’s Dreams of a Spirit-Seer.” Kant Studies Online (2015): 178-203; posted November 2, 2015. [M] [pdf]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article surveys the different ways in which Kant scholars have read and interpreted Dreams of a Spirit-Seer. While the anti-metaphysical reading and the selfcritical reading have come to dominate interpretations of the text, I contend that both readings misrepresent the context in which Dreams of a Spirit-Seer was written and the structure of Kant’s arguments. When these factors are considered, it becomes apparent that Dreams of a Spirit-Seer is closely related to another work Kant was preparing at the time, which he called The Proper Method of Metaphysics. Instead of being an attack on metaphysics or a repudiation of Kant’s pre-critical philosophy, Dreams of a Spirit-Seer is a cautionary tale about how not to do metaphysics, which was supposed to complement the positive account of the correct approach to metaphysics that he still hoped to publish in the late 1760s.

 ——. “Kant’s Critique of Baumgarten’s Aesthetics.” Idealistic Studies 45.1 (2015): 69-80. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article considers three objections Immanuel Kant raises against Alexander Baumgarten’s plan for a science of aesthetics at different points in his career. Although Kant’s objections appear to be contradictory, this article argues that the contradiction is the result of an anachronism in the composition of Kant’s Logic. When the contradiction is resolved, it becomes apparent that Kant’s main reason for rejecting Baumgarten’s aesthetics during the pre-critical period—the lack of a priori principles for a critique of taste—loses its force after Kant develops a kind of critique that yields a priori principles and then discovers a priori principles of aesthetic judgment. Instead of withdrawing his objections, Kant finds different reasons to deny that aesthetics can be a science, based on the distinction between determining and reflective judgments.

Meincke, Anne Sophie. Auf dem Kampfplatz der Metaphysik: Kritische Studien zur transtemporalen Identität von Personen. Münster: Mentis, 2015. [356 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: First published as the author's doctoral dissertation in philosophy (Ludwig Maximilian Universität München, 2012).

Mensch, Jennifer. Kant’s Organicism: Epigenesis and the Development of Critical Philosophy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015. [xi, 246 p.] [WC]

 ——. “Genealogy and Critique in Kant’s Organic History of Reason.” Con-Textos Kantianos 1 (2015): 178-96. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Although scholarly attention has been mostly paid to the many connections existing between Kant and the exact sciences, the landscape of Kant studies has begun to noticeably change during the last decade, with many new pieces devoted to a consideration of Kant’s relation to the life sciences of his day. It is in this vein, for example, that investigators have begun to discuss the importance of Kant’s essays on race for the development of Anthropology as an emerging field. The bulk of the contributions to this recent trend, however, have focused on Kant’s remarks on organic life in the Critique of Judgment, such that Kant’s “theory of biology” is now seen to be firmly located in that text. Amidst such consolidation, there are a few pieces that have begun to address Kant’s appeal to organic vocabulary within the context of his theory of cognition, though these too remain dominated by the interpretive template set by the third Critique. My own strategy in this essay will be different. Kant did indeed borrow from the life sciences for his model of the mind, but in a manner that would reject a naturalized account. His preference for epigenesis as a theory of organic generation needs to be carefully distinguished, therefore, from the use he would make of it when discussing a metaphysical portrait of reason.

Meo, Oscar. “Die Übereinstimmung zwischen Einbildungskraft und Verstand und die „Erkenntnis überhaupt“.” [German; The Harmony between Understanding and Imagination, and the “Cognition in General”] Con-Textos Kantianos 2 (2015): 86-99. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the first part of this paper I discuss the meaning of the syntagm “cognition in general”, introduced by Kant in the § 9 of the KU to solve the problem both of the communicability of the “mental state” underlying the judgment of taste and of the aesthetic harmony between understanding and imagination: during the aesthetic experience it is necessary that they join as if they aim at object knowledge, but their relationship consists in a free play at the pre-theoretical level of the pure cognitive form. I also investigate an interesting, but too little studied, consequence of the harmony between the cognitive powers: the emergence of a specific time-consciousness in the observer. In the second part I examine, on the basis of some text passages, the possible answers to an objection made by some scholars, i.e. that from Kant’s solution of the problem of the harmony between the cognitive powers arises the necessity to define all objects of experience as beautiful.

Meoli, Angela. “Libertà e necessità in Kant. Dalla terza antinomia all'autodeterminazione pratica della ragione.” [Italian] Intelletto e ragione in Kant e Schopenhauer. Ed. Giuseppe Giannetto (op cit.). 117-56??. [WC]

Mercedes Gómez, Marilín. Rev. of Kant, Antropología en sentido pragmático, translated by Dulce María Granja, Gustavo Leyva, Peter Storandt (2014). [Spanish] Con-Textos Kantianos 1 (2015): 259-62. [M] [online]

Mercer, Ronald. “Hume and Kantian Teleology.” Open Theology 1.1 (2015): 107-21. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper argues that Hume’s claim to have some belief in God is accurate because his own philosophy is held together by a teleological underpinning that leads to the idea of God. Previous work that has favorably connected Hume’s philosophy to Kant’s provides a framework to argue that Hume inadvertently admits a teleological a priori in understanding nature in the same way that Kant understands teleology as the “lawfulness of the contingent.” Having connected Hume and Kant through teleological aesthetics, this paper moves to show how this teleology underwrites several positive statements about God that Hume makes in the Dialogues.

Merle, Jean-Christophe. “How Kant’s Arguments about the Right of Necessity are Refuted by Translating them into a Two-tiered Thought Experiment.” Kant’s Theory of Law. Eds. Jean-Christophe Merle and Alexandre Travessoni Gomes Trivisonno (op cit.). 45-55. [M]

 ——. “The ‘principle of equality governing the actions and counter-actions’ in Kant’s Practical Philosophy.” Con-Textos Kantianos 2 (2015): 62-71. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant’s “principle of equality governing the actions and counter-actions” (8:26) belongs not only to the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Sciences (1786), but also to his practical philosophy. Kant’s Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose (1784) and On the Common Saying: That may be Correct in Theory, but it is of no Use in Practice (1793) may contribute to the understanding of the “principle of equality governing the actions and counter-actions” in the latter writing, and vice-versa. Referring to all three, this paper tries to show that, in the context of his concept of right, Kant understands the principle of the equality of action and reaction in two different senses, which he combines: a dynamic one and a legal one.

 ——. “What Exactly Does the Court of Justice as Kant’s Metaphor of Reason Mean?” Kant and the Metaphors of Reason. Ed. Patricia Kauark-Leite, et al. (op cit.). 137-45. [M]

 ——, and Alexandre Travessoni Gomes Trivisonno, eds. Kant’s Theory of Law. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2015. [138 p.] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents: Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, Beiheft 143. Proceedings of the Special Workshop “Kant’s Concept of Law” held at the 26th World Congress of the International Association for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy in Belo Horizonte, 2013. Essays include:
Fiete Kalscheuer (Human Dignity as Justice in the Face of Injustice: On Kant’s Supplementary Function of Human Dignity in Law),
José Luis Colomer (Kant’s Theory of Law and the Principle of Freedom),
Maria Lúcia de Paula Oliveira (Compatibility of the Moral Foundation of Law in Kant with the Theory of Reflective Judgment and with the Kantian Theory of Revolution),
Jean-Christophe Merle (How Kant’s Arguments about the Right of Necessity are Refuted by Translating them into a Two-tiered Thought Experiment),
Kenneth R. Westphal (Vernunftkritik, Moralkonstruktivismus and Besitzrecht bei Kant), Dietmar von der Pfordten (Kant on the Right of Resistance),
Alexandre Travessoni Gomes Trivisonno (Kant’s Republicanism).

Mertens, Thomas. “Kant and the Ends of Life.” Morality and Life: Kantian Perspectives in Bioethics. Eds. Darlei Dall’Agnol and Milene Consenso Tonetto (op cit.). 33-52. [M]

Messina, James. “Conceptual Analysis and the Essence of Space: Kant’s Metaphysical Exposition Revisited.” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 97.4 (2015): 416-57. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: I offer here an account of the methodology, historical context, and content of Kant’s so-called “Metaphysical Exposition of the Concept of Space” (MECS). Drawing on Critical and pre-Critical texts, I first argue that the arguments making up the MECS rest on a kind of conceptual analysis, one that yields (analytic) knowledge of the essence of space. Next, I situate Kant’s MECS in what I take to be its proper historical context: the debate between the Wolffians and Crusius about the correct analysis of the concept of space. Finally, I draw on the results of previous sections to provide a reconstruction of Kant’s so-called “first apriority argument.” On my reconstruction, the key premise of the argument is a claim to the effect that space grounds the possibility of the co-existence of whatever things occupy it.

Meurer, Ulrich. “Die ausgezeichnete Stirne zeigt den tiefen Denker Von der biografischen zur fotografischen Konstruktion der Identität Immanuel Kants.” Wissen. Erzählen. Narrative der Humanwissenschaften, edited by Arne Höcker, Jeannie Moser, and Philippe Weber. Bielefeld: transcript Verlag, 2015. Pp. 185-96. [online]

Meyer, Matthew. Rev. of “Der Faule Fleck des Kantischen Kriticismus”: Erscheinung und Ding an sich bei Nietzsche, by Mattia Riccardi (year). Journal of Nietzsche Studies 46.1 (2015): 143-45. [PW]

Miguens, Sofia, ed. Ser ou não ser Kantiano. [Portuguese; To be or not to be Kantian] Lisbon: Edicões Colibri, 2015. [218 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents: (not cited individually in this bibliography)
Sofia Miguens, "Ser ou não ser kantiano - A opção entre Kant e Frege" (p. 19f),
João Alberto Pinto, "Kant? Qual Kant? A doutrina do esquematismo, mais uma vez" (p. 43f),
Mattia Riccardi, "Experiência, juízo e objectividade em Kant - Notas a partir de Strawson" (p. 59f),
Paulo Tunhas, "Abime, passage, limite" (p. 73f),
Clara Morando, "A consciência e a arquitectónica da razão pura - A experiência transcendental da consciência originária" (p. 111f),
João Santos, "Podem os sentidos ser silenciosos? - Sobre a dialéctica transcendental da experiência" (p. 141f),
Paulo Renato de Jesus, "Kant's unstable self: transcendental apperception between form and force" (p. 171f),
José Maria Costa Macedo, "Hegemonia metafísica do tempo - A abordagem heideggeriana de Kant em Kant e o problema da metafísica" (p. 193f).

Mihaylova, Katerina. “Gewissen als Pflicht gegen sich selbst. Zur Entwicklung des forum internum von Pufendorf bis Kant.” Gewissen: Interdisziplinäre Perspektiven auf das 18. Jahrhundert. Eds. Simon Bunke and Katerina Mihaylova (op cit.). 53-70. [M]

Miklaszewska, Justyna, ed. See: Chmielinski, Maciej, Justyna Miklaszewska, and Anna Tomaszewska, eds.

Mikoshiba, Yoshiyuki. Jibun de Kangaeru yuki: Kanto Tetsugaku Nyumon. [Japanese] Tokyo: Iwanamishoten, 2015. [196 p.] [WC]

Miller, Eddis N. Kant’s Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason: A Reader’s Guide. London/New York: Bloomsbury, 2015. [x, 161 p.] [WC]

Misak, Cheryl. “Peirce, Kant, and What We Must Assume.” Pragmatism, Kant, and Transcendental Philosophy. Eds. Gabriele Gava and Robert Stern (op cit.). 85-93??. [WC]

Mohr, Georg, ed. See: Willaschek, Marcus, Jürgen Stolzenberg, Georg Mohr, and Stefano Bacin, eds.

Mohrmann, Judith. Affekt und Revolution: Politisches Handeln nach Arendt und Kant. Frankfurt/Main: Campus-Verlag, 2015. [230 p.] [WC]

Moledo, Fernando. “Über die Bedeutung der objektiven und der subjektiven Deduktion der Kategorien.” Kant-Studien 106.3 (2015): 418-29. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the preface to the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason Kant refers to two deductions of the categories: the objective and the subjective deduction (KrV, A XVII). This well-known reference possesses several problems of interpretation and has been widely addressed in the specialized literature. Regarding this reference, the accepted interpretation is that both deductions refer to two different tasks of one and the same deduction: the transcendental deduction of the categories. There is nevertheless a widely overlooked passage in the Critique of Pure Reason that suggests a different interpretation on the issue. This passage is to be found in the transcendental Dialectic in the context of the discussion about the possibility of a deduction of the transcendental ideas (KrV, A 336/B 393). According to this passage I will argue in this paper that the objective deduction of the categories corresponds to the transcendental deduction of the categories while the subjective deduction of these concepts corresponds to the metaphysical one.

 ——. “Nöthigung, necessitatío, necesitación. Sobre el significado de un concepto kantiano de la filosofia práctica.” [Spanish] Crítica y metafísica: Homenaje a Mario Caimi. Ed. Claudia Jáuregui, et al. (op cit.). 292-307. [M]

Molina, Eduardo. “Sentimiento de la vida y autoconciencia en Kant.” [Spanish; Feeling of life and self-consciousness in Kant] Anuario Filosofico 48.3 (2015): 493-514. [ASP]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper I will discuss different senses of Kant’s notion of life and the types of self-consciousness associated with them. I will point out that this association is a key element to consider when assessing the Kantian theory of self-consciousness as a whole and in this context I will specially emphasize the role played by the feeling of life described by Kant in the Critique of Judgment.

Montan, Carl. See: Deleuze, Gilles.

Morais, Marceline. “Les divergences entre Kant et Herder au sujet de la signification de l’Aufklarung.” Kant, la raison pratique: concepts et héritages. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Margit Ruffing, and Ricardo Ribeiro Terra (op cit.). 395-402. [M]

 ——. Rev. of Kant: Théologie et religion, edited by Robert Theis (2013). [French] Con-Textos Kantianos 1 (2015): 297-302. [M] [online]

Moran, Kate. “On Kristi Sweet’s Kant on Practical Life: From Duty to History.” Critique (blog posted: date) n.p. [PW] [online]

Moran, Shane. “Kant’s Conception of Pedagogy.” South African Journal of Philosophy 34.1 (2015): 29-37. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Confronted with the thoroughgoing marketisation of education, scholars have revisited the nature of pedagogy. The work of Immanuel Kant is a resource for critiquing the channelling of the transformation of self and society into rapacious consumerism. Kant's exploration of the connection between inner freedom and political freedom has been recast as pedagogy of the oppressed. Countering the dismissal of the Enlightenment as an accomplice of colonialism and imperialism, Kantian pedagogy is enlisted in the struggle against the forces undermining the very structure of liberal democracy and humanity on a global scale. This essay points to the limitations of this revindication on the grounds that it leaves undisturbed the formative complicities at work in the current crisis, complicities all too familiar to those who teach and learn.

Mordacci, Roberto, and Alberto Pirni. “Intersubjectivity and Respect in Kant’s Categorical Imperative: A Bioethical Perspective.” Morality and Life: Kantian Perspectives in Bioethics. Eds. Darlei Dall’Agnol and Milene Consenso Tonetto (op cit.). 179-202. [M]

Morente, Manuel García, ed. See: Kant, Immanuel. Crítica del Juicio

Moretto, Antonio. “Herder’s Notes on Kant’s Mathematics Course.” Reading Kant’s Lectures. Ed. Robert R. Clewis (op cit.). 418-53. [M]

Morris, Katherine. “Sartre’s Method: Philosophical Therapy or Transcendental Philosopher?” Comparing Kant and Sartre. Ed. Sorin Baiasu (op cit.). 197-216. [PW]

Morscheck, Taina. Rev. of Vom Selbstbewußtsein zum Selbstverständnis. Kant und die Philosophie der Wahrnehmung, by Claus Langbehn (2012). Kant-Studien 106.4 (2015): 713-17. [PW]

Morscher, Edgar. Rev. of New Anti-Kant, edited by Sandra Lapointe and Clinton Tolley (2014). Journal of the History of Philosophy 53.3 (2015): 556-57. [M]

Moscón, Pablo. “El concepto de ilusión como clave interpretativa del concepto de apariencia ilusoria transcen-dental en la KrV de I. Kant.” [Spanish; The concept of ilusion as a interpretive key of the concept of transcendental semblance in the KrV of I. Kant] Studia Kantiana 13.19 (2015): 39-62. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the Transcendental Dialectic of the Critique of Pure Reason (KrV), whose task is to attain a critique of transcendental semblance (transzendentaler Schein), Kant refers to such semblance by the term "Illusion" (illusion). While in the literature on the KrV it has been considered that the sense of this term must be identified with the sense of the term “semblance” (Schein), in this paper I argue that this identification is illegitimate. Although the term semblance is used to indicate merely subjective representations that are assumed to be objective, the term illusion denotes a specific kind of semblance that it is distinguishes from deception, and it turns out to have, in some cases, a useful purpose. Then, from this distinction, I aim to prove that this concept is a valuable interpretive key to clarify the concept of transcendental semblance (transzendentaler Schein), which is critically examined in the context of the Transcendental Dialectic of the KrV.

Mösenbacher, Rudolf. “Immanuel Kant: Die Einheit des Bewusstseins. Die „Deduktion der Kategorien“ und die „Paralogismen der reinen Vernunft“. Internationale Konferenz in Graz 19. bis 20. September 2014.” Kant-Studien 106.3 (2015): 523-27. [PW]

Moyar, Dean. “The First Person and the Moral Law.” Kantian Review 20.2 (2015): 289-300. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In Kant’s Defense of Common Moral Experience: A Phenomenological Account, Jeanine Grenberg argues for the centrality to Kant’s ethics of the experience of the feeling of moral constraint, especially as that feeling is described in Kant’s fact of reason argument. She criticizes interpretations of the fact of reason that interpret it as primarily a certain kind of act. I defend my version of an act-based interpretation against Grenberg’s criticisms, flesh out the Fichtean background of that interpretation and raise some further questions about Grenberg’s account.

Muchnik, Pablo, and Oliver Thorndike, eds. Rethinking Kant: Volume 4. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars, 2015. [xiv, 205 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Content: Proceedings from regional study group meetings of the North American Kant Society.
Pogge, Thomas (Transcendental Idealism, 13-33),
Warren, Daniel (Kant on Substance-Accident Relation and the Thinking Subject, 35-54),
Pasternack, Lawrence (Kant on Knowledge, Opinion, and the Threshold for Assent, 55-74),
Bruno, Anthony (Epistemic Reciprocity and Schelling’s Late Return to Kant, 75-92),
Wood, Allen (Purposiveness in Kant’s Practical Philosophy, 95-110),
Wilson, Donald (Norms of Truthfulness and Non-Deception in Kantian Ethics, 111-33),
Kahn, Samuel (Kant’s Theory of Conscience, 135-55),
Platz, Jeppe von (The Metaphysics of Vice: Kant and the Problem of Moral Freedom, 157-81),
Trullinger, Joseph (Kant’s Endorsement of the Fear of God, 183-202).

Mücke, Dorothea E. von. The Practices of the Enlightenment: Aesthetics, Authorship, and the Public. New York: Columbia University Press, 2015. [xxvi, 292 p.] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Chapter Two: “Disinterested Interest: The Human Animal’s Lack of Instinct” (pp. 27-38).

Mudd, Sasha. Rev. of Kant on Practical Life: From Duty to History, by Kristi E. Sweet (2013). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (Mar 2015, #26). [M] [online]

Münz, Teodor. “Od Kantovej metafyziky k Nietzscheho základom metafyziky.” [Slovak; From Kant's metaphysics to Nietzsche's foundation of metaphysics] Studia Philosophica Kantiana 1 (2015): 3-16. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Der Autor dieses Aufsatzes versucht den Unterschied zwischen der Kants und Nietzsches Metaphysik festzustellen. Dieses Problem ist in einem Teil des Nietzsches Nachlasses „Der Wille zur Macht“ unter dem Titel: „Der Wille zur Macht als Erkenntnis“ zum Vorschein gekommen. Seiner Meinung nach ist Kants Metaphysik teilweise Platons Erbe, während Nietzsches Grundlagen der Metaphysik erst recht originell sind. Nietzsche sieht den Ursprung der Metaphysik in biologischer Notwendigkeit. Nietzsche war – nach Meinung des Autors – eigenartiger Darwinist, menschliche Fähigkeiten für Erkenntnisprozesse hat er als Instrumente des menschlichen Überlebens und nicht als Bedürfnis, die objektive, unabhängige Realität adäquat zu erfassen, dargestellt. Seine Grundlagen wurden auf Aufhaltung der Bewegung aufgebaut. So sind die Wörter und Begriffe entstanden, die die Bewegung eigentlich stoppen, sie gleichen die Objekte aus, sie verallgemeinern, vereinfachen, wiederholen, schaffen die Gesetze, usw. Gerade in diesen Eigenschaften der Begriffe sucht Nietzsche die Wurzel der Metaphysik, die erst dann entsteht, wenn sie aus der immanenten zur transzendenten Sphäre steigt, wo sie dann ein nicht verwandelbares, ewiges Sein gestaltet – im Widerspruch zum irdischen Werden – und wirkt sogar als sein Vorbild. Auch Kants Metaphysik, ihr nicht verwandelndes und das „ewige“ Apriori (von Platon stammend) hat diese Eigenschaften gehabt und war deshalb metahistorisch. Im Gegensatz zu Kant hat Nietzsche nur irdisch überlegt, und nur historisch. Es war für ihn kein Problem auf den irdischen und historischen Ursprung von Kants Apriori hinzuweisen, womit er auf den gleichen Ursprung von Platons Metaphysik hingewiesen hatte. Gleichzeitig lehnt Nietzsche jegliche Metaphysik ab – seiner Meinung nach ist sie scheinbar, lügnerisch, sie vergewaltigt die Geschehnisse, die charakteristisch für die ganze Welt sind. De facto hat Nietzsche diese Grundlagen nicht erschaffen, er hat sie in dem Menschen selbst gefunden und nur auf diese Weise konstatiert. Ähnlich wie Kant. Deshalb können wir Nietzsche ohne Zweifel Antimetaphysiker nennen. Heutzutage ist Nietzsche absolut im Vordergrund und zwar vor Kant selbst; er beeinflusst die heutigen philosophischen Bewegungen mehr als jeder anderer lebender und bedeutender Philosoph. Wenn wir nun feststellen, dass Platon in den Hintergrund getreten ist, dann ist es sein Verdienst. So hat Nietzsche die Tür für Postmodernismus geöffnet, aber ohne Zweifel auch Dank Kants Metaphysik.

Muránsky, Martin. Die Freiheit zum radikal Bösen: das Problem der Fatalismus-These in Reinholds Interpretation zu Kant. Frankfurt/Main: Peter Lang, 2015. [182 p.] [WC]

Murphy, Jeffrie G. “Kant on Three Defenses in the Law of Homicide.” Reason, Value, and Respect. Eds. Mark Timmons and Robert N. Johnson (op cit.). 157-77. [M]

Murray, Bradley. The Possibility of Culture: Pleasure and Moral Development in Kant’s Aesthetics. Chichester, West Sussex: John Wiley & Sons, 2015. [x, 145 p.] [WC]

[top] N    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Nachmanowicz, Ricardo. “A tensão entre fenomenologia e teoria nos comentários de Kant sobre a música.” [Portuguese; The tension between theory and phenomenology in Kant’s comments about music] Cadernos de Filosofia Alemã: Crítica e Modernidade 20.1 (2015): 143-60. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Situated between paragraphs §51 and §53 of what would be an addition of Deduction of Pure Aesthetic Judgments, we find the kantian main comments about the musical art. These comments are inserted in a broader discussion on the division of fine arts and the individual characterization of some arts. We seek to demonstrate how Kant articulates these musical comments with preceding theoretical elaborations, critically emphasizing the phenomenological elements of his description and the theoretical elements that apply to the understanding the musical phenomenon.

Nadai, Bruno. “L’éducation morale et les exemples dans la philosophie pratique de Kant.” Kant, la raison pratique: concepts et héritages. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Margit Ruffing, and Ricardo Ribeiro Terra (op cit.). 197-204. [M]

Nahra, Cinara. “Kant: Suicide and Euthanasia.” Morality and Life: Kantian Perspectives in Bioethics. Eds. Darlei Dall’Agnol and Milene Consenso Tonetto (op cit.). 53-65. [M]

 ——. “Sobre o aperfeiçoamento moral como destino da espécie humana.” [Portuguese; On Moral Perfection as Destiny of the Human Species] Con-Textos Kantianos 1 (2015): 46-56. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The main of this article is to discuss the idea of moral enhancement in Kant. We will show that moral enhancement is related do idea of acting from duty and as individuals all that we can do is to act morally and enhance ourselves morally, contributing for the moral enhancement of the human species. To achieve the moral enhancement of the human species, however, it is necessary not only to work for our enhancement, but also to work for the happiness of others. But even if we work for other´s happiness, the accomplishment of the highest good (consummatum), I mean, the happiness for the virtuous, does not depend entirely on us and our efforts as individuals or as species. Human destiny ,then, is to morally improve ourselves as individuals, contributing this way to change the character of the species, becoming not only a species capable of morality but de facto moral, achieving the highest good (supremum), while hoping for the happiness of the virtuous, i.e., hoping for the accomplishment of the highest good (consummatum).

Naragon, Steve. “Reading Kant in Herder’’s Lecture Notes.” Reading Kant’s Lectures. Ed. Robert R. Clewis (op cit.). 37-62. [M]

 ——. Rev. of Kant and Rational Psychology, by Corey W. Dyck (2014). Journal of the History of Philosophy 53.2 (2015): 336-37. [M]

Nassar, Dalia. “Analogy, Natural History and the Philosophy of Nature: Kant, Herder and the Problem of Empirical Science.” Journal of the Philosophy of History 9 (2015): 240-57. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In 1785 Kant published a series of critical reviews of Johann Gottfried Herder’s Ideas for a Philosophy of the History of Humanity (1784–1785), in which he not only challenges Herder’s conception of nature but also, and more importantly, his methodology. Kant’s complaint is that by relying on analogy, Herder draws deeply mistaken conclusions that overlook fundamental differences between human and nonhuman beings. But was Kant’s critique of Herder entirely fair? And how does it compare to Kant’s own use of analogy? My claim is that Herder’s use of analogy posed a fundamental methodological challenge to Kant, a challenge he sought to meet in the years following the reviews. In so doing, however, Kant found himself in the untenable situation of, on the one hand, granting analogy greater significance, and, on the other, severely restricting its use. By tracing the shifts in Kant’s thought through the lens of analogy, I aim to show that Kant’s transformed understanding of analogy reveals a fundamental tension between his a priori “metaphysics of nature” and empirical science, a tension that fundamentally shaped the philosophies of nature after Kant.

Newton, Alexandra. “Kant on the Logical Origin of Concepts.” European Journal of Philosophy 23.3 (2015): 456-84. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In his lectures on general logic Kant maintains that the generality of a representation (the form of a concept) arises from the logical acts of comparison, reflection and abstraction. These acts are commonly understood to be identical with the acts that generate reflected schemata. I argue that this is mistaken, and that the generality of concepts, as products of the understanding, should be distinguished from the classificatory generality of schemata, which are products of the imagination. A Kantian concept does not provide mere criteria for noting sameness and difference in things, but instead reflects the inner nature of things. Its form consists in the self‐consciousness of a capacity to judge (i.e. the Concept is the ‘I think’).

Nicolae, Ioana. “Receptări kantiene în spațiul filosofic românesc.” [Romanian; Kant’s Reception in Romanian Philosophy] Filosofie și viață. In honorem Alexandru Boboc. Eds. M.A. Drăghici, O. Vasilescu (Bucarest: Ed. Academiei Române, 2015). 343-54. [RC]

Nizhnikov, S. A. Tvorchestvo Immanuila Kanta v Dialoge Kul’tur Rossii i Zapada. [Russian; Immanuel Kant's creativity in the dialogue between cultures of Russia and the West] Moscow: Rosspen, 2015. [254 p.] [WC]

Noe, Kenneth. “Intensive Magnitudes, Temporality, and Sensus Communis in Kant’s Aesthetics.” International Philosophical Quarterly 55.4 (2015): 417-35. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: I offer a critique of Melissa Zinkin’s reading of Kant’s analysis of aesthetic judgment. She argues that in judgments of taste the imagination is freed from its determinate relation with the understanding because the form of intuition in which beauty is apprehended is different from the form of intuition employed in determinate judgment. By distinguishing between an extensive and intensive form of intuition, this interpretation is able to explain why the apprehension of beauty cannot be subsumed under a concept. But I contest Zinkin’s identification of the sensus communis with this intensive form of intuition. I then substantiate two interrelated claims: (1) that we can account for the genesis of the sensus communis by distinguishing between an intensive and an extensive form of time, and (2) that we can avoid making the sensus communis atemporal by showing that it resides within an intensive form of time as a condition for its possibility, thereby structuring Kant’s account of the sensus communis securely within the critical framework.

Noller, Jörg. Die Bestimmung des Willens. Zum Problem individueller Freiheit im Ausgang von Kant. Freiburg: Verlag Karl Alber, 2015. [406 p.] [WC]

 ——. Rev. of Achtung für das Gesetz. Moral und Motivation bei Kant, by Steffi Schadow (2013). Kant-Studien 106.1 (2015): 160-64. [PW]

Notturni, Loris. “Schwarmerei et raison pratique: l’aspect programmatique des Träume de 1766.” Kant, la raison pratique: concepts et héritages. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Margit Ruffing, and Ricardo Ribeiro Terra (op cit.). 205-13. [M]

Nowak, Piotr Grzegorz. “Ocena moralna transplantacji ex vivo i handlu ludzkimi organami w świetle etyki aKnta.” [Polish; The Moral Evaluation of Living Organ Donation and Trade in Human Organs in Light of Kant's Ethics] Diametros 46 (2015): 30-54. [PW] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the article I justify the acceptability of ex vivo transplantation and I provide the ethical evaluation of trafficking in human organs from the Kantian perspective. Firstly, I refer to passages of Kant's works, where he explicitly states that depriving oneself of one’s body parts for other purposes than self-preservation is not permitted. I explain that the negative ethical evaluation of the disposal of the body parts was given various justifications by Kant. Subsequently, I provide partial criticism of this justification, resulting in the recognition of the admissibility of ex vivo transplantation. Secondly, I analyse the Kantian slippery-slope argument which, as some philosophers believe, supports banning trade in human organs. It turns out, however, that this argument has wider application, namely it applies to all forms of the instrumental treatment of the human body. Using a previously introduced distinction between organs of the first and the second order, I show that the slippery-slope argument is inconclusive. However, I propose a reinterpretation of this reasoning, which results in using this argument as an additional reason to support prohibiting trade in human organs.

Nunes Chaib, André. “La position du sujet de droit chez Kant.” Kant, la raison pratique: concepts et héritages. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Margit Ruffing, and Ricardo Ribeiro Terra (op cit.). 305-13. [M]

Nyholm, Sven. Revisiting Kant’s Universal Law and Humanity Formulas. Boston: De Gruyter, 2015. [xi, 168 p.] [WC]

 ——. “Kant's Universal Law Formula Revisited.” Metaphilosophy 46.2 (2015): 280-99. [ASP]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Abstract: Kantians are increasingly deserting the universal law formula in favor of the humanity formula. The former, they argue, is open to various decisive objections; the two are not equivalent; and it is only by appealing to the humanity formula that Kant can reliably generate substantive implications from his theory of an acceptable sort. These assessments of the universal law formula, which clash starkly with Kant’s own assessment of it, are based on various widely accepted interpretative assumptions. These assumptions, it is argued in this article, depend on misleading translations of key terms; selective attention to Kant’s concrete examples; not taking seriously Kant’s theoretical claims about the relations among his various ideas; and a failure to take into account Kant’s idiosyncratic definitions of key concepts. The article seeks to right these interpretative wrongs, and finds that the universal law formula is not open to many of the standard objections.

Nzengui, Aaron Septime. De Kant à l’Afrique: Réflexion sur la constitution républicaine en Afrique noire. Paris: L’Harmattan, 2015. [114 p.] [WC]

[top] O    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

O’Neill, Onora. Constructing Authorities: Reason, Politics and Interpretation in Kant’s Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015. [vii, 253 p.] [WC]

 ——. “Autonomy and Public Reason in Kant.” Reason, Value, and Respect. Eds. Mark Timmons and Robert N. Johnson (op cit.). 119-31. [M]

Oberst, Michael. “Two Worlds and Two Aspects: on Kant’s Distinction between Things in Themselves and Appearances.” Kantian Review 20.1 (2015): 53-75. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the interpretation of Kant’s transcendental idealism, a textual stalemate between two camps has evolved: two-world interpretations regard things in themselves and appearances as two numerically distinct entities, whereas two-aspect interpretations take this distinction as one between two aspects of the same thing. I try to develop an account which can overcome this dispute. On the one hand, things in themselves are numerically distinct from appearances, but on the other hand, things in themselves can be regarded as they exist in themselves and as they appear. This reveals a mutual entailment of both accounts. Finally, I suggest that this approach most naturally leads to a kind of ‘phenomenalism’, but of a sort not normally attributed to Kant.

Okopien, Krzysztof. Totalitaryzm i trzy Pytania Kantowskie. [Polish; Totalitarianism and three Kantian questions] Warsaw: Narodowe Centrum Kultury, 2015. [24 p.] [WC]

Oliva, Luca. “Paolo Parrini’s Il Valore della Verità.” Kantian Review 20.3 (2015): 467-78. [PW]

Oliveira, Maria Lúcia de Paula. “Compatibility of the Moral Foundation of Law in Kant with the Theory of Reflective Judgment and with the Kantian Theory of Revolution.” Kant’s Theory of Law. Eds. Jean-Christophe Merle and Alexandre Travessoni Gomes Trivisonno (op cit.). 35-44. [M]

Oliver, Kelly. Earth and World: Philosophy After the Apollo Missions. New York: Columbia University Press, 2015. [xi, 298 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: See ch. 2: "The Earth's Inhospitable Hospitality: Kant".

Ollero-Perán, Jorge.  See: García-Quero, Fernando, and Jorge Ollero-Perán.

Onnasch, Erst-Otto. “Ein bislang übersehener Brief Immanuel Kants an Friedrich Nicolovius vom 7. Februar 1800: Ein Dokument zur Diskussion um die Authentizität der zweiten Auflage der Anthropologie von 1800.” Kant-Studien 106.3 (2015): 507-17. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper, on a forgotten letter by Immanuel Kant to his publisher Friedrich Nicolovius (February 7, 1800), argues for the authenticity of the revisions in the second edition of Kant’s Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, i.e. that these revisions must be ascribed to Kant himself and not, as has been argued in current Kant research, to Christian Gottfried Schütz. A transcription of the letter is provided.

Onof, Christian. “Kant’s Lectures on Physics and the Development of the Critical Philosophy.” Reading Kant’s Lectures. Ed. Robert R. Clewis (op cit.). 461-83. [M]

 ——. “Drawing on Sartre’s Ontology to Interpret Kant's Notion of Freedom.” Comparing Kant and Sartre. Ed. Sorin Baiasu (op cit.). 77-111. [PW]

 —— and Dennis Schulting. “Space as Form of Intuition and as Formal Intuition: On the Note to B160 in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.” Philosophical Review 124.1 (2015): 1-58. [M]

Oroño, Matías. “Autoconciencia y corporalidad en la teoría crítica kantiana.” [Spanish; Self-awareness and corporeality in Kantian critical theory] Anuario Filosofico 48.3 (2015): 469-91. [ASP]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to study the a priori consciousness of oneself as a corporeal being that emerges from the Kantian critical theory of space. First, we analyze several passages from the “Transcendental Aesthetic.” Second, we address the “Leningrad Reflection.” Both texts allow us to elucidate a mode of a priori consciousness whose thematic object is the subject’s own body in its formal aspects.

 ——. “La incursión de lo sublime en la ética según el enfoque kantiano pre-crítico.” [Spanish]  Areté: Revista de Filosofía 27.2 (2015): 187-208. [ASP]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: “The Incursion of the Sublime in Ethics according the Kantian Pre- critical Period”. The main objective of this paper is to investigate the originality of the kantian treatment of the sublime. We will study the version correspond- ing to the pre-critical period, in order to point out that even in this period Kant distances himself from the dominant mode of analysis, represented by Edmund Burke’s work. We think that the novelty of the kantian approach lies in the close link established between the sublime and ethics.

Orth, Ernst Wolfgang. Rev. of Ernst Cassirer, Nachgelassene Manuskripte und Texte. Band 17. Davoser Vorträge. Vorträge über Hermann Cohen. Mit einem Anhang: Briefe Hermann und Martha Cohen an Ernst und Toni Cassirer, edited by Jörn Bohr und Klaus Christian Köhnke (2014). Kant-Studien 106.3 (2015): 542-45. [PW]

O’Shea, James R. “Kantian Reflections on the Givenness of Zahavi’s Minimal Experiential Self.” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23.5 (2015): 619-25. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: At the core of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason was a decisive break with certain fundamental Cartesian assumptions or claims about consciousness and self-consciousness, claims that have nonetheless remained perennially tempting, from a phenomenological perspective, independently of any further questions concerning the metaphysics of mind and its place in nature. The core of this philosophical problem has recently been helpfully exposed and insightfully probed in Dan Zahavi’s book, Self and Other: Exploring Subjectivity, Empathy, and Shame (OUP, 2014). In these remarks I suggest that Zahavi’s view of what he calls ‘The Experiential Self’ defends precisely the sorts of claims to which a Kantian account of consciousness is fundamentally opposed, and while assessing the overall merits of the two contrasting outlooks is no easy matter, I side with the Kantian view.

 ——. “Concepts of Objects as Prescribing Laws: A Kantian and Pragmatist Line of Thought.” Pragmatism, Kant, and Transcendental Philosophy. Eds. Gabriele Gava and Robert Stern (op cit.). 196-216??. [WC]

O’Shea, Tom. “A Law of One's Own: Self‐Legislation and Radical Kantian Constructivism.” European Journal of Philosophy 23.4 (2015): 1153-73. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Radical constructivists appeal to self‐legislation in arguing that rational agents are the ultimate sources of normative authority over themselves. I chart the roots of radical constructivism and argue that its two leading Kantian proponents are unable to defend an account of self‐legislation as the fundamental source of practical normativity without this legislation collapsing into a fatal arbitrariness. Christine Korsgaard cannot adequately justify the critical resources which agents use to navigate their practical identities. This leaves her account riven between rigorism and voluntarism, such that it will not escape a paradox that arises when self‐legislation is unable to appeal to external normative standards. Onora O'Neill anchors self‐legislation more firmly to the self‐disciplining structures of reason itself. However, she ultimately fails to defend sufficiently unconditional practical norms which could guide legislation. These endemic problems with radical constructivist models of self‐legislation prompt a reconstruction of a neglected realist self‐legislative tradition which is exemplified by Christian Wolff. In outlining a rationalist and realist account of self‐legislation, I argue that it can also make sense of our ability to overcome anomie and deference in practical action. Thus, I claim that we need not make laws but can make them our own.

[top] P    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Pakalski, Dariusz. “Voraussetzung und Erkenntnis in der Metaphysik Kant.” Immanuel Kant und die kopernikanische Wende in der Philosophie. Ed. Tomasz Kupś (op cit.). 95-100. [WC]

Palmquist, Stephen R. Comprehensive Commentary on Kant’s Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason. Hokoken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2014. [xxix, 604 p.] [WC]

 ——. “What is Kantian Gesinnung? On the Priority of Volition over Metaphysics and Psychology in Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason.” Kantian Review 20.2 (2015): 235-64. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant’s enigmatic term Gesinnung baffles many readers of Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason. This study clarifies the notion in Kant’s theories of both general moral decision-making and specifically religious conversion. It is argued that Kantian Gesinnung is volitional, referring to a person’s principle-based choice to live a certain way. More specifically, interpreted as principled ‘conviction’, Kantian Gesinnung is a religiously manifested, moral form of Überzeugung (‘convincing’). This is confirmed by a detailed analysis of the 169 occurrences of Gesinnung and cognate words in Religion. It contrasts with what is suggested by translating Gesinnung as ‘disposition’, which reinforces a tendency to interpret the notion more metaphysically, and also with Pluhar’s translation as ‘attitude’, which has too strongly psychological connotations.

 ——. “Kant’s Lectures on Philosophical Theology — Training-Ground for the Moral Pedagogy of Religion?” Reading Kant’s Lectures. Ed. Robert R. Clewis (op cit.). 365-91. [M]

 ——. “Kant’s Prudential Theory of Religion: The Necessity of Historical Faith for Moral Empowerment.” Con-Textos Kantianos 1 (2015): 57-76. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Given his emphasis on deontological ethics, Kant is rarely regarded as a friend of prudence. For example, he is often interpreted as an opponent of so-called “historical faiths” (i.e., empirical religious traditions). What typically goes unnoticed is that in explaining the legitimate (indeed, indispensable) role of historical faiths in the moral development of the human race, Kant appeals explicitly to their prudential status. A careful examination of Kant’s main references to prudence demonstrates that the prudential status of historical faith is the key to understanding both its limitations (as merely the vehicle of true religion, not its essential core) and its real value (as a necessary means of moral empowerment). The wise person adopts some form of historical faith, because to abandon any and all prudential appeals to a faith-based vehicle for morality would render the goal of living a good life virtually impossible for embodied beings to achieve.

 ——. Rev. of Kant and the Meaning of Religion, by Terry F. Godlove (2014). International Philosophical Quarterly 55.4 (2015): 517-19. [PI]

Panknin-Schappert, Helke. “Der Zweckgedanke in der Philosophie Immanuel Kants – Zu Deutungen in der Kritik der Urteilskraft und der Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht.” Estudos Kantianos 3.2 (2015): 91-106. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant reflects on the thinking of an end by human reason in several ways. This paper intends to show that Kant bases the thinking of an end in a non- conceptual A priori. The thinking of an end articulates an unexpressed knowledge, which manifest human faculties of knowledge to be conditioned.
In the Critique of the Power of Judgement Kant demonstrates that man disposes - besides the teleological judgement - of a nonconceptual knowledge of the whole. In the outer nature, man is not able to accede to a unity, but he has an inner access to the transcendental unconditional by his moral feeling and belief. This unity, sensed by feeling is interpreted by the Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View to be the emanation of a supra-individual intention. Experience itself is of a signification a priori and is of an accordance of possibility and reality, of morality and sensibility. In the anthropological reflection the thinking of an end is the realisation of the divine wisdom.

 ——. “Le concept de l’angoisse. Emmanuel Kant et Soren Kierkegaard.” Kant, la raison pratique: concepts et héritages. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Margit Ruffing, and Ricardo Ribeiro Terra (op cit.). 403-11. [M]

Papish, Laura. “Kant on the Independence of the Moral Law from Sensibility.” Kantian Review 20.1 (2015): 77-98. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: There are several senses in which Kant’s moral law is independent of sensibility. This paper is devoted mainly to Kant’s account of ‘physical conditions independence’, or the idea that the moral law can compel us to pursue ends that might be impossible to realize empirically. Since this idea has received little attention from commentators, this paper addresses both its textual basis in Kant’s writings and its overall philosophical viability.

Pascoe, Jordan. “Domestic Labor, Citizenship, and Exceptionalism: Rethinking Kant’s ‘Woman Problem’.” Journal of Social Philosophy 46.3 (2015): 340-56. [PW]

 ——. Rev. of Herder’s Political Thought: A Study of Language, Culture, and Community, by Vicki A. Spencer (2012). Kantian Review 20.1 (2015): 137-40. [PI]

Pasternack, Lawrence. “Kant's ‘Appraisal’ of Christianity: Biblical Interpretation and the Pure Rational System of Religion.” Journal of the History of Philosophy 53.3 (2015): 485-506. [M]

 ——. “Reply to Christopher Insole.” Critique (blog posted: 1 Jul 2015) n.p. [PW] [online]

 ——. “Reply to Allen Wood.” Critique (blog posted: 8 Jul 2015) n.p. [PW] [online]

 ——. “Response to Allen Wood.” Critique (blog posted: 20 Jul 2015) n.p. [PW] [online]

 ——. “Kant on Knowledge, Opinion, and the Threshold for Assent.” Rethinking Kant: Volume 4. Eds. Pablo Muchnik and Oliver Thorndike (op cit.). 55-74. [WC]

 ——. Rev. of Kant and the Creation of Freedom: A Theological Problem, by Christopher Insole (2013). Kantian Review 20.1 (2015): 162-66. [PI]

Patton, Lydia. Rev. of The Genesis of Neo-Kantianism, 1796-1880, by Frederick C. Beiser (2014). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (Oct 2015, #27). [M] [online]

Paulson, Spencer. Rev. of Kant on Mind, Action, and Ethics, by Julian Wuerth (2014). Kantian Review 20.3 (2015): 512-16. [PW]

 —— and Colin Marshall. Rev. of Kant on Mind, Action, and Ethics, by Julian Wuerth (2014). Kantian Review 20.3 (2015): 512-16. [PW]

Pavão, Aguinaldo. “Kant contra Kant: direito sem Estado na Metafísica dos Costumes.” [Portuguese; Kant against Kant: Right without State in Metaphysics of Morals] Kant e-Prints 10.1 (2015): 1-19. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: For Kant, individuals "do wrong in the highest degree by willing to be and to remain in a condition that is not rightful, that is, in which no one is assured of what is his against violence" (RL, AA 06: 307- 308). This statement is open to criticism. If you, in the state of nature, acts to prevent freedom of others (which is not a hindrance to freedom of others according to a possible universal principle), you are unfair. In the spirit of the Universal Principle of Right, it seems reasonable to understand that who initiates the violence is unfair (either in the state of nature or in civil state). That is, who hinder external freedom of others compatible with the freedom of all according to a possible universal law is unfair. So, it is worth asking: what injustice I commit, if I want to be and remain in the state of nature? Suppose that an individual “A” try to exercise its alleged right to compel the individual B to enter the civil state. Imagine a fight between the two, B resisting the action of A. it seems pertinent to ask: who did start this fight? Who did attack first? It seems to me reasonable to say that who starts an attack is unfair, not who defends. Who is unjust is A, because it is the individual that wants to force the individual B to leave the state of nature. Indeed, if I start violence against another person just based on the evaluation that it may come to harm me, it is no longer simply of coercion against coercion (RL, AA 06: 231-232). If it is not more a coercion against coercion, the person affected by my violence can, with full right, resist against my coercion. Therefore, the state coercion cannot be justified, for it always seems to result in the initiation of violence against the innocent. In this paper, I try to develop and justify the hypothesis assumed here. I will do this by comparing the thesis I present to the allegations that Kant offers in §§ 41 and 42 of the Doctrine of Right.

Pecere, Paolo. “The Systematical Role of Kant’s Opus postumum. “Exhibition” of Concepts and the Defense of Transcendental Philosophy.” Con-Textos Kantianos 1 (2015): 156-77. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant’s admission of a “gap” in the philosophical system of criticism, which his unpublished project of the “Transition from the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science to Physics” would have been meant to fill, has been the object of controversy among scholars. This article reconsiders the problem by connecting the manuscripts with the operation of “exhibition” of concepts, which already had a systematic role in the 1780s, concluding that the new project was intended to provide not a reform, but a necessary complement of previous works. In the final section Kant’s new awareness of this problem in the 1790s is connected to the contemporary reception of criticism (Garve, Reinhold, Maimon, Beck, Schulze, Tiedemann, Fichte). This context provides more evidence supporting the main argument of the article about the inner development of Kant’s thought.

Peck, Jason M. “Kant, his Jewish 'Students' and the Origins of Romanticism.” European Romantic Review 26.1 (2015): 45-57. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: For the early German Romantics in the 1790s, no thinker arguably had a greater influence on the genesis of their thought than Immanuel Kant. The work Kant produced between 1781 (the publication of The Critique of Pure Reason) and 1790 (the publication of The Critique of Judgment) underlies the basic Romantic understanding of cognition, ethics and aesthetics in Germany. An overlooked aspect of the development in Kant's thought, as well as a surreptitious influence on the origins of early German Romanticism, is Kant's fraught relationship with his Jewish students and acquaintances throughout the 1780s. This is made most explicit in his relationship to Marcus Herz ­ a close confidant to Kant throughout the 1770s, the official respondent to Kant's inaugural dissertation as well as the director of the Jewish hospital in Berlin. Herz publishes in 1787 Versuch über den Schwindel [On Vertigo], a book that Herz openly dedicates to Kant and claims is directly influenced by Kant's teaching. Although Kant dismissed the book at the time, Herz's book on vertigo not only critiques Kant's conflation of reason and feeling, but introduces the possibility of individual psychology undermining the subject's orientation in thought.

Pedersen, Stefan. “Kantian and Wellsian Cosmopolitanism: A Critical Distinction.” Cosmopolitanism without Foundations. Eds. Tamara Caraus and Dan Lazea (Bowling Green: Philosophy Documentation Center, 2015). 66-90. [PW]

Peña-Guzmán, David. Rev. of Kant’s Organicism: Epigenesis and the Development of Critical Theory, by Jennifer Mensch (2013). [English] Con-Textos Kantianos 2 (2015): 365-69. [M] [online]

Perez, Daniel Omar. “The Possibility of an Anthropological Study of Human Nature in Kant.” Kant and the Metaphors of Reason. Ed. Patricia Kauark-Leite, et al. (op cit.). 445-54. [M]

Perin, Adriano. “The Proof of the Principle of Sufficient Reason: Wolff, Crusius and the Early Kant on the Search for a Foundation of Metaphysics.” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 71.2-3 (2015): 515-29. [JSTOR; PW]

Perovich, Anthony N. Rev. of Kand and the Meaning of Religion, by Terry F. Godlove (2014). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (Mar 2015, #8). [M] [online]

Perret, Nicole. “Téléologie biologique aujourd'hui, entre transcendantal et naturalisation.” Studi Kantiani 28 (2015): 89-103. [PW]

Peters, Laurence. The United Nations: History and Core Ideas. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. [xiv, 185 p.] [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: See ch. 3: “Balancing the Powers: Kant’s Key Contribution” (pp. 47-58)
Chapter Abstract: In this chapter we address Kant’s doctrine regarding his critical balance of power theory that formed the basis for his vision for a federated group of governments that would govern the world. In Chapter Eight (pp. 109-39), where we discuss the rise of the human rights movement, we will address the great German philosopher’s ideas about the treatment of all human beings, regardless of their citizenship, as he develops his doctrine of cosmopolitanism. Kant’s contributions in these two areas are nothing short of seminal in the conception of the United Nations (UN).

Petrillo, Agostino. “Il giovane Schopenhauer interprete del criticismo e del principio di ragione sufficiente.” [Italian] Intelletto e ragione in Kant e Schopenhauer. Ed. Giuseppe Giannetto (op cit.). 157-98??. [WC]

Petrone, Giuseppe Landolfi, ed. See: Spaventa, Bertrando.

Phillips, James. “Hegel and Heidegger on the Essence of Beauty: Plotting a Trajectory from Kant’s Third Critique.” Philosophy Today 59.1 (2015): 23-36. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Heidegger's discussions of beauty in the 1930s and '40s arguably have more to do with a confrontation with Hegel than with a revisiting of the question of how best to analyse our experience of the beautiful. Beauty, for Heidegger as for Hegel, takes its definition from truth. At issue is a forcible rewriting of the harmony of the faculties to which Kant appeals in his defence of pure aesthetic judgements. The highest truth, and the truth of beauty, lies in a proper understanding of harmony, whether as the comprehensive reconciliation of the absolute 'idea' or as the nonclosure in which truth as unconcealment remains contested by concealment. While neither Hegel nor Heidegger abides by the subjectivism of Kant's aesthetics, insisting instead that beauty is more than a mere feeling, Hegel's beauty as reconciliation and Heidegger's beauty as strife both attest to the ongoing sway of Kant's harmony of the faculties.

Piché, Claude. “La Rotondité de la Terre: une chance pour la paix.” Kant-Studien 106.3 (2015): 371-97. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In his Doctrine of Right (1797), Kant claims that all three components of public law must be realized if perpetual peace is to be achieved: state law, the law of peoples, and cosmopolitan law. In their accounts of Kant’s cosmopolitan law, commentators have noted Kant’s remark that the Earth is not an infinite plane surface, but a globe. A close reading of section 43 shows, however, that the sphericity of the Earth is also a condition of the possibility of Kant’s new state law of peoples (Völkerstaatsrecht), a law oriented toward the ideal of a ‘global’ state of nation states (Völkerstaat). This means that the closed political space of the Earth, which is a purely contingent condition, had a decisive impact on Kant’s threefold conception of public law.

 ——. “Kant’s Enlightenment as a Critique of Culture.” Con-Textos Kantianos 2 (2015): 197-216. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: It is puzzling to notice that in his 1784 essay on Enlightenment, Kant addresses every human being with his watchword «Have the courage to use your own understanding!», while at the same time he seems to restrict the access to the public discussion of matters of common interest to the learned persons (Gelehrte). This begs the question: Is the participation in the public debate part and parcel of Kant’s conception of Aufklärung? A positive answer to this question is given by Katerina Deligiorgi in her Kant and the Culture of Enlightenment. A critical assessment of this book will lead us however to consider that Kant has a differentiated approach to enlightenment depending on whether someone is educated or uneducated. Following Rousseau, Kant has come to recognize as a matter of fact this inequality toward the products of culture. Now the two-level conception of enlightenment entailed by this inequality becomes explicit in the 1790s, especially in the very last work Kant has published: The Conflict of the Faculties (1798).

 ——. “Guerre et paix. Les deux acceptions du droit des peuples en 1797.” Kant, la raison pratique: concepts et héritages. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Margit Ruffing, and Ricardo Ribeiro Terra (op cit.). 315-24. [M]

Pigeard de Gurbert, Guillaume. Kant et le Temps. Paris: Éditions Kimé, 2015. [124 p.] [WC]

Pihlström, Sami. “Subjectivity as Negativity and as a Limit: On the Metaphysics and Ethics of the Transcendental Self, Pragmatically Naturalized.” Pragmatism, Kant, and Transcendental Philosophy. Eds. Gabriele Gava and Robert Stern (op cit.). 217-38??. [WC]

 ——. Rev. of Art and Ethics in a Material World: Kant’s Pragmatist Legacy, by Jennifer A. McMahon (2014). Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93.4 (2015): 834-36. [PW]

Pinzani, Alessandro. “Between the Natural and the Artificial: How Kantian are Habermas’ Remarks on Positive Eugenics?” Morality and Life: Kantian Perspectives in Bioethics. Eds. Darlei Dall’Agnol and Milene Consenso Tonetto (op cit.). 147-64. [M]

 ——. Rev. of La pace fraintesa. Kant e la teoria della pace democratica, by Luigi Caranti (2012). Kant-Studien 106.2 (2015): 355-59. [PW]

Pippin, Robert B. Interanimations: Receiving Modern German Philosophy. Chicago/London: The University of Chicago Press, 2015. [273 p.] [WC]

Piredda, Patrizia. “The Influence of Kant’s Practical Reason on Renato Serra’s Ethical Response to the Great War.” Forum for Modern Language Studies 51.4 (2015): 417-28. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this article I study the argument used by Serra in Esame di coscienza di un letterato to reflect on the question of interventismo. For Serra, everyone has to decide his own stance on the war, after a long and deep process of reflection made possible only by excluding irrational elements derived from passions and false beliefs. One's ethical choice to take part in the war or not must be founded on freedom of judgement. Serra is hostile to all irrational discourse that propounds false myths in order to arouse an emotional acceptance of the war; he advocates instead analytic discourse based on dialectics derived from Kantian philosophy, from which Serra adopts the idea that 'freedom' is the condition that allows the individual to evaluate his own action by 'thinking for himself', by submitting all opinion to the examination of reason.

Pirni, Alberto. “Hacia una Crítica de la razón armónica.” [Spanish; Towards a Critique of harmonic reason] Con-Textos Kantianos 2 (2015): 20-31. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This essay focuses on the attempt of articulating the idea of a critique of harmonic reason understood as a comprehensive (and not explicitly expressed) project within Kant’s theoretical path. In the first paragraph, the attempt of elaborating a critical idea of harmony is addressed both biographically and theoretically by referring to the intense period 1783-1786. In the second paragraph, we introduce and discuss a methodical idea of critic harmony, whose roots are grounded within the framework of both pre-critical and critical period. Finally, as presented by the editor of the present monographic issue, the essay opens up to the dialogue with other interpretative paths about the topic, by offering a comprehensive view of all essays jointed in this issue and by presenting those stimulating materials along three concentric circles.

 ——. “The Community within Us: About the Distinction between Wille and Willkür.” Estudos Kantianos 3.2 (2015): 41-50. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Starting with an analysis of the concepts of Wille and Willkür, the essay distinguishes different meanings attributed to the freedom of the will (§ 1). Secondly, it distinguishes a positive from a negative dimension of that freedom, referred both to as Wille and Willkür (§ 2). Finally, the development of this aspect leads to a rethinking of the internal dynamics of the entire faculty of the will from a communitarian perspective (§ 3), by redefining as an a priori figure the relationship between singular subject and multiplicity of subjects, which Kant considered to operate already in the inner forum of every single being capable of reason.

 ——. See: Mordacci, Roberto, and Alberto Pirni.

Piza, Suze. “A filosofia de Foucault como semântica transcendental-histórica.” [Portuguese; Foucault’s Philosophy as transcendental-historical semantics] Kant e-Prints 10.1 (2015): 20-48. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Foucault states that, if he can be found in any philosophical tradition, it is in Kantianism. Based on this affirmation, and the understanding that Kant’s philosophy is a transcendental semantic, we defend the content of this article, giving that Foucault’s philosophy is also a semantic, albeit a transcendental-historical semantic. The archeological investigation is based on transcendental-semantic fields and demarcates the scope of positivity and the conditions that make it possible for objects to emerge. Foucault’s demarcation is based on the verification that a discursive field is not characterized by the objects that he studies, but by modalities of enunciation, concepts or privileged themes, i.e., by the way in which their objects are formed within a given domain subject to rules.

Plack, Iris. Indirekte Übersetzungen: Frankreich als Vermittler deutscher Literatur in Italien. Tübingen: Francke, 2015. [489 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: See chapter four: "Immanuel Kant: Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten."

Platz, Jeppe von. “The Metaphysics of Vice: Kant and the Problem of Moral Freedom.” Rethinking Kant: Volume 4. Eds. Pablo Muchnik and Oliver Thorndike (op cit.). 157-81. [WC]

 ——. Rev. of Rousseau and German Idealism: Freedom, Dependence and Necessity, by David James (2013). Kantian Review 20.1 (2015): 155-62. [PI]

 ——. Rev. of Kant’s Politics in Context, by Reidar Maliks (2014). Kantian Review 20.3 (2015): 492-97. [PW]

Poellner, Peter. “Action, Value, and Autonomy: A Quasi-Sartrean View.” Comparing Kant and Sartre. Ed. Sorin Baiasu (op cit.). 132-57. [PW]

Pogge, Thomas. “Transcendental Idealism.” Rethinking Kant: Volume 4. Eds. Pablo Muchnik and Oliver Thorndike (op cit.). 13-33. [WC]

Poggi, Davide. “Standing in front of the Ocean: Kant and the Dangers of Knowledge.” Kant and the Metaphors of Reason. Ed. Patricia Kauark-Leite, et al. (op cit.). 87-106. [M]

Poncela González, Ángel. “Verdad y Tiempo en la historiografía de la Historia de la Filosofía: Kant y las derivas del método kantiano.” [Spanish] Historiografía y Teoría de la Historia del Pensamiento, la Literatura y el Arte. Eds. Pedro Aullón and Ana Agud (Madrid: Dykinson, 2015). 129-44. [WC/JSTOR]

 ——, ed. See: Heit, Alexander, Harald Matern, and Enno Edzard Popkes, eds.

Pötzsch, Janelle. “Kantian Ethics in Gulliver’s Travels: Are the Houyhnhnms Role Models?” Philosophy and Literature 39.1 (2015): 259-66. [MUSE]

Pozzo, Riccardo. “Kant’s Latin in Class.” Reading Kant’s Lectures. Ed. Robert R. Clewis (op cit.). 160-75. [M]

 ——. Rev. of Kritische Metaphysik der Substanz: Kant im Widerspruch zu Leibniz, by Andree Hahmann (2009). Kant-Studien 106.1 (2015): 134-36. [PW]

 ——. Rev. of Ludwig Heinrich von Jakob, Denkwürdigkeiten aus meinem Leben, edited by Hans-Joachim Kertscher, with Michael Mehlow (2011). Kant-Studien 106.2 (2015): 367-68. [PW]

Prauss, Gerold. Die Einheit von Subjekt und Objekt: Kants Probleme mit den Sachen Selbst. Freiburg: Karl Alber, 2015. [640 p.] [WC]

Pringe, Hernán. “Metafisica, lógica y probabilidad cuánticas.” [Spanish] Crítica y metafísica: Homenaje a Mario Caimi. Ed. Claudia Jáuregui, et al. (op cit.). 308-18. [M]

Proops, Ian. “Kant on the Ontological Argument.” Nous 49.1 (2015): 1-27. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article examines Kant’s various criticisms of the broadly Cartesian ontological argument as they are developed in the Critique of Pure Reason. It is argued that each of these criticisms is effective against its intended target, and that these targets include — in addition to Descartes himself — Leibniz, Wolff, and Baumgarten. It is argued that Kant’s most famous criticism — the charge that being is not a real predicate — is directed exclusively against Leibniz. Kant’s argument for this thesis — the argument proceeding from his example of a hundred thalers — although it may seem to beg the question, in fact succeeds against Leibniz. It does so because the charge of begging the question can be rebutted if one makes certain Leibnizian assumptions.

Puls, Heiko. “Better never to have been? Kant über menschliche Reproduktion, Glück und den Wert des Lebens.” Kant-Studien 106.4 (2015): 596-625. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper I argue that Kant’s claim regarding the asymmetry between the need for happiness and the fulfilment of happiness means that no rational human being could hypothetically wish to repeat its own existence. I show that from this claim it follows that it could be rationally desirable for human beings not to be brought into existence. Thus I show that a Kantian response is available for the contemporary applied ethics question whether human beings are harmed by coming into existence.

 ——. “Kant über die äußerste Grenze aller praktischen Philosophie. Ein Kommentar zur Sektion 5 der Grundlegung.” Kants Begründung von Freiheit und Moral in Grundlegung III: neue Interpretationen. Ed. Dieter Schönecker (op cit.). 157-214. [M]

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Qvortrup, Matt. Rev. of Kant’s Politics in Context, by Reidar Maliks (2014). Philosophy Now 108 (2015): 49-50. [PW]

[top] R    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Raedler, Sebastian. Kant and the Interests of Reason. Boston/Berlin: De Gruyter, 2015. [vi, 275 p.] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kantstudien Ergänzungshefte, vol. 182. Originally appeared as the author’s Ph.D. dissertation (Cologne, 2014).

Rähme, Boris. “Transcendental Arguments,Epistemically Constrained Truth,and Moral Discourse.” Pragmatism, Kant, and Transcendental Philosophy. Eds. Gabriele Gava and Robert Stern (op cit.). 259-86??. [WC]

Rainsborough, Marita. “Grenze und Überschreitung. Michel Foucaults Kantrezeption im Spiegel der philosophischen Metaphern.” Kant and the Metaphors of Reason. Ed. Patricia Kauark-Leite, et al. (op cit.). 531-45. [M]

Rajiva, Suma. “Solus Secedo and Sapere Aude: Cartesian Meditation as Kantian Enlightenment.” Con-Textos Kantianos 2 (2015): 261-79. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Recently Samuel Fleischacker has developed Kant’s model of enlightenment as a “minimalist enlightenment” in the tradition of a relatively thin proceduralism focused on the form of public debate and interaction. I want to discuss the possibility that such a minimalism, endorsed by Fleischacker, Habermas, Rawls, and others, benefits from a metaphysics of critical individual subjectivity as a prerequisite for the social proceduralism of the minimalist enlightenment. I argue that Kant’s enlightenment, metaphysically thicker than much contemporary proceduralism, constitutes a recovery and transformation of a subjective interiority deeply Cartesian in spirit and central to the reciprocity of the community of subjects in What is Enlightenment. This opens a space for a site of resistance to the social. Descartes’ solus secedo describes the analogical space of such a resistance for Kant’s sapere aude. The Meditations thus point forward implicitly to how a rational subject might achieve critical distance from tradition in its various forms, epistemic, ethical, moral, and political.

Ramos de Souza, Luís Eduardo. “A concepção de sistema em Kant e Fichte.” [Portuguese; The conception of system in Kant and Fichte] Studia Kantiana 13.18 (2015): 112-33. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This work has the general objective to present the conception of system developed by Kant and Fichte, and particular objective to reflect on their respective properties, namely the completeness, uniqueness and correction. The problems raised around these objectives are addressed to two issues: 1) the philosophical systems of Kant and Fichte are open or closed? 2) In what way they conceive system properties (completeness, uniqueness and correction)? The first question, the work supports the hypothesis that both defend, despite different philosophical assumptions a closed system theory, which is founded on a set of specific concepts and principles. The second question, it will be argued that the two philosophers conceive the properties of the system slightly differently, although this theme is developed more clearly in Fichte. In conclusion, the work will hold some metatheoretical reflections on the system concept and its properties in the philosophies of Kant and Fichte.

Rand, Sebastian. “On Sally Sedgwick’s Hegel’s Critique of Kant.” Critique (blog posted: 9 Jan 2015) n.p. [PW] [online]

Raulet, Gérard. “La téléologie critique et ses paradigmes scientifiques. Sur la méthode de l’Histoire selon Kant.” Con-Textos Kantianos 1 (2015): 27-45. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant’s texts on history are often considered as minor or subsidiary by the interpreters concerned with philosophical systems whereas some of them qualify these writings as a “fourth critique”. The present paper defends the thesis that Kant’s critical intervention on the field of the historical reflections and practices of the 18th Century represents a decisive scientific turn. Whilst the idea of progress asserts itself against the two dominant paradigms of local history and Christian theodicy a critique of the notion of progress itself was necessary in order to establish the legitimacy of a science of history, provided that this would be possible. The scientific ideal which history had to aim at was constituted by three established models: astronomy, physics, and biology. The core and the instrument of this enterprise is the teleology. It is in the middle of the challenge because it is also the science of the living organisms. The difference between its “dogmatic” use in the natural sciences and the “critical” use in the historical science is therefore the anchor from which we can try to define Kant’s understanding of science in historical matters.

Rauscher, Frederick. Naturalism and Realism in Kant’s Ethics. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015. [viii, 264 p.] [WC]

 ——. “Did Kant Justify the French Revolution Ex Post Facto?” Reading Kant’s Lectures. Ed. Robert R. Clewis (op cit.). 325-45. [M]

 ——. “Die äusserste Grenze aller praktischen Philosophie und die Einschränkungen der Deduktion in Grundlegung III.” Kants Begründung von Freiheit und Moral in Grundlegung III: neue Interpretationen. Ed. Dieter Schönecker (op cit.). 215-29. [M]

 ——. Rev. of Kant on Moral Autonomy, edited by Oliver Sensen (2013). Journal of the History of Philosophy 53.3 (2015): 552-54. [M]

 ——. Rev. of Essays on Kant, by Henry Allison (2012). Mind 124.493 (2015): 302-5. [PW]

Reath, Andrews. “Did Kant Hold Rational Volition is Sub Ratione Boni?” Reason, Value, and Respect. Eds. Mark Timmons and Robert N. Johnson (op cit.). 232-55. [M]

 ——. Rev. of Immanuel Kant’s Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals: A Commentary, by Dieter Schönecker and Allen W. Wood (2015). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (Aug 2015, #16). [M] [online]

Ribeiro dos Santos, Leonel. “Economy and the Teleology of Evil in Kant’’s Lectures on Anthropology (1775-1784).” Kant’’s Lectures/Kants Vorlesungen. Eds. Bernd Dörflinger, et al. (op cit.). 107-120. [M]

 ——. “From Metaphor to the Principle of Taste in Kant’s Philosophy.” Kant and the Metaphors of Reason. Ed. Patricia Kauark-Leite, et al. (op cit.). 349-75. [M]

Ricken, Friedo. “Offenbarung und Vernunftreligion in der Philosophie Kants: ein vielfach differenziertes Verhältnis von Mittel und Zweck.” Vernunftreligion und Offenbarungsglaube. Eds. Norbert Fischer and Jakub Sirovátka (op cit.). 189-202. [M]

Riha, Rado. “Das transzendentale Subjekt und sein Dawider.” Filozofski vestnik (Ljubljana) 36.2 (2015): 139-54. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The aim of this essay is to provide an answer to the question of knowing whether it is possible to find in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason a figure of the subject that would not be solely reduced to a function in the constitution of the object. Is Kant’s “Copernican turn” truly a turn towards the subject or is it rather simply a detailed elaboration of the theory of the object, a theory with two voids: the void of the transcendental subject and the void of the transcendental object? The answer elaborated in this essay is the following: in the first Critique there is indeed a figure of the subject that is not solely the subject of the object, but is rather the subject for which the object is not only a vis-à-vis but also a part thereof, although a constitutively subtracted part. While this curious object, which the author proposes to call a trans-empirical, makes the constitution of the subject possible, it remains for the latter something that is radically Dawider.

 ——, and Jan Voelker. “Introduction: The Issue With Kant.” Filozofski vestnik (Ljubljana) 36.2 (2015): 7-10. [PW]

Rind, Miles. Rev. of Expressions of Judgment: An Essay on Kant’s Aesthetics, by Eli Friedlander (2015). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (May 2015, #10). [M] [online]

Rivera de Rosales, Jacinto. “Kant: die theoretische Welt der Metaphysik L₁ (1776-1778).” Kant’’s Lectures/Kants Vorlesungen. Eds. Bernd Dörflinger, et al. (op cit.). 213-232. [M]

 ——. “Kant: the Beautiful Alliance between Imagination and Reason.” Kant and the Metaphors of Reason. Ed. Patricia Kauark-Leite, et al. (op cit.). 397-414. [M]

 ——. “Kant: gusto y reflexión. La presencia del concepto en la experiencia estética.” [Spanish] Crítica y metafísica: Homenaje a Mario Caimi. Ed. Claudia Jáuregui, et al. (op cit.). 337-60. [M]

Rivero, Gabriel. “Le concept d’obligation comme concept premier de la philosophie pratique. Sur le développement de la raison pratique kantienne.” Kant, la raison pratique: concepts et héritages. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Margit Ruffing, and Ricardo Ribeiro Terra (op cit.). 215-23. [M]

Robinson, Elizabeth. Rev. of Kant’s Critique of Spinoza, by Omri Boehm (2014). Journal of the History of Philosophy 53.2 (2015): 337-38. [M]

Rocha, James. “Kantian Respect for Minimally Rational Animals.” Social Theory and Practice 41.2 (2015): 309-27. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Immanuel Kant, in a much-maligned view, thought that we could only have indirect duties to nonhuman animals who have no inherent moral value since they lack rationality. While there are various responses to this worrisome position, no one seems to consider that animals could conceivably qualify as having rationality, even on Kantian high standards. Animals engage in various activities (such as playing, seeking revenge, and altruistically helping others) that could be taken as indicators of the core aspects of rationality that Kant requires for having absolute worth (such as a reflective self-consciousness, a free end-setting ability, and the ability to make moral demands on others). While these animal behaviors will not prove that animals are rational, we must remember that we also cannot prove that other humans are rational. Instead, my goal is only to provide a basis for a precautionary moral principle that requires treating animals as minimally rational, given that they might be. On this basis, we ought to accept some direct Kantian duties for the respectful treatment of animals.

Rockmore, Tom. “Kant, Fichte, and Transcendental Idealism.” Kant, Fichte, and the Legacy of Transcendental Idealism. Eds. Halla Kim and Steven Hoeltzel (op cit.). 77-100. [M]

Roelofs, Monique. “Kantian Mouthliness: Enlightenment, Address, Aesthetics.” Differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies 26.2 (2015): 29-60. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant’s famous Enlightenment article is a crucial but overlooked source for his aesthetics. This essay unlocks its aesthetic significance by scrutinizing the mode of address in which Kant grounds his enlightenment project. Enlightenment, for Kant, revolves around the address we direct as men of learning to the reading public. If left free, this address, argues Kant, enables us to become mündig (mature) or, in other words, to learn to think and act for ourselves. Kant’s vision invokes the mouth (Mund) along with other bodily media of address (reading, writing). Presenting the mouthly in and beyond Kant as a site of aesthetic agency and experience, this essay reveals how he aestheticizes enlightenment. Kant’s use of address underwrites an expanded array of demands and commitments cocooned within his view of enlightenment and vastly broadens the resonance of his call for enlightenment. Kant’s aesthetics bursts beyond the bounds it has ordinarily been given.

Rogerson, Kenneth F. “Kant and Empirical Concepts.” Journal of Philosophical Research 40 (2015): 441-54. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Although Kant is most well-known for his arguments in support of pure or a priori concepts, he also attempts to give an account of how empirical concepts are acquired. In this paper I want to take a close look at this account. Specifically, I am interested in a recent criticism that Kant’s explanation of empirical concept acquisition is, in some sense, circular. I will consider and criticize a recent attempt to solve this problem. Finally, I will argue for my own solution to the circularity problem relying, oddly enough, on Kant’s commitment to pure or a priori concepts of the understanding as well as the pure forms of the imagination. Briefly, I want to argue that Kant can give a coherent and non-circular account of empirical concept acquisition relying primarily on the a priori conceptual tools developed in the Critique of Pure Reason.

Römer, Inga. Affektivität und Ethik bei Kant und in der Phänomenologie. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2015. [293 p.] [WC]

Roldán, Concha. “Universalité, autonomie et égalité: limites sociopolitiques de la morale kantienne.” Kant, la raison pratique: concepts et héritages. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Margit Ruffing, and Ricardo Ribeiro Terra (op cit.). 225-33. [M]

Rollmann, Veit Justus. Apperzeption und dynamisches Naturgesetz in Kants Opus postumum: ein Kommentar zu “Übergang 1-14”. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2015. [xi, 325 p.] [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Kantstudien Ergänzungshefte, vol. 181. Originally appeared as the author’s Ph.D. dissertation (Trier-Universität, 2014).

 ——. Rev. of The Post-Critical Kant: Understanding the Critical Philosophy through the Opus postumum, by Bryan Wesley Hall (2015). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (Sep 2015, #31). [M] [online]

Rosales, Alberto. “La teoría de la apercepción en el capítulo de los paralogismos.” Crítica y metafísica: Homenaje a Mario Caimi. Ed. Claudia Jáuregui, et al. (op cit.). 319-36. [M]

Rosenzweig, Franz. Franz Rosenzweigs Jugendschriften (1907-1914). Philosophie: Teil 1 - Kant, edited by Wolfgang D. Herzfeld. Hamburg: Verlag Dr. Kovad, 2015. [171 p.] [WC]

Rouanet, Luiz Paulo. “Da metafísica da natureza para a física – parte II.” [Portuguese] Kant e-Prints 10.2 (2015): 54-65. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper is the follow up of a research on Kant‟s philosophy of nature. In special, studies the issue of the existence of aether, the history of this concept and what thought about it Isaac Newton and Immanuel Kant. This concept seems to be theoretically justified, for that time, even if there are no material proofs of its existence. The first part, then, will show a brief reconstitution of the history of aether, following Whittaker (1973). The second part will examine the conception of Newton about the aether. The third part, finally, will see the conception of Kant on the aether, especially in his uncompleted work “Transition from the metaphysical principles of the science of nature to Physics”, which is part of his Opus postumum. The conclusion will make a general assessment of the present research so far.

Ruffing, Margit. “Kant-Bibliographie 2013.” Kant-Studien 106.4 (2015): 632-84. [PW]

 ——. “La méthodologie de la raison pure pratique.” Kant, la raison pratique: concepts et héritages. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Margit Ruffing, and Ricardo Ribeiro Terra (op cit.). 111-19. [M]

 ——. “Kants ‘Stimme der Vernunft’ – Analyse einer unauffälligen Metapher.” Kant and the Metaphors of Reason. Ed. Patricia Kauark-Leite, et al. (op cit.). 195-204. [M]

 ——. “Political and religious aspects of community according to Kant.” ethic@ 14.2 (2015): 338-52. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Based on the concept of community, Kant's conception of religion may be connected, on my view, to the question of which mental attitude is suitable for the collective life of human society. It is possible to imagine a successful community, even if such a community does not exist in the empirical world, and to be oriented toward this ideal without ever being able to realize it. According to Kant, human moral self-understanding is developed by human reason, and this explains the structural similarity between the secular republic and the Kingdom of God under the specific conditions of the enlightened consciousness of a person who thinks for herself. Thus the anthropological "fact": the self-understanding of the human being characterised by his faculty of reason.

 ——. “Kantov jazyk pravdovravnosti.” [Slovak; Kant's language of truthfulness] Studia Philosophica Kantiana 1 (2015): 17-24. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Die menschliche Sprache ist für Kant mehr als die beliebige Produktion von Rede: Insofern es das Sich-Mitteilen eines vernünftigen Wesens ist, steht es in unauflöslichem Bezug zum Denken und Begreifen. Der innere Zweck des Sprechens ist die Gedankenmitteilung, und diese ist betroffen von der Pflicht der Wahrhaftigkeit. Kants Sprachauffassung hat somit praktische Relevanz und gehört zur Moralphilosophie; eine eigene Sprachphilosophie oder Sprachtheorie, die primär der theoretischen Philosophie zuzuordnen wäre, hat Kant nicht entwickelt. Die moralische Forderung nach Wahrhaftigkeit als positiver Aspekt des Lügenverbots, die aus dem inneren Zweck menschlichen Sprechens hervorgeht, hat allerdings auch linguistische Implikationen: Nicht jede Sprachverwendung ist dem vernünftigen Selbstverständnis angemessen; dem Aufklärungsmotto gemäß ist das durch Selbstdenken entstandene Begreifen mit größtmöglicher Genauigkeit und Deutlichkeit zu bezeichnen und mitzuteilen. Im folgenden Beitrag soll diesen Zusammenhängen nachgegangen werden, um Kants Sprachauffassung als moralische herauszustellen.

 ——. “Fortschritt zum Besseren oder Zukunft einer Illusion? Freud und Kant als Aufklärer.” Estudos Kantianos 3.1 (2015): 159-67. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Auch wenn Kants Forderung nach einer Anthropologie der apriorischen Vernunft und Freuds empirisch verfahrende psychoanalytische Erklärung des menschlichen Bewusstseins einander zu widersprechen scheinen, lässt sich in den Moralauffassungen des Begründers der Psychoanalyse und des kritischen Transzendentalphilosophen eine bedeutende Gemeinsamkeit feststellen: Freuds erklärtes Ziel der Aufhebung des pathologischen Symptoms „Moralität“ ähnelt Kants aufklärerischer Kritik am Kultus historischer Religionen, beide kritischen Denker haben das Anliegen, ein aufgeklärtes Selbstverständnis des Menschen zu fördern. Im Folgenden sollen einige Reflexionen präsentiert werden, die Argumente für das kontinuierliche Erfordernis von Aufklärung darstellen, wobei die trennenden Perspektiven auf die jeweiligen Auffassungen von Kultur und Fortschritt zu berücksichtigen sind.

 ——. “Gedanke, Sprache, Ton — Bemerkungen zu Kants ,Sprachkritik’.” Crítica y metafísica: Homenaje a Mario Caimi. Ed. Claudia Jáuregui, et al. (op cit.). 361-75. [M]

 ——, ed. See: Grapotte, Sophie,  Margit Ruffing, and Ricardo Ribeiro Terra, eds.

 ——, ed. See: Kauark-Leite, Patricia, Giorgia Cecchinato, Virginia De Araujo Figueiredo, Margit Ruffing, and Alice Serra, eds.

Rukgaber, Matthew S. “Irrationality and Self-Deception within Kant’s Grades of Evil.” Kant-Studien 106.2 (2015): 234-58. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Scholars have failed to adequately distinguish Kant’s grades of evil: frailty (weakness of will), impurity, and depravity. I argue that the only way to distinguish them is, firstly, to recognize that frailty is explicitly, practically irrational and not caused by any sort of self-deception. Instead, it is caused by the radical evil that Kant finds within the character of all persons. Secondly, impurity can only be understood to be self-deception either about the nature of the act itself, which results in an epistemic error, or about one’s motivations for following a properly reasoned, moral conclusion, which results in a motivational error. Thirdly, depravity is self-deception about morality itself, by which the agent believes that it is morally right to follow self-love.

Rumore, Paola. Rev. of Kant’s Empirical Psychology, by Patrick Frierson (2014). [Italian] Con-Textos Kantianos 1 (2015): 274-79. [M] [online]

[top] S    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Sabourin, Charlotte. Rev. of Critique et réflexion: Essai sur le discours kantien, by Antoine Grandjean (2009). Kant-Studien 106.3 (2015): 528-31. [PW]

Sala, Giovanni B. Lonergan and Kant: Five Essays on Human Knowledge. Edited by Robert M. Doran, and Joseph S. Spoerl. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015. [xviii, 178 p.] [WC]

Salikov, Alexey N. “Kantforschung in Russland und Polen Gemeinsame Probleme und Perspektiven der Zusammenarbeit. Bericht über einen russisch-polnischen Workshop in Kaliningrad, 22. April 2015.” Kant-Studien 106.3 (2015): 518-22. [PW]

Sánchez Madrid, Nuria. “Prudence and the Rules for Guiding Life. The Development of Pragmatic Normativity in Kant’s Lectures on Anthropology.” Kant’s Lectures/Kants Vorlesungen. Eds. Bernd Dörflinger, et al. (op cit.). 163-176. [M]

 ——. “Instinct and Reason. Animal Metaphors in Kant’s Practical Philosophy.” Kant and the Metaphors of Reason. Ed. Patricia Kauark-Leite, et al. (op cit.). 455-70. [M]

 ——. “La politesse comme moyen de civilisation: l’opacité du coeur humain et la lente moralisation de l’espèce humaine chez Kant.” Kant, la raison pratique: concepts et héritages. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Margit Ruffing, and Ricardo Ribeiro Terra (op cit.). 235-42. [M]

 ——. “Duty and Coercion in Kant’s Republican Cosmopolitanism.” [English] Kantovski Sbornik (2015): 57-69. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper argues whether Kant’s cosmopolitanism entails a specific theory of coercion. I will especially tackle Kant’s account of international political order. First, I claim that Kant attributes a systematic role to the cosmopolitan right, what justifies considering this part of the doctrine of law as a necessary rational conclusion of the legal system, although its institutional embodiment differs from that required by the rights of states. I highlight that according to Kant states may not behave as individual citizens do, since they do not recognize any higher authority than themselves. Second, cosmopolitan law shows that coercion is not an insurmountable condition to fulfill legal obligations, since the cosmopolitan order depends on the moral equality among states, far from involving a hierarchy over governmental structure. Third, I will discuss that the only reason to perform an active role in the political sphere according to Kant stems from the statehood, so that to help other needy and less developed peoples and societies in order to boost that they achieve their autonomy as a state would not belong to the duties that a republic should abide to. Thus, the transformation of a human society into a republican civil union means according to Kant’s account of right the greatest contribution that a state could offer to enhance the cosmopolitan order.

 ——. “Algunas aporías del derecho kantiano. Reforma social y republicanismo cosmopolita.” [Spanish] Fragmentos de Filosofía 13 (2015): 43-57. [PW]

 ——. “Deber, justicia y coacción en el cosmopolitismo jurídico kantiano.” [Spanish; Duty, justice and coercion in Kant’s juridical cosmopolitanism] Cadernos de Filosofia Alemã: Crítica e Modernidade 20.1 (2015): 75-90. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article aims at giving an account of the coercive weakness of Kant’s cosmopolitan right and at understanding the mechanisms proposed to spread the republican forma regiminis throughout the earth. With this goal, I will analyze the Kantian model of the transition from the state of nature, t.i. a social state, to the civil union as a step that brings human beings from the empirical to the intelligible realm. I will attempt to gauge the distance between right as a product based on reason and right as a political instrument intended to reduce the effects of social inequality. The paper discusses the relationship between theory and practice regarding the scope of right, concluding that Kant always gives priority to the first over the second, what encourages considering the idea of a cosmopolitan federation States as a consequence of the mere existence of a true single republic on the earth.

 ——. Rev. of Culture as Mediation: Kant on Nature, Culture and Morality, by Ana Marta González (2011). Kant-Studien 106.1 (2015): 145-48. [PW]

Sánchez Rodríguez, Manuel. “Die pragmatische Dimension des Geschmacks im aufgeklärten Bildungsprogramm der Anthropologie Kants.” Kant and the Metaphors of Reason. Ed. Patricia Kauark-Leite, et al. (op cit.). 429-41. [M]

 ——. Rev. of Immanuel Kant, Primera Introducción de La Crítica del Juicio, translated and edited by Nuria Sánchez Madrid (2011). Kant-Studien 106.3 (2015): 535-38. [PW]

Sandford, Stella. Rev. of Kant’s Organicism: Epigenesis and the Development of Critical Philosophy, by Jennifer Mensch (2013). Critical Philosophy of Race 3.1 (2015): 167-70. [PW]

Sandkaulen, Birgit. “Letzte oder erste Fragen? Zum Bedürfnis nach Metaphysik in einer Skizze zu Kant und Jacobi” Das neue Bedürfnis nach Metaphysik / The New Desire for Metaphysics. Ed. Markus Gabriel (op cit.). 49-57. [WC]

Sandler, Sergeiy. “A Strange Kind of Kantian: Bakhtin’s reinterpretation of Kant and the Marburg School.” Studies in East European Thought 67.3/4 (2015): 165-82. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper looks at the ways in which Mikhail Bakhtin had appropriated the ideas of Kant and of the Marburg neo-Kantian school. While Bakhtin was greatly indebted to Kantian philosophy, and is known to have referred to himself as a neo-Kantian, he rejects the main tenets of neo-Kantianism. Instead, Bakhtin offers a substantial re-interpretation of Kantian thought. His frequent borrowings from neo-Kantian philosophers (Hermann Cohen, Paul Natorp, and others) also follow a distinctive pattern of appropriation, whereby blocks of interconnected ideas are removed from their original context, and made to serve Bakhtin's own-substantially different-philosophical purposes in the context of his own thought. Bakhtin's thought thus remains original even as he is borrowing ideas from others.

Santos, Eberth Eleutério dos. “A metafísica freudiana: um estudo para a demarcação metodológica da filosofia freudiana a partir de Kant.” [Portuguese; Freudian metaphysics: a study for a methodological demarcation of Freudian philosophy on the basis of Kant] Studia Kantiana 13.18 (2015): 148-81. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: From the presentation offered by Kant in his treatise Inquiry concerning the distinctness of the principles of natural theology and morality (1764), also known as the “Prize essay”, we make remarks on the proper way to methodological research in philosophy, distinguishing it from that which is proper to the construction of mathematical knowledge. These observations form the basis for an attempt at rapprochement between methodological manner provided by metaphysics, understood as ontology, and Freudian metapsychology which can then be conceived as an ontology functioning within their psychology. Our aim is to understand the Freudian metapsychology as obedient to methodological way we attach to ontology. In this way, Freud’s metapsychology is conceived as a type of generator/processor of psychological concepts. We will take the example of the example of the qualitative pleasure-unpleasure series, as presented in the Project for a psychology to reveal the emergence of a general principle for the functioning of the psychic apparatus: constancy principle. Then will take care to show that the effort of conceptual basis guide Freud, almost twenty-five years later, a profound rethinking of the place of this principle within his theory, mainly with the analysis of the hypothesis that all organisms would share a inclination more fundamental than the pursuit of pleasure: the death drive.

 ——. “Leucipo, Demócrito e Kant: uma Reflexão sobre a Equivalência entre Ser e Não-Ser.” [Portuguese; Leucippus, Democritus and Kant: a reflection on the equivalence between being and non-being] Trans/Form/Ação: Revista de Filosofia 38.2 (2015): 71-94. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Initially, we present the theory of Democritus and Leucippus whereby being is not more than the not-being (non-being), in contrast to Eleatic ideas about the necessary inexistence of the not-being. This discussion leads us to the opposition between the whole (full) and the empty, which will then be transposed into the opposition between being and nothingness (or not-being). Thus, the opposition between whole and the empty is an opposition that moves to being and not-being. Finally, we will make an assessment of the Kantian pre-critical essay Attempt to introduce the concept of negative magnitude into philosophy, in which we recognize a kind of opposition that, as we believe, would be interpreted as being in agreement with the position of Democritus and Leucippus regarding the ontological status of the not-being as an equivalent principle to the being, understood here not as a mutual contradiction in a purely logical sense.

Santos, Robinson dos. Rev. of Kant on Human Dignity, by Oliver Sensen (2013). [Portuguese] Con-Textos Kantianos 1 (2015): 280-86. [M] [online]

Saraiva, Marcelo H., and Pedro G. Ferreira. Rev. of The Foundations of Analytic Philosophy, by Robert Hanna (2001). Kant e-Prints 10.2 (2015): 77-82. [M] [online]

Sargentis, Konstantinos. “Crisis, Evil, and Progress in Kant’s Philosophy of History.” Journal of the Philosophy of History 9.1 (2015): 71-96. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The significance of the regulative function of the reflecting power of judgment for Kant’s philosophy of history is widely accepted in the relevant literature. However, less attention has been paid to particular modes of reflection with reference to history. In the last paragraphs of the Critique of the Power of Judgment we find a distinction between the “theoretically reflecting power of judgment” and the reflecting power of judgment “in accordance with concepts of practical reason”. In the present paper, I attempt to stress the importance of this distinction for Kant’s philosophy of history. More specifically, it is my view that this distinction leads Kant to a double perspective on history, by means of which one can explain why the notions of Nature and Providence cannot be used interchangeably. Interestingly, at the same time, it facilitates a new understanding of what Kant in Religion within the Boundaries of mere Reason calls “revolution in the disposition of the human being”. Another notion which is crucial for the main argument put forward in the present paper is that of the “culture of discipline”. Although Kant introduces it in the third Critique, I attempt to show that this is the notion that mediates Kant’s two views on history.

Satne, Paula. Rev. of Kant’s Defense of Common Moral Experience: A Phenomenological Accoun, by Jeanine Grenberg (2013). [English] Con-Textos Kantianos 1 (2015): 309-22. [M] [online]

Ščerbina, A M. Učenie Kanta o vešči v sebe. [Russian] Moscow: Lenand, 2015. [189 p.] [WC]

Schafer, Karl. “Realism and Constructivism in Kantian Metaethics (1): Realism and Constructivism in a Kantian Context.” Philosophy Compass 10.10 (2015): 690-701. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Metaethical constructivism is one of the main movements within contemporary metaethics – especially among those with Kantian inclinations. But both the philosophical coherence and the Kantian pedigree of constructivism are hotly contested. In the first half of this article, I first explore the sense in which Kant's own views might be described as constructivist and then use the resulting understanding as a guide to how we might think about Kantian constructivism today. Along the way, I hope to suggest that a fairly diverse range of views within contemporary metaethics – including some without any explicit allegiance to Kant – may be thought of as pursuing a version of the resulting strategy.

 ——. “Realism and Constructivism in Kantian Metaethics (2): The Kantian Conception of Rationality and Rationalist Constructivism.” Philosophy Compass 10.10 (2015): 702-13. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the second half of this essay, I discuss the robust conception of rationality that lies at the heart of the Kantian version of Rationalist Constructivism – offering some reasons to prefer this conception to the more minimal accounts of rationality associated with Humean views. I then go on to discuss some of the potential metaethical advantages of the resulting form of constructivism.

Schapiro, Tamar. “On Christine Korsgaard’s ‘Aristotle and Kant on the Source of Value’.” Ethics 125.4 (2015): 1123-26. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: An essay on the article ‘Aristotle and Kant on the Source of Value’, by Christine Korsgaard is presented. It offers a review of arguments on the systematic and exegetical aspects of a good end and examines the conflicting roles of moral virtue and contemplation as to the source of value based on different backgrounds of Immanual Kant and Aristotle. The author relates that there could be a number of theories on value that includes objectivism, subjectivism as well as constructivism.

Scheffel, Dieter. “Kants Idee der kopernikanischen Wendung.” Urteil und Erfahrung: Kants Theorie der Erfahrung. Ed. Rainer Enskat (op cit.). 239-72. [M]

Schliesser, Eric. Rev. of Kant’s Critique of Spinoza, by Omri Boehm (2014). Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 36.2 (2015): 463-83. [PW]

Schlösser, Ulrich. “Kants Konzeption der Mitteilbarkeit.” Kant-Studien 106.2 (2015): 201-33. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In his Critique of Judgment, Kant relates the communicability of aesthetic feeling to the fact that we are in a position to communicate cognitions. In his references back to the theory of cognition in the first Critique, however, Kant alters the original direction of proof and attributes a new role to some of his most important theorems, e.g. to his claims about synthesis and its foundational function for composition and relation. In this paper, I will reconstruct and defend Kant’s views on communicability and the changes associated with it. In a final section, I will argue that the concept of communicability should not be identified with the concept of subjective universal validity. Subjective universal validity is merely a special case of the former.

Schlüter, Stephan. “Die Aktualität von Kants bildungsgeschichtlichem Programm einer kosmopolitischen Menschheitsgeschichte und seine Verbindung zur Stoa.” Studia Philosophica Kantiana 2 (2015): 16-45. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Gerade die hellenistische Philosophie, und hier v.a. die frühe Stoa in der Ethik, hat hinsichtlich ihrer Natur- und Vernunftbestimmung des Menschen Kant maßgeblich beeinflusst. Diogenes war es, der als einer der ersten überlieferten Denker den Begriff des kosmopolites geprägt hat und zugleich das Hauptanliegen der daran anschließenden Stoa zum Ausdruck bringt.
Die Stoiker betrachten den Menschen nicht nur in eine göttliche, zweckmäßig angeordnete Allnatur eingebettet, sondern darüber hinaus stellt er als vernunftbegabtes Wesen einen naturgegebenen Teil des vernunftdurchfluteten Kosmos dar, den alle Menschen als ihre primäre Heimat empfinden – ungeachtet ihrer lokalen und kontingenten Einschreibung in der Welt. Die kosmopolitische Dimension der Stoa im Hinblick auf eine natur- und vernunftgemäße Schicksalsgemeinschaft, die in wechselseitiger Abhängigkeit zueinander steht, wird Kant zum Anlass nehmen, um im Gewand einer dynamischen Geschichtsphilosophie, seinen bildungsgeschichtlichen Entwurf einer kosmopolitischen Menschheitsgeschichte zu verfassen.
Der Beitrag versucht Schnittmengen als auch Differenzen zwischen der Stoa und Kant im Hinblick auf die Kosmopolis zu untersuchen; besondere Berücksichtigung werden hierbei die Affekte und die Teleologie finden.

Schmidt, James. “Niemieckie oświecenie.” [Polish; German enlightenment] Filozofia Oswiecenia: Radykalizm, Religia, Kosmopolityzm. Eds. Maciej Chmielinski, Justyna Miklaszewska, and Anna Tomaszewska (op cit.). 65-94??. [WC]

Schmidtz, David. See: Zwolinski, Matt, and David Schmidtz.

Schmitz, Friederike. “On Kant's Conception of Inner Sense: Self‐Affection by the Understanding.” European Journal of Philosophy 23.4 (2015): 1044-63. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Among the extensive literature on the first Critique, very few commentators offer a thorough analysis of Kant's conception of inner sense. This is quite surprising since the notion is central to Kant's theoretical philosophy, and it is very difficult to provide a consistent interpretation of this notion. In this paper, I first summarize Kant's claims about inner sense in the Transcendental Aesthetic and show why existing interpretations have been unable to dissolve the tensions arising from the conjunction of these claims. Secondly, I present my own reconstruction of Kant's model of inner sense, relying essentially on Kantian considerations found in the B‐version of the Transcendental Deduction. My main idea is that inner sense, for Kant, is a passive faculty that gets affected by the understanding performing its figurative synthesis on material given in outer sense. In the remainder of the paper, I highlight a few consequences of my interpretation and outline ways to deal with some objections.

Schneewind, J. B. “Foreword.” Kant’s Lectures on Ethics: A Critical Guide. Eds. Denis, Lara, and Oliver Sensen. (op cit.). xiii-xv. [M]

Schneider, Ruben. “Negative Theologie und analoge Gotteserkenntnis in Kants theoretischer Philosophie. Kantische und Thomanische Analogielehre im Vergleich.” Vernunftreligion und Offenbarungsglaube. Eds. Norbert Fischer and Jakub Sirovátka (op cit.). 297-317. [M]

Schneidereit, Nele, ed. See: Binkelmann, Christoph, and Nele Schneidereit, eds.

Schnepf, Robert. “Transzendentale Argumente und die Probleme der kantischen Urteilstafel.” Urteil und Erfahrung: Kants Theorie der Erfahrung. Ed. Rainer Enskat (op cit.). 71-127. [M]

Schönecker, Dieter. “Bemerkungen zu Oliver Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity, Chapter 1.” Kant-Studien 106.1 (2015): 68-77. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper I sketchily deal with some critical points concerning the first chapter of Oliver Sensen’s book, Kant on Human Dignity. These points are as follows: (i) Sensen interprets only a few passages in any great detail; (ii) where we do encounter more precise analysis, Sensen suggests that human beings are to be respected just because one must respect them; (iii) Sensen criticizes a position (according to which Kant has a concept of value that is independent of the moral law) that is obviously wrong and, in any case, not the crucial point; (iv) Sensen misconceives the function of respect as something that grounds knowledge; (v) he is wrong to consider freedom a non-normative concept; (vi) he does not sufficiently clarify the precise meaning of “metaphysical”; (vii) section III of the Groundwork is virtually ignored; and (viii) Sensen overlooks the fact that the relational property (ist erhoben über) is based on an intrinsic property (hat Würde).

 ——, ed. Kants Begründung von Freiheit und Moral in Grundlegung III. Neue Interpretationen. Münster: Mentis-Verlag, 2015. [332 p.] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents: The essays stem from the Siegener Kant-Tagung (2012).
Larissa Berger (Der "Zirkel" im dritten Abschnitt der Grundlegung: eine neue Interpretation und ein Literaturbericht),
Jochen Bojanowski (Die Deduktion des Kategorischen Imperativs),
Paul Guyer (Die Beweisstruktur der Grundlegung und die Rolle des dritten Abschnittes),
Christoph Horn (Das Bewusstsein, unter dem moralischen Gesetz zu stehen: Kants Freiheitsargument in GMS III),
Heiko Puls (Kant über die äußerste Grenze aller praktischen Philosophie — Ein Kommentar zur Sektion 5 der Grundlegung),
Frederick Rauscher (Die äußerste Grenze aller praktischen Philosophie und die Einschränkungen der Deduktion in Grundlegung III),
Oliver Sensen (Die Begründung des Kategorischen Imperativs),
Michael Wolff (Warum der kategorische Imperativ nach Kants Ansicht gültig ist. Eine Beschreibung der Argumentationsstruktur im Dritten Abschnitt seiner Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten).

 —— and Allen W. Wood. Immanuel Kant’s Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals: A Commentary, translated from the German by Nicholas Walker. Cambridge, Mass./London: Harvard University Press, 2015. [xii, 236 p.] [WC] [review]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Originally published in German as Immanuel Kant Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten: Ein einfürhrender Kommentar. Paderborn: Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh, 2002.

Schott, Thomas. Neue Aspekte zu Kants Pädagogik. Baden-Baden: Deutscher Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2015. [84 p.] [WC]

Schroeder, Mark. “Hypothetical Imperatives: Scope and Jurisdiction.” Reason, Value, Respect. Eds. Mark Timmons and Robert N. Johnson (op cit.). 89-100. [M]

Schulting, Dennis. “Probleme des „kantianischen“ Nonkonzeptualismus im Hinblick auf die B-Deduktion.” Kant-Studien 106.4 (2015): 561-80. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Recently, Allais, Hanna and others have argued that Kant is a nonconceptualist about intuition and that intuitions refer objectively, independently of the functions of the understanding. Kantian conceptualists have responded (e.g. with reference to KrV, A 89 ff./B 122 ff. (§ 13), which the nonconceptualists also cite as textual evidence for their reading) that this view conflicts with the central goal of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction: to argue that all intuitions are subject to the categories. I argue that the conceptualist reading of KrV, A 89 ff./B 122 ff. is unfounded. Further, I argue that the nonconceptualists are wrong to believe that intuitions as such refer objectively and that they are mistaken about the relation between figurative synthesis and intellectual synthesis.

 ——. “Transcendental Apperception and Consciousness in Kant’s Lectures on Metaphysics.” Reading Kant’s Lectures. Ed. Robert R. Clewis (op cit.). 89-114. [M]

——. See: Onof, Christian, and Dennis Schulting.

——, ed. See: Banham, Gary, Dennis Schulting, and Nigel Hems, eds.

Schwienhorst-Schönberger, Ludger. “Schrifthermeneutik und Rationalität des christlichen Glaubens bei Origenes — mit einem Ausblick auf Kant.” Vernunftreligion und Offenbarungsglaube. Eds. Norbert Fischer and Jakub Sirovátka (op cit.). 103-16. [M]

Sciuto, Cinzia. La Terra è Rotonda: Kant, Kelsen e la Prospettiva Cosmopolitica. [Italian] Milan: Mimesis, 2015. [155 p.] [WC]

Sedgwick, Sally. “Reply to William Bristow & Sebastian Rand.” Critique (blog posted: 13 Jan 2015) n.p. [PW] [online]

Seixas da Silva, Mitieli. “L’usage public de la raison et la ‘condition d’indépendance’.” Kant, la raison pratique: concepts et héritages. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Margit Ruffing, and Ricardo Ribeiro Terra (op cit.). 325-33. [M]

Sengupta, Kakali Ghosh. Conceptual Scheme: Theories of Kant, Quine, Davidson and Strawson. Kolkata: Mitram, 2015. [103 p.] [WC]

Sensen, Oliver. “Die Begründung des Kategorischen Imperativs.” Kants Begründung von Freiheit und Moral in Grundlegung III: neue Interpretationen. Ed. Dieter Schönecker (op cit.). 231-56. [M]

 ——. “Moral Obligation and Free Will.” Kant’s Lectures on Ethics: A Critical Guide. Eds. Denis, Lara, and Oliver Sensen. (op cit.). 138-55. [M]

 ——. “Kants Begriff des Gewissens.” Gewissen: Interdisziplinäre Perspektiven auf das 18. Jahrhundert. Eds. Simon Bunke and Katerina Mihaylova (op cit.). 123-34. [M]

 ——. The Supreme Principle of Morality.” Reading Kant’s Lectures. Ed. Robert R. Clewis (op cit.). 179-99. [M]

 ——. “Kant on Human Dignity Reconsidered.” Kant-Studien 106.1 (2015): 107-29. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The justification for Kant’s dictum to treat oneself and others never merely as a means can be read in very different ways. In this article I respond to comments made by Dieter Schönecker, Jochen Bojanowski, Heiner Klemme and Stefano Bacin on the justification I offer in my book Kant on Human Dignity. In the book I argue against the most popular reading of Kant’s justification, which tries to base th e respect one owes to others on a value they possess. In contrast, my view ties Kant’s justification more closely to his theoretical philosophy, and argues that it is based on an a priori law. In my response I clarify several points I made in the book: I spell out how Kant conceives of value as a prescription of reason, why value cannot be the foundation of Kant’s moral philosophy as well as whether it needs a special end to motivate moral actions, and what Kant means by ‘end in itself.’ In this article I also enlarge upon the positive account of why one should respect others, and how Kant conceives of this requirement to be based in pure reason. Finally, I offer a modified reading of the traditional paradigm of dignity to which Kant also adheres. Unlike the account I give in the book, I do not believe any longer that in this conception dignity is always connected to a duty to oneself, and I grant that this conception has often been used as an intuitively plausible but incomplete shorthand argument for the requirement to respect others.

 ——, ed. See: Denis, Lara, and Oliver Sensen, eds.

Serequeberhan, Tsenay. Existence and Heritage: Hermeneutic Explorations in African and Continental Philosophy. Albany: SUNY Press, 2015. [xvi, 185 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: See "Post-9/11, perpetual peace?: a reading of Immanuel Kant".

Serra, Alice Mara. “Affektion, Selbstaffektion, Heteroaffektion: Modulationen eines quasi-Begriffs bei Kant und Husserl.” Kant and the Metaphors of Reason. Ed. Patricia Kauark-Leite, et al. (op cit.). 515-30. [M]

 ——, ed. See: Kauark-Leite, Patricia, Giorgia Cecchinato, Virginia De Araujo Figueiredo, Margit Ruffing, and Alice Serra, eds.

Setton, Dirk. “The Capacity to Sustain Receptivity Spontaneously: Imagination in Kant’s Theory of Experience.” Filozofski vestnik (Ljubljana) 36.2 (2015): 155-72. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: One problem that is fundamental for a theory of experiential judgment resides in the question of how to understand the unity of spontaneity and receptivity that is essential to its exercise. How is it possible for a non-normative and non-conceptual aspect (i.e. receptivity) to have normative significance with respect to experiential judgments? In contemporary debates concerning Kant’s solution to this puzzle we can discern two tendencies that seem to form equally unsatisfactory alternatives: In interpreting his idea that the conditions of spontaneity constitutively enter the manner in which things are given to us, either we arrive at an account in which the non-normative or non-conceptual element of receptivity is obliterated, or we end up with an account of sensible experience as a composite structure containing natural and normative aspects without being able to understand the very necessity that holds these heterogeneous aspects together. The starting point of this paper is the assumption that such a picture is the result of an “idealist” misunderstanding of Kant’s account of experience in the first Critique – and of the “materialist” punchline of the conception of spontaneous receptivity that the latter involves. The proposal is that we should reconstruct the unity of spontaneity and receptivity in such a way that the judging subject determines itself to be spontaneously receptive, i.e. that the subject sustains his or her own sensible affections as affections self-actively. That aspect of spontaneity that accomplishes this is the (transcendental) power of imagination. The aim of this paper is to reconstruct some basic traits of Kant’s conception of imagination in the A and B deductions of the first Critique, and to sketch out an argument for its contribution to the puzzle of receptivity.

Seyler, Frédéric. “De Kant à Fichte: La moralité et son destin dans la synthèse quintuple.” Kant, la raison pratique: concepts et héritages. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Margit Ruffing, and Ricardo Ribeiro Terra (op cit.). 413-21. [M]

Shabel, Lisa, ed. See: Carson, Emily, and Lisa Shabel, eds.

Shaddock, Justin B. “Kant’s Transcendental Idealism and his Transcendental Deduction.” Kantian Review 20.2 (2015): 265-88. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: I argue for a novel, non-subjectivist interpretation of Kant’s transcendental idealism. Kant’s idealism is often interpreted as specifying how we must experience objects or how objects must appear to us. I argue to the contrary by appealing to Kant’s Transcendental Deduction. Kant’s Deduction is the proof that the categories are not merely subjectively necessary conditions we need for our cognition, but objectively valid conditions necessary for objects to be appearances. My interpretation centres on two claims. First, Kant’s method of self-knowledge consists in his determining what makes our cognitive faculty finite in contrast to God’s infinite cognitive faculty. Second, Kant’s limitation of our knowledge to appearances consists in his developing an account according to which appearances and our finite cognitive faculty are conceived of in terms of each other and in contrast to noumena in the positive sense and God’s infinite cognitive faculty.

 ——. Rev. of Space, Geometry, and Kant’s Transcendental Deduction of the Categories, by Thomas C. Vinci (2014). Kantian Review 20.3 (2015): 501-6. [PW]

Shand, John. “Kant, Respect, and Hypothetical Acts.” Philosophy 90.3 (2015): 505-18. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The role of hypothetical acts, as opposed to actual acts, has been neglected in understanding the nature of what is required by the Respect for Persons formulation of the Categorical Imperative in concrete moral relations between persons. This had led to a failure to understand fully the way and the extent to which the Categorical Imperative may be present in all such relations with others as encapsulated in an appropriate attitude towards others that may refer to hypothetical acts, as well as actual acts. The result is an underestimation of the direct relevance and moral efficacy of the Categorical Imperative.

Shell, Susan Meld. “Reading Kant’s Lectures On Pedagogy.” Reading Kant’s Lectures. Ed. Robert R. Clewis (op cit.). 277-98. [M]

 ——. Rev. of The Powers of Pure Reason: Kant and the Idea of Cosmic Philosophy, by Alfredo Ferrarin (2015). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (Sep 2015, #18). [M] [online]

Sheplyakova, Tatjana. Rev. of The Impact of Idealism: The Legacy of Post-Kantian German Thought, Volume II: Historical, Social and Political Thought, edited by John Walker (2013). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (Nov 2015, #31). [M] [online]

Shinkawa, Nobuhiro. Kanto no Heiwa Koso: Eien Heiwa no Tameni no Shinchihei. [Japanese] Kyoto: Koyoshobo, 2015. [161 p.] [WC]

Sibertin-Blanc, Guillaume. “D’un aléa sexuel de la normativité juridique chez Kant: notes sur la perversion comme condition quasi-transcendantale du droit.” Filozofski vestnik (Ljubljana) 36.2 (2015): 173-97. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This essay proposes a rereading of the Kantian doctrine of domestic law and conjugal rights. I analyse the textual anomalies released by the introduction of the concept of „dingliche Art persönlichen Recht“, disturbing the juridical, anthropological, and metaphysical dichotomy between Ding and Person, and compelling a series of operations to restore its impossible disjunction, as crucial as it is to articulate the categories of ownership and community: on the one hand, operations of reciprocal metaphorisation of femininity and animality (and of domesticity and domestication), and on the other hand, operations of the metonymisation of genital and oral objects. I finally try to enlighten how these two attempts to juridicise the sexuality, or to submit its “organs” to the norm of the law, release as well two excessive limits, maybe two traumatic points where the Kantian jouissance break through its own philosophical rampart.

Siep, Ludwig. Der Staat als irdischer Gott: Genese und Relevanz einer Hegelschen Idee. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2015. [xi, 268 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: See "Immanuel Kant: das Recht der Person und der Vernunftstaat" (pp. 35f.), "Kant und Fichte: Staatliche Existenzsicherung: oder Planwirtschaft als Bedingung des Rechts auf Arbeit?" (pp. 87f.), "Immanuel Kant: die Pflicht zur Vereinigung in der 'doppelten Republik'" (pp. 114f.), "Kant: Rechtsgemeinschaft und Gottesannahme" (pp. 156f.).

Silva, Fernando M. F. “‘Zum Erfinden wird Witz erfordert’. On the Evolution of the Concept of Witz in Kant’’s Anthropology Lectures.” Kant’’s Lectures/Kants Vorlesungen. Eds. Bernd Dörflinger, et al. (op cit.). 121-132. [M]

Simont, Juliette. Gérard Lebrun et les Critiques de Kant: le moment de “La mort de l’homme”. Bruxelles: Édition Ousia, 2015. [273 p.] [WC]

Sirovátka, Jakub. Das Sollen und das Böse in der Philosophie Immanuel Kants: zum Zusammenhang zwischen kategorischem Imperativ und dem Hang zum Bösen. Hamburg: Meiner, 2015. [190 p.] [WC]

 ——. Rev. of Metaphysik und Erfahrung in Kants praktischer Philosophie, by Oliver Laschet (2011). Kant-Studien 106.3 (2015): 532-35. [PW]

 ——. Rev. of La fragilità della virtù. Dall’antropologia alla morale e ritorno nell’epoca di Kant, by Laura Anna Macor (2011). Kant-Studien 106.4 (2015): 707-9. [PW]

 ——, ed. See: Fischer, Norbert, and Jakub Sirovátka, eds.

Skelton, Anthony. Rev. of The Development of Ethics: A Historical and Critical Study. Vol. 3, From Kant to Rawls, by Terence Irwin (2009). Philosophical Review 124.2 (2015): 279-86. [PW]

Skempton, Simon. “Kant, Hegel, and the Moral Imagination.” Idealistic Studies 45.1 (2015): 53-67. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article addresses the question of whether Kantian moral formalism (Moralität) or Hegelian concrete ethical life (Sittlichkeit) is more relevant to the understanding of revolutionary changes in the moral attitudes of society. As Sittlichkeit conceives of morality as immanent to the existing conventions of society and Moralität involves principles that transcend any particular community, the former initially appears to be more conservative and the latter more potentially revolutionary. However, Moralität involves an individualized form of moral reasoning, whereas Hegelian modern Sittlichkeit involves a social form of moral reasoning based on relations of reciprocal recognition. It is argued here that Sittlichkeit so understood has the potential to overcome the limitations placed on the moral imagination (the ability to envisage contexts of suffering and repression) by abstract individualized reasoning.

Smeenk, Chris. Rev. of Kant’s Construction of Nature: A Reading of the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, by Michael Friedman (2013). Philosophy of Science 82.4 (2015): 718-26. [JSTOR]

Smit, Houston, and Mark Timmons. “Love of Honor, Emulation, and the Psychology of the Devilish Vices.” Kant’s Lectures on Ethics: A Critical Guide. Eds. Denis, Lara, and Oliver Sensen. (op cit.). 256-76. [M]

Smith, Daniel W. “Deleuze, Kant and the Transcendental Field.” At the Edges of Thought: Deleuze and Post-Kantian Philosophy. Eds. Craig Lundy and Daniela Voss (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015). 25-45. [WC/JSTOR]

Smith, Justin E. H. Nature, Human Nature, and Human Difference: Race in Early Modern Philosophy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015. [vii, 296 p.] [WC]

Smith, Simon D. “Kant’s Mathematical Sublime and the Role of the Infinite: Reply to Crowther.” Kantian Review 20.1 (2015): 99-120. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper offers an analysis of Kant’s account of the mathematical sublime with reference to his claim that ‘Nature is thus sublime in those of its appearances the intuition of which brings with them the idea of its infinity’ (CJ, 5: 255). In undertaking this analysis I challenge Paul Crowther’s interpretation of this species of aesthetic experience, and I reject his interpretation as not being reflective of Kant’s actual position. I go on to show that the experience of the mathematical sublime is necessarily connected with the progression of the imagination in its move towards the infinite.

Sodré, Felipe Arruda. “Ensaio sobre a possibilidade de uma psicologia transcendental.” [Portuguese; Essay on the possibility of a Transcendental Psychology]] Estudos Kantianos 3.2 (2015): 195-210. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The main purpose of this essay is to answer the question: is there a Transcendental Psychology? Kant, in his Critique of Pure Reason, especially in the second part of the Transcendental Logic shows that the knowledge of Rational Psychology are not legitimate. On the other hand, Kitcher believes that the Transcendental Philosophy can be seen just like a Metaphysical Psychology that could not be confused with a Rational Psychology. Nevertheless, we affirm that Psychology Metaphysics defended by Kitcher represent yet one Transcendental illusion that invalidate the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories.

Solé, Joan. Kant: el giro Copernicano en la Filosofía. [Spanish; Kant, the Copernican turn in philosophy] Barcelona: Batiscafo, 2015. [143 p.] [WC]

Sonderegger, Erwin. Zur Funktion der Chora in Platons Timaios und des Äthers in Kants Ubergangsschrift. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2015. [138 p.] [WC]

Soškova, Jana. “Concepts of “Aesthetics of Arts” in Slovak Aesthetics of the 19th Century and Kant’s Conception of “Harmonization”.” Con-Textos Kantianos 2 (2015): 151-61. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The paper analyses three concepts of aesthetics of arts in Slovak aesthetics in the first third of the 19th century based on the ideas of three Slovak authors (Michal Greguš, Andrej Vandrák and Karol Kuzmány) who all shared creative reading of Kant and transformation of the process of “harmonization” as a foundation of defining possible aesthetic potentiality of art.

Spaventa, Bertrando. Quattro Articoli Sulla Filosofia Tedesca (Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel), edited by Giuseppe Landolfi Petrone. [Italian] Padova: Il Prato, 2015. [335 p.] [WC]

Spencer, Vicki A. “Kant and Herder on colonialism, indigenous peoples, and minority nations.” International Theory 7.2 (2015): 360-92. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: It is the orthodox view in the cosmopolitan and normative international relations literature that Immanuel Kant is a staunch critic of European colonialism. This paper offers a far more critical stance towards Kant’s position with respect to minority nations and stateless Indigenous peoples through an analysis that draws on the criticisms developed by his contemporary and former student, Johann Gottfried Herder. The paper proceeds in three parts. In the first section, I present the evidence in favour of seeing both Kant and Herder as strident opponents of colonialism. In the second section, I then show the problems that arise in Kant’s position when his views on the state and property rights are taken into consideration. Kant’s coupling of the nation and state in contrast to Herder’s insistence that they are separate entities is highlighted as a crucial distinguishing point in their positions. In the third and final section, I indicate how Herder provides a far deeper critique of colonialism than Kant, also due to his recognition of the problematic nature of ideological pronouncements of progress.

Sperber, Peter. “Empiricism and Rationalism: The Failure of Kant’s Synthesis and its Consequences for German Philosophy around 1800.” Kant Yearbook: Kant and Empiricism 6 (2015): 115-38. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant’s synthesis of empiricism and rationalism is often considered to be one of his most important contributions to philosophy. In this article I investigate the reception of this synthesis in the late 1780s and early 1790s. I show that during this early reception Kant’s attempt at a synthesis, and its empiricist side in particular, proved to be a failure when it was confronted with a powerful challenge from the side of Gottlob Ernst Schulze, Salomon Maimon and Karl Leonhard Reinhold. This failure, I argue, resulted in a break within the Kantian movement itself between a rationalist and an empiricist Kantianism.

Spezzapria, Mario. “Kant, Moritz e la Magazin zur Erfahrungs-Seelenkunde.” [Italian; Kant, Moritz and the Magazine for Empirical Psychology] Estudos Kantianos 3.2 (2015): 131-39. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The Berliner Magazine for Empirical Psychology (1783-1793), founded by Karl Philipp Moritz in order to gather observations and empirical reflexions – along the path of Wolff’s empirical psychology tradition – drew on the investigations on the relationships between the soul and the body in medical-anthropological environment, and more in general on the big debate about the Menschbestimmung. Such researches were acknowledged by Kant, who alluded to them in his lectures on anthropology; nonetheless, since he had developed a new pragmatic approach to anthropology, and gone beyond the old metaphysics by means of his critical-transcendental philosophy, he did not accept Moritz’ invitation to spread out the Magazine in Königsberg.

Stacho, Kristián. Rev. of Das Leben der Vernunft. Beiträge zur Philosophie Kants, edited by Dieter Hüning, Stefan Klingner, and Carsten Olk (2013). [Slovak] Studia Philosophica Kantiana 1 (2015): 65-70. [M] [online]

Staiti, Andrea, ed. See: De Warren, Nicolas, and Andrea Staiti, eds.

Stan, Marius. “Kant and the Object of Determinate Experience.” Philosophers’ Imprint 15.33 (2015): 1-19. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: On an influential view, Newton's mechanics is built into Kant's very theory of exact knowledge. However, Newtonian dynamics had serious explanatory limits already known by 1750. Thus we might worry that Kant's Analytic is too narrow to ground enough exact knowledge. In this paper, I draw on Enlightenment dynamics to show that Kant's notion of determinate objecthood is sufficiently broad, non-trivial, and still relevant to the present.

Stang, Nicholas F. “Kant’s Argument that Existence is not a Determination.” Philosophy & Phenomenological Research 91.3 (2015): 583-626. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper, I examine Kant's famous objection to the ontological argument: existence is not a determination. Previous commentators have not adequately explained what this claim means, how it undermines the ontological argument, or how Kant argues for it. I argue that the claim that existence is not a determination means that it is not possible for there to be non-existent objects; necessarily, there are only existent objects. I argue further that Kant's target is not merely ontological arguments as such but the larger 'ontotheist' metaphysics they presuppose: the view that God necessarily exists in virtue of his essence being contained in, or logically entailed by, his essence. I show that the ontotheist explanation of divine necessity requires the assumption that existence is a determination, and I show that Descartes and Leibniz are implicitly committed to this in their published versions of the ontological argument. I consider the philosophical motivations for the claim that existence is a determination and then I examine Kant's arguments in the Critique of Pure Reason against it.

 ——. “Who’s Afraid of Double Affection?” Philosophers’ Imprint 15.18 (2015): 1-28. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: There is substantial textual evidence that Kant held the doctrine of double affection: subjects are causally affected both by things in themselves and by appearances. However, Kant commentators have been loath to attribute this view to him, for the doctrine of double affection is widely thought to face insuperable problems. I begin by explaining what I take to be the most serious problem faced by the doctrine of double affection: appearances cannot cause the very experience in virtue of which they have their empirical properties. My solution consists in distinguishing the sense of ‘experience’ in which empirical objects cause experience from the sense of ‘experience’ in which experience determines empirical objects. I call the latter “universal experience”. I develop my conception of universal experience, and then I explain how it solves the problem of double affection. I conclude by addressing several objections.

Stark, Werner. “Versuch eines summarischen und pointierten Berichts über die Vorlesungen von Immanuel Kant.” Kant’’s Lectures/Kants Vorlesungen. Eds. Bernd Dörflinger, et al. (op cit.). 1-30. [M]

 ——. “Amanuenses — Die engsten Vertrauten des Professors Immanuel Kant.” Euphorion: Zeitschrift für Literaturgeschichte 109.4 (2015): 473-511. [M]

 ——. “Mücken in der Wüste? Aus den Präliminarien zu Kant’s Vorlesungen über Physische Geographie.” Studi Kantiani 28 (2015): 117-48. [PW]

 ——. “Immanuel Kant’s On Pedagogy: A Lecture Like Any Other?” Reading Kant’s Lectures. Ed. Robert R. Clewis (op cit.). 259-76. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Original German publication: “Immanuel Kant Ueber Pädagogik: Eine Vorlesung wie jede andere?” Jahrbuch für historische Bildungsforschung 18 (2012): 147-68.

 ——. “Moraltheologie und Cosmologischer Beweis. Hinweise und Überlegungen zu einer übersehenen Reflexion von Immanuel Kant.” Kant and the Metaphors of Reason. Ed. Patricia Kauark-Leite, et al. (op cit.). 227-41. [M]

Stefanov, Anguel. Kant’s Conceptions of Space and Time and Contemporary Science. Montreal: Minkowski Institute Press, 2015. [ii, 120 p.] [WC]

Stellino, Paolo. “Kant and Nietzsche on Suicide.” Philosophical Inquiry 39.2 (2015): 79-104. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper aims to develop the antagonism between Kant’s and Nietzsche’s views of suicide by focusing particularly on the relation between morality and life. Whereas Kant establishes a primacy of morality over life and puts forward one main moral argument against the permissibility of suicide, Nietzsche reverses this hierarchical relation and gives to life a primacy over morality. The first two sections will be thus devoted to a critical examination of both positions, while in the third and last section the attention will be focused on the consequences deriving from such approaches. The paper will be concluded by proposing two essential conditions which in the author’s view should be met in order to begin working on a tenable Nietzschean defence of suicide.

Stephenson, Andrew. “Kant, the Paradox of Knowability, and the Meaning of ‘Experience’.” Philosophers’ Imprint 15.27 (2015): 1-19. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: It is often claimed that anti-realism is a form of transcendental idealism or that Kant is an anti-realist. It is also often claimed that anti-realists are committed to some form of knowability principle and that such principles have problematic consequences. It is therefore natural to ask whether Kant is so committed, and if he is, whether this leads him into difficulties. I argue that a standard reading of Kant does indeed have him committed to the claim that all empirical truths are knowable and that this claim entails that there is no empirical truth that is never known. I extend the result to a priori truths and draw some general philosophical lessons from this extension. However, I then propose a re-examination of Kant’s notion of experience according to which he carefully eschews any commitment to empirical knowability. Finally I respond to a remaining problem that stems from a weaker, justified believability principle.

 ——. “Kant on the Object-dependence of Intuition and Hallucination.” The Philosophical Quarterly 65.260 (2015): 486-508. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Against a view currently popular in the literature, it is argued that Kant was not a naïve realist about perceptual experience. Naive realism entails that perceptual experience is object-dependent in a very strong sense. In the first half of the paper, I explain what this claim amounts to and I undermine the evidence that has been marshalled in support of attributing it to Kant. In the second half of the paper, I explore in some detail Kant's account of hallucination and argue that no such account is available to someone who thinks that veridical perceptual experience is object-dependent in the naïve realist sense. Kant's theory provides for a remarkably sophisticated, bottom-up explanation of the phenomenal character of hallucinatory episodes and is crucial for gaining a proper understanding of his model of the mind and its place in nature.

Stern, Robert. Kantian Ethics: Value, Agency, and Obligation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. [x, 284 p.] [WC] [review]

 ——. “Round Kant or Through Him? On James’s Arguments for Fredom, and Their Relation to Kant’s.” Pragmatism, Kant, and Transcendental Philosophy. Eds. Gabriele Gava and Robert Stern (op cit.). 152-76??. [WC]

 ——. See: Gava, Gabriele, and Robert Stern.

 ——, ed. See: Gava, Gabriele, and Robert Stern, eds.

Sticker, Martin. “The Moral-Psychology of the Common Agent – A Reply to Ido Geiger.” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 23.5 (2015): 976-989. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Ido Geiger's paper ‘What it is the Use of the Universal Law Formula of the Categorical Imperative?’ is part of a growing trend in Kant scholarship, which stresses the significance of the rational competence of ordinary human beings. I argue that this approach needs to take into account that the common agent is an active reasoner who has the means to find out what she ought to do. The purpose of my paper is to show how universality already figures in the active reasoning of pre-theoretical agents in the form of a common universalization test. I present textual evidence for this test, and argue that this conception does not present pre-theoretical moral cognition in an overly intellectualistic or mechanistic way. Finally, I discuss how, on the pre-theoretical level, universalization relates to humanity or a rational agent's special status. Universalization is present to common agents in the form of procedures or questions that we ask ourselves, humanity as an awareness of certain particularly blatant violations of duty. These two different modes of cognition of duty are reflected in two different formulae of the Categorical Imperative.

 ——. “Educating the Common Agent: Kant on the Varieties of Moral Education.” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 97.3 (2015): 358-87. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: I discuss the relation between Kant’s trust in the rational capacities of ordinary agents and education. First, I show that Kant is very optimistic regarding our common moral capacities. Then I discuss what room this leaves for moral education. I argue that a discussion of Kant’s conception of moral education should distinguish between different functions of education: (i) education is necessary for agents to make the transition from a purely instrumental to a pure practical use of reason (Basic Education); (ii) education can strengthen the motivational force of the moral law by presenting the moral law in all its dignity and clarity (Motivational Education); (iii) education can instruct agents about the source of morality and offer an abstract formula of the Categorical Imperative (Philosophical Education); and (iv) education can enhance agents’ capacity to apply general moral principles to concrete cases (Education of Judgement).

 ——. Rev. of Kant’s Lectures on Anthropology: A Critical Guide, edited by Alix Cohen (2014). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (April 2015, #7). [M] [online]

 ——.  See: Ackeren, Marcel, and Martin Sticker.

Stevenson, Leslie. “Self-Knowledge in Kant and Sartre.” Comparing Kant and Sartre. Ed. Sorin Baiasu (op cit.). 115-31. [PW]

Stolzenberg, Jürgen, ed. See: Willaschek, Marcus, Jürgen Stolzenberg, Georg Mohr, and Stefano Bacin, eds.

Stoner, Samuel. Rev. of Kant and the Promise of Rhetoric, by Scott R. Stroud (2014). Kantian Review 20.3 (2015): 497-501. [PW]

Storrie, Stefan. “On Kant’s Knowledge of Leibniz’ Metaphysics—a Reply to Garber.” Philosophia 43.4 (2015): 1147-55. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Daniel Garber has put forward an argument that aims to show that Kant’s understanding of Leibniz’ metaphysics should be discounted because he could only have had access to a small and narrow sample of Leibniz’ works from around 1710–1714. In particular, Garber argues that as Kant could not have read Leibniz’ correspondence with Arnauld or his correspondence with Des Bosses he could not have had an adequate conception of Leibniz’ understanding of the relation between substance and body. I will show that Kant could have read some of the Arnauld correspondence and practically all of the Des Bosses correspondence, as well as a number of other related texts that are important for understanding Leibniz’ metaphysics, over a decade before writing the Critique of Pure Reason. Garber’s historical-textual argument for dismissing Kant’s account of Leibniz’ metaphysics is therefore seriously misleading.

Strathern, Paul. Kant en 90 minutos. [Spanish] Translated from the English by José A. Padilla Villate. Tres Cantos: Madrid Siglo XXI España, 2015. [92 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Original publication: Strathern, Kant in 90 minutes (Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1996).

Suárez, Luis Carlos. Rev. of La deducción trascendental y sus inéditos (1772-78), edited by Gonzalo Serrano Escallón (2014) and of Los años silenciosos de Kant by Fernando Moledo (2014). [Spanish] Con-Textos Kantianos 1 (2015): 263-66. [M] [online]

Sudakow, Andrej K. “Zwischen Herzensglauben und Vernunftfrömmigkeit: Wie Kant nicht zum Offenbarungsphilosophen geworden ist.” Vernunftreligion und Offenbarungsglaube. Eds. Norbert Fischer and Jakub Sirovátka (op cit.). 328-47. [M]

Sussman, David. “The Highest Good: Who Needs It?” The Highest Good in Aristotle and Kant. Eds. Joachim Aufderheide and Ralf M. Bader (op cit.). 214-28. [M]

Suzuki, Fumitaka. The Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant and his Theory of the Ego. Tokyo: Ibunsha, 2015. [110 p.] [WC]

Suzuki, Márcio. “Antropologia e estética na gênese do sistema kantiano.” [Portuguese; Anthropology and Esthetics in the Genesis of the Kantian System] Rev. of Kant, Lecciones de Antropología. Fragmentos de estética y antropología, translated by Manuel Sánchez Rodríguez (2015). Con-Textos Kantianos 2 (2015): 394-96. [M] [online]

 ——. “Kant acordou mesmo do sono dogmático?” [Portuguese; Did Kant really awaken from his dogmatic slumber?] Estudos Kantianos 3.2 (2015): 11-39. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In der bekannten Stelle der Vorrede zu den Prolegomena behauptet Kant, David Hume habe seinen dogmatischen Schlummer unterbrochen. Dieser Abschnitt wird oft gelesen als Kants Bekanntmachung seines endgültigen Heraustretens aus dem Dogmatismus, kann aber nicht recht verstanden werden ohne den dogmatischen Hintergrund, der diese Behauptung ermöglicht. Der vorliegende Artikel versucht, die „Schlaf-„ und „Traumlehre“ des Leibnizianismus zu rekonstruieren, um dem Sinn dieser Ansage Kants näherzukommen.

Svoboda, Toby. Duties Regarding Nature: a Kantian Environmental Ethic. New York/London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2015. [xiii, 171 p.] [WC]

Sweet, Kristi. “Kant and the Liberal Arts: A Defense.” The Journal of Aesthetic Education 49.3 (2015): 1-14. [JSTOR]

 ——. “Reply to Kate Moran & Stefano Bacin.” Critique (blog posted: 16 Jun 2015) n.p. [PW] [online]

Szczepański, Jakub. “Odpowiedź Kanta na pytanie: czym jest oświecenie?” [Polish; Kant's answer to the question: What is enlightenment?] Filozofia Oswiecenia: Radykalizm, Religia, Kosmopolityzm. Eds. Maciej Chmielinski, Justyna Miklaszewska, and Anna Tomaszewska (op cit.). 95-108??. [WC]

[top] T    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Tanzer, Mark. “Heidegger on Kant’s Definition of Being.” Journal of Philosophical Research 40 (2015): 357-68. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Heidegger’s 1927 lecture course, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, includes an examination of the Kantian conception of being as it appears within the first Critique’s refutation of the ontological proof of God’s existence. There, Heidegger maintains that the Kantian definition of being as position is beset with an ambiguity that Kant could not resolve, as such a resolution would require the repudiation of the traditional ontology of the subject that Kant presupposes. Heidegger then claims that his own ontology of Dasein, articulated in Being and Time, addresses the ambiguity in the Kantian position, and thus in Kantian being, through a phenomenology of the intentio/intentum relation—an analysis in which Heidegger attempts to move beyond the traditional ontology. Heidegger’s assessment of Kant, here, is characteristic of Heideggerian Kant-interpretation. That is, Heidegger typically views Kant as having pushed the traditional ontology to its limits, and then as having retreated from the radical implications of his own thought, due to his allegiance to that ontology. And in the context of his Kant-interpretations, Heidegger characterizes his own philosophical position as resulting from the pursuit of these radical implications of Kantian thought.

Taraborrelli, Angela. Rev. of Kant and Cosmopolitanism: The Philosophical Ideal of World Citizenship, by Pauline Kleingeld (2011). Kant-Studien 106.4 (2015): 703-7. [PW]

Telegdi-Csetri, Aron. “Kant’s World-State-Ideal and its Provisional Surrogates.” Cosmopolitanism without Foundations. Eds. Tamara Caraus and Dan Lazea (Bowling Green: Philosophy Documentation Center, 2015). 43-65. [PW]

Terra, Ricardo Ribeiro. “1784 — une année extraordinaire.” Kant, la raison pratique: concepts et héritages. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Margit Ruffing, and Ricardo Ribeiro Terra (op cit.). 335-41. [M]

 ——. “Transformações na filosofia da história kantiana na década de 1780.” [Portuguese] Crítica y metafísica: Homenaje a Mario Caimi. Ed. Claudia Jáuregui, et al. (op cit.). 376-88. [M]

 ——, ed. See: Grapotte, Sophie,  Margit Ruffing, and Ricardo Ribeiro Terra, eds.

Teruel, Pedro Jesús. “Zur Wurzel des Bösen. Das Problem der Erbsünde zwischen geoffenbarter Religion und Vernunft, von Kant und Schelling bis Freud: ein Versöhnungsvorschlag.” Vernunftreligion und Offenbarungsglaube. Eds. Norbert Fischer and Jakub Sirovátka (op cit.). 421-41. [M]

Tester, Steven. Rev. of Kant and Rational Psychology, by Corey W. Dyck (2014). British Journal for the History of Philosophy 23.1 (2015): 205-7. [PW]

Theis, Robert. “Doktrinaler Glaube und metaphysischer Diskurs bei Kant.” Perspektiven der Philosophie 41 (2015): 139-75. [PW]

 ——. Rev. of Immanuel Kant, Der einzig mögliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes, edited by Lothar Kreimendahl and Michael Oberhausen (2011). Kant-Studien 106.1 (2015): 148-55. [PW]

Theodorou, Panos. “Kant’s Analyticity: A Historico-Phenomenological Revisiting and Restatement (For All).” Kant Studies Online (2015): 204-50; posted November 9, 2015. [M] [pdf]

Thiel, Udo. “Unities of the Self: From Kant to Locke.” Kant Yearbook: Kant and Empiricism 6 (2015): 139-66. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper re-evaluates the relation between Kant and some of the most important philosophers traditionally labelled ‘empiricists’ on the topic of the unity of the self. Although Kant was familiar with at least some of the writings of the philosophers dealt with here, this paper’s concern is not with the question of influence or development, but with systematic aspects of Kant’s relation to the empiricist tradition. It is argued that Kant’s relationship to empiricist thought on this issue is more complex than one might be tempted to think. There are several different notions of unity within the empiricist tradition. Moreover, the philosophers considered here, thinkers as diverse as Locke, Condillac, Hume, Feder, Priestley, Reid and Tetens, work with more than one notion of the unity of the self, as does Kant. Locke’s contribution at the beginning of early modern thought about unity turns out to be closer to Kant’s account than that of other empiricists in that Kant develops further the Lockean idea of consciousness as a unifying activity. In general terms Kant’s account can be seen as continuous with the debate about unity among empiricist thinkers, it does not constitute a simple break with that tradition.

Thielke, Peter. “To Have and to Hold: Intelligible Possession and Kant’s Idealism.” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 23.3 (2015): 502-23. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: While the debate about whether Kant's idealism requires a ‘Two Worlds’ or ‘Two Aspect’ interpretation has reached a seeming impasse, I argue that the account of intelligible possession found in the ‘Doctrine of Right’ provides novel and compelling evidence in favour of an epistemic ‘Two Aspect’ reading of Kant's position.

 ——. “Turnabout is Fair Play: A New Humean Response in the Old Debate with Kant.” Hume Studies 41.2 (2015): 263-88. [MUSE]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant claims that Hume failed to see that mathematics provides us with synthetic a priori knowledge; had he done so, Kant argues, Hume would have to admit the possibility of such knowledge in causal judgments as well. Instead, Kant insists that Hume treats mathematics as analytic, and so missed the key insights of the Critical philosophy. I argue that it is rather Kant who is mistaken: Hume, in fact, endorses a position very similar to the view that mathematics is synthetic and a priori, and arrives at an account of mathematical necessity that stands as a plausible alternative to Kant's. More importantly, recognizing this Humean account of mathematics exposes a potentially grave vulnerability in Kant's system that Hume might exploit: while mathematics can be seen as synthetic a priori knowledge, Hume can argue that this gives us good reason to think that causal judgments cannot meet this standard of necessity.

Thisted, Marcos A. “Sagesse et métaphysique dans les Progrès de la métaphysique.” Kant, la raison pratique: concepts et héritages. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Margit Ruffing, and Ricardo Ribeiro Terra (op cit.). 243-51. [M]

 ——. “La Weisheitslehre en los Fortschritte der Metaphysik.” Crítica y metafísica: Homenaje a Mario Caimi. Ed. Claudia Jáuregui, et al. (op cit.). 389-402. [M]

Thorpe, Lucas. The Kant Dictionary. London/New York: Bloomsbury, 2015. [viii, 240 p.] [WC]

Tilliette, Xavier. Untersuchungen über die intellektuelle Anschauung von Kant bis Hegel. Edited by Lisa Egloff und Katia Hay; translated from the French by Susanne Schaper. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 2015. [x, 473 p.] [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Volume 26 of Schellingiana (Walter E. Ehrhardt and Jochem Hennigfeld, general editors).

Timmermann, Jens. “Mrongovius II: a Supplement to the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals.” Kant’s Lectures on Ethics: A Critical Guide. Eds. Denis, Lara, and Oliver Sensen. (op cit.). 68-83. [M]

 ——. “Kant – konserwatysta czy radykał?” [Polish; Kant – conservative or radical?] Filozofia Oswiecenia: Radykalizm, Religia, Kosmopolityzm. Eds. Maciej Chmielinski, Justyna Miklaszewska, and Anna Tomaszewska (op cit.). 443-55??. [WC]

 ——. “Why Some Things Must Remain Unknown: Kant on Faith, Moral Motivation, and the Highest Good.” The Highest Good in Aristotle and Kant. Eds. Joachim Aufderheide and Ralf M. Bader (op cit.). 229-42??. [PW]

Timmons, Mark, and Robert N. Johnson. Reason, Value, and Respect: Kantian Themes from the Philosophy of Thomas E. Hill, Jr.. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. [viii, 311 p.] [M] [review]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Includes a bibliography of Hill’s publications (pp. 297-302), and essays by Bernard Boxill and Jan Boxill, Robin S. Dillon, Stephen Darwall, Mark Schroeder, Jonathan Dancy, Onora O’Neill, Gerald Gaus, Jeffrie G. Murphy, Matt Zwolinski and David Schmidtz, Cheshire Calhoun, Marcia Baron, Andrews Reath, Julia Driver, and Thomas E. Hill, Jr.

 ——. See: Smit, Houston, and Mark Timmons.

Tinguely, Joseph. “The Implicit Affection Between Kantian Judgment and Aristotelian Rhetoric.” Philosophy & Rhetoric 48.1 (2015): 1-25. [JSTOR]

Tokarzewska, Monika. Rettung vor Bodenlosigkeit: Neues Anfangsdenken und Kosmologische Metaphern bei Locke, Leibniz, Kant, Fichte, Novalis und Jean Paul. Frankfurt/Main: Peter Lang, 2015. [315 p.] [WC]

Tolley, Clinton. Rev. of Kant’s Elliptical Path, by Karl Ameriks (2012). Philosophical Review 124.4 (2015): 578-82. [PW]

Tomasi, Gabriele. “Self-knowledge as religious experience. On an aspect of Kant's conception of the vocation of human beings.”  Anuario Filosofico 48.3 (2015): 515-41. [MUSE]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper, I will deal with an aspect of Kant’s conception of our vocation (Bestimmung). I will argue that the way Kant conceives of our “higher” vocation, namely in terms of a vocation to moral self-legislation, allows for a religious experience of ourselves and in ourselves. In understanding herself in relation to the holiness of her pure will, a person might have a religious experience of herself, conceiving of her duties as divine commands, whilst also in a sense experiencing God in herself — in her personality.

Tomassini, Fiorella. “La crítica de Kant al eudemonismo político en Über den Gemeinspruch das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, aber taugt nicht für die Praxis.” [Spanish; Kant’s Critique of Political Eudaimonism in Über den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, aber taugt nicht für die Praxis] Ideas y Valores 64.158 (2015): 107-22. [PW] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant’s position on the link between law and the natural impulse toward happiness is examined. If the State is established to satisfy particular ends, the result is a justification of despotism and popular rebellion. Two hypotheses are given: a) the principle of happiness should be replaced by the idea of a general legislative will as the only normative-evaluative criterion for the legitimacy of political obligation; and b) this juridic principle a priori requires the sovereign and the people to adopt the perspective of general will to judge the prevailing political power.

Tomaszewska, Anna. “Spinoza’s God in Kant’s Pre-Critical Writings: An Attempt at Localizing the ‘Threat’.” Kant Studies Online (2015): 65-102; September 1, 2015. [M] [pdf]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The paper discusses Kant’s pre-critical ‘possibility proof’ for the existence of God against a background of recent reinterpretations of this argument, which point at Spinozist consequences for Kant’s conception of God that can follow from the ‘proof’ (O. Boehm, A.Chignell). I contend that, in the light of textual evidence, attributing a Spinozist conception of God to the pre-critical Kant would misrepresent his view. However, while he would never openly subscribe to Spinozism, Kant seems to be well aware, especially in the critical period, that the dogmatic metaphysics he endorsed before the ‘Copernican revolution’ was under a Spinozist ‘threat.’ In this paper I attempt to find out what the source of the ‘threat’ might be and I reach a conclusion that the potential for Spinozism contained in Kant’s pre-critical metaphysics derives from his account of the divine grounding of possibilities, on some plausible accounts of grounding, and in particular from the incompatibility between his conception of spatial extension as one of the basic features of reality and the divine nature that is supposed to ‘ground’ the basic properties of reality and their consequences.

 ——. “Bóg Spinozy w pismach przedkrytycznych Kanta.” [Polish; Spinoza's god in Kant's pre-critical writings] Filozofia Oswiecenia: Radykalizm, Religia, Kosmopolityzm. Eds. Maciej Chmielinski, Justyna Miklaszewska, and Anna Tomaszewska (op cit.). 305-29??. [WC]

 ——. See: Head, Jonathan, Anna Tomaszewska, Jochen Bojanowski, Alberto Vanzo, and Sorin Baiasu.

 ——, ed. See: Chmielinski, Maciej, Justyna Miklaszewska, and Anna Tomaszewska, eds.

Tommasi, Francesco Valerio. “(La raison pratique, analogon de la raison théorique. Ou vice versa?” Kant, la raison pratique: concepts et héritages. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Margit Ruffing, and Ricardo Ribeiro Terra (op cit.). 253-61. [M]

 ——. Rev. of Kant’s Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason: A Critical Guide, edited by Gordon Michalson (2014). [Italian] Con-Textos Kantianos 1 (2015): 323-28. [M] [online]

Torkler, René. Philosophische Bildung und politische Urteilskraft. Hannah Arendts Kant-Rezeption und ihre didaktische Bedeutung. Freiburg: Verlag Karl Alber, 2015. [488 p.] [WC]

Tourinho Peres, Daniel. “La philosophie kantienne de l’histoire entre la rhétorique et la connaissance objective.” Kant, la raison pratique: concepts et héritages. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Margit Ruffing, and Ricardo Ribeiro Terra (op cit.). 343-51. [M]

Tredanaro, Emanuele. “A Revolução em Kant: uma questão de erro(s).” [Portuguese; The Revolution in Kant: a matter of errors] Kant e-Prints 10.1 (2015): 94-112. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The aim of this paper is to underline the common denominator of texts of different nature and dating, concerning Kant’s position about the need to found a priori the philosophy of history and, especially, the philosophy of law and politics. This need exceeds theoretical dimension and is reflected directly in the configuration of civil organization. In particular, this paper tries to show how this issue closely interacts with the right to resistance, which becomes an useful reading key to highlight the articulations of Kantian point of view within this specific area of practical philosophy. Through the examination of the debate about the right to resistance, revitalized by revolutionary events of that age, the perspective of Kantian analysis reveals all its coherence, because of its inseparability from a political judgment on the events contemporary to Kant, political judgment which is firm and enlightened at the same time. So, on the one hand, Kant’s opposition to the silent observance to the existing legal and political relations, which guarantees a peaceful well-being, is justified, but this observance, asking in return the silence of reason, stops any progress that goes beyond a simple passive perpetuation of a people during time; on the other hand, the reasons why Kant cannot yield to temptations of an easy enthusiasm are meanwhile explained. Giving up this balanced critical position is the theoretical mistake that causes political mistakes. For this purpose, on the basis of the analysis of the observations about French Revolution – present in Kantian thought since 1789 and whose function remains unchanged all through the 90s – this paper will cover some central steps of Kant's legal and political reflection, indicating the specificity of each of them and, at the same time, their fundamental coherence.

Trevisan, Diego Kosbiau. “L’influence du droit dans la genèse de la philosophie morale critique de Kant.” Kant, la raison pratique: concepts et héritages. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Margit Ruffing, and Ricardo Ribeiro Terra (op cit.). 353-61. [M]

Trivisonno, Alexandre Travessoni Gomes. “Kant’s Republicanism.” Kant’s Theory of Law. Eds. Jean-Christophe Merle and Alexandre Travessoni Gomes Trivisonno (op cit.). 119-38. [M]

 ——, ed. See: Merle, Jean-Christophe, and Alexandre Travessoni Gomes Trivisonno, eds.

Trullinger, Joseph. “Kant’s Neglected Account of the Virtuous Solitary.” International Philosophical Quarterly 55.1 (2015): 67-83. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper I analyze the importance of Kant’s account of principled solitude at the end of § 29 of the Third Critique. The scant attention paid to this passage by the scholarship has mistaken it to mean that solitude is a misanthropic attitude, a misreading that serves a prevailing interpretation that Kant elevates communal interaction as the solution to moral turpitude. In reality, Kant holds that solitude can afford an individual liberation from the competitive obsession with others that characterizes vice. Whereas misanthropic recluses withdraw from society out of hatred, fear, or indifference toward people, the virtuous solitary withdraws from their company in order to acquire a morally principled attitude of self-possession. By carefully delineating the development of this view in Kant’s lectures and critical works, as well as by laying out the essence of Kant’s notions of philanthropy and misanthropy, I construct an account of how solitude can perform this philanthropic function.

 ——. “Kant’s Endorsement of the Fear of God.” Rethinking Kant: Volume 4. Eds. Pablo Muchnik and Oliver Thorndike (op cit.). 183-202. [WC]

 ——. Rev. of Kant and the Meaning of Religion, by Terry F. Godlove (2014). The Review of Politics 77.3 (2015): 478-80. [PW]

Tuppini, Tommaso. “La Metafora, la Libertà: Kant, Derrida e il Tono della Filosofia.” [Italian] Kant and the Metaphors of Reason. Ed. Patricia Kauark-Leite, et al. (op cit.). 547-60. [M]

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Ugarte, Oscar. Rev. of Die „wahre Republik“ und das „Bündel von Kompromissen“: Die Staatsphilosophie Immanuel Kants im Vergleich mit der Theorie des amerikanischen Federalist, by Cora Wawrzinek (2009). Kant-Studien 106.1 (2015): 130-34. [PW]

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Valagussa, Francesco. “Kant. Il trascendentale e l’armonia delle facoltà.” [Italian; Kant. The Transcendental and the Harmony of Faculties] Con-Textos Kantianos 2 (2015): 72-85. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Starting from Simmel’s analysis of the criticism, we can say that Kant has broken the harmony between being and thinking from a metaphysical point of view and the harmony between happiness and virtue concerning the moral point of view. It does not mean that Kant left definitely a theory of the system of our faculties, rather he focuses on this problem, thinking about it as a task. In this sense the Critique of Judgement could be read as the attempt to knot again these broken wires: in this context the nature plays a leading role. The nature is no more an object subjected to the legislation of our intellect, rather the nature gives the rule to the art.

Vanden Auweele, Dennis. “Kant on Religious Moral Education.” Kantian Review 20.3 (2015): 373-94. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: While scholars are slowly coming to realize that Kant’s moral philosophy has a distinctive theory of moral education, the import of religion in such education is generally neglected or even denied. This essay argues that Kant’s reflections on religion in parts II and III of Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason interpret religion specifically as one aspect of moral education, namely moral ascetics. After first clearly distinguishing between a cognitive and a conative aspect of moral education, I show how certain historical religious practices serve to provide the conative aspect of moral education. Kant defines this aspect of moral education as practices that render the human agent ‘valiant and cheerful in fulfilling his duties’ (MS, 6: 484). By this it is meant that certain practices can inspire moral interests either by justifying rational hope in living up to a certain standard of moral perfection (Christology) or by endeavouring to unite human beings in a universal, invisible ethical community that inspires cooperation rather than adversity (ecclesiology).

Vandenabeele, Bart. “The Sublime in Art: Kant, the Mannerist, and the Matterist Sublime.” The Journal of Aesthetic Education 49.3 (2015): 32-49. [JSTOR]

Vanzo, Alberto. See: Head, Jonathan, Anna Tomaszewska, Jochen Bojanowski, Alberto Vanzo, and Sorin Baiasu.

Varden, Helga. “Immanuel Kant – Justice as Freedom.” Contemporary Philosophy: A New Survey, vol. 12: Philosophy of Justice. Ed. Guttorm Fløstad (Dordrecht: Springer 2015). 213-37. [WC]

Vázquez Lobeiras, María Jesús. “Warum sind die Logikvorlesungen Kants interessant?” Kant’’s Lectures/Kants Vorlesungen. Eds. Bernd Dörflinger, et al. (op cit.). 33-46. [M]

 ——. “Die Vernunft und die parteiischen Richter.” Kant and the Metaphors of Reason. Ed. Patricia Kauark-Leite, et al. (op cit.). 121-36. [M]

 ——. “Juicio, conciencia y autoconciencia en el pensamiento de Immanuel Kant.” [Spanish] Crítica y metafísica: Homenaje a Mario Caimi. Ed. Claudia Jáuregui, et al. (op cit.). 403-26. [M]

Verneaux, Roger. Les sources cartésiennes et kantiennes de l’idéalisme Français. Paris: Beauchesne, 2015. [526 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Facsimile of the 1936 1st edition.

Vidal, Marciano. “Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). La Ética crítica paralos nuevos tiempos.” [Spanish] Moralia 38.146-47 (2015): 127-78. [ASP]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In line with his recent work on the history of moral thought, the author introduces the critical philosophy of Immanuel Kant, whose contributions marked a turning point in the understanding of morality. After an introduction to Kant's ethical system, the paper points out some general perspectives on Kant's thought about religion. It also provides an overview of Christian reactions to the proposals of the Enlightenment's greatest thinker.

Vigo, Alejandro G. “Kategoriale Synthesis und Einheit des Bewusstseins. Zu Kants Lehre vom Verhältnis zwischen Wahrnehmung und Erfahrung.” Urteil und Erfahrung: Kants Theorie der Erfahrung. Ed. Rainer Enskat (op cit.). 169-99. [M]

Vilhena de Paiva, Gustavo Barreto. “Transcendentes ou transcendentais? Um ensaio sobre Kant e o erro dos escolásticos.” [Portuguese; Transcendents or transcendentals? An essay on Kant and the Scholastics’ mistake] Cadernos de Filosofia Alemã: Crítica e Modernidade 20.2 (2015): 179-200. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The term “transcendental” has been of fundamental importance to the discussions produced in the many fields of Contemporary Philosophy. This is mostly due to the fact that Kant’s philosophy has been the undeniable and constant reference to authors from the 19th to the 21st century. Hence is derived the problematic projection of the notion of “transcendental” over the philosophy of medieval scholastic authors. Although the latter would use the term “transcendent”, they did not even know the term “transcendental”. The confusion of both could not be any more harmful to the reading of medieval authors.

Villarán, Alonso. “Overcoming the Problems of Heteronomy and Derivation in Kant’s Idea of the Highest Good.” Philosophical Forum 46.3 (2015): 287-306. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article explores heteronomy and derivation problems over philosopher Immanuel Kant's idea of the highest good, which occupies a pivotal place in the German philosopher's works like Critique of Pure Reason and Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. Topics discussed include concerns over the ethical status of Kant's highest good as started by the Beck-Silber controversy and Kant's view of the highest good as the determining ground of the will.

Villaverde López, Guillermo. Rev. of The Faculties of the Human Mind and the Case of Moral Feeling in Kant’s Philosophy, by Antonino Falduto (2014). [Spanish] Con-Textos Kantianos 2 (2015): 406-14. [M] [online]

Villinger, Rahel. Rev. of Poetic Force: Poetry After Kant, by Kevin McLaughlin (2014). Kant Studies Online (2015): 132-48. [M] [online]

Vinci, Thomas. Space, Geometry and Kant’s Transcendental Deduction of the Categories. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. [xii, 251 p.] [WC] [review]

 ——. “Wayne Waxman’s Kant’s Anatomy of the Intelligent Mind.” Kantian Review 20.1 (2015): 121-32. [PW]

Visser, Alnica. “The Original Analytic/Synthetic Distinction: Still no cause for concern.” South African Journal of Philosophy 34.3 (2015): 271-78. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In her 2007 survey of the topic, Gillian Russell stipulates five criteria that any adequate account of the analytic/synthetic distinction must meet. These criteria include the charge that the distinction must provide an account of the objects of the distinction, render the distinction non-trivial, explain why analytic truths are necessary and a priori, explain away our intuitions regarding some apparently contingent analytic truths, and finally explain why some truths that are true in virtue of meaning alone fail to seem analytic. In this paper I argue that a species-genus hierarchy interpretation of Kant's version of the distinction can meet all five these criteria. I argue further that Kant's distinction provides an interesting escape from Quine's charge that the distinction relies implicitly on a vicious circularity. The aim of this paper is to showcase the continuing strength of Kant's presentation of the distinction, despite the widespread contemporary charges of obscurity.

Völker, Jan. “The I think and Its Imaginary Unity.” Filozofski vestnik (Ljubljana) 36.2 (2015): 199-220. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Starting from the question of what it means to read Kant today, the article first considers the transcendental apparatus as causing three problems: that of its change, that of its origin, and that of its unity. The problem of the unity of thought is then referred to the unity of the I think in Kant’s philosophy, a unity that proves to be the fulfilment of its own imaginary. It is Heidegger who grounds his interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason on the imagination, but he thereby stabilises the I think into a moment of being. Adorno then again takes the I think to be a figure of being, and loses the instability of the I think as a void point in the subject. It is in the moment of these excessive over-interpretations that a moment in Kant can be found that is in itself excessive and unsatisfied.

Volpato Dutra, Delamar José. “Dworkin on Abortion: Rights or Intrinsic Value?” Morality and Life: Kantian Perspectives in Bioethics. Eds. Darlei Dall’Agnol and Milene Consenso Tonetto (op cit.). 165-78. [M]

Von der Pfordten, Dietmar. “Kant on the Right of Resistance.” Kant’s Theory of Law. Eds. Jean-Christophe Merle and Alexandre Travessoni Gomes Trivisonno (op cit.). 101-18. [M]

Voss, Daniela. “Maimon, Kant, Deleuze: The Concepts of Difference and Intensive Magnitude.” At the Edges of Thought: Deleuze and Post-Kantian Philosophy. Eds. Craig Lundy and Daniela Voss (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015). 60-84. [WC/JSTOR]

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Waibel, Violetta L., ed. Umwege: Annäherungen an Immanuel Kant in Wien, in Österreich und in Osteuropa. In collaboration with Max Brinnich, Sophie Gerber, and Philipp Schaller. Göttingen: Verlag V&R, 2015. [647 p.] [WC][Table of Contents: English/German]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Also published in English as Detours: Approaches to Immanuel Kant in Vienna, in Austria, and in Eastern Europe. This is an expanded reader for the exhibition in the University of Vienna library that coincided with the 12th International Kant Congress (September 21-25, 2015). The readings concern six areas: Kant and Censorship, Kant and Karl Leonhard Reinhold, Kant and Eastern Europe, Kant and his Poets, Kant and the Vienna Circle, and Kant and Phenomenology.

Walla, Alice Pinheiro. “Kant's Moral Theory and Demandingness.” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18.4 (2015): 731-43. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper, I sketch a Kantian account of duties of rescue, which I take to be compatible with Kant's theory. I argue that there is in fact no 'trumping relation' between imperfect and perfect duties but merely that 'latitude shrinks away' in certain circumstances. Against possible demandingness objections, I explain why Kant thought that imperfect duty must allow latitude for choice and argue that we must understand the necessary space for pursuing one's own happiness as entailed by Kant's justification of one's duty to promote other's happiness. Nevertheless, becoming worthy of happiness has always priority over one's own happiness, even when circumstances are such that we cannot secure our own happiness without seriously neglecting more pressing needs of other persons. I conclude that Kant's moral theory calls for complementation by the political and juridical domain. Implementing just political institutions and creating satisfactorily well-ordered societies create an external world which is friendlier to our attempts to reconcile moral integrity and a happy human life.

 ——. “When the strictest right is the greatest wrong: Kant on Fairness.” Estudos Kantianos 3.1 (2015): 39-55. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper, I put forward an interpretation of the Kantian state that offers an alternative to the traditional minimalist and to recent welfare interpretations of the Kantian state. I show that although the Kantian state has no duty to redistribute, Kant’s conception of equity or fairness (Billigkeit, MS RL VI: 234) allows the state to recognize redistribution as belonging to the ideal republic (republica noumenon), towards which all states have a non-coercible obligation to strive. I back up my interpretation with passages of the Metaphysics of Morals and of Kant’s lectures in which Kant questions the character of the duty of beneficence as a meritorious duty, given the fact that need is often the result of previous injustice of governments. The problem is that although the destitute have a right to collective aid, unlike strict right, these rights cannot be juridically enforced. This has led to the wrong conclusion that the state or the supreme commander has a duty of virtue towards its subjects and that the poor have no right to aid.

Walton, Roberto J. “La articulación kantiana de la fenomenología de Husserl.” [Spanish] Crítica y metafísica: Homenaje a Mario Caimi. Ed. Claudia Jáuregui, et al. (op cit.). 427-50. [M]

Wang, Kui. Kang de lun mei de Yan yi. [Chinese; Kant on the interpretation of the United States] Beijing: Jing ji ke xue chu ban she, 2015. [146 p.] [WC]

Ware, Owen. “Accessing the Moral Law through Feeling.” Kantian Review 20.2 (2015): 301-11. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this article I offer a critical commentary on Jeanine Grenberg’s claim that, by the time of the second Critique, Kant was committed to the view that we only access the moral law’s validity through the feeling of respect. The issue turns on how we understand Kant’s assertion that our consciousness of the moral law is a ‘fact of reason’. Grenberg argues that all facts must be forced, and anything forced must be felt. I defend an alternative interpretation, according to which the fact of reason refers to the actuality of our moral consciousness.

Warren, Daniel. “Kant on Substance-Accident Relation and the Thinking Subject.” Rethinking Kant: Volume 4. Eds. Pablo Muchnik and Oliver Thorndike (op cit.). 35-54. [WC]

Wendland, Aaron James, and Rafael Winkler. “Hegel’s Critique of Kant.” South African Journal of Philosophy 34.1 (2015): 129-42. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper we present a reconstruction of Hegel's critique of Kant. We try to show the congruence of that critique in both theoretical and practical philosophy. We argue that this congruence is to be found in Hegel's criticism of Kant's hylemorphism in his theoretical and practical philosophy. Hegel is much more sympathetic to Kant's response to the distinction between matter and form in his theoretical philosophy and he credits Kant with ‘discovering’ here that thinking is an activity that always takes place within a greater whole. He, however, argues that the consequences of this are much more significant than Kant suspects and that, most importantly, the model of cognition in which thought (form) confronts something non-thought (matter) is unsustainable. This leads to Hegel's appropriation of Kantian reflective judgements, arguing that the greater whole in which thinking takes place is a socially shared set of meanings, something resembling what Kant calls a sensus communis. From here, it is not far to Hegel's Geist, which eventually gains self-consciousness in Sittlichkeit, a whole of social practices of mutual recognition. In practical philosophy, Hegel argues for the importance of situating oneself within such a whole in order to attain the self-knowledge required for autonomous, or ethically required, action. For this to happen, he claims, it is necessary to recognise the status of Kantian Moralität as a form of Sittlichkeit or social practice. This would justify our practices without an appeal to a ‘fact of reason’ and also allow a wider range of actions that could count as autonomous.

Westerholm, Martin. “Kant’s Critique and Contemporary Theology.” Modern Theology 31.3 (2015): 403-27. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article looks at an inquiry from American philosopher Nicholas Wolterstorff on whether it is possible and desirable for theologians to recover from German philosopher Immanuel Kant. Topics covered include the distinction between metaphysical and Christological approaches to Christian dogmatics, the concept of second-wave Kantianism, and a discussion on transcendental realism and transcendental idealism.

Westphal, Kenneth R. “Vernunftkritik, Moralkonstruktivismus and Besitzrecht bei Kant.” Kant’s Theory of Law. Eds. Jean-Christophe Merle and Alexandre Travessoni Gomes Trivisonno (op cit.). 57-100. [M]

 ——. “Oświecenie, rozum i uniwersalizm: intuicje krytyczne Kanta.” [Polish;; Enlightenment, reason, and universalism: Kant's critical intuitions] Filozofia Oswiecenia: Radykalizm, Religia, Kosmopolityzm. Eds. Maciej Chmielinski, Justyna Miklaszewska, and Anna Tomaszewska (op cit.). 456-84??. [WC]

 ——. “Hegel’s Pragmatic Critique and Reconstruction of Kant’s System of Principles in the 1807 Phenomenology of Spirit.” Hegel Bulletin 36.2 (2015): 159-83. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Peirce's study of Kant, and later of Hegel, and Dewey's (1930) retention of much of Hegel's social philosophy are recognised idealist sources of pragmatism. Here I argue that the transition from idealism to pragmatic realism was already achieved by Hegel. Hegel's ‘Objective Logic’ corresponds in part to Kant's ‘Transcendental Logic’ (WdL, GW 21:47.1-3). Hegel faults Kant for relegating concepts of reflection to an Appendix to his Transcendental Logic (WdL, GW 12:19.34-38), and for treating reason as ‘only dialectical’ and as ‘merely regulative’ (WdL, GW 12:23.12, .16-17). I present three important yet neglected features of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason which are key enthymemes undergirding Hegel's critical reconstruction of Kant's Critical philosophy (§2). I then summarise some features of the philosophical context within which Hegel begins to re-assess and reconstruct Kant's Transcendental Logic (§3), and review several key steps in this direction Hegel undertook in the 1807 Phenomenology (§4). (A related paper extends these results to Hegel's Logic and Encyclopaedia.) These points show that Hegel's reanalysis of Kant's Critical philosophy is the first and still one of the most sophisticated and adequate pragmatic — specifically pragmatic realist — accounts of the a priori.

Westra, Adam. “Kritik ist Pflicht: La dimension éthique de la Critique de la raison pure.” Kant, la raison pratique: concepts et héritages. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Margit Ruffing, and Ricardo Ribeiro Terra (op cit.). 263-71. [M]

Wicks, Robert. “The Divine Inspiration for Kant’s Formalist Theory of Beauty.” Kant Studies Online (2015): 1-31; posted January 23, 2015. [M][pdf]

Wiedner, Manfred. Selbstbestimmtes Subjekt? Über Fördermöglichkeiten und Gefährdungen Menschlicher Selbstbestimmung nach Immanuel Kant. Berlin: Logos Verlag, 2015. [131 p.] [WC]

Wiegerling, Klaus. Rev. of Zwischen Bild und Begriff – Kant und Herder zum Schema, edited by Ulrich Gaier and Ralf Simon (2010). Kant-Studien 106.2 (2015): 335-38. [PW]

Wierzbicka, Anna. “Can There be Common Knowledge Without a Common Language?: German Pflicht versus English Duty.” Common Knowledge 21.1 (2014): 141-71. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This essay argues that, since Kant wrote in German and since German has no word for “right” corresponding in meaning to the English word, it is a case of conceptual anglocentrism to say, as many anglophone philosophers do, that Kant reformulated the foundations of ethics by formulating them in terms of the “right” rather than the “good.” Further, the essay shows how the German word Pflicht, central to Kant's ethics, does not correspond in meaning to the English word duty, whose cultural roots lie in English Puritanism. More generally, the argument is that, ultimately, “common knowledge” is possible only to the extent to which it can be stated in words corresponding to universal human concepts — a set of which has been identified through empirical cross-linguistic investigations — rather than in words whose meanings have been shaped by a particular history and culture. Finally, the essay shows how “NSM” methodology, developed within linguistic semantics, allows us to cast new light on aspects of German culture reflected in keywords such as Ordnung, Gehorsam, Befehl, and Pflicht — terms that appear to be anchored in the legacy of Luther and Kant.

Wildenauer, Miriam. “Wie neue Kommunikationstechnologien zur Verwirklichung von Kants Idee öffentlichen Rechts beitragen können.” Kant-Studien 106.3 (2015): 461-86. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The later Kant (1797/98) believed that he had solved the highest problem of humankind, namely, how a society should be constituted by law so that the freedom of each one of its members is maximized under the law and an irresistible power is instituted by law to protect the freedoms of its members (I). The core of his solution is his threefold idea of public law: 1. the constitutional law of the state; 2. public international law; and 3. cosmopolitan law (II). In order to solve this problem epistemologically and to implement it through action, Kant offers two transcendental principles of public law (II and III). Today, modern communication technologies might help us to further realize Kant’s idea of public law (IV).

Willaschek, Marcus. “The Sensibility of Human Intuition: Kant’s Causal Condition on Accounts of Representation.” Urteil und Erfahrung: Kants Theorie der Erfahrung. Ed. Rainer Enskat (op cit.). 129-49. [M]

 ——. “Kant and Peirce on Belief.” Pragmatism, Kant, and Transcendental Philosophy. Eds. Gabriele Gava and Robert Stern (op cit.). 133-51??. [WC]

 ——, Jürgen Stolzenberg, Georg Mohr, and Stefano Bacin, eds. Kant-Lexikon. 3 vols. Berlin / Boston: Walter de Gruyter, 2015. [xiv, 2880 p.] [M]

Williams, Howard. “Oświeceniowa krytyka Dialektyki oświecenia.” [Polish] Filozofia Oswiecenia: Radykalizm, Religia, Kosmopolityzm. Eds. Maciej Chmielinski, Justyna Miklaszewska, and Anna Tomaszewska (op cit.). 109-24??. [WC]

 ——. Rev. of Global Justice, Kant and the Responsibility to Protect: A Provisional Duty, by Heather M. Roff (2013). Kantian Review 20.1 (2015): 166-70. [PI]

 ——, and Lorena Cebolla. “El concepto kantiano de propiedad.” [Spanish; Kant’s Concept of Property] Con-Textos Kantianos 2 (2015): 347-59. [M] [online]

Williamson, Diane. Kant’s Theory of Emotion: Emotional Universalism. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. [x, 279 p.] [WC]

 ——. “What Can I Hope about the Earth’s Future Climate? Affective Resources for Overcoming Intergenerational Distance, Kantian and Otherwise.” Moral Philosophy and Politics 2.1 (2014): 57-82. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: While climate change involves spatial, epistemological, social, and temporal remoteness, each type of distance can be bridged with strategies unique to it that can be borrowed from analogous moral problems. Temporal, or intergenerational, distance may actually be a motivational resource if we look at our natural feelings of hope for the future of the world, via Kant’s theory of political history, and for our children. Kant’s theory of hope also provides some basis for including future generations in a theory of justice.

Wilson, Donald. “Norms of Truthfulness and Non-Deception in Kantian Ethics.” Rethinking Kant: Volume 4. Eds. Pablo Muchnik and Oliver Thorndike (op cit.). 111-13. [WC]

Wilson, Eric Entrican. “Kant and the Selfish Hypothesis.” Social Theory and Practice 41.3 (2015): 377-402. [JSTOR]

 ——. “Self‐Legislation and Self‐Command in Kant's Ethics.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96.2 (2015): 256-78. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In his later writings, Kant distinguishes between autonomy and self‐mastery or self‐command. My article explains the relation between these two ideas, both of which are integral to his understanding of moral agency and the pursuit of virtue. I point to problems with other interpretations of this relation and offer an alternative. On my view, self‐command is a condition or state achieved by those agents who become proficient at solving problems presented by the passions. Such agents are able to stick to the results of self‐legislation over time and thereby achieve a form of temporally extended freedom.

 ——. Rev. of Kant on Practical Life: From Duty to History, by Kristi Sweet (2013). Kantian Review 20.1 (2015): 170-74. [PI]

Wilson, Jeffrey L. Rev. of Space, Geometry, and Kant’s Transcendental Deduction of the Categories, by Thomas C. Vinci (2015). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (December 2015, #5). [M] [online]

Wilson, Holly L. Rev. of Kant’s Lectures on Anthropology: A Critical Guide, edited by Alix Cohen (2014). British Journal for the History of Philosophy 23.3 (2015): 589-92. [PW]

Winegar, Reed. “Kant's Criticisms of Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 23.5 (2015): 888-910. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: According to recent commentators like Paul Guyer, Kant agrees with Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1) that physico-theology can never provide knowledge of God and (2) that the concept of God, nevertheless, provides a useful heuristic principle for scientific enquiry. This paper argues that Kant, far from agreeing with Hume, criticizes Hume's Dialogues for failing to prove that physico-theology can never yield knowledge of God and that Kant correctly views Hume's Dialogues as a threat to, rather than an anticipation of, his own view that the concept of God provides a useful heuristic principle for science. The paper concludes that Kant's critique of physico-theology reflects Kant's deep dissatisfaction with Hume's manner of argumentation and suggests that Kant's attempt to provide a more successful critique of physico-theology merits continued philosophical attention.

 ——. Rev. of Kant’s Anatomy of the Intelligent Mind, by Wayne Waxman (2014). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (Nov 2015, #1). [M] [online]

Winkler, Rafael. See: Wendland, Aaron James, and Rafael Winkler.

Wipf, Jean-Marie. Conflit de la Raison. Preface by Jean-Luc Nancy. Paris: Éditions Kimé, 2015. [169 p.] [WC]

Wittwer, Héctor. Rev. of Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals. A Critical Guide, edited by Lara Denis (2010). Kant-Studien 106.2 (2015): 343-46. [PW]

 ——. Rev. of Kants Deduktion des Rechts als intelligibler Besitz. Kants ‚Privatrecht‘ zwischen vernunft rechtlicher Notwendigkeit und juristischer Kontingenz, by Ulli F. H. Rühl (2010). Kant-Studien 106.4 (2015): 699-703. [PW]

Wolff, Michael. “Warum der kategorische Imperativ nach Kants Ansicht gültig ist. Eine Beschreibung der Argumentationsstruktur im Dritten Abschnitt seiner Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten.” Kants Begründung von Freiheit und Moral in Grundlegung III: neue Interpretationen. Ed. Dieter Schönecker (op cit.). 257-330. [M]

Wood, Allen W. “Kant’s History of Ethics.” Kant’s Lectures on Ethics: A Critical Guide. Eds. Denis, Lara, and Oliver Sensen. (op cit.). 120-37. [M]

 ——. “Purposiveness in Kant’s Practical Philosophy.” Rethinking Kant: Volume 4. Eds. Pablo Muchnik and Oliver Thorndike (op cit.). 95-110. [WC]

 ——. “On Lawrence Pasternack’s Kant on Religion.” Critique (blog posted: 7 Jul 2015) n.p. [PW] [Online: Part A / Part B]

 ——. “Rejoinder to Lawrence Pasternack.” Critique (blog posted: 19 Jul 2015) n.p. [PW] [online]

 ——. See: Schönecker, Dieter and Allen W. Wood.

Wood, Robert E. The Beautiful, the True, the Good. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2015. [xxxiv, 475 p.] [JSTOR]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Chapter Ten: Kant's "Antinomic" Aesthetics (pp. 191-215).

Woolwine, Sarah, and E. M. Dadlez. “Gender and Moral Virtue in Kant’s Critique of Judgment: The Third Critique as a Template for Identifying Feminine Deficit.” Southwest Philosophy Review 31.1 (2015): 109-18. [PW]

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Xavier, Roberto Moreira. See: Caruso, Francisco and Roberto Moreira Xavier.

[top] Y    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Yanzer Portela, Luis Cesar. “O caráter "transcendental" da Dialética e o da Doutrina do Método na Crítica da Razão Pura.” [Portuguese] Kant e-Prints 10.2 (2015): 66-76. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Firstly, the article aims at demonstrating it is possible to identify at least two critiria which delimit what belongs to the scope of transcendental philosophy investigation in the Critique of Pure Reason. Secondly, we will show that, in setting such criteria, Kant seems to restrict the scope of the investigation relevant to transcendental philosophy only to the investigations concerned with Transcendental Aesthetica and Transcendental Analytic, what implies the exclusion of the investigation conducted in the Transcendental Dialectic and in the Method of Transcendentalism. Having set such point, we will sustain that is not the case. In what concerns the legitimacy of the use of “transcendental” regarding the Dialectic, we will sustain that Kant attributed to the term “transcendental” in the Dialectics a meaning which, although is not exactly the same proper meaning employed in the Transcendental Aesthetic and in the Transcendental Analytic, holds a derivative meaning justifying its legitimate use. As to the legitimacy of the attribution of “transcendental” to the Method Doctrine, we will sustain that it is legitimate to name such doctrine “transcendental” because it takes over the results of the transcendental knowledge exhibited in the Transcendental Doctrine of Elements and is refered to them when projecting the future system of pure reason.

Yokoyama, Fernando Sposito. “Leis causais empíricas na Segunda Analogia e a suposta dependência de uma ‘harmonia pré-estabelecida’.” [Portuguese; Empirical causal laws in the Second Analogy and the alleged dependence on a ‘pre-established harmony’] Studia Kantiana 13.19 (2015): 63-88. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: According to what may be termed “strong” interpretation of the Second Analogy of Experience, Kant’s argument establishes the existence of empirical causal laws concerning totalities of objects and events which instantiate determinate types. On the other hand, according to the proponents of a “weak” interpretation of the Second Analogy, the schema of causality is applied only to singular objects and events. This article will propose an interpretation that will be, in many respects, close to the “weak” one, since we will argue that the Second Analogy cannot exclude the possibility that there might be nothing more than what Henry Allison has termed “instantaneous laws”. Our interpretation will be presented as a response to the arguments of Paul Guyer and Kenneth Westphal, according to which the main theses put forward in the Transcendental Analytic presuppose a “pre-established harmony” between our forms of synthesis and the empirical contents of experience.

Yost, Benjamin S. Rev. of Kant on Moral Autonomy, by Oliver Sensen (2013). Philosophical Review 124.2 (2015): 263-68. [PW]

Yudanin, Michael. “Can Positive Duties be Derived from Kant's Categorical Imperative?” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18.3 (2015): 595-614. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant's moral philosophy usually considers two types of duties: negative duties that prohibit certain actions and positive duties commanding action. With that, Kant insists on deriving all morality from reason alone. Such is the Categorical Imperative that Kant lays at the basis of ethics. Yet while negative duties can be derived from the Categorical Imperative and thus from reason, the paper argues that this is not the case with positive duties. After answering a number of attempts to derive positive duties from the Categorical Imperative, most notably those of Barbara Herman, it sketches an alternative approach to understanding the relationship between the universal moral law and specific moral contents.

[top] Z    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Zahavi, Dan. “On Self, Empathy, and Shame.”  International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23.5 (2015): 638-44. [ASP]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Replies to the comments on Self and Other in this Review Symposium by O’Shea, Magri, Papazian and Stout

Zákutná, Sandra. “Kant’s Reform in Thinking and Civil Society.” Immanuel Kant und die kopernikanische Wende in der Philosophie. Ed. Tomasz Kupś (op cit.). 117-22. [WC]

 ——. “Philosophy of History of Adam Ferguson and Immanuel Kant.” Estudos Kantianos 3.1 (2015): 75-82. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The paper compares central issues of philosophy of history of A. Ferguson and I. Kant. It deals with their explanation of origins and development of civil society, and characterizes its basic features, focusing on progress motivated by fruitful conflict and tension among individuals and nations. It also focuses on the role of citizens in civil society and the question of their activity. Then, in connection with Ferguson’s and Kant’s views on relationships among states the paper discusses their different portrayal of possible future history.

 ——. Rev. of Kant’s Embedded Cosmopolitanism. History, Philosophy and Education for World Citizens, by Georg Cavallar (2015). [Slovak] Studia Philosophica Kantiana 1 (2015): 60-64. [M] [online]

Zammito, John H. “Philosophy for Every Man: Kant’s Encyclopedia Course.” Reading Kant’s Lectures. Ed. Robert R. Clewis (op cit.). 301-19. [M]

 ——. “Bringing Biology Back In: The Unresolved Issue of ‘Epigenesis’ in Kant.” Con-Textos Kantianos 1 (2015): 217-34. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Epigenesis has become a far more exciting issue in Kant studies recently, especially with the publication of Jennifer Mensch’s Kant’s Organicism. In my commentary, I propose to clarify my own position on epigenesis relative to that of Mensch by once again considering the discourse of epigenesis in the wider eighteenth century. In order to situate more precisely what Kant made of it in his own thought, I distinguish the metaphysical use Kant made of epigenesis from his rejection of its aptness as a theory for life science. In that light, I raise questions about the scope and authority of philosophy vis à vis natural science.

Zanella, Diego Carlos. “A filosofia cosmopolita de Immanuel Kant.” [Portuguese; The cosmopolitan philosophy of Immanuel Kant] Studia Kantiana 13.18 (2015): 69-85. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper aims to clarify the cosmopolitan meaning of Immanuel Kant’s philosophy. This explanation will consider the definitions of ‘philosophy’, ‘philosopher’, ‘teaching’ and ‘philosophize’. It will show that the proper constitution of the concept of philosophy still preserves its Greek root as ‘love of wisdom’; that it is necessary to cultivate this ‘love of wisdom’ to learning how to reason; that philosophizing has a practical direction to the enlightenment, that is, the emancipation from the tutelage of others.

Zelizňaková, Eva. “O rovnosti a spravodlivosti v Kantovom systéme práva.” [Slovak; On Equality and Justice in Kant’s System of Law] Studia Philosophica Kantiana 2 (2015): 46-80. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The paper deals with the status of equality and justice as two key principles of the areas of private and public law within a system of Kant’s philosophy of law. The area of private law is the first area of Kant’s positivistic approach to the law, where attribute “reality” expresses the empirical aspect of a human being as a physical entity in particular space and time. A human within this area is a rights holder holding a potential of entering into relationships with other people (lex iuridica). This right is built on the principle of equality of every individual in the mutual relations with other subjects of law and results from the inevitability of interpersonal contacts in the outside world where the right is related to the duty not to harm anyone (neminem laede).
If the mutual interpersonal relations are to be defined as legal relations, they have to become embodied in the public legal system, which is an expression of the area of public law. Its inevitability expresses empirical necessity of an impartial and generally acceptable power; it is inevitable to create a civil society (suum cuique tribue), to ensure the legal certainty for subjects of private law. It is an expression of the principle of autonomy of human as a citizen, a “co-founder” of public law and a “co-keeper” of an order of society in which he is a member by providing generally acceptable rules for the exercise of those rights (lex iustitae).

Ziche, Paul. See: Beyleveld, Deryck, and Paul Ziche.

Zimmermann, Stephan. “Wovon handelt Kants „Typik der reinen praktischen Urteilskraft“?” Kant-Studien 106.3 (2015): 430-60. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper seeks to discover the purpose of Kant’s “Typic of Pure Practical Judgement” in the Critique of Practical Reason. My first thesis is that the problem underlying this chapter is not a new discovery of the Critique: the function of pure practical judgement is simply to test the morality of maxims by means of the so-called type. The new complexity of this approach still calls for a renewed investigation into an old puzzle. To that effect, my second thesis is that the maxim test is related to the doctrine of the categories of freedom, which Kant also newly introduced in the Critique. How the test procedure works in detail will be explained in light of the categories.

Zinkin, Melissa. Rev. of Kant and the Promise of Rhetoric, by Scott R. Stroud (2014). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (Jul 2015, #38). [M] [online]

Zöller, Günter. Res Publica: Plato’s Republic in Classical German Philosophy. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2015. [xi, 118 p.] [WC/JSTOR]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Chapter Two: "The Ideal Republic: Kant and Plato" (pp. 11-36).

 ——. “‘[O]hne Hofnung und Furcht’. Kants Naturrecht Feyerabend über den Grund der Verbindlichkeit zu einer Handlung.” Kant’’s Lectures/Kants Vorlesungen. Eds. Bernd Dörflinger, et al. (op cit.). 197-210. [M]

 ——. “‘Without hope and fear’: Kant’s Naturrecht Feyerabend on Bindingness and Obligation.” Reading Kant’s Lectures. Ed. Robert R. Clewis (op cit.). 346-61. [M]

 ——. “The Virtuous Republic: Rousseau and Kant on the Relation between Civil and Moral Religion.” Kant, Fichte, and the Legacy of Transcendental Idealism. Eds. Halla Kim and Steven Hoeltzel (op cit.). 31-51. [M]

 ——. “Metaphor or Method. Jennifer Mensch’s Organicist Kant Interpretation in Context.” Con-Textos Kantianos 1 (2015): pages. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In her recent study, Kant's Organicism. Epigenesis and the Development of Critical Philosophy (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2013), Jennifer Mensch employs the technical term "organicism" to designate both Kant’s thinking about organisms and his thinking about other matters–chiefly among those transcendental cognition –in terms of his thinking about organisms. The article places Mensch's organicist reading of Kant into the wider context of recent and current work on Kant as a natural historian (Naturforscher) and its repercussion for understanding the critical core of Kant’s philosophy. To that end, the article addresses the methodological function of conceptual metaphors in general and of biological metaphors in particular in Kant. The article proceeds in three steps, first focusing on an alleged anthropological turn in recent work on Kant, then addressing the distinction between schematism and symbolism in Kant’s critical epistemology and concluding with a consideration of the possibilities and limitations inherent in an organicist reading of Kant.

 ——. “‘The Platonic Republic.’ The Beginnings of Kant’s Juridico-Political Philosophy in the Critique of Pure Reason.” Estudos Kantianos 3.1 (2015): 11-25. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The essay focuses Kant’s engagement with Plato at the beginning of the Transcendental Dialectic of the Critique of Pure Reason, which presents a crucial but often overlooked feature of Kant’s magnum opus. In particular, the essay examines Kant’s positive pronouncements on the “Platonic republic” (Platonische Republik) in Book One of the Transcendental Dialectic by placing them in the twofold context of the first Critique’s affirmative retake on Plato’s Forms (Ideen) and its original views on juridico-political matters. More specifically, the essay aims to show that Kant’s prime position in legal and political philosophy, as contained in the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason (1781), involves a normative conception of civic life that places the societal exercise of individual freedom under universal laws. Section 1 explores the extent of affinity between Plato and Kant as arch-representatives of ancient and modern idealism. Section 2 traces the transition from Platonic dogmatism to Kantian criticism in the theory of ideas. Section 3 presents Kant’s appropriation of the idea of the “Platonic republic” for purposes of a specifically modern republican account of the rule of law under conditions of freedom.

 ——. “L’intelligible en nous. Liberté transcendantale et chose en elle-même dans l’‘Élucidation critique de l’analytique de la raison pratique pure’ de Kant.” Kant, la raison pratique: concepts et héritages. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Margit Ruffing, and Ricardo Ribeiro Terra (op cit.). 53-70. [M]

 ——. “Mechanism or Organism: Kant on the Symbolic Representation of the Body Politic.” Kant and the Metaphors of Reason. Ed. Patricia Kauark-Leite, et al. (op cit.). 303-19. [M]

Zwolinski, Matt, and David Schmidtz. “Virtue, Repugnance, and Deontology.” Reason, Value, and Respect. Eds. Mark Timmons and Robert N. Johnson (op cit.). 178-93. [M]

[top] Dissertations    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Bailey, Micah Joel. Kant‘s Knowledge of Unknowable Things in Themselves: An Examination of the Doctrine of Ignorance and the Non-spatiotemporality Thesis. Ph.D. diss. University of Kansas, 2015. [185 p.] Advisor: Scott Jenkins. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This dissertation is an examination of things in themselves as they are presented in the Critique of Pure Reason. Chapter 1 deals with Kant’s notion of a thing in itself generally. I argue that Kant uses ‘things in themselves’ in two ways: (1) to refer to logically possible entities that, if they exist, are ontologically distinct from appearances; (2) to signify the thought of empirical objects apart from sensibility. This follows from the fact that the notion of a thing in itself is a function of the understanding, but that our intellectual representations cannot relate to things in themselves.
Chapters 2 and 3 attend to two theses of things in themselves: (1) they are unknowable; (2) they are non-spatiotemporal. Thesis (1) seems to render any judgment of things in themselves epistemically unjustifiable, thereby undermining Kant’s right to maintain either thesis (1) or (2). Thesis (2) seems to rest on an invalid argument and, consequently, fails to rule out the possibility that things in themselves are spatiotemporal (the traditional neglected alternative). Chapter 2 focuses on establishing that Kant is entitled to the Identity Thesis (i.e. if x is intuited a priori , then x is reducible to the representational content of that a priori intuition). I argue that the Identity Thesis secures a valid argument for thesis (2). Chapter 3 demonstrates that Kant’s argument for the transcendental ideality of space (and time) entails that our sensible representations cannot relate to things in themselves. Since neither our sensible, nor our intellectual, representations can relate to things in themselves, thesis (1) actually expresses a subtler claim: we cannot cognize things in themselves through our representations. I argue that this is neither self-undermining, nor does it undermine thesis (2); however, it does restrict us to a weak reading of thesis (2), such that it cannot rule out the possibility of a strong structural isomorphism obtaining between things in themselves and space and time (a new neglected alternative). I conclude by arguing that this new neglected alternative does not present Kant’s cognitive theory with any serious difficulties.

Bekker, Duncan. The Metaphysics of Freedom: Time, Kant and Compatibilism. Master’s thesis. University of the Witwatersrand, 2015. [60 p.] Advisor: ??. [WC]

Bistonz Pérez, Santos Héctor. La libertad como fundamento de la moral en el pensamiento de Immanuel Kant. [Spanish] Ph.D. diss. Pontificia Universidad Católica Madre y Maestra (Dominican Republic), 2015. [xvi, 95 p.] Advisor: ??. [WC]

Breece, Matthew Jay. Nietzsche's "On Truth and Lie": A tropological response to Kant’s first Critique. Master’s thesis. Dan Diego State University (Rhetoric and Writing), 2015. [68 p.] Advisor: Glen McClish. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this study, I examine how Friedrich Nietzsche’s definition of truth as a “moveable army of metaphors, metonymies, and anthropomorphisms” in “On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense” responds to Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. First, I evaluate the ways in which Nietzsche’s trope of metaphor as a carrying-over critiques Kant’s constitutive elements of cognition, demonstrating that the synthetic relationship between intuitions and concepts in cognition is neither a priori nor determinate. Second, I focus on how Nietzsche’s trope of metonymy as an exchange of cause and effect responds to Kant’s a priori concept of causality, illustrating that the idea of causality is not only developed a posteriori through lived-experiences, but also that Kant’s synthetic judgments are merely a metonymic exchange from the concrete to the abstract. Third, I consider in what respects Nietzsche’s trope of anthropomorphism as a peculiar synecdoche appropriates Kant’s own subjectcentered idealism, accepting the limits of cognition yet arguing that we must overcome skepticism through art rather than faith. I conclude by suggesting how Nietzsche’s appropriation, critique, and performance of Kant allow us to reconsider the relationship between rhetoric and philosophy beyond the conventional screen of conflict.

Burkhalter, Katie. Kant on Intuitional Content and the Representation of Incongruent Counterparts. Master’s thesis. San Francisco State University, 2015. [v, 28 p.] Advisor: David Landy. [WC] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper, I raise an objection to Robert Hanna’s Kantian Non-Conceptualism thesis. Hanna argues that the existence and representational significance of non-conceptual content is founded in Kant’s cognitive theory, and Hanna takes Kant’s argument from incongruent counterparts to show this. My objection to Hanna centers on the necessity of, and the necessary role of concepts in constituting, the transcendental unity of apperception, something under which all representations must stand in order to have any significance for me. I argue representational significance is the product of synthesis in accordance with a rule (i.e. a concept). Only a rule can bring unity to both the manifold of representations in an intuition and our consciousness of it, the transcendental unity of apperception. Specifically, I show the representation that represents incongruent counterparts as distinct, the representation of the object as located in space, must be conceptually structured in order to bring about this necessary unity of consciousness, the thoroughgoing identity of the self in all possible representations.

Castillo Miranda, José Antonio. Valoración Histórica de la Filosofía Balmesiana y Confrontación Metafísico-epistemológica de Jaime Balmes con Immanuel Kant Respecto a las Nociones de Dios, espacio y tiempo. [Spanish] Ph.D. diss. Universidad de Granada, 2015. [337 p.] Advisor: María del Carmen Lara Nieto. [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: La Tesis Doctoral pretende en tres partes poner de relieve, en primer lugar, la valoración que históricamente se ha hecho de la filosofía del pensador del diecinueve español; en segundo lugar, exponer y analizar la confrontación metafísico-epistemológica que mantiene la filosofía balmesiana en contraposición al pensamiento kantiano respecto a las nociones de Dios, espacio y tiempo, y como resultado de este antagonismo metafísico-epistemológico evidenciar la concepción objetivista por parte de Balmes y la concepción subjetivista por parte de Kant, no sólo en cuanto al modo de conocer la realidad, sino también en cuanto al modo de considerar las estructuras mismas de la realidad; y, en tercer lugar, proponer, no un estudio acabado sobre Dios en la obra de Balmes y Kant, sino, más bien, destacar el puesto que Dios ocupa en el pensamiento crítico balmesiano y kantiano para plantear, a partir de ello, sus consecuencias en las dos nociones metafísico-epistemológicas expuestas y analizadas en la filosofía dichos pensadores, a saber: el espacio y el tiempo. En esta parte tercera reside el núcleo de nuestra investigación, destacando, por una parte, la cuestión de Dios en el marco tanto metafísico y epistemológico, como moral y religioso del sistema crítico de Immanuel Kant; y, por otra parte, y de igual modo, el carácter ontológico de Dios en el también sistema crítico de Jaime Balmes. Y es que el estatuto y la función que Dios posee tanto en el pensamiento metafísico-epistemológico, moral y religioso de Kant, como en la onto-epistemología y teología natural de Balmes, y la influencia que tal noción metafísica y teológica ejerce en la concepción que ambos filósofos tienen del espacio y el tiempo, es la tesis fundamental de un estudio que se propone relacionar Dios, espacio y tiempo en dos pensamientos cuyos fundamentos son tan dispares, y al cual acompaña gran dificultad. Por tanto, nuestra investigación expone y analiza las nociones metafísico-epistemológicas de espacio y tiempo, las cuales esperan poder responder al interrogante que plantea el por qué de una concepción objetiva y subjetiva de la realidad y del conocimiento por parte de Balmes y Kant, respectivamente. La respuesta a tal interrogante la ofrece la noción de Dios que ambos autores mantienen, de la cual depende su concepción espacio-temporal, en la cual encuentran tales nociones su fundamento categórico y por la cual se genera un vínculo entre las tres nociones de Dios, espacio y tiempo. Esta última noción, o sea, la de Dios, la cual actúa como determinante esencial para una concepción kantiano-balmesiana del espacio y el tiempo, está presente, de alguna manera, en toda la obra filosófica de Balmes y Kant. Una serie de pensadores se posicionan frente a Balmes para someter a examen crítico su filosofía. Tenemos, entonces, que el Jesuita José Fernández Cuevas, el Cardenal e historiador de la filosofía Ceferino González, José Mendive, José Luis Comellas y Urráburu analizan el pensamiento balmesiano, poniendo en evidencia aquellos puntos que, a juicio de estos autores, presentan cierta debilidad. La teoría de la verdad de Balmes, su epistemología y criteriología serán las cuestiones que recibirán una crítica por parte de tales personalidades. Ahora bien, a diferencia de Fernández Cuevas, Ceferino González, Mendive, Comellas y Urráburu, que presentan una posición crítica frente a Balmes, otra serie de autores estudiosos del pensamiento del filósofo catalán se posicionarán respecto a este genio español del diecinueve, pero ahora desde una postura apologética. Así pues, Francisco Ginebra, los componentes del Congreso de Vich, Marcelino Menéndez y Pelayo, los pensadores de la Escuela de Lovaina y los jesuitas Ignacio Casanovas y Miguel Florí son los protagonistas de una defensa de la filosofía balmesiana. Pero si una primera etapa se caracteriza por una cara negativa y positiva en cuanto a la valoración que históricamente se ha hecho de la filosofía balmesiana; ahora, una segunda etapa se caracteriza por un posicionamiento equilibrado respecto al valor del pensamiento de Balmes. Esta etapa de equilibrio y posicionamiento la encarnan Georg Van Riet y Batllori, Sauret, Francisco Segarra y García Matías, entre otros, el jesuita Jesús Muñoz, Marcel de Corte, Luis Bogliolo y Roig Gironella. Éstos tratan las cuestiones relacionadas con el Escolasticismo y su influencia en las soluciones gnoseológicas de Balmes, el carácter apologético de la filosofía realista balmesiana frente al Idealismo Trascendental de Kant, la doctrina del ¿Instinto Intelectual¿ y el sentido de la criteriología balmesiana, y el platonismo cristiano en el pensamiento de Balmes. El espacio y el tiempo según el Idealismo Trascendental Kantiano son considerados intuiciones puras y formas a priori de la sensibilidad. Concretamente, el espacio sería tratado por Kant en su filosofía pre-crítica como aquello que es explicado gracias a la concepción de un Dios existente; sin embargo, con la influencia del empirismo inglés en el racionalismo de base que hay en el pensador alemán, el espacio y ya también el tiempo pasarían a considerarse estructuras trascendentales de todo conocimiento teórico del ser, pasando a plantearse la cuestión de Dios como hipótesis necesaria para una comprehensión unitaria de los fenómenos. Dios se convertirá, por tanto, en el periodo crítico en la tarea fundamental de la razón pura. En cambio, la razón práctica postulará la existencia de Dios para poder justificar la validez y también existencia de la ley moral, con la consecuencia de una reducción de Dios a los límites de la mera razón. Ahora bien, el espacio y el tiempo según el Realismo Crítico Balmesiano son considerados realidades ontológicas, y no subjetivas a la manera kantiana. Efectivamente, espacio y tiempo para Balmes no son otra cosa que la misma extensión y sucesión que hay en los objetos y en los actos de la conciencia. Dios es ahora el Ser necesario, cuya existencia no se plantea ya como mera hipótesis, sino como una realidad totalmente demostrable por la razón. Al igual que Tomás de Aquino, Balmes propondrá cinco argumentos para la demostración de la existencia del Ser necesario. Para ambos filósofos, la noción de Dios mantiene una relación intrínseca con el espacio y el tiempo. El fundamento categórico de tal relación reside en la determinación que Dios ejerce en la concepción kantiana y balmesiana del espacio y tiempo. A través de tres argumentos conforme al Idealismo de Kant y tres argumentos conforme al Realismon de Balmes, se establecerá la tesis sobre la noción de Dios como determinante para una concepción del espacio y el tiempo, bien objetivista al modo balmesiano, bien subjetivista al modo kantiano. La aclaración fenómeno/noúmeno, la huella de un conocimiento intuitivo en la filosofía crítica kantiana y los antecedentes de la Dissertatio de 1770 de Kant, por un lado; y la relación de Dios con el espacio y con el tiempo, y la idea de creatio ex nihilo en la filosofía balmesiana, por otro lado, ponen de manifiesto la veracidad de la tesis central de nuestra investigación.

Chen, Hsin-Pai. Moralität und Gerechtigkeit. Politische Gerechtigkeit als die Sittlichkeit im Zusammenleben der Personen in Kants praktischer Philosophie. Ph.D. diss. Eberhard-Karls-Universität Tübingen, 2015. [160 p.] Advisor: NN. [WC]

Cho, Kyoung Min. Kant on Radical Evil. Master’s thesis. University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2015. [36 p.] Advisor: Julius O. Sensat. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The purpose of this thesis is to propose an interpretation of Kant’s claim that the human being’s evil nature is the effect of the free power of choice. I suggest that if his concept of free choice is properly understood, Kant’s claim should be interpreted as follows: the human being’s radical evil is the effect of a failure to use freely the power of choice that determines its fundamental disposition, a failure that is to be presupposed as universal for all human agents. According to this reading, we are evil by nature since evil lies in our fundamental disposition. Still, our evil nature can be thought of as acquired, since we could constitute our fundamental disposition as morally good through freedom of choice. In the end, it turn out that for Kant, the concepts of free choice and of evil nature are closely connected.

Crosby-Grayson, Nicola Jane. Schematic and Symbolic Hypotyposis in Kant’s Critical Works. Ph.D. diss. Manchester Metropolitan University (History, Politics, and Philosophy), 2015. [336 p.] Advisor: Ullrich Haase and Keith Crome. [PQ] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Studies into schematic and symbolic hypotyposis in Kant’s Critical works rarely set out how different types of concept and idea are realised comprehensively. As a consequence, it is difficult to compare the two types of exhibition in respect to how they differ and relate to one another. There are numerous reasons why these two modes have not been set out with clarity, I will focus on three. The first pertains to the nature of the subject matter itself as the schematism chapter is notoriously dense. Attempts to render Kant’s account coherent consistently fail to acknowledge the schema he addresses in the Architectonic of Pure Reason and as a result they cannot be considered comprehensive or exhaustive. Secondly, the realisation of practical ideas is rarely addressed, referred to or included for comparison in works that address schemata and symbols. Consequently, one cannot gain a comprehensive view of Kant’s account of exhibition. The practical schemata (if one may call them that) prove interesting as they challenge the distinction between direct and indirect exhibition that Kant sets out so confidently in § 59 of the Third Critique (5:352). Thirdly, attempts to present Kant’s account of the symbol with clarity either seek to reduce the symbol to a mode of schematic exhibition (in line with schema from the Architectonic of Pure Reason), or, they fail to distinguish between the examples Kant gives and consequently make claims about one type of symbol based upon their understanding of another, all of which results in further confusion and complications. This thesis will present a clarification of Kant’s account of exhibition with respect to the use of symbols, schemata, and analogy to establish the extent to which philosophy must appropriate art to communicate ideas and concepts. It will draw out the rhetorical connotations affiliated with the term hypotyposis and present the consequences of this in respect to philosophical methodology.

Cutillas, Abel. L’Estètica entre Kant i Nietzsche i la seva projecció en l’art del segle XX. [Spanish] Ph.D. diss. Universitat de Barcelona, 2015. [280 p.] Advisor: Salvi Turró Tomás. [WC]

Danko, Christina Marie. Freedom from Despair: An Examination of the Self in Hume, Kant and Kierkegaard. Ph.D. diss. The Claremont Graduate University (School of Arts and Humanities), 2015. [206 p.] Advisor: Patricia Easton. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Against those who argue the self does not exist and thus is a negligible concept, I claim the concept is crucial for practical purposes. To do so, I engage the philosophies of Hume, Kant and Kierkegaard, which together offer a complex context to understand the self, namely, psychologically, morally and socially.
Hume clarifies the problem of the self. Taking a skeptical stance, he argues efforts to know the self’s essence are futile; instead, he focuses on its unity. While admitting his skeptical account seems flawed, he develops an account of the self with regard to the passions (not the understanding), thereby pointing towards the experiential significance of the concept. Denying we have knowledge of what the self is, Hume nonetheless asserts its psychological reality vis-à-vis our emotions.
Also renouncing the metaphysical realm, Kant goes beyond Hume by elucidating the practical characteristics of the self—the way it functions in the world. First, he argues it is a formal condition for the possibility of knowledge, a transcendental ego undergirding the empirical one. Then he defends the idea that the self is an autonomous agent, derivable from the moral law. In doing so, Kant gives the self an essential role in moral action. However, he struggles to account fully for the self as an autonomous agent in light of radical evil.
Kierkegaard fleshes out the conception of the practical self. He addresses Kant’s problem of autonomy by offering a dynamic conception of the self: it strives for fulfillment in relation to God and others. Moreover, he contends the self discovers these relationships through the experience of despair. In doing so, Kierkegaard synthesizes the psychological, moral and social dimensions of the self.
While we may not be able to prove a self exists, we may still grasp its practical conception, which is ever-evolving and shaped through our personal and public interactions. By relating the philosophies of Hume, Kant and Kierkegaard, I hope to offer not only a unique understanding of the self, but also a useful bridge between analytic and continental philosophy.

Diaz, Emiliano. Body and Horizon: Kant, Husserl, and the Nonconceptual Content of Experience. Ph.D. diss. State University of New York at Stony Brook, 2015. [323 p.] Advisor: Don Welton. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The debate that took place between Herbert Dreyfus and John McDowell a few years back concerning the nonconceptual content of experience was in many ways disappointing. The question addressed in the debate between Dreyfus and McDowell, in its most basic form, is why we should think embodied cognition is a more compelling account of our motor engagement with the world than one that casts it in terms of concepts. A question that is not addressed is why we should find the justificatory grounds provided by either thinker more or less compelling than the other. To answer this question, I reframe their debate in terms of the apperceptive content with which both Kant and Husserl are concerned. Apperception is best defined in terms of holistic structures which logically precede and order cognition, whether this cognition proceeds via intuition or concepts. For instance, to grasp a concept is to grasp it as possibly a predicate of judgments other than the one in which it is featured or as part of a conceptual holism. Intuitions, on the other hand, are structured by a part-whole relation in which the wholes of space and time always logically precede their parts. Slices of space and time are always first presented as situated within an indeterminately extended whole. The difference between these two kinds of apperceptive content marks the difference between conceptual and nonconceptual content in the transcendental tradition.
With this distinction in hand I make three major arguments. First, because the part-whole relationship governing space and time is different from the part-whole relationship governing concepts, we can only indicate, but not fully cognize the intuitions by way of concepts. Secondly, though we have good reason to be suspicious of Kant's particular way of justifying his claims about concepts and intuitions, his arguments against the idea that experience is wholly determined by concepts can be reframed as reductio arguments that apply beyond the scope of his project. Finally, the distinction between nonconceptual content and conceptual content can also be carried phenomenologically, or through a detailed account of lived experience. Here we find that the kind of cognition proper to the intuitions is housed in the body, in the relation between perception, action, and Husserl's own take on the part-whole relation governing space and time, the horizon.

Ekin, Özge. New Approaches to Visual Reasoning in Mathematics and Kantian Characterization of Mathematics. Ph.D. diss. Freien Universität/Berlin, 2015. [iv, 205 p.] Advisors: Sybille Krämer and Konrad Polthier. [WC] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: My aim in this thesis is to reveal the true nature of mathematical reasoning and to show the necessity of pictorial representations in mathematics. In order to support my thesis I argue that using only the formal language, without fully integrating visual reasoning in mathematical communication, mathematics operates insufficiently and it can never reach its full potential.
First of all, I provide a short historical approach to philosophy of mathematics as well as a summary of current state of visualization in mathematics. Then, I bring forth a complete picture of philosophy of mathematics and mathematical objects, which consistently allows visual reasoning, intuitions and constructions in mathematical communication. This interpretation makes it easy to see the pictorial representations as a natural part of mathematical reasoning. Moreover, I lay out the medium for visual reasoning in mathematics: Space. After providing several defini- tions of space I conclude that Kant’s characterization is the finest one as a base for mathematical reasoning, in particular for visual reasoning. Furthermore, I bring out the method of visual reasoning: Synthetic a priori. In order to show the link between visualization and synthetic a priori I provide hitherto definitions of visualization and argue that these lead up to Kantian characterization of constructions and synthetic a priori. Then, I provide several interpretations to show that Kant’s characterization of mathematics has elements valuable for modern mathematics that modern logic cannot capture.
Finally, I offer three main arguments leading to the main thesis “pictorial representations/ diagrams are necessary parts of mathematical reasoning”: (1) There are formal systems with diagrams. Hence, not all uses of diagrams are synthetic. (2) There are necessary non-formal uses of diagrams in mathematical proofs. (3) There is a strong link between visualization and Kantian philosophy of mathematics. As a result, I claim that the real capacity of mathematics is not in turning it into a machine language but integrating and appreciating the aesthetic part of it as well. I also indicate the necessity of having a theory of diagrammatics, which should be set up as a branch of mathematics.

Fakhoury, Tamara. The Kantian Duty of Self-improvement in the Context of Oppression. Master’s thesis. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2015. [57 p.] Advisor: Thomas E. Hill, Jr. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Is Kant's duty of natural self-perfection a moral obligation for individuals who suffer the harms of oppression? In this paper I argue that it is. Understood in a Kantian framework, the project of self-improvement is neither impossible nor too onerous a task under oppression. Adopting the end of self-improvement is a requirement of self-respect and an accessible and morally worthy means of resisting one's oppression.

Gustin, Robert D. Kant’s Argument for the Transcendental Ideality of Time. Ph.D. diss. University of Notre Dame, 2015. [vi, 220 p.] Advisor: Karl Ameriks. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This dissertation presents a unified account of Kant's argument for the transcendental ideality of time as put forward in the Transcendental Aesthetic and the First Antinomy of the Critique of Pure Reason. Kant's transcendental ideality thesis for both space and time is that time and space are not fundamentally real entities but rather forms of intuition by which we are able to experience the world. In the secondary literature on Kant, the argument for the transcendental ideality of time is consistently and repeatedly ignored in favor of discussing the transcendental ideality of space. The ideality of time has its own distinctive issues that require special attention. My goal is to focus on these aspects of Kant's argument and to present my own unique interpretation of whether Kant's argument for the transcendental ideality of time is sound or not. Although, in the end, I argue that Kant's argument for the transcendental ideality of time is unsuccessful, it is by no means the case that all the arguments that led Kant to this conclusion are misguided. In fact, there are a number of Kant’s arguments that are able to bear philosophical fruit. I discuss a number of these philosophically fruitful arguments and theses in the dissertation.

Hoffman, Robert R. A New Reading of Kant’s Theory of Punishment. Ph.D. diss. University of Pennsylvania, 2015. [vi, 284 p.] Advisor: Paul Guyer. [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: There are deep, insurmountable difficulties with the traditional interpretation of Immanuel Kant's writings on the subject of punishment. Although it is undeniable that throughout his published writings on practical philosophy — and in particular in his Metaphysics of Morals — he consistently advocates for the view that punishment can only be justified as a direct response to an individual's act of wrongdoing, his status as one of the foremost theorists in the retributivist pantheon is philosophically untenable. In this dissertation, I articulate the ways in which Kant's explicit support for retributivism directly contradicts more foundational elements of his practical philosophy and argue instead that he has the resources to consistently construct a deterrent theory of punishment. In particular, I highlight Kant's division of duties and his conception of the state to demonstrate that the idea of a political community retributively responding to moral desert is wholly incompatible with Kantian principles. In order to overcome these obstacles, I develop a new approach to Kantian deterrence — which I call Kantian Protective Deterrence — that grounds the state's right to exercise coercive force against its citizens in what Kant understood to be its fundamental role of protecting each individual citizen from violations of her or his right to exercise external freedoms.

Huxford, Georg Gilbert. The Scope and Development of Kant’s Theodicy. Ph.D. diss. University of London, King’s College, 2015. [175 p.] Advisor: John Callanan and Maria Rosa Antognazza. [PQ/PW] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The thesis which underpins the whole study is that Kant's engagement with theodicy was career-long and not confined to his short treatise of 1791, On the Failure of All Attempted Philosophical Theodicies, which dealt explicitly with the subject. In the study, Kant's developing thought on theodicy is treated in three periods, pre-Critical, early-Critical, and late-Critical. Each of the periods has its own special character, respectively that of exploration, transition, and conclusion. In the course of developing the underpinning thesis, I argue for a further five substantial theses:
• Kant's stance on theodicy developed through his career, from an essentially Leibnizian starting point to his own unique authentic theodicy.
• Kant did not reject all theodicies. He rejected so-called philosophical theodicies based on theoretical/speculative reason but advanced authentic theodicy grounded in practical reason. In this way he found a middle ground between philosophical theodicy and fideism, both of which he rejected.
• Kant's work in other areas, particularly that in natural science and his Critical epistemology, served to constrain his theodicy.
• Metaphysical Evil conceived as limitation and Kant's Radical Evil perform the same function, namely providing the ground for the possibility of moral evil in the world.
• Nevertheless, Kant's authentic theodicy fails (i) because it fails to meet his own definition (ii) it relies on the Highest Good which cannot bear the weight Kant puts on it because (a) there is no a priori deduction of a duty in its regard and (b) intractable difficulties in applying the Highest Good in practice.

Jackson, Daniel Lee. Perfecting Kant’s Highest Good. Master’s thesis. Boston University, 2015. [76 p.] Advisor: Manfred Kuehn. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The highest good is to Kant’s moral philosophy what things-in-themselves are to his metaphysics. Kant’s system is incomplete without it, but the system itself seems to reject any notion of content at the level needed. In this thesis, I take a look at the debate between Eoin O’Connell and Andrews Reath as to whether the relation between the constituents of the highest good, virtue and happiness, should be regarded as one of proportionality or one that tells us only that should both be maximized. With an eye on content and the threat of heteronomy, I track the highest good as the necessary idea of the unconditioned totality of the object of pure practical reason. I demonstrate that O’Connell’s and Reath’s positions stem from a misreading of the typic of pure practical judgment and argue that, counter to O’Connell’s claims, the proportionality relation Kant has in mind when introducing the impartial spectator does not entail a notion of just desserts. In the end, I conclude that although neither a maximization nor a proportionality thesis are acceptable, Kant’s introduction of the impartial spectator gives us an idea of the highest good that both preserves the formal aspect of Kant’s system and, although cutting short the project to establish the unconditioned totality of the object of pure practical reason, makes the highest good an objective and possible end for moral agents.

Kesselman, Todd. Kant’s Theory of Desire. Ph.D. diss. The New School, 2015. [321 p.] Advisor: Jay M. Bernstein. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: My dissertation refutes the common, but erroneous, view that disinterested pleasure in Kant’s Critique of Judgment is pleasure in the beautiful without desire, by arguing that such pleasure involves contradictory desires, or what Kant calls mere wishes (Wünsche). Aesthetic desire, understood in this way, demonstrates that Kant’s theory of aesthetic pleasure is not apathetic indifference. However, its significance extends far beyond the task of disproving accusations of detached formalism. Aesthetic desire also serves to explain the difference between aesthetic and cognitive judgments in Kant’s critical system, and the significance of this difference. In a judgment of the beautiful, the circuit of desire and pleasure is a mimetic reproduction of the kind of form under consideration in the judgment, namely, purposiveness without purpose. Therefore, judgments of the beautiful do not merely re-present; they reproduce the form of beauty within the activity of reflection itself, and the result is a feeling of life (Lebensgefühl), which is the embodied recognition of this mimetic relation. Thus, judgments of the beautiful achieve what perspectival judgments, within objective cognition, only aspire to: namely, full amenability between judgments, and that which is judged.

Lowe, Chun-yip. Zum ewigen Frieden: Die Theorie des Völkerrechts bei Kant und Rawls. Ph.D. diss. Freie Universität Berlin, 2015. [# p.] Advisor: ??. [PQ]

Mekanic, Ilijaz. The Contrast Between Appearance and Experience. Master’s thesis. San Francisco State University, 2015. [32 p.] Advisor: NN. [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Michael Friedman elaborates on the contrast between appearance and experience, as stated in the first proposition of the “Phenomenology” chapter of the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, by invoking the discussion of provisional choice and (anticipated) revision of that choice at the later stage. He finds support for this view in book III of Newton’s Principia, which Kant, according to Friedman, is closely following in making an argument in the “Phenomenology” chapter. In this paper I offer an alternative way of thinking about the contrast between appearance and experience by drawing on Kant’s discussion of judgments of perception and judgments of experience in the Prolegomena, as well as his discussion of what may be referred to as subjective connections and objective judgments in section 19 of the B-Deduction. I then support this interpretation by drawing on the text of the Second Analogy.

Morgan, Jeffrey. Singular Self-awareness with the Searcher of Hearts: Conscience in the Thought of Kant, Kierkegaard, and Barth. Ph.D. diss. University of Notre Dame (Theology), 2015. [318 p.] Advisor: Gerald P. McKenny. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The thesis of this dissertation is that conscience is the knowledge we have of ourselves in relation to God as God holds us accountable for the quality of the life we live before God. This thesis bears a heavy argumentative burden, because I argue that the knowledge we have of ourselves in our conscience before God is distinct from the knowledge we have of ourselves before any human community. In other words, I make a case for conscience as our singular moral self-awareness in relation to God. I do not mean to deny that community is vital in our moral and spiritual formation; nor do I present this thesis as a kind of necessary contradiction to an affirmation of the church’s vocation to mediate God’s presence. I do mean to say that there is something ultimately distinct between our moral self-awareness before God and our moral self-awareness before any human community, including the church.
But this claim is seemingly untenable in our communitarian era of Christian ethics. We can summarize this (still) prevailing communitarian commitment as the idea that our moral identity comes into being as we are embedded in a public world, as we are drafted into a role by the life of a particular, historical moral culture that lives according to particular socio-linguistic conventions. The task of the moral agent is to make her own the role given to her by this particular moral culture. But in this case, it would probably be best not to make much of an individual’s singular moral self-awareness as this might imply an unwelcome buffer between the individual and the community. It would be better, instead, to keep the focus on the habits and practices that disclose the community’s self-awareness. Consequently, conscience as an individual’s singular moral self-awareness before God has become marginal at best in contemporary Christian ethics.
In chapter one I offer an account of this marginalization. Kant looms large in this picture, as influential critics like Alasdair MacIntyre and Stanley Hauerwas find in Kant’s practical philosophy the origins of the self-asserting, autonomous individual that plagues modern life, and as influential Christian ethicists like Paul Lehmann and Oliver O’Donovan discern in Kant’s theory of conscience a significant buoy for this modern individual. In this light we can understand why efforts in the 20th century to “save” conscience attempt situate it in an ethic that better appreciates the irreducibly historical, contingent, and communal nature of moral agency. H. Richard Niebuhr is especially important here. But what we can see following Niebuhr, in a trajectory we can trace from Niebuhr through MacIntyre and into Hauerwas, is that conscience dissipates in the prevailing emphasis on corporate life and corporate self-understanding
In the remainder of the dissertation I challenge this trajectory and its marginalization of conscience. I begin in chapter two with Kant, where the idea of conscience as singular moral self-awareness is thought to become problematic. But Kant has been severely misinterpreted. I argue that he understands conscience to be the knowledge we have of ourselves that seeks to approximate the knowledge God has of us as God sees our hearts. Kant sincerely defines conscience as the principle of our accountability before God and he offers a defensible account of what this means. Kierkegaard and Barth each develop a theory of conscience, like Kant, as our singular moral self-awareness in relation to God. But they differ from Kant inasmuch as they understand this relation in intimate, personal terms we do not find in Kant’s thought. And in this regard, they both understand conscience as serving the final end of our union with God. In chapter three I argue that Kierkegaard understands conscience to be our singular moral self-awareness in relation to God as God holds us accountable to be who God created us to be in relation to God. In chapter four I argue that Barth understands conscience to be our singular moral self-awareness in relation to God as God holds us accountable to be who God redeemed us to be.
In the final chapter I argue that these distinctions are, ultimately, intramural distinctions within a defensible tradition of inquiry about conscience. I argue that this tradition resolves certain intractable problems facing contemporary Christian communitarianism and that it draws our attention back to a central witness of the Christian faith that we can find across Scripture and the Christian tradition: God claims and knows each individual and that to have a conscience is to share with God in this knowledge.

Morris, Courtney Allison. Kant and the Significance of the Self. Ph.D. diss. University of California, Riverside, 2015. [295 p.] Advisor: Pierre Keller. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant’s philosophy, it is often thought, leads to an untenable picture of the self. He argues that we cannot have knowledge of the type of entity we are, but seems to contradict that conclusion by claiming we are free and morally responsible. Commentators accuse him of blindly prioritizing his ethical views, not recognizing that his metaphysical views prohibit the very picture of the self his moral theory necessitates. Sympathetic interpreters of Kant’s view of the self focus on either his theoretical or ethical view, despite Kant’s insistence that the two are interdependent.
I argue that Kant offers us a deeply consistent, unified, and plausible view of the self. For Kant, an individual necessarily thinks and acts as though he or she—and any other human being—is a substantial, complete entity with an identity that remains the same over time. As this work shows, the significance of the self, for Kant, is practical, not theoretical.
A theory aims to gain knowledge of the self and examine what type of object it is and how it is constituted. Perhaps we are spiritual, immaterial souls, or alternatively, entities ultimately reducible to the brain or body. I establish that Kant thinks that such views are doomed to be either tautological or contradictory. This is because they answer the wrong question.
The right question is not how the self is constituted, but what we are committed to. Kant thinks the answer is clear: we must hold ourselves and others responsible, and we must believe that we are free and that our actions and choices matter. My interpretation reveals that Kant’s true aim is to demonstrate how we can make good on these commitments without fear of being contradicted by theory. Theorizing about the self, according to Kant, is idle. But recognizing so makes room for one to act in accordance with one’s commitments, both moral and explanatory. Furthermore, I prove that Kant thinks we must act under the idea of the self not just to hold ourselves and others responsible but to view the world as the causally unified place we do.

Mueller, Laura Joy. Transcendental Sensus Communis: Reflective Foundations of Cognition in Kantian Epistemology. Ph.D. diss. Southern Illinois University Carbondale, 2015. [vi, 387 p.] Advisor: Randall Auxier. [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Pre-cognitive experience is important to Kant's epistemology, but for decades, the scholarship tended to leave this aspect aside. Pre-cognitive experience must be reintegrated, and several important works have made progress toward this goal. Some scholars maintain that the distinction between the A- and B-editions of the Critique of Pure Reason largely relates to the role of pre-cognitive experience in Kant's system. I offer an account of what Kant calls the "obscure functions of understanding," drawing from the third Critique, the Anthropology, and other writings in which Kant discusses pre-cognitive experience. I argue that the key to integrating pre-cognitive experience into Kantian epistemology lies in the proper analysis of sensus communis, or social feeling. Reflective judgment provides the logical structure by which both social feeling and the experience of the sublime come to be synthesized with cognitive experience. The result of my argument is a deepened and enhanced understanding of autonomy (which pervades the entire architectonic).

Murski, Jessica. Mind and World in Kant’s Theory of Sensation. Master’s thesis. Colorado Stae University, 2015. [76 p.] Advisor: Jane Kneller. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In examining sensation as Kant presents it in the Critique of Pure Reason and understanding the problems exemplified in the debate which has arisen surrounding this topic, it becomes clear that Kant believed the objective world to be a product of the mind. This discussion of sensation follows three main themes: (i) the nature of sensation, (ii) the form of sensation and its contribution in determining the spatial properties of objects and (iii) the role of sensation in achieving object-directed cognition. In the first chapter I will present Kant’s view on sensation as it relates to each of these themes.
In the second chapter, I will explore the conflict that seems to arise between the nature of sensation and its form and function in the cognitive process. I examine three proposed solutions to this conflict as they are presented by Rolf George, Lorne Falkenstein, and Apaar Kumar. George presents a constructivist account of sensation, while Falkenstein argues that sensations must be physical events in the body of the perceiver. Kumar provides clear evidence from Kant’s writing that Falkenstein’s position is unavailable to Kant and instead proposes a non-constructivist view of sensation. Understanding these concerns helps to highlight a different requirement of sensation in Kant’s cognitive theory.
Finally, in the third chapter I provide evidence that Kant took the spatial form of the objective world to be a product of the human mind rather than something that exists “in itself.” This perspective shows why each of the concerns presented in chapter two are important. However, they arise because of the fundamental misunderstanding that Kant took the spatial properties of the external world to exist in its own right, before or aside from human consciousness. I will show how a correct understanding of the relationship between the mind and the external world in Kant’s theory can resolve the conflicts that seem to arise in his theory of sensation.

Nunez, Albert Tyke. Kant’s Formal Idealism, the Synthetic a priori, and the Constitution of Objects of Experience. Ph.D. diss. University of Pittsburgh, 2015. [149 p.] Advisor: Stephen Engstrom. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: We rightly take it for granted that knowledge of empirical objects is possible. In contemporary philosophy, however, the question of how we can have this knowledge has largely fallen off of the agenda. In contrast, in the philosophy of Kant, the question of how we can have our ordinary knowledge of these objects lies at the heart of the enterprise of vindicating synthetic a priori judgments. With an eye to revitalizing that question, in this dissertation I begin to mark off a class of Kantian views in metaphysics and epistemology. According to these views, the only way to account for how we can have knowledge of empirical objects as objects—as things that exist and are available to everyone to be known—is if both the nature of these objects, and our knowledge of them, are partially grounded in our faculty for knowing them. It is the necessary, not the contingent, features of these objects that will be grounded in these faculties. And this will be so, not only for the general necessary features that all empirical objects share, but also for those special features of individual objects that we can nonetheless know to be necessary.
Although when examining Kant it is impossible to avoid the question of how empirical objects have their synthetic a priori grounding in our representations, this question has received relatively little sustained attention in the secondary literature. In part because of this, rather than directly delineating the class of Kantian views I am after, I have chosen to spend this dissertation developing a reading of this aspect of Kant's account. In the first chapter, I look at how this grounding works in general. In the second, I examine how the special necessary features of certain representations are grounded in the necessary features of more general representations. Finally, in the third I combine these two elements into an account of how, according to Kant, both the general and specific necessary features of objects have their synthetic a priori grounding in our faculty for knowledge and its representations.

Olsson, Tyler. The Aesthetics of Concept-Acquisition: Kant and Heidegger in the Age of Neo-pragmatism. Master’s thesis. San Francisco State University, 2015. [vi, 33 p.] Advisor: ??. [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper addresses the philosophical problem of concept acquisition, and in particular I explore the central role that aesthetics plays in addressing this problem. By invoking Kant, John McDowell’s philosophy makes headway into this territory, but his story about how we come to have determinate concepts along these lines is under-developed to say the least. As I see it, Heidegger has a more robust account of concept acquisition that benefits from Kant’s third Critique, and we can use this account to supplement McDowell. Accordingly I argue through a reading of Heidegger on being-in-the-world and being-with-others that we acquire determinate concepts by orienting ourselves toward the world in a disinterested way, and by then having other people guide imaginative reflection to notice features of the world through ostensive discourse.

Othman, Muhammad Atiullah. Elemen tanggungjawab menurut Ibnu Taymiyyah dan Immanuel Kant. [Malay; Elements of responsibility according to Ibn Taymiyyah and Immanuel Kant] Ph.D. diss. Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 2015. [xiv, 270 p.] Advisor: ??. [WC]

Palatnik, Nataliya. Kant’s Science of the Moral World and Moral Objectivity. Ph.D. diss. Harvard University, 2015. [282 p.] Advisor: Christine M. Korsgaard, Matthew Boyle, Stephen P. Engstrom. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Critics of Kant's moral philosophy often object that it cannot account for moral requirements that are both genuinely objective and contentful. Notwithstanding the long history of this dispute, Kantians have been unable to put these objections to rest. I argue that we can answer these objections and fully understand Kantian moral objectivity only if we consider Kant’s moral philosophy in light of his methodological and architectonic concerns.
My dissertation takes up this task by providing a new account of Kant’s conception of moral theory as a philosophical science: Kant’s moral philosophy, I argue, appropriates the central features of the then revolutionary method of Newtonian natural science for the investigation of practical cognition. Just as Newtonian science begins with a priori (largely mathematical) principles and then gradually "comes down to" particular concrete physics, so too Kantian moral philosophy begins with general a priori moral principles that then gradually translate into a system of particular requirements. The objectivity of the content of our practical thought develops as the background conditions of moral deliberation become progressively more inter-subjectively justifiable. This progress is possible only through co-deliberation and collective action demanded by the duty to make morality fully efficacious in our shared social world, that is, the duty to promote the highest good.
My account highlights the attractiveness of Kant’s conception of the relationship between a priori and empirical aspects of practical thought, between theory and practice, and enables its systematic defense against objections by later German Idealists, particularly by Hegel. I argue that Hegel’s polemic against Kant's account of morality is fundamentally a disagreement about the nature of philosophical science and its method, and adjudicating between their views requires adjudicating the methodological dispute itself. I offer a systematic assessment of the methodological grounds of Hegel’s approach and of his critique of Kant’s moral philosophy. I argue that (1) Hegel’s approach does not, on the whole, present a viable alternative to Kant’s moral theory and (2) Hegel’s challenge can be met, but only by appealing to developmental or genetic aspects of Kant’s conception of moral objectivity grounded in his views on the proper method and form of a philosophical science. I show that these aspects of Kant’s thought, generally overlooked by commentators and Kantian theorists, are indispensable to his moral theory and provide a basis for a fruitful engagement with contemporary issues in moral philosophy, such as questions about the nature and role of imperfect duties.

Parolai, Marco. L’Illuminismo Tedesco e Immanuel Kant. [Italian; German enlightenment and Kant] Master’s thesis. Università degli Studi di Siena, 2015. [# p.] Advisor: ??. [WC]

Pave, Adam D. Hope Matters: Kant’s Moral Progress through the Lens of Hope. Ph.D. diss. Claremont Graduate University, 2015. [ix, 234 p.] Advisor: Patricia Easton. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this dissertation, I explore Kant's philosophy of hope from the standpoint of his moral philosophy. Kant's critical philosophy, philosophy of religion and historical thought are important to understanding Kant's philosophy of hope. However, I argue that Kant's moral philosophy is foundation by which we best understand and interpret Kant on hope. My aim is to stimulate further research on the importance of hope, particularly what I call the lens of hope, from the standpoint of Kant's moral thought. To accomplish this, I show when we understand of Kant's vision of moral progress through the lens of hope, we should notice that Kant is promoting a sense of moral responsibility and even a qualified duty to hope for that very same moral progress. Hope for the future interprets the present and allows - or makes it possible - for people to prepare for a better future by becoming morally responsible. Simply put, people who hope become better people, particularly in a moral sense. We are not waiting for better days, but we are making ourselves better by "hoping." If we can regard Kant, primarily, as a moral philosopher, then I argue that we need to approach his philosophy of hope from a moral standpoint. In this work, I argue that the proper study of Kant's philosophy of hope is based upon his moral philosophy, and not upon his philosophy of religion, history, or critical thought."

Penfield, Christopher S. Foucault, Kant, Deleuze, and the Problem of Political Agency. Ph.D. diss. Purdue University, 2015. [339 p.] Advisor: Daniel Smith. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Political agency concerns the transformation of the conditions of social organization through collective action. In order to treat the set of necessary conditions for such agency, I develop a detailed reconstruction of Michel Foucault's political philosophy, placed in relation to the work of Immanuel Kant and Gilles Deleuze. I argue that the key to Foucault's political thought is contained in two crucial but neglected concepts, verticality and transversality, and that the systematic exposition of these concepts yields an account of what must obtain for political agency to be possible, realizable, and sustainable.

Pérez García, Róger Antonio. Arte y Desinterés en la “Analítica de lo sublime” de Kant: una Revisión del Fundamento Moral de la Estética Kantiana. [Spanish] Ph.D. diss. Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2015. [124 p.] Advisor: Kathia Hanza. [WC]

Quitián Alvarez, Eduard Andrés. La uerra en la filosofía kantiana: entre la conveniencia teleológica y la inviabilidad moral. [Spanish] Master’s thesis. Universidad de los Andes, 2015. [115 p.] Advisor: Felipe Castañeda Salamanca. [PQ]

Rimoux, Frédéric. Kants Rechtstheorie vom Weltfrieden. Zwischen apriorischen Rechtsprinzipien und politischer Praxis. Ph.D. diss. Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen, 2015. [268 p.] Advisor: Otfired Höffe. [WC] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kants erste epochale Leistung im Bereich der politischen Philosophie liegt darin, dass er auf die Frage nach den notwendigen Bedingungen der Möglichkeit des vernünftigen Zusammenlebens der Menschen auf Erden eine rechtsphilosophische Antwort a priori gibt. Damit ist jedoch nur ein (freilich ganz entscheidender) Aspekt der eigentlichen epochalen Leistung Kants im Bereich der politischen Philosophie genannt. Darüber hinaus darf jedoch nicht übersehen werden, dass Kant sich insbesondere in der Friedensschrift auch dem Problem der Anwendung der apriorischen Prinzipien des Rechts auf die Erfahrungsfälle widmet. Die hier aufgeworfene Frage ist jene nach dem Verhältnis von Apriorität und Empirie oder anders ausgedrückt von Normativität und Faktizität. Das Mittelglied der Verknüpfung und des Übergangs von den ersteren zu den letzteren sieht Kant in der Figur des moralischen Politikers. In der Friedensschrift weist Kant die These der Unabhängigkeit der Politik von Moral und Recht und somit eine doppelte Moral entschieden zurück. Er stellt dagegen der Politik als ausübende Rechtslehre die Moral als theoretische Rechtslehre begrifflich gegenüber. Moral und Politik stehen somit im Verhältnis zueinander wie die Theorie zur Praxis. In der Folge kann es keinen Widerstreit zwischen Moral, Recht und Politik geben. Wahre Politik soll sich der Moral und dem Recht systematisch unterwerfen. Die Aufgabe der Politik besteht darin, zwecks der moralisch gebotenen Friedensstiftung die apriorischen Prinzipien des Rechts in der politischen Realität zu verwirklichen. Kant zeigt sich dabei als ein erfahrungsoffener, kontextsensibler Rechtsphilosoph, welcher der Erfahrungserkenntnis der Menschen, der Klugheit und der erfahrungsgeschärften Urteilskraft eine gewichtige Rolle einräumt. Die bloße Erkenntnis der erfahrungsunabhängigen Prinzipien des Rechts reicht nicht aus, wenn Politik erfolgreich sein soll. Die Moral und das Recht geben letztlich den Rahmen verbindlich vor, in welchem sich die Politik zu bewegen hat. Innerhalb dieses Rahmens steht aber der Politik die Entscheidung über Mittel und Wege völlig frei. Es gibt keine Autonomie der Politik, also keine Eigengesetzlichkeit, wohl aber eine Eigenständigkeit.

Romero, Paola Valentina. Kant’s Critique of Revolution and the Nature of his Political Thought. MPhil. University of London, King’s College, 2015. [82 p.] Advisor: John Callanan and Sacha Golob. [PQ] [online]

Saunders, Joe. Reason, Freedom and Morality: An Interpretation and Defence of Kant’s Groundwork III. Ph.D. diss. University of Sheffield, 2015. [173 p.] Advisor: ??. [PQ] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant worries that if we are not free, morality will be nothing more than a phantasm for us. In the final section of the Groundwork, he attempts secure our freedom, and with it, morality. Here is a simplified version of his argument: 1. A rational will is a free will 2. A free will stands under the moral law 3. Therefore, a rational will stands under the moral law In this thesis, I offer an interpretation and defence of this. I begin by defending the first two premises. I follow Kant to argue that reason involves freedom, and offer an account of the relationship between freedom and morality. I then turn to two prominent objections. Commentators often complain that Kant has not managed to establish that we are rational beings with wills in the first place, and that he equivocates in his use of ‘free’ between premise 1 and 2. I argue that both of these objections can be overcome, and thus seek to defend Kant’s approach in Groundwork III. In doing so, I depart from Kant (and Kantians) at several points. Most significantly, I argue against a non-metaphysical account of freedom, an anti-realist meta-ethics, and transcendental idealism itself. I stay with the spirit of Kant’s project, but often depart from the letter. In this, I find my project to be post-Kantian; I begin with Kant, but end up alongside his successors. Through this, I hope to vindicate our conception of ourselves as free, such that morality is no phantasm.

Schwall, Marie L. The Conception of War and Peace in a Utopian World Order: A Comparison of T’ai Kungs Six Secret Teachings and Immanuel Kant’s Perpetual Peace. Master’s thesis. Universität Hamburg, 2015. [57 p.] Advisor: ??. [WC]

Sethi, Janum. Kant on Subjectivity and Self-Consciousness. Ph.D. diss. University of California, Berkeley, 2015. [116 p.] Advisor: Daniel Warren and Hannah Ginsborg. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: With his ambitious argument in the Transcendental Deduction, Kant claims to have established that a certain purely formal self-consciousness — the mere consciousness that my thoughts and judgments are mine — guarantees the objectivity of those thoughts and judgments, that is, their claim to represent the world as it is. But this intended conclusion gives rise to two questions: (1) If merely being conscious that my thoughts are mine guarantees their objectivity, does Kant mean to deny that I can ever be conscious of thoughts that are subjective? (2) Does Kant's apparently exclusive focus on formal self-consciousness in the Deduction mean that this is the only way he thinks a cognitive subject can be conscious of herself?
Both questions can be seen as versions of a more general worry about whether a robust account of subjectivity is compatible with Kant's description of cognition in the first Critique. It is the project of my dissertation to argue that such an account of subjectivity is not only possible, but essential to Kant's analysis of cognition. Much of the existing secondary literature on the topic, I claim, overlooks the fact that the two questions I list above are related, and can be jointly answered.
To motivate such an answer, I argue against the standard interpretive response to (1), according to which a subject can judge in a way that is 'merely subjective' by expressing what is true from her particular spatiotemporal point of view rather than from every point of view. I argue that this suggestion misunderstands Kant's objective/subjective distinction: merely subjective judgments are not about the world at all, whereas judgments made from a spatiotemporal point of view surely are.
I also challenge the widely accepted response to (2), on which a subject can become conscious of herself by introspectively becoming aware of her representations as representations. Whereas this entails that empirical self-consciousness is incidental to — and an interruption of — object-directed cognitive activity, I argue that Kant strongly indicates that empirical self-consciousness is involved in and essential for carrying out such cognitive activity in the first place.
In light of these arguments, I develop an alternative account on which I respond to (1) by arguing that judgments count as 'merely subjective' according to Kant insofar as they express combinations of thoughts that a subject finds herself having as a result of psychological associations that hold in her particular case. Furthermore, I claim, it is consciousness of such combinations that constitutes the empirical self-consciousness discussed in (2). Such consciousness is necessary for cognition, I argue, because it explains how we first come to acquire new concepts.
Kant's claim that a subject's empirical character is as essential to he activity of cognition as her transcendental character finally amounts, on my view, to the familiar Kantian dictum that both receptivity and spontaneity are essential ingredients of cognition.

Smyth, Daniel Harrison Sumner. Infinity and Givenness: Kant’s Critical Theory of Sensibility. Ph.D. diss. University of Chicago, 2015. [414 p.] Advisor: Robert B. Pippin. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant notoriously holds that mathematical knowledge is irreducibly (though not exclusively) sensible. But scholars have not appreciated a radical consequence of this view. For Kant also holds that humans can grasp the mathematically infinite; and he thinks we can do so not despite but precisely because of the fact that math is sensibly grounded. Since our senses are manifestly limited in scope and acuity, rationalists and empiricists alike have traditionally held that infinitary knowledge is possible only if it is not sensible. Kant’s conception of sensibility is paradoxically meant to have its paradigmatic manifestation in perception yet also ground infinitary knowledge in mathematics. By understanding how this is possible, I argue, we can recover a philosophically fruitful notion of sensible representation and shed new light on Kant’s cognitive-capacity approach to epistemology. Kant rejects both the rationalists’ logical conception of sensibility (as confused representation) and the empiricists’ phenomenological conception (as vivacity to consciousness). I defend a novel account of Kantian sensibility as resting on a functional analysis of our cognitive finitude: whatever outstrips our finite capacity for discursive thought must, ipso facto, be given to us (i.e. sensibly presented) if it is to be thought at all. This account explains the sensible status of perception as well as infinitary mathematics, since both provide the mind with contents whose complexity discursive thought can accommodate, but never originate. Moreover, this conception of human sensibility emerges out of a functional analysis of our self-understanding as finite knowers. This opens up the possibility of an a priori approach to the philosophy of mind that eschews the traditional, ontological view of the mind as a thinking substance.

Sticker, Martin. Common Human Reason in Kant: a Study in Kant’s Moral Psychology and Philosophical Methods. Ph.D. diss. University of St Andrews, 2015. [267 p.] Advisor: Jens Timmermann. [WC/PQ] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In my thesis I explain why the common, pre-theoretical understanding of morality is an important part of Kant’s ethics, and I critically evaluate what the strengths and weaknesses are of doing ethics with the common perspective as a point of reference. In chapter 1, I discuss the significance of common rational capacities for the deduction in Groundwork III as well as for the Fact of Reason. Attention to the fundamental role of common rational capacities in the Second Critique reveals that Kant intends to provide further warrant for the Fact than its introspective self-evidence. In chapter 2, I discuss what it means for a rational agent to be endowed with common rational capacities. The agent has everything she needs to reason on her own about what she ought to do and act from rational judgements. Furthermore, I critically evaluate Kant’s claim that his ethics spells out fundamental, pre-theoretical convictions. In chapter 3, I discuss Kant’s conception of rationalizing (“Vernünfteln”). I analyse rationalizing as a process of self-deception in which an agent tries to justify or excuse violations of the moral law. This can lead to loss of the reliable use of common rational capacities. I discuss what help critical practical philosophy and moral education can afford against rationalizing. In chapter 4, I argue that Kant saw dialogical engagement with ordinary agents as an important way of obtaining data concerning the correct starting point of practical philosophy. Kant demands that whatever we get from dialog and observation has to be isolated from its contingent elements. I conclude that the main problem for Kant’s method is how we can, on the one hand, exclude non-rational content, and, on the other hand, be open to what other agents actually have to say about morality.

Todaro, Giorgia. La funzione dell’immaginazione tra Kant e Fichte. [Italian; The function of the imagination in Kant between Fichte] Ph.D. diss. Università degli studi di Palerma, 2015. [198 p.] Advisor: Leonardo Samonà. [WC]

Tse, Michelle Man Ha. The Unity of Being: Groundwork for a Theory of Obligations to Other Animals. Master’s thesis. University of Toronto (Law), 2015. [73 p.] Advisor: Peter Benson. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Is there a condition that we recognize in other animals that we must uphold as having absolute value, and that can limit our conduct as a matter of moral imperative? Animals are excluded from direct concern in Kant’s moral philosophy because they do not share in the condition that grounds the moral imperative, namely, the capacity to determine one’s own ends through reason. The reason we value our capacity for free election, however, is because it is the means by which we, as free beings, become unified with our own end. The condition of absolute worth that we must uphold, therefore, is in the unity of our purpose in our being. Animals, as an end of nature, are unified with their own end in their original condition and, therefore, share in the condition that all rational beings must uphold as an absolute value and an end in itself.

Ustyniak, Iwo. Czlowiek a Czas: Kant, Husserl, Heidegger. [Polish; Man and time: Kant, Husserl, Heidegger] Ph.D. diss. Uniwersytet Łódź, 2016. [143 p.] Advisor: Barbara Tuchańska. [WC]

Vatansever, Saniye. Kant’s Response to Hume in the Second Analogy. Ph.D. diss. University of Illinois at Chicago, 2015. [152 p.] Advisor: Daniel Sutherland. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This dissertation project aims to solve – what I call – Kant’s “problem of empirical laws”, a problem concerning the coherence of Kant's claims that empirical laws as laws express a kind of necessity, and as empirical judgments they are contingent. In the literature, this issue is framed in the context of Kant’s relation to Hume, and formulated as a question of whether Kant agrees with Hume that empirical laws are mere contingent generalizations. The disagreement on Kant’s conception of empirical laws partly stems from attributing different goals to Kant's argument in the Second Analogy. In my dissertation, I closely examine the two most popular readings of the Second Analogy, namely the "modest" and the "strong" readings, which view the Second Analogy as responding to Hume's "problem of causation" and "problem of induction" respectively. After pointing out some textual and philosophical problems with both readings, I offer an alternative interpretation of what the Second Analogy establishes, which allows me to read Kant's apparently conflicting passages in a coherent manner, and thereby solve Kant’s problem of empirical laws.

Veneroni, Stefano. La questione delle ‘forze vive’ nel primo scritto di Kant. Tra meccanicismo cartesiano e dinamismo leibniziano. [Italian; The question of 'living forces' in Kant's first writing. Between Cartesian mechanism and Leibnitzian dynamism] Ph.D. diss. Università degli Studi di Macerata / Université Paris Sorbonne (Paris IV), 2015. [818 p.] Advisors: Silvia Ferretti and Dominique Pradelle. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Asking ourselves about the interpretative framework that we should adopt when we set out to read and examine Kant’s first oeuvre demands that we pose the preliminary question of whether a red thread recurs throughout Kant’s philosophical and scientific investigation. A reconstruction of Kant’s theoretical investigation reveals that Kant’s inquiry, beginning with the Gedanken, is entirely devoted to accomplish (I) a systematic description of the universe (understood as objective knowledge of the external and internal world, a knowledge that is viewed both materially and formally, materialiter and formaliter spectata); (II) an antecedently determined description of the universe (understood as subjective knowledge, a knowledge that is viewed both materially and formally, materialiter and formaliter spectata); and (III) a description of the universe that is carried out within the programmatic direction proper of ‘classic’ Science. Our research findings allowed us to (1) show that the question of ‘living forces’ has Aristotelian underpinnings; (2) shed new light on the first development of Kant’s thought and show that the orthodox Kantian sources (that is, Descartes, Leibniz and Wolf) depart from Kant’s philosophical project which was primarily concerned with the problems that resulted from the crisis of Aristotelian science due to Galileo’s contributions and Newton’s attempt at a systemic unification of nature; (3) finally, identify a Kantian solution for overcoming the epistemological dualism (and the incompatibility thereof) between Einstein’s model of a continuum in nature and the Quantum Mechanical model that describes nature as discrete and probabilistic.

Wennersten, Annika. Back to the Woods or Into Ourselves? Kant, Rousseau and the Search for the Essence of Human Nature. Ph.D. diss. Uppsala University, 2015. [262 p.] Advisors: Paulina Remes and Marcel Quarfood. [WC] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This thesis contributes to a field of Kant’s practical philosophy that has received renewed attention, namely his moral anthropology. While it is true that Kant, in some of his best-known writings, literally says that the fundamental ground of morality must be pure and thus entirely free from admixture with anthropological principles, he nevertheless admits that these “subjective conditions” in human nature that “either hinder or help people in fulfilling the laws of the metaphysics of morals” make up the foundation of all applied ethics. In other words, in order to know if and to which extent human beings are susceptible to moral commands, we need to know our abilities as well as our limitations.
Kant wrote several works about these topics and his long-term teaching of anthropology shows that he had a continuing interest in the theory of man. Moreover, it is widely acknowledged that Kant, during the mid-1760s was highly influenced by Rousseau. It is hardly a coincidence that Kant’s first reference to the “unchanging nature of human beings” appeared at the same time as Rousseau proclaimed the need of finding the true nature of man – the unmasked being who has not been damaged by social prejudice. In order to understand man and his moral capacities we need to find his true essence or what really constitutes humanity.
Accordingly, a careful examination of the multifaceted characteristics of human nature is needed in order to understand the very concept of a moral being and to account for his moral progress. I will argue that Kant’s early insights about this need runs like a thread through his entire course of philosophy and that Rousseauian ideas actually affect also his critical ethics. They agree that man is sociable, but also suspicious. He has good predispositions but is likewise susceptible to corruption. My analysis will shed light on man’s eternal balance between conflicting forces and on the means needed for the progress towards the vocation of humankind. This reveals the need of knowing oneself and explains why the question: “what is the human being?” ought to be taken seriously.

Wyrebska-Ðermanovic, Ewa. Projekt Uniwersalnego Stanu Prawnego w Kantowskiej Filozofii Prawa. [Polish] Ph.D. diss. Uniwersytet Lódzki, 2015. [243 p.] Advisor: Andrzej Maciej Kaniowski. [WC]

Zighelboim Grau, Kittim. De Moral y Violencia. [Spanish] Licentiate thesis. Universidad Católica del Perú, 2016. [65 p.] Advisor: ??. [WC]

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Citation Source Key

[ASP] — Academic Search Premier

[JSTOR] — Journal Storage

[M] — material copy of the book or journal

[MUSE] — Project Muse

[PI] — Philosopher’s Index

[PQ] — ProQuest

[PW] — publisher’s website

[RC] — Rodica Croitoru

[WC] — WorldCat

I thank Andrey Zilber for his kind assistance with the articles from the Russian journal Kantovskij Sbornik, Rodica Croitoru for her help with many of the items from the Romanian literature, and my student assistant, Andrew Luwaga, for his help in preparing many of the entries.