[2010]  Kant Bibliography 2011  [2012]

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[top]Kant    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Editions and translations of the writings of Immanuel Kant

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[See also the items listed under Collections]

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Die Frage, ob die Erde veralte, physikalisch erwogen (1754)

 ——. “De la question de savoir si la Terre vieillit, considérée d’un point de vue physique.” [French] Translated and introduced by Hicham-Stéphane Afeissa. Philosophie (Paris) 110 (2011): 3-30. [M]

Der einzig mögliche Beweisgrund (1763)

 ——. Der einzig mögliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes. Historisch-kritische Edition. Edited, and with an introduction and notes, by Lothar Kreimendahl and Michael Oberhausen. Hamburg: Meiner, 2011. [clvii, 290 p.] [M]

Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen (1764)

 ——. Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime and Other Writings. [English] Edited by Patrick Frierson and Paul Guyer, with an introduction by Patrick Frierson. Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011. [xlv, 348 p.] [M] [review]

[Note] [Hide Note] From the Publisher: This volume collects Kant’s most important ethical and anthropological writings from the 1760s, before he developed his critical philosophy. The materials presented here range from the Observations, one of Kant’s most elegantly written and immediately popular texts, to the accompanying Remarks which Kant wrote in his personal copy of the Observations and which are translated here in their entirety for the first time. This edition also includes little-known essays as well as personal notes and fragments that reveal the emergence of Kant's complex philosophical ideas. Those familiar with Kant’s later works will discover a Kant interested in the 'beauty' as well as the 'dignity' of humanity, in human diversity as well as the universality of morals, and in practical concerns rather than abstract philosophizing. Readers will be able to see Kant's development from the Observations through the Remarks towards the moral philosophy that eventually made him famous.
Contents: “Thoughts on the occasion of Mr Johann Friedrich von Funk’s untimely death” (1760) — Observations on the feeling of the beautiful and sublime (1764) — Remarks in the Observations on the feeling of the beautiful and sublime (1764-65) — “Essay on the maladies of the head” (1764) — Inquiry concerning the distinctness of the principles of natural theology and morality (1764) — M. Immanuel Kant’s announcement of the program of his lectures for the winter semester, 1765-1766 (1765) — Herder’s notes from Kant’s lectures on Ethics (1762-64) — Selected notes and fragments from the 1760s.

Versuch über die Krankheiten des Kopfes (1764)

 ——. “Ensayo sobre las enfermedades de la cabeza (1764).” [Spanish] Introduced and translated by Juan Manuel Uribe Cano. Affectio Societatis (Medellín-Colombia) 8.15 (2011): n.p. [online] [WC]

Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1781/87)

 ——. 纯粹理性批判 / Chun cui li xing pi pan. [Chinese] Translated by Lan Guangwu. Shanghai: Shanghai san lian shu dian, 2011. [533 p.] [WC]

 ——. Kritika cistega uma. [Slovenian] Translated by Zdravko Kobe. Ljubljana: Drustvo za teoretsko psihoanalizo, 2011. [312 p.] [WC]

 ——. Tīrā prāta kritika. [Latvian] Translated by Rihards Kūlis. Riga: Zinātne, 2011. [597 p.] [WC]

 ——. 纯粹理性批判 / Chun cui li xing pi pan. [Chinese] Translated by Qiuling Li. Beijing: Zhong guo ren min da xue, 2011. [561 p.] [WC]

 ——. Kritika čistogo razuma. [Russian] Translated by N. O. Losskij, C. G. Arzakanjana, and M. I. Itkin. Moscow: Ėksmo, 2011. [736 p.] [WC]

 ——. 純粋理性批判 / Junsui risei hihan. [Japanese] Vols. 4 and 5 (of 5). Translated by Gen Nakayama. Tokyo: Kobunsha, 2011. [366, 431 p.]

 ——. Crítica de la razón pura. [Spanish] Translated by José del Perojo and José Rovira Armengol; edited by Ansgar Klein. Buenos Aires: Losada, 2011. [792 p.] [WC]

Prolegomena (1783)

 ——.  任何一种能够作为科学出现的未来形而上学导论 / Ren he yi zhong neng gou zuo wei ke xue chu xian de wei lai xing er shang xue dao lun. [Chinese] Translated by Jingren Pang.  Beijing: Shang wu yin shu guan, 2011.  [249 p.]

Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht (1784)

 ——. Kant: Idée d’une histoire universelle au point de vue cosmopolitique. [French] Translated, with analysis, by Paulin Clochec. Paris: Ellipses, 2011. [101 p.] [WC]

“Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?” (1784)

 ——. Răspuns la întrebarea: Ce este Iluminismul? [German/Romanian edition] Translated and notes and introduction by Daniel Mazilu. Piteşti: Paralela, 2011. [131 p.] [WC]

Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (1785)

 ——. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. A German-English Edition. [German/English] Translated by Mary Gregor with revisions by Jens Timmerman; German text edited, and with an introduction by Timmermann. Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011. [xiv, 198 p.] [M] [review]

 ——. Fundamentação da metafísica dos costumes. [Portuguese] Translated by Paulo Quintela, with an introduction by Pedro Galvão. Lisbon: Edições 70, 2011. [132 p.] [WC]

Kritik der praktischen Vernunft (1788)

 ——. Kritik af den praktiske fornuft. [Danish] Translated by Tom Bøgeskov. Helsingør: Det lille Forlag, 2011. [162 p.] [WC]

 ——. Krytyka praktycznego rozumu. [Polish] Translated by Jerzy Galecki. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 2011. [xii, 290 p.] [WC]

 ——. Crítica de la razón práctica. [German/Spanish] Translated, notes, and analytical index by Dulce María Granja Castro. Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2011.  [192 p.] [WC]

 ——. 實踐理性批判 / Shi jian li xing pi pan. [Chinese] Translated by Qiuling Li. Beijing: Zhong guo ren min da xue, 2011. [155 p.] [WC]

Erste Fassung der Einleitung in die Kritik der Urteilskraft (1789)

 ——. Uvod ke Kritice soudnosti: první verze. [Czech] Translated by Jindrich Karásek. Prague: Oikumene, 2011. [87 p.] [WC]

 ——. Primera introducción de la crítica del juicio. [German/Spanish] Translated, edited, and with an introduction by Nuria Sánchez Madrid. Madrid: Escolar y Mayo, 2011. [343 p.] [WC]

Kritik der Urteilskraft (1790)

 ——. Critica del giudizio. [Italian] Translated by Alfredo Gargiulo, introduction by Paolo D’Angelo. Roma: Laterza, 2011. [765 p.] [WC]

 ——. Critica della facoltà di giudizio. [Italian] Edited, and translated by Emilio Garroni and Hansmichael Hohenegger. Torino: Einaudi, 2011. [lxxxv, 317 p.] [WC]

 ——. Le jugement esthétique. [French] Translated and edited by Florence Khodoss. Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2011. [122 p.] [WC]

 ——. 判斷力批判 / Pan duan li pi pan. [Chinese] Translated by Qiuling Li. Beijing: Zhong guo ren min da xue, 2011. [301 p.] [WC]

 ——. Crítica del juicio. [Spanish] Translated by Manuel García Morente; edited by Juan José García Norro and Rogelio Rovira. Madrid: Tecnos, 2011. [461 p.] [WC]

Über das Misslingen aller philosophischen Versuche in der Theodicee (1791)

 ——. Sobre el fracaso de todo ensayo filosófico en la Teodicea. [Spanish/German] Translated by Rogelio Rovira. Madrid: Encuentro, 2011. [59 p.] [WC]

Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft (1793)

 ——. 이성의 한계 안에서의 종교. [Korean] Translated by Jong Hyun Baek. Seoul: Acanet, 2011. [522 p.] [WC]

 ——. Religionen innenfor fornuftens grenser. [Norwegian] Translated by Øystein Skar; introduction by Trond Berg Eriksen. Oslo: Humanist, 2011. [221 p.] [WC]

Welches sind die wirklichen Fortschritte, die die Metaphysik seit Leibnitzens und Wolf’s Zeiten in Deutschland gemacht hat? (1793)

 ——. Sobre el tema del concurso para el año de 1791 propuesto por la Academia Real de Ciencias de Berlín ¿cuáles son los efectivos progresos que la metafísica ha hecho en Alemania desde los tiempos de Leibniz y Wolff?. [Spanish] 2nd ed. Translated by Félix Duque. Madrid: Tecnos, 2011. [ccxxx, 193 p.] [WC]

“Über den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht für die Praxis.” (1793)

 ——. 속설에 대하여: 그것은 이론에서는 옳을지 모르지만, 실천에 대해서는 쓸모없다는. [Korean] Translated by Oh Jin Seok. Seoul, 2011. [127 p.] [WC]

Zum Ewigen Frieden (1795)

 ——. Hacia la paz perpetua: un esbozo filosófico. [Spanish] Translated by Jacobo Muñoz; preface by Pedro Garcia Cuartango. Barcelona: Ciro, 2011. [89 p.] [WC]

 ——. Zum Ewigen Frieden, und Auszüge aus der Rechtslehre. German text edited and with commentary by Peter Niesen and Oliver Eberl. Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2011. [416 p.] [M]

 ——. 영원한 평화를 위하여: 하나의 철학적 기획. [Korean] Translated by Oh Jin Seok. Seoul, 2011. [110 p.] [WC]

Die Metaphysik der Sitten in zwei Teilen (1797)

 ——. Doctrine du droit, vol. 1 of Métaphysique des moeurs. [French] Translated and with an introduction by Alexis Philonenko, preface by Michel Villey. Paris: J. Vrin, 2011. [408 p.] [WC]

 ——. 法的形而上学原理: 权利的科学 / Fa de xing er shang xue yuan li: quan li de ke xue [Chinese; The science of right]. Translated by name??. Beijing: Shang wu yin shu guan, 2011. [220 p.] [WC]

Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht abgefaßt (1798)

 ——. Anthrōpología apó pragmatologikē ápopsē. Transl. into Greek by Haris Tasakos. Athens: Printa, 2011. [291 p.] [WC]

Jäsche Logik (1800)

 ——. 逻辑学讲义 / Luo ji xue jiang yi [Chinese; Logic lectures]. Transl. into Chinese by Jingzing Xu, edited by Yizhi Yang. Beijing: Shang wu yin shu guan, 2011. [155 p.] [WC]

Nachlaß

 ——. Réflexions métaphysiques (1780-1789). Transl. into French, and notes, by Sophie Grapotte. Paris: J. Vrin, 2011. [300 p.] [WC]

Collections

[Pevatolo/Di Donato 2011] Sette scritti politici liberi. [Italian] Translated, with commentary, of Kant’s political writings by Maria Chiara Pievatolo and Francesca Di Donato. Florence: Firenze University Press, 2011. [283 p.] [online] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Translations into Italian, with commentary, of seven of Kant‘s essays: (1) “Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht,” (2) “Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?,” (3) “Von der Unrechtmäßigkeit des Büchernachdrucks,” (4) “Über den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht für die Praxis,” (5) Zum ewigen Frieden. Ein philosophischer Entwurf, (6) “Über ein vermeintes Recht, aus Menschenliebe zu lügen,” and (7) Part Two of Der Streit der Fakultäten: “Ob das menschliche Geschlecht im beständigen Fortschreiten zum Besseren sei.”

[Wloch 2011] Religia w obrebie samego rozumu / Spór fakultetów / Metafizyka moralnosci. [Polish] Translation of Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft, Der Streit der Facultäten, and Die Metaphysik der Sitten by Wojciech Wloch, Aleksander Bobko, Miroslaw Zelazny, and Wlodzimierz Galewicz. Torun: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Mikolaja Kopernika, 2011. [682 p.] [WC]

[Zick 2011] Începutul şi sfârşitul [Romanian; Beginning and end]. Translation of Conjectural Beginning and The End of all Things by Martin Zick. Bucarest: All, 2011. [70 p.] [WC]

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[top]A    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Acerbi, Ariberto. Rev. of Libertà e moralità: A partire da Kant, by Marco Ivaldo (2010). Acta Philosophica: Pontificia Universita della Santa Croce 20.1 (2011): 213-15. [PI]

Achourioti, T., and M. Van Lambalgen. “A Formalization of Kant’s Transcendental Logic.” The Review of Symbolic Logic 4.2 (2011): 254-89. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Although Kant (1998) envisaged a prominent role for logic in the argumentative structure of his Critique of Pure Reason, logicians and philosophers have generally judged Kant’s logic negatively. What Kant called ‘general’ or ‘formal’ logic has been dismissed as a fairly arbitrary subsystem of first-order logic, and what he called 'transcendental logic’ is considered to be not a logic at all: no syntax, no semantics, no definition of validity. Against this, we argue that Kant’s ‘transcendental logic’ is a logic in the strict formal sense, albeit with a semantics and a definition of validity that are vastly more complex than that of first-order logic. The main technical application of the formalism developed here is a formal proof that Kant's table of judgements in section 9 of the Critique of Pure Reason, is indeed, as Kant claimed, complete for the kind of semantics he had in mind. This result implies that Kant’s ‘general’ logic is after all a distinguished subsystem of first-order logic, namely what is known as geometric logic.

Acosta, María del Rosario. Rev. of Correspondencia: Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, edited and translated by Jorge Aurelio Díaz, H. Ochoa, and R. Gutiérrez (2011). [Spanish] Ideas y Valores: Revista Colombiana de Filosofia 60.147 (2011): 254-63. [text] [PI]

Aframjani, Ali-Akbar Ahmadi, and Amir Naemy. “Gödel: From Relativity to Idealism: The Consistency between Einstein’s Relativity Theory and Kant’s Philosophy of Time.” [Farsi] Hekmat va Falsafeh 7 (2011): 119-142. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Einstein’s theory of relativity made many difficulties for Newtonian physics, so as it did not remain any way for keeping it but setting apart or reforming some of the most fundamental concepts such as space and time. Many thinkers believe that relativity theory made some irreparable hurts on Kant’s philosophy. However, some other thinkers, like Gödel, have tried to read relativity theory in such a way that not only have no contradiction with Kant’s philosophy, but also introduce some affirmations for it. This paper casts light on Gödel’s effort for reconciling relativity theory with Kant’s philosophy in the topic of ‘time’; it also contains some remarks on the point that how conception of time in relativity theory can lead us to defend idealism. Finally, it would be suggested that for reconciling Kant’s philosophy with modern science, we should both cease his inflexibility about the process of acquiring knowledge and set apart the hypothesis of being unknowable of the thing-in-itself.

Agard, Olivier, and Françoise Lartillot. “Introduction.”  Kant: l’anthropologie et l’histoire. Eds. Olivier Agard and Françoise Lartillot (op cit.). 7-13. [WC]

 —— and Françoise Lartillot, eds. Kant: l’anthropologie et l’histoire. Paris: Harmattan, 2011. [221 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents:
Gérard Raulet, “Les passages politiques de Kant”
Christian Thies, “Kants Geschichtsphilosophie aus heutiger Sicht”
Jean-Michel Muglioni, “Pourquoi faut-il une philosophie de l’histoire pour répondre à la question «qu’est-ce que l’homme?»?”
Cédric Chappuis. “«Der Keim der Aufklärung». Penser le progrés et l’histoire dans le système critique de Kant”
Philippe Huneman, “Hérédité et adaptation: la conception kantienne des races et des espèces”
Anne Lagny, “Questions de méthode. La réponse de Forster à Kant dans Noch etwas über die Menschenrassen (1786)”
Angèle Kremer-Marietti, “Kant et l’ouvrage de Soemmering, De l’organe de l’âme”
Monique Castillo, “L’idée kantienne de république selon le droit, la politique et l’histoire”
Andrea Allerkamp, “«Dann kann Ich allererst ihn mit Vernunft übersehen.» Kants Arbeit an Rousseau”
Goran Gretic, “Die gegenwärtige Bedeutung von Pax Kantiana”
Norbert Waszek, “Peut-on, avec Kant, passer de l’etat de droit (Rechtsstaat) à un etat de droit social (sozialer Rechtsstaat)?”
Alexandre Dupeyrix, “Le projet de paix perpetuelle. Une relecture de Kant par Habermas”

Aka-Evy, Jean-Luc. “L’image de l’Afrique noire à l’épreuve de la théorie critique et de l’anthropologie kantiennes.”  Kant et les sciences. Un dialogue philosophique avec la pluralité des savoirs. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Mai Lequan, and Margit Ruffing (op cit.). 361-66. [M]

Alain, Vincent. “De l’in esse leibnizien à l’Inhalt kantien.”  Kant et la science. La théorie critique et transcendantale de la connaissance. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Mai Lequan, and Margit Ruffing (op cit.). 215-23. [M]

Alegría, Ciro. Rev. of Immanuel Kant — Was bleibt?, by Reinhard Brandt (2010). Arete: Revista de Filosofia 23.2 (2011): 423-26. [PI]

Ales Bello, Angela. “The Transcendental: Husserl and Kant.” Transcendentalism Overturned: From Absolute Power of Consciousness Until the Forces of Cosmic Architectonics. Ed. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (op cit.). 229-43. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The essay deals with the notion of “transcendental” as it is proposed by Husserl and Kant. The key point of this comparison is linked up with the phenomenological analysis of consciousness with its lived-experiences and the discovery of the relationship between the level of the passive syntheses and the active ones. This kind of analysis distinguishes Husserl’s position from Kant’s one, even if the former uses the word “transcendental” to pinpoint the structure of subjectivity. The consequence of Husserl’s approach is that the knowledge of the world, of the human being and of God is gained in a totally different manner regarding Kant.

Allais, Lucy. “Transcendental Idealism and the Transcendental Deduction.” Kant’s Idealism. Eds. Schulting and Verburgt (op cit.). 91-107. [M]

 ——. “Idealism Enough: Response to Roche.” Kantian Review 16.3 (2011): 375-98. [M]

Allerkamp, Andrea. “«Dann kann Ich allererst ihn mit Vernunft übersehen.”  Kant: l’anthropologie et l’histoire. Eds. Olivier Agard and Françoise Lartillot (op cit.). 155-74. [WC]

Allison, Henry E. Kant’s Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals: A Commentary. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. [xii, 377 p.] [review] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents: Pt. 1. Preliminaries. The nature of and need for a metaphysic of morals: an analysis of the preface of GMS — Universal practical philosophy and popular moral philosophy — Pt. 2. GMS 1. The good will — Maxims and moral worth redux — Kant’s three propositions, the supreme principle of morality, and the need for moral philosophy — Pt. 3. GMS 2. Rational agency and imperatives — The universal law (FUL) and the law of nature (FLN) — The formula of humanity (FH) — Autonomy, heteronomy, and constructing the categorical imperative — Pt. 4. GMS 3. The moral law, the categorical imperative, and the reciprocity thesis — The presupposition of freedom, the circle, and the two standpoints — The deduction of the categorical imperative and the outermost boundary of practical philosophy.

 ——. “Reason, Revelation, and History in Lessing and Kant.” Internationales Jahrbuch des Deutschen Idealismus/International Yearbook of German Idealism 7 (2011[sic]): 35-57. [M]

Allouche-Pourcel, Béatrice. Kant et la Schwärmerei: histoire d’une fascination. Paris: l’Harmattan, 2011. [285 p.] [WC]

Altman, Matthew C. Kant and Applied Ethics: The Uses and Limits of Kant’s Practical Philosophy. Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011. [x, 320 p.] [WC] [review]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents: Animal suffering and moral character — Kant’s strategic importance for environmental ethics — Moral and legal arguments for universal health care — The scope of patient autonomy — Subjecting ourselves to capital punishment — Same-sex marriage as a means to mutual respect — Consent, mail-order brides, and the marriage contract — Individual maxims and social justice — The decomposition of the corporate body — On becoming a person — Conclusion: emerging from Kant’s long shadow.

Altuner, Ilyas. “Transcendental Dialectic: Critique of Metaphysics in the Philosophy of Al-Ghazali and Kant.” [Turkish] Felsefe va Sosial-siyasi Elmler (Philosophy and Social-Political Sciences) 1 (2011): 49-57. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Our study aims to deal with different and similar conditions between Al-Ghazali and Kant, as characters at whom can show two different thinking form and two different cultural structure in their thoughts, in the context of the same subject. The article investigates the stages of these two thinkers approaches to the topic of transcendental dialectic and tries to display that why and how two different cultural worlds incline to this subject.

Alves, Pedro. “La question kantienne de l’espace face à la phénoménologie et la nouvelle physique.”  Figuras da Racionalidade: Neokantismo e Fenomenologia. Ed. Olivier Feron (op cit.). 59-67. [WC]

Ameriks, Karl. “Kant’s Idealism on a Moderate Interpretation.” Kant’s Idealism. Eds. Schulting and Verburgt (op cit.). 29-53. [M]

 ——. “Das Schicksal von Kants Rezensionen zu Herders Ideen.” Immanuel Kant, Schriften zur Geschichtsphilosophie. Ed. Otfried Höffe (op cit.). 119-36. [M]

Andaluz, Ana Maria. “Sistemática de la Naturaleza y vida orgánica en la Crítica del juicio.” [Spanish]  Kant y las ciencias. Ed. Pedro Jesús Teruel (op cit.). 91-137. [M]

Anderson-Gold, Sharon. “Cosmopolitan Right: State and System in Kant’s Political Theory.” Politics and Metaphysics in Kant. Eds. Sorin Baiasu, Howard Williams, and Sami Pihlström (op cit.). 235-49. [M]

Andreica, V. V. “Critica kantiană a argumentului ontologic şi depăşirea acesteia din perspectiva conceptului de existenţă necesară.” [Romanian; Kant’s Critique of the Ontological Argument and Its Overtaking from the View of the Concept of a Necessary Existence] An. Univ. Craiova, Filosofie 28.2 (2011): 147-57. [RC]

Andriopoulos, Stefan. “Kant’s Magic Lantern: Historical Epistemology and Media Archaeology.” Representations 115.1 (2011): 42-70. [JSTOR]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This essay juxtaposes Kant’s critical epistemology with the visual medium of the phantasmagoria and a contemporaneous debate about spirit apparitions. Kant’s notion of Erscheinung as an appearance or apparition of a supersensory thing in itself draws on the previous hypothesis of genuine spirit apparitions from his Dreams of a Spirit Seer (1766). His doctrine of transcendental illusion, by contrast, adapts a second, skeptical explanation of spirit visions by describing speculative metaphysics as a “magic lantern of brain phantoms.” Kant thereby transforms the optical instrument into an epistemological figure, highlighting the unreliability and limits of philosophical knowledge.

Angelis, Nicolas. “L’objet de la Logique selon Kant et Aristote.”  Kant et la science. La théorie critique et transcendantale de la connaissance. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Mai Lequan, and Margit Ruffing (op cit.). 235-41. [M]

Aportone, Anselmo. “Forma dell’intuizione e intuizione formale: Configurazioni dell’apriori della sensibilità nella filosofia di Kant.” [Italian] Rivista di Storia della Filosofia 66.3 (2011): 4431-70. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant characterizes space and time as both forms of intuition and formal intuitions, thus in two different though interlinked ways, which are outlined clearly but not exhaustively and contextually developed. A careful examination of these notions is nevertheless required for a better understanding of the theory of the synthesis of intuition, perception and experience. This essay explains the concepts of form of intuition and formal intuition and their relation to one other, principally in the context of the first Critique but also with respect to the development of the Kantian reflection on the a priori of sensibility up to the Opus postumum.

Апресян, Р. Г. (Apresíàn, R. G.). О праве лгать / O prave lgatʹ. [Russian; The Right to Lie] Moscow: Rosspen, 2011. [390 p.] [WC]

Araujo, Saulo de Freitas. “A Questão da psicologia empírica no período pré-crítico: explicando uma ruptura no pensamento.” [Portuguese] Kant e-Prints 6.2 (2011): 59-70. [online] [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant‟s assertions about the nature and limits of empirical psychology in relation to philosophical knowledge are well known and have been abundantly discussed in the secondary literature. The latter, however, has centered on the critical period, leaving some important questions for a better understanding of Kantian thought unanswered. Accordingly, a more thorough explanation of the gradual transformation that empirical psychology underwent in Kant‟s thought is called for, from its initial subordination to metaphysics in the tradition of Wolff and his disciple Baumgarten to its dissolution in pragmatic anthropology. The aim of this paper is to present the first results of a larger study that will indicate similarities and differences between Wolff and Kant (in his pre-critical period) in their conception of empirical psychology. The concept of empirical psychology and its potential contributions to metaphysics will be emphasized here. Finally, some ramifications of this question in the critical period will be indicated.

Arana, Juan. “Naturaleza y libertad: Kant y la tradición racionalista.” [Spanish]  Kant y las ciencias. Ed. Pedro Jesús Teruel (op cit.). 320-31. [M]

Arias-Albisu, Martín. “El esquema trascendental de las categorías de la cantidad como determinación temporal.” [Spanish] Endoxa: Series Filosoficas 27 (2011): 55-72. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The objective of this article is to show that two theses about the nature of transcendental schemas are valid for the case of the transcendental schema of the categories of quantity. (1) Transcendental schemas are procedures of synthesis and, simultaneously, the main temporal properties of the empirical objects produced by these procedures. In the case of the transcendental schema that we are studying, on one hand, Kant calls the schema, insofar as it is a procedure, a “number,” (Zahl). On the other hand, we hold that the schema as a product is determined by what Kant calls “extensive magnitude” (extensive Größe). (2) Transcendental schemas are not determinations of pure time, but temporal determinations of empirical things. In other words, the syntheses of schemas as procedures do not determine pure intuition but, rather, they temporally determine empirical multiplicity.

 ——. “La concepción objetiva de la substancia en la Crítica de la razón pura de Kant.” [Spanish] Revista Estudios de Filosofía 44 (2011): 39-60. [HUM]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The aim of this paper is to examine a duality in the objective conception of substance in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. With this purpose in mind, I analyze the transcendental schema of the category of substance and accident. My hypothesis is that two different conceptions of substance can be distinguished in the Kantian text. On the one hand, substances1 are the relatively permanent objects of everyday experience. On the other hand, substance2 is the absolutely permanent matter of which substances1 are made. Since substances1 are accidents or ways of existing of substance2, both conceptions are part of a coherent theory.

Arroyo, Christopher. “Freedom and the Source of Value: Korsgaard and Wood on Kant’s Formula of Humanity.” Metaphilosophy 42.4 (2011): 353-59. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This essay examines two interpretations of Kant’s argument for the formula of humanity. Christine M. Korsgaard defends a constructivist reading of Kant’s argument, maintaining that humans must view themselves as having absolute value because their power for rational choice confers value on their ends. Allen Wood, however, defends a realist interpretation of Kant’s argument, maintaining that humans actually are absolutely valuable and that their choices do not confer value but rather reflect their understanding of how the objects of their choices fulfill their needs and wants and contribute to their flourishing. Though Korsgaard’s reading is more consistent with Kant’s prioritizing of the right over the good, this essay raises a metaethical question regarding her constructivist position, namely, “What is meant by her claim that rational choice ‘confers’ value on objects?” In developing this question, it presents a realist account of goodness that is taken from Peter Geach’s “Good and Evil.”

Asheim, Olav. “What is Said with a Sentence σ in a Context C?” Kant, Here, Now, and How. Eds. Siri Granum Carson, Jonathan Knowles, and Bjørn K. Myskja (op cit.). 161-78. [M]

Asmuth, Christoph, and Patrick Grüneberg, eds. Subjekt und Gehirn, Mensch und Natur. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2011. [350 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: See the essays by Burkhard Nonnenmacher (“»Genau zu reden, hat also die Organisation der Natur nichts Analogisches mit irgend einer Causalität, die wir kennen.« Überlegungen zu Kants Kritik der Urteilskraft”) and Sergueї Spetschinsky (“Die Natur in der Kritik der Urteilskraft von Kant”).

Audard, Catherine. Rev. of Reconstructing Rawls: The Kantian Foundations of Justice as Fairness, by Robert Taylor (2011). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (October 2011, #6). [online] [M]

Axtmann, Roland. “Cosmopolitanism and Globality: Kant, Arendt, and Beck on the Global Condition.” German Politics and Society 29.3 (2011): 20-37. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The notion of cultural plurality and the idea of intercultural dialogue have been central to the discussion of cosmopolitanism in both political philosophy and social theory. This point is developed in an exposition of the arguments put forward by Immanuel Kant and Hannah Arendt and through a critical engagement with Ulrich Beck's social theory of cosmopolitanism as a “social reality.“ It is argued that Beck's analysis fails to convince as a sociological extension of a long philosophical tradition and that instead of Beck's macrostructural analysis it is more promising to formulate an actor-centred sociological theory on the transnationalization of social spaces and the formation of a “cosmopolitan“ consciousness or awareness of transnational actors.

Aydin, Ciano. “Generalizing in a Pluralistic Society: From Kant’s Duty Ethics to Peirce’s Communitarian Ethics of Ideals.” Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia 12.1 (2011): 21-33. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper the author reflects on the problem of generalizing in a pluralistic society. According to him, what is much needed in our postmodern era is an ethical perspective that, on the one hand, does not disregard the different particular, empirical settings in which moral criteria emerge and are being developed and, on the other hand, endorses the possibility of pursuing common goals and ideals. This perspective is developed through a reconstruction of a dialog between Kant and Peirce.

[top] B    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Bacin, Stefano, and Dieter Schönecker. “Gründlich zerstört oder gründlich gelesen? Eine Replik auf Brandts alternative Lesart des §9 der Tugendlehre.” Kant-Studien 102.1 (2011): 113-19. [M]

Bächtold, Manuel. “L’espace dans ses dimensions transcendantale et pragmatiste.” Kant-Studien 102.2 (2011): 145-67. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article examines the Kantian thesis of the a priori nature of our knowledge of space. Because it makes the representation of objects possible as external to us and all others, and consequently, as distinct and individualized, space (whatever its structure may be) claims the status as necessary condition and as apriori possibility of all knowledge. However, in the light of various physical, psychological and philosophical considerations, it seems that the particular structure allocated by Kant to space (i.e., uniqueness, infinity, continuity, homogeneity, isotropy, Euclidean character and three-dimensional character) is neither necessary nor a priori but is rather contingent and dependent on experience. For this reason a pragmatist relativization of the transcendental approach appears to be necessary: the structure of space which makes knowledge possible is not apriori in an absolute sense, but rather, it is determined within the context of a certain practice, which is characterized by a certain mode of interaction with the environment and reveals particular empirical constraints to which this spatial structure must fit.

Baghramian, Maria, ed. Kant and Nonconceptual Content. Abingdon: Routledge, 2011. [320-520 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: A special issue (19.3) of the International Journal of Philosophical Studies

Baiasu, Sorin. Kant and Sartre: Re-Discovering Critical Ethics. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. [xiii, 291 p.] [M]

 ——. “Space, Time and Mind-Dependence.” Kantian Review 16.2 (2011): 175-90. [M]

 ——. “Metaphysics and Moral Judgement.” Politics and Metaphysics in Kant. Eds. Sorin Baiasu, Howard Williams, and Sami Pihlström (op cit.). 174-95. [M]

 ——, Sami Pihlström, and Howard Williams. “Metaphysics and Politics in the Wake of Kant: The Project of a Critical Practical Philosophy.” Politics and Metaphysics in Kant. Eds. Sorin Baiasu, Howard Williams, and Sami Pihlström (op cit.). 1-27. [M]

 —— and Michelle Grier. “Revolutionary versus Traditionalist Approaches to Kant: Some Aspects of the Debate.” Kantian Review 16.2 (2011): 161-73. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The interpretation of Kant’s Critical philosophy as a version of traditional idealism has a long history. In spite of Kant’s and his commentators’ various attempts to distinguish between traditional and transcendental idealism, his philosophy continues to be construed as committed (whether explicitly or implicitly and whether consistently or inconsistently) to various features usually associated with the traditional idealist project. As a result, most often, the accusation is that his Critical philosophy makes too strong metaphysical and epistemological claims.
In his The Revolutionary Kant, Graham Bird engages in a systematic and thorough evaluation of the traditionalist interpretation, as part of perhaps the most comprehensive and compelling defence of a revolutionary reading of Kant’s thought. In the third part of this special issue, the exchanges between, on the one hand, Graham Bird and, on the other, Gary Banham, Gordon Brittan, Manfred Kuehn, Adrian Moore and Kenneth Westphal focus on specific aspects of Bird’s interpretation of Kant’s first Critique. More exactly, the emphasis is on specific aspects of Bird's interpretation of the Introduction, Analytic of Principles and Transcendental Dialectic of Kant's first Critique.
The second part of the special issue is devoted to discussions of particular topics in Bird’s construal of the remaining significant parts of the first Critique, namely, of the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Analytic of Concepts. Written by Sorin Baiasu and Michelle Grier, these articles examine specific issues in these two remaining parts of the Critique, from the perspective of the debate between the traditionalist and revolutionary interpretation. The special issue begins with an Introduction by the guest co-editors. This provides a summary of the exchanges between Bird and his critics, with a particular focus on the debates stemming from the differences between traditional and revolutionary interpretations of Kant.

 ——, Howard Williams, and Sami Pihlström, eds. Politics and Metaphysics in Kant. Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2011. [viii, 277 p.] [M] [review]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents: Sorin Baiasu, Sami Pihlström, and Howard Williams, “Metaphysics and Politics in the Wake of Kant: The Project of a Critical Practical Philosophy”; Kenneth R. Westphal, “Kant’s Moral Constructivism and Rational justification”; Alyssa R. Bernstein, “Political, not Metaphysical, yet Kantian? A Defence of Rawls”; Sami Pihlström, “On the Conditions of Discourse and Being: Kantian, Wittgensteinian and Levinasian Perspectives on the Relation between Metaphysics and Ethics”; Lucas Thorpe, “One Community or Many? From Logic to Juridical Law via Metaphysics”; Tatiana Patrone, “Kant’s Rechtslehre and Ideas of Reason”; Lea Ypi, “Practical Agency, Teleology and System in Kant’s Architectonic of Pure Reason”; Katerina Deligiorgi, “What a Kantian Can Know A Priori: An Argument for Moral Cognitivism”; Sorin Baiasu, “Metaphysics and Moral Judgement”; Garrath Williams, “‘Intelligible Facts’: Toward a Constructivist Account of Action and Responsibility”; Howard Williams, “Metaphysical and not just Political”; Sharon Anderson-Gold, “Cosmopolitan Right: State and System in Kant’s Political Theory”; Oliver Eberl, “The Metaphysics of International Law: Kant’s ‘Unjust Enemy’ and the Limitation of Self-Authorization”

Baker, Gideon. “Right of Entry or Right of Refusal? Hospitality in the Law of Nature and Nations.” Review of International Studies 37.3 (2011): 1423-45. [JSTOR]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article explores the account of international hospitality found in the natural law tradition from Vitoria to Kant. Rather than limit itself to intellectual history, the focus here is on a more enduring theme: the double-bind of hospitality which the natural lawyers encountered in seeking to find a place for the welcome of the foreigner in the ‘law of nations’. Although these thinkers agreed on a natural right of communication, this proved destabilising, even destructive, of the property claims by which hosts establish their domain as properly theirs in the first place. All struggled with this double-bind, though this took different forms, from the concern that the law of hospitality might thereby justify colonial appropriation to fears for how it could threaten sovereignty. Two thinkers arguably find a way out of the double-bind of right of communication-right of property in hospitality, but sacrifice the law of hospitality in the process: Pufendorf, subordinating communication to property, turns hospitality into charity and thereby effectively denies it status as a law of nature; Kant, putting communication first, makes hospitality a matter of right, not philanthropy, but also sees it as instrumental to the development of a global civil condition, where it would be redundant.

Balanovsky, Valentin V. “Kant versus Vladimir Solovyov: Gnosiology With Reflection and Without It.” [Russian] Kantovskij Sbornik 36 (2011): 22-37. [M]

Bambauer, Christoph. Deontologie und Teleologie in der kantischen Ethik. Freiburg/München: Verlag Karl Alber, 2011. [532 p.] [data] [M]

Banham, Gary. “Transcendental Idealism and Transcendental Apperception.” Kant’s Idealism. Eds. Schulting and Verburgt (op cit.). 109-25. [M]

 ——. “New Work on Kant’s Doctrine of Right.” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 19.3 (2011): 549-60. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Review of Arthur Ripstein, Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy (2009) and B. Sharon Byrd and Joachim Hruschka, Kant’s Doctrine of Right: A Commentary (2010).

 ——. “The Status of the Principles of the Analogies.” Kantian Review 16.2 (2011): 201-10. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The purpose of this piece is to elucidate the status of Kant’s analogies of experience in his overall transcendental philosophy of nature. The rationale for the discussion is as a reply to Graham Bird’s account of the analogies in his recently published commentary on the Critique of Pure Reason. Conclusions reached are that the principles of the analogies have to be seen as justifying a view of event-types that relates to a conception of causal laws, that they do justify causal determinism and that the sense in which they are “regulative” is different from that in which regulative ideas are “regulative”.

Barale, Massimo. Rev. of Leçons sur Kant, by Mario Caimi (2007). [Italian] Studi Kantiani 24 (2011): 137-41. [M]

Baranzke, Heike. “Menschenwürde – nichts als ein Rechtsbegriff? Zur notwendigen Differenzierung des Begriffs menschlicher Würde in Recht, Moral und Ethik im Anschluss an die Kantische Moralphilosophie.”  Facetten der Menschenwürde. Eds. Nikolaus Knoepffler, Peter Kunzmann und Martin O’Malley (Freiburg/Munich: Alber, 2011). 191-215. [WC]

Baron, Marcia. “Virtue Ethics in Relation to Kantian Ethics: An Opinionated Overview and Commentary.” Perfecting Virtue: New Essays on Kantian Ethics and Virtue Ethics. Eds. Lawrence Jost and Julian Wuerth (op cit.). 8-37. [M]

Barron, Anne. “Kant, Copyright and Communicative Freedom.” Law and Philosophy: Online First, posted 29 June 2011. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The rapid recent expansion of copyright law worldwide has sparked efforts to defend the ‘public domain’ of non-propertized information, often on the ground that an expansive public domain is a condition of a ‘free culture’. Yet questions remain about why the public domain is worth defending, what exactly a free culture is, and what role (if any) authors’ rights might play in relation to it. From the standard liberal perspective shared by many critics of copyright expansionism, the protection of individual expression by means of marketable property rights in authors’ works serves as an engine of progress towards a fully competitive ‘marketplace of ideas’ – though only if balanced by an extensive public domain from which users may draw in the exercise of their own expressivity. This article shows that a significantly different, and arguably richer, conception of what a free culture is and how authors’ rights underpin it emerges from a direct engagement with the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. For Kant, progress towards a fully emancipated (i.e. a ‘mature’ or ‘enlightened’) culture can only be achieved through the critical intellectual activity that public communication demands: individual expressive freedom is only a condition, not constitutive, of this ‘freedom to make public use of one’s reason in all matters’. The main thesis defended in this article is that when Kant’s writings on publicity (critical public debate) are read in relation to his writings on the legal organization of publishing, a necessary connection emerges between authors’ rights – as distinct from copyrights – and what Jürgen Habermas and others have named the public sphere. I conclude that it is the public sphere, and not the public domain as such, that should serve as the key reference point in any evaluation of copyright law’s role in relation to the possibility of a free culture.

Barth, Christian, and Holger Sturm, eds. Robert Brandom’s expressive Vernunft: historische und systematische Untersuchungen. Paderborn: Mentis, 2011. [378 p.] [WC] [data]

Bassoli, Selma Aparecida. “L’usage des grandeurs négatives en morale.”  Kant et les sciences. Un dialogue philosophique avec la pluralité des savoirs. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Mai Lequan, and Margit Ruffing (op cit.). 87-96. [M]

Baum, Manfred. “Objects and Objectivity in Kant’s First Critique.” Kant’s Idealism. Eds. Schulting and Verburgt (op cit.). 55-70. [M]

Baumann, Lutz. “La philosophie et les sciences chez Kant et Hegel.”  Kant et la science. La théorie critique et transcendantale de la connaissance. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Mai Lequan, and Margit Ruffing (op cit.). 95-105. [M]

Baur, Michael. “From Kant’s Highest Good to Hegel’s Absolute Knowing.” A Companion to Hegel. Eds. Stephen Houlgate and Michael Baur (op cit.). 452-73. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This chapter aims to show how G. W. F. Hegel developed his own philosophical thought through a critical consideration of the immanent tensions and difficulties in the work of Immanuel Kant. More specifically, this chapter investigates Kant’s thinking about “the highest good” and “the moral proof” for God’s existence, and illustrates how Hegel’s critical engagement with Kantian thought led him eventually to his account of “absolute knowing” in the Phenomenology of Spirit. Special attention is paid to the critical reception of Kant’s “moral proof” at the Tübingen seminary where Hegel studied; the meaning of self-positing in J. G. Fichte’s philosophy; and the role of “conscience” in the sections of Hegel’s Phenomenology leading up to “absolute knowing.”

Bayne, Steven M. “Marks, Images, and Rules: Concepts and Transcendental Idealism.” Kant’s Idealism. Eds. Schulting and Verburgt (op cit.). 127-42. [M]

Beade, Ileana P. “Concepto, palabra y límite: un análisis de las observaciones kantianas referidas al uso e interpretación de términos filosóficos.” [Spanish; Concept, word and limit: an analysis of Kant’s observations concerning the use and interpretation of philosophical terms] Revista Estudios de Filosofía 44 (2011): 77-97. [HUM]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper I analyze some observations made by Kant concerning the difficulties implied in the selection and use of linguistic terms in the process of philosophical writing (a topic which is analyzed in the “Transcendental Dialectic”, Critique of Pure Reason). I believe this analysis is relevant not only for a general reconstruction of Kant’s conception of language, but also in order to understand the distinction between concept and word established within the framework of Kant’s critical epistemology. I will also suggest that, although in this initial section of the “Dialectic” we encounter important problems which will be frequently discussed in contemporary discussions of Philosophy of Language, the methodological strategy adopted by Kant in order to solve the specific philosophical issues considered in the first Critique prevents him from conceiving such problems as relevant to the determination of the limits of human knowledge.

Bęben, Dariusz, and Andrzej Jan Noras, eds. Filozofia Kanta i jej recepcja. [Polish; Kant’s Philosophy and its reception] Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, 2011. [269 p.] [contents] [WC]

Becchi, Paolo. Kant diverso: pena, natura, dignità. [Italian] Brescia: Morcelliana, 2011. [114 p.] [WC]

Beck, Lewis White. 实践理性批判》通释. Translation of A Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason into Chinese by Liuyisi Beike zhu and Huang Tao yi. Shanghai: Hua dong shi fan da xue chu ban she, 2011. [394 p.] [WC]

Begley, Ann Marie. “The good, the bad and the ‘not so bad’: Reflecting on moral appraisal in practice.” Nursing Inquiry 18.1 (2011): 21-28. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The aim of this study is to facilitate reflection on the moral merit of practitioners in various contexts. Insight is gained from Aristotelian and Kantian accounts of moral character and an original framework for reflection is presented as an adjunct to ethical theory and principles considered when appraising others. In relation to states of character, there is an irreconcilable difference between Kantian (deontic) and Aristotelian (aretaic) conceptions of the nature of full virtue (excellence of character), but at the same time it can be argued that in relation to practice their approaches complement each other. It is also argued that in relation to caring for the vulnerable, Aristotle’s conception of full virtue is more compelling than Kant’s. On the other hand, Kant’s notion of self-serving action is important in nursing and it therefore needs to be considered when reflecting on professional conduct. The conclusion reached is that Aristotelian and Kantian accounts of character appraisal should be used in a combined approach to moral appraisal. This approach draws on the accounts of both philosophers and offers valuable insight into moral character, professional conduct and, in a more formal setting, fitness to practise.

Beiner, Ronald. “Paradoxes in Kant’s Account of Citizenship.” Kant and the Concept of Community. Eds. Charlton Payne and Lucas Thorpe (op cit.). 209-25. [M]

Bencivenga, Ermanno:. “Consequences in Kantian Ethics.” American Dialectic 1.2 (2011): 275-84. [online] [M]

Bennington, Geoffrey. “Kant’s Open Secret.” Theory, Culture and Society 28 (2011): 26-40. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: It is argued that Kant’s claimed reconciliation of politics and ethics in the appendix to “Perpetual Peace” founders on an irreducible element of secrecy that no amount of ‘publicity’ could ever dissipate. A similar problem reappears in the supplementary “Secret Article” that Kant includes in the second edition of “Perpetual Peace”, which specifies, ‘secretly’, that heads of state should take secret counsel from the open and public discussions of philosophers. In giving away this secret, even as he declares it to be a secret, Kant essentially repeats the gesture of revealing the violent origin of the state, shown in the ‘Rechtslehre’ to be illegal, and in so doing condemns the philosopher at best to a kind of exile with respect to political time and space. In conclusion, it is proposed that thinking through these problems would require less a turn toward ethics than a rereading of the concept of nature, on the basis of its Heraclitean penchant for hiding or veiling itself.

Berdinesen, Hein. “Transcendental Philosophy and Fundamental Ontology.” Transcendentalism Overturned: From Absolute Power of Consciousness Until the Forces of Cosmic Architectonics. Ed. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (op cit.). 41-55. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In Davos and in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics Heidegger wants to demonstrate the Kantian conception of the transcendental imagination (Einbildungskraft) as the root of receptivity and spontaneity. According to Heidegger, the transcendental imagination, interpreted as “original time” is the fundamental condition of the possibility of both objective experience and freedom given our finite and temporal nature. According to Cassirer Heidegger misplaces Kant’s problem of freedom: For Heidegger all existence is to be understood within the framework of temporal existence, whereas Kant’s ‘idea of freedom’ and practical reason is not merely bound to temporal conditions. Heidegger’s attempt to discover the original unity of theoretical and practical reason unjustly collapses the Kantian dichotomy between causality and freedom. This paper discusses the main topics in the Davos disputation and in Heidegger’s ‘Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics’, namely how to interpret the Kantian concepts of ‘intuition’ (Anschauung), ‘imagination’ and ‘schematism’ in relation to the problems of ‘objectivity’ and ‘freedom’.

Berg, Hein. “Kant’s Conception of Proper Science.” Synthese 183.1 (2011): 7-26. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant is well known for his restrictive conception of proper science. In the present paper I will try to explain why Kant adopted this conception. I will identify three core conditions which Kant thinks a proper science must satisfy: systematicity, objective grounding, and apodictic certainty. These conditions conform to conditions codified in the Classical Model of Science. Kant’s infamous claim that any proper natural science must be mathematical should be understood on the basis of these conditions. In order to substantiate this reading, I will show that only in this way it can be explained why Kant thought (1) that mathematics has a particular foundational function with respect to the natural sciences and (2) as such secures their scientific status.

Berman, Michael. “‘The Happy Accident’: Merleau-Ponty and Kant on the Judgment of God.” European Legacy 16.2 (2011): 223-36. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant’s ideas about, questions, and challenges to the Western tradition of philosophy reverberate into the third century of the reception of his texts. The writings of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, the twentieth-century French existential and hermeneutic phenomenologist, are interlaced with engagements with Kant’s ideas. Often these incidents are marked by Merleau-Ponty’s critique, yet there is a noticeable recurrence of his efforts to contend with Kant’s philosophy. In Merleau-Ponty’s course notes, Nature (2002), he wrestles with Kant’s version of nature in the Critique of Judgment (1790), specifically citing the happy accident between sensibility and the understanding. This opens upon realms of metaphysical thought that remain deeply contentious within Kantian scholarship. An interrogation of this happy accident leads to insights about Merleau-Ponty’s conceptualization of an existentialized metaphysics the implications of which shed light on theology and the judgment of God.

Bernasconi, Robert. “Kant’s Third Thoughts on Race.” Reading Kant’s Geography. Eds. Stuart Elden and Eduardo Mendieta (op cit.). 291-318. [M]

Bernstein, Alyssa R. “Political, not Metaphysical, yet Kantian? A Defence of Rawls.” Politics and Metaphysics in Kant. Eds. Sorin Baiasu, Howard Williams, and Sami Pihlström (op cit.). 47-70. [M]

Besch, Thomas M. “Kantian Constructivism, the Issue of Scope, and Perfectionism: O’Neill on Ethical Standing.” European Journal of Philosophy 19.1 (2011): 1-20. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Article first published online: 22 July 2009.
Kantian constructivists accord a constitutive, justificatory role to the issue of scope: they typically claim that first-order practical thought depends for its authority on being suitably acceptable within the right scope, or by all relevant others, and some Kantian constructivists, notably Onora O’Neill, hold that our views of the nature and criteria of practical reasoning also depend for their authority on being suitably acceptable within the right scope. The paper considers whether O’Neill-type Kantian constructivism can coherently accord this key role to the issue of scope while adhering to the universalist, ‘cosmopolitan’ commitments at its core. The paper argues that this is not so. On the one hand, it shows that O’Neill’s attempt to ‘fix’ the scope of practical reasoning supposes, rather than establishes, a view of ethical standing and the scope of practical reasoning. On the other hand, the paper argues that Kantian constructivism should endorse a non-constructivist, perfectionist view of the good to determine that scope. The paper thereby supports the perfectionist conjecture that Kantian constructivism, in order to defend its universalist commitments, should take refuge in non-constructivist, perfectionist considerations, and that Kantian constructivism should therefore construe perfectionism as a partial, though uneasy, ally.

Bhattacharyya, Krishnachandra. Implications of the Philosophy of Kant / Kantdarsaner tatparya. Transl. from the Bengali by J. N. Mohanty and Tara Chatterjea New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2011. [x, 218 p.] [WC]

Bialek, Przemyslaw. Rev. of Rousseau, Kant, Goethe, by Ernst Cassirer (1991). Kwartalnik Filozoficzny 39.1 (2011): 178-86. [PI]

Becchi, Paolo. Kant diverso. Pena, Natura, Dignità. [Italian] Morcelliana: Brescia, 2011. [114 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents: (Ch. 1) Kant retribuzionista?, (Ch. 2) I doveri dell' uomo nei confronti della natur, (Ch. 3) La dignità umana e le sue a ttuali implicazioni in ambito bioetico.

 ——. “Kant rétributiviste?” [Italian] Culpabilité et rétribution: essais de philosophie pénale. Eds. Stefano Biancu, Alberto Bondolfi, and Francesca De Vecchi, eds. . Basel: Schwabe, 2011. 171-96. [WC]

Bird, Graham. “Replies to my Critics.” Kantian Review 16.2 (2011): 257-82. [M]

 ——. Rev. of Inspirations from Kant: Essays, by Leslie Stevenson (2011). Kant Studies Online (2011): 193-214; posted October 28, 2011. [M] [online]

Bird-Pollan, Stefan. “Some Normative Implications of Korsgaard’s Theory of the Intersubjectivity of Reason.” Metaphilosophy 42.4 (2011): 376-80. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article argues that Christine Korsgaard’s conception of self-constitution can be historicized by considering the impact of actual humans on our reflective activity. Because Korsgaard bases her argument on a philosophy of action rather than of intention (as Kant does), and our actions must always be concrete, the article argues that the principles for action which we develop in reflection are likewise responses to concrete human demands. It further interprets the types of demands humans make on each other as the expression of historical circumstance rather than as transcendentally anchored. The notion of universal respect that reflection seeks to achieve is thus seen as developing by a self-correcting process of concrete human interaction. Finally, the article concludes that there can be no metaphysical proof of morality, since morality develops through human interaction that seeks to approximate the idea of respect for persons.

 ——. Rev. of The Kantian Sublime and the Revelation of Freedom, by Robert Clewis (2009). The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 69.1 (2011): 348-50. [PW]

Birken-Bertsch, Hanno. “Die Überschaubarkeit des Logischen. Zu einer Voraussetzung von Kants Philosophieren.”  Die Begründung der Philosophie im Deutschen Idealismus. Ed. Elena Ficara (op cit.). 199-207. [WC]

Blanc-Brude, Gilles. “L’Anthropologie du point de vue pragmatique est-elle une psychologie?”  Kant et les sciences. Un dialogue philosophique avec la pluralité des savoirs. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Mai Lequan, and Margit Ruffing (op cit.). 321-29. [M]

Blattner, William. Rev. of Philosophy and Temporality from Kant to Critical Theory, by Espen Hammer (2011). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (November 2011, #36). [online] [M]

Blomme, Henny. “Pourquoi la chimie ne peut-elle aspirer au titre de science proprement dite?”  Kant et les sciences. Un dialogue philosophique avec la pluralité des savoirs. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Mai Lequan, and Margit Ruffing (op cit.). 159-68. [M]

Blumenberg, Hans. “Kant e la questione del ‘Dio misericordioso’.” [Translated from German into Italian by Nicola Zambon, and with an afterword by Zambon] Dianoia: Annali di Storia della Filosofia 16 (2011): 237-77. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In his essay ‘Kant und die Frage nach dem “gnädigen Gott”’ Hans Blumenberg deals with the crisis of the modern age, whose roots he detects in the aporia between justice and goodness in the concept of God in the Middle Ages. After pointing out how this problem reverberates through the modern philosophy, he analyses Kant’s philosophy of religion in order to stress, on the one hand, why Kant fails to solve the aporia; on the other hand, he suggests his own “therapy”, that aims at the possibility of the return of God. An afterword will try to contextualise this essay within Blumenberg’s work ‘Die Legitimität der Neuzeit’ and to propose an interpretation of his thoughts.

Bock, Wolfgang. “Kants Rechtsbegriff. Philosophische Bestimmung und geschichtlicher Reichtum.”  Gegenstandsbestimmung und Selbstgestaltung. Eds. Christian Krijnen and Kurt Walter Zeidler (op cit.). 43-60. [M]

Bøe, Solveig. “Place and Time in Aristotle, an Opening to Kant?” Kant, Here, Now, and How. Eds. Siri Granum Carson, Jonathan Knowles, and Bjørn K. Myskja (op cit.). 35-47. [M]

Boehm, Omri. “The First Antinomy and Spinoza.” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 19.4 (2011): 683-710. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Scholars commonly assume that Kant never seriously engaged with Spinoza or Spinozism. However, in his later writings Kant argues several times that Spinozism is the most consistent form of transcendental realism. In the first part of the paper, I argue that the first Antinomy, debating the age and size of the world, already reflects Kant’s confrontation with Spinozist metaphysics. Specifically, the position articulated in the Antithesis – according to which the world is infinite and uncreated – is Spinozist, not Leibnizian, as commonly assumed. In the second part of the paper, I raise the chief Spinozist challenge to the Antinomy, arising from Spinoza’s reliance on a cosmological totum analyticum – an infinite whole which is prior to its parts. In conclusion, I begin to elaborate a defence of the Kantian position, confronting Spinoza’s infinite whole with Kant's account of the absolutely infinite in his discussion of the sublime.

Böhr, Christoph. “Die Selbsterfahrung des Handelns in der Unberechenbarkeit des Lebens. Zur Wiederentdeckung von Kants novus rerum ordo der Philosophie.” Facetten der Kantforschung. Eds. Christoph Böhr and Heinrich P. Delfosse (op cit.). 11-23. [M]

 —— and Heinrich P. Delfosse, eds. Facetten der Kantforschung: Ein internationaler Querschnitt. Festschrift für Nobert Hinske zum 80. Geburtstag. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: frommann-holzboog, 2011. [180 p.] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Forschungen und Materialien zur deutschen Aufklärung, Division II (Monographs on the Philosophy of the German Enlightenment), vol. 23. General editors: Norbert Hinske, Lothar Kreimendahl, and Clemens Schwaiger. Essays by Christoph Böhr, Norbert Hinske, Gerd Irrlitz, Katsutoshi Kawamura, Alexei N. Krouglov, Yeop Lee, and Paola Rumore, and a bibliography of Hinske’s writings as of spring 2011 (pp. 143-70).
Abstract (from the publisher): Die Erforschung Kants ist längst zu einem weltumspannenden Unternehmen geworden. Welch reiche Frucht der Wissenschaft dadurch zufällt, zeigen die Beiträge dieser Festschrift, die dem Nestor der deutschen Kantforschung, Norbert Hinske, gewidmet ist. Bekannte Vertreter der italienischen, japanischen, russischen und deutschen Kantforschung kommen zu Wort. Von besonderer Bedeutung für die – in diesem Punkt gänzlich neu zu schreibende – Lebensund Entwicklungsgeschichte Kants ist ein neu entdeckter, erstmals im Faksimile abgedruckter Brief von J. E. Biester an J. N. Tetens, der belegt, dass der preußische Kultusminister v. Zedlitz zunächst nicht etwa Kant, sondern Tetens nach Halle berufen hat. Hinskes vollständige Bibliographie rundet den Band ab – und zeigt eindrucksvoll, wie viel die Kantforschung weltweit gerade ihm zu verdanken hat.

Bojanowski, Jochen. “Zweites Stück: Moralische Vollkommenheit.” Immanuel Kant, Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft. Ed. Ottfried Höffe (op cit.). 91-110. [M]

Bonnet, Jean. Dekantations: fonctions idéologiques du kantisme dans le XIXe siècle français. Bern: Peter Lang, 2011. [xvii, 372 p.] [M]

Borbone, Giacomo. Rev. of Discourse on a New Method, edited by Mary Domski and Michael Dickson (2010). Philosophy in Review 31 (2011): 264-66. [online] [M]

Borges-Duarte, Irene. “O monismo da imaginação. Sobre as Bemerkungen de Cassirer ao Kant-Buch de Heidegger.”  Figuras da Racionalidade: Neokantismo e Fenomenologia. Ed. Olivier Feron (op cit.). 85-102. [WC]

Botul, Jean-Baptiste. La vita sessuale di Kant. Translation of Vie sexuelle d’Emmanuel Kant from French into Italian by Emanuela Schiano Di Pepe. Genoa: Il melangolo, 2011. [92 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Botul is a fictional character, and what comes from his pen has a similar vintage.

Bourgeois, Patrick. “Hope, Imagination, and Reflective Judgment: Paul Ricoeur and Immanuel Kant.” Paul Ricoeur: Honoring and Continuing the Work. Ed. Farhang Erfani (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books). 119-33. [M]

Bouton, Christophe. “À la recherché du temps profond. La contribution de Kant à l’histoire de l’Univers.”  Kant et la science. La théorie critique et transcendantale de la connaissance. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Mai Lequan, and Margit Ruffing (op cit.). 297-306. [M]

Bowman, Brady. “A Conceptualist Reply to Hanna’s Kantian Non-Conceptualism.” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 19.3 (2011): 417-46. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Hanna proposes a version of nonconceptualism he closely associates with Kant. This paper takes issue with his proposal on two fronts. First, there are reasons to dispute whether any version of nonconceptualism can be rightly attributed to Kant. In addition to pointing out passages that conflict with Hanna’s interpretation, I also suggest ways in which the Kant of the Opus postumum could integrate key insights of nonconceptualism into a basically conceptualist framework. In part two of the paper, I turn to a more systematically oriented critique of Hanna’s nonconceptualism. Drawing on work by Gareth Evans, John McDowell, Sonia Sedivy, and Alva Noë, I argue that conceptualism is in a position to integrate the points which are taken by Hanna to speak most strongly in favor of nonconceptualism. In particular, I argue for the deep compatibility of conceptualism and direct realism. At the same time, I point to what I see as weaknesses in Hanna’s defence of nonconceptualism.

Brachtendorf, Johannes. “Die Kritik des Judentums und die Geheimnisse der Vernunft.” Immanuel Kant, die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft. Ed. Ottfried Höffe (op cit.). 151-72. [M]

Bramer, Marilea. “Domestic Violence as a Violation of Autonomy and Agency: The Required Response of the Kantian State.” Social Philosophy Today: Poverty, Justice, and Markets 27 (2011): 97-110. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Contrary to what we might initially think, domestic violence is not simply a violation of respect. This characterization of domestic violence misses two key points. First, the issue of respect in connection with domestic violence is not as straightforward as it appears. Second, domestic violence is also a violation of care. These key points explain how domestic violence negatively affects a victim’s autonomy and agency — the ability to choose and pursue her own goals and life plan. We have a moral responsibility to respond to the problem of domestic violence as individuals. But the state also has a responsibility to respond. According to Kant in the ‘Doctrine of Right’, one of the purposes of the state is to secure just treatment for everyone. I argue that this includes an obligation to put in place policies and services that will promote the autonomy and agency of victims of domestic violence.

Brandom, Robert B. “Kantische Lehren über Geist, Bedeutung und Rationalität.”  Robert Brandom’s expressive Vernunft. Eds. Barth, Christian and Holger Sturm (op cit.). 27-59. [WC]

Brandt, Reinhard. “Die einheitliche Naturgeschichte der Menscheit (Idee, Achter Satz).” Immanuel Kant, Schriften zur Geschichtsphilosophie. Ed. Otfried Höffe (op cit.). 91-101. [M]

 ——. Rev. of Kant’s ‘Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim’: A Critical Guide, edited by Amélie Oksenberg Rorty and James Schmidt (2009). Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 93.3 (2011): 380-89. [PI]

Brewer, Talbot. “Two Pictures of Practical Thinking.” Perfecting Virtue: New Essays on Kantian Ethics and Virtue Ethics. Eds. Lawrence Jost and Julian Wuerth (op cit.). 116-46. [M]

Brinkmann, Klaus. Idealism without Limits: Hegel and the Problem of Objectivity. Dordrecht/Heidelberg/London: Springer, 2011. [xiii, 283 p.] [WC]

Brittan, Gordon. “Graham Bird, The Revolutionary Kant: Introduction.” Kantian Review 16.2 (2011): 211-19. [M]

 ——. “Davidson, Kant, and Double-Aspect Ontologies.”  Dialogues with Davidson. Acting, Interpreting, Understanding. Ed. Jeff Malpas (Cambridge, Mass./London: MIT Press). 43-59. [M]

Bromand, Joachim. “Kant und Frege über Existenz.”  Gottesbeweise: von Anselm bis Gödel. Eds. Joachim Bromand and Guido Kreis (op cit.). 195-210. [WC]

 ——, and Guido Kreis, eds. Gottesbeweise: von Anselm bis Gödel. Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2011. [712 p.] [WC]

Brook, Andrew. “Kant y las ciencias cognitivas.” [Spanish]  Kant y las ciencias. Ed. Pedro Jesús Teruel (op cit.). 227-36. [M]

 ——. “Representations and Reality: Kant’s Two Views.”  Rethinking Kant: 3. Ed. Oliver Thorndike (op cit.). 219-48. [M]

Brudner, Alan. “Private Law and Kantian Right.” University of Toronto Law Journal 61.2 (2011): 279-311. [MUSE]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In The Idea of Private Law, Ernest Weinrib sought to rescue private law’s autonomy from functionalism’s reduction of private law to an instrument of the public interest. The twin ideas he employed for this purpose were corrective justice and Kantian Right. According to Weinrib, corrective justice provides private law’s unifying structure, while Kantian Right supplies its normative content. In this essay, I argue that Kantian Right cannot be the normative complement to the corrective justice form of private law because, with the exception of trespass to the person, private law vanishes in Kantian Right. I argue that there is no possibility for an autonomous private law in Kantian Right and that there is, indeed, a logical progression from Kantian Right to the very functionalism that Weinrib opposes.

Bryushinkin, Vladimir N. “Kant’s Logic and Strawson’s Metaphysics.” Kantovskij Sbornik. Selected Articles 2010-2011, pp. 6-15 [M] [pdf (English)]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article defines the way of interaction between formal and transcendental logic through introducing ontological considerations based on P. Strawson’s descriptive metaphysics. The notions of a particular, a sortal universal, and a feature universal are introduced into the transcendental limitation on the inferences of formal logic.

Buchhammer, Brigitte. Feministische Religionsphilosophie: Philosophisch-systematische Grundlagen. Münster: LIT Verlag, 2011. [424 p.] [WC]

Buckle, Stephen. “Assessing Peter Singer’s Argument for Utilitarianism: Drawing a Lesson from Rousseau and Kant.” Journal of Value Inquiry 45.2 (2011): 215-27. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Peter Singer argues, in Practical Ethics, that utilitarianism is the “first base” of moral thinking. The argument is not successful, because it cannot bridge between its starting-point in self-interest and its disinterested conclusion. Rousseau’s argument for the social contract has the same problem: he cannot show why self-interested natural man should embrace the outlook of civic man. Kant resolved the problem by recasting the argument entirely in terms of civic man, thereby giving a morality friendly starting point. Singer must do something comparable. Self-interest has seemed attractive because of the influence of evolutionary naturalism. When he turns to consider evolutionary theory and its significance, Singer rejects the self-interest assumption – but fails to remove it from his moral argument.

Buée, Jean-Michel. “La métaphysique comme science et comme disposition naturelle.”  Kant et la science. La théorie critique et transcendantale de la connaissance. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Mai Lequan, and Margit Ruffing (op cit.). 177-83. [M]

Bunyadzade, Kenul. “The Rationalist Interpretations of the Problem of Man: Kant and Marx.” [Azerbaijani] Felsefe va Sosial-siyasi Elmler (Philosophy and Social-Political Sciences) 2 (2011): 34-46. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article analyses the phenomenon of “man” in the context of the philosophical thought system of Kant and Marx. The author states that, the reason of her reference to Kant and Marx is that, Kant was not only one the important turning point in the Western philosophy, but also seriously influenced following development of it. Some of the Western ideas that are criticized are related to Kantian philosophy. As regards to Marx, he ignored the phenomenon of “man” and placed the class conflict to forefront. As a result he formed a worldwide known doctrine which became the ideological basis of some states. The doctrines of Kant and Marx paved the way for the serious falsifications in the investigations of the phenomenon of “man”.

Burbidge, John W. Rev. of The Science of Logic, by G. W. F. Hegel, transl. and edited by George di Giovanni (2010). Kantian Review 16.2 (2011): 309-15. [M]

Burchard, Hermann G. W. “The Role of Conscious Attention in Perception: Immanuel Kant, Alonzo Church, and Neuroscience.” Foundations of Science 16.1 (2011): 67-99. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Impressions, energy radiated by phenomena in the momentary environmental scene, enter sensory neurons, creating in afferent nerves a data stream. Following Kant, by our inner sense the mind perceives its own thoughts as it ties together sense data into an internalized scene. The mind, residing in the brain, logically a Language Machine, processes and stores items as coded grammatical entities. Kantian synthetic unity in the linguistic brain is able to deliver our experience of the scene as we appear to see it. Uniquely, the brain records its own history, synthesizing a Movie-in-the-Brain, called the Noumenal Cosmos. Attempting thereby to represent the actual Universe, this makes for a sovereign brain that governs itself. The brain is domicile of an Ego, with its selfhood at stake at all times. Yet, it can know itself only by its actions, in which it appears as an actor in its own movie. Phenomena enter garbled, as confused apparitions, and must be put in good form using top–down feedback control by Ego, so that each movie frame makes rational sense within the overall context of the Noumenal Cosmos. A stack of frames is processed typically in 40 Hz rhythm with 300 ms process time each, for about 12 in the stack at any time. Successive neural centers are processing the stack in the brain assembly line, based on data from increasingly global receptive fields. Ego stitches together the movie frames, but only the top frame is in consciousness for 25 ms. The top frame contains the whole scene where the Ego makes an appearance as the actor that imposes Kantian synthetic unity on the scene, merely an assembly of grammatical texts, in a system-internal coded process language, fitting the scene into the Noumenal Cosmos. But Ego observes Ego only to the extent permitted by the objectivity rule, only what it does and thinks, not its true face. From the Noumenal Cosmos, the Ego receives grammatical messages in the internal sense code. They are integrated into a whole in the reaction of the Ego to the momentary scene. The voluntary nature of Ego’s decisions is explained, based on its ability to code in advance its own actions sequentially in time, as it sees fit with a view to an orderly Noumenal Cosmos, records of code being arranged spatially in neural structures.

Burtscher, Cordula, and Markus Hien, eds. Schiller im philosophischen Kontext. Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann, 2011. [220 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: See the essays by Koukou (“Schillers Kant-Kritik in seiner Schrift Ueber Anmuth und Würde”) and Meier (“Kantische Grundsätze? Schillers Selbstinszenierung als Kant-Nachfolger in seinen Briefen Ueber die ästhetische Erhebung des Menschen”).

Butterman, Ralf. Die Fiktion eines Faktums: Kants Suche nach einer Rechtswissenschaft; Erwägungen zu Begründung und Reichweite der kantischen Rechtsphilosophie. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2011. [311 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Originally a Ph.D dissertation (Universität Potsdam, 2010).

Buzzoni, Marco. “Kant und das Gedankenexperiment. Über eine kantische Theorie der Gedankenexperimente in den Naturwissenschaften und in der Philosophie.” Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 59.1 (2011): 93-107. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Why, for such a long time, has there been no Kantian point of view among the most influential theories about thought experiments? The primary historical reason – the main trends in the philosophy of science have always rejected the existence of a priori knowledge – fits a theoretical reason. Kant oscillated between two very different views about the a priori: on the one hand, he attributed to it a particular content, whereas on the other hand he insisted on its purely formal character. The first interpretation of the a priori was one-sidedly developed by Ørsted and led to his untenable notion of thought experiment. The other interpretation, however, can be further developed into new Kantian theories of thought experiments in the natural sciences and in philosophy.

Bynum, Gregory Lewis. “Kant's Conception of Respect and African American Education Rights.” Educational Theory 61.1 (2011): 17-40. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Immanuel Kant envisioned a kind of respect in which one recognizes each human (1) as being not fully comprehensible by any human understanding, (2) as being an end in him- or herself, and (3) as being a potential source of moral law. In this essay, Gregory Lewis Bynum uses this conception of respect as a lens with which to examine African American education rights on three levels: the individual level (the level of individual persons’ moral experience and moral significance), the community level (the level of the formation and sustaining of social groups that have value for humanity), and the global level (the level of a universal community of humanity). Bynum's goal in this examination is to strengthen our practical understanding of African Americans' right to education defined, in accordance with international human rights documents, as the right to an education that supports the full development of the human personality in a manner that respects students’ “cultural identity, language, and values.”

 ——. “The Critical Humanisms of Dorothy Dinnerstein and Immanuel Kant Employed for Responding to Gender Bias: A Study, and an Exercise, in Radical Critique.” Studies in Philosophy & Education 30 (2011): 385-402. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Two humanist, critical approaches — those of Dorothy Dinnerstein and Immanuel Kant — are summarized, compared, and employed to critique gender bias in science education. The value of Dinnerstein’s approach lies in her way of seeing conventional ‘masculinity’ and conventional 'femininity’ as developing in relation to each other from early childhood. Because of women’s dominance of early childcare and adults’ enduring, sexist resentment of that dominance, women become inhumanely associated with the non-adult qualities of immaturity, dependence, and childish vulnerability and punish-ability; and male human beings — to whom woman-resenting convention assigns the impossible task of absolutely triumphing over ‘the feminine,’ childhood experience, and all human vulnerability — become inhumanely held to unachievable standards of super-hero invulnerability and god-like mental and practical infallibility. The value of Kant’s approach lies in his insistence that our sense of what is right and necessary for social progress must arise in a practically engaged and experientially full manner, rather than (1) from concepts (such as rigid ideological prescriptions) conceived as being detached from sense experience and as arising from an otherworldly, divine or quasi-divine realm of moral infallibility (such concepts being conventionally associated with ‘masculine’ authority and leadership), or (2) from a sense of being trapped in what — in a given historical, cultural, or experiential moment — may appear as an absolute and unchangeable reality of embodied human experience (an anti-critical, anti-intellectual, and anti-progressive sense of things often associated with disempowered 'feminine' experience). I demonstrate that critique integrating these approaches is useful in a science education setting.

[top] C    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Cabada, Ladislav. See: Waisová, Sárka and Ladislav Cabada.

Callanan, John J. “Normativity and the Acquisition of the Categories.” Hegel Bulletin 32.1-2 (2011): 1-26. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: It is quite common when explicating the nature of Kant's break with the preceding Early Modern tradition to cite his attitude towards the acquisition and deployment of concepts. It is claimed that Kant sought to distinguish two tasks that had become unfortunately intertwined and conflated — explaining how we come to acquire our concepts on the one hand and showing how we are justified in deploying them in judgement on the other. This conflation can be expressed in terms of a conflation of the natural and the normative, of descriptive and prescriptive questions. The topic of the conditions of concept-possession, i.e. how we have come to possess the concepts that we do, is an entirely psychological inquiry, involving ‘natural’ descriptive inquiries. The topic of concept-deployment, the story about how we use our concepts in veridical judgements about the world, is an entirely philosophical question, since it involves the question of how we ought to deploy those concepts in judgement. The fundamental distinction between the natural and the normative is drawn by Kant, it is claimed, in order to distinguish these two practices of acquisition and deployment.
The manner in which this claim is expressed is through Kant's distinction between the question of fact (quaestio facti) and the question of right (quaestio juris). I want to claim that a proper understanding of this distinction doesn't support this notion of Kant's ‘normative turn’. In fact, the distinction is best understood within an interpretation whereby Kant is understood as continuing to endorse the Early Modern conviction that the provision of a concept's possession-conditions is sufficient to determine that concept's deployment-conditions, and that the task of the Transcendental Deduction is to determine the possession-conditions for the Categories.

Callender, Lenval A. Kant and Revolution. Bury St Edmonds, Suffolk: Arima, 2011. [113 p.] [WC]

Câmara Leme, José Luís. “Foucault, Kant e a crítica política.” [Portuguese] Kant e-Prints 6.2 (2011): 100-19. [online] [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Could M. Foucault be, after all, a right-wing philosopher? Strange as it may seem, this once carefully whispered suspicion is currently voiced aloud. Is there anything in the philosophy of M. Foucault that gives this statement any kind of a solid base? What I propose here is an analysis of the political inflexion of M. Foucault, from the extreme to the moderate left, anchored in his return to Kant. My argument presents three main reasons: the letting go of the idea of revolution, the definition of criticism as a partner of government, and the proposal for a critical morality.

Camera, Francesco. Rev. of Kants Lösung des Theodizeeproblems, by Volker Dieringer (2009). [Italian] Studi Kantiani 24 (2011): 157-62. [M]

Campo, Mariano. “Totalità della problematica kantiana.” [Italian] Studi Kantiani 24 (2011): 121-30. [M]

Cannon, Joseph. “The Moral Value of Artistic Beauty in Kant.” Kantian Review 16.1 (2011): 113-26. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the third Critique, Kant argues that it is “always the mark of a good soul” to take an immediate interest in natural beauty, because it indicates an interest in harmony between nature and moral freedom. He, however, denies that there can be a similarly significant interest in artistic beauty. I argue that Kant ought not to deny this value to artistic beauty because his account of fine art as the joint product of the “natural gift” of genius and the discipline of taste commits him to the claim that artistic beauty expresses such a harmony between nature and freedom.

 ——. “Reply to Paul Guyer.” Kantian Review 16.1 (2011): 135-39. [M]

Cantù, Paola. “Bolzano versus Kant: Mathematics as Scientia Universalis.” Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Kevin Mulligan. Ed. Anne Reboul (Geneva, online at: http://www.philosophie.ch/kevin/festschrift/). 26 p. [online] [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The paper will discuss some changes in Bolzano’s definition of mathematics attested in several quotations from the Beyträge, Wissenschaftslehre and Grössenlehre: is mathematics a theory of forms or a theory of quantities? Several issues that are maintained throughout Bolzano’s works will be distinguished from others that were accepted in the Beyträge and abandoned in the Grössenlehre. Changes will be interpreted as a consequence of the new logical theory of truth introduced in the Wissenschaftslehre, but also as a consequence of the overcome of Kant’s terminology, and of the radicalization of Bolzano’s anti‐Kantianism. It will be argued that Bolzano’s evolution can be understood as a coherent move, if one compares the criticism expressed in the Beyträge on the notion of quantity with a different and larger notion of quantity that Bolzano developed already in 1816. This discussion is based on the discovery that two unknown texts mentioned by Bolzano can be identified with works by von Spaun and Vieth respectively. Bolzano’s evolution will be interpreted as a radicalization of the criticism of the Kantian definition of mathematics and as an effect of Bolzano’s unaltered interest in the Leibnizian notion of mathesis universalis. As a conclusion, it will be argued that Bolzano never abandoned his original idea of considering mathematics as a scientia universalis, i.e., as the science of quantities in general, and it will be suggested that the question of ideal elements in mathematics, which has been interpreted as a main reason for the development of a new logical theory, can also be considered as a main reason for developing a different definition of quantity.

Capeillères, Fabien. “Cassirer lecteur des Prolégomènes. Une interprétation néokantienne – et phénoménologique?”  Figuras da Racionalidade: Neokantismo e Fenomenologia. Ed. Olivier Feron (op cit.). 13-29. [WC]

 ——. “Chimie, physique, droit, géographie et astronomie. Les paradigmes de la scientificité de la métaphysique kantienne et leurs articulations systématiques.”  Kant et la science. La théorie critique et transcendantale de la connaissance. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Mai Lequan, and Margit Ruffing (op cit.). 155-76. [M]

Capozzi, Mirella. “Le inferenze del Giudizio riflettente nella logica di Kant: l’induzione e l’analogia.” [Italian] Studi Kantiani 24 (2011): 11-48. [M]

Caranti, Luigi. “Kant e l’agire politico.” [Italian] Rivista di Filosofia 102.1 (2011): 77-104. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This essay reconstructs Kant’s conception of politics, mainly understood in terms of political agency, as well as politics’ relation with justice (Recht) and morality. It argues that Kant sees politics as subordinated to justice regarding its ultimate orientation and legitimacy, but also as autonomous, which is to say governed by its own maxims, with regard to how the demands of justice are to be realized in the world. The paper reaches this result by focusing on the well-known notions of “moral politician”, “political moralist”, “despotic moralist”, and “moralising politician” and offers a novel interpretation of these. It also notices and tries to defuse a tension in Kant regarding the relation between knowledge (especially predictive ability) and politics. At times, Kant considers such predictive ability as both indispensable for a good politician and possible to attain. Other times, he considers it as beyond the reach of any human being. Similarly, he regards this epistemic limitation as a fatal shortcoming for the political moralist but, mysteriously, not for the moral politician. The paper ends with a reflection on the higher faculties — particularly judgment — Kant sees as necessarily involved in the political agency.

 ——. “The One Possible Basis for the Proof of the Existence of the External World: Kant’s Anti-Sceptical Argument in the 1781 Fourth Paralogism.” Kant Studies Online (2011): 162-92; posted September 19, 2011. [M] [online]

Carmo Temple, Giovana. “Foucault, o acontecimento e os limites da razão kantiana.” [Portuguese] Kant e-Prints 6.2 (2011): 84-99. [online] [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The aim of this presentation is to problematize the Foucault’s thought under the light of an “event’s genealogy”. That problematization confronts us, in face of the statement’s rarity and of the subsequent naturalization of the history, with the multiplicity of events that characterize the mixture between the bodies. It is about a debt of Foucault with the old Stoicism, particularly in relation to the notion of event, understanding the way by which the historical event is rationalized and universalized. In this perspective, we will question the horizons of a Kantian reason, faced with the event’s multiplicity.

Carrano, Antonio. “La connaissance de l’ignorance et le combat kantien contre le nomadisme sceptique.”  Kant et la science. La théorie critique et transcendantale de la connaissance. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Mai Lequan, and Margit Ruffing (op cit.). 287-96. [M]

Carson, Emily. “Sensibility: space and time, transcendental idealism.” Immanuel Kant: Key Concepts. Eds. Will Dudley and Kristina Engelhard (op cit.). 28-44. [M]

Carson, Siri Granum, Jonathan Knowles, and Bjørn K. Myskja, eds. Kant, Here, Now, and How: Essays in Honour of Truls Wyller. Paderborn: Mentis, 2011. [299 p.] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Content: Essays by Geert Keil, Solveig Bøe, Ronny Selbaek Myhre, Thomas Krogh, Dagfinn D. Dybvig, Erling Skjei, Bengt Molander, Jonathan Knowles, Audun Øfsti, Olav Asheim, Anton Friedrich Koch, Karen Margrethe Nielsen, Lars Johan Materstvedt, Lars Øystein Ursin, Brit Strandhagen, and Olaf L. Müller.

Casales García, Roberto. “El papel de la antropología moral dentro de la filosofía práctica de Kant.” [Spanish] Topicos: Revista de Filosofia (Mexico) 41 (2011): 159-81. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: One of the most common mistakes in traditional readings of Kant’s practical philosophy has been the inclination to narrow its proposal to exclusively the pure approach. These readings, however, have made Kantian moral thinking the prefect stage for its critics. The present work tries to develop some arguments highlighting the important role of moral anthropology in Kant’s practical philosophy.

 ——. Rev. of El poder de juzgar en Immanuel Kant, by Carlos Mendiola Mejía (2008). [Spanish] Anuario Filosofico 44.3 (2011): 637-40. [PI]

Cascardi, Anthony J. “Cavell and Kant: The Work of Criticism and the Work of Art.” Stanley Cavell and Literary Studies: Consequences of Skepticism. Eds. Richard Eldridge and Bernard Rhie (New York: Continuum, 2011). 47-61. [PI]

Casey, Edward S. “Is there Still Room for Freedom? A Commentary on David Harvey’s ‘Cosmopolitanism in the Anthropology and Geography’.” Reading Kant’s Geography. Eds. Stuart Elden and Eduardo Mendieta (op cit.). 285-89. [M]

Cassirer, Ernst. Rousseau, Kant, Goethe: Deux Essais, transl. Jean Lacoste. Paris: Belin, 2011. [157 p.] [WC]

Castelo Branco, Guilherme. “Kant-Foucault: autonomia e analítica da finitude.” [Portuguese] Kant e-Prints 6.2 (2011): 1-13. [online] [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In his intellectual maturity, Michel Foucault, in articles and interviews, insists on the opposition between Descartes and Kant. This opposition would have historical and philosophical motivations. Descartes, when asked about the self, answers that it is a single subject, universal a-historical. Cartesian self is a substance that is not described by its circumstances; on the contrary, the “I” is a condition of knowledge and of representations. Kant, on the other hand, would have raised a completely distinct order problematization: "... the question that Kant raises is different: Who we are, at this precise moment in history? What this issue analysis is, at the same time, ourselves and our situation at the present time. "(FOUCAULT, 1994, vol. IV, p. 231-2). That Kant is reference to Foucault's ideas regarding autonomy, with reflections on the question of freedom (it means, the fight against the domination), of true saying, creating yourself, simply confirm by reading the Hermeneutics of the subject and the Government of the self and of others, as well as in his texts and articles. Our interest, however, comes from the opposition of Descartes-Kant that is exposed in words and things. In the book, Foucault describes in detail the process of transformation of the Classical Age to the modern age, periods in which Descartes and Kant played central role, respectively. Our hypothesis is that Kant (despite the criticism directed to him by Foucault) contributes to the modification of the important role of the subject of rationalism as an unconditional introduction, in his critical philosophy, place for finiteness, and in this coup, leads to a new vision of contemporary man, in the sense of the word. This idea of man, on the other hand, influences and provides the conditions of possibility for the self-drafting of the subjects, techniques of himself, from the 18th century, with reflexes in the actual days.

Castillo, Monique. “L’idée kantienne de république selon le droit, la politique et l’histoire.”  Kant: l’anthropologie et l’histoire. Eds. Olivier Agard and Françoise Lartillot (op cit.). 141-53. [WC]

Chadha, Monima. See: Hanna, Robert and Monima Chadha.

Chan, Wing-Cheuk. “Mou Zongsan on Confucian and Kant’s Ethics: A Critical Reflection.” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 38(supplement) (2011): 146-64. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: As a major figure in contemporary neo-Confucianism, Mou Zongsan is unique in attempting to reconstruct Confucian ethics with the help of Kant’s moral philosophy. In attaining his goal, Mou Zongsan argues for an identity between Kant’s ethics and that of the School of Mind as represented by Lu Xiangshan and Wang Yangming. But at the same time he develops a critique of Kant’s ethics from a Confucian standpoint. Given the complexity of Mou Zongsan’s critique, in this paper I will mainly concentrate on two topics: (1) the limitation of Kant’s theory of moral feeling; (2) an extension of Kant’s theory of the typic. I will argue that in the first place, like Kant, Mou Zongsan suffers from a lack of the conception of pure feeling as the determining ground of morality; in the second place, Mou Zongsan’s introduction of the concept of noumenal action in effect eliminates Kant’s theory of the typic. This might jeopardize his attempt to synthesize Confucian and Kant’s ethics. In particular, Mou Zongsan’s claim about the autonomy of Confucian ethics can hardly be justified.

Chance, Brian A. “Sensibilism, Psychologism, and Kant’s Debt to Hume.” Kantian Review 16.3 (2011): 325-49. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Hume’s account of causation is often regarded a challenge Kant must overcome if the critical philosophy is to be successful. But from Kant’s time to the present, Hume’s denial of our ability to cognize supersensible objects, a denial that relies heavily on his account of causation, has also been regarded as a forerunner to Kant’s critique of metaphysics. After identifying reasons for rejecting Wayne Waxman’s recent account of Kant’s debt to Hume, I present my own, more modest account of this debt, an account that seeks to unite the two very different pictures of Kant’s relationship to Hume sketched above.

Chappell, Timothy. “Intuition, System, and the ‘Paradox’ of Deontology.” Perfecting Virtue: New Essays on Kantian Ethics and Virtue Ethics. Eds. Lawrence Jost and Julian Wuerth (op cit.). 271-88. [M]

Chappuis, Cédric. “«Der Keim der Aufklärung». Penser le progrés et l’histoire dans le système critique de Kant.”  Kant: l’anthropologie et l’histoire. Eds. Olivier Agard and Françoise Lartillot (op cit.). 69-94. [WC]

Charpenel Elorduy, Eduardo. “Pensar la moral desde la belleza: una lectura del parágrafo cincuenta y nueve de la ‘Kritik der Urteilskraft’.” [Spanish] Topicos: Revista de Filosofia (Mexico) 41 (2011): 183-219. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: My aim in this article is to study the role of beauty as symbol of morality within Kant’s Kritik der Urteilskraft. First, I draw a comparison between the schematism of concepts and the process of analogous reasoning. I sustain that analogous and symbolic reasoning leads in Kant to a consideration of the objects under the conditions set by the reflective agent himself: the thesis that I will prove thereby is that symbolic objects serve one’s own purposes of reflection on a given topic. I proceed then to explain why Kant considers that beauty is an adequate symbol of morality on account of the existence of an interesting number of similarities between the aesthetical and the moral realms. Lastly, I clarify why only freedom can be exhibited by means of a symbol in Kantian aesthetics, and why the other two ideas of reason — namely God and the soul — are much more associated with the experience of the sublime.

Cheng, Chung-Ying. “Incorporating Kantian Good Will: A Confucian-Kantian Synthesis.” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 38.4 (2011): 602-38. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: An essay on the analysis of Immanuel Kant’s moral philosophy, particularly the theory of good will, which can be improved by incorporating the aspects of Confucian doctrine of benevolence. It introduces a concept of autonomy of self, namely the autonomy of the human person instead of the autonomy of the good will. It also resolves the antinomy of practical reason as a matter of achieving autonomous harmonization both within and without the human person.

Chignell, Andrew. “The Devil, the Virgin, and the Envoy. Symbols of Moral Struggle in Religion, Part Two, Section Two.” Immanuel Kant, die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft. Ed. Ottfried Höffe (op cit.). 111-29. [M]

 ——. “Causal Refutations of Idealism Revisited.” The Philosophical Quarterly 61 (2011): 184-86. [online] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Causal refutations of external-world scepticism start from our ability to make justified judgements about the order of our own experiences, and end with the claim that there must be perceptible external objects, some of whose states can be causally correlated with that order. In a recent paper, I made a series of objections to this broadly Kantian anti-sceptical strategy. Georges Dicker has provided substantive replies on behalf of a version of the causal refutation of idealism. Here I offer a few final remarks about issues at the heart of our disagreement.

 ——. “Real Repugnance and our Ignorance of Things-in-Themselves: A Lockean Problem in Kant and Hegel.” Internationales Jahrbuch des Deutschen Idealismus/International Yearbook of German Idealism 7 (2011[sic]): 135-59. [M]

Chillón, José Manuel. “La Ilustración pendiente: El legado kantiano en Horkheimer y en Popper.” [Spanish] Contrastes: Revista Interdisciplinar de Filosofia 16 (2011): 67-84. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The positivist dispute exposed the argument between Horkheimer and Popper. But this opposition has been both misunderstood and exaggerated. Between these two philosophies there are interesting affinities which lead to a common root: Kant. Specifically, his illustrated optimism is the one that, as I will try to prove, is present in the philosophies of Horkheimer and Popper, since both are dominated by a determined confidence in reason. These philosophies represent in our time, from different positions, the essential connection between reason and freedom in mankind.

Chiurazzi, Gaetano. Modalità ed esistenza: dalla critica della ragion pura alla critica della ragione ermeneutica: Kant, Husserl, Heidegger. Rome: Aracne, 2011. [346 p.] [WC]

Church, Michael. “Immanuel Kant and the Emergence of Modern Geography.” Reading Kant’s Geography. Eds. Stuart Elden and Eduardo Mendieta (op cit.). 19-46. [M]

Cíbik, Matej. “Kant and Rawls on the Neutrality of a Liberal State.” [Slovak] Filozofia 66.5 (2011): 481-85. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The conflict between perfectionism and the neutrality of a liberal state is one of the burning issues of contemporary liberalism and political philosophy as a whole. The paper examines the roots of the perfectionist as well as neutralistic thinking, which are found in the philosophies of Immanuel Kant and John Rawls respectively. Through the reconsideration of the latter the character of the conflict can also be redefined. The aim of the paper is to show the basic difference between the above mentioned conceptions, which in the long run appears to be an anthropological one.

Cicatello, Angelo. Ontologia critica e metafisica: studio su Kant. Milano: Mimesis, 2011. [174 p.] [abstract] [WC]

 ——. “La questione del soprasensibile nella ‘Preisschrift’ sui progressi della metafisica di Immanuel Kant.” [Italian] Giornale di Metafisica 33 (2011): 99-120. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This essay, starting from a reading of Preisschrift über die Fortschritte der Metaphysik, intends to highlight the architectural sense that metaphysics takes on in Kant: metaphysics does not link its most eminent performance to dogmatic possession of a domain, either the theoretical one of the objects of nature or the practical one of the objects of ethics, but to the possibility of lighting the way for passage from one to the other sphere of knowledge, in a critical perspective that, if on one side it shows up the dangers inherent in the dogmatic excesses of reason, on the other one nevertheless refuses the idea of metaphysics of the supersensual conceived in the sign of a summary renouncement of theoretical knowledge tout court.

Cicovacki, Predrag. “Pure Reason and Metaphors: A Reflection on the Significance of Kant's Philosophy.” Annales Philosophici 2 (2011): 9-19. [HUM]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article debates the problems of metaphors in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. The most important four Kantian metaphors analyzed here are: the Copernican revolution, the island of truth and the stormy ocean of illusion, the starry heavens and the moral law, and the vision of perpetual peace. Besides the extensive analysis of these four metaphors and of some criticism directed towards some of the core problems of Kantianism, these pages try to answer to the question if Kant’s metaphors are still capable of stimulating our systematic thinking.

Clarke, Eric O. “Kant’s Kiss: Reflections on the Philosophy of Lifestyle.” boundary 2, 38.2 (2011): 188-206. [PI]

Clavier, Paul. “Ce que Kant doit à Wolff: l’épuisement de la création.”  Kant et Wolff. Eds. Sophie Grapotte und Tinca Prunea-Bretonnet (op cit.). 203-13. [M]

Cobben, Paul. “The Lord and the Sublime: Free Life’s Transcendence of Finitude.” The Sublime and its Teleology. Ed. Donald Loose (op cit.). 133-58. [M]

Costa Rego, Pedro. “Aperception subjective et aperception objective dans la «Déduction» B de la Critique de la raison pure.”  Kant et la science. La théorie critique et transcendantale de la connaissance. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Mai Lequan, and Margit Ruffing (op cit.). 307-15. [M]

Croitoru, Rodica. “La science du «ciel étoilé» et la morale du «moi invisible».”  Kant et les sciences. Un dialogue philosophique avec la pluralité des savoirs. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Mai Lequan, and Margit Ruffing (op cit.). 369-74. [M]

 ——. “Activismul formal al Criticii raţiunii practice.” [Romanian; The Formal Activism of the Critique of Practical Reason] Cercet. Fil. Psih. 4.2 (201??): 142-45. [RC]

 ——. “Armonia facultăţilor subintelectuale ale sufletului în proiectul antropologic kantian.” [Romanian; The Harmony of the Sub-intellectual Faculties of the Soul in Kant’s Anthropological Project] Studii de istoria filosofiei universale 19 (2011): 124-132. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: What is specific to the anthropologic present project is that it offers us the possibility to bring to light some subjacent or sub-intellectual faculties, which complete the view of the three main faculties of man. In this way it is emphasized that between the intellectual faculties and the sub-intellectual ones there is a harmony giving us an unitary and harmonious image on man, which comes to be taken from generation to generation, with the view of opening out an interactive perspective on culture.

 ——. “Cadrul necesar al categoriilor libertăţii.” [Romanian; The Necessary Framework of the Categories of Freedom] Studii de teoria categoriilor 4 (2011): 57-68. [RC]

Cubo Ugarte, Óscar. Rev. of Libertad, objeto práctico y acción: La facultad del juicio en la filosofía moral de Kant, by José M. Torralba (2009). Endoxa: Series Filosoficas 27 (2011): 391-94. [PI]

Curci, Stefano. La nascita dell’ateismo: Dai clandestini a Kant. [Italian] Roma: Libreria Ateneo Salesiano, 2011. [192 p.] [PI]

[top] D    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Daly, Aengus. Rev. of The Notion of the A Priori, by Mikel Defrenne, trans. Edward S. Casey (2009). Philosophy in Review 31.2 (2011): 93-95. [online] [PW]

Danz, Christian, and Jürgen Stolzenberg, eds. System und Systemkritik um 1800. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2011. [x, 400 p.] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Kant-Forschungen, vol. 19.

d’Aviau de Ternay, Henri. “De la science de la première Critique aux sciences de la troisième Critique.”  Kant et la science. La théorie critique et transcendantale de la connaissance. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Mai Lequan, and Margit Ruffing (op cit.). 117-24. [M]

Dávila, Johnny Antonio. “Algunas consideraciones sobre el sentimiento de respeto a la ley moral.” [Spanish] Discusiones Filosóficas 12.18 (2011): 145-54. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper focuses exclusively on the claim about the feeling of respect for the moral law, which Kant sets out in chapter three of ‘The Analytic of Pure Practical Reason (Critique of Practical Reason)’. There he held the following theses: (i) the feeling of respect, as ‘a priori’ feeling, is a logical requirement of the argumentation, in order to maintain the coherence of the Kantian system and to make freedom possible, (ii) the feeling of respect fulfills both a causal function and a distinctive function, and, (iii) Kant’s moral theory asserts the existence of two ‘a priori’ feelings: the feeling of respect for the moral law and the feeling of pain.

 ——. “Sobre el papel del ‘estado natural’ en el pensamiento jurídico y político de Kant.” [Spanish] Ideas y Valores: Revista Colombiana de Filosofia 60 (2011): 65-88. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant resorts to the idea of an original contract in order to legitimate right and the state; however, no reasons are given for the establishment of either of them. The article suggests that the concept of natural state needs to be analyzed in order to find out what those reasons are. This concept not only indicates what those reasons are, but also determines the content of positive legal norms. On the other hand, the article suggests that the wide spectrum of the concept of ‘natural state’ also motivates the Kantian idea of a universal legal structure.

De Bianchi, Silvia. “Kant’s concept of the Technique of Nature in the Critique of the Power of Judgment.” Kant e-Prints 6.1 (2011): 12-28. [online][PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The relationship between reason and nature embodies one of the main aspects of Kant‟s critique of teleology. In order to highlight this relation, I shall investigate the concept of the technique of nature, as it has been introduced in Critique of the Power of Judgment. According to Kant, the technique of nature allows the laws of reason to represent the agreement of the transcendental principles of reason with nature. Thus, the concept of the technique of nature assumes a fruitful role by exposing, through an analogy with human faculties, the productive activity of nature, as if its activity were oriented towards ends.

De Biase, Riccardo. I saperi della vita: biologia, analogia e sapere storico in Kant, Goethe e W. v. Humboldt. Naples: Giannini, 2011. [xxxi, 198 p.] [WC]

De Boer, Karin. “Kant, Reichenbach, and the Fate of A Priori Principles.” European Journal of Philosophy 19.4 (2011): 507-31. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Article first published online: 18 Feb 2010.
Abstract: This article contends that the relation of early logical empiricism to Kant was more complex than is often assumed. It argues that Reichenbach’s early work on Kant and Einstein, entitled ‘The Theory of Relativity and A Priori Knowledge’ (1920) aimed to transform rather than to oppose Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. On the one hand, I argue that Reichenbach’s conception of coordinating principles, derived from Kant’s conception of synthetic a priori principles, offers a valuable way of accounting for the historicity of scientific paradigms. On the other hand, I show that even Reichenbach, in line with neo-Kantianism, associated Kant’s view of synthetic a priori principles too closely with Newtonian physics and, consequently, overestimated the difference between Kant’s philosophy and his own. This is even more so, I point out, in the retrospective account logical empiricism presented of its own history. Whereas contemporary reconstructions of this history, including Michael Friedman’s, tend to endorse this account, I offer an interpretation of Kant’s conception of a priori principles that contrasts with the one put forward by both neo-Kantianism and logical empiricism. On this basis, I re-examine the early Reichenbach’s effort to accommodate these principles to the paradigm forged by Einstein.

 ——. “Transformations of Transcendental Philosophy: Wolff, Kant, and Hegel.” Hegel Bulletin 32.1-2 (2011): 50-79. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Shedding new light on Kant’s use of the term ‘transcendental’ in the Critique of Pure Reason, this article aims to determine the elements that Kant’s transcendental philosophy has in common with Wolffian ontology as well as the respects in which Kant turns against Wolff. On this basis I argue that Wolff’s, Kant’s and Hegel’s conceptions of metaphysics — qua first philosophy — have a deeper affinity than is commonly assumed. Bracketing the issue of Kant’s alleged subjectivism, I challenge the opposition between metaphysical and nonmetaphysical readings of Hegel’s Science of Logic. One the one hand, I argue that Hegel was more deeply indebted to Kant than he generally admits. On the other hand, I hold that this debt concerns Kant’s conception of metaphysics rather than his alleged subjectivism.

 ——. “Kant, Hegel, and the System of Pure Reason.”  Die Begründung der Philosophie im Deutschen Idealismus. Ed. Elena Ficara (op cit.). 77-87. [WC]

 ——. Rev. of Ideal Embodiment: Kant’s Theory of Sensibility, by Angelica Nuzzo (2008). Cosmos & History 7.2 (2011): 236-40. [HUM]

De Federicis, Nico. Rev. of Kant’s "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim". A Critical Guide, edited by Amélie Oksenberg Rorty and James Schmidt (2009). [Italian] Studi Kantiani 24 (2011): 171-76. [M]

Degryse, Annelies. “Sensus communis as a Foundation for Men as Political Beings: Arendt’s Reading of Kant’s Critique of Judgment.” Philosophy & Social Criticism 37.3 (2011): 345-58. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the literature on Hannah Arendt’s Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, two sorts of claim have been made by different interpreters. First, there is Beiner’s observation that there is a shift in Arendt’s thoughts on judgment, which has led to the idea that Arendt develops two distinct theories of judgment. The second sort of claim concerns Arendt’s use of Kant’s transcendental principles. At its core, it has led to the critique that Arendt detranscendentalizes — or empiricalizes — Kant, by linking Kant’s judgments of taste to an empirical sociability. In this article, I argue against both of these claims. Early fragments of Arendt’s on judgment make clear that she develops only one theory of judgment. It is only that it is not until later in her life that she fully elaborates it. Nor does Arendt confuse Kant’s idea of enlarged thinking with an actual dialogue with others. In fact, Arendt introduces an interesting interdependence between judgment and speech, or communication. I develop my argument by first outlining the problems Arendt hoped to resolve via judgment. Through my reading of the Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, I show how Arendt interprets Kant’s Critique of Judgment not as his theory of aesthetic judgments, but as an answer to the more general question ‘How do I judge?’ I also clarify the difference Arendt draws between common sense and community sense. With community sense, Arendt uncovers a foundation not only for men as political beings but also for the idea of humanity. This finding is often overlooked in the literature. I conclude with another Arendtian distinction that is often overlooked, that between spectators and the solitary philosopher.

Dekens, Olivier. Comprendre Kant. Paris: A. Colin, 2011. [191 p.] [WC]

Delfosse, Heinrich P. See: Böhr, Christoph and Heinrich P. Delfosse.

Deligiorgi, Alexandra. “Kant’s ‘Was ist Aufklarung?’: Notes on the Foucauldian Reading of the Kantian Reinterpretation of Enlightenment.” Skepsis 21.2 (2011): 23-34. [PI]

Deligiorgi, Katerina. “The Proper Telos of Life: Schiller, Kant and Having Autonomy as an End.” Inquiry 54.5 (2011): 494-511. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper I set the debate between Kant and Schiller in terms of the role that an ideal of life can play within an autonomist ethic. I begin by examining the critical role Schiller gives to emotions in tackling specific motivational concerns in Kant's ethics. In the Kantian response I offer to these criticisms, I emphasise the role of metaphysics for a proper understanding of Kant's position whilst allowing that with respect to moral psychology, Kant and Schiller are in agreement about the importance of emotions in our moral lives. I conclude by returning to the themes broached in the introduction to consider the extent to which the teleological concerns that motivate Schiller can be addressed within Kant's autonomist ethics.

 ——. “What a Kantian Can Know A Priori: An Argument for Moral Cognitivism.” Politics and Metaphysics in Kant. Eds. Sorin Baiasu, Howard Williams, and Sami Pihlström (op cit.). 152-73. [M]

Démuth, Andrej. “Respect for Reason as a Reason of Law and Morality in the World: Some Annotation to Kant’s Conception of World Citizenship.” Kaygi: Uludag Universitesi Felsefe Dergisi (Uludag University Journal of Philosophy) 16 (2011): 53-59. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The background of the study is set on the analysis of Kant’s idea of world citizenship in empire of human rationality, which he sees as world of academic liberty, authority of reason and equality of actors. Author of this study tries to focus an attention on basic idea of Kantian morality — on respect to moral lawgiver. He shows that in Kant’s conception is the lawgiver only the critical reason. This moment allows Kant to create autonomous morality in which is lawgiver, actor and judge the same. Reason in each from these persons is the same like in each rational being. So Kant discovered proof of equality as a condition of universal morality. The second moment of Kantian morality is duty of logical consistency (respect of rationality to reason in everybody). Because the rationality is universal, we must respect reason in each man and it gives the dignity to each. Equality and the duty of respect to another is a main idea of Kant’s conception of world citizenship. At the end of study the author analyses typical idea of freedom as a condition of morality in the polemic with Kant’s idea of “providence” and rationality of nature. The author believes that Kant’s argumentation can be inspirative in contemporary world, too.

Denis, Lara. “A Kantian Conception of Human Flourishing.” Perfecting Virtue: New Essays on Kantian Ethics and Virtue Ethics. Eds. Lawrence Jost and Julian Wuerth (op cit.). 164-93. [M]

 ——. Rev. of Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: A Critical Guide, edited by Jens Timmermann (2009). Philosophy in Review 31 (2011): 235-38. [online] [M]

Depner, Hanno. Kant für die Hand: die Kritik der reinen Vernunft zum Basteln & Begreifen; mit Anleitung und 12 Bogen Bausatz. München: Knaus, 2011. [69 p.] [WC]

De Quincey, Thomas. Immanuel Kant'ın Son Günleri. Translation of The Last Days of Immanuel Kant into Turkish by Tugçe Aytes. Istanbul: MonoKL Sel Yayinlari, 2011. [87 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: De Quincey’s The Last Days of Immanuel Kant was first published in Blackwood’s Magazine (February 1827), and reprinted in De Quincey's Works, vol. 3 (Last Days of Immanuel Kant and Other Writings, Edinburgh: Adam and Charles Black, 1862), pp. 99-166.

De Santis, Daniele. Rev. of Eugen Fink e le interpretazioni fenomenologiche di Kant, by Riccardo Lazzari (2009). [Italian] Studi Kantiani 24 (2011): 177-80. [M]

Desch, Michael C. “Benevolent Cant? Kant’s Liberal Imperialism.” Review of Politics 73.4 (2011): 649-56. [PI]

De Vos, Lu. Rev. of Kant et la Schwärmerei, by Béatrice Allouche-Pourcel (2010). Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 73.3 (2011): 559-62. [PI]

DiCenso, James. Kant, Religion, and Politics. Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011. [viii, 294 p.] [WC] [review]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents: 1. Introduction: on religion, ethics, and the political in Kant — 2. Religion, politics, enlightenment — 3. Knowledge and experience — 4. Illusions of metaphysics and theology — 5. Autonomy and judgment in Kant’s ethics — 6. Ethics and politics in Kant’s Religion.

Dicker, George. “Kant’s Refutation of Idealism: A Reply to Chignell.” The Philosophical Quarterly 61 (2011): 175-83. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: I reply to the most important criticisms made by Chignell of my ‘Kant's Refutation of Idealism’. I also introduce a new consideration which brings out more fully the power of Kant's argument.

Dimitrov, Ivaylo. “Imagination in Kant: A Faculty or a Power?!” [Russian Philosophical Alternative (Bulgarian Academy of Sciences) 20.1 (2011): 15-27. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The particular aim of this paper is to put forward an alternative translation of the Kantian concept ‘Einbildungskraft’ into Bulgarian. The general intention is to challenge the widespread synonymic use of traditional philosophical concepts of power and faculty. Parallels with the variety of English translations of the terms ‘Vermögen’ (faculty/capacity/ability/power) and ‘Kraft’ (power/force/faculty) are given as an example of this practice which blurs the lines of metaphysical dynamic concepts as potentiality, actuality, necessity, causality, etc. The paper outlines the possible approaches toward a critical metaphysics of faculties based on the Kantian threefold synthetic discrimination between ‘Fähigkeit’ (capacity/ability), ‘Vermögen’ (faculty), and ‘Kraft’ (power/force).

Dispersyn, Éléonore. “Du mal radical au salut dans la ‘Religion dans les limites de la simple raison’: une instabilité créatrice: Discussion de la lecture de Gordon Michalson.” Revue Philosophique de Louvain 109.3 (2011): 461-88. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The problem of salvation in Kant’s Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason is thorny, as it cannot be understood independently of that of radical evil. The two are indeed opposed and even appear to eliminate each other since how can one explain salvation if one admits that human nature is radically corrupted by an evil that systematically impedes the maxim of all our moral actions? Furthermore, even if one envisages the possibility of moral renaissance, how can one justify having recourse to a discourse that is found beyond the limits of simple reason? From evil to salvation, should one entertain hope of despair for human nature, and what role does God play in this process? This article seeks to show that all of these questions constitute precisely the crux of a certain instability of religion, which, far from emphasizing an incoherence or a fault in Kant’s argumentation, rather bears witness to the creative richness of a new type of reasoning, that makes it possible to surpass traditional dualism between the sensible world and the intelligible world.

Dlugač, Tamara B. Dve filosofskie refleksii: ot Golʹbacha k Kantu; sravnitelʹno-istoričeskij analiz. [Russian; Two Philosophical Reflections on D’Holbach and Kant] Moscow: Kanon+, 2011. [351 p.] [WC]

Dörflinger, Bernd. “Wozu sind die mathematischen kosmologischen Ideen gut?” Über den Nutzen von Illusionen. Eds. Bernd Dörflinger and Günter Kruck (op cit.). 103-16. [M]

 —— and Günter Kruck, eds. Über den Nutzen von Illusionen. Die regulativen Ideen in Kants theoretischer Philosophie. Hildesheim/Zürich/New York: Georg Olms Verlag, 2011. [164 p.] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Vol. 81 in the series Studien und Materialien zur Geschichte der Philosophie.
Essays by Günter Zöller, Claudio La Rocca, Claude Piché, Camilla Serck-Hanssen, Christian Iber, Friedrike Schick, Bernd Dörflinger, Günter Kruck, Burkhard Tuschling, and Ernst Wolfgang Orth.
Abstract: The thinking self as simple substance, the universe and God are, according to Kant, nothing but the subjects of ideas. Admittedly reason must think these thought entities, but when it claims that its ideas are concepts of real things, claiming for example that it can recognise the existence of God, then it is creating illusions. And yet these ideas, which can cause reason to become ensnared in illusion and deception, are not superfluous. For alongside their illegitimate transcendental function they have, Kant says, a positive function. It is their regulative use as ideas which orientates immanent knowledge towards the gaining of knowledge and systematic unity. The essays in this volume clarify Kant’s conception of the regulative ideas of theoretical reason, developing its implications, and assessing its capacity.

Doğan, Aysel. “On the Priority of the Right to the Good.” Kant-Studien 102.3 (2011): 316-34. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Rawls’s view that the right is prior to the good has been criticized by various scholars from divergent points of view. Some contend that Rawls’ teleological/deontological distinction based on the priority of the right is misleading while others claim that no plausible ethical theory can determine what is right prior to the good. There is no consensus on how to interpret the priority of right to the good; nor is there an agreement on the criteria of teleological/deontological distinction. In this article, I argue that the critics’ interpretations of the principle of the priority of right to the good as well as their conceptions of the teleological/deontological distinction have serious shortcomings to the extent that they ignore rich theoretical resources we find in Kant’s moral and political philosophy. Kant’s conception of human dignity and his division of the doctrine of virtue and the doctrine of right supply powerful arguments to clarify and sustain the idea of the priority of right to the good and the teleological/deontological division.

Dohrn, Daniel. “Brandoms kantische Lehren.”  Robert Brandom’s expressive Vernunft. Eds. Barth, Christian and Holger Sturm (op cit.). 61-90. [WC]

Doyle, Michael W. Liberal Peace: Selected Essays. New York: Routledge, 2011. [243 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents: Introduction — Kant, liberal legacies, and foreign affairs — Kant, liberal legacies, and foreign affairs part 2 — Liberalism and world politics — Politics and grand strategy — The voice of the people — One world, many peoples: international justice — An international liberal community — A more perfect union? the liberal peace and the challenge of globalization — A few words on Mill, Walzer, and nonintervention — After the freedom agenda.

Ducheyne, Steffen. “Kant and Whewell on Bridging Principles between Metaphysics and Science.” Kant-Studien 102.1 (2011): 22-45. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this essay, I call attention to Kant’s and Whewell’s attempt to provide bridging principles between a priori principles and scientific laws. Part of Kant’s aim in the Opus postumum (ca. 1796–1803) was precisely to bridge the gap between the metaphysical foundations of natural science and physics by establishing intermediary concepts or ‘Mittelbegriffe’ (henceforth this problem is referred to as ‘the bridging-problem’). It will be argued, on the basis of a close reading of Whewell's Notebooks on Induction, that Whewell’s account of the Idea of Cause (and by extension, his doctrine of Fundamental Ideas in general) grew out of his dissatisfaction with Kantian philosophy of science and its seeming inability to solve the bridging-problem. This analysis throws new light on the importance of Kantianism in Whewell’s philosophy, for it will be shown that Whewell took over and transformed Kant's idea of a priori principles as conditions for the establishment of proper knowledge about the world (without always clinging to Kant’s exact differentiation between them) and that Whewell was trying to address a typical Kantian topic: namely, to show how scientific knowledge could be both empirical and necessary and how the gap between metaphysics and physics could be bridged.

Dudley, Will, and Kristina Engelhard, eds. Immanuel Kant: Key Concepts. Durham, England: Acumen, 2011. [x, 237 p.] [M] [review]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Essays by Günter Zoller, Emily Carson, Dietmar Heidemann, Michelle Grier, Paul Guyer, Kenneth R. Westphal, Georg Mohr/Ulli F. H. Rühl, Katrin Flikschuh, Kirk Pillow, John Zammito, Stephen Houlgate, and Patrick Frierson.

Duncan, Samuel. “‘There is None Righteous’: Kant on the Hang Zum Bösen and the Universal Evil of Humanity.” Southern Journal of Philosophy 49.2 (2011): 137-63. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper offers a new interpretation of the propensity to evil and its relation to Kant’s claim that the human race is universally evil. Unlike most of its competitors, the interpretation presented here neither trivializes Kant’s claims about the universal evil of humanity nor attributes a position to him that is incompatible with his repeated insistence that we are blameworthy for actions only when we could have acted differently. This interpretation also accounts for a number of otherwise bewildering claims in the Religion and makes sense of the analogy Kant draws between the propensity to evil and addiction.

Dunham, Jeremy, Lain Hamilton Grant, and Sean Watson. Idealism: The History of a Philosophy. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2011. [x, 334 p.] [WC]

Dunson, James A. “An Entire Nest of Contradictions: Re-examining Hegel’s Critique of the Kantian Moral Subject.” International Philosophical Quarterly 51 (2011): 23-38. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Defending Kant against the charge that his ethics is formalistic has prompted some prominent interpreters to stress the “humanity” formulation of the categorical imperative. In this paper I argue that this more sophisticated account of Kantian ethics generates a deeper and more philosophically interesting Hegelian criticism (located primarily in the Phenomenology of Spirit). Hegel’s claim that the moral worldview is rife with dialectical conflict serves as a criticism both of Kant’s conception of the moral self and of his more basic assumptions about the proper philosophical reply to the challenges posed by dogmatism and skepticism. As I will argue, the moral worldview unselfconsciously preserves elements of dogmatism and skepticism, even as it claims to be self-critical. Hegel’s strategy, then, is to accuse Kant of falling into a kind of practical antinomy that makes his account of the moral self existentially unsatisfying and, ultimately, incoherent.

Dupeyrix, Alexandre. “Le projet de paix perpetuelle. Une relecture de Kant par Habermas.”  Kant: l’anthropologie et l’histoire. Eds. Olivier Agard and Françoise Lartillot (op cit.). 201-17. [WC]

Duque, Félix. De la libertad de la pasión a la pasión de la libertad: ensayos sobre Hume y Kant. [Spanish] Valencia: Natán, 2011. [114 p.] [WC]

Durán Migliardi, Mario. “Teorías Absolutas de la Pena.” [Spanish] Revista de Filosophía (Santiago) 67 (2011): 123-44. [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Within the realm of the discussion about the aims of the sanction and the reappearance of the absolute theories, the present article develops the origin and the foundations of such theories. It also examines the main postulates of Immanuel Kant’s Theory of Moral Retribution, so as to finally develop the most important criticism to Kant’s Theory and to the neo retributism.

Dutra, Delamar Volpato. “In ricordo di Valerio Rohden.” [Italian] Studi Kantiani 24 (2011): 131-34. [M]

Dybvig, Dagfinn D. “Kant in the Garden of Infinitely Forking Paths: Time, Causality and the Labyrinth of Philosophy.” Kant, Here, Now, and How. Eds. Siri Granum Carson, Jonathan Knowles, and Bjørn K. Myskja (op cit.). 77-93. [M]

Dyck, Corey W. “Kant’s Transcendental Deduction and the Ghosts of Descartes and Hume.” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 19.3 (2011): 473-96. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper considers how Descartes’s and Hume’s sceptical challenges were appropriated by Christian Wolff and Johann Nicolaus Tetens specifically in the context of projects related to Kant’s in the transcendental deduction. Wolff introduces Descartes’s dream hypothesis as an obstacle to his account of the truth of propositions, or logical truth, which he identifies with the ‘possibility’ of empirical concepts. Tetens explicitly takes Hume's account of our idea of causality to be a challenge to the ‘reality’ of transcendent concepts in general, a challenge he addresses by locating the source of this concept in the understanding rather than in the imagination. After considering this background, I turn to Kant’s deployment of apparently traditional sceptical concerns at the outset of the transcendental deduction and argue that he does not there intend to introduce a global sceptical challenge and, accordingly, that there are historical grounds for doubting that the transcendental deduction is intended as an anti-sceptical argument.

 ——. “A Wolff in Kant’s Clothing: Christian Wolff’s Influence on Kant’s Accounts of Consciousness, Self-Consciousness, and Psychology.” Philosophy Compass 6.1 (2011): 44-53. [online] [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In attempts to come to grips with Kant’s thought, the influence of the philosophy of Christian Wolff (1679–1754) is often neglected. In this paper, I consider three topics related to Kant’s philosophy of mind, broadly construed, where Wolff’s influence is particularly visible, namely, consciousness, self-consciousness, and the doctrine of the soul or psychology. I argue that within this context we can better understand Kant’s particular arguments and positions, and gain a more accurate sense of which aspects of Kant’s accounts derive from the antecedent traditions and which constitute genuine philosophical innovations.

 ——. “Turning the Game Against the Idealist: Mendelssohn’s Refutation of Idealism in the Morgenstunden and Kant’s Replies.” Studies in German Idealism 13.3 (2011): 159-82. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Moses Mendelssohn’s Metaphysics and Aesthetics, edited by Reinier Munk.
Abstract: While there is good reason to think that Mendelssohn’s Morgenstunden targets some of the key claims of Kant’s first Critique, this criticism has yet to be considered in the appropriate context or presented in all of its systematic detail. I show that far from being an isolated assault, Mendelssohn’s attack in the Morgenstunden is a continuation and development of his earlier criticism of Kant’s idealism as presented in the Inaugural Dissertation. I also show that Mendelssohn’s objection was more influential on Kant than has previously been suspected; not only did Kant respond to it in a brief review and a set of remarks published along with a disciple’s examination of Mendelssohn’s text but, as I will suggest, Kant’s Refutation of Idealism is intended (at least in part) to undermine the Cartesian starting-point Mendelssohn had presumed throughout his campaign against Kantian idealism.

 ——. Rev. of The Cambridge Companion to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, edited by Paul Guyer (2010). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (January 2011, #31). [online] [M]

[top] E    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Ebels-Duggan, Kyla. “Kantian Ethics.” The Continuum Companion to Ethics. Ed. Christian Miller (London: Continuum, 2011). 168-89. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper articulates and defends the most central claims of contemporary Kantian moral theory, and explains some of the most important internal disagreements in the field. It begins by dispelling common misinterpretations of the Kantian program, arising largely from misreadings of Kant’s Groundwork I. It then contrasts two approaches to Kantian ethics: Kantian constructivism and Kantian realism, connecting the former to Kant’s formula of universal law and the latter to his formula of humanity. It ends with a discussion of applications of the formula of humanity in normative ethics. I outline some normative commitments that most Kantians share and then discuss differences between constructivists and realists over how the formula ought to be applied.

 ——. Rev. of Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy, by Arthur Ripstein (2009). Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41.4 (2011): 549-74. [PI]

Eberl, Oliver. “The Metaphysics of International Law: Kant’s ‘Unjust Enemy’ and the Limitation of Self-Authorization.” Politics and Metaphysics in Kant. Eds. Sorin Baiasu, Howard Williams, and Sami Pihlström (op cit.). 250-69. [M]

Edwards, Jeffrey. “Original Community, Possession, and Acquisition in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals.” Kant and the Concept of Community. Eds. Charlton Payne and Lucas Thorpe (op cit.). 150-82. [M]

 ——. “‘The Unity of All Places on the Face of the Earth’: Original Community, Acquisition, and Universal Will in Kant’s Doctrine of Right.” Reading Kant’s Geography. Eds. Stuart Elden and Eduardo Mendieta (op cit.). 233-63. [M]

Egenhofer, Sebastian. “Für eine Topik der Bildkritik.” Zeitschrift fuer Aesthetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft 56.1 (2011): 143-50. []

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Starting from Kant’s conception of critique as “Grenzziehung,” the immanent representation of being, or, the conscious world, is understood as a screening off of its noumenal ground. Materially bound images gain a particular function in the explication of the structure of this immanence. As objects within the phenomenal world they duplicate the world’s phenomenality in the dimension of iconic semblance by (partially) negating their material support. This cleavage between the image’s phenomenality and its materiality makes images into possible catalysis of a critique of natural consciousness, be it individual or collective. Thus, “image critique” can serve as a hinge between a transcendental critique of consciousness and a critique of ideology or spectacle.

Ehrsam, Raphaël. “Le rôle du schématisme dans la connaissance: une interprétation sémiotique.”  Kant et la science. La théorie critique et transcendantale de la connaissance. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Mai Lequan, and Margit Ruffing (op cit.). 145-52. [M]

Elberfeld, Rolf. “Kant’s Doctrine on Virtues and the Buddhist Practice of Exercises.” [Slovenian] Phainomena: Journal of the Phenomenological Society of Ljubljana 20.76-78 (2011): 199-219. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The final purpose of man is according to Kant the culture in terms of the cultivation of man. Kant distinguishes different levels of culture: culture of reason, culture of the will, culture of taste, culture of the body, etc. Without the continued cultivation of human powers, it is not possible for man to realize a moral action. How the cultivation of human powers is to be carried out in a concrete way, Kant does not say. At this point in the essay, the Buddhist practice is brought into play. Also the Buddhist practice allows people to act ethically. In this way, Kant and Buddhism can fruitfully be correlated.

Elden, Stuart. “Reintroducing Kant’s Geography.” Reading Kant’s Geography. Eds. Stuart Elden and Eduardo Mendieta (op cit.). 1-15. [M]

 —— and Eduardo Mendieta, eds. Reading Kant’s Geography. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2011. [vii, 382 p.] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents: Stuart Elden, “Reintroducing Kant’s Geography” — Michael Church, “Immanuel Kant and the Emergence of Modern Geography” — Charles W. J. Withers, “Kant’s Geography in Comparative Perspective” — Werner Stark, “Kant’s Lectures on ‘Physical Geography’: A Brief Outline of Its Origins, Transmission, and Development: 1754–1805” — Werner Stark, “Historical and Philological References on the Question of a Possible Hierarchy of Human ‘Races’, ‘Peoples’, or ‘Populations’ in Immanuel Kant — A Supplement” — Olaf Reinhardt, “Translating Kant’s Physical Geography: Travails and Insights into Eighteenth Century Science (and Philosophy)” — Max Marcuzzi, “Writing Space: Historical Narrative and Geographical Description in Kant’s Physical Geography” — Robert Louden, “‘The Play of Nature’: Human Beings in Kant’s Geography” — Holly Wilson, “The Pragmatic Use of Kant’s Physical Geography Lectures” — David Morris, “The Place of the Organism in Kantian Philosophy: Geography, Teleology, and the Limits of Philosophy” — Jeff Malpas and Karsten Thiel, “Kant’s Geography of Reason” — Onora O’Neill, “Orientation in Thinking: Geographical Problems, Political Solutions” — Jeffrey Edwards, “‘The Unity of All Places on the Face of the Earth’: Original Community, Acquisition, and Universal Will in Kant’s Doctrine of Right” — David Harvey, “Cosmopolitanism in the Anthropology and Geography” — Ed Casey, “Is there Still Room for Freedom? A Commentary on David Harvey’s ‘Cosmopolitanism in the Anthropology and Geography’” — Robert Bernasconi, “Kant’s Third Thoughts on Race” — Walter Mignolo, “The Darker Side of the Enlightenment: A De-Colonial Reading of Kant’s Geography” — Eduardo Mendieta, “Geography Is to History as Woman Is to Man: Kant on Sex, Race, and Geography”
Publisher summary: For almost forty years, German enlightenment philosopher Immanuel Kant gave lectures on geography, more than almost any other subject. Kant believed that geography and anthropology together provided knowledge of the world, an empirical ground for his thought. Above all, he thought that knowledge of the world was indispensable to the development of an informed cosmopolitan citizenry that would be self-ruling. While these lectures have received very little attention compared to his work on other subjects, they are an indispensable source of material and insight for understanding his work, specifically his thinking and contributions to anthropology, race theory, space and time, history, the environment, and the emergence of a mature public. This indispensable volume brings together world-renowned scholars of geography, philosophy, and related disciplines to offer a broad discussion of the importance of Kant’s work on this topic for contemporary philosophical and geographical work.

Engelhard, Kristina, ed. See: Dudley, Will and Kristina Engelhard, eds.

Engstrom, Stephen. “Herman on Moral Literacy.” Kantian Review 16.1 (2011): 17-31. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In her recent book, Barbara Herman explores a range of topics commonly associated with virtue ethics; her focus, however, is not so much on virtue as on normal moral competence and the basic moral capacity underpinning it. To explicate this competence, Herman introduces the idea of moral literacy, arguing that it reveals Kantian ethical thought to be better able than Humean views to account for our readiness to hold persons responsible even for conduct reflecting character flaws that stem from deficiencies in their upbringing. Examination of Herman's account raises a question, however, about how intimately moral literacy is related to the basic moral capacity.

Ennis, Paul. “Copernican Metaphysics.” Continent 1.2 (2011): 94.101. [online] [M]

Erdelack, Wesley. “Antivoluntarism and the Birth of Autonomy.” Journal of Religious Ethics 139.4 (2011): 651-79. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Traditionalist and radical orthodox critiques of the Enlightenment assert that the modern discourse on moral self-government constitutes a radical break with the theocentric model of morality which preceded it. Against this view, this paper argues that the conceptions of autonomy emerged from the effort to reconcile commitments within the Christian tradition. Through an analysis of the moral thought of the Cambridge Platonist Ralph Cudworth, this paper contends that distinctively Christian theological concerns concerning moral accountability to God and the character of divine-human moral relationships produced a theory of moral autonomy which anticipates that of Kant. This paper highlights the role of anti-voluntarism in the creation of this moral standpoint, and argues that the resultant moral view is an ‘internalization’ of the voluntarist model of sovereignty.

Erle, Giorgio. Tre prospettive su veridicità e agire morale: Leibniz, Kant, Hegel. [Italian; Three perspectives on truth and moral action: Leibniz, Kant, Hegel] Bologna: Archetipolibri, 2011. [160 p.] [WC]

Ertle, Wolfgang. “Kant and the Early Modern Scholastic Legacy: New Perspectives on Transcendental Idealism.”  Departure for Modern Europe. A Handbook of Early Modern Philosophy (1400-1700). Ed. Hubertus Busche (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2011), 1262 pp. 1178-1193. [M]

Esenyel, Adnan. “Idealism and Kant’s Conception of Space.” [Turkish] Kaygi: Uludag Universitesi Felsefe Dergisi 17 (2011): 149-62. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: One of the basic deadlocks of modern philosophy emerges during the attempt of the knowing subject who tries to justify an objective world which is independent of him. Starting with Descartes, modern philosophy which moves from the content of subject’s consciousness finds itself generally, as shown by Berkeley and Hume, stuck “in the marsh” of solipsism and idealism. With the distinction between the phenomenon and the thing-in-itself, Kant claims to produce a solution for the deadlock of modern philosophy. But, Kant’s theory which fundamentally cannot escape the conjectures of modern philosophy, for this reason finds itself encountering with the danger of solipsism and idealism. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate Kant’s position against idealism, by means of his conception of space.

Eterović, Igor. “Kant’s Categorical Imperative and Jahr’s Bioethical Imperative.” JAHR [Croatia] 2.4 (2011): 457-74. [data/pdf] [WC]

 ——. “Kant’s Teleology as the Basis for Orientation in Ecology.” [Croatian] Filozofska Istrazivanja 122 (2011): 299-309. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant’s teleological theory, presented in the second part of ‘Critique of Judgment’, undeservedly received little reception. A possible fruitful valorization of this theory is an attempt of its bioethical interpretation. Kant’s “extended argument” lead him from internal purposiveness of organisms to the nature as a system of ends and, finally, to the ultimate and final end. This argument sets fruitful ground for the establishment of important bioethical messages related to ecology, through at least two moments. (1) People can achieve moral ends exclusively within nature, and use this same nature as a mean only with respect to the moral ends. (2) Nature is so interwoven and interconnected system that one cannot conceit the possibility of comprehending all consequences of his act, let alone the ability to control these consequences, but one must be moderate in all interventions in the environment. These messages give us a significant contribution to the formation of orientational framework for accessing the environment.

[top]F    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Fabbianelli, Faustino. “Penser la réalité, une question de non-contradiction? Réflexions sur Wolff, Crusius et Kant.”  Kant et Wolff. Eds. Sophie Grapotte und Tinca Prunea-Bretonnet (op cit.). 87-97. [M]

Falduto, Antonino. Rev. of Ideal Embodiment. Kant’s Theory of Sensibility, by Angelica Nuzzo (2008). Kant-Studien 102.3 (2011): 401-3. [M]

Fallon, Stephen M. Rev. of Kant and Milton, by Sanford Budick (2010). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (April 2011, #2). [online] [M]

Fantasia, Francesca. Rev. of Kants Begriff der Sinnlichkeit: Seine Unterscheidung zwischen apriorischen und aposteriorischen Elementen der sinnlichen Erkenntnis und deren lateinische Vorlagen, by Takeshi Nakazawa (2009). Giornale di Metafisica 33.3 (2011): 486-88. [PI]

Faradzhev, Kirill. “M. Rubinsteins Projekt der praktischen Philosophie des Neukantianismus: Pädagogik als angewandtes Wertesystem.” Kant-Studien 102.2 (2011): 191-201. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article is devoted to the Russian Neokantian philosopher, teacher, and member of the Kant Society, Moses M. Rubinstein, who attained his doctoral degree under Rickert in 1905 and who was very involved in promoting Kantianism in Russian. He is known for his public defence of Kant in 1914 at the time of the slavophile attacks on Kantian philosophy occasioned by World War I. Rubinstein’s essay on “The Logical Foundations of the Hegelian System and the End of History” was published in Kant-Studien in 1906. In his chief work “On the Meaning of Life”, Rubinstein attempted a synthesis of Neokantianism and the philosophy of life.

Faraone, Rosella. Gentile e Kant. [Italian] Florence: Le lettere, 2011. [197 p.] [WC]

Faucher, Jean-Marc. L’automatisme mental: Kant avec de Clérambault. Toulouse: Érès éd., 2011. [158 p.] [WC]

Feldhaus, Charles. “As Diferentes estratégias de enfrentar a controversa posição de Kant a respeito do dever de não mentir por amor à humanidade.” [Portuguese] Kant e-Prints 6.2 (2011): 120-34. [online] [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This study aims to reconstruct some of the main strategies to address the controversial position of Kant in his opusculum On the Supposed Right to Lie for the sake of Humanity, namely, an unconditional prohibition of lying, even when the consequences are catastrophic, seeking to ascertain the relevance such as an attempt to better situate the ethics of Kant in the face of overwhelming objections from the critics.Wood, for example, argues that the opusculum does not deal with an ethical duty, but a legal duty not to lie, claiming that the prohibition does not lie in the opusculum comes from the categorical imperative, but the universal principle of law. Korsgaard and Mahon argue that, regardless of the question for the type of duty in dispute between Kant and Constant, the point is that it does not follow the ethics of Kant, at least in some formulations of the categorical imperative of an unconditional prohibition of lying. In addition, it will defend itself in order to avoid such objections to Kantian ethics would need to abandon the distinction between duties of perfect obligation and duties of imperfect obligation, since, although not a dispute about an ethical duty, the classification of the duty not to lie as a perfect duty to oneself or to others signifies your unconditional.

Feloj, Serena. Rev. of Kant über das Erhabene, by Kap Hyun Park (2009). [Italian] Studi Kantiani 24 (2011): 163-66. [M]

Feola, Michael. “Community and Normativity: Hegel’s Challenge ot Kant in the Jena Essays.” Kant and the Concept of Community. Eds. Charlton Payne and Lucas Thorpe (op cit.). 183-208. [M]

Fernandes, Paulo Cezar. “Le droit est-il une science selon Kant? Le droit pénal et le problème de la peine de mort.”  Kant et les sciences. Un dialogue philosophique avec la pluralité des savoirs. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Mai Lequan, and Margit Ruffing (op cit.). 375-83. [M]

Feron, Olivier, ed. Figuras da Racionalidade: Neokantismo e Fenomenologia. [Portuguese] Lisbon: Centro de Filosofia da Universidade, 2011. [247 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: See especially the essays by Capeilleres, Ruffing, Loparic, Alves, Franco de Sá, Borges-Duarte, and Ribeiro dos Santos.

Ferrari, Jean. “Discours d’ouverture.”  Kant et la science. La théorie critique et transcendantale de la connaissance. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Mai Lequan, and Margit Ruffing (op cit.). 15-17. [M]

 ——. “Jean-Jacques Rousseau dans les Leçons d’anthropologie (AK XXV).”  Kant et les sciences. Un dialogue philosophique avec la pluralité des savoirs. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Mai Lequan, and Margit Ruffing (op cit.). 311-19. [M]

 ——. “Discours d’ouverture.”  Kant et les sciences. Un dialogue philosophique avec la pluralité des savoirs. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Mai Lequan, and Margit Ruffing (op cit.). 15-17. [M]

Ferrari, M. Rev. of Kant, by Allen W. Wood (2005).  Translated from English into Russian by A. Salikov. Kantovskij Sbornik 35 (2011): 104-05. [M]

Feuerhahn, Wolf. “Le champ de bataille de l’anthropologie. Kant entre l’héritage wolffien et le défi de la philosophie populaire.”  Kant et Wolff. Eds. Sophie Grapotte und Tinca Prunea-Bretonnet (op cit.). 217-32. [M]

Ficara, Elena, ed. Die Begründung der Philosophie im Deutschen Idealismus. Würzburg: Könighausen & Neumann, 2011. [350 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: See the essays by Karin De Boer (Kant, Hegel, and the System of Pure Reason), Ansgar Lyssy (Mit und gegen Hume - Eine Skizze der skeptischen und antiskeptischen Argumente in der Kritik der reinen Vernunft), Hanno Birken-Bertsch (Die Überschaubarkeit des Logischen. Zu einer Voraussetzung von Kants Philosophieren), Jannis Pissis (Begründung im Unbedingten als unabweisbares Problem. Die Funktion von Kants transzendentaler Dialektik), and Rainer Schäfer (Das bipolare Ich - Analytische und synthetische Einheit der Apperzeption in Kants Kategoriendeduktion).

Fichant, Michel. “Kant, la science et les sciences: la situation architectonique des sciences dans l’accomplissement critique.”  Kant et la science. La théorie critique et transcendantale de la connaissance. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Mai Lequan, and Margit Ruffing (op cit.). 27-42. [M]

Figueiredo, Virginia. “O Sublime explicado às crianças.” [Portuguese] Trans/Form/Ação: Revista de Filosofia 34-supplement #2 (2011): 35-56. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: As indicated by its title, the aim of this essay is debating with the contemporary French philosophy reception of Kant’s concept of the sublime, particularly with Jean-François Lyotard. As a consequence of this French influence, instead of highlighting, as traditional commentators tend to do, the moral and systematic implications of Kantian sublime, this essay takes Kant’s notion as intended in the first place to account for an essential aspect of our experience of art. But, at the same time, I want to distance myself from Lyotard’s interpretation and object to his view that Burke’s notion of the sublime is more adequate than Kant’s conception for understanding contemporary art. In particular, I want to hold that it is possible to understand time (that Lyotard takes to be the central aspect of Burke’s notion) as being also a key feature of Kantian sublime.

Fincham, Richard Mark. “Transcendental Idealism and the Problem of the External World.” Journal of the History of Philosophy 49.2 (2011): 221-41. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article defends Immanuel Kant against the charge of “representationalism” by suggesting that pre-critical attempts to prove the reality of external objects lead to a dialectical conflict, which, while not explicitly outlined in the Critique of Pure Reason, the Critique nonetheless resolves. It shows how Kantian transcendental idealism resolves this conflict by proving that conviction in the identity of representation and object is rationally justifiable. Therefore, it is concluded that, far from reducing empirical reality to a mere veil of ideas, Kant actually rationally demonstrates the reality of the external world.

Fink, Eugen. Epilegomena zu Immanuel Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Ein phänomenologischer Kommentar (1962-1971). 3 vols. Edited by Guy van Kerckhoven. Freiburg/Munich: Verlag Karl Alber, 2011. [2050 p.] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Vol. 13 of Division III (Philosophische Ideengeschichte) of the Eugen Fink Gesamtausgabe, edited by Stephan Grätzel, Cathrin Nielsen, and Hans Rainer Sepp.

Fisher, Talia. Rev. of Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy, by Arthur Ripstein (2009). Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence: An International Journal of Legal Thought 24.2 (2011): 387-402. [PI]

Fletcher, Michael. Rev. of Kant and Spinoza: Transcendental Idealism and Immanence from Jacobi to Deleuze, by Beth Lord (2011). Kantian Review 16.3 (2011): 482-88. [M]

Flikschuh, Katrin. “Gottesdienst und Afterdienst: die Kirche als öffentliche Institution?” Immanuel Kant, die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft. Ed. Ottfried Höffe (op cit.). 193-210. [M]

 ——. “Political obligation: property, trade, peace.” Immanuel Kant: Key Concepts. Eds. Will Dudley and Kristina Engelhard (op cit.). 136-52. [M]

 ——. “Hope as Prudence: Practical Faith in Kant’s Political Thinking.” Internationales Jahrbuch des Deutschen Idealismus/International Yearbook of German Idealism 7 (2011[sic]): 95-117. [M]

Formosa, Paul. “Is Kant a Moral Constructivist or a Moral Realist?” European Journal of Philosophy (pre-print online, posted 23 Jan 2011). [abstract] [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The dominant interpretation of Kant as a moral constructivist has recently come under sustained philosophical attack by those defending a moral realist reading of Kant. In light of this, should we read Kant as endorsing moral constructivism or moral realism? In answering this question we encounter disagreement in regard to two key independence claims. First, the independence of the value of persons from the moral law (an independence that is rejected) and second, the independence of the content and authority of the moral law from actual acts of willing on behalf of those bound by that law (an independence that is upheld). The resulting position, which is called not ‘all the way down’ constructivism, is attributed to Kant.

 ——. Rev. of Kant’s Anatomy of Evil, edited by Sharon Anderson-Gold and Pablo Muchnik (2010). Kantian Review 16.1 (2011): 150-56. [M]

Forschner, Maximilian. “Über die verschiedenen Bedeutungen des ‘Hangs zum Bösen’.” Immanuel Kant, die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft. Ed. Ottfried Höffe (op cit.). 71-90. [M]

Förster, Eckart. Die 25 Jahre der Philosophie: Eine systematische Rekonstruktion. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2011. [400 p.] [M] [review]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Volume 102 of the series Philosophische Abhandlungen.
[From the publisher] Kant behauptete, dass es vor der Kritik der reinen Vernunft von 1781 gar keine Philosophie gegeben habe, und 1806 erklärte Hegel, dass die Philosophie nun beschlossen sei. Hätten beide mit ihren Behauptungen recht gehabt, würde sich die Geschichte der Philosophie, die wir normalerweise auf zweieinhalb Jahrtausende berechnen, auf 25 Jahre reduzieren. “Die 25 Jahre der Philosophie” ist der Versuch, den Gedanken, dass die Philosophie 1781 beginnt und 1806 beschlossen ist, nachzuvollziehen und zu verstehen. Eckart Förster untersucht die Gründe, die Kant und Hegel zu ihren Aussagen bewegt haben, sowie die Schritte, die in so kurzer Zeit von Kants ‘Anfang’ zu Hegels ‘Ende’ führen konnten. Er kommt zu dem überraschenden Ergebnis, dass sowohl Kant als auch Hegel in einem unerwarteten aber gewichtigen Sinn recht haben.

 ——. “Immanuel Kant.” The Routledge Companion to Epistemology. Eds. Sven Bernecker and Duncan Pritchard (New York: Routledge, 2011), 911 p. 741-49. [M]

Fortino, Mirella. “Kant et la question des fondements de la géométrie dans la doctrine conventionnaliste.”  Kant et les sciences. Un dialogue philosophique avec la pluralité des savoirs. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Mai Lequan, and Margit Ruffing (op cit.). 97-105. [M]

Franco de Sá, Alexandre. “Finitude e liberdade na confrontação de Heidegger com Kant.”  Figuras da Racionalidade: Neokantismo e Fenomenologia. Ed. Olivier Feron (op cit.). 71-83. [WC]

Frank, Martin. “Kant und der ungerechte Feind.” Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 59.2 (2011): 199-219. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This essay proposes that Kant′s unjust enemy has a central place within his conception of international law. The first part rejects the assumption that the unjust enemy is part of Kant’s law of war and primarily a domestic problem. Instead, it is argued that this figure is best understood as a spoiler of the building process of international law. Several forms of the unjust enemy are distinguished in order to show that the theorem has also positive functions within Kant’s theory. These positive features could be used within Kant′s evolutionary conception of international law to point to some internal deficiencies.

Fréchette, Guillaume. “Sur le rôle de la psychologie en théorie de la connaissance: Kant à l’école de Brentano.”  Kant et les sciences. Un dialogue philosophique avec la pluralité des savoirs. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Mai Lequan, and Margit Ruffing (op cit.). 351-59. [M]

Frelih, Jasenka. “Schopenhauerova kritika Kantove etike.” [Croation; “Schopenhauer’s criticism of Kant’s ethics.”] Filozofska istraživanja 30.4 (2011): 649-54. [abstract/pdf] [WC]

Fremstedal, Roe. “The Concept of the Highest Good in Kierkegaard and Kant.” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 69.3 (2011): 155-71. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article tries to make sense of the concept of the highest good (eternal bliss) in Søren Kierkegaard by comparing it to the analysis of the highest good found in Immanuel Kant. The comparison with Kant’s more systematic analysis helps us clarify the meaning and importance of the concept in Kierkegaard as well as to shed new light on the conceptual relation between Kant and Kierkegaard. The article argues that the concept of the highest good is of systematic importance in Kierkegaard, although previous research has tended to overlook this, no doubt due to Kierkegaard’s cryptic use of the concept. It is argued that Kierkegaard’s concept of the highest good is much closer to Kant’s than what previous research has indicated. In particular, Kant and Kierkegaard see the highest good not only as comprising of virtue and happiness (bliss), but also as being the Kingdom of God.

Frey, Christiane. “Kants proportionierte Stimmung.”  Stimmung: Zur Wiederkehr einer ästhetischen Kategorie. Ed. Anna-Katharina Gisbertz (Paderborn: Wilhelm Fink, 2011). 75-94. [WC]

Freyenhagen, Fabian. “Empty, Useless, and Dangerous? Recent Kantian Replies to the Empty Formalism Objection.” Hegel Bulletin 32.1-2 (2011): 163-86. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kantians and Hegelians seem to be in a stand-off on what in contemporary parlance is known as the empty formalism objection. Kant’s ethics is charged with being merely formal and thereby failing to provide the kind of specific guidance that any defensible ethical system should have the resources to provide. Hegel is often credited with having formulated this objection in its most incisive way, and a wealth of Kantian responses has been deployed to answer it. In this paper, I take up the objection as it appears in section 135R of ‘Elements of the Philosophy of Right’ in order to scrutinise the contemporary debate between the two camps. I propose that there are, in fact, three different, albeit connected objections and examine the best Kantian replies to them. I will not adjudicate which of these replies is the most accurate interpretation of Kant’s texts, nor trace the particular historical context in which Hegel takes up Kant’s ethics, nor the way the empty formalism objection fits into Hegel’s wider system. My limited aim here is to show that, even if one grants — for argument’s sake — the legitimacy of such a noncontextual approach, significant difficulties remain.

Frierson, Patrick. “Rational Faith: God, Immortality, Grace.” Immanuel Kant: Key Concepts. Eds. Will Dudley and Kristina Engelhard (op cit.). 200-15. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article offers an explanation and analysis of Kant’s philosophy of religion. It starts with Kant’s criticisms of the ontological, cosmological, and physico-teleological arguments for the existence of God from the Critique of Pure Reason. It then explains Kant’s moral arguments in the Critique of Practical Reason for the existence and nature of God and for humans’ personal immorality. Finally, it lays out the argument for the necessity of grace from Kant’s Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason.

 ——. Rev. of Becoming Human: Romantic Anthropology and the Embodiment of Freedom, by Chad Wellmon (2010). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (October 2011, #25). [online] [M]

Fritzman, J. M. Rev. of Kant, Kantianism, and Idealism: The Origins of Continental Philosophy, edited by Thomas Nenon (2010). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (October 2011, #10). [online] [M]

Fröhlich, Günter. Form und Wert: die komplementären Begründungen der Ethik bei Immanuel Kant, Max Scheler und Edmund Husserl. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2011. [417 p.] [M]

Fuentes, Juan B. “De Kant a Freud: la formación del sujeto modernista en el seno de las crisis románticas del pensamiento kantiano.” Pensamiento: Revista de Investigación e Información Filosofíca 67.253 (2011): 427-58. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: We sketch the main genealogical and structural lines of the historical course of ideas that, starting from Kant, and through the consecutive romantic crises of the initial Kantian thought, leads to the formation of the philosophical key ideas the underlie “modernist” man’s cultural attitude of rebelliousness. These key ideas would have paradigmatically crystallized in the philosophy of Schopenhauer in the first place, and only from there into that of Nietzsche, to end up reappearing in the Freudian anthropology understood as a modernist, historical culmination of this flow of ideas.

Futch, Michael. Rev. of La métaphysique du temps chez Leibniz et Kant, by Adrian Nita (2008). The Leibniz Review 21 (2011): 171-74. [PI]

[top]G    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Gabriel, Markus. “Absolute Identität und Reflexion. Kant, Hegel, McDowell.” System und Systemkritik um 1800. Eds. Danz and Stolzenberg (op cit.). 211-26. [M]

Gallagher, Daniel B. Rev. of The Cambridge Companion to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, ed. by Paul Guyer (2010). Reviews in Religion & Theology 19.1 (2011): 77-80. [PI]

Gallois, Laurent. “De la philosophie transcendantale à une philosophie de l’esprit dans l’Opus postumum. “un passage possible?”  Kant et les sciences. Un dialogue philosophique avec la pluralité des savoirs. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Mai Lequan, and Margit Ruffing (op cit.). 341-50. [M]

Galvin, Richard. “Rounding Up the Usual Suspects: Varieties of Kantian Constructivism in Ethics.” The Philosophical Quarterly 61 (2011): 16-36. [online] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Some commentators have attributed constructivism to Kant at the first-order level; others cast him as a meta-ethical constructivist. Among meta-ethical constructivist interpretations I distinguish between ‘atheistic’ and ‘agnostic’ versions regarding the existence of an independent moral order. Even though these two versions are incompatible, each is linked with central Kantian doctrines, revealing a tension within Kant's own view. Moreover, among interpretations that cast Kant as rejecting substantive realism but embracing procedural realism, some (i.e., those that are ‘constructivist’) face charges of indeterminacy or relativism, while others (practical reasoning views) face ‘daunting rationalism’ objections. I close with some objections to interpreting Kant as a meta-ethical constructivist.

 ——. “Maxims and Practical Contradictions.” History of Philosophy Quarterly 28.4 (2011): 407-19. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Two interpretations of Kant’s contradiction in conception test, the practical contradiction (PCI) and logical contradiction Interpretations, have received the most attention. One argument in favor of PCI is that it provides a solution to the “problem of relevant descriptions” and the difficulty of determining which maxim is to be subjected to the noncontradiction test. I examine three proposals for formulating the maxim offered by proponents of PCI. I argue that although each proposal fails, revealing difficulties within PCI itself. Since PCI’s method for generating the proper maxim to test fails, one of its purported advantages over other interpretations of the noncontradiction test evaporates, since the possibility of alternative maxims would make claims of rendering “all-things-in” judgments of that actions are permissible, obligatory or prohibited difficult to sustain.

Gambriani, Sourénto. La place de Jean-Jacques Rousseau dans la philosophie kantienne de l'éducation. Paris: Onde, 2011. [102 p.] [WC]

García, Roberto Casales. Rev. of El poder de juzgar en Immanuel Kant, by Mendiola Mejía (2008). Anuario Filosofico 44.3 (2011): 637-40. [HUM]

García Ferrer, Soledad. “La felicidad como ideal de la imaginación.” [Portuguese] Trans/Form/Ação: Revista de Filosofia 34.2 (2011): 21-51. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this article, we develop minimally five discourses about the happiness we find in Kant’s work. We hardly met them because they are not ordered or continued speeches throughout his pages, but suggestions that appears from time to time, between the lines of other reflections. Happiness is designed as totality, as an undefined concept, as the opposite corner of culture, and as feeling and wellness. Although not involving linked speeches, it is possible to follow its tracks throughout the text. However, there is another suggestion that Kant gives us without having developed entirely: according to that, happiness would be the ideal of imagination. This nonpronounced speech could be the key to find consistency of others.

García Morente, Manuel. La filosofía de Kant. [Spanish] Barcelona: Planeta DeAgostini, 2011. [211 p.] [WC]

García Norro, Juan José. “Las imágenes biológicas en la Crítica de la razón pura.” [Spanish]  Kant y las ciencias. Ed. Pedro Jesús Teruel (op cit.). 165-84. [M]

Gardner, Sebastian. “Kant’s Practical Postulates and the Limits of the Critical System.” Hegel Bulletin 32.1-2 (2011): 187-215. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The topic that I wish to consider is the significance, both systematic and historical, for Kant’s system as a whole, of the postulates of pure practical reason, more specifically, of the two theological postulates concerning the existence of God and personal immortality which form the basis of Kant’s moral theology. My discussion will focus on the problems of Kant’s moral theology in the eyes of his early contemporaries, for whom it constituted a crux in Kant’s project. Different views were taken by Kant’s contemporaries of what exactly these problems signified regarding the future of critical philosophy. For the thinkers I will be looking at here, the miscarriage of the moral theology constituted a fatal fault in the Kantian project. For the German idealists, the moral theology instead provided a vital clue as to how the Kantian system could be transformed into a more radical idealism, while confirming that it needed to be. The role of the practical postulates in the development of German idealism demands a separate treatment; what I will argue here is simply that the practical postulates do indeed represent a point at which Kant’s philosophical system displays a deep and interesting tension, in light of which both historical responses are prima facie intelligible.

Gare, Arran. “From Kant to Schelling and process metaphysics: on the way to ecological civilization.” Cosmos and History 7.2 (2011): 26-69. [data/pdf] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The post-Kantians were inspired by Kant’s Critique of Judgment to forge a new synthesis of natural philosophy, art and history that would overcome the dualisms and gulfs within Kant’s philosophy. Focusing on biology and showing how Schelling reworked and transformed Kant’s insights, it is argued that Schelling was largely successful in laying the foundations for this synthesis, although he was not always consistent in building on these foundations. To appreciate this achievement, it is argued that Schelling should not be interpreted as an idealist but as a process metaphysician; as he claimed, overcoming the oppositions between idealism and realism, spiritualism and materialism. It is also argued that as a process metaphysician, Schelling not merely defended an organic view of nature but developed a theory of emergence and a new conception of life relevant to current theoretical and philosophical biology. This interpretation provides a defense of process metaphysics as the logical successor to Kant’s critical philosophy and thereby as the most defensible tradition of philosophy up to the present. It provides the foundations for post-reductionist science, reconciling the sciences, the arts and the humanities, and provides the basis for a more satisfactory ethics and political philosophy. Most importantly, it overcomes the nihilism of European civilization, providing the foundations for a global ecological civilization.

Garwood-Gowers, Austen. “International Means for Protecting Humans as Ends in Medicine.” Medicine Law 30.1 (2011): 133-46. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: According to Kant human beings should use their humanity, whether in their own person or the person of any other, ‘always at the same time as an end never simply as a means’ (1786, p. 429). This has traditionally been broken down into an imperfect duty of virtue to promote both one’s own ends and the ends of others as if they were one’s own (the means by which perfection can be achieved) and the more narrow but perfect duty not to treat oneself and others as mere means. This article critically examines how the latter duty is interpreted and enforced in the health field, particularly via general and health-specific international human rights instruments.

Gasché, Rodolphe. “Das Vergnügen an Vergleichen. Über Kants Ausarbeitung der Kritik der praktischen Vernunft.” Von Ähnlichkeiten und Unterschieden: Vergleich, Analogie und Klassifikation in Wissenschaft und Literatur (18./19. Jahrhundert). Ed. Michael Eggers (Heidelberg: Univ.-Verl. Winter, 2011; 276 p.). 167-82[??]. [GVK]

Gaudet, Pascal. L’anthropologie transcendantale de Kant. Paris: L’Harmattan, 2011. [73 p.] [M]

 ——. Kant et la fondation architectonique de l’existence. Paris: L’Harmattan, 2011. [94 p.] [WC]

Gava, Gabriele. “Peirce’s ‘Prescision’ as a Transcendental Method.” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 19.2 (2011): 231-53. [ASP]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper I interpret Charles S. Peirce’s method of prescision as a transcendental method. In order to do so, I argue that Peirce’s pragmatism can be interpreted in a transcendental light only if we use a non-justificatory understanding of transcendental philosophy. I show how Peirce’s prescision is similar to some abstracting procedure that Immanuel Kant used in his Critique of Pure Reason. Prescision abstracts from experience and thought in general those elements without which such experience and thought would be unaccountable. Similarly, in the Aesthetics, Kant isolated the a priori forms of intuition by showing how they could be abstracted from experience in general, while experience in general cannot be thought without them. However, if Peirce’s and Kant’s methods are similar in this respect, they reached very different conclusions.

 ——. “Does Peirce Reject Transcendental Philosophy?” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 93.2 (2011): 195-221. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The aim of this paper is to determine whether Charles S. Peirce’s direct criticisms of the transcendental method in philosophy are effective. I will present two different views on transcendental arguments by introducing two ways of accounting for Kant’s transcendental project. We will see that Peirce’s criticisms are directed against a picture of transcendental philosophy which is in line with what I will call the justificatory account of Kant. Since this view is totally in contrast to what I will call the alternative account, Peirce’s criticisms of the former cannot be considered a refutation of the latter. As far as Peirce’s criticisms attack only justificatory accounts of transcendental philosophy, they are not in conflict with transcendental readings of his philosophy along the lines of the alternative account.

Gawlick, Günter, transl. and ed. See: Baumgarten, Alexander.

Geels, Kasha. See: Trafimow, David, Gayle Hunt, Stephen Rice, and Kasha Geels.

Geiger, Ido. “Transcendental Idealism in the Third Critique.” Kant’s Idealism. Eds. Schulting and Verburgt (op cit.). 71-88. [M]

 ——. “Rational Feelings and Moral Agency.” Kantian Review 16.2 (2011): 283-308. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant’s conception of moral agency is often charged with attributing no role to feelings. I suggest that respect is the effective force driving moral action. I then argue that four additional types of rational feelings are necessary conditions of moral agency: (1) The affective inner life of moral agents deliberating how to act and reflecting on their deeds is rich and complex (conscience). To act morally we must turn our affective moral perception towards the ends of moral action: (2) the welfare of others (love of others); and (3) our own moral being (self-respect). (4) Feelings shape our particular moral acts (moral feeling). I tentatively suggest that the diversity of moral feelings might be as great as the range of our duties.

 ——. “Kant on the Affective Moods of Morality.” Philosophy’s Moods: The Affective Grounds of Thinking. Eds. Hagi Kenaan and Ilit Ferber (Dordrecht: Springer, 2011). 159-72. [PI]

Geise, Anna and Wolfgang Wagner. “How far is it from Königsberg to Kandahar? Democratic peace and democratic violence in International Relations.” Review of International Studies 37.4 (2011): 1555-77. [JSTOR]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Over the last two decades, there has been a ‘democratic turn’ in peace and conflict research, that is, the peculiar impact of democratic politics on a wide range of security issues has attracted more and more attention. Many of these studies are inspired by Immanuel Kant’s famous essay on ‘Perpetual Peace’. In this article, we present a critical discussion of the ‘democratic distinctiveness programme’ that emerged from the Democratic Peace debate and soon spread to cover a wider range of foreign policy issues. The bulk of this research has to date been based on an overly optimistic reading of a ‘Kantian peace’. In particular, the manifold forms of violence that democracies have exerted, have been treated either as a challenge to the Democratic Peace proposition or as an undemocratic contaminant and pre-democratic relict. In contrast, we argue that forms of ‘democratic violence’ should no longer be kept at arm's length from the democratic distinctiveness programme but instead should be elevated to a main field of study. While we acknowledge the benefits of this expanding research programme, we also address a number of normative pitfalls implied in this scholarship such as lending legitimacy to highly questionable foreign policy practices by Western democracies. We conclude with suggestions for a more self-reflexive and ‘critical’ research agenda of a ‘democratically turned’ peace and conflict studies, inspired by the Frankfurt school tradition.

Geismann, Georg. Kant und kein Ende, vol 3: Pax Kantiana oder Der Rechtsweg zum Weltfrieden. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2011. [258 p.]

Gentile, Andrea. Rev. of Selbstbewusstsein und Erfahrung bei Kant und Fichte. Über Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der Transzendentalphilosophie, by Frank Kuhne (2007). [German] Kant-Studien 102.2 (2011): 267-70. [M]

Geonget, Brigitte. “Le statut épistémique de l’esthétique entendue comme «critique du goût»: art ou science?”  Kant et les sciences. Un dialogue philosophique avec la pluralité des savoirs. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Mai Lequan, and Margit Ruffing (op cit.). 287-95. [M]

Gerhardt, Volker. “Mutmaßlicher Anfang der Menschengeschichte.” Immanuel Kant, Schriften zur Geschichtsphilosophie. Ed. Otfried Höffe (op cit.). 175-96. [M]

Gerlach, Burkhard. Rev. of Moral und Politik bei Kant. Eine Untersuchung zu Kants praktischer und politischer Philosophie im Ausgang der Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft, by Samuel Klar (2007). [German] Kant-Studien 102.2 (2011): 265-67. [M]

Gerlach, Stefan. Immanuel Kant. Tübingen: Narr Francke Attempto Verlag, 2011. [144 p.] [M]

Gescinska, Alicja. Rev. of Verbindung freier Personen. Zum Begriff der Gemeinschaft bei Kant und Scheler, by Takahiro Kirihara (2009). [Dutch] Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 73.2 (2011): 388-89. [M]

Gibson, Martha I. “A Revolution in Method, Kant’s “Copernican Hypothesis”, and the Necessity of Natural Laws.” Kant-Studien 102.1 (2011): 1-21. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In an effort to account for our a priori knowledge of synthetic necessary truths, Kant proposes to extend the successful method used in mathematics and the natural sciences to metaphysics. In this paper, a uniform account of that method is proposed and the particular contribution of the ‘Copernican hypothesis’ to our knowledge of necessary truths is explained. It is argued that, though the necessity of the truths is in a way owing to the object’s relation to our cognition, the truths we come to know are fully objective, expressing necessary relations between properties. Kant’s distinction between ‘phenomena’ and ‘noumena’ is shown to serve to properly restrict the scope of the necessity claims so that they do express necessary connections between properties.

Gilgen, Peter. Rev. of Kant and Skepticism, by Michael N. Forster (2010). Monatshefte 103.2 (2011): 293-97. [JSTOR]

Gilmanov, Vladimir Kh. “«Spasenie prirody» v treh pis'mah Gamana k Kantu.” [Russian; “‘Salvation of nature’ in three Hamann’s letters to Kant”] Kantovskij Sbornik 37 (2011-3): 44-58. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The brief letter exchange between Hamann and Kant, in which they discussed a physics textbook for children, is the main purpose of this text. It unravels an urgent question about the nature of consciousness and its role in the structure of the physical world.

Ginsborg, Hannah. “Kant.” The Routledge Companion to Philosophy and Music. Eds. Theodore Gracyk and Andrew Kania (Oxford: Routledge, 2011). 328-38. [Pre-print] [PW]

Giordanetti, Piero. L’avventura della ragione: Kant e il giovane Nietzsche. [Italian; The Adventure of Reason: Kant and the Young Nietzsche] Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 2011. [222 p.] [WC]

 ——. Etica, genio e sublime in Kant. Milan: Mimesis, 2011. [231 p.] [contents] [WC]

Giovanelli, Marco. Reality and Negation - Kant’s Principle of Anticipation of Perception: An Investigation of its Impact on the Post-Kantian Debate. Dordrecht: Springer, 2011. [xii, 252 p.] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract (publisher): Kant, in the Critique of Pure Reason, only dedicates a few pages to the principle of Anticipations of Perception and only a few critical studies are outspokenly dedicated to this issue in recent critical literature. But if one considers the history of post-Kantian philosophy, one can immediately perceive the great importance of the new definition of the relationship between reality and negation, which Kant’s principle proposes. Critical philosophy is here radically opposed to the pre-critical metaphysical tradition: “Reality” no longer appears as absolutely positive being, which excludes all negativity from itself, and “negation” is not reduced to being a simple removal, the mere absence of being. Instead, reality and negation behave as an equally positive something in respect to one another such that negation is itself a reality that is actively opposed to another reality. Such a definition of the relation between reality and negation became indispensable for post-Kantian Philosophy and represents a central aspect of Kantian-inspired philosophy in respect to Leibnizian metaphysics. The present work therefore departs from the hypothesis that the essential philosophical importance of the Anticipations of Perception can only be fully measured by exploring its impact in the Post-Kantian debate.

 ——. “Leibniz, Kant und der moderne Symmetriebegriff.” Kant-Studien 102.4 (2011): 422-54. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract The paper analyses the significance of the modern concept of “symmetry” for the understanding of the concept of “intuition” in Kant’s philosophy of geometry. A symmetry transformation or automorphism is a structure preserving mapping of the space into itself that leaves all relevant structure intact so that the result is always like the original, in all relevant respects. Hermann Weyl was the first to show that this idea can be drawn on Leibniz’s definition of similarity: two figures are similar if they are only distinguishable through the simultaneous perception of them (comperceptio): “an automorphism carries a figure into one that in Leibniz’s words is ‘indiscernible from it if each of the two figures is considered by itself’“. The author argues that, under the light of this definition, Leibniz’s notion of “comperceptio” turns out to play a similar role for the notion of “intuition” in Kant’s philosophy of space and time. Both cases are about the “difference between conceptual definition and intuitive exhibition”, as Weyl puts it. This result has on the one hand an exegetical significance: it frees Kant’s notion of “intuition” from every vague reference to the “visualisation” of geometrical figures; on the other hand a theoretical one: it makes easy to compare Kant’s philosophy of space and time with modern developments of sciences, in which as Weyl first showed, the concept of symmetry plays a fundamental role.

Godani, Paolo. Rev. of L’existence nue. Essai sur Kant, by Alfonso Cariolato (2009). [Italian] Studi Kantiani 24 (2011): 147-49. [M]

Godlove, Jr., Terry F. “Hanna, Kantian Non-conceptualism, and Benacerraf’s Dilemma.” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 19.3 (2011): 447-64. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Robert Hanna has recently advanced a theory of nonconceptual content, the central claim of which is that “it is perfectly possible for there to be directly referential intuitions without concepts”. Hanna bases this claim in Kant’s account of intuition in the ‘Critique of Pure Reason’, and so extends his Kantian nonconceptualism beyond the epistemology of empirical knowledge into the realm of mathematics. Thus, Hanna has proposed a Kantian nonconceptualist solution to a well-known dilemma set out by Paul Benacerraf in his 1973 paper, “Mathematical Truth”. I argue that Hanna is right about Kant’s nonconceptualism, but mistaken in its application to Benacerraf’s dilemma.

Goldenbaum, Ursula. Rev. of Diotima’s Children: German Aesthetic Rationalism from Leibniz to Lessing, by Frederick C. Beiser (2011). Journal of the History of Philosophy 49 (2011): 258-59. [M]

Goldman, Lucien. Immanuel Kant. London/New York: Verso, 2011. [236 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents: Introduction — Part I. 1.Classical Philosophy and the Western Bourgeoisie – 2.The Category of Totality in the Thought of Kant and in Philosophy in General – 3.The Precritical Period — Part II. 1.The Critical Philosophy and its Problems – 2. What Can I Know? – 3.What Ought I to Do? – 4.What May I Hope For? – The Present – Beauty – Eternity – God, Immortality – The Future – History — Conclusion: What is Man? Kant and contemporary philosophy.

Golob, Sacha. “Kant on Intentionality, Magnitude, and the Unity of Perception.” European Journal of Philosophy [Posted online: 28 Dec 2011]. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper addresses a number of closely related questions concerning Kant’s model of intentionality, and his conceptions of unity and of magnitude [Gröβe]. These questions are important because they shed light on three issues which are central to the Critical system, and which connect directly to the recent analytic literature on perception: the issues are conceptualism, the status of the imagination, and perceptual atomism. In Section 1, I provide a sketch of the exegetical and philosophical problems raised by Kant’s views on these issues. I then develop, in Section 2, a detailed analysis of Kant’s theory of perception as elaborated in both the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Judgment; I show how this analysis provides a preliminary framework for resolving the difficulties raised in Section 1. In Section 3, I extend my analysis of Kant’s position by considering a specific test case: the Axioms of Intuition. I contend that one way to make sense of Kant’s argument is by juxtaposing it with Russell’s response to Bradley’s regress; I focus in particular on the concept of ‘unity’. Finally, I offer, in Section 4, a philosophical assessment of the position attributed to Kant in Sections 2 and 3. I argue that, while Kant’s account has significant strengths, a number of key areas remain underdeveloped; I suggest that the phenomenological tradition may be read as attempting to fill precisely those gaps.

Gondek, Hans-Dieter. Rev. of Einführung in Kants Anthropologie, by Michel Foucault, transl. into German by Ute Frietsch (2010). Zeitschrift für Kulturphilosophie 5.1 (2011): 245-53. [PI]

Gonnelli, Filippo. Rev. of Kant-Index, Band 30: Stellenindex und Konkordanz zum “Naturrecht Feyerabend”, Teilband 1, edited by Heinrich Delfosse, Norbert Hinske, and Gianluca Sadun Bordoni (2010). [Italian] Studi Kantiani 24 (2011): 167-69. [M]

González, Ana Marta. Culture as Mediation: Kant on Nature, Culture, and Morality. Hildesheim/Zürich/New York: Georg Olms Verlag, 2011. [361 p.] [M]

 ——. “Kant’s Philosophy of Education: Between Relational and Systemic Approaches.” Journal of Philosophy of Education 45.3 (2011): 433-54. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to view Kant’s approach to education in the broader context of Kant’s philosophy of culture and history as a process whose direction should be reflectively assumed by human freedom, in the light of man’s moral vocation. In this context, some characteristic tensions of his enlightened approach to education appear. Thus, while Kant takes the educational process to be a radically moral enterprise all the way through—and hence, placed in a relational context—he also aspires to constitute education as a science, to be improved through experiments, thereby paving the way for a systemic approach to education; in spite of its moral inspiration, his systemic approach not only could enter into conflict with the moral demand of taking each individual subject as an end, but is also marked by an intrinsic paradox, already involved in the ambiguity of the term ‘humanity’, which might mean a) humanity as a moral disposition present in each individual human being or b) humanity as a whole, as the ‘human species’.

 ——. “Norma moral y cambio social: La aproximación de lso filósofos.” [Spanish] Acta Philosophica: Pontificia Universita della Santa Croce 20.2 (2011): 243-71. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The purpose of this article is to analyze the way in which three moral philosophers — Aquinas, Hume, Kant — have approached the relationship between moral norm and social change. To this aim, I take as a point of reference the institutionalization of the moral norm in the traditional division of duties; this approach reveals itself as a promising path, to explore the way in which modern social theory has recognized the effect of social change on the strength with which the moral bond presents itself in consciences.

González, Catalina. “Pyrrhonism vs. Academic Skepticism in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.” Philosophy Today 55-supplement (2011): 225-30. [PI]

Gordon, Paul. “Nietzsche’s Critique of the Kantian Absolute.”  Philosophy and Literature and the Crisis of Metaphysics. Ed. Sebastian Hüsch (Würzburg: Königshausen u. Neumann, 2011). 52-65?. [WC]

Gorodeisky, Keren. “A Tale of Two Faculties.” British Journal of Aesthetics 51.4 (2011): 415-36. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The notion of the ‘free harmony of the faculties’ has baffled many of Kant’s readers and also attracted much criticism. In this paper I attempt to shed light on this puzzling notion. By doing so, I aim to challenge some of the criticisms that this notion has attracted, and to point to its relevance to contemporary debates in aesthetics. While most of the literature on the free harmony is characterized by what I regard as an ‘extra-aesthetic approach’, I propose ‘an aesthetic approach’ to the harmony. Such an aesthetic interpretation explains why aesthetic judgement, but not cognitive judgement, is based on a free agreement of the faculties in distinctively aesthetic terms. By contrast, an extra-aesthetic approach to Kant’s aesthetic theory does not explain what it is in beautiful objects as beautiful that calls for a free agreement of the faculties. I argue that this approach is limited, and suggest an alternative to it by articulating the necessary reciprocity and explanatory interdependence between the form and value of beautiful objects and the form of the mental activity that underlies judgements of taste. My proposal is not only aesthetic, but also normative in its attempt to carve up a space for a distinct form of aesthetic normativity, the one that Kant describes as ‘free lawfulness’ or ‘lawfulness without a law’. I opt for a specifically normative variant of aesthetic interpretation because I believe that Kant is committed to the view of aesthetic judgement as normatively autonomous and irreducible.

Goubet, Jean-François. “«La logique générale de Wolff est la meilleure que nous possédions.» Sens et portée d’un hommage du professeur Kant.”  Kant et Wolff. Eds. Sophie Grapotte und Tinca Prunea-Bretonnet (op cit.). 45-56. [M]

Grandjean, Antoine. “Esthétique et téléologie de la connaissance de la nature.”  Kant et les sciences. Un dialogue philosophique avec la pluralité des savoirs. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Mai Lequan, and Margit Ruffing (op cit.). 297-305. [M]

Granja, Dulce María. “El postulado de la inmortalidad del alma en la filosofía moral kantiana: Parte I.” [Spanish] Topicos: Revista de Filosofia (Mexico) 41 (2011): 249-80. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The aim of this article is to clarify the grounds of Kant’s practical postulate of the immortality of the soul. In order to do that, I discuss some passages of the Critique of Pure Reason, in which Kant explains the nature of antinomies and the reasons why these cannot be theoretically solved. After that, my next step will be to elucidate the connection in Kant’s philosophy between the moral law and the intelligible world. By doing so, I explore the arguments in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and the Critique of Practical Reason that prove that there is a practical access to the intelligible world, which is banned to those who consider the problems of antinomies — specially, the problem of human freedom — solely from a theoretical standpoint. I then reconstruct Kant’s view about the nature of practical postulates. In this regard, my analysis will focus on the notion of moral progress, which is, according to Kant, the actual motive that prompts us human beings to suppose legitimately our enduring existence after death. Lastly, I discuss the problematic nature of the notion of moral progress — which implies temporality — and try to provide some reasonable grounds as to why it is nevertheless sound and cogent within Kant’s system.

Grant, Lain Hamilton. See: Dunham, Jeremy, Lain Hamilton Grant, and Sean Watson.

Grapotte, Sophie. “Le projet kantien de métaphysique comme science: l’objectivité de la connaissance «pratique» du suprasensible en question.”  Kant et la science. La théorie critique et transcendantale de la connaissance. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Mai Lequan, and Margit Ruffing (op cit.). 185-95. [M]

 ——. “Ontologie critique / ontologie wolffienne: la réforme kantienne de l’ontologie.”  Kant et Wolff. Eds. Sophie Grapotte und Tinca Prunea-Bretonnet (op cit.). 131-46. [M]

 ——. Rev. of Kants Philosophie der Notwendigkeit, by Giuseppe Motta (2007). Kant-Studien 102.1 (2011): 127-30. [M]

 —— and Tinca Prunea-Bretonnet, eds. Kant et Wolff: héritages et ruptures. Paris: J. Vrin, 2011. [235 p.] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents:
Norbert Hinske (De l'accueil correct des idées d'autrui. Culture de la conversation et de la lecture de Wolff à Kant),
Robert Theis (La physico-théologie du jeune Kant. Avec Wolff, au-delà de Wolff),
Jean François Goubet («La logique générale de Wolff est la meilleure que nous possédions». Sens et portée d'un hommage du professeur Kant),
Christian Leduc (Les degrés conceptuels dans les logiques de Wolff et de Kant),
Mattheu Haumesser (Distinction sensible et confusion intellectuelle: comment Kant élabore contre Wolff la problématique des sources de la connaissance),
Faustino Fabbianelli (Penser la réalité, une question de non-contradiction? Réflexions sur Wolff, Crusius et Kant),
Jean-Paul Paccioni (u'est-ce qui est dogmatique ? La pensée wolffienne et l'articulation du critique et du dogmatique selon la Critique de la raison pur),
Giuseppe Motta («Ratio fiendi». La redéfinition kantienne des principes fondamentaux de l'ontologie dans la Nova dilucidatio de 1755),
Sophie Grapotte (Ontologie critique / ontologie wolffienne: la réforme kantienne de l'ontologie),
Tinca Prunea-Bretonnet (De l'ontologie à la philosophie transcendantale: dans quelle mesure Kant est-il wolffien?),
François Marty (L'ontologie dans le système wolffien: fortune et infortune d'un chemin de pensée),
Luc Langois (Wolff et les débuts de la philosophie morale de Kant l'héritage oublié ),
Claude Piché (La conscience morale. Kant, héritier de Wolff et de Baumgarten?),
Paul Clavier (Ce que Kant doit à Wolff: l'épuisement de la création),
Wolf Feuerhahn (Le champ de bataille de l'anthropologie. Kant entre l'héritage wolffien et le défi de la philosophie populaire).

 ——, Mai Lequan, and Margit Ruffing, eds. Kant et la science. La théorie critique et transcendantale de la connaissance. Paris: J. Vrin, 2011. [327 p.] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Volume One of the proceedings of 9th Congrès international de la Société d'études kantiennes de langue française (September 2009). Volume one: Kant et la science. La théorie critique et transcendantale de la connaissance; volume two: Kant et les sciences. Un dialogue philosophique avec la pluralité des savoirs.

 ——, Mai Lequan, and Margit Ruffing, eds. Kant et les sciences. Un dialogue philosophique avec la pluralité des savoirs. Paris: J. Vrin, 2011. [388 p.] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Volume Two of the proceedings of 9th Congrès international de la Société d'études kantiennes de langue française (September 2009). Volume one: La théorie critique et transcendantale de la connaissance; volume two: Kant et les sciences: un dialogue philosophique avec la pluralité des savoirs.

Green, Garth W. The Aporia of Inner Sense: The Self-knowledge of Reason and the Critique of Metaphysics in Kant. Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2011. [vi, 352 p.] [WC]

Green, Ronald Michael. Kant and Kierkegaard on Time and Eternity. Macon, Ga.: Mercer University Press, 2011. [269 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents: The first formulation of the categorical imperative as literally a “legislative” metaphor — Kant on Christian love — The limits of the ethical in Kierkegaard’s The concept of anxiety and Kant’s Religion within the limits of reason alone — Kant and Kierkegaard on the need for a historical faith: an imaginary dialogue — Kant: a debt both obscure and enormous — “Developing” fear and trembling — Fear and trembling: a Jewish appreciation — Kierkegaard’s great critique: either/or as a Kantian transcendental deduction — Either/or: Kierkegaard's overture — Erotic love in the religious existence-sphere (with Theresa Ellis).

Greenberg, Robert. “On a Presumed Omission in Kant’s Derivation of the Categorical Imperative.” Kantian Review 16.3 (2011): 449-59. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: A new book by Stephen Engstrom repeats a criticism of Bruce Aune’s of Kant’s derivation of the universalizability formula of the categorical imperative. The criticism is that Kant omitted at least one substantive premise in the derivation of the formula: “Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law.” The grounds for the formula that are given in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, however, are said to support only a weaker requirement, namely, that a maxim conform to a universal law. Hence, Kant omits at least one necessary substantive premise of the derivation. This paper attempts to show that nothing substantive is omitted from the argument. It only needs two principles of inference that it is assumed add nothing substantive to the premises.

Grenberg, Jeanine. “Making Sense of the Relationship of Reason and Sensibility in Kant’s Ethics.” Kantian Review 16.3 (2011): 461-72. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this essay, I look at some claims Anne Margaret Baxley makes, in her recent book Kant’s Theory of Virtue: The Value of Autocracy, about the relationship between reason and sensibility in Kant’s theory of virtue. I then reflect on tensions I find in these claims as compared to the overall goal of her book: an account of Kant’s conception of virtue as autocracy. Ultimately, I argue that interpreters like Baxley (and myself) who want to welcome a more robust role for feeling in Kantian ethics must, in order to achieve our purposes, move beyond the general account of the limits for the role of the moral feeling of respect in the grounding of Kant’s ethics which Henry Allison established in his influential Kant’s Theory of Freedom.

 ——. Rev. of Kant’s Theory of Virtue: The Value of Autocracy, by Anne Margaret Baxley (2010). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (May 2011, #3). [online] [M]

Gretic, Goran. “Die gegenwärtige Bedeutung von Pax Kantiana.”  Kant: l’anthropologie et l’histoire. Eds. Olivier Agard and Françoise Lartillot (op cit.). 175-82. [WC]

Grier, Michelle. “The Revolutionary Interpretation of the Analytic of Concepts.” Kantian Review 16.2 (2011): 191-200. [M]

 ——. “Reason: syllogisms, ideas, antinomies.” Immanuel Kant: Key Concepts. Eds. Will Dudley and Kristina Engelhard (op cit.). 63-82. [M]

 ——. See: Baiasu, Sorin, and Michelle Grier.

 ——. “Kantian Communities: The Realm of Ends, the Ethical Community, and the Highest Good.” Kant and the Concept of Community. Eds. Charlton Payne and Lucas Thorpe (op cit.). 88-120. [M]

Grillenzoni, Paolo. “El peso de la ciencia en la formación pre-crítica de Immanuel Kant.” [Spanish]  Kant y las ciencias. Ed. Pedro Jesús Teruel (op cit.). 305-11. [M]

Groult, Martine. “Kant et le rassemblement des sciences chez D’Alembert.”  Kant et la science. La théorie critique et transcendantale de la connaissance. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Mai Lequan, and Margit Ruffing (op cit.). 53-63. [M]

Grüne, Stefanie. “Is There a Gap in Kant’s B Deduction?” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 19.3 (2011): 465-90. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In “Beyond the Myth of the Myth: A Kantian Theory of Non-Conceptual Content”, Robert Hanna argues for a very strong kind of nonconceptualism, and claims that this kind of nonconceptualism originally has been developed by Kant. But according to “Kant’s Non-Conceptualism, Rogue Objects and the Gap in the B Deduction”, Kant’s nonconceptualism poses a serious problem for his argument for the objective validity of the categories, namely the problem that there is a gap in the B deduction. This gap is that the B deduction goes through only if conceptualism is true, but Kant is a nonconceptualist. In this paper, I will argue, contrary to what Hanna claims, that there is not a gap in the B deduction.

 ——. “Brandom über Kants Konzeption der intentionalität.”  Robert Brandom’s expressive Vernunft. Eds. Barth, Christian and Holger Sturm (op cit.). 91-115. [WC]

Grüneberg, Patrick, ed. See: Asmuth, Christoph, and Patrick Grüneberg, eds.

Grunert, Frank, and Gideon Stiening, eds. Johann Georg Sulzer (1720-1779). Aufklärung zwischen Christian Wolff und David Hume. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2011. [345 p.] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: See the essays by Marion Heinz (Johann Georg Sulzer und die Anfänge der Dreivermögenslehre bei Kant) and Heiner Klemme (Johann Georg Sulzers ›vermischte Sittenlehre‹. Ein Beitrag zur Entwicklungsgeschichte von Kants Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sittenlehre).

Guenova, Ludmila L. “In Search of a Universal Organic Force: Kant’s Notion of Lebenskraft.”  Rethinking Kant: 3. Ed. Oliver Thorndike (op cit.). 249-69. [M]

Güzey, Cemil. “Ineffability of the Sublime.” [Turkish] Baykus: Felsefe Yazilari Dergisi 7 (2011): 155-63. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant’s notion of the sublime is traced back to archaic times and its continuity is exhibited via Wittgenstein. The paper focuses on epistemological and ontological concerns and takes into account the first two critiques as well as the Critique of Judgement. Consequently, the persistence of the problem of the ineffability of the sublime as a limit is rendered clear and recurrent.

Gupta, Rajender Kumar. Heidegger on Kant’s First Critique and Other Essays. New Delhi: Apple Books, 2011. [viii, 223 p.] [WC]

Guyer, Paul. “Genius and Taste: A Response to Joseph Cannon, ‘The Moral Value of Artistic Beauty in Kant’.” Kantian Review 16.1 (2011): 127-34. [M]

 ——. “Gerard and Kant: Influence and Opposition.” Journal of Scottish Philosophy 9 (2011): 59-93. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In his notes and lectures on anthropology, Kant explicitly refers to Alexander Gerard’s 1774 Essay on Genius, and his own position that genius is necessary for art but not for science is clearly a response to Gerard. Kant does not explicitly mention Gerard’s 1759 Essay on Taste, but it was probably an influence on his own conception of free play, and in any case a comparison of the two theories of aesthetic response is instructive. Gerard’s development of a version of the theory of free play without Kant’s assumptions that aesthetic judgments must be independent of concepts and yet always intersubjectively valid allows him to accommodate a variety of facts about aesthetic experience in general and our experience of the fine arts in particular more readily and more fully than Kant can, especially those concerning the affective dimension of our experience of art.

 ——. “Kant and the Philosophy of Architecture.” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 69.1 (2011): 7-19. [PI]

 ——. “Kantian Perfectionism.” Perfecting Virtue: New Essays on Kantian Ethics and Virtue Ethics. Eds. Lawrence Jost and Julian Wuerth (op cit.). 194-214. [M]

 ——. “Freedom: will, autonomy.” Immanuel Kant: Key Concepts. Eds. Will Dudley and Kristina Engelhard (op cit.). 85-102. [M]

[top]H    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Haddock, Adrian. “Davidson and Idealism.” Transcendental Philosophy and Naturalism. Eds. Joel R. Smith and Peter M. Sullivan (op cit.). 26-41. [M]

Hadji, Salah. “La médiation symbolique entre science et sciences chez Kant.”  Kant et la science. La théorie critique et transcendantale de la connaissance. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Mai Lequan, and Margit Ruffing (op cit.). 75-83. [M]

Hahmann, Andree. Rev. of Einbildungskraft und Erfahrung bei Kant, by Matthias Wunsch (2007). Kant-Studien 102.2 (2011): 123-26. [M]

 ——. Rev. of Kant and Skepticism, by Michael N. Forster (2008). Internationales Jahrbuch des Deutschen Idealismus/International Yearbook of German Idealism 7 (2011[sic]): 289-92. [M]

 —— and Veit-Justus Rollmann. “Weltstoff und absolute Beharrlichkeit: Die Erste Analogie der Erfahrung und der Entwurf Übergang 1-14 des Opus postumum.” Kant-Studien 102.2 (2011): 168-90. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In Kant’s theoretical philosophy substance is not only constitutive for objects as one of the categories of pure reason, but also functions as a substrate for the unity of time. Result of these different functions is an ambiguity in the meaning of Kant’s notion of substance. Is there only one or are there many individual substances?
This paper traces the ways in which Kant uses substance not only in the Critique of Pure Reason, but also in the draft “Transition 1–14” of the Opus postumum to find a solution for this problem.

 ——. See: Rollmann, Veit-Justus and Andree Hahmann.

Hall, Brian (with the assistance of Mark Black and Matt Sheffield). The Arguments of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Lanham/Boulder/New York: Rowmann & Littlefield, 2011. [x, 232 p.] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents: 1. Introduction to the transcendental aesthetic — 2. Space — 3. Time — 4. Conclusions from the transcendental aesthetic — 5. Introduction to the transcendental analytic — 6. Metaphysical deduction — 7. The A transcendental deduction — 8. The B transcendental deduction — 9. Schematism — 10. Axioms and anticipations — 11. Analogies of experience — 12. Postulates and fefutation of idealism — 13. Conclusions from the transcendental analytic — 14. Introduction to the transcendental dialectic — 15. Paralogisms — 16. Antinomies — 17. Ideal — 18. Conclusions from the transcendental dialectic.

 ——. “A Dilemma for Kant's Theory of Substance.” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 19.1 (2011): 79-109. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper poses a dilemma for applying the category of substance given Kant’s different conceptions of substance in the Critique of Pure Reason. Briefly stated, if the category of substance applies to an omnipresent and sempiternal substance, then although this would ensure that all experiences of empirical objects take place in a common spatiotemporal framework, one could not individuate these empirical objects and experience their alterations. If the category of substance applies to ordinary empirical objects, however, then although one could individuate these substances and experience their alterations, the category would not pick out a common spatiotemporal framework for these experiences. I will argue that this dilemma can be overcome by examining the development of Kant's conception of substance in his final work, the Opus postumum.

Halldenius, Lena. “Kant on Freedom and Obligation Under Law.” Constellations 18.2 (2011): 170-89. [PI]

Hammer, Espen. Philosophy and Temporality from Kant to Critical Theory. Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011. [ix, 260 p.] [WC] [review]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents: Introduction — 1. The historicity of time — 2. Modern temporality — 3. Two responses to the time of modernity — 4. Hegel’s temporalization of the absolute — 5. Schopenhauer and transcendence — 6. Time and myth in the early Nietzsche — 7. Recurrence and authenticity: the later Nietzsche on time — 8. Heidegger on boredom and modernity — 9. A modernist critique of postmodern temporality — Conclusion.
Abstract: This book is a critical analysis of how key philosophers in the European tradition have responded to the emergence of a modern conception of temporality. Espen Hammer suggests that it is a feature of Western modernity that time has been forcibly separated from the natural cycles and processes with which it used to be associated. In a discussion that ranges over Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Heidegger and Adorno, he examines the forms of dissatisfaction which result from this, together with narrative modes of configuring time, the relationship between agency and temporality, and possible challenges to the modern world’s linear and homogenous experience of time. His study is a rich exploration of an enduring philosophical theme: the role of temporality in shaping and reshaping modern human affairs.

Hammermeister, Kai. Rev. of Diotima’s Children: German Aesthetic Rationalism from Leibniz to Lessing, by Frederick C. Beiser (2009). British Journal for the History of Philosophy 19.2 (2011): 353-55. [M]

Hanna, Robert. “Kant’s Non-conceptualism, Rogue Objects, and the Gap in the B Deduction.” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 19.3 (2011): 399-415. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper is about the nature of the relationship between (1) the doctrine of nonconceptualism about mental content, (2) Kant’s transcendental idealism, and (3) the transcendental deduction of the pure concepts of the understanding, or categories, in the B (1787) edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, i.e., the B deduction. Correspondingly, the main thesis of the paper is this: (1) and (2) yield serious problems for (3), yet, in exploring these two serious problems for the B Deduction, we also discover some deeply important and perhaps surprising philosophical facts about Kant’s theory of cognition and his metaphysics.

 ——. “The Myth of the Given and the Grip of the Given.” Diametros: An Online Journal of Philosophy 27 (2011): 25-46. [online] [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper I argue that the Sellarsian Myth of the Given does not apply to all forms of Non-Conceptualism; that Kant is in fact a non-conceptualist of the right-thinking kind and not a Conceptualist, as most Kant-interpreters think; and that an intelligible and defensible Kantian Non-Conceptualism can be developed which supports the thesis that true perceptual beliefs are non-inferentially justified and also normatively funded by direct, embodied, intentional interactions with the manifest world (a.k.a. the Grip of the Given).

 ——. Rev. of Kant and Skepticism, by Michael N. Forster (2010). The Philosophical Quarterly 61 (2011): 635-37.

 ——. Rev. of Kant and the Human Sciences: Biology, Anthropology, and History, by Alix Cohen (2009). International Journal of Philosophical Studies 19.5 (2011): 777-81. [PI]

 ——. Rev. of Inspirations from Kant: Essays, by Leslie Stevenson (2011). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (December 2011, #24). [online] [M]

 —— and Monima Chadha. “Non-Conceptualism and the Problem of Perceptual Self-Knowledge.” European Journal of Philosophy 19 (2011): 184-223. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper we (i) identify the notion of ‘essentially non-conceptual content’ by critically analyzing the recent and contemporary debate about non-conceptual content, (ii) work out the basics of broadly Kantian theory of essentially non-conceptual content in relation to a corresponding theory of conceptual content, and then (iii) demonstrate one effective application of the Kantian theory of essentially non-conceptual content by using this theory to provide a ‘minimalist’ solution to the problem of perceptual self-knowledge which is raised by Strong Externalism.

Hara, Toshiharu. 生きることへの共感 : カントとマルクスの自由と生活の共存する社会 /Ikiru koto eno kyōkan: kanto to marukusu no jiyū to seikatsu no kyōzon suru shakai. [Japanese] Osaka: Seifūdōshotenshuppanbu, 2011. [295 p.] [WC]

Hare, John E. “Ethics and Religion: Two Kantian Arguments.” Philosophical Investigations 34.2 (2011): 151-68. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper describes and defends two arguments connecting ethics and religion that Kant makes in Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. The first argument is that the moral demand is too high for us in our natural capacities, and God’s assistance is required to bridge the resulting moral gap. The second argument is that because humans desire to be happy as well as to be morally good, morality will be rationally unstable without belief in a God who can bring happiness and virtue together. The paper states and replies to three objections to each argument.

 ——. “Kant, the Passions, and the Structure of Moral Motivation.” Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers 28.1 (2011): 54-70. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper is an account of Kant’s view of the passions, and their place in the structure of moral motivation. The paper lays out the relations Kant sees between feelings, inclinations, affects and passions, by looking at texts in Metaphysics of Morals, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, Anthropology and Lectures on Education. Then it discusses a famous passage in Groundwork about sympathetic inclination, and ends by proposing two ways in which Kant thinks feelings and inclinations enter into moral judgment, and two ways in which this can go wrong. This analysis involves responding to Karl Ameriks on the question of whether Kant is an internalist about moral motivation.

Harter, Thomas D. “Reconsidering Kant on Suicide.” The Philosophical Forum 42.2 (2011): 167-85. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This work assesses whether Kant considers all self-killings morally equivalent to suicide. Argued is that Kant morally distinguishes between suicides, which are immoral, and self-killing from duty, which is morally praiseworthy. Examined are Kant’s views on suicide as they appear in The Groundwork, The Metaphysics of Morals, and Lectures on Ethics. Two conclusions are established. First, although Kant considers some self-killings morally praiseworthy, he still maintains that all self-killings morally blameworthy. Second, on this interpretation of Kant on suicide, he may have to allow for morally permissible self-killings in circumstances when individuals foresee the permanent loss of their rationality.

Harvey, David. “Cosmopolitanism in the Anthropology and Geography.” Reading Kant’s Geography. Eds. Stuart Elden and Eduardo Mendieta (op cit.). 267-84. [M]

Haumesser, Matthieu. “La Critique de la raison pure, théorie de la science?”  Kant et la science. La théorie critique et transcendantale de la connaissance. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Mai Lequan, and Margit Ruffing (op cit.). 257-66. [M]

 ——. “Distinction sensible et confusion intellectuelle: comment Kant élabore contre Wolff la problématique des sources de la connaissance.”  Kant et Wolff. Eds. Sophie Grapotte und Tinca Prunea-Bretonnet (op cit.). 71-86. [M]

Heathwood, Chris. “The Relevance of Kant's Objection to Anselm's Ontological Argument.” Religious Studies 47.3 (2011): 345-57. [online] [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The most famous objection to the ontological argument is given in Kant’s dictum that existence is not a real predicate. But it is not obvious how this slogan is supposed to relate to the ontological argument. Some, most notably Alvin Plantinga, have even judged Kant’s dictum to be totally irrelevant to Anselm’s version of the ontological argument. In this paper, I argue, against Plantinga and others, that Kant’s claim is indeed relevant to Anselm’s argument, in the straightforward sense that if the claim is true, then Anselm’s argument is unsound.

Heidemann, Dietmar H., ed. Kant Yearbook: Anthropology. Berlin / New York: De Gruyter, 2011. [166 p.] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents:
Andrew Stephenson, “Kant on Non-Veridical Experience”,
Thomas Sturm, “Freedom and the Human Sciences: Hume’s Science of Man versus Kant’s Pragmatic Anthropology”,
Liesbet Vanhaute, “Systematic Classification of Purposive Moralization? On why Teoleology is not the (only) Key to Kant’s Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View”,
Matthias Wunsch, “The Activity of Sensibility in Kant’s Anthropology. A Developmental History of the Concept of the Formative Faculty”,
Thomas Wyrwich, “From Gratification to Justice. The Tension between Anthropology and Pure Practical Reason in Kant’s Conception(s) of the Highest Good”,
Job Zinkstok, “Anthropology, Empirical Psychology, and Applied Logic”,
Günter Zöller, “Kant’s Political Anthropology.”

 ——. “Appearance, Thing-in-Itself, and the Problem of the Skeptical Hypothesis.” Kant’s Idealism. Eds. Schulting and Verburgt (op cit.). 195-210. [M]

 ——. “Introduction: Kant and Nonconceptual Content – Preliminary Remarks.” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 19.3 (2011): 319-22. [HUM]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article offers author’s insights on the philosophical views of philosopher Immanuel Kant on conceptualism and nonconceptualism. It states that Kant’s distinction of understanding and sensibility appears to offer a theoretical basis of the world’s mental representation. Kant argues that spatial directions are obtained by intuitional representation and intuition and not just conceptual description. It also mentions that there was a strong case that Kant advocates nonconceptualism.

 ——. “Understanding: judgements, categories, schemata, principles.” Immanuel Kant: Key Concepts. Eds. Will Dudley and Kristina Engelhard (op cit.). 45-62. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The purpose of the article is to outline the transcendental theory of the understanding in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. The article first considers the meaning of “transcendental logic”. Then it explores the key concepts of that theory: understanding itself as the faculty of thinking; categories and judgments as the forms of thinking; the transcendental deduction that demonstrates the conditions under which the use of the forms of thinking can be objectively justified, and the role that apperception and imagination, as the main cognitive capacities of the understanding, play in that demonstration; the schemata of the imagination that demonstrate how concrete objects of sensibility can be subsumed under the abstract forms of thinking, which include not only the categories but also the principles of the pure understanding, the most abstract rules that govern all possible human experience and cognition.

Heilke, Thomas W. “‘Out of such crooked wood’: How Eric Voegelin read Immanuel Kant.” Eric Voegelin and the Continental Tradition: Explorations in Modern Political Thought. Eds. Lee Trepanier and Steven F. McGuire (Columbia, Mo.: University of Missouri Press, 2011), 272 p. 15-43. [WC]

Heintel, Peter. Rev. of Kant und die Wissenschaften vom Menschen, by Thomas Sturm (2009). [German] Kant-Studien 102.2 (2011): 256-57. [M]

Heinz, Marion. “Johann Georg Sulzer und die Anfänge der Dreivermögenslehre bei Kant.”  Johann Georg Sulzer (1720-1779). Aufklärung zwischen Christian Wolff und David Hume. Eds. Frank Grunert and Gideon Stiening (op cit.). 83-100. [M]

Heis, Jeremy. “Ernst Cassirer's Neo-Kantian Philosophy of Geometry.” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 19.4 (2011): 759-94. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: One of the most important philosophical topics in the early twentieth century – and a topic that was seminal in the emergence of analytic philosophy – was the relationship between Kantian philosophy and modern geometry. This paper discusses how this question was tackled by the Neo-Kantian trained philosopher Ernst Cassirer. Surprisingly, Cassirer does not affirm the theses that contemporary philosophers often associate with Kantian philosophy of mathematics. He does not defend the necessary truth of Euclidean geometry but instead develops a kind of logicism modeled on Richard Dedekind’s foundations of arithmetic. Further, because he shared with other Neo-Kantians an appreciation of the developmental and historical nature of mathematics, Cassirer developed a philosophical account of the unity and methodology of mathematics over time. With its impressive attention to the detail of contemporary mathematics and its exploration of philosophical questions to which other philosophers paid scant attention, Cassirer’s philosophy of mathematics surely deserves a place among the classic works of twentieth century philosophy of mathematics. Though focused on Cassirer’s philosophy of geometry, this paper also addresses both Cassirer’s general philosophical orientation and his reading of Kant.

Heller, Michal. Philosophy in Science: An Historical Introduction. Heidelberg: Springer, 2011. [xi, 167 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents: The First Task of the Philosophy of Nature: Problem of Elementarity — The Philosophical Myth of Creation: The Platonic Philosophy of Nature — Aristotle’s Physics — Aristotle’s Method of Cosmological Speculation — Descartes’ Mechanism — Isaac Newton and the Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy -- The World of Leibniz: The Best of All Possible Worlds — Immanuel Kant: The A Priori Conditions of the Sciences — The Romantic Philosophy of Nature — The Cosmology of Whitehead: The Universe as Process — Popper’s Open Universe — Science as Philosophy — Problems and Methods of the Philosophy of Nature.

Hems, Nigel. See: Banham, Gary, Nigel Hems, and Dennis Schulting, eds.

Hennig, Boris. “Kants Modell kausaler Verhältnisse: Zu Watkins’ Kant and the Metaphysics of Causality.” Kant-Studien 102.3 (2011): 367-84. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Eric Watkins argues that according to Kant, causation is not a relation between two events, but a relation between the “causality” of a substance and an event. It is shown that his arguments are partly based on a confusion between causation and interaction. Further, Watkins claims that for Kant, causes cannot be temporally determined. If this were true, it would follow that there can be no causal chains, and that all factors that determine the time when an effect occurs do not belong to its cause. However, it is not true. In order to understand Kant, one must distinguish between causation, action, and interaction. When two substances interact, each of them does something (an event), which causes something to happen to the other one.

Henning, Tim. “Why Be Yourself? Kantian Respect and Frankfurtian Identification.” Philosophical Quarterly 61 (2011): 725-45. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Harry Frankfurt has claimed that some of our desires are ‘internal’, i.e., our own in a special sense. I defend the idea that a desire's being internal matters in a normative, reasons-involving sense, and offer an explanation for this fact. The explanation is Kantian in spirit. We have reason to respect the desires of persons in so far as respecting them is a way to respect the persons who have them (in some cases, ourselves). But if desires matter normatively in so far as they belong to persons, then it matters whether they really do belong to the persons who have them. Thus Kantian considerations explain why identification (or internality) is a normatively relevant category. This account is superior to others, and does not lead to reasons bootstrapping or a self-centred conception of deliberation.

Herman, Barbara. “The Difference that Ends Make.” Perfecting Virtue: New Essays on Kantian Ethics and Virtue Ethics. Eds. Lawrence Jost and Julian Wuerth (op cit.). 92-115. [M]

 ——. “Embracing Kant’s Formalism.” Kantian Review 16.1 (2011): 49-66. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In response to critical discussions of my book, Moral Literacy, by Stephen Engstrom, Sally Sedgwick and Andrews Reath, I offer a defence of Kant’s formalism that is not only friendly to my claims for the moral theory’s sensitivity to a wide range of moral phenomena and practices at the ground level, but also consistent with Kant’s high rationalist ambitions.

Heubel, Fabian. “Kant and Transcultural Critique: Toward a Contemporary Philosophy of Self-Cultivation.” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 38.4 (2011): 584-601. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article presents the author’s views on the paradigms of self-cultivation in relation to the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. He argues that there was a connection between German and French critical theory and modern Confucianism although both philosophical movements have had very little mutual influence on and interest for each other. He also notes the work of Mou Zongsan who perceived that Kant attempted to come to terms with modern Western philosophy and to modernize Confucianism.

Hicks, John. Rev. of Looking Away: Phenomenality and Dissatisfaction, Kant to Adorno, by Rei Terada (2009). Journal of Philosophy: A Cross-Disciplinary Inquiry 6 (2011): 66-77. [PI]

Hien, Markus, ed. See: Burtscher, Cordula, and Markus Hien, eds.

High, Jeffrey J. “Crisis, Denial, and Outrage: Kleist (Schiller, Kant) and the Path to the German Novella(s) of Modernity.” Heinrich von Kleist and Modernity. Eds. Bernd Fischer and Timothy J. Mehigan (Rochester, NY: Camden House). 187-203. [WC]

Hill, Jr., Thomas E. “Kantian Constructivism as Normative Ethics.” Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, vol. 1. Ed. Mark Timmons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 26-50. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: What would Kantian constructivism be like as a normative (not metaethical) theory that focused on ethical, not political questions? After reviewing conceptions of the normative/metaethical distinction, general features of ‘constructivism’, and ‘Kantian’ constructivism as described by Rawls, O’Neill, and Hill, this essay highlights features of Kant’s the doctrine of virtue (The Metaphysics of Morals, part II), proposing that we view this as a ‘normative’ ethical theory with constructivist features separable from the more ambitious metaethical claims in the prominent Kantian constructivisms of Rawls and O’Neill. So interpreted, the doctrine of virtue fits well with the constructivist normative theory suggested by Kant’s later formulations of the categorical imperative in the Groundwork. The essay responds briefly to Onora O’Neill’s objections to partially similar constructivisms proposed by Rawls.

Hiltscher, Reinhard. “Einheit der Anschauung und Einheit des Gegenstandes der Anschauung bei Kant.”  Gegenstandsbestimmung und Selbstgestaltung. Eds. Christian Krijnen and Kurt Walter Zeidler (op cit.). 123-59. [M]

 ——. Rev. of Erfahrung und Gegenstand. Das Verhältnis von Sinnlichket und Verstand, by Johannes Haag (2007). Kant-Studien 102.2 (2011): 130-34. [M]

 ——. Rev. of Kants Logik der Begriffe. Die Begriffslehre der formalen und transzendentalen Logik Kants, by Bernd Prien (2006). [German] Kant-Studien 102.2 (2011): 261-64. [M]

Hindrichs, Gunnar. “Kants Idee einer transzendentalen Logik und die Transzendentalphilosophie der Alten.”  Gegenstandsbestimmung und Selbstgestaltung. Eds. Christian Krijnen and Kurt Walter Zeidler (op cit.). 161-78. [M]

 ——. Rev. of An Introduction to Kant’s Moral Philosophy, by Jennifer K. Uleman (2010). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (February 2011, #35). [online] [M]

Hinske, Norbert. “Kants Glaube an die Macht der Methode. Zum Zusammenhang von dogmatischer, polemischer, skeptischer und kritischer Methode im Denken Kants.” Facetten der Kantforschung. Eds. Christoph Böhr and Heinrich P. Delfosse (op cit.). 25-36. [M]

 ——. “Das Stichwort ,Materie‘ und seine verschiedenen Facetten bei Kant.”  Materia. XIII Colloquio Internazionale: Roma 7-8-9 gennaio 2010. Eds. Delfina Giovannozzi and Marco Veneziani (Rome: L. S. Olschki, 2011), viii, 535p. 481-88. [WC]

 ——. “De l’accueil correct des idées d’autrui. Culture de la conversation et de la lecture de Wolff à Kant.”  Kant et Wolff. Eds. Sophie Grapotte und Tinca Prunea-Bretonnet (op cit.). 19-27. [M]

Hirata, Céli. “Cause et conséquence: la reprise du principe de raison suffisante chez Kant.”  Kant et la science. La théorie critique et transcendantale de la connaissance. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Mai Lequan, and Margit Ruffing (op cit.). 317-23. [M]

Hodge, Joanna. “Philosophy in a Time of Terror: Kant and Derrida.” Women 22 (2011): 204-19. [HUM]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper considers a need to combine discussions of an affect, or affects called terror, of political events, known as terroristic, and of the adoption of political strategies, called terrorism. The method of phenomenology, as one in which distinct temporal characteristics are made salient is suggested to have much to contribute. The writings of Kant, of Arendt and of Derrida are considered, as given in the mode of futurity; and a posthumous status is assigned especially to the thought of Kant, as not yet fully developed and received.

Hoeppner, Till. “Kants Begriff der Funktion und die Vollständigkeit der Urteils- und Kategorientafel.” Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 65 (2011): 193-217. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper offers a new account of Kant’s metaphysical deduction of the categories in the Critique of Pure Reason. This is accomplished by way of a new interpretation of Kant’s notion of function and his theory of mental activity, which is presented in terms of a logic and theory of intentional reference. A detailed discussion of the definition (A 68 / B 93) and use of the notion of function in the “Leading Thread” leads to an interpretation of the notion of function as a complex, triparted unity of intentional reference. Kant’s thesis that the unity of judgment and the unity of intuition rest on the very same function (A 79 / B 104f.) is thus explained as the thesis of the structural identity of analysis and synthesis. The presented interpretation of the notion of function and the corresponding theory of intentional reference make it possible to deduce the titles of quality, quantity, and relation of the tables of judgments and the categories, and to justify their necessity. The conception of a logic of reference to particulars then establishes the respective three moments of these titles. The title and the moments of modality finally are grounded in the cognitive constitution of finite beings. Thus Kant’s claim for completeness of the tables of judgments and the categories can be elucidated as well as justified.

Höffe, Ottfried. Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft: die Grundlegung der modernen Philosophie. Munich: Beck, 2011. [378 p.] [data] [M]

 ——. Geschichtsphilosophie. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2011. [x, 230 p.] [WC]

 ——. “Einführung in Kants Religionsschrift.” Immanuel Kant, die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft. Ed. Ottfried Höffe (op cit.). 1-28. [M]

 ——. “Philosophische Grundsätze der Schritauslegung: Ein Blick in den Streit der Fakultäten.” Immanuel Kant, die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft. Ed. Ottfried Höffe (op cit.). 231-47. [M]

 ——. “Zum Ewigen Frieden, Erster Zusatz.” Immanuel Kant, Schriften zur Geschichtsphilosophie. Ed. Otfried Höffe (op cit.). 157-73. [M]

 ——. “Geschichtsphilosophie nach Kant: Schiller, Hegel, Nietzsche.” Immanuel Kant, Schriften zur Geschichtsphilosophie. Ed. Otfried Höffe (op cit.). 229-42. [M]

 ——, ed. Immanuel Kant, die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft. Berlin: Akademie, 2011. [ix, 294 p.] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Vol. 41 of the series Klassiker Auslegen.
Note: Essays by Jochen Bojanowski (Pittsburgh), Johannes Brachtendorf (Tübingen), Andrew Chignell (Cornell), Katrin Flickschuh (London), Maximilian Forschner (Erlangen), Otfried Höffe (Tübingen), Christoph Horn (Bonn), Eberhard Jüngel (Tübingen), Douglas McGaughey (Willamette), Reza Mosayebi (Bonn/Tübingen), Burkhard Nonnenmacher (München), Friedo Ricken (München), Allen Wood (Stanford).

 ——, ed. Immanuel Kant, Schriften zur Geschichtsphilosophie. Berlin: Akademie, 2011. [ix, 254 p.] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Vol. 46 of the series Klassiker Auslegen.
Contents:
Wolfgang M. Schröder, “Freiheit im Großen ist nichts als Natur. Kants Idee zu einer allgemeinen Gechichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht. Einleitung und Erster und Zweiter Satz”;
Jane Kneller, “‘Nur ein Gedanke’. Ein Kommentar zum Dritten und Vierten Satz von Kants Idee”;
Alessandro Pinzani, “Botanische Anthropologie und physikalische Staatslehre. Zum Fünften und Sechsten Satz der Idee”;
Pauline Kleingeld, “Die Bedeutung des weltbürgerlichen Zustandes. Der Siebente Satz der Idee”;
Reinhard Brandt, “Die einheitliche Naturgeschichte der Menscheit (Idee, Achter Satz)”;
Christoph Horn, “Das Interesse der Philosophie an der Menschheitsgeschichte: Aufklärung und Weltbürgertum (Idee, Neunter Satz)”;
Karl Ameriks, “Das Schichsal von Kants Rezensionen zu Herders Ideen”;
Patrick Kain, “Der Charakter der Gattung”;
Otfried Höffe, “Zum Ewigen Frieden, Erster Zusatz”;
Volker Gerhardt, “Mutmaßlicher Anfang der Menschengeschichte”;
Jean-Michel Muglioni, “Enthusiasmus und moralischer Fortschirtt im Streit der Fakultäten”;
Dieter Langewiesche, “Über Geschichte a priori und die Machbarkeit von Geschichte als Fortschritt. Der Streit der Fakultäten, 2. Abschnitt, 7-10”;
Otfried Höffe, “Geschichtsphilosophie nach Kant: Schiller, Hegel, Nietzsche”.

 ——, ed. Immanuel Kant, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, 2nd ed. Berlin: Akademie, 2011. [x, 200 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Vol. 26 of the series Klassiker Auslegen.
Note: 1st edition: 2002.

 ——, ed. Immanuel Kant, Zum Ewigen Frieden, 3rd rev. ed. Berlin: Akademie, 2011. [x, 210 p.] [data] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Vol. 1 of the series Klassiker Auslegen.
Note: 2nd edition: 2004.

 ——. Rev. of Der späte Kant: Für ein anderes Gesetz der Erde, by Peter Fenves (2010). Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 65.2 (2011): 294. [PI]

Hoffmann, Thomas Sören. “ Kants ‚intellektueller Begriff des Geldes‘ und die Aufgabe der Wirtschaftsphilosophie.”  Philosophische Aspekte der Ökonomie. Ed. Hubertus Busche (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2011). 137-54. [WC]

 ——. Rev. of Karl Leonhard Reinhold: Korrespondenz 1788-1790, edited by Faustino Fabbianelli, et al. (2007). Kant-Studien 102.1 (2011): 120-23. [M]

Holtman, Sarah. Rev. of Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy, by Arthur Ripstein (2009). Kantian Review 16.3 (2011): 473-78. [M]

Honrath, Klaus. Die Wirklichkeit der Freiheit im Staat bei Kant. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2011. [442 p.] [WC]

Horn, Christoph. “Die menschliche Gattungsnatur: Anlagen zum Guten und Hang zum Bösen.” Immanuel Kant, die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft. Ed. Ottfried Höffe (op cit.). 43-69. [M]

 ——. “Das Interesse der Philosophie an der Menschheitsgeschichte: Aufklärung und Weltbürgertum (Idee, Neunter Satz).” Immanuel Kant, Schriften zur Geschichtsphilosophie. Ed. Otfried Höffe (op cit.). 103-118. [M]

Houlgate, Stephen. “Nature and history: ultimate and final purpose.” Immanuel Kant: Key Concepts. Eds. Will Dudley and Kristina Engelhard (op cit.). 184-99. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This essay examines Kant’s philosophy of history, drawing primarily on his essay “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim” (1784). I consider Kant’s claims that nature must be regarded as purposive, that the “highest intention of nature” is “the development of all the predispositions in humanity”, that history is the fulfilment of this aim of nature by means of “‘unsociable sociability’“, and that nature’s aim can be fulfilled only in a “‘just civil constitution’“ within a “lawful ‘external relation between states’“ or “federation of nations”. I also consider Kant’s views on the relation between nature, history and morality. I argue that, for Kant, nature cannot ‘make’ us morally virtuous but can ‘facilitate’ our becoming virtuous by forcing us to become cultivated and civilised.

 —— and Michael Baur, eds. A Companion to Hegel. Malden: Wiley Blackwell, 2011. [xviii, 649 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: See the essays by Michael Baur and Sally Sedwick.

Howell, Robert. Kant’s Transcendental Deduction: An Analysis of Main Themes in his Critical Philosophy. Dordrecht/London: Springer, 2011. [xxiv, 424 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The argument of the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories in the Critique of Pure Reason is the deepest and most far-reaching in philosophy. In his new book, Robert Howell interprets main themes of the Deduction using ideas from contemporary philosophy and intensional logic, thereby providing a keener grasp of Kant's many subtleties than has hitherto been available. No other work pursues Kant's argument through every twist and turn with the careful, logically detailed attention maintained here. Surprising new accounts of apperception, the concept of an object, the logical functions of thought, the role of the Metaphysical Deduction, and Kant's relations to his Aristotelian-Cartesian background are developed. Howell makes a precise contribution to the discussion of most of the disputed issues in the history of Deduction interpretation. Controversial in its conclusions, this book demands the attention of all who take seriously the task of understanding Kant's work and evaluating it dispassionately.

Hübner, Dietmar. Die Geschichtsphilosophie des deutschen Idealismus: Kant - Fichte - Schelling - Hegel. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2011. [236 p.] [data] [WC]

Huneman, Philippe. “Hérédité et adaptation: la conception kantienne des races et des espèces.”  Kant: l’anthropologie et l’histoire. Eds. Olivier Agard and Françoise Lartillot (op cit.). 97-114. [WC]

 ——. “La place de l’analytique de la biologie dans la philosophie transcendantale.”  Kant et les sciences. Un dialogue philosophique avec la pluralité des savoirs. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Mai Lequan, and Margit Ruffing (op cit.). 253-65. [M]

Hunt, Gayle. See: Trafimow, David, Gayle Hunt, Stephen Rice, and Kasha Geels.

Hurson, Didier. “La question de l’universalité des sciences chez Kant: savoir du monde et connaissance de soi.”  Kant et la science. La théorie critique et transcendantale de la connaissance. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Mai Lequan, and Margit Ruffing (op cit.). 65-73. [M]

Hursthouse, Rosalind. “What does the Aristotelian phronimos Know?” Perfecting Virtue: New Essays on Kantian Ethics and Virtue Ethics. Eds. Lawrence Jost and Julian Wuerth (op cit.). 38-57. [M]

[top]I    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Iber, Christian. “Über das Verhältnis von Metaphysik und Vernunft in Kants Lehre von den Antinomien im Weltbegriff.” Über den Nutzen von Illusionen. Eds. Bernd Dörflinger and Günter Kruck (op cit.). 71-83. [M]

Insole, Christopher. “Kant’s Transcendental Idealism and Newton’s Divine Sensorium.” Journal of the History of Ideas 72.3 (2011): 413-36. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: When Kant read Newton (and Clarke) the following conceptual space could have been opened up for him: space is neither a substance nor an accident, but is the way in which objects are to the creation. That objects have a spatial form occurs insofar as objects are dependent upon and known by (divine) mind. Such a conceptual space, transposed to the human cognitive mind, might plausibly — both philosophically and historically speaking — have helped Kant along the road to transcendental idealism.

 ——. “Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, Freedom and the Divine Mind.” Modern Theology 27.4 (2011): 608-38. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Without denying the importance of a range of independent epistemic and metaphysical considerations, I argue that there is an irreducibly theological dimension to the emergence of Kant’s transcendental idealism. Creative tasks carried out by the divine mind in the pre-critical works become assigned to the human noumenal mind, which is conceived of as the (created) source of space, time and causation. Kant makes this shift in order to protect the possibility of transcendental freedom. I show that Kant has significant theological difficulties ascribing such transcendental freedom to creatures in relation to God, and that he intends transcendental idealism to be a solution to these difficulties. I explain how this provides Kant with a powerful motivation and reason for denying the so-called ‘neglected alternative’, and conclude by suggesting that the nature of any theological response to Kant will depend upon some fundamental options about how to conceive of the relationship between the creator and creation.

 ——. “Intellectualism, Relational Properties and the Divine Mind in Kant’s Pre-Critical Philosophy.” Kantian Review 16.3 (2011): 399-427. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: I demonstrate that the precritical Kant is essentialist and intellectualist about the relational properties of substances. That is to say, God can choose whether or not to create a substance, and whether or not to connect this substance with other substances, so as to create a world: but God cannot choose what the nature of the relational properties is, once the substance is created and connected. The divine will is constrained by the essences of substances. Nonetheless, Kant considers that essences depend upon God, in that they depend upon the divine intellect. I conclude by gesturing towards some possible implications of this interpretation, when considering the role that might be played by God — both historically and conceptually — in relation to the notion of ‘laws of nature’, and when understanding Kant’s transcendental idealism and his critical conception of freedom.

Inutake, Masayuki. カントの批判哲学と自然科学:「自然科学の形而上学的原理」の研究 / Kanto no hihan tetsugaku to shizen kagaku: shizen kagaku no keijijōgakuteki genri no kenkyū. [Japanese; Kant’s critical philosophy and the natural sciences: a study of “The Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science”] Tokyo: Sobunsha, 2011. [219 p.] [WC]

Iofrida, Manlio. “Foucault e la filosofia francese.” [Italian] Dianoia: Annali di Storia della Filosofia 16 (2011): 181-99. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The essay tries to interpret the whole of Michel Foucault intellectual development from the point of view of his constant reference to Kant’s work. Foucault’s ‘Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology’ is examined and its connection with Kant, Heidegger and Nietzsche is focused. In conclusion, Foucault’s allegiance to Kant pertains, in an original way, to the mainstream of the French republican tradition, and, ultimately, to the intellectual and political heritage of the French Revolution.

Irrlitz, Gerd. “Philosophiegeschichte der deutschen Aufklärung. Norbert Hinske zum 75. Geburtstag am 24. Januar 2006.” Facetten der Kantforschung. Eds. Christoph Böhr and Heinrich P. Delfosse (op cit.). 37-71. [M]

Irwin, T. H. “Continuity in the History of Autonomy.” Inquiry 54.5 (2011): 442-59. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Six apparent features of Kant's conception of autonomy appear to differentiate it sharply from anything that we can find in an Aristotelian conception of will and practical reason. (1) Autonomy requires a role for practical reason independent of its instrumental role in relation to non-rational desires. (2) This role belongs to the rational will. (3) This role consists in the rational will's being guided by its own law. (4) This guidance by the law of the will itself requires acts of legislation—the making of laws—for oneself. (5) These acts of legislation constitute the law as one's own law, as moral constructivists hold. (6) Kant marks this character of the rational will by using “autonomy” and cognates. These six apparent features, however, do not mark any discontinuity between Kant and an Aristotelian conception. The first three apparent features are genuinely Kantian, but are not aspects of discontinuity, whereas the last three mark aspects of discontinuity, but are not genuinely Kantian.

Ivaldo, Marco. Rev. of Immanuel Kant, Critica della ragion practica. Un commento, by Giovanni Battista Sala (2009). Rivista di Storia della Filosofia 66 (2011): 174-80.[M]

Izard V., P. Pica, E. S. Spelke, and S. Dehaene. “Flexible intuitions of Euclidean geometry in an Amazonian indigene group.” Proceedings of The National Academy of Sciences 108 (2011): 9782-87. [MEDLINE]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant argued that Euclidean geometry is synthesized on the basis of an a priori intuition of space. This proposal inspired much behavioral research probing whether spatial navigation in humans and animals conforms to the predictions of Euclidean geometry. However, Euclidean geometry also includes concepts that transcend the perceptible, such as objects that are infinitely small or infinitely large, or statements of necessity and impossibility. We tested the hypothesis that certain aspects of nonperceptible Euclidian geometry map onto intuitions of space that are present in all humans, even in the absence of formal mathematical education. Our tests probed intuitions of points, lines, and surfaces in participants from an indigene group in the Amazon, the Mundurucu, as well as adults and age-matched children controls from the United States and France and younger US children without education in geometry. The responses of Mundurucu adults and children converged with that of mathematically educated adults and children and revealed an intuitive understanding of essential properties of Euclidean geometry. For instance, on a surface described to them as perfectly planar, the Mundurucu’s estimations of the internal angles of triangles added up to ~180 degrees, and when asked explicitly, they stated that there exists one single parallel line to any given line through a given point. These intuitions were also partially in place in the group of younger US participants. We conclude that, during childhood, humans develop geometrical intuitions that spontaneously accord with the principles of Euclidean geometry, even in the absence of training in mathematics.

[top]J    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Jackson, Richard. Rev. of Terrorism: How to Respond, by Richard English (2009). Kantian Review 16.2 (2011): 320-23. [M]

Jähnig, Dieter. Der Weltbezug der Künste: Schelling, Nietzsche, Kant. Freiburg/München: Verlag Karl Alber, 2011. [151 p.; 16 unnumbered pages of plates] [M]

James, David. Rev. of Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Attempt at a Critique of All Revelation, edited by Allen Wood, translated by Garrett Green (2010). Kantian Review 16.2 (2011): 315-17. [M]

Janiak, Andrew. Rev. of Kant and Philosophy of Science Today, edited by Michela Massimi (2008). Metascience 20.1 (2011): 153-57. [online] [PW]

Jauernig, Anja. “Kant, the Leibnizians, and Leibniz.” The Continuum Companion to Leibniz. Ed. Brandon C. Look (London: Continuum, 2011). 289-309. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: A popular story about Kant’s relation to Leibniz presents Kant as a Leibniz-Wolffian by education who, inspired by his encounter with the teachings of Newton and Hume, took on the project of reconciling Leibniz-Wolffian metaphysics with Newtonian science and of responding to epistemological skepticism, a project that led him further and further away from his Leibniz-Wolffian roots and culminated in the total rejection of the Leibniz-Wolffian philosophy in the Critique of Pure Reason. In this essay, four shortcomings of the popular story are identified and several suggestions are made about how to amend and expand the story in order to overcome these shortcomings. Furthermore, some of the most important Leibnizian doctrines that influenced Kant are collected and their role in Kant’s philosophy is discussed.

Jáuregui, Claudia. “Subjetividad y auto-conocimiento en la filosofía trascendental de I. Kant.” [Spanish] Agora: Papeles de Filosofia 30.1 (2011): 31-47. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The assumptions of transcendental idealism determine that only the empirical self — as a phenomenon given to inner sense — can be considered an object of knowledge. But in the “Refutation of Idealism” Kant claims that there is nothing permanent in inner sense. And since permanence is the transcendental schema that allows the application of the category of substance, it must be concluded that the empirical self cannot be a substantial object. It is, in consequence, a sort of pseudo-object that is not strictly subject to the requirements that transcendental idealism establishes for objectivity. In this paper, we try to find a solution for these problems taking into account some ‘Reflections’ that Kant writes between 1788 and 1793, where empirical apperception is described as ‘cosmological apperception’, and it is underlined that we are for ourselves first of all objects of outer sense. We intend to demonstrate that the problems concerning self-knowledge can be solved if we abandon the narrow limits of inner sense and consider ourselves as psycho-physical objects.

Joerden, Jan C. “WikiLeaks, Kants ‘Princip der Publicität’, Whistleblowing und ‘illegale Geheimnisse’.” Jahrbuch fuer Recht und Ethik 19 (2011): 227-39. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article is concerned with the acts of the WikiLeaks website in respect of criminal law and ethical aspects. Parallel problems are also taken into consideration. In particular, the question is debated, what consequences can be drawn from Kant’s “principle of publicity (Princip der Publicität)” in judging WikiLeaks. Furthermore, WikiLeaks behaviour is compared to the phenomenon of whistleblowing, and similarities to the term “illegal secrets (illegale Geheimnisse)” known in German criminal law are shown. Finally, it is discussed, under what conditions publications in the style of WikiLeaks may be acceptable.

Johnson, Robert N. Self-Improvement: An Essay in Kantian Ethics. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. [vi, 174 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents: Introduction — Self-improvement as an imperfect duty — Universalizability and self-improvement — Duties to and regarding ourselves — Self-respect and self-improvement — Kantian convergence arguments and self-improvement — On what we cannot improve in others — What is an ability?

Johnson, Ryan J. “An Accord in/on Kantian Aesthetics (or the Sensus Communis: Attunement in a Community of Diverse Sites of Purposiveness).” Kritike 5.1 (2011): 117-35. [online] [HUM]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant’s Critique of Judgment is a storehouse full of provocative concepts and structures, which is why, since at least the 1970’s, many contemporary Kant scholars and philosophers of other sorts have attempted to mine and explicate this text to varying degrees of success. Among these concepts and structures, there are a few that continue to evade complete elucidation. One of the most well tread, albeit still contested, grounds that appears in the third Critique is “purposiveness without purpose.” Picking up from some recent interpretations of Kantian aesthetics, I contend that it is possible to discover at least three forms of purposiveness without purpose in aesthetic judgments. A second concept, the sensus communis, I will contend, is as important as the three sites of purposiveness without purpose. In fact, I will show how the sensus communis, in its ternary form, can be mapped onto the three sites of purposiveness without purpose; the two concepts cannot be separated. Finally, this mapping will allow for an attempt at what I could refer to as an “inconstruction” of the Deduction of Aesthetic Judgments that will engage many of the long-standing questions surrounding this text.

 ——. “Locating the Abject in the Third Critique.” Consciousness, Literature & the Arts 12.2 (2011): 1-58. [HUM]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: A literary criticism of the book Critique of Judgment, by Immanuel Kant is presented. It outlines the aesthetic philosophy of Kant regarding beauty. It examines the architectonic structure of beauty in forms of non-cognitive and non-conceptual meaning. Furthermore, A brief history of abjection is presented.

Jost, Lawrence, and Julian Wuerth, eds. Perfecting Virtue: New Essays on Kantian Ethics and Virtue Ethics. Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011. [xiv, 308 p.] [M] [review]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents: Lawrence Jost and Julian Wuerth, “Introduction” — 1. Marcia Baron, “Virtue ethics in relation to Kantian ethics: an opinionated overview and commentary” — 2. Rosalind Hursthouse, “What does the Aristotelian Phronimos know?” — 3. Allen Wood, “Kant and agent-oriented ethics” — 4. Barbara Herman, “The difference that ends make” — 5. Talbot Brewer, “Two pictures of practical thinking” — 6. Julian Wuerth, “Moving beyond Kant’s moral agent in the Grounding” — 7. Lara Denis, “A Kantian conception of human flourishing” — 8. Paul Guyer, “Kantian perfectionism” — 9. Nancy Sherman, “Aristotle, the Stoics, and Kant on anger” — 10. Christine Swanton, “Kant’s impartial virtues of love” — 11. Michael Slote, “The problem we all have with deontology” — 12. Timothy Chappell, “Intuition, system, and the ‘paradox’ of deontology”.

Junga, Kristin. Wissen — Glauben — Bilden: Ein bildungsphilosophischer Blick auf Kant, Schleiermacher und Wilhelm von Humboldt. Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2011. [325 p.] [WC]

Jüngel, Eberhard. “Zum Titel und den beiden Vorreden.” Immanuel Kant, die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft. Ed. Ottfried Höffe (op cit.). 29-42. [M]

[top]K    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Kain, Patrick. “Der Charakter der Gattung.” Immanuel Kant, Schriften zur Geschichtsphilosophie. Ed. Otfried Höffe (op cit.). 137-55. [M]

Kalinnikov, Leonard A. “On the Moral Centrism of Kant’s Transcendental Anthropology.” [Russian] Kantovskij Sbornik 35 (2011): 37-43. [M]

 ——. “At the Edge of Romanticism or Beyond It? E. T. A. Hoffmann and the Nature of Art in Kant’s Aesthetics.” [Russian] Kantovskij Sbornik 36 (2011): 38-51. [M]

Kapust, Antje. “Ethics of Respect and Human Dignity. A Responsive Reading.” Etica & Politica [Trieste, Italy] 13 (2011): 151-63. [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: One of the key concepts in recent moral debates is respect. The paper establishes the thesis that respect must first be understood as a responsive deontic demand. This occurs if beyond a universalisation of the practical law it keeps open the connection to the various pronominal versions and is shaped as response to a call which does not follow classical schemes of mere reciprocity but which takes into account the asymmetry of the other. For this reason main accounts of respect in contexts of human dignity (Immanuel Kant, Axel Honneth, Rainer Forst and others) are questioned in the horizon of the philosophy of Bernhard Waldenfels.

Karatani, Kōjin, and Jinghua Zhao. 跨越性批判: 康德与马克思 / Kua yue xing pi pan: Kangde yu Makesi. [Chinese] Beijing: Zhong yang bian yi chu ban she, 2011. [276 p.] [WC]

Katz, Larissa. “Ownership and Social Solidarity: A Kantian Alternative.” Legal Theory 17.2 (2011): 119-43. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article considers what Kant’s theory of property, as set out in Arthur Ripstein’s Force and Freedom, contributes to contemporary property theory. I argue that by drawing our attention to a new set of questions concerning the basis of the state’s authority, a Kantian approach provides an important alternative to the dominant instrumentalist approach to the moral problems that private ownership introduces (specifically, the problems of poverty and dependence). I consider the extent to which the Kantian framework is normative appealing. After raising a number of objections to the Kantian division of labor in response to the problem of material dependence, I suggest a way to restore some harmony between the rights of owners and the interests of others within a Kantian framework.

Kawamura, Katsutoshi. “Die Goldene Regel als Handlungsnorm und ihre Kritik durch Kant.” Facetten der Kantforschung. Eds. Christoph Böhr and Heinrich P. Delfosse (op cit.). 73-86. [M]

Keienburg, Johannes. Immanuel Kant und die Öffentlichkeit der Vernunft. Berlin / New York: De Gruyter, 2011. [viii, 204 p. + unpaginated Personenregister] [content] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Kantstudien Ergänzungshefte, vol. 164.

Keil, Geert. “Ich bin jetzt hier — aber wo ist das?” Kant, Here, Now, and How. Eds. Siri Granum Carson, Jonathan Knowles, and Bjørn K. Myskja (op cit.). 15-34. [M]

Kemp, Ryan. “The Contingency of Evil: Rethinking the Problem of Universal Evil in Kant’s Religion.”  Rethinking Kant: 3. Ed. Oliver Thorndike (op cit.). 100-23. [M]

Kendrick, Christopher. Rev. of Kant and Milton, by Sanford Budick (2010). Milton Quarterly 45.3 (2011): 193-97. [HUM]

Kerr, Gaven. “Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: A Hypothesis?” International Philosophical Quarterly 51.2 (2011): 195-222. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this article I investigate Kant’s argumentation in the Critique of Pure Reason in favor of transcendental idealism. The argumentation for transcendental idealism seeks to establish the main conjecture of Kant’s Copernican hypothesis, to the effect that objects are conformed to our knowledge and not our knowledge to objects. But if the argumentation for transcendental idealism should presuppose anything of the Copernican hypothesis itself, then such argumentation remains as hypothetical as the Copernican hypothesis. What I seek to establish in this article is that in the Critique Kant presupposes the same presuppositions as does the Copernican turn, in which case transcendental idealism, as defended in the Critique, is nothing more than an elaborate hypothesis.

Kerstein, Samuel J. “Treating Consenting Adults Merely as Means.” Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, vol 1. Ed. Mark Timmons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 51-74. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: According to Kant, it is wrong to treat others merely as means. This paper explores two approaches to formulating a sufficient condition for an agent’s using another, but not merely as a means: an actual consent account, inspired by Nozick, and a possible consent account, based on work by O’Neill. The paper argues that both accounts need modification; for both imply implausibly that one’s profiting from a vulnerability in another for which one bears responsibility does not amount to just using the other. The paper then contends that actual consent accounts suffer from a difficulty not shared by possible consent accounts, namely, that of implying implausibly that ineffectual or otiose attempts at coercing another to serve as a means to one’s ends do not amount to just using the other.

Kerszberg, Pierre. “Kant et la première idée de Copernic.”  Kant et les sciences. Un dialogue philosophique avec la pluralité des savoirs. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Mai Lequan, and Margit Ruffing (op cit.). 141-49. [M]

Kiliçaslan, Eyüp Ali. “Is Hegel’s Concept of Geist Kant’s Transcendental Ego? A Reply to Hegel’s Kantianization.” Geist? Zweiter Teil. Eds. Andreas Arndt, Paul Cruysberghs, and Andrzej Przylebski (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2011). 193-98. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: From the Hegel-Jahrbuch 2011.

Kinander, Morten. “Rasjonalitet og rettferdighet hos Kant og Rawls. Er John Rawls en kantianer?” [Norwegian; Rationality and Justice in Kant and Rawls] Norsk filosofisk tidsskrift 46.4 (2011): pages. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article is an analysis for Rawls' conception of rationality in the heritage from Kant, with a focus on the differences between the categorical imperative and the original position - perhaps the philosophers' two most famous constructions - and corresponding concepts with a view to how they conceive of the rational actor. It is argued that Rawls' position is suprisingly inconsistent with Kant's moral philosphy, and even though this becomes clearer and more recognized as Rawls' philosophy develops, this has always been the case. Instead, it is argued that Rawls' project is closer to Kant's political philosophy. Kant's political philosophy is, however, not present in Rawls' own works as an inspiration, and it is not as a political thinker that Rawls claims Kantian inspiration. In this light, Rawls is not the deontologist which he is known for being.

Kinnaman, Ted. Rev. of Kant and Skepticism, by Michael Forster (2008). Kant-Studien 102.3 (2011): 397-401. [M]

Kiryushchenko, Vitaly. “Logic, Ethics, and Aesthetics: Some Consequences of Kant’s Critiques in Peirce’s Early Pragmatism.” European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 3.2 (2011): 258-74. [online] [PI]

Kitcher, Patricia. Kant’s Thinker. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. [xiv, 312 p.] [WC] [review]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents: Overview — Locke’s internal sense and Kant’s changing views — Personal identity and its problems — Rationalalist metaphysics of mind — Consciousness, self-consciousness, and cognition — Strands of Argument in the Duisburg Nachlass — A transcendental deduction for a priori concepts — Synthesis: why and how? — Arguing for apperception — The power of apperception — “I-think” as the destroyer of rational psychology — Is Kant’s theory consistent? — The normativity objection — Is Kant’s thinker (as such) a free and responsible agent? — Kant our contemporary.

 ——. “The Unity of Kant’s Active Thinker.” Transcendental Philosophy and Naturalism. Eds. Joel R. Smith and Peter M. Sullivan (op cit.). 55-73. [M]

Klein, Hans-Dieter, ed. Ethik als prima philosophia? Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2011. [253 p.] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: See especially the essays by Manfred Wetzel (“Kants Anstoß zur Philosophie des sogenannten Deutschen Idealismus”), Renate Wahsner (“Kants Begründung der Ethik - nach Cohen und deren Kritik”).

Kleingeld, Pauline. Kant and Cosmopolitanism: The Philosophical Ideal of World Citizenship. Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011. [232 p.] [WC] [review]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract (publisher): This is the first comprehensive account of Kant’s cosmopolitanism, highlighting its moral, political, legal, economic, cultural and psychological aspects. Contrasting Kant’s views with those of his German contemporaries and relating them to current debates, Pauline Kleingeld sheds new light on texts that have been hitherto neglected or underestimated. In clear and carefully argued discussions, she shows that Kant’s philosophical cosmopolitanism underwent a radical transformation in the mid 1790s and that the resulting theory is philosophically stronger than is usually thought. Using the work of figures such as Fichte, Cloots, Forster, Hegewisch, Wieland and Novalis, Kleingeld analyses Kant’s arguments regarding the relationship between cosmopolitanism and patriotism, the importance of states, the ideal of an international federation, cultural pluralism, race, global economic justice and the psychological feasibility of the cosmopolitan ideal. In doing so, she reveals a broad spectrum of positions in cosmopolitan theory that are relevant to current discussions of cosmopolitanism.

Contents: Introduction; 1. World citizens in their own country: Wieland and Kant on moral cosmopolitanism and patriotism; 2. Universal republic of world citizens or international federation?: Cloots and Kant on global peace; 3. Global hospitality: Kant’s concept of cosmopolitan right; 4. Hierarchy or diversity? Forster and Kant on race, culture, and cosmopolitanism; 5. International trade and justice: Hegewisch and Kant on cosmopolitanism and globalization; 6. Cosmopolitanism and feeling: Novalis and Kant on the development of a universal human community; 7. Kant’s cosmopolitanism and current philosophical debates.

 ——. “Die Bedeutung des weltbürgerlichen Zustandes. Der Siebente Satz der Idee.” Immanuel Kant, Schriften zur Geschichtsphilosophie. Ed. Otfried Höffe (op cit.). 79-89. [M]

 ——. “Kant, história e a ideia de desenvolvimento moral.” [Portuguese] Cadernos de Filosofia Alemã: Crítica e Modernidade 18 (2011): 105-32. [M] [online]

Klemme, Heiner. “Johann Georg Sulzers ›vermischte Sittenlehre‹. Ein Beitrag zur Entwicklungsgeschichte von Kants Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sittenlehre.”  Johann Georg Sulzer (1720-1779). Aufklärung zwischen Christian Wolff und David Hume. Eds. Frank Grunert and Gideon Stiening (op cit.). 309-22. [M]

 ——. “Das rechtsstaatliche Folterverbot aus der Perspektive der Philosophie Kants.”  Die Geschichte der Folter seit ihrer Abschaffung. Eds. Karsten Altenhain und Nicola Willenberg (Göttingen: V&R unipress). 39-53. [WC]

Klimowski, Andrzej. See: Want, Christopher and Andrzej Klimowski.

Kneller, Jane. “Aesthetic Reflection and Community.” Kant and the Concept of Community. Eds. Charlton Payne and Lucas Thorpe (op cit.). 260-83. [M]

 ——. “‘Nur ein Gedanke’. Ein Kommentar zum Dritten und Vierten Satz von Kants Idee.” Immanuel Kant, Schriften zur Geschichtsphilosophie. Ed. Otfried Höffe (op cit.). 45-61. [M]

Knowles, Jonathan. “Action, Causes, and Causal Explanation.” Kant, Here, Now, and How. Eds. Siri Granum Carson, Jonathan Knowles, and Bjørn K. Myskja (op cit.). 121-33. [M]

Kobe, Zdravko. “Kant’s Critique of the Ontological Proof or: What Does Absolutely Necessary Mean?” [Slovenian] Problemi 49.7-8 (2011): 261-308. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The paper discusses Kant’s critique of all attempts to prove God’s existence from the concept alone, its historical and conceptual presuppositions, as well as the problems that the very inconclusiveness of the ontological argument poses for the transcendental idealism. It is argued that the transcendental illusion of rational theology does not arise directly from the notion of ‘ens realissimum’, as a necessary presupposition for the thorough determination of any existent thing, it comes rather from its connection with the notion of ‘ens necessarium’, the result of fourth antinomy. Since it is only this connection that is able to give meaning to the notion of necessary being, it represents the very crux of the ontological proof, both in its history and especially in Kant. This is why his presentation of the impossibility of the, first, ontological and, then, cosmological proof is strictly parallel, starting in both cases from the necessary being, the only difference being that it is given first as a notion without existence and then as an existence without notion. The final fall of the ontological proof implies consequently that the notion of the necessary being is without meaning viz. that the principle of reason is not universal. But since for the transcendental idealism the absolute necessity remains an indispensable presupposition of any use of reason, the paper argues, it is stands in the final analysis for the relation that the finite reason has to itself and its factuality. The transcendental presupposition is a way to give ground to its groundlessness.

Koch, Anton Friedrich. “Die Bildtheorie des Elementarsatzes und die Lesbarkeit der Dinge (Wittgenstein, Sellars, Kant).” Kant, Here, Now, and How. Eds. Siri Granum Carson, Jonathan Knowles, and Bjørn K. Myskja (op cit.). 179-92. [M]

Köhnke, Klaus Christian. Surgimiento y auge del neokantismo: la filosofía universitaria alemana entre el idealismo y el positivismo. Translation of Entstehung und Aufstieg des Neukantianismus. Die deutsche Universitätsphilosophie zwischen Idealismus und Positivismus. [Spanish] Translated by José Andrés Ancona Quiroz. México, D.F.: Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana, 2011. [570 p.] [WC]

Koistinen, Olli. “Descartes in Kant’s Transcendental Deduction.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 35 (2011): 149-63. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article offers the author’s insights on philosopher Rene Descartes’ philosophy in reference to philosopher Immanuel Kant’s transcendental deduction. The author discusses both Descartes’ and Kant’s concept of objective reality and the existence of self. She argues against Descartes statement that bodies are perceived through the intellect by conducting an experiment with a piece of wax. She tackles Kant’s A-deduction which focuses on the characterization of object.

Kok, Arthur. “Sublimity, Freedom, and Necessity in the Philosophy of Kant.” The Sublime and its Teleology. Ed. Donald Loose (op cit.). 79-114. [M]

Kontos, Pavlos. “Kant’s Categories of Freedom as Rules of Moral Salience.” Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 65 (2011): 218-40. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper attempts to bring to light and to justify the double task that Kant confers on the categories of freedom. It will be maintained that the categories of freedom not only function as the ratio cognoscendi of free actions within the sensible world but they are also well appropriated to ground the concepts of the good and the evil as genuine rules of moral salience (according to Herman’s well-known label), that is to say, as rules of how to detect and appraise circumstances and events bestowed with moral significance.

Korkut, Buket. “The Real Virtue of Friedman’s Neo-Kantian Philosophy of Science.” Philosophy of Science 78.1 (2011): 1-15. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Michael Friedman has recently developed a neo-Kantian conception of science as a rival to holistic accounts. According to Friedman, the main virtue of his neo-Kantian philosophy is that it resolves the problem of incommensurability. A close reading of Friedman’s work, however, indicates that his account surprisingly accomplishes the opposite of what he believes to have defended. This article will argue that the real virtue of Friedman’s neo-Kantian account of scientific theories is not that it resolves the problem of incommensurability but that it provides an elegant philosophical account much needed to substantiate Thomas Kuhn’s historical thesis of incommensurability.

Kornblith, Hilary. “Reasons, Naturalism, and Transcendental Philosophy.” Transcendental Philosophy and Naturalism. Eds. Joel R. Smith and Peter M. Sullivan (op cit.). 96-119. [M]

Korsgaard, Christine M. “The Activity of Reason.” Reasons and Recognition: Essays on the Philosophy of T. M. Scanlon. Eds. R. Jay Wallace, Rahul Kumar, and Samuel Freeman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 3-22. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: I contrast two views of the relations among reason (the active dimension of the mind), rational principles, and reasons. According to Kant, rational principles are constitutive principles of rational activity, and substantive reasons result from applying those principles. According to Scanlon and Broome, substantive reasons exist independently of rational principles, whose function and normative status then becomes problematic. The problem for the Kantian view is that if we can characterize the activity of reason only as “justifying beliefs and actions” then it appears that reasons must exist prior to that activity. I argue that the activities of justifying our beliefs and actions coincide with the activities of constructing a unified conception of the world and of constructing a unified self, respectively. These alternative descriptions enable us to explain why rational principles are normative and determine reasons.

Korte, Tapio, and Arto Repo. “The Problem of Singular Judgments in Kant.” History of Philosophy Quarterly 28.4 (2011): 389-406. [PI]

Kotkas, Toomas. “Kant on the Right of Pardon: A Necessity and Ruler’s Personal Forgiveness.” Kant-Studien 102.4 (2011): 413-21. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The aim of this article is to analyse Kant’s views on the ruler’s right of pardon. This particular theme in the ‘Rechtslehre’ has remained on the margins of Kant research. The few existing commentaries have taken as their starting-point to interpret Kant’s conception of the ruler’s right of pardon chiefly against the background of his legal philosophy and its criminal law theory in particular. However, it is argued in this article that Kant’s conception of the right of pardon cannot be fully grasped without knowledge of the intellectual history of pardoning and the contemporary Prussian law code, ‘Allgemeines Landrecht für die Preussischen Staaten’, of 1794. It is claimed that in Kant’s mind the right of pardon came close to the ruler’s personal forgiveness.

Koukou, Kalliope. “Schillers Kant-Kritik in seiner Schrift Ueber Anmuth und Würde.”  Schiller im philosophischen Kontext. Eds. Cordelia Burtscher and Markus Hien (op cit.). 40-49?. [WC]

Kraft, David. Apriorität und Positivität des Rechts nach Kant. Baden-Baden: Nomod, 2011. [129 p.] [WC]

Kraus, Katharina T. Rev. of Kant und die Wissenschaften vom Menschen, by Thomas Sturm (2009). Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 42.4 (2011): 618-24. [PI]

Kreimendahl, Lothar, transl. and ed. See: Baumgarten, Alexander.

 ——, ed. See: Kant, Immanuel. Der einzig mögliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes.

Kreis, Guido. “Die Kritik der Gottesbeweise in der klassischen deutschen Philosophie.”  Gottesbeweise: von Anselm bis Gödel. Eds. Joachim Bromand and Guido Kreis (op cit.). 210-43. [WC]

 ——, ed. See: Bromand, Joachim, and Guido Kreis, eds.

Kremer-Marietti, Angèle. “Kant et l’ouvrage de Soemmering, De l’organe de l’âme.”  Kant: l’anthropologie et l’histoire. Eds. Olivier Agard and Françoise Lartillot (op cit.). 127-38. [WC]

Krijnen, Christian. “Subjektive Logik als Grundlage von objektiver Logik? Husserls Phänomenologie im Kontext der Transzendentalphilosophie Kants und des Neukantianismus.” Transcendentalism Overturned: From Absolute Power of Consciousness Until the Forces of Cosmic Architectonics. Ed. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (op cit.). 57-78. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Die von Husserl initiierte Phänomenologie wird gerade innerhalb des phänomenologischen Diskurses als Kulminationspunkt der Kantischen Tradition der Transzendentalphilosophie aufgefaßt. Eine eindringliche Analyse macht jedoch klar, daß Husserl die von Kant herausgearbeitete Verhältnisbestimmung von Subjektivität und Objektivität wirkungsmächtig umkehrt: anders als bei Kant übernimmt bei Husserl das Noetische eine Primatstellung gegenüber dem Noematischen, wie sich paradigmatisch an Hand von Husserls Logik-Konzept aufzeigen läßt, namentlich das von subjektiver und objektiver Logik. In der kantianisierenden Transzendentalphilosophie, gerade im Neukantianismus, hat es zum Verhältnis von subjektiver und objektiver Logik eine intensive Debatte gegeben, deren Höhepunkt Rickerts Analyse der sog. “zwei Wege der Erkenntnistheorie” ist. Hier übernimmt wie bei Kant das Noematische den Primat. Es geht im vorliegenden Beitrag darum, Sinn und Grenzen von Husserls Ansatz von Transzendentalphilosophie zu diskutieren im Kontext der Transzendentalphilosophie Kants und Rickerts, und zwar am Leitfaden des Problems von subjektiver und objektiver Logik. Es wird aufgezeigt, daß mit dem Projekt der Phänomenologie eine einseitige Betonung und Ausarbeitung der subjektiven, noetischen, transzendental-motivationalen Seite verbunden ist. (edited)

 ——. “Das Soziale bei Hegel. Eine Konstruktion in Auseinandersetzung mit kantianisierenden Transzendentalphilosophie.”  Gegenstandsbestimmung und Selbstgestaltung. Eds. Christian Krijnen and Kurt Walter Zeidler (op cit.). 189-286. [WC]

 ——. “Teleology in Kant’s Philosophy of Culture and History: A Problem for the Architectonic of Reason.” The Sublime and its Teleology. Ed. Donald Loose (op cit.). 115-32. [M]

 —— and Kurt Walter Zeidler, eds. Gegenstandsbestimmung und Selbstgestaltung. Transzendentalphilosophie im Anschluss an Werner Flach. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2011. [325 p.] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: See the essays by Wolfgang Bock, Reinhard Hiltscher, Gunnar Hindrichs, and Kurt Walter Zeidler.

Krogh, Thomas. “The Past in the Present.” Kant, Here, Now, and How. Eds. Siri Granum Carson, Jonathan Knowles, and Bjørn K. Myskja (op cit.). 61-75. [M]

Krouglov, Alexei N. “Kant and Orthodox Thought in Russia.” Russian Studies in Philosophy 49.4 (2011): 10-33. [HUM]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The author shows that the reception of Kant and his philosophy by Russian Orthodox thinkers in the nineteenth and early twentieth century was much less uniformly hostile than is generally believed. Contrary to a widespread view, the antagonistic attitude toward Kantian philosophy within Russian Orthodox thought was rather a marginal phenomenon, while a dominant trend was introduced by more balanced and favorable presentations of Kant’s ideas.

 ——. “Erste oder zweite Wahl? Kant und die Suche nach einem Nachfolder für Meier in Halle (1777/78).” Facetten der Kantforschung. Eds. Christoph Böhr and Heinrich P. Delfosse (op cit.). 87-96. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Includes an appendix with a facsimile and transcription of a letter from Johann Erich Biester to Johann Nikolaus Tetens (29 June 1777). (op cit.). 98-103.

Kruck, Günter. “Vom Nutzen des Ideals der reinen Vernunft.” Über den Nutzen von Illusionen. Eds. Bernd Dörflinger and Günter Kruck (op cit.). 117-31. [M]

 ——, ed. See: Dörflinger, Bernd and Günter Kruck, eds.

Kryshtop, Ludmila E. “The Concept of Postulate in Kant’s Philosophy.” [Russian] Kantovskij Sbornik 35 (2011): 24-36. [M]

Kuehn, Manfred. Kant: una biografia. [Italian] Translated from the English by Stefano Bacin. Bologna: Il Mulino, 2011. [663 p.] [WC]

 ——. “‘How, or Why, do we Come to Think of a World of Things in Themselves?’.” Kantian Review 16.2 (2011): 221-33. [M]

Kuhnke, Gerhard. Goethes Wege zu Kant. Frankfurt am Main/New York: P. Lang, 2011. [195 p.] [WC]

Kupka, Thomas. “Feyerabend und Kant: Kann das gut gehen? Paul K. Feyerabends Naturphilosophie und Kants Polemik gegen den Dogmatismus.” Journal 42.2 (2011): 399-409. [PW]

Kuplen, Mojca. “Disgust and Ugliness: A Kantian Perspective.” Contemporary Aesthetics 9 (2011): 1-21. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Contemporary discussions of the problem of ugliness in Kant’s aesthetic theory have, to my knowledge, left unexplored the relation of disgust to ugliness. At most, they have explained away disgust as merely an extreme form of ugliness or displeasure, as Guyer did in his interpretation of ugliness in Kant’s aesthetic theory, and by that strayed from the phenomenological and conceptual uniqueness of disgust in comparison to ugliness, while Kant, as I argue, did not. As a matter of fact, careful investigation of the concept of disgust in Kant’s writing will reveal the distinctive and multifaceted character that he ascribed to this phenomenon. By examining Kant’s treatment of disgust in comparison with more comprehensive contemporary studies given by phenomenologist Aurel Kolnai, psychologist Paul Rozin, and the social study of William Ian Miller, I will address the ways in which disgust can penetrate artistic representation without subverting it and, more closely, interrogate the role of disgust in contemporary art. Furthermore, within Kant’s aesthetic framework, I will suggest a theoretical difference between disgust and the concept of aesthetic ugliness.

Kurtar, Senem. “Time as Pure Form of Intuition or Formal Intuition in Kant: The Paradox of Finitude Which Differentiate Heidegger from Marburg School.” [Turkish] Kaygi: Uludag Universitesi Felsefe Dergisi (Uludag University Journal of Philosophy) 17 (2011): 11-27. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article critically examines Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant, regarding his controversial thesis that, for Kant, intuition and thought has a “single root” as imagination. That is, for Heidegger, Kant’s theory of imagination, uncovers the idea that all thought have a relation to intuition as a synthesis speciosa. This means that our all cognitive powers are primordially finite on the basis of the finitude of human being as Dasein and Being as such. As Heidegger puts it, “man is never absolute and infinite in the creativeness of being itself, but only in so far he is engaged in comprehending it”. As opposed to Heidegger, Marburg School Neo-Kantians claim that infinity of the ontological is essentially tied to the experience of the ontic for Kant. Then neo-Kantians maintain that such an understanding allows a finite creature such as man attains to knowledge, reason, or truth. According to them, Kant’s problem is precisely this: “How, given this human finitude, could there every be truths which are both necessary and universal?”, “How are synthetic a priori judgments possible?” This study also articulate difference between the “pure forms of intuition” and the “formal intuition” to pinpoint Heidegger-Marburg School disputation.

Kuś, Mira. “Notes on Kant.” [poem] Mid-American Review 31.2 (2011): 165. [HUM]

Kusheshi, Parish. See: Shahabi, Parviz Zia’ and Parish Kusheshi.

Kuster, Friederike. “Verdinglichung und Menschenwürde. Kants Eherecht und das Recht der häuslichen Gemeinschaft.” Kant-Studien 102.3 (2011): 335-49. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Within “The Doctrine of Right” in The Metaphysics of Morals Kant deals with the social institution of household, the domestic society, next to property right and contract right as part of the private right. The juridical problem to solve is the question to what extent human beings can be entitled to dispose persons as a “belonging” at all. This problem of reification insistently arises with regard to the relation of partners in a marriage: According to Kant, sexuality as a consumption by which human beings make use of themselves as of things is reconcilable with the dignity of humanity only under the condition of marriage. By marrying, persons acquire one another reciprocally, so that they aren’t in an external relation to one another any more. However, in contrast to this strict juridical reciprocity of the sexes in a marriage there is no corresponding equality concerning the regime of the household. Hence, with his anthropology of the sexes Kant unintentionally implements teleological patterns of argumentation into the right of pure practical reason.

Kvasz, Ladislav. “Kant’s Philosophy of Geometry — On the Road to a Final Assessment.” Philosophia Mathematica 19.2 (2011): 139-66. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The paper attempts to summarize the debate on Kant’s philosophy of geometry and to offer a restricted area of mathematical practice for which Kant’s philosophy would be a reasonable account. Geometrical theories can be characterized using Wittgenstein’s notion of pictorial form. Kant’s philosophy of geometry can be interpreted as a reconstruction of geometry based on one of these forms — the projective form. If this is correct, Kant’s philosophy is a reasonable reconstruction of such theories as projective geometry; and not only as they were practiced in Kant’s time, but also as architects use them today.

[top]L    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Labate, Sergio. “The Transcendentalism of Hope from the Rational Religion to the Phenomenology of Hope with Kant and Marcel.” Transcendentalism Overturned: From Absolute Power of Consciousness Until the Forces of Cosmic Architectonics. Ed. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (op cit.). 683-93. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Through the distinction transcendental use and transcendental meaning, Kant suggested a de-formalisation of the transcendental that has to be revised both in an ethical and phenomenological sense. These two fields of philosophical knowledge indeed — ethics and phenomenology — are consulted starting from the movement that joins them in the human experience of hope. Right through a phenomenology of hope — announced by Gabriel Marcel — the transcendental by Kant is shown in its absolute topicality. Through this path, the faculty of hoping becomes a configuration rule of existence, without becoming itself an act. As it is inactual, hope remains transcendental and unconstituted, but regulative. The intuition by Kant is reconsidered and the de-formalised transcendental can be questioned starting from concrete human experiences. Now we have to find again in hope the phenomenological content of the transcendental, and in the transcendental the pure shape of the experience of hope.

Lagny, Anne. “Questions de méthode. La réponse de Forster à Kant dans Noch etwas über die Menschenrassen (1786).”  Kant: l’anthropologie et l’histoire. Eds. Olivier Agard and Françoise Lartillot (op cit.). 115-26. [WC]

Lambinet, Julien. “Note sur Kant et le paradigme aristotélicien des sciences.”  Kant et la science. La théorie critique et transcendantale de la connaissance. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Mai Lequan, and Margit Ruffing (op cit.). 85-94. [M]

Lanzillotti, Francesco. Rev. of Kant and Phenomenology, by Tom Rockmore (2011). [Italian] Studi Kantiani 24 (2011): 181-84. [M]

La Rocca, Claudio. “Formen des Als-Ob bei Kant.” Über den Nutzen von Illusionen. Eds. Bernd Dörflinger and Günter Kruck (op cit.). 29-45. [M]

Landy, David. “What Incongruent Counterparts Show.” European Journal of Philosophy (pre-print online, posted 23 Feb 2011). [abstract] [PW]

Lang, Dimitri. “Kant et le problème du fondement des normes logiques.”  Kant et la science. La théorie critique et transcendantale de la connaissance. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Mai Lequan, and Margit Ruffing (op cit.). 225-34. [M]

Langewiesche, Dieter. “Über Geschichte a priori und die Machbarkeit von Geschichte als Fortschritt. Der Streit der Fakultäten, 2. Abschnitt, 7-10.” Immanuel Kant, Schriften zur Geschichtsphilosophie. Ed. Otfried Höffe (op cit.). 215-27. [M]

Langlois, Luc. “Finitude morale et ontologie de la création: L’interprétation kantienne de Gerhard Krüger.” Archives de Philosophie 74.1 (2011): 129-47. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper deals with Gerhard Krüger’s interpretation — somewhat forgotten nowadays — of Kant’s critical philosophy. Against Heidegger, Krüger finds the true sense of Kant’s Critique in its moral and theological motives. According to this view, Kant’s most urgent task is to save and renew metaphysics against the threat of atheism, which Krüger associates to modern ‘Aufklärung’.

 ——. “Wolff et les débuts de la philosophie morale de Kant: l’héritage oublié.”  Kant et Wolff. Eds. Sophie Grapotte und Tinca Prunea-Bretonnet (op cit.). 173-85. [M]

Langthaler, Rudolf. “‘Das Prinzip der Selbsterhaltung der Vernunft ist das Fundament des Vernunftglaugens.’ Eine frühe programmatische These Kants und ihre spätere systematische Entfaltung.” Internationales Jahrbuch des Deutschen Idealismus/International Yearbook of German Idealism 7 (2011[sic]): 58-94. [M]

Lartillot, Françoise. See: Agard, Olivier and Françoise Lartillot.

 ——, ed. See: Agard, Olivier and Françoise Lartillot, eds.

Laschet, Oliver. Metaphysik und Erfahrung in Kants praktischer Philosophie. Freiburg/Munich: Verlag Karl Alber, 2011. [335 p.] [M]

LaVaque-Manty, Mika. “Our Kant.” Political Theory 39 (2011): 261-75. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article surveys recent literature on Immanuel Kant’s political philosophy and focuses on books by Alessandro Ferrara, Jean-François Lyotard, Susan Meld Shell, and Arthur Ripstein. It appreciates the diversity of approaches that are possible into Kant’s politics as well as the ways in which Kant remains relevant for contemporary politics: the authors surveyed show, among other things, that new things can be discovered about Kant’s conceptions of autonomy, judgment and exemplarity, and that reconciliation between force and freedom is one of Kant’s key contributions to politics. The article laments, however, the disciplinary Balkanization the books evince.

 ——. Rev. of Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy, by Arthur Ripstein (2009). Political Theory: An International Journal of Political Philosophy 39.2 (2011): 260-75. [PI]

 ——. Rev. of Kant and the Limits of Autonomy, by Susan Meld Shell (2009). Political Theory: An International Journal of Political Philosophy 39.2 (2011): 260-75. [PI]

Le Blanc, Guillaume. Foucault lecteur de Kant: le champ anthropologique. Pessac: Presses Universitaires de Bordeaux, 2011. [159 p.] [WC]

Lechner, Silviya. Rev. of Kantian Ethics, by Allen W. Wood (2008). Kantian Review 16.1 (2011): 141-50. [M]

Leduc, Christian. “Kant et l’usage méthodologique des hypothèses.”  Kant et la science. La théorie critique et transcendantale de la connaissance. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Mai Lequan, and Margit Ruffing (op cit.). 127-35. [M]

 ——. “Les degrés conceptuels dans les logiques de Wolff et de Kant.”  Kant et Wolff. Eds. Sophie Grapotte und Tinca Prunea-Bretonnet (op cit.). 57-69. [M]

Lee, Sang Hyung. Moralität und Sittlichkeit: Versuch einer Synthese im Hinblick auf die Ethik des Guten. Würzburg: Ergon-Verlag, 2011. [353 p.] [data] [WC]

Lee, Seung-Kee. Rev. of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason: An Introduction, by Jill Vance Buroker (2006). Kantian Review 16.1 (2011): 156-59. [M]

Lee, Yeop. “Vom Leben nach dem Prinzip der Klugheit zum Leben nach dem Prinzip der Sittlichkeit.” Facetten der Kantforschung. Eds. Christoph Böhr and Heinrich P. Delfosse (op cit.). 105-119. [M]

Lefèvre, Wolfgang. Between Leibniz, Newton, and Kant: Philosophy and Science in the Eighteenth Century. Dordrecht/London: Springer, 2011. [304 p.] [WC]

Lennon, Kathleen. “Imagination and the Expression of Emotion.” Ratio 24.3 (2011): 282-98. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Many writers offer accounts of our grasp of the expressive gestures of others, or of the expressive content of works of art, in terms of our imagining the experiences of another, or ourselves having certain experiences, or, in the case of works of art, a persona to have experiences. This invocation of what Kant would term, the reproductive imagination, in the perception of expressive content, is contested in this paper. In its place it is suggested that the detection of expressive content is a form of direct, but reason constituting perception. In such perception it is the Kantian productive, rather than the reproductive, imagination which plays a central role.

Lequan, Mai. “La théorie des vents de 1756: entre histoire descriptive et physique mathématique.”  Kant et les sciences. Un dialogue philosophique avec la pluralité des savoirs. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Mai Lequan, and Margit Ruffing (op cit.). 213-43. [M]

 ——. Rev. of Kant-Index, Band 16: Stellenindex und Konkordanz zur ‘Kritik der praktischen Vernunft’, edited by Heinrich P. Delfosse and Michael Oberhausen (1995). Revue Philosophique de la France et de l’Etranger 201.4 (2011): 590-91. [PI]

 ——. Rev. of Leçons sur Kant: la déduction transcendantale dans la deuxième édition de la Critique de la raison pure, by Mario Caimi (2007). Kant-Studien 102.4 (2011): 492-95. [M]

 ——. Rev. of Métaphysique et biologie: Kant et la constitution du concept d’organisme, by Philippe Huneman (2008). Kant-Studien 102.4 (2011): 495-98. [M]

 ——, ed. See: Grapotte, Sophie, Mai Lequan, and Margit Ruffing, eds.

Lerussi, Natalia. “Sobre la justificación para introducir el concepto de “fin natural” (Naturzweck) en la investigación de la naturaleza según Kritik der Urteilskraft.” [Spanish] Kant e-Prints 6.1 (2011): 69-92. [online][PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the section §65 of the Kritik der teleologischen Urteilskraft Kant expounds the notion of `natural end ́ (Naturzweck). Towards the end of the section Kant points out two conditions by which we would be authorized to introduce the above mentioned concept in the investigation of nature. By means of this authorization we gain for the first time a ground for a teleology in the science of nature. Nevertheless the two conditions in question are not proved by the philosopher in the section §65. In the following paper I show that it is possible to reconstruct the proof that justifies the introduction of the concept of `natural end ́ in the science of nature if we take into account the sections §§ 74, 75 and 77 of the Dialektik der teleologischen Urteilskraft. I defend that we are legitimized to use the concept of `natural end ́ in the frame of natural science if we have in mind not only the discursive peculiarity (Eigentümlichkeit) of our faculties of knowledge –as is pointed out by the “mainstream interpretation”- but also their scope (Umfang) and limits (Schranken).

Lessing, Hans-Ulrich, Rudolf A. Makkreel, and Riccardo Pozzo, eds. Recent Contributions to Dilthey’s Philosophy of the Human Sciences. Stuttgart: frommann-holzboog, 2011. [258 p.] [data] [M]

Light, Aimée Upjohn. Rev. of Kant and Theology, by Pamela Sue Anderson and Jordan Bell (2010). Reviews in Religion & Theology 19.1 (2011): 6-8. [PI]

Lima, Newton de Oliveira. “Kant e a Fundamentação do Direito Subjetivo do Cidadão à Publicidade dos Atos Estatais.” [Portuguese] Ethica: Cadernos Acadêmicos 18.1 (2011): 129-47. [PI]

Lin, Shing-Shang. Von den modernen zu den postmodernen Zeitvorstellungen: Kant, Heidegger, Virilio, Baudrillard. Essen: Verlag Die Blaue Eule, 2011. [422 p.] [WC]

Longuenesse, Béatrice. “Kant’s Standpoint on the Whole: Disjunctive Judgment, Community, and the Third Analogy of Experience.” Kant and the Concept of Community. Eds. Charlton Payne and Lucas Thorpe (op cit.). 17-40. [M]

Look, Brandon C. “Leibniz, Kant and Frege on the Existence Predicate.” Natur und Subjekt: Akten des IX. Internationalen Leibniz-Kongresses. Eds. H. Breger, J. Herbst & S. Erdner (Hannover: Hartmann, 2011). 616-24. [PW]

 ——. Rev. of Kant’s Thinker, by Patricia Kitcher (2011). Journal of the History of Philosophy 49.4 (2011): 502-3. [PI]

Loose, Donald. “Introduction: The Kantian Sublime and Its Aftermath.” The Sublime and its Teleology. Ed. Donald Loose (op cit.). 1-11. [M]

 ——. “The Dynamic Sublime as the Pivoting Point between Nature and Freedom in Kant.” The Sublime and its Teleology. Ed. Donald Loose (op cit.). 53-78. [M]

 ——, ed. The Sublime and its Teleology: Kant, German Idealism, Phenomenology: Kant — German Idealism — Phenomenology. Leiden: Brill, 2011. [vi, 230 p.] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Donald Loose ("Introduction: The Kantian Sublime and Its Aftermath"), Herman van Erp ("The Genuine Sublime: Kant on the Sublimity of Moral Consciousness"), Birgit Recki ("Kant’s Aesthetics of Morals"), Donald Loose ("The Dynamic Sublime as the Pivoting Point between Nature and Freedom in Kant"), Arthur Kok ("Sublimity, Freedom, and Necessity in the Philosophy of Kant"), Christian Krijnen ("Teleology in Kant’s Philosophy of Culture and History: A Problem for the Architectonic of Reason"), Paul Cobben ("The Lord and the Sublime: Free Life’s Transcendence of Finitude"), Jacob Rogozinski ("The Sublime Monster"), Simon Critchley ("The Tragical Sublime"), Frans van Peperstraten ("The Sublime and the Limits of Metaphysics"), Ruud Welten ("Melville’s ‘Sublime Uneventfulness’. Toward a Phenomenology of the Sublime").

Loparic, Zeljko. “Kant entre o ficcionalismo de Vaihinger e a fenomenologia deHeidegger.”  Figuras da Racionalidade: Neokantismo e Fenomenologia. Ed. Olivier Feron (op cit.). 39-57. [WC]

Lord, Beth. Kant and Spinozism: Transcendental Idealism and Immanence from Jacobi to Deleuze. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire/ New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. [xiv, 214 p.] [M] [review]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the late eighteenth century, several thinkers attempted to fuse Kant’s transcendental idealism with Spinoza’s philosophy of immanence. These ‘Spinozistic’ readings of Kant had a profound influence on the development of his theories of nature and teleology in the Critique of Judgment, and on the transformation of his philosophical system in the Opus Postumum. Lord examines Kant’s relation to three of his Spinozistic readers — F.H. Jacobi, J.G. Herder, and Solomon Maimon — and investigates his response to their provocative suggestion that an immanent ontology solves the problems of transcendental idealism. Lord argues that this is the right context in which to understand Gilles Deleuze’s reading of Kant, thereby opening new avenues for understanding both the centrality of Spinozism to Kant’s thought, and the complex interrelations between Spinoza, Kant, Maimon, and Deleuze.

Lorenz, Hilmar. Kants kopernikanische Wende vom Wissen zum Glauben. Systematischer Kommentar zu Vorrede B der Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2011. [450 p.] [M]

 ——. “La doctrine kantienne de la science.”  Kant et la science. La théorie critique et transcendantale de la connaissance. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Mai Lequan, and Margit Ruffing (op cit.). 107-16. [M]

Lories, Danielle. “La légalité du contingent dans les limites de la science de la nature.”  Kant et les sciences. Un dialogue philosophique avec la pluralité des savoirs. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Mai Lequan, and Margit Ruffing (op cit.). 277-85. [M]

Louden, Robert B. Kant’s Human Being: Essays on his Theory of Human Nature. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. [256 p.] [content] [WC] [review]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents: Kant’s virtue ethics — Moral strength: virtue as a duty to oneself — Kantian moral humility: between Aristotle and Paul — “Firm as rock in her own principles” (but not necessarily a Kantian) — The second part of morals — Applying Kant’s ethics: the role of anthropology — Anthropology from a Kantian point of view: toward a cosmopolitan conception of human nature — Making the law visible: the role of examples in Kant’s ethics — Evil everywhere: the ordinariness of Kantian radical evil — “The play of nature”: human beings in Kant’s geography — Becoming human: Kant and the philosophy of education — National character via the beautiful and sublime?

 ——. “‘The Play of Nature’: Human Beings in Kant’s Geography.” Reading Kant’s Geography. Eds. Stuart Elden and Eduardo Mendieta (op cit.). 139-59. [M]

 ——. Rev. of Immanuel Kant, Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime and Other Writings, edited by Patrick Frierson and Paul Guyer (2011). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (July 2011, #5). [online] [M]

Lowe, Walter. “Kant, Immanuel.” The Cambridge Dictionary of Christian Theology. Ed. Ian McFarland (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press), xxi, 549 p. 260-61. [M]

Lozano, Valerio Rocco and Marco Sgarbi, eds. Diritto e storia in Kant e Hegel. Trento: Verifiche, 2011. [237 p.] [WC]

Luftig, Jonathan. “Fiction, Criticism and Transcendence: On Carazan’s Dream in Kant’s Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime.” MLN 126.3 (2011): 614-29. [MUSE]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The writer analyses Kant’s surprising claim in the Observations, that human dignity is “grounded” in a “shudder”, first in the context of Kant’s treatment of the melancholic temperament, and then in “Carazan’s Dream”, an anonymous story cited by him as an extended example of the “terrifying sublime”. He finds that if the ethical shudder — that feeling that marks the limit of feeling — is a grounding fiction of the ethical, then the question of why, and according to what necessity, a universal and non-phenomenal ground needs to be presented phenomenally, or in figurative language that gestures towards transcendence even as it produces phenomenal effects.

Lundestad, Øystein. Rev. of Kant’s Moral and Legal Philosophy, edited by Karl Ameriks and Otfried Höffe (2009). Kantian Review 16.3 (2011): 489-95. [M]

Lyssy, Ansgar. “Mit und gegen Hume - Eine Skizze der skeptischen und antiskeptischen Argumente in der Kritik der reinen Vernunft.”  Die Begründung der Philosophie im Deutschen Idealismus. Ed. Elena Ficara (op cit.). 155-171. [WC]

[top]M    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Macor, Laura Anna. La fragilità della virtù: dall'antropologia alla morale e ritorno nell'epoca di Kant. [Italian] Milan: Mimesis, 2011. [192 p.] [WC] [contents]

Maddy, Penelope. “Naturalism, Transcendentalism, and Therapy.” Transcendental Philosophy and Naturalism. Eds. Joel R. Smith and Peter M. Sullivan (op cit.). 120-56. [M]

Madonna, Luigi Cataldi, and Paola Rumore, eds. Kant und die Aufklärung: Akten der Kant-Tagung in Sulmona, 24.-28. März 2010. Hildesheim: G. Olms, 2011. [421 p.] [WC]

Madore, Joël. Difficult Freedom and Radical Evil in Kant: Deceiving Reason. London/New York: Continuum, 2011. [x, 184 p.] [M]

Mahuzi, Reza. “Meaning of a Perfect Philosophical System in Kant.” [Farsi] History of Philosophy: Journal of the International Society of the History of Philosophy 1.3 (2011): 143-56. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: According to Kant, a philosophical system is perfect when the harmony and cooperation required by a unified whole exists among its components. However, in his first and second critiques, he has distinguished between the faculties of understanding and reason and assumed an impassible ocean between them. In his third critique, in order to attain a perfect philosophical system, he has tried to remove this gap by resorting to the faculty of judgment and clarify the organic and mutual relationship between the three main components of philosophy: knowledge, ethics, and the sense of aestheticism. The present paper aims at examining the meaning and quality of a perfect philosophical system in Kant based on his major works and the related commentaries.

 ——. “The Importance of the Sublime in Kant’s Philosophy of Art.” [Farsi] Hekmat va Falsafeh 7 (2011): 53-74. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the analysis of natural and artistic beauty, Kant explains the pleasure of the taste based on free play between imagination and understanding upon the principle of teleology of nature. Hence, the aesthetic judgments are produced by indeterminate harmony between imagination and understanding. Kant explains the sublime upon this principle, but he has not noticed the harmony between imagination and understanding in detail. Consequently, some of commentators have held that the sublime is not important in Kant’s philosophy of art. However, is it true that Kant has changed his opinion about aesthetic sensations? This paper aims at showing the fact that the sublime is very important in Kant’s aesthetical thoughts, because it explains the highest sensation of the imagination and connects the sublime to ethics and religion.

Makkreel, Rudolf A. See: Lessing, Hans-Ulrich, Rudolf A. Makkreel, and Riccardo Pozzo, eds.

Malandrino, Corrado. “L’invenzione’ della complementarità del pensiero federalista di Kant e Hamilton in Italia.” [Italian] Montesquieu.it: Biblioteca elettronica su Montesquieu e dintorni 3 (2011): 141-64. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The ‘invention’ of the ‘complementarity’ of Kant’s and Hamilton’s federalist thought is the result of Mario Albertini’s philosophical elaboration. His idea of this ‘complementarity’ is bound to join together in one theoretical unit the value of the ‘perpetual peace’ among nation-states with the constitutional concept of the liberal right in the international (and particularly European) frame. Albertini says this is possible, like both Kant and Hamilton demonstrated in their federalist essays (Zum ewigen Frieden and The Federalist), through the theory of the federal state. Therefore, Kant’s and Hamilton’s political discourses are, in the opinion of Albertini and of his students, ‘complementary’ and constitute a homogeneous nucleus. Nevertheless, Albertini’s theory appears as a rhetorical ‘invention’ that is a rhetorical procedure and argument to elaborate a convincing federalist ideology, not a result of scientific proceedings and discovery.

Maliks, Reidar. “Liberal Revolution: the Cases of Jakob and Erhard.” Hegel Bulletin 32.1-2 (2011): 216-31. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article explores the writings of Ludwig Heinrich Jakob and Johann Benjamin Erhard, two young Kantians who produced original defences of resistance and revolution during the 1790's. Comparing these two neglected philosophers reveals a crucial divergence in the liberal theory of revolution between a perspective that emphasises resistance by the individual and another that emphasises revolution by the nation. The article seeks to contribute to a more nuanced view of the political theory of the German Enlightenment, which has often been presented as excessively obedient to authority.
The historian Charles Ingrao repeated a common perception when, in an article on enlightened absolutism, he speculated that, ‘the German's greater acceptance of authority both then and now may be rooted in their own distinctive national culture’ (Ingrao 1986: 165). This idea of the obedient German has been promoted especially by those who seek cultural explanations for the authoritarian bent of German society in the 20th century (such as Mandt 1974 and Lepenies 2006). But the idea has a longer history. Herder described Germany as the land of obedience, and Kant wrote that, ‘in keeping with their penchant for law and order, they [the Germans] will rather submit to despotic treatment than venture on innovations (especially wilful reforms of government)’ (Kant 1974: AA 7: 318). By ‘wilful reforms of government’ Kant meant revolution. Madame de Staël later observed that Germans ‘join the greatest boldness of thought to the most obedient character’ (Staël Holstein 1813: 35). As Frederick Beiser has shown, this view, which was repeated by Heine and Marx, came to dominate the historiography (Beiser 1992: 7).

Malpas, Jeff, and Karsten Thiel. “Kant’s Geography of Reason.” Reading Kant’s Geography. Eds. Stuart Elden and Eduardo Mendieta (op cit.). 195-214. [M]

Mancebo Pérez, Pilar. “‘Sich der Menschheit würdig zu machen’: Lenguaje y comunidad en la ‘Antropología en respecto pragmático’.” [Spanish] Convivium: Revista de Filosofia 24 (2011): 73-102. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This essay explores the notions of language and community, starting from the place occupied by the Anthropology in Pragmatic Respect in the Kantian architectonic and understanding this respect as a “making oneself worthy of humanity”. With this intention, we pay attention to the role of the imagination in Kant’s work, and particularly, in the Anthropology, as a hinge between sensibility and understanding, materialized in the idea of sense and in language as faculty of designation. From this point, the essay investigates the distinction between intuitive knowledge and discursive knowledge, based on the close unity between speaking and hearing and, therefore, between ‘lógos’ and community, both fulfilled in dialog as a condition of possibility of saying and as condition of possibility of making oneself worthy of humanity.

Manning, Richard N. “A Spinozistic Deduction of the Kantian Concept of a Natural End.” Philo 14.2 (2011): 176-200. [PDC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant distinguishes “natural ends” as exhibiting a part-whole reciprocal causal structure in virtue of which we can only conceive them as having been caused through a conception, as if by intelligent design. Here, I put pressure on Kant’s position by arguing that his view of what individuates and makes cognizable material bodies of any kind is inadequate and needs supplementation. Drawing on Spinoza, I further urge that the needed supplement is precisely the whole-part reciprocal causal structure that Kant takes to be distinctive of natural ends alone.

Marafioti, Rosa Maria. Il ritorno a Kant di Heidegger: la questione dell'essere e dell'uomo. Milano: Mimesis, 2011. [469 p.] [contents] [WC]

Marandiuc, Natalia. “Human Will, Divine Grace, and Virtue: Jonathan Edwards Tangos with Immanuel Kant.” Jonathan Edwards and Scotland. Eds. Kelly Van Andel, Adriaan C. Neele, and Kenneth P. Minkema (Edinburgh: Dunedin Academic Press). 129-46. [M]

Marcon, Loretta. Kant e Leopardi: Saggi. [Italian] Napoli: Guida, 2011. [155 p.] [contents] [M]

Marcucci, Silvestro. “Kant y la ciencia físico-matemática moderna.” [Spanish]  Kant y las ciencias. Ed. Pedro Jesús Teruel (op cit.). 41-47. [M]

Marcuzzi, Max. “Writing Space: Historical Narrative and Geographical Description in Kant’s Physical Geography.” Reading Kant’s Geography. Transl. from the French by Samuel A. Butler. Eds. Stuart Elden and Eduardo Mendieta (op cit.). 115-36. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: This essay originally appeared as “L’écriture de l’espace: Récit historique et description géographique dans la Géographie physique de Kant.” Historicité et spatialité. Le problème de l’espace dans la pensée contemporaine. Eds. Jocelyn Benoist and Fabio Merlini. Paris: Vrin, 2001. 117-39.

Marey, Macarena. “¿Es la exigencia kantiana de universalización un procedimiento suficiente para establecer contenidos morales-éticos? Algunas consideraciones acerca de una respuesta negativa a esta pregunta.” [Spanish Arete: Revista de Filosofia 23.1 (2011): 79-108. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this article we analyze the thesis that claims the sufficiency of the Kantian universalization procedure expressed in the categorical imperative of the general law (Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals) to determine the content of morality, with the aim of holding that this thesis contradicts Kant’s final conception of ethics as it is expounded in ‘Metaphysics of Morals’, insofar as it is structured upon the normative priority of the “end of humanity”. The effective adoption of this end — or practical principle — is a necessary condition for the ascription of morality and for the determination of the “content” of the “moral law”. In order to achieve this aim, we analyze two of the most influential interpretations that are at the base of the aforementioned thesis, e.g., John R. Silber’s, in “Procedural Formalism in Kant’s Ethics”, and Henry E. Allison’s in “Morality and Freedom: Kant’s Reciprocity Thesis”.

 ——. “¿Es la exigencia kantiana de universalización un procedimiento suficiente para establecer contenidos morales-éticos? Algunas consideraciones acerca de una respuesta negativa a esta pregunta.” [Spanish] Areté: revista de filosofía 23 (2011): 79-108. [WC]

 ——. “Sobre la indeterminación ética del procedimiento kantiano de universalización y su relación con el ‘principio supremo de la doctrina de la virtud’.” [Spanish] Studi Kantiani 24 (2011): 49-71. [M]

 ——. “Las críticas de Kant al modelo teórico del estado westfaliano.” [Spanish] Cadernos de Filosofia Alemã: Crítica e Modernidade 18 (2011): 13-33. [M] [online]

 ——. Rev. of Immanuel Kant, Fundamentação da metafísica dos costumes. [Portuguese] Translated , and with an introduction and notes, by Guido Antônio de Almeida (2009). Kantian Review 16.2 (2011): 318-20. [M]

Mariña, Jacqueline. “Transcendental Arguments for Personal Identity in Kant’s Transcendental Deduction.” Philo 14.2 (2011): 109-36. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: One of the principle aims of the B version of Kant’s transcendental deduction is to show how it is possible that the same “I think” can accompany all of my representations, which is a transcendental condition of the possibility of judgment. Contra interpreters such as A. Brook, I show that this “I think” is an a priori (reflected) self-consciousness; contra P. Keller, I show that this a priori self-consciousness is first and foremost a consciousness of one’s personal identity from a first person point of view.

 ——. Rev. of Kants Vorsehungskonzept auf dem Hintergrund der deutschen Schulphilosophie und -theologie, by Ulrich L. Lehner (2007). Heythrop Journal 52.1 (2011): 148-49. [PI]

Marques, Ubirajara Rancan de Azevedo. “Science et non-science. Essai d’analogie concernant le rapport entre l’empirique et le transcendantal.”  Kant et la science. La théorie critique et transcendantale de la connaissance. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Mai Lequan, and Margit Ruffing (op cit.). 267-75. [M]

 ——. “Contra os Leibnizianos, a favor de Leibniz? ‘inato’ e ‘a priori’ em Kant.” [Portuguese] Philosophica 37 (2011): 95-107. [M] [online]

Marshall, Colin. Rev. of Kant’s Thinker, by Patricia Kitcher (2011). British Journal for the History of Philosophy 19.6 (2011): 1226-29. [PW]

Martin, Christopher. “Education without Moral Worth? Kantian Moral Theory and the Obligation to Educate Others.” Journal of Philosophy of Education 45.3 (2011): 475-92. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article examines the possibility of a Kantian justification of the intrinsic moral worth of education. The author critiques a recent attempt to secure such justification via Kant’s notion of the Kingdom of Ends. He gives four reasons why such an account would deny any intrinsic moral worth to education. He concludes with a tentative justification of his own and a call for a more comprehensive engagement between Kant's moral theory and the philosophy of education for purposes of understanding what constitutes the moral core of education.

Martin, John Levy. “Immanuel Kant: An Analytic Grammar for the Relation between Cognition and Action.” Sociological Insights of Great Thinkers: Sociology through Literature, Philosophy, and Science. Eds. Christofer Edling and Jens Rydgren (Santa Barbara, Calif.: Praeger, 2011), 370 p. 279-88. [WC]

Martinello, Francesco. “Direzioni del moto e direzioni nello spazio: Berkeley e Kant.” [Italian] Rivista di Filosofia 102.1 (2011): 105-23. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: One of the steps that moved to a better comprehension of Kant’s argument for the existence of absolute space in his essay ‘Von dem ersten Grunde des Unterschiedes der Gegenden im Raume’ (1768) has been its comparative reading with Euler’s ‘Réflexions sur l’espace et le temps’ (1748), where a similar claim is made. Moreover, this paper suggests that also Berkeley’s ‘De Motu’ (1721) could have influenced Kant, although in that work Berkeley maintains the opposite thesis. The present essay shows that there are important resemblances between two parts of Kant’s text and a section of ‘De Motu’, and then explains why Berkeley’s criticism of Newtonian absolute space may have led Kant to conceive a proof of its existence grounded on incongruent counterparts. This can be relevant because the originality of Kant’s argument is that it is a “static” proof, namely a proof concerned only with geometrical notions. On the contrary the previous attempts to support absolute space, including Newton’s and Euler’s ones, were “dynamical” proofs, which involved the concepts of motion and inertial force.

Marton, Scarlett. “Nietzsche, Kant et la métaphysique dogmatique.” Nietzsche-Studien 40 (2011): 106-29. [M]

 ——. “Lo spazio e il corpo nel saggio kantiono del 1768.” [Italian] Rivista di Estetica 51 (2011): 163-77. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The more recent interpretations of Kant’s 1768 essay ‘Concerning the Ultimate Ground of the Differentiation of Directions in Space’ stressed the important role of the human body in determining the spatial feature of directionality. For that reason it seems to provide great support to an alternative account of Kant’s official doctrine of space in the ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’, namely a reading grounded on a “phenomenological” approach to the text. The present article firstly explains why a revision in translation allowed to discover in the 1768 essay the new topic of the body. Then it shows how Kant’s remarks have been connected with his mature views by ascribing to him a constant phenomenological attitude. Finally, it argues that a similar hypothesis is not much consistent with Kant’s aims because of the methodological rules of philosophizing he was following in 1768.

Marty, François. “Quand la connaissance du vivant croise la faculté de juger réfléchissante.”  Kant et les sciences. Un dialogue philosophique avec la pluralité des savoirs. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Mai Lequan, and Margit Ruffing (op cit.). 247-52. [M]

 ——. “L’ontologie dans le système wolffien: fortune et infortune d’un chemin de pensée.”  Kant et Wolff. Eds. Sophie Grapotte und Tinca Prunea-Bretonnet (op cit.). 163-70. [M]

Marx, Karianne J. The Usefulness of the Kantian Philosophy: How Karl Leonhard Reinhold’s Commitment to Enlightenment Influenced his Reception of Kant. Berlin / Boston: De Gruyter, 2011. [xii, 321 p.] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Volume 1 of the series Reinholdiana, edited by Ernst-Otto Onnasch.

Massimi, Michela. “Kant’s Dynamical Theory of Matter in 1755, and its Debt to Speculative Newtonian Experimentalism.” Studies in History & Philosophy of Science 42.4 (2011): 525-43. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper explores the scientific sources behind Kant’s early dynamical theory of matter in 1755, with a focus on two main Kant’s writings: Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens and On Fire. The year 1755 has often been portrayed by Kantian scholars as a turning point in the intellectual career of the young Kant, with his much debated conversion to Newton. Via a careful analysis of some salient themes in the two aforementioned works, and a reconstruction of the scientific sources behind them, this paper shows Kant’s debt to an often overlooked scientific tradition, i.e. speculative Newtonian experimentalism. The paper argues that more than the Principia, it was the speculative experimentalism that goes from Newton’s Opticks to Herman Boerhaave’s Elementa chemiae via Stephen Hales’ Vegetable Staticks that played a central role in the elaboration of Kant’s early dynamical theory of matter in 1755.

 ——. “From data to phenomena: a Kantian stance.” Synthese 182.1 (2011): 101-16. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper investigates some metaphysical and epistemological assumptions behind Bogen and Woodward’s data-to-phenomena inferences. I raise a series of points and suggest an alternative possible Kantian stance about data-to-phenomena inferences. I clarify the nature of the suggested Kantian stance by contrasting it with McAllister’s view about phenomena as patterns in data sets.

Materstvedt, Lars Johan. “What is This Thing Called Medical Ethics: A Kantian Interpretation.” Kant, Here, Now, and How. Eds. Siri Granum Carson, Jonathan Knowles, and Bjørn K. Myskja (op cit.). 207-33. [M]

Matsumoto, Dairi. Moralbegründung zwischen Kant und Transzendentalpragmatik: Von der transzendentalen Begründung zur Faktizität des Moralischen. Marburg: Tectum, 2011. [242 p.] [abstract] [WC]

Mauri, Margarita. “Self-Respect and Honesty.” Filozofia 66.1 (2011): 74-82. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Self-esteem and self-respect refer to a way through which one relates to oneself, although they can be used as synonymous expressions. On the basis of long tradition, since Kant ties self-respect to morality, all reference to self-respect has to be based on morality. Self-respect has a deeper root than self-esteem which is used to indicate a simple feeling of satisfaction with oneself without any value meaning. Self-respect is not a duty in itself but rather an acknowledgment of moral law which means the recognition of all moral duties. In Kantian ethics self-esteem comes from duty to treat oneself considering mankind in his person. From self-respect derive duties to oneself which are the foundation of duties to other people. Honesty has been understood as a commitment to find the truth and to live according to it. Honesty as a virtue means refusing any falsification of facts. Honesty is the most remarkable expression of self-respect and other-respect, without any concessions to self-deception or other-deception. The aim of the paper is to establish the differences between self-respect and self-esteem and to relate the two with the virtue of honesty.

McAleer, Sean. Rev. of Kant’s Theory of Virtue: The Value of Autocracy, by Anne Margaret Baxley (2010). Ethics 122.1 (2011): 174-78. [PI]

McCall, Corey. Rev. of The Kantian Aesthetic: From Knowledge to the Avant-Garde, by Paul Crowther (2010). Philosophy in Review 31 (2011): 191-94. [online] [M]

McDonough, Richard. “A Synoptic View of Kant’s Emergentism.” Iyyun: The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly 60 (2011): 245-74. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In his Anthropology Kant states a view of chemical synthesis analogous to emergent materialism and that organic genesis and mental synthesis are analogous to chemical synthesis. In the first Critique Kant remarks that he employs a chemical model of mental synthesis, suggesting that he has an emergence-like view of mental synthesis (including “the epigenesis of pure reason”). Additional examples of emergence-like views in Kant’s various works, including views akin to emergent evolutionism in the third Critique and the Opus Postumum, are discussed. It is argued that Kant’s methodology does require an important qualification on the ascription of emergence-like views to Kant. Finally, it is argued that Kant’s emergence-like views are the template for the emergence-like views in the organicism of Hegel, Schelling, and Bergson.

McGaughey, Douglas. “Kants theologischer Kontext: Eine Stichprobe.” Immanuel Kant, die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft. Ed. Ottfried Höffe (op cit.). 271-82. [M]

McLear, Colin. “Kant on Animal Consciousness.” Philosophers’ Imprint 11.15 (2011): 1-16. [online] [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant is often considered to have argued that perceptual awareness of objects in one’s environment depends on the subject’s possession of conceptual capacities. This conceptualist interpretation raises an immediate problem concerning the nature of perceptual awareness in non-rational, non-concept using animals. In this paper I argue that Kant’s claims concerning animal representation and consciousness do not foreclose the possibility of attributing to animals the capacity for objective perceptual consciousness, and that a non-conceptualist interpretation of Kant’s position concerning perceptual awareness can actively endorse this attribution. Kant can consistently allow that animals have a point of view on the objective world which possesses a distinctive phenomenal character while denying what seems most important to him — viz., that animals have the capacity to take cognitive attitudes towards, and thus self-ascribe, their own representational states.

McMahon, Jennifer A. “Critical Aesthetic Realism.” Journal of Aesthetic Education 45.2 (2011): 49-69. [HUM]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article discusses the aesthetic theory of philosopher Immanual Kant. The author explores disagreements among various aesthetic theories including expressivism, cognitivism, and moderate formalism, and discusses aesthetic judgment as well as objectivity and subjectivity. The author suggests that Kant’s aesthetic theory is superior to other aesthetic theories despite not providing a link between aesthetic form and aesthetic ideas. Other topics include aesthetic characterization, aesthetic experience, evolutionary traits relating to aesthetic preferences, and how aesthetic theory affects art education.

 ——. “The Kantian Aesthetic: From Knowledge to the Avant-Garde.” British Journal of Aesthetics 51.2 (2011): 229-31. [HUM]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: “P[aul] Crowther provides interpretations of key concepts in Kant’s Critique of Aesthetic Judgment, indicating (particularly in very informative footnotes) how his views compare with those of other Kant commentators such as Paul Guyer, Rachel Zuckert, Béatrice Longuenesse, Henry Allison, Donald Crawford, Robert Wicks, and others. One might be inclined to ask whether yet another interpretation of Kant’s third critique was needed, yet compared to his other two critiques, Kant’s Critique of Judgment can still be regarded as the neglected sibling. Its relevance to his system as a whole, and in particular to his moral theory, is still under-appreciated. However, if one is after a study of Kant’s third critique along these lines, this is not the place to find it. . . . Ultimately, the test is whether the author’s position is coherently related to other scholarship in the field of study and illuminating in its own right in some respect. Crowther’s book passes this test with flying colours.”

McQuillan, Colin. “The History of a Distinction: Sensible and Intellectual Cognition from Baumgarten to Kant.”  Rethinking Kant: 3. Ed. Oliver Thorndike (op cit.). 180-99. [M]

 ——. Rev. of Plato in German: Kant-Natorp-Heidegger, by Alan Kim (2010). Journal of the History of Philosophy 49.3 (2011): 382-83. [M]

 ——. Rev. of Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime and Other Writings, by Immanuel Kant, ed. and transl. by Patrick Frierson and Paul Guyer (2011). Philosophy in Review 31.6 (2011): 438-41. [online] [PW]

Meerbote, Ralf. “Hughes on Kant’s Aesthetic Epistemology.” Kant-Studien 102.2 (2011): 202-12. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Hughes has recently argued that there is to be found in Kant’s epistemology an aesthetic constraint that makes for an objectivity of empirical knowledge-claims. The reading that she defends leads to a rejection of an imposition-view of empirical concepts and the categories and to an affirmation of a realism in Kant’s theory of empirical knowledge. I am in broad agreement with her thesis but disagree with her ultimate explanation of the ontology of Kant’s objects of empirical knowledge. Hughes’ exposition and my reading wind their way through both Kant’s epistemology and his theory of free beauty and of pure judgments of taste.

Mehigan, Tim. Heinrich von Kleist: Writing after Kant. Rochester, N.Y.: Camden House, 2011. [x, 232 p.] [data] [WC]

Meier, Lars. “Kantische Grundsätze? Schillers Selbstinszenierung als Kant-Nachfolger in seinen Briefen Ueber die ästhetische Erhebung des Menschen.”  Schiller im philosophischen Kontext. Eds. Cordelia Burtscher and Markus Hien (op cit.). 50-63?. [WC]

Mendieta, Eduardo. “Geography Is to History as Woman Is to Man: Kant on Sex, Race, and Geography.” Reading Kant’s Geography. Eds. Stuart Elden and Eduardo Mendieta (op cit.). 345-68. [M]

 ——, ed. See: Elden, Stuart and Eduardo Mendieta, eds.

Mensch, Jennifer. “Intuition and Nature in Kant and Goethe.” European Journal of Philosophy 19.3 (2011): 431-53. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Article first published online: 25 Sep 2009.
Abstract: This essay addresses three specific moments in the history of the role played by intuition in Kant’s system. Part one develops Kant’s attitude toward intuition in order to understand how ‘sensible intuition’ becomes the first step in his development of transcendental idealism and how this in turn requires him to reject the possibility of an ‘intellectual intuition’ for human cognition. Part two considers the role of Jacobi when it came to interpreting both Kant’s epistemic achievement and what were taken to be the outstanding problems of freedom’s relation to nature; problems interpreted to be resolvable only via an appeal to ‘intellectual intuition’. Part three begins with Kant’s subsequent return to the question of freedom and nature in his Critique of Judgment. With Goethe’s contemporaneous Metamorphoses of Plants as a contrast case, it becomes clear that whereas Goethe can embrace the role of an intuitive understanding in his account of nature and within the logic of polarity in particular, Kant could never allow an intuition of nature that in his system would spell the very impossibility of freedom itself.

Merritt, Melissa McBay. “Kant's Argument for the Apperception Principle.” European Journal of Philosophy 19.1 (2011): 59-84. [online] [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: My aim is to reconstruct Kant’s argument for the principle of the synthetic unity of apperception. I reconstruct Kant’s argument in stages, first showing why thinking should be conceived as an activity of synthesis (as opposed to attention), and then showing why the unity or coherence of a subject’s representations should depend upon an a priori synthesis. The guiding thread of my account is Kant’s conception of enlightenment: as I suggest, the philosophy of mind advanced in the Deduction belongs to an enlightenment epistemology. Kant’s conception of enlightenment turns on the requirement that a subject be able to recognize herself as the source of her cognitions. The argument for the apperception principle is reconstructed under the guidance of this conception of the ideal of enlightenment.

 ——. “Kant on Enlightened Moral Pedagogy.” Southern Journal of Philosophy 49.3 (2011): 227-53. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: For Kant, the ideal of enlightenment is most fundamentally expressed as a self-developed soundness of judgment. But what does this mean when the judgment at issue is practical, that is, concerns the good to be brought about through action? I argue that the moral context places special demands on the ideal of enlightenment. This is revealed through an interpretation of Kant's prescription for moral pedagogy in the Critique of Practical Reason. The goal of the pedagogy is to cultivate the moral disposition, and the method consists of training in judgment. Unfortunately, Kant seems to wind up somewhere short of this goal, leaving the young person with only an idle wish for a properly cultivated moral disposition. In this paper, I argue that when we address the special issues that arise when the enlightenment ideal is brought to bear on practical judgment — issues that stem from the intrinsic connection between practical judgment and agency — we will see that there is no lacuna in Kant's account.

 ——. Rev. of Immanuel Kant: Key Concepts, edited by Will Dudley and Kristina Engelhard (2011). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (October 2011, #27). [online] [M]

Mertens, Thomas. “Kant en de traditie van de rechtvaardige oorlog.” [Dutch] Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 73.3 (2011): 467-88. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant’s writings on international law, especially in his ‘Towards Perpetual Peace’ and the ‘Metaphysics of Morals, Doctrine of Right (Rechtslehre)’, have given rise to a variety of interpretations. In this paper, it is argued that these interpretations stem from an ambiguity within these writings. Whereas the first text seems to subscribe to a pacifist viewpoint, the latter rather seems to give support to just-war thinking. In an attempt to unravel this seeming incongruity, I sketch both perspectives and make an effort to reconcile them. In doing so, I rely not only on Kant’s text, but also on a reflection of the basic tenets of just-war thinking. From this, I draw the conclusion that one should only give preference to the perspective of ‘Towards Perpetual Peace’. Although a part of Kant’s writings appears to belong within the tradition of the ‘just war’, preference should be given to a more pacifist interpretation, albeit it of a peculiar, legal kind.

Messina, James. “Answering Aenesidemus: Schulze’s Attack on Reinholdian Representationalism and Its Importance for Fichte.” Journal of the History of Philosophy 49 (2011): 339-69. [M]

Michalski, Krzysztof. Zrozumiec przemijanie. [Polish] Warsaw: Fundacja Augusta hr. Cieszkowskiego, 2011. [468 p.] [WC]

Michel, Karin. “Personalität und Stellvertretung: Ethik und Recht stellvertretender Entscheidungen.” Jahrbuch fuer Recht und Ethik 19 (2011): 347-66. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The paper examines the close connection between personhood, human dignity and self-determination by consulting John Locke and Immanuel Kant as two major philosophers of the European tradition of thought. It aims to an application of the outcome of this examination to the problem of surrogate decision-making. The result gained by this application is that surrogate decision-making is ethically and legally adequate only in order to regard or to restitute personal autonomy. By this it confirms the main purpose of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities adopted on 13 December 2006.

Mieszkowski, Jan. “Social Demands: Kant and the Possibility of Community.” Kant and the Concept of Community. Eds. Charlton Payne and Lucas Thorpe (op cit.). 284-302. [M]

Mignolo, Walter D. “The Darker Side of the Enlightenment: A De-Colonial Reading of Kant’s Geography.” Reading Kant’s Geography. Eds. Stuart Elden and Eduardo Mendieta (op cit.). 319-43. [M]

Mikalsen, Kjartan Koch. “In Defense of Kant’s League of States.” Law and Philosophy 30.3 (2011): 291-317. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article presents a defense of Kant’s idea of a league of states. Kant’s proposal that rightful or just international relations can be achieved within the framework of such a league is often criticized for being at odds with his overall theory. In view of the analogy he draws between an interpersonal and an international state of nature, it is often argued that he should have opted for the idea of a state of states. Agreeing with this standard criticism that a league of states cannot establish the institutional framework for international justice, others also suggest an alternative stage model interpretation. According to this interpretation, Kant’s true ideal is in fact a state of states, whereas the league is merely introduced as a temporary and second best solution. In contrast to both the standard criticism and the stage model interpretation, I argue that fundamental normative concerns count in favour of a league rather than a state of states. I also argue that Kant’s defense of such a league is consistent with his position on the institutional preconditions for just interaction in the domestic case because of crucial relevant differences between the state of nature among individuals and the external relations between states.

Mikkola, Mari. “Kant on Moral Agency and Women’s Nature.” Kantian Review 16.1 (2011): 89-111. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Some commentators have condemned Kant’s moral project from a feminist perspective based on Kant’s apparently dim view of women as being innately morally deficient. Here I will argue that although his remarks concerning women are unsettling at first glance, a more detailed and closer examination shows that Kant’s view of women is actually far more complex and less unsettling than that attributed to him by various feminist critics. My argument, then, undercuts the justification for the severe feminist critique of Kant's moral project.

Milbank, John. “Hume versus Kant: Faith, Reason, and Feeling.” Modern Theology 27.2 (2011): 276-97. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The sharp separation between religion and reason in public life is not compatible with democracy. For thinkers like Habermas this separation is based upon enlightenment, but in fact it is based only on one version of enlightenment, that of Kant. If we turn instead to Hume, who made feeling, not reason, central for the workings of the human mind, then we discover far more fluidity between religious and other modes of thought and yet at the same time a greater ease with naturalism. Moreover, when we understand the centrality of feeling for thought, modes of physicalist reductionism of mind become much harder to entertain, even within a naturalistic perspective.

Miller, David. “Property and Territory: Locke, Kant, and Steiner.” Journal of Political Philosophy 19.1 (2011): 90-109. [PI]

Miller, Elaine P. “Rearranging the Furniture: Irigaray Reads Kant on Temporality.” Philosophy Today 55-supplement (2011): 240-44. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article discusses Luce Irigaray’s interpretation of Immanuel Kant’s concept of temporality in her essay “Paradox A Priori.” According to the author, Irigaray critiques Kant’s understanding of time as the internal sense that organizes the diversity of sensuous experience based on unilateral parameters. The author notes that Irigaray seems to follow Heidegger’s critique of the temporality of Kant.

Millson, Jared A. “Context and Creation: The Significance of Kant's Third Critique to Dilthey’s Hermeneutics of History.” Recent Contributions to Dilthey’s Philosophy of the Human Sciences. Eds. Hans-Ulrich Lessing, et al. (op cit.). 83-103. [M]

Minimah, Fl. “Kant as a Professor: Some Lessons for Today’s Intellectuals.” Sophia: An African Journal of Philosophy 13.2 (2011): 9-17. [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The thoughts of every great philosopher is measured and represented by the history of his social background. It is indeed, more appropriate particularly in the case of a great philosopher like Immanuel Kant to single out for special recognition the outstanding characteristics of his early life on his career as a professor of philosophy. Kant has no other biography than the story of his philosophizing. His philosophical ideas were undoubtedly a reflection or product of his youth and parental upbringing in which he immersed himself with unwavering discipline in an almost superhuman exclusiveness. According to one account, Kant’s critical epistemology is significant because it struggles hard to discern and give full recognition of the elements of truth in all its approaches. Anyone who takes the trouble to grapple with Kant’s biography would see that he represents a good example of one whose parental upbringing influenced his intellectual thought. In this paper, it is our purpose not only to demonstrate the correlation between Kant’s biography and his intellectual development as a professor but also to show what philosophers and non specialists alike can today learn from Kant’s social background to his becoming one of the leading giants of eighteenth century philosophy. What follows is a testimony of how well Kant achieved this purpose.

Mitrovic, Branko. Philosophy for Architects. New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 2011. [200 p.] [GVK]

Mitscherlich-Schönherr, Olivia. “Glück bei Kant.” Glück: Ein interdisziplinäres Handbuch. Eds. Dieter Thomä and Olivia Mitscherlich-Schönherr (Stuttgart/Weimar: J. B. Metzler, 2011). 183-88. [M]

Mittelstrass, Jürgen. Leibniz und Kant. Erkenntnistheoretische Studien. Berlin / New York: De Gruyter, 2011. [x, 344 p.] [WC]

Mohr, Georg. Immanuel Kant: Kritik der reinen Vernunft. 2nd, improved edition. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2011. [366, 431 p.]

 —— and Ulli. F. H. Rühl. “Moral obligation: rights, duties, virtues.” Immanuel Kant: Key Concepts. Eds. Will Dudley and Kristina Engelhard (op cit.). 120-35. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This chapter gives an outline of the main notions, arguments and theses presented in Immanuel Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals. The notion of moral obligation is the fundamental concept of both Kant’s legal philosophy and ethics as well which together make up Kant’s moral philosophy as it is presented in his Metaphysics of Morals. Kant’s distinctions between morals, rights and ethics, perfect and imperfect duties, juridical and ethical laws are commented, Kant’s conception of ethics as the “system of the ends”, the “universal principle of right”, the idea of “intelligible possession” as well as Kant’s justification of legal punishment are interpreted in their systematical context.

Molander, Bengt. “Subjectivity, Fallibility and the Absence of Doubt.” Kant, Here, Now, and How. Eds. Siri Granum Carson, Jonathan Knowles, and Bjørn K. Myskja (op cit.). 107-19. [M]

Moledo, Fernando. Rev. of Kant-Index. Section 2. Vol. 30.1: Stellenindex und Konkordanz zum “Naturrecht Feyerabend”, edited by Heinrich Delfosse, Norbert Hinske, and Gianluca Sadun Bordoni (2010). [Portuguese] Cadernos de Filosofia Alemã: Crítica e Modernidade vol (2011): 141-45. [M] [online]

Monten, Jonathan. See: Wilson, James Lindley and Jonathan Monten.

Moore, A. W. “Bird on Kant’s Mathematical Antinomies.” Kantian Review 16.2 (2011): 235-43. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The author considers Graham Bird’s treatment of Kant’s mathematical antinomies in ‘The Revolutionary Kant’. On Bird’s interpretation, Kant thinks that our error is to raise issues about the limits of physical reality that we fancy ourselves capable of settling by pure reason, though in fact we cannot settle them at all. On the author’s interpretation, we can settle them. Our error is to presuppose that the concept of the unconditioned has application to physical reality. Once this presupposition has been abandoned, we can retrieve sound arguments from the antinomies, not for the views that were originally being defended but against their opposed views. The author concludes with some suggestions about how this disagreement relates to some broader differences between his understanding of Kant and Bird’s.

 ——. “Vats, Sets, and Tits.” Transcendental Philosophy and Naturalism. Eds. Joel R. Smith and Peter M. Sullivan (op cit.). 42-54. [M]

Moran, Kate. “The Ethical Community as Ground of Moral Action: An Interpretation of the Highest Good.”  Rethinking Kant: 3. Ed. Oliver Thorndike (op cit.). 78-99. [M]

Moretto, Antonio. “L’infini potentiel et actuel dans la philosophie des mathématiques de Kant.”  Kant et les sciences. Un dialogue philosophique avec la pluralité des savoirs. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Mai Lequan, and Margit Ruffing (op cit.). 107-15. [M]

Morgan, Diane. “«La terre est une sphère»: la «globalité» et les sciences de la terre chez Kant.”  Kant et les sciences. Un dialogue philosophique avec la pluralité des savoirs. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Mai Lequan, and Margit Ruffing (op cit.). 191-202. [M]

Morris, David. “The Place of the Organism in Kantian Philosophy: Geography, Teleology, and the Limits of Philosophy.” Reading Kant’s Geography. Eds. Stuart Elden and Eduardo Mendieta (op cit.). 173-92. [M]

Morujdo, Carlos. “Kant e a Ideia de Europa: uma Interpretação do Opúsculo para a Paz Perpétua.” [Portuguese]  A ideia de Europa de Kant a Hegel. Eds. Carlos Morujão and Cláudia Oliveira (Lisbon: Universidade Católica Portuguesa, 2011), 223 p. 11-32?. [WC]

Mosayebi, Reza. “Die ‘Definition’ der Vernunftreligion.” Immanuel Kant, die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft. Ed. Ottfried Höffe (op cit.). 249-70. [M]

Motta, Giuseppe. “Five Meanings of ‘Contingency’ in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.” Pli: The Warwick Journal of Philosophy 22 (2011): 110-23. [PI]

 ——. “Qu’est-ce qu’un postulat? Considérations sur l’anticonstructivisme de Kant.”  Kant et la science. La théorie critique et transcendantale de la connaissance. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Mai Lequan, and Margit Ruffing (op cit.). 137-43. [M]

 ——. “«Ratio fiendi». La redéfinition kantienne des principes fondamentaux de l’ontologie dans la Nova dilucidatio de 1755.”  Kant et Wolff. Eds. Sophie Grapotte und Tinca Prunea-Bretonnet (op cit.). 119-29. [M]

 ——. Rev. of Kant und Swedenborg, edited by Friedemann Stengel (2008). Kant-Studien 102.3 (2011): 407-11. [M]

Moutsopoulos, Evanghélos. “À propos de l’«astrophysique» kantienne.”  Kant et les sciences. Un dialogue philosophique avec la pluralité des savoirs. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Mai Lequan, and Margit Ruffing (op cit.). 151-55. [M]

Moya, Eugenio. “Kant y la embriología.” [Spanish]  Kant y las ciencias. Ed. Pedro Jesús Teruel (op cit.). 185-224. [M]

Moyar, Dean. “Kantian Right and the Realization of Free Agency.”  Rethinking Kant: 3. Ed. Oliver Thorndike (op cit.). 124-56. [M]

Moyn, Samuel, and Azzan Yadin-Israel. “The Creaturely Limits of Knowledge: Martin Heidegger’s Theological Critique of Immanuel Kant.” The Weimar Moment: Liberalism, Political Theology, and Law. Eds. Leonard V. Kaplan and Rudy Koshar (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2011). 123-44. [WC]

Mueller, Axel. “How to Continue Kant’s ‘Perpetual Peace’ with Addams’ ‘Newer Ideals of Peace’.” Enrahonar: Quaderns de Filosofía 46 (2011): 93-122. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article examines some arguments in favor of taking peace as a political obligation that can be found in one of the most important founders of the pacifist movement, Jane Addams. The main focus is on her 1907 book ‘Newer Ideals of Peace’, which has often been read as idealistic and outdated, and above all, as more of an activist’s manifesto than a serious contribution to either political philosophy or political theory. I point out that this owes much to an ambiguity of Addams’s criticisms of the traditional and Kantian cosmopolitan defense of peace as a political ideal, the ambiguity between practical-political and conceptual problems. However, Addams’s succeeds in identifying one profound problem for traditional, even enlightened institution-centered ideals of peace, the collapse of the very ideal in cases of breaches of explicit peace agreements among nations, because breaches of agreements are tantamount to the loss of all commitment to the other nation’s rights. It reveals that the conditions imposed by such ideals are at most necessary, but not sufficient for peace and, hence, that the concept based on them is not a complete concept of lasting peaceful conditions among humans. Once it is seen as dedicated to resolving the problems entailed by this fundamental problem, Addams’s work, and in particular her focus on resources of solidarity and right-granting practices beyond and outside explicit agreements between governments can be understood as the development of a more adequate, coherent and comprehensive, while also a more actionable conception of peace.

 ——. “Does Kantian Mental Content Externalism Help Metaphysical Realists?” Synthese 182.3 (2011): 449-73. [HUM]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Standard interpretations of Kant’s transcendental idealism take it as a commitment to the view that the objects of cognition are structured or made by conditions imposed by the mind, and therefore to what Van Cleve calls ‘honest-to-God idealism’. Against this view, many more recent investigations of Kant’s theory of representation and cognitive significance have been able to show that Kant is committed to a certain form of Mental Content Externalism, and therefore to the realist view that the objects involved in experience and empirical knowledge are mind-independent particulars. Some of these recent interpreters have taken this result to demonstrate an internal incompatibility between Kant’s transcendental idealism and his own model of cognitive content and the environmental conditions of empirical knowledge. Against this suggestion, this article argues that, while Kant’s theory of content is indeed best construed as externalist, an adequately adjusted form of transcendental idealism is not only compatible with this externalism, but in fact supports it. More generally, the article develops the position that mental content externalism cannot force the adoption of metaphysical realism.

Müller, Olaf L. “Hasserfüllte Pazifisten.” Kant, Here, Now, and How. Eds. Siri Granum Carson, Jonathan Knowles, and Bjørn K. Myskja (op cit.). 273-96. [M]

Müller, Tim. Der souveräne Mensch: die Anthropologie Heinrich von Kleists. Göttingen: V & R Unipress, 2011. [240 p.] [data] [GVK]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Originally a Ph.D dissertation (Paderborn, 2009). See esp. ch. 5: "Handlungssouveränität - Kants Menschenbild."

Muglioni, Jean-Michel. La philosophie de l'histoire de Kant: la réponse de Kant à la question: “Qu'est-ce que l'homme?”. Paris: Hermann, 2011. [282 p.] [WC]

 ——. “Enthusiasmus und moralischer Fortschirtt im Streit der Fakultäten.” Immanuel Kant, Schriften zur Geschichtsphilosophie. Ed. Otfried Höffe (op cit.). 197-214. [M]

 ——. “Pourquoi faut-il une philosophie de l’histoire pour répondre à la question «qu’est-ce que l’homme?»?”  Kant: l’anthropologie et l’histoire. Eds. Olivier Agard and Françoise Lartillot (op cit.). 51-67. [WC]

Myhre, Ronny Selbaek. “Spatial Cognition: Kant Redux.” Kant, Here, Now, and How. Eds. Siri Granum Carson, Jonathan Knowles, and Bjørn K. Myskja (op cit.). 49-60. [M]

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Naemy, Amir. See: Aframjani, Ali-Akbar Ahmadi and Amir Naemy.

Nakajima, Yoshimichi. 悪への自由 : カント倫理学の深層文法 / Aku eno jiyū : kanto rinrigaku no shinsō bunpō. Tokyo: Keisoshobo, 2011. [228 p.] [WC]

Nakano, Hirotaka. “Selbstaffektion in der transzendentalen Deduktion.” Kant-Studien 102.2 (2011): 213-31. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The aim of this article is to examine the theory of “self-affection” in the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories in the second edition of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. I propose that the self-affection, identified with transcendental synthesis of imagination, should be considered as a condition of all reception of the manifold of intuition in the spatio-temporal order. In other words, spontaneity of the subject is required for the reception of materials for cognition. Analyzing some interpretations on Kant’s notions such as temporality, inner sense and synthesis, I try to show the necessity to avoid supposing materials that would be given independently of spontaneity and regarded as antecedent conditions of self-affection.

Nakhimovsky, Isaac. The Closed Commercial State: Perpetual Peace and Commercial Society from Rousseau to Fichte. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011. [x, 203 p.] [M] [review]

Narholz, Christoph. Die Politik des Schönen. Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2011. [300 p.] [WC]

Natorp, Paul. Tra Kant e Husserl: scritti 1887-1914 [Italian] Transl. from the German by Massimo Ferrari and Gianna Gigliotti. Florence: Le Lettere, 2011. [194 p.] [WC]

Nelson, Eric S. “Kant and China: Aesthetics, Race, and Nature.” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 38.4 (2011): 509-25. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article presents an argument that Immanuel Kant and Xunzi conceptualize desire as prone to disorder and that desire plays an important role in ritual and community activity. It mentions that both Kant and Xinzi share a similar commitment to the ends of ordering an agent’s desires in the project of moral cultivation and evince a commitment to similar means in reaching such goal despite their cultural distance. It also highlights the theme of Kant’s moral work, Metaphysics of Morals.

 ——. Rev. of What Is Enlightenment: Can China Answer Kant’s Question?, by Wei Zhang (2010). Journal of Chinese Philosophy 38.4 (2011): 666-69. [PI]

Neuber, Matthias. “Zwei Formen des transzendentalen Revisionismus: ‘Wissenschaftliche Philosophie’ beim fruhen Ernst Cassirer und beim fruhen Morirtz Schlick.” Kant-Studien 102.4 (2011): 455-76. [M]

Nielsen, Karen Margrethe. “The Good Will: Aristotle, Kant and the Stoics on What is Good Without Qualification.” Kant, Here, Now, and How. Eds. Siri Granum Carson, Jonathan Knowles, and Bjørn K. Myskja (op cit.). 193-205. [M]

Nigro, Roberto. “Um Episódio do debate contemporâneo ao redor da antropologia filosófica.” Kant e-Prints 6.2 (2011): 14-31. [online] [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the beginning of the 20th century, the discussion of the anthropological theme across the field of French philosophical debate. It also implies a redefinition of philosophy and politics at different levels. This is about the second episode of great anthropological questioning that took place in the 20th century, since the first had to do with the great German philosophical works which draws on the writings of Max Scheler, Martin Heidegger, Helmuth Plessner, Arnold Gehlen, and Ernst Cassirer, among others. In the early 1960, the issues of the debate are of a different order. What is at the heart of this reflection is both a radical discussion issue of anthropology as an attempt to define the role and status of criticism in contemporary thought. Foucault makes the anthropological critique the point of departure, at the same time, in his review of the role and function of the Humanities on the device knowledge-power of modern and contemporary societies and the whole philosophical trajectory in which he will involve his searches during the duration of his life. He tries to understand what the meaning of the field of empirical knowledge that comes to emerge at this time with the claim to be a science, anthropology. Anthropology ends up wanting to resume human experience and philosophy in a move where the man gives his truth as the soul of truth. It is at this movement that Nietzsche put an end, when he showed that the death of God accompanies the death of man; that death of God is the end of metaphysics, and the place left free isn't absolutely the man who takes. The critique of the anthropological question is the starting point of an analysis with larger theme the problem of subject’s deconstruction and reconstruction, namely, the deconstruction of the subject as a cause (principle, origin) and reconstruction of subjectivity as effect.

Nihon kanto kyōkai / 日本カント協会 [Kant Society of Japan]. カントと日本の哲学 / Kanto to nihon no tetsugaku. [Japanese; Philosophy of Kant and Japan] Matsudo: Risōsha, 2011. [249 p.] [WC]

Nikseresht, Iraj. Kant et la possibilité des jugements synthétiques a priori. Paris: Harmattan, 2011. [126 p.] [WC]

Nonnenmacher, Burkhard. “Der Begriff sogenannter Gnadenmittel unter der Idee eines reinen Religionsglaubens.” Immanuel Kant, die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft. Ed. Ottfried Höffe (op cit.). 211-29. [M]

 ——. “»Genau zu reden, hat also die Organisation der Natur nichts Analogisches mit irgend einer Causalität, die wir kennen.« Überlegungen zu Kants Kritik der Urteilskraft.”  Subjekt und Gehirn, Mensch und Natur. Eds. Christoph Asmuth and Patrick Grüneberg (op cit.). 235-50. [WC]

Noras, Andrzej Jan. See: Bęben, Dariusz and Andrzej Jan Noras, eds.

Norcross, Alastair. “Beastly Violence, or How Kant Screws Everything up Yet Again.” Southwest Philosophy Review 27.2 (2011): 63-66. [PDC]

Norris, Christopher. “‘Second Nature’, Knowledge, and Normativity: Revisiting McDowell’s Kant.” Diametros: An Online Journal of Philosophy 27 (2011): 64-107. [online] [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this article I raise a number of issues concerning John McDowell’s widely influential revisionist reading of Kant. These have to do with what I see as his failure — despite ambitious claims in that regard — to overcome the various problematic dualisms that dogged Kant’s thought throughout the three Critiques. Moreover, as I show, they have continued to mark the discourse of those who inherit Kant’s agenda in this or that updated, e.g., ‘linguistified’ form. More specifically, I argue that McDowell’s ‘new’ reading amounts to no more than a series of terminological shifts or substitutions, such that (for instance) the well-known problem with explaining how ‘sensuous intuitions’ can be somehow synthesised with ‘concepts of understanding’ is replaced — scarcely resolved — by an equally opaque and question-begging appeal to Kantian ‘receptivity’ and ‘spontaneity’. My essay goes on to discuss a number of kindred dichotomies, among them that of nature and ‘second nature’, all of which can basically be seen as resulting from the normative deficit entailed by McDowell’s particular kind of half-way naturalizing project. I conclude that this project shows insufficient regard to the history of post-Kantian Continental thought, in particular the similar problems faced by ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ idealists like Fichte and Schelling.

Notturni, Loris. “Ontology and Transcendental Critique: A Historical Discussion.” [Bulgarian] Philosophical Alternative (Bulgarian Academy of Sciences) 20.5 (2011): 5-18. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper I shall draw a historical enquiry of the question of ontology’s necessity in the Kantian precritical works. In this purpose, I shall first collect some precritical moments which heavily suggest Kant’s own concerns in evaluating Baumgarten’s ontology and Wolffian metaphysics. Then I would enlight what might become tasks of ontology from 1781 into the Kant’s architectonical, critical standpoint.

Nuyen, A. T. “The Kantian Good Will and the Confucian Sincere Will.” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 38.4 (2011): 526-37. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article presents the author’s views on the comparison between the Confucian notion of the sincere will and the notion of Immanuel Kant of the good will in order to draw out the moral significant of the former. He notes that it is easy to see the absolute sincere in the Confucian texts based on the Kantian model of good will. He also states that sincerity is regarded as a great virtue in East Asia and parts of Southeast Asia in which lack of it may be considered to be a serious accusation.

Nuzzo, Angelica. “The Voice, the Body, and the Mind: Reflections in the Aftermath of Kant and Herder.” Mosaic: A Journal for the Interdisciplinary Study of Literature” 44.1 (2011): 121-37. [MUSE]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This essay examines the connection between sensibility and voice in a prominent but generally overlooked historical connection, namely, in the relation between Kant and Herder. On this basis, it draws consequences for our philosophical thinking of the role that the voice plays in articulating philosophical thinking.

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Oberhausen, Michael, ed. See: Kant, Immanuel. Der einzig mögliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes.

Ochoa, Hugo. “Encuentros y desencuentros del idealismo alemán: A propósito de la publicación Correspondencia: Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel.” [Spanish] Ideas y Valores: Revista Colombiana de Filosofia 60.147 (2011): 7-24. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The history of German idealism is marked by points of agreement and divergence among those who attempted to complete a task that might have remained unfinished in terms of its first formulations and that would lead to the definitive constitution of philosophy. In this sense, the correspondence among Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel makes it possible to unravel, to some extent, the nonexplicit assumptions underlying the systems of these thinkers, since it reveals the questions, objectives, initial formulations, discussions, and differences that would later acquire a systematic structure. This article attempts to show how despite the intention of these philosophers to remain faithful to an original impulse, that alleged fidelity was based on essential misunderstandings.

Øfsti, Audun. “The Turntable: Two Intersecting Transformation Spaces or Frames.” Kant, Here, Now, and How. Eds. Siri Granum Carson, Jonathan Knowles, and Bjørn K. Myskja (op cit.). 135-59. [M]

Oittinen, Vesa. “A Kantian Utopia in Russia: Erikh Solov'ëv.” Studies in East European Thought 63.1 (2011): 75-86. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article deals with Erikh Solov'ëv (b. 1934), a historian of philosophy who is one of the best Soviet and post-Soviet exponents of Kant. In several of his works and articles, published in the 1990s, Solov'ëv has attempted to apply the ideas of Kant’s social philosophy to post-Soviet realities. Kant is important above all as a theoretician of a free subjectivity, human rights, and a critic of paternalism in social life. Several Kantian motives came to the fore during the perestrojka when the Marxist “class approach” was abandoned and “all-human” values (obščečelovečeskie tsennosti) entered into the discussion. Later, Solov'ëv attempted to develop Kantian guidelines for a post-Soviet society, including moral norms for businessmen in the new Russia, but these attempts bore the distinct hallmark of social utopianism.

Olmedo, Pablo. “Kant, Nietzsche y el problema de la existencia moral.” [Spanish] Kant e-Prints 6.1 (2011): 29-49. [online][PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This writing aims to put under discussion Kant ́s and Nietzche ́s philosophies regarding the problem of moral existence. Without taking into account the mediations of the possible lectures between the philosophy of the thinker from Konigsberg and Nieztche ́s interpretation of his work, we try to contrast some selected texts of theirs. These writings argue the problem of moral existence. Once he destroyed the basis on which metaphysics used to be erected, Kant will still try to give a far reaching background to moral behaviour. Nietzche, on the other hand, will try to take Kant ́s enlightened theory to its last consequence up to such an extent, that he will undermine every intent of moral sustent. Our target is to renew this discussion, since we believe it revivifies one of the most important and prob- lematic issues of modern philosophy, which is of great influence still today.

Oktar, Sibel. “Transcendental Ethics.” Transcendentalism Overturned: From Absolute Power of Consciousness Until the Forces of Cosmic Architectonics. Ed. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (op cit.). 213-25. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Our ontological, epistemological and metaphysical point of view is a very important determinant of how we conceive ethics and the possibility of ethical discourse. Kant, G. E. Moore and Wittgenstein had a quite eloquent discourse on ethics though they were, prima facie, incompatible. Kant regards ethics as belonging to supersensible reality, Moore, tells us that “goodness” is a nonnatural and intuitively known notion. Wittgenstein says he “respected deeply” that he himself could not talk about. Both Kant and Wittgenstein might at least find a common point on the idea of ethics being transcendental, whereas Moore strongly objects. I will try to show that Moore’s notion of “good” as a nonnatural object that does not exist in time is difficult to conceive without assuming a “transcendental object” and the existence of a supersensible reality, as Kant does. I will investigate the role of transcending the limits of language in Wittgenstein’s conception of ethics where it manifests itself in our attitude towards the world. I will argue that Wittgenstein suggests a transcendental ethics with an account of viewing the world ‘sub specie aeterni’, without a need for a supersensible reality.

Olaru, Bogdan. “Prolegomena at a Critique of Reasonable Reason: On the Practical Gains of the Theoretical Antinomies.” [Romanian] Revista de Filosofie (Romania) 58 (2011): 103-16. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper reveals a few insights into how to accommodate some strong assumptions common in the traditional philosophy of reason to the contemporary moral thinking. Kant has shown both how to temperate the tendency to extend knowledge above the empirical realm, a tendency which leads to the theoretical antinomies, and the need to relate to some nonempirical ground in moral reasoning. My aim is to point out some arguments about how philosophy of science and moral philosophy benefit from temperating the strong assumptions about rationality that lead back to Kant.

O'Neill, Onora. “Kant’s Conception of Public Reason.” Kant and the Concept of Community. Eds. Charlton Payne and Lucas Thorpe (op cit.). 138-49. [M]

 ——. “Orientation in Thinking: Geographical Problems, Political Solutions.” Reading Kant’s Geography. Eds. Stuart Elden and Eduardo Mendieta (op cit.). 215-32. [M]

Onnasch, Ernst-Otto. “Der Briefwechsel zwischen Immanuel Kant und Jeronimo de Bosch. Oder ein Beitrag zum holländisch-deutschen Austausch über die kritische Philosophie.” Kant-Studien 102.1 (2011): 89-112. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper presents the correspondence in the year 1799 between Jeronimo de Bosch, the curator of the university of Leiden, and Kant or rather F. Th. Rink, who obviously was writing on behalf of Kant. The correspondence was initiated by a letter that de Bosch sent on 6 July 1799 to Kant accompanied by a lengthy poem on Kant’s ethics. This paper presents two critically-edited, hitherto unknown letters by Rink to De Bosch and an autograph by Kant. These letters provide us with new materials pertaining to the development of and Kant’s involvement in Rink’s edition of Mancherley zur Geschichte der metacritischen Invasion, the so-called „Gedächtniszettel“ and Kant’s activities in the summer of 1799 while editing his so-called Opus postumum. It also sheds new light on the reception of Kant's philosophy in Holland, mainly with respect to De Bosch’s Kantian sources.

 ——. Rev. of Königsberg 1724-1804. Materialien zum politischen, sozialen und geistesgeschichtlichen Hintergrund von Leben und Werk Immanuel Kants, edited by Bernd Dörflinger, James Jakob Fehr, and Rudolf Malter (2009). [Dutch] Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 73 (2011): 169-70. [M]

Onof, Christian. “Thinking the In-itself and Its Relation to Appearances.” Kant’s Idealism. Eds. Schulting and Verburgt (op cit.). 211-35. [M]

 ——. “Moral Worth and Inclinations in Kantian Ethics.” Kant Studies Online, 116-61; posted April 7, 2011. [M] [online]

 ——. Rev. of Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: A Critical Guide, edited by Jens Timmermann (2009). The Philosophical Quarterly 61 (2011): 410-12.

Orth, Ernst Wolfgang. “Husserl und die Idee im Kantischen Sinne.” Über den Nutzen von Illusionen. Eds. Bernd Dörflinger and Günter Kruck (op cit.). 157-64. [M]

[top]P    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Paccioni, Jean-Paul. “Qu’est-ce qui est dogmatique? La pensée wolffienne et l’articulation du critique et du dogmatique selon la Critique de la raison pure.”  Kant et Wolff. Eds. Sophie Grapotte und Tinca Prunea-Bretonnet (op cit.). 101-18. [M]

Palazzo, Sandro. “Sintesi e tempo: Trasformazione del trascendentale kantiano nella filosofia de Deleuze.” [Italian] Dianoia: Annali di Storia della Filosofia 16 (2011): 149-80. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this article, we show through the examination of some textual loci of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft, with a focus on the two transcendental deduction’s editions, that Deleuze develops his own transcendental critique. In particular, it is fruitful for the inquiry about the relationship between the experience and its conditions to compare the Deleuze’s interpretation, which is based on the own original idea of the passive synthesis elaborated in the second chapter of Différence et répétition, and the Kant’s conception.

Palmer, Linda. “On the Necessity of Beauty.” Kant-Studien 102.3 (2011): 350-66. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the Critique of Judgment Kant argues that we may assume a certain ‘common inner sense’ on pain of skepticism. I present an interpretation of this argument, which holds that its skeptical threat involves the threat of a regress for judgment, that it argues for a principle underlying both empirical cognition and judgments of beauty, and that no ‘everything is beautiful problem’ results. This principle is essentially ‘epistemologically normative’ rather than moral, although in the end the moral raises its head. Kant’s account is important not only for his aesthetic theory but for his theory of empirical cognition.

Palmquist, Stephen R. “Introduction: Levels of Perspectives in Kant and Chinese Philosophy.” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 38.4 (2011): 505-08. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: An introduction is presented in which the editor discusses various reports within the issue on topics including ethics of Immanuel Kant in contemporary Chinese philosophy, Daoist tradition of Chinese thought and Kantian and Yi jing architectonic.

 ——. “Architectonic Reasoning and Interpretation in Kant and the Yi jing.” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 38.4 (2011): 569-83. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article presents the author’s philosophical understanding of architectonic reasoning and interpretation in Immanuel Kant’s philosophical system and its systemic relation to the twelve categories in the Chinese classic, the Yi jing. He mentions that Kant’s architectonic reasoning refers to as constructive reasoning though the main difference between these terms lies in the different metaphor implied in each. It also interprets the set of sixty-four unique hexegrams from Yi jing.

 ——. “The Kantian Grounding of Einstein’s Worldview: (II) Simultaneity, Synthetic Apriority and the Mystical.” Polish Journal of Philosophy 5.1 (2011): 97-116. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Part I in this two-part series employed a perspectival interpretation to argue that Kant’s epistemology serves as the philosophical grounding for modern revolutions in science. Although Einstein read Kant at an early age and immersed himself in Kant’s philosophy throughout his early adulthood, he was reluctant to admit Kant’s influence, possibly due to personal factors relating to his cultural-political situation. This sequel argues that Einstein’s early Kant-studies would have brought to his attention the problem of simultaneity and the method of solving it that eventually led to the theory of relativity. Despite Einstein’s reluctance to acknowledge his Kantian grounding, a perspectival understanding of Kant’s philosophy of science shows it is profoundly consistent with Einstein’s views on both synthetic apriority and the nature of scientific theory. Moreover, Kant and Einstein share quasi-mystical religious tendencies, relying on an unknowable absolute as the ultimate boundary of our scientific understanding of nature.

Panknin-Schappert, Helke. “Emmanuel Kant, Charles Darwin et la science de la biologie au XVIIIe siècle. La dialectique de la faculté de juger téléologique.”  Kant et les sciences. Un dialogue philosophique avec la pluralité des savoirs. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Mai Lequan, and Margit Ruffing (op cit.). 267-74. [M]

 ——. Rev. of Immanuel Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft, ed. by Otfried Höffe (2008). [German] Kant-Studien 102.2 (2011): 258-60. [M]

Parellada, Ricardo. “Kant y la geometría.” [Spanish]  Kant y las ciencias. Ed. Pedro Jesús Teruel (op cit.). 30-40. [M]

Parker, Kelly A. Rev. of Without Criteria: Kant, Whitehead, Deleuze and Aesthetics, by Steven Shaviro (2009). Review of Metaphysics 64.3 (2011): 658-59. [PI]

Parszutowicz, Przemyslaw, and Maciej Soin, eds. Idea transcendentalizmu: od Kanta do Wittgensteina. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Instytutu Filozofii i Socjologii Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 2011. [471 p.] [WC]

Pasternack, Lawrence. “The Development and Scope of Kantian Belief: The Highest Good, the Practical Postulates, and the Fact of Reason.” Kant-Studien 102.3 (2011): 290-315. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper offers an account of the historical development of Kant’s understanding of belief (‘Glaube’) from its early ties to George Friedrich Meier’s Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre through various stages of refinement. It will be argued that the Critique of Pure Reason reflects an important but not final stage in Kant’s understanding of belief. Its structure is further refined and its scope narrowed in later works, including the Critique of Practical Reason and Critique of Judgment. After charting these stages, an analysis of how belief relates to the ‘fact of reason’ will be presented.

 ——. “Kant’s Doctrinal Belief in God.” Rethinking Kant, vol. 3. Ed. Oliver Thorndike (op cit.). 200-18. [M]

 ——. “Regulative Principles and the ‘Wise Author of Nature’.” Religious Studies 47.4 (2011): 411-429. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: There is much more said in the Critique of Pure Reason about the relationship between God and purposiveness than what is found in Kant’s analysis of the physico-theological (design) argument. The “Wise Author of Nature” is central to his analysis of regulative principles in the appendix to the “Transcendental Dialectic” and also appears in the ‘Canon’, first with regards to the ‘highest good’ and then again in relation to our theoretical use of purposiveness. This paper will begin with a brief discussion of the physico-theological argument before moving on to the appendix and the ‘Canon’. Finally, it will consider some changes to the role of the Wise Author in the Critique of Judgement.

 ——. Review of Kant and Theology at the Boundaries of Reason, by Chris Firestone (2009). Kantian Review 16.3 (2011): 495-98. [M]

Patrone, Tatiana. “Kant’s Rechtslehre and Ideas of Reason.” Politics and Metaphysics in Kant. Eds. Sorin Baiasu, Howard Williams, and Sami Pihlström (op cit.). 115-33. [M]

Patton, Lydia. “The Paradox of Infinite Given Magnitude: Why Kantian Epistemology Needs Metaphysical Space.” Kant-Studien 102.3 (2011): 273-89. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant’s account of space as an infinite given magnitude in the Critique of Pure Reason is paradoxical, since infinite magnitudes go beyond the limits of possible experience. Michael Friedman’s and Charles Parsons’s accounts make sense of geometrical construction, but I argue that they do not resolve the paradox. I argue that metaphysical space is based on the ability of the subject to generate distinctly oriented spatial magnitudes of invariant scalar quantity through translation or rotation. The set of determinately oriented, constructed geometrical spaces is a proper subset of metaphysical space, thus, metaphysical space is infinite. Kant’s paradoxical doctrine of metaphysical space is necessary to reconcile his empiricism with his transcendental idealism.

 ——. Rev. of Discourse on a New Method: Reinvigorating the Marriage of History and Philosophy of Science, edited by Mary Domski and Michael Dickson (2010). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (April 2011, #8). [online] [M]

Paulo Rouanet, Luiz. “Da Metafísica da natureza para a física – parte I.” [Portuguese] Kant e-Prints 6.2 (2011): 32-42. [online] [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper is part of a ongoing research on Kant’s Philosophy of Nature. It analyzes a writing of the Opus postumum (DP), Transition from the Metaphysical Principles of the Science of Nature to Physics. It is the third paper on a series which mean to deepen the knowledge about Kant “als Naturforscher”, reviewing and complementing the classical studies by Adickes, Cohen and Vuillemin, among others. Our first investigations point to a deeper knowledge of Physics by Kant then what is suggested by Adickes, who maintained that Kant “kein empirischer Forscher und in den Naturwissenschaften nur ein Dilletant war” [“was not an empirical researcher and was a mere amateur concerning the natural sciences”]. The present research, on Transition from the Metaphysical Principles of the Science of Nature to Physic, tries the hypothesis of a Kant “physical”, and not only metaphysical (either in the traditional sense or in the critical one). This research should be continued with the scrutinizing of other papers by Kant, either on the Pre-critical period or in the Critical period.

Pavão, Aguinaldo. “Como concordar com a filosofia moral de Kant e discordar de seu opúsculo sobre a mentira: observações sobre ética e direito em Sobre um suposto direito de mentir por amor à humanidade.” [Portuguese] Kant e-Prints 6.2 (2011): 71-83. [online] [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant claims in “On a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy” the thesis that "truthfulness in statements that cannot be avoided is the formal duty of man to everyone, however great the disadvantage that may arise there from for him or for any other” (A 304). I try to show that this is not a good thesis, regardless if it is interpreted as a thesis concerning the juridical duties, or whether interpreted as a thesis on ethical duties. For this, I make a critical reconstruction of the arguments contained in the 1797 article. I point out that my rejection of Kant’s thesis intends to be inspired in the premises of Kantian moral philosophy. I believe that a defensible interpretation of Kant’s legal philosophy and the meaning of the categorical imperative to conclude that lying to a murderer is both legally and ethically justifiable.

Pavesich, Vida. “The Anthropology of Hope and the Philosophy of History: Rethinking Kant’s Third and Fourth Questions with Blumenberg and McCarthy.” Thesis eleven 104 (2011): 20-39. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In order to address the question of hope in the present, it behooves us to revisit Kant’s third and fourth questions: ‘What may we hope?’ and ‘What is the human being?’ I reexamine these questions through an analysis of Thomas McCarthy’s recent book Race, Empire, and the Idea of Human Development and several works by Hans Blumenberg. I agree with McCarthy that Kant’s anthropology is incomplete and that the postmodern rejection of macronarratives was premature, but I claim that he requires a more complex philosophical anthropology to guide a philosophy of history. In order to address the question about hope, I reconstruct the anthropology implied in Blumenberg’s writings. I claim that this answer to Kant’s fourth question supplies conceptual scaffolding missing from McCarthy’s book, provides resources necessary for making normative claims on behalf of all human beings, and can inform a multiversal history for grounding rational hope in the present.

Pawliszyn, Aleksandra. “Transcendentality as an Ontic Transgression.” Transcendentalism Overturned: From Absolute Power of Consciousness Until the Forces of Cosmic Architectonics. Ed. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (op cit.). 103-10. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the frame of epistemological analyses of Descartes, Kant and Husserl, the transgressive aspects of the transcendental I are shown. The human being, realizing the possibilities of the world becomes a kind of lonely monad as if dancing on the borders of existence, a dance created by the power of his own expression. In the context of a Heideggerian interpretation of Sophocles’ Antigone, the situation of the human being as a desperado fighting with the overpowering might of the elements of existence has been recognized. Human existence is marked by an eruption of excess, which is illustrated by an eruption into the power of the abyss, of the ocean and might of the earth — in such a case, human existence is fundamentally transgressive. Heidegger’s interpretation of the power of humanity, that it follows on from the fact that the human being is a strange creature, and also admits that the limits of human learning are the arena of a battle about the shape of the human world, can be treated transcendentality as an ontic transgression.

Payne, Charlton. “Kant’s Parergonal Politics: The Sensus Communis and the Problem of Political Action.” Kant and the Concept of Community. Eds. Charlton Payne and Lucas Thorpe (op cit.). 245-59. [M]

 —— and Lucas Thorpe, eds. Kant and the Concept of Community. Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2011. [vi, 321 p.] [M] [review]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Vol. 9 of the NAKS Studies in Philosophy, with contributions from Béatrice Longuenesse, Eric Watkins, Lucas Thorpe, Paul Guyer, Allen W. Wood, Onora O'Neill, Jeffrey Edwards, Michael Feola, Ronald Beiner, Susan M. Shell, Charton Payne, Jane Kneller, and Jan Mieszkowski.

Pedroso de Lima, João Tiago. “Efeitos e afectos de Kant na estética fenomenológica de M. Dufrenne. A noção de a priori afectivo.”  Figuras da Racionalidade: Neokantismo e Fenomenologia. Ed. Olivier Feron (op cit.). 219-25. [WC]

Pelletier, Arnaud. “L’érosion et la boule de feu: difficultés et tâches d’une science de la Terre selon Kant (1754-1764).”  Kant et les sciences. Un dialogue philosophique avec la pluralité des savoirs. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Mai Lequan, and Margit Ruffing (op cit.). 203-11. [M]

Pellisari, Mauro. Rev. of Kant’s Theory of Action, by Richard McCarty (2009). [Portuguese] Kant e-Prints 6.1 (2011): 102-7. [online] [PW]

Penny, Laura. Rev. of Kant and Milton, by Sanford Budick (2010). Journal of the History of Philosophy 49.4 (2011): 503-4. [M]

Pentzopoulou-Valalas, Thérèse. “Transcendant ontologique et transcendant logique dans la théorie de la connaissance de Kant.”  Kant et la science. La théorie critique et transcendantale de la connaissance. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Mai Lequan, and Margit Ruffing (op cit.). 277-85. [M]

Pereira, Reinaldo Sampaio. “Alguns pontos de aproximação entre a ética aristotélica e a kantiana.” [Portuguese; Some common things between the aristotelian and kantian ethics] Trans/Form/Ação: Revista de Filosofia 34.3 (2011): 31-40. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Our purpose in this paper is to bring together two different ethical models, the Kantian and Aristotelian, in order to detect some common things where we may find some dialogue between the two ethical models.

Perkins, Robert L. Rev. of Freedom and Reason in Kant, Schelling, and Kierkegaard, by Michelle Kosch (2006). Philosophical Review 120 (2011): 134-37. [M]

Peters, Marc. “Le problème des définitions dans l’Ecole de Lwow-Varsovie. Lesniewski versus Kant.” An. Univ. Craiova, Filosofie 28.2 (2011): 129-46. [RC]

Phillips, James. “Placing Ugliness in Kant’s Third Critique: A Reply to Paul Guyer.” Kant-Studien 102.3 (2011): 385-95. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant’s treatment of pure aesthetic judgement can ignore ugliness, since an analytic of the ugly, according to a recent essay by Paul Guyer, uncovers the aesthetic impurity of the criteria against which we judge ugliness. Free beauty, as Kant expounds it, does not admit a contrary and, hence, a Kantian account of ugliness, such as Guyer’s, must look elsewhere in order to scrabble together terms for its definition. Yet if we recognise the ugly by its unsuitability as an object of pure contemplation, then we have made a disinterested judgement of free ugliness. The pleasure of the harmony of the faculties, which is a pleasure in the way the world and our faculties fit together, observes itself contradicted by ugliness.

Philonenko, Alexis. Kant et l’île de la vérité: néant, chose en soi, sujet transcendantal, causalité, grandeur intensive, temps, substance. Paris: Vrin, 2011. [220 p.] [M]

Picardi, Roberta. Rev. of Libertà e moralità. A partire da Kant, by Marco Ivaldo (2009). [Italian] Studi Kantiani 24 (2011): 151-55. [M]

Piché, Claude. “Die Entstehung der Illusion in den Paralogismen.” Über den Nutzen von Illusionen. Eds. Bernd Dörflinger and Günter Kruck (op cit.). 47-58. [M]

 ——. “Les triangles sphériques et le paradoxe des objets non congruents.”  Kant et les sciences. Un dialogue philosophique avec la pluralité des savoirs. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Mai Lequan, and Margit Ruffing (op cit.). 55-76. [M]

 ——. “La conscience morale. Kant, héritier de Wolff et de Baumgarten?”  Kant et Wolff. Eds. Sophie Grapotte und Tinca Prunea-Bretonnet (op cit.). 187-200. [M]

Pickering, Mark. “The Idea of the Systematic Unity of Nature as a Transcendental Illusion.” Kantian Review 16.3 (2011): 429-48. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The appendix to the “Transcendental Dialectic” of Kant’s first Critique is notorious for two reasons. First, it appears to contradict itself in saying that the idea of the systematic unity of nature is and is not transcendental. Second, in the passages in which Kant appears to espouse the former alternative, he appears to be making a significant amendment to his account of the conditions of the possibility of experience in the “Transcendental Analytic”. I propose a solution to both of these difficulties. With regard to the first, I argue that Kant does not contradict himself. With regard to the second, I argue that Kant is not making any change to his view of the conditions of the possibility of experience espoused in the “Transcendental Analytic”. The underlying cause of these apparent problems is also their solution: the transcendental illusion that nature is necessarily systematic.

Pierce, Andrew J. “ Formal Democracy, Structural Violence, and the Possibility of ‘Perpetual Peace’.” Journal for Peace and Justice Studies 21.1 (2011): 31-50. [PDC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper, I revisit and evaluate Kant’s prerequisites for “perpetual peace,” including the claim, central to contemporary political rhetoric, that formal democracy produces peace. I argue that formal democracy alone is insufficient to address the kinds of deep-rooted structural violence that ultimately manifest in terrorism and other forms of direct violence. I claim that the attempt to eliminate structural violence, and so achieve real “perpetual peace,” requires a more substantive sort of democracy, of which the United States and the West remain poor examples. It requires a political critique that goes deeper than just the critique of state power and government action. This paper tries to develop that critique through a conception of structural violence, and of participatory parity as an overarching standard of redress for this type of violence in all of its forms.

Piercey, Robert. “Kant and the Problem of Hermeneutics: Heidegger and Ricoeur on the Transcendental Schematism.” Idealistic Studies 41.3 (2011): 187-202. [HUM]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Paul Ricoeur sharply distinguishes his hermeneutics from Heidegger’s ‘ontological’ hermeneutics. An ontological hermeneutics, Ricoeur claims, is bound to be insufficiently critical. Yet this cannot be the whole story, since Ricoeur himself engages in ontological hermeneutics. What really distinguishes Heidegger’s hermeneutics from Ricoeur’s? I seek an answer to this question in the two thinkers’ appropriations of Kant. More specifically, I examine their appropriations of Kant’s view of the productive imagination, as conveyed in the Transcendental Schematism. Heidegger sees the productive imagination as a ‘third basic faculty’ prior to sensibility and understanding. Conceived in this way, the imagination is so primordial that it must be characterized in a highly abstract way. Ricoeur sees this move as dangerous, and tries to avoid it by reinterpreting the imagination as a faculty that requires the mediation of concrete symbols. In doing so, he hopes to preserve Kant’s insights while leaving room for critique.

Pierobon, Frank. “La conception kantienne des mathématiques.”  Kant et les sciences. Un dialogue philosophique avec la pluralité des savoirs. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Mai Lequan, and Margit Ruffing (op cit.). 25-53. [M]

Pihlström, Sami. “On the Conditions of Discourse and Being: Kantian, Wittgensteinian and Levinasian Perspectives on the Relation between Metaphysics and Ethics.” Politics and Metaphysics in Kant. Eds. Sorin Baiasu, Howard Williams, and Sami Pihlström (op cit.). 71-96. [M]

 ——, ed. See: Baiasu, Sorin, Howard Williams, and Sami Pihlström, eds.

Pillow, Kirk. “Beauty: subjective purposiveness.” Immanuel Kant: Key Concepts. Eds. Will Dudley and Kristina Engelhard (op cit.). 155-69. [M]

Pinheiro, Letícia Machado. “Kant e o resgate do bem na natureza humana decaída.” [Portuguese] Trans/Form/Ação: Revista de Filosofia 34.2 (2011): 53-69. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article has as purpose to examine the Kant’s argument with relationship to of the possibility restoration of good in face of radical evil in human nature. The study proposed here takes as its starting and central point to Kant’s affirmation that the intention or supreme maxim is corrupted by evil, and seeks, from the consequences of such finding and arguments provided by Kant, outline the possibilities and character of the restoration of good in the within such intention.

Pinzani, Alessandro. “Botanische Anthropologie und physikalische Staatslehre. Zum Fünften und Sechsten Satz der Idee.” Immanuel Kant, Schriften zur Geschichtsphilosophie. Ed. Otfried Höffe (op cit.). 63-78. [M]

 ——. Rev. of Direitos Humanos em Kant e Habermas, by Milene C. Tonetto (2010). [Portuguese] ethic@ 10.1 (2011): 179-84. [M] [online]

Piper, Mark. Rev. of Kant’s Theory of Virtue: The Value of Autocracy, by Anne Margaret Baxley (2010). International Philosophical Quarterly 51.3 (2011): 412-15. [M] [online]

Pires, Teresinha Inês Teles. O primado da razão prática em Kant. [Portuguese; The Primacy of Practical Reason in Kant] Núria Fabris, 2011. [#, # p.] [WC]

Pissis, Jannis. “Begründung im Unbedingten als unabweisbares Problem. Die Funktion von Kants transzendentaler Dialektik.”  Die Begründung der Philosophie im Deutschen Idealismus. Ed. Elena Ficara (op cit.). 209-19. [WC]

Placencia, Luis. “Kant y la voluntad como ‘razón práctica’.” [Spanish] Topicos: Revista de Filosofia (Mexico) 41 (2011): 63-104. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this article I provide an account of the difficult passage in the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (GMS), in which Kant characterises the will as ‘practical reason’ (GMS, AA 04 412 26-31). I analyse six different interpretations of the aforementioned passage and I support one of them, which has not been considered by most of scholars. I argue that this interpretation is helpful to gain a better understanding of Kant’s theory of action and the function of practical judgements (maxims and imperatives) in this theory.

Poddyakov, A. N. “Is it acceptable to lie to a murderer in order to prevent a crime: An analysis of historical polemic.” Cultural-Historical Psychology 1 (2011): 28-41. [PsycINFO]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The controversy about Kant’s essay «On a Supposed Right to Tell Lies from Benevolent Motives» is discussed, where Kant justifies the idea: if a murderer asks a person where his friend is hiding in order to kill his friend, morality calls not to lie to a murderer and tell the truth. The article argues that although the followers of this Kantian position are considered as absolutists, and its opponents as relativists, the Kantians with a necessity perform a large-scale relativization of the truth maxima and often adopt even a more conformist position regarding deceit than Kant’s opponents, the «relativists». We introduce the paradoxes of a «dear friend» and «Kant’s generalized consequence for a variety of friends» that describe the contradictory positions of Kant supporters. The «absolutist» and «relativists» confrontation is interpreted as a polemic between the supporters of reductionist and holistic (integrated) methodological approaches taking into account that the methodological confrontation is intensified by the confrontation of moral values.

Poliakova, Ekaterina A. “‘Vermöge eines Vermögens’.” Russian Studies in Philosophy 50.1 (2011): 14-33. [HUM]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article examines Nietzsche’s main arguments “for” and “against” Kant, with a particular focus on the former’s “by virtue of a faculty” (Vermöge eines Vermögens)* formula, which, according to Nietzsche, is the key to understanding Kant’s critical philosophy. In Nietzsche, the radicalization of Kant’s critique of reason takes the form of consistent philosophical questioning of the possibility of definitive knowing as well as formulating the principle of morality. His polemic resorts to metaphor, such as the image of the Chinese merchant and the metaphor of the seafarer.

Pollmann, Arnd. “Der Kummer der Vernunft. Zu Kants Idee einer allgemeinen Geschichtsphilosophie in therapeutischer Absicht.” Kant-Studien 102.1 (2011): 69-88. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: A cursory overview of the most recent studies on Kant's philosophy of history might lead one to suspect that Kant was so confident of the moral potential of human reason that the future could only lead to human progress. But in fact Kant was very much conscious of the disheartening picture that human development presented. In the conclusion to his Conjectures on the Beginnings of Human History he writes: “The thinking person is assailed by a melancholy that can even lead to moral corruption, something of which the unthinking person knows nothing: namely a dissatisfaction with that providence that rules the course of the world.” But Kant not wish to remain in a state of “melancholy”. He sees a possible connection between melancholy and the philosophy of history. In his relevant writings Kant addresses himself directly to the threat of this despair. The horrors of history can yield a philosophical meaning. Not history itself, but rather the philosophy of history has the capacity to console us. It can “heal” that which is lacking in wholeness through human progress. And because the history of philosophy contributes to the recovery of hope and conviction, it itself becomes an important movens of history.

Pollok, Konstantin. “Reflexion und Untersuchung in Kants logischem Expressivismus.”  Robert Brandom’s expressive Vernunft. Eds. Barth, Christian and Holger Sturm (op cit.). 117-45. [WC]

Poma, A. “The Critical Philosophy of Hermann Cohen. Chapter 6: Ethics.” [Russian] Translated from the Italian by Olga A. Popova Kantovskij Sbornik 36 (2011): 73-82. [M]

Ponchio, Alice. Etica e diritto in Kant: un’interpretazione comprensiva della morale kantiana. Pisa: ETS, 2011. [190 p.] [WC]

Popova, Varvara S. “Kul’turnye osnovanija stilja filosofstvovanija.” [Russian; “ultural foundations of the style of philosophising (a comparison of N. O. Lossky's oeuvre with I. Kant's anthropology)] Kantovskij Sbornik 38 (2011-4): 75-85. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The concepts of style and topos in their cultural studies interpretation by Yu. V. Rozhdestvensky are applied to the analysis of some fragments of N. O. Lossky’s philosophical concept pertaining to the features of Russian culture in general and the originality of Russian philosophy in particular. The topic is developed through comparative digressions into the field of anthropological aspects of I. Kant’s philosophy.

Povilaitis, Vladas J. “The Basic Concepts of F. A. Stepun’s Philosophy of History.” [Russian] Kantovskij Sbornik 35 (2011): 55-59. [M]

Pozzo, Ricardo. Rev. of Kant im Spiegel der russischen Kantforschung heute, Forschungen und Materialien zur deutschen Aufklärung, edited by Nelly Motroschilowa and Norbert Hinske (2008). Kant-Studien 102.3 (2011): 406-7 [M]

 ——. Rev. of Philosophia transcendentalis: La questione antepredicativa e l’analogia tra la Scolastica e Kant, by Francesco Valerio Tommasi (2008). Kant-Studien 102.3 (2011): 411-12. [M]

 ——. See: Lessing, Hans-Ulrich, Rudolf A. Makkreel, and Riccardo Pozzo, eds.

Presto, Jenifer. “The Aesthetics of Disaster: Blok, Messina, and the Decadent Sublime.” Slavic Review 70 (2011): 259-90. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this article, Jenifer Presto argues that the 1908 Messina-Reggio Calabria earthquake had an impact on Aleksandr Blok no less significant than that which the 1755 Lisbon earthquake had on writers of the Enlightenment and proceeds to demonstrate how it shaped Blok’s aesthetics of catastrophe. This aesthetics can best be termed the “decadent sublime,” an inversion of the Kantian dynamic sublime with its emphasis on bourgeois optimism. Following Immanuel Kant, Blok acknowledges the fear and attraction that nature’s forces can inspire; however, unlike Kant, he insists that modern man remains powerless in the face of nature, owing to his decadence — a decadence endemic to European civilization. The decadent sublime is manifested in a host of Blok’s writings, ranging from The Elements and Culture to Lightning Flashes of Art and The Scythians; it is intensely visual and is indebted to images of ruin by artists such as Giovanni Battista Piranesi and Luca Signorelli.

Pribytkova, Elena. “Menschenwürde und Gerechtigkeit bei Immanuel Kant, Vladimir Solov'ev und John Rawls.” Pravda: Diskurse der Gerechtigkeit in der russischen Ideengeschichte: Beiträge der Tagung der Forschungsgruppe “Russische Philosophie” und des Verbundprojekts “Kulturen der Gerechtigkeit”, Bochum, 29.-30. Oktober 2009. Eds. Holger Kusse and N. S. Plotnikov (Munich: Sagner). #-#. [WC]

Principe, Salvatore. Kant: la capacità di giudicare: il ruolo del giudizio nell'organon della ragione pratica. [Italian; Kant, The Ability to Judge: The Role of Judgment in the Organon of Practical Reason] Naples: Giannini, 2011. [xxi, 132 p.] [WC]

Pringe, Hernán. “The Fiction of the Affecting Object in Hans Vaihinger’s Philosophy.” Studi Kantiani 24 (2011): 105-18. [M]

Protevi, John. Rev. of Kant, Deleuze and Architectonics, by Edward Willatt (2010). Philosophy in Review 31 (2011): 239-41. [online] [M]

Proulx, Jeremy. “Nature, Judgment and Art: Kant and the Problem of Genius.” Kant Studies Online, posted January 31, 2011. 27 pp. [M] [online]

Prunea-Bretonnet, Tinca. “De l’ontologie à la philosophie transcendantale: dans quelle mesure Kant est-il wolffien?”  Kant et Wolff. Eds. Sophie Grapotte und Tinca Prunea-Bretonnet (op cit.). 147-61. [M]

 ——, ed. See: Grapotte, Sophie and Tinca Prunea-Bretonnet, eds.

Purdy, Daniel L. On the Ruins of Babel: Architectural Metaphor in German Thought. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011. [x, 316 p.] []

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The eighteenth century struggled to define architecture as either an art or a science-the image of the architect as a ground figure who synthesizes all other disciplines within a single master plan emerged from this discourse. Immanuel Kant and Johann Wolfgang Goethe described the architect as their equal, a genius with godlike creativity. For writers from Descartes to Freud, architectural reasoning provided a method for critically examining consciousness. The architect, as philosophers like to think of him, was obligated by the design and construction process to mediate between the abstract and the actual. In On the Ruins of Babel, Daniel Purdy traces this notion back to its wellspring. He surveys the volatile state of architectural theory in the Enlightenment, brought on by the newly emerged scientific critiques of Renaissance cosmology, then shows how German writers redeployed Renaissance terminology so that “harmony”, “unity”, “Synthesis”, “foundation”, and “orderliness” became states of consciousness, rather than terms used to describe the built world. Purdy’s distinctly new interpretation of German theory reveals how metaphors constitute interior life as an architectural space to be designed, constructed, renovated, or demolished. He elucidates the close affinity between Hegel’s Romantic aesthetic of space and Daniel Libeskind’s deconstruction of monumental architecture in Berlin’s Jewish Museum. Through a careful reading of Walter Benjamin’s writing on architecture as myth, Purdy details how classical architecture shaped Benjamin’s modernist interpretations of urban life, particularly his elaboration on Freud’s archaeology of the unconscious. Benjamin’s essays on dreams and architecture turn the individualist sensibility of the Enlightenment into a collective and mythic identification between human and buildings.

[top]Q    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Quarfood, Marcel. “Discursivity and Transcendental Idealism.” Kant’s Idealism. Eds. Schulting and Verburgt (op cit.). 143-58. [M]

Qi, Liangji. 康德的知识学 / Kangde de zhi shi xue. [Chinese; Kant’s Theory of Knowledge] Bejing: Shang wu yin shu guan, 2011. [x, 502 p.] [WC]

[top]R    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Rabaté, Jean-Michel. “Beckett's Three Critiques: Kant’s Bathos and the Irish Chandos.” Modernism/modernity 18.4 (2011): 699-719. [MUSE]

Raulet, Gérard. “Les passages politiques de Kant.”  Kant: l’anthropologie et l’histoire. Eds. Olivier Agard and Françoise Lartillot (op cit.). 17-34. [WC]

Reath, Andews. “Will, Obligatory Ends and the Completion of Practical Reason: Comments on Barbara Herman’s Moral Literacy.” Kantian Review 16.1 (2011): 1-15. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper discusses three inter-related themes in Barbara Herman’s Moral Literacy – the idea that, for Kant, the will is a ‘norm-constituted power’ whose activity is guided by its own internal norm, that the obligatory ends are reasonably viewed as the ends of all rational choice, and that morality ‘completes’ practical reason or rational agency.

Recki, Birgit. “Kant’s Aesthetics of Morals.” The Sublime and its Teleology. Ed. Donald Loose (op cit.). 43-52. [M]

Redding, Paul. “The Metaphysical and Theological Commitments of Idealism: Kant, Hegel, Hegelianism.” Politics, Religion, and Art: Hegelian Debates. Ed. Douglass Moggach (Evanston, Ill: Northwestern University Press, 2011; vii, 360 pp.). 47-65. [WC]

 ——. Rev. of Having the World in View: Essays on Kant, Hegel, and Sellars, by John McDowell (2009). Philosophical Review 120 (2011): 137-40. [M]

 ——. Rev. of Karl Leonhard Reinhold and the Enlightenment, edited by George di Giovanni (2010). Philosophy in Review 31.4 (2011): 256-59. [online] [PW]

Rego, Pedro Costa. “Universalidade estética e universalidad lógica: Notas sobre o §8 da ‘Crítica do Juízo’ de Kant.” [Portuguese] Trans/Form/Ação: Revista de Filosofia 34-supplement 2 (2011): 3-20. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The universality issue is discussed in the second “moment” of the analytic of the ‘beautiful’, leading to the conclusion that “the beautiful is that which, apart from a concept, pleases universally”. Kant draws this conclusion after having established in chapter 8 the distinction between the universality of the aesthetic response and that of determinant judgments of theoretical and practical knowledge. The former is termed “aesthetic universality”, “general validity”, and “subjective universal validity”, whereas the latter is designated by the presumably equivalent titles of “logical universality” and “objective universal validity”. In this paper, I shall argue that three levels of ambiguity concerning the use of these concepts compromise the distinctness of the notion of aesthetic universality. Firstly, I shall analyze a set of difficulties in Kant’s presentation of the concepts of “universality” and “universal validity”. Secondly, I shall discuss the damages brought about by the conflation in Kant’s treatment of the notions of “aesthetic universality” and “subjective universal validity”. Finally, I shall propose the distinction between objective and logical universality in order to respond to the question: regarding their quantity, judgments of taste are more properly defined in contrast to judgments which are universally valid because they are determinant -- given the role of the concept or idea in their determining ground? Or against judgments which are universal insofar their truth-value remain determinable when their subject-concept is universally quantified? More succinctly: the universality of the beautiful is anticonceptual or only antilogical?

Regvald, Richard. “Kant et le rêve de l’Organon.”  Kant et la science. La théorie critique et transcendantale de la connaissance. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Mai Lequan, and Margit Ruffing (op cit.). 243-53. [M]

Reinhardt, Olaf. “Translating Kant’s Physical Geography: Travails and Insights into Eighteenth Century Science (and Philosophy).” Reading Kant’s Geography. Eds. Stuart Elden and Eduardo Mendieta (op cit.). 103-14. [M]

Reinhold, Karl Leonhard. Essay on a New Theory of the Human Capacity for Representation. Transl. by Timothy J. Mehigan and Barry Empson Berlin: De Gruyter, 2011. [xxv, 311 p.] [WC]

Renz, Ursula. “Von Marburg nach Pittsburgh: Philosophie als Transzendentalphilosophie.” Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 59.2 (2011): 249-70. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article reconstructs some of the basic decisions underlying Hermann Cohen’s theoretical philosophy by drawing a line to some claims of Wilfrid Sellars’ and to one aspect of Robert Brandom’s philosophy. The first part is concerned with a comparison of the main theses of Cohen’s book Kants Theorie der Erfahrung and Sellars’s early essay entitled “Some Remarks on Kant’s Theory of Experience,” both authors reading the Critique of Pure Reason as the discovery of a new, holistic concept of experience. The second part discusses some of the parallels between Cohen’s and Sellars’s respective critique of the myth of the given, and it is shown how Cohen’s later critique of Kant can be understood against this background. In the third part I suggest interpreting Cohen’s logic along the lines of Robert Brandom’s inferentialism. It is the declared intention of both philosophers to explain the origin of the content of epistemic claims without making use of any claim about mental representations. The article ends with a comparison of Cohen’s and Sellars’s visions of the systematic character of philosophy. It is argued that while both assume the compatibility of scientific realism with an irreducibly normative ethics, Cohen’s approach is more ambitious, insofar as it requests ethics to develop its own ethical theory of man, the task of which is to overcome the mythical presuppositions of our common sense views on morals.

Repo, Arto. See: Korte, Tapio and Arto Repo.

Rettig, Cristián. Rev. of Libertad, objeto práctico y acción: La facultad del juicio en la filosofía moral de Kant, by José M. Torralba (2009). Anuario Filosofico 44.3 (2011): 654-57. [PI]

Ribeiro dos Santos, Leonel. “Neokantismo e Ficcionalismo. Hans Vaihinger e a sua «Filosofia do Como se».”  Figuras da Racionalidade: Neokantismo e Fenomenologia. Ed. Olivier Feron (op cit.). 205-18. [WC]

Ricken, Friedo. “‘Vom Dienst Gottes in einer Religion überhaupt’.” Immanuel Kant, die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft. Ed. Ottfried Höffe (op cit.). 173-91. [M]

 ——. Rev. of Kants Moraltheologie: Ethische Zugänge zur Religion, by Dieter Witschen (2009). Theologie und Philosophie: Vierteljahresschrift 86.3 (2011): 427-29. [PI]

Rickman, Peter. “Having Trouble with Kant?” Philosophy Now 86 (2011): 10-12. [HUM]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article offers the insights of British philosopher Lord Anthony Quinton on Immanuel Kant. According to Quinton, which he published in his article “The Trouble With Kant,” the philosopher is a wild and intellectually irresponsible arguer. Quinton also argues on Kant’s transcendental idealism wherein he argues that the said idea of ordering the sense data in the mind would make experience arbitrary.

Rice, Stephen. See: Trafimow, David, Gayle Hunt, Stephen Rice, and Kasha Geels.

Rivera de Rosales, Jacinto. El punto de partida de la metafísica transcendental: un estudio crítico de la obra kantiana. [Spanish] Madrid: Xorki, 2011. [325 p.] [WC]

 ——. “La finalidad en la Naturaleza y la biología. Releyendo a Kant.” [Spanish]  Kant y las ciencias. Ed. Pedro Jesús Teruel (op cit.). 138-64. [M]

Rivero, Gabriel. Rev. of La existencia del mundo exterior. Un estudio sobre la refutación kantiana del idealismo, by Santiago Echeverri (2008). Kant-Studien 102.3 (2011): 403-6. [M]

Robinson, Daniel N. How is Nature Possible? Kants Project in the First Critique. New York: Continuum, 2011. [xii, 200 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents: Preliminaries — The larger context — The possibility of metaphysics — The pure intuitions and the analogies of experience — Idealisms and their refutation — Concepts — Judgment — Whose experience?: the self and outer sense — The discipline of reason: paralogisms, antinomies, and freedom.

Rocco Lozano, Valerio, and Marco Sgarbi. Diritto e storia in Kant e Hegel [Italian; Law and history in Kant and Hegel]. Trento: Verifiche, 2011. [237 p.] [WC]

Roche, Andrew F. “Allais on Transcendental Idealism.” Kantian Review 16.3 (2011): 351-74. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Lucy Allais argues that we can better understand Kant’s transcendental idealism by taking seriously the analogy of appearances to secondary qualities that Kant offers in the Prolegomena. A proper appreciation of this analogy, Allais claims, yields a reading of transcendental idealism according to which all properties that can appear to us in experience are mind-dependent relational properties that inhere in mind-independent objects. In section 1 of my paper, I articulate Allais’s position and its benefits, not least of which is its elegant explanation of how the features of objects that appear to us are transcendentally ideal while still being ‘empirically’ real. In section 2, I contend that there are elements of Allais’s account that are problematic, yet also inessential, to what I view to be the core contribution of her analysis. These elements are the views that the properties that appear to human beings are not really distinct from properties that things have ‘in themselves’ and that Kant embraced a relational account of perception. In section 3, I return to the core of Allais’s reading and argue that, despite its multiple virtues, it cannot make sense of key features of Kant’s idealism.

Rockmore, Tom. Kant and Phenomenology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011. [258 p.] [M] [review]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents: From Platonism to phenomenology — Kant’s epistemological shift to phenomenology — Hegel’s phenomenology as epistemology — Husserl’s phenomenological epistemology — Heidegger’s phenomenological ontology — Kant, Merleau-Ponty’s descriptive phenomenology, and the primacy of perception — On overcoming the epistemological problem through phenomenology.

Rodi, Frithjof. “Dilthey zwischen Kant and Goethe.” Recent Contributions to Dilthey’s Philosophy of the Human Sciences. Eds. Hans-Ulrich Lessing, et al. (op cit.). 135-53. [M]

Rödl, Sebastian. “Der Inhalt der Kategorien nach Kant, Quine und Brandom.”  Robert Brandom’s expressive Vernunft. Eds. Barth, Christian and Holger Sturm (op cit.). 147-57. [WC]

Römer, Inga. “Das Tragische im Ethischen. Eine Untersuchung des ethischen Personalismus im Ausgang von Kant und Hegel.”  Subjektivität und Intersubjektivität in der Phänomenologie. Ed. Inga Römer (Würzburg: Ergon, 2011), 251 p. 215-31. [WC]

Rößner, Christian. “Das Datum der Vernunft. Zur Rekonstruktion der Grundlegung von Kants praktischer Metaphysik im Ausgang von Emmanuel Levinas.”  Subjektivität und Intersubjektivität in der Phänomenologie. Ed. Inga Römer (Würzburg: Ergon, 2011), 251 p. 187-99. [WC]

Rogozinski, Jacob. “The Sublime Monster.” The Sublime and its Teleology. Ed. Donald Loose (op cit.). 159-68. [M]

Rohlf, Michael. “Kant’s Early Ethics.” American Dialectic 1.1 (2011): 137-66. [online] [M]

Rokstad, Konrad. “Historicity and Transcendental Philosophy: Husserl and the Problem of Kant’s Philosophy — A Phenomenological Reflection.” Transcendentalism Overturned. Ed. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (op cit.). 13-39. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant is, of course, the most famous transcendental philosopher — he was the founder and after Kant no one has accomplished anything similar to what he did. But how definite (absolutely finished and determinate) was his conception of the “transcendental” and what is it about Kant’s transcendental philosophy that provides his significance? In this paper I will try to provide some answer to these questions by interrogating the relationship between Kant’s transcendental philosophy and Husserl’s phenomenology especially the way it is conceived in the ‘Crisis’ as both the life-world and historicity have obtained transcendental significance in a systematic manner.

Rollmann, Veit-Justus. See: Hahmann, Andree and Veit-Justus Rollmann.

Romagnoli, Nathalie Maillard. “La notion de devoir envers soi-même est-elle logiquement incohérente?” Revue de Theologie et de Philosophie 143.1 (2011): 51-66. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: For diverse reasons, the idea that we could have duties towards ourselves is no longer very popular in moral philosophy today. Some authors, notably, have said that the very concept of self-duty poses problems of logic and should be abandoned. In this article, we come back to the formal arguments against the plausibility of self-duty. We confront these arguments with the paradigm of Kant’s doctrine of self-duties. Our objective is to show that the notion of duty towards one’s self, once one has understood in what sense it should be understood, is neither incoherent nor particularly vague.

Rorty, Amelie. “Kant on Two Modalities of Friendship.”  Rethinking Kant: 3. Ed. Oliver Thorndike (op cit.). 33-51. [M]

Rosas, Alejandro. “Kant y el sueño de la ciencia unificada.” [Spanish]  Kant y las ciencias. Ed. Pedro Jesús Teruel (op cit.). 312-19. [M]

Rosefeldt, Tobias. “Frege, Pünjer, and Kant on Existence.” Grazer Philosophische Studien: Internationale Zeitschrift für Analytische Philosophie 82 (2011): 329-51. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The paper tries to shed new exegetical light on Frege’s “Dialogue with Pünjer on Existence” by showing that Pünjer’s position in the dialogue is strongly inspired by Kantian claims about existence. It is argued that Pünjer’s wavering between a broadly Meinongian and a broadly Fregean view on existence can be explained by the fact that there are Kantian remarks which seem to speak in favour of each of these views. A suggestion is then made how Kant’s claims can be interpreted in such a way that the tension which they seem to entail disappears.

Rosenkoetter, Timothy. “Kant on Construction, Apriority, and the Moral Relevance of Universalization.” British Journal of the History of Philosophy 19.6 (2011): 1143-74. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper introduces a referential reading of Kant’s practical project, according to which maxims are made morally permissible by their correspondence to objects, though not the ontic objects of Kant’s theoretical project but deontic objects (what ought to be). It illustrates this model by showing how the content of the Formula of Universal Law might be determined by what our capacity of practical reason can stand in a referential relation to, rather than by facts about what kind of beings we are (viz., uncaused causes). This solves the neglected puzzle of why there are passages in Kant’s works suggesting robust analogies between mathematics and ethics, since to universalize a maxim is to test a priori whether a practical object with that particular content can be constructed. An apparent problem with this hypothesis is that the medium of practical sensibility (feeling) does not play a role analogous to the medium of theoretical sensibility (intuition). In response I distinguish two separate Kantian accounts of mathematical apriority. The thesis that maxim universalization is a species of construction, and thus a priori, turns out to be consistent with the account of apriority that informs Kant’s understanding of actual mathematical practice.

 ——. Rev. of Kant’s Theory of Action, by Richard McCarty (2009). European Journal of Philosophy 19.4 (2011): 640-46. [PI]

Rossi, Miguel Ángel, and Luis Félix Blengino. “La lógica del neoliberalismo a partir de la interlocución de Immanuel Kant y la impronta de Michel Foucault.” [Spanish] Crisis y metamorfosis del Estado argentino: el paradigma neoliberal en los noventa. Eds. Miguel Ángel Rossi and Andrea López (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Luxemburg). 19-46??. [WC]

Rostbøll, Christian F. “From the Standpoint of Practical Reason: A Reply to Tønder.” Political Theory: An International Journal of Political Philosophy 39.3 (2011): 386-93. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This reply elaborates on what it means to view autonomy from the standpoint of practical reason and indicates how this approach to autonomy can counter some of Lars Tønder’s objections to my article “Autonomy, Respect, and Arrogance in the Danish Cartoon Controversy” (Critical Theory (5) 2009). It argues that Kantian autonomy is unqualifiedly egalitarian and is to be preferred compared to Millian autonomy. In Kant, autonomy is a quality we unavoidably presuppose everyone has, not because we can explain it but because it is required for practical purposes, that is, for the use of reason in our conduct.

Roth, Klas. “Principles of the Unification of our Agency.” Educational Philosophy and Theory 43.3 (2011): 283-97. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Do we need principles of the unification of our agency, our mode of acting? Immanuel Kant and Christine Korsgaard argue that the reflective structure of our mind forces us to have some conception of ourselves, others and the world-including our agency-and that it is through will and reason, and in particular principles of our agency, that we take upon ourselves to unify and test the way(s) in which we make our lives consistent. I argue that the principles suggested — the hypothetical imperative and the categorical imperative — function to unify our understanding of ourselves and others as agents as efficacious and autonomous and that the extent to which those concerned render themselves efficacious and autonomous in cosmopolitan education or elsewhere is due to the extent to which they act in accordance with and are motivated by the suggested principles and in particular the categorical one. I first discuss how the principles function to unify our agency and how the categorical imperative functions as a test of maxims for our actions, how the will is the source of our morality, and how we are forced to have practical identities. I end with some remarks on what it means to acknowledge the mentioned principles in cosmopolitan education.

 ——. “Good Will: Cosmopolitan Education as a Site for Deliberation.” Educational Philosophy and Theory 43 (2011): 298-312. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Why should we deliberate? I discuss a Kantian response to this query and argue that we cannot as rational beings avoid deliberation in principle; and that we have good reasons to consider the value and strength of Kant’s philosophical investigations concerning fundamental moral issues and their relevance for the question of why we ought to deliberate. I also argue that deliberation is a wide duty. This means that it has to be set as an end, that it is meritorious, and that we cannot specify exactly what acts can be identified with it or are required for its realization. I begin by discussing why we cannot avoid deliberation in principle, that deliberation is a wide duty and why we ought to set it as an end. In the second part I argue how deliberation can be acknowledged in cosmopolitan education, and how we can inquire into the quality of communication in terms of deliberation in such an education or elsewhere.

Roth, S. “Mathematics and Biology: A Kantian View on the History of Pattern Formation Theory.” Development Genes And Evolution 221 (2011): 255-79. [MEDLINE]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Driesch’s statement, made around 1900, that the physics and chemistry of his day were unable to explain self-regulation during embryogenesis was correct and could be extended until the year 1972. The emergence of theories of self-organisation required progress in several areas including chemistry, physics, computing and cybernetics. Two parallel lines of development can be distinguished which both culminated in the early 1970s. Firstly, physicochemical theories of self-organisation arose from theoretical (Lotka 1910-1920) and experimental work (Bray 1920; Belousov 1951) on chemical oscillations. However, this research area gained broader acceptance only after thermodynamics was extended to systems far from equilibrium (1922-1967) and the mechanism of the prime example for a chemical oscillator, the Belousov-Zhabotinski reaction, was deciphered in the early 1970s. Secondly, biological theories of self-organisation were rooted in the intellectual environment of artificial intelligence and cybernetics. Turing wrote his The chemical basis of morphogenesis (1952) after working on the construction of one of the first electronic computers. Likewise, Gierer and Meinhardt’s theory of local activation and lateral inhibition (1972) was influenced by ideas from cybernetics. The Gierer-Meinhardt theory provided an explanation for the first time of both spontaneous formation of spatial order and of self-regulation that proved to be extremely successful in elucidating a wide range of patterning processes. With the advent of developmental genetics in the 1980s, detailed molecular and functional data became available for complex developmental processes, allowing a new generation of data-driven theoretical approaches. Three examples of such approaches will be discussed. The successes and limitations of mathematical pattern formation theory throughout its history suggest a picture of the organism, which has structural similarity to views of the organic world held by the philosopher Immanuel Kant at the end of the eighteenth century.

Rovira, Rogelio. “Kant ante la cuestión de la pneumatología.” [Spanish] Topicos: Revista de Filosofia (Mexico) 41 (2011): 281-311. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant seldom uses the name “pneumatology” to designate the science of the immortality of the soul. But in many occasions he deals in an original way with the concept meant by the name. In this paper the four senses in which Kant understands this concept are distinguished and explained, namely: (1) pneumatology as the idea of a possible science; (2) pneumatology as a natural disposition; (3) theoretical-dogmatic or doctrinal pneumatology; and (4) practical-dogmatic or authentic pneumatology. The different cognitive value granted by Kant to the doctrines about immortality assembled under the various senses of the concept of pneumatology is likewise considered.

 ——. “¿Es 7+5=12 un juicio sintético? Examen de las razones de Kant (y de Schultz).” [Spanish]  Kant y las ciencias. Ed. Pedro Jesús Teruel (op cit.). 17-29. [M]

Rueger, Alexander. “Systematicity and Symbolisation in Kant’s Deduction of Judgements of Taste.” Hegel Bulletin 32.1-2 (2011): 232-51. [PI]

Ruffing, Margit. “Pratique de la raison – théorie de l’expérience vécue. Quelques réflexions sur Dilthey et Kant.”  Figuras da Racionalidade: Neokantismo e Fenomenologia. Ed. Olivier Feron (op cit.). 31-37. [WC]

 ——. “Kant-Bibliographie 2009.” Kant-Studien 102.4 (2011): 499-540. [M]

 ——. “La théologie, une science de la révélation?”  Kant et la science. La théorie critique et transcendantale de la connaissance. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Mai Lequan, and Margit Ruffing (op cit.). 203-12. [M]

 ——, ed. See: Grapotte, Sophie, Mai Lequan, and Margit Ruffing, eds.

Rühl, Ulli F. H. See: Mohr, Georg and Ulli. F. H. Rühl.

Ruiz Méndez, Alberto. “Kant en la filosofía política contemporánea.” Topicos: Revista de Filosofia (Mexico) 41 (2011): 221-47. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article has the aim to expose and analyze the form in which the ethical and political thought of Kant has been interpreted in the debate between the liberal and the communitarian thought. The author stresses the fact that between the normative level, in which he states Rawls’s proposal, and the descriptive level of Sandels’s proposal, the Kantian thought can serve as a mediating strategy with the objective to construct, departing from a third level, which Kant called pragmatic, a social theory that embraces the complexity of contemporary societies.

Rumore, Paola. “Logica e metodo. La presenza di Georg Friedrich Meier nella Disciplina della ragion pura.” [Italian] Studi Kantiani 24 (2011): 93-104. [M]

 ——. “Materie und Form der Vorstellung: Kant und sein historischer Hintergrund.” Facetten der Kantforschung. Eds. Christoph Böhr and Heinrich P. Delfosse (op cit.). 121-41. [M]

 ——. Rev. of Metaphysica / Metaphysik, by Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, edited by Günter Gawlick and Lothar Kreimandahl (2011). [Italian] Studi Kantiani 24 (2011): 185-88. [M]

 ——. See: Madonna, Luigi Cataldi and Paola Rumore, eds.

Rumyantseva, Tatyana G. “I. Kant, Je. Svedenborg i metafizika sverhchuvstvennogo.” [Russian; Immanuel Kant, Emanuel Swedenborg and the metaphysics of the supersensible] Kantovskij Sbornik 38 (2011-4): 7-16. [M]

Rusnock, Paul. “Kant and Bolzano on Logical Form.” Kant-Studien 102.4 (2011): 477-91. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the works of Kant and his followers, the notion of form plays an important role in explaining the apriority, necessity and certainty of logic. Bernard Bolzano (1781-1848), an important early critic of Kant, found the Kantians’ definitions of form imprecise and their explanations of the special status of logic deeply unsatisfying. Proposing his own conception of form, Bolzano developed radically different views on logic, truth in virtue of form, and other matters. This essay presents Bolzano’s views in the light of his criticisms of the Kantian logicians.

Ruthrof, Horst. “From Kant’s Monogram to Conceptual Blending.” Philosophy Today 55.2 (2011): 111-26. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The author focuses on German philosopher Immanuel Kant’s monogram to conceptual blending proposed by Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner. The author stresses the return of Mark Johnson to Kant’s notion of analogy in the cognitive mechanism in the book Critique of Pure Reason. The authors also emphasizes Kant’s schematism section in the book. It is mentioned that Fauconnier and Turner attempt nothing less than a redevelopment of the dynamics of human conceptual integration.

[top]S    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Saage, Richard. “Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) als politischer Denker.” Politische Theorien des 17. und 18. Jahrhunderts: Staat und Politik in Deutschland. Eds. Bernd Heidenreich and Gerhard Göhler (Darmstadt: Verlag Philipp von Zabern). 239-57. [WC]

Sabbatini, Carlo. “Il sovrano come ideale della ragione: sulle implicazioni giuridico-politiche dell’ipostasi kantiana del potere.” [Italian] Filosofia Politica 25.1 (2011): 107-20. [PI]

Sagemüller, Franz. “La métaphysique comme science en raison de la conscience.”  Kant et la science. La théorie critique et transcendantale de la connaissance. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Mai Lequan, and Margit Ruffing (op cit.). 197-201. [M]

Salikov, Alexei N. “The Russians in Kant-Studien. Part I: Vaihinger’s Kant-Studien (1896-1933).” [Russian] Kantovskij Sbornik 36 (2011): 95-106. [M]

Sánchez Madrid, Nuria. “La Distribución de la Naturaleza Humana en Temperamentos. Modos de Sentir y Ejercicio de la Libertad en la Antropología en Sentido Pragmático de Kant.” [Spanish] Philosophica 37 (2011): 75-90. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article tackles with the role that Kantian notion of temperament plays within his theory of practical freedom. With this purpose, we will connect Kant’s approach to temperaments with the classical Greek approach to this principle of classification, in order to recognize in it the means to feel the passage of time and also the conditions of our relation to the world, that is, a physiological-empirical background for the exercise of freedom that, without being moral, shelter contents which reason will only try to reform, without expecting to silence it entirely. Our final goal is to extract relevant observations to answer adequately to Kant’s question What is Man?

Sans, Georg. Rev. of Kants Deduktion des Rechts als intelligibler Besitz: Kants ‘Privatrecht’ zwischen vernunftrechtlicher Notwendigkeit und juristischer Kontingenz, by Ulli F. H. Rühl (2010). Gregorianum 92.2 (2011): 641-43. [PI]

Santos, Robinson dos. “O Conceito de Klugheit em Kant.” [Portuguese] Philosophica 37 (2011): 91-106. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper aims to analyze Kant’s concept of Klugheit and how it relates to morality. For Kant, this concept does not belong to the field of morality as it is, according to him, an interested act, therefore only capable of hypothetical imperatives. In this sense, prudence generates at most one’s own happiness, but not necessarily goodness. On the other hand, we reason that prudence plays an important role in promoting man’s moral improvement towards the exercise of virtue. Prudence only holds good, therefore, if understood from a Kantian anthropological point of view.

 ——. “A concepção de justiça penal na Doutrina do Direito de Kant.” [Portuguese; The concept of punishment in Kant’s doctrine of right] ethic@ 10.3 (2011): 103-14. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In his theory of criminal justice, Kant defines the law of punishment as “a categorical imperative”. This law, according to Kant, cannot be imposed on any interest other than mere penalty, i.e. the retribution of crime. Punishment can neither be associated with criminal intimidation nor can it be linked to any advantage or benefit to society, not even in favor of the punished individual. This study aims to examine the basis on which Kant supports his arguments in defense of this principle.

Sardinha, Diogo. “Kant, Foucault e a antropologia pragmática.” Kant e-Prints 6.2 (2011): 43-58. [online] [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this article we address Foucault’s interpretation of Kant’s anthropology as a whole, i.e. beyond Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1798). I expose Foucault’s three most important thesis, which concern firstly the faithfulness of this book to the critical work that preceded it; secondly, the need of reading the Introduction to the Logic and the Opus postumum in order to draw crucial aspects of Kant’s anthropology; and thirdly, the importance of reviving a critical gesture (which he identifies with Nietzsche), so as to demystify the pretensions of the post-kantian anthropological discourse. This way the difference between Foucault and Heidegger on the one side, and Foucault and Sartre on the other side, becomes clear: against the latter he adopts an anti-humanist perspective, and unlike the former he uses the Opus postumum (which for historical reasons Heidegger almost ignored) to distinguish false anthropology from Kant’s anthropology.

 ——. “Le paradoxe de l’anthropologie.”  Kant et les sciences. Un dialogue philosophique avec la pluralité des savoirs. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Mai Lequan, and Margit Ruffing (op cit.). 331-40. [M]

Sargentis, Konstantinos. “Das Böse als Selbstverhältnis des Guten. Zum Problem der Stufen des ‘bösen Herzens’ bei Kant.” Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie 36 (2011): 49-69. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The special relation between the evil and the good in Kant’s moral anthropology is largely ignored in the secondary literature. Consequently, the problem of the stages of evil is misrepresented. This article tries to show that according to Kant the evil is a ‘self-relation’ of the good. This is the other face of Kant’s rejection of the devilish will. The notion of order plays a crucial role in this special relation between the evil and the good. Whilst the good consists in the morally right order of the three predispositions towards the good, the evil consists in the reversal of this order. The understanding of evil as a self-relation of the good facilitates a meaningful account of the stages of evil. Each stage of evil signifies a different morally wrong relation between the predispositions to good. At the same time, there is a one to one correspondence between the three stages of evil and the three predispositions towards the good.

Sarmiento, Gustavo. “De la ontología pre-crítica a la teoría trascendental de la materia: Sobre los puntos de vista de Kant en torno a las fuerzas de la materia y sus antecedentes en las ideas de los seguidores de Newton.” [Spanish]  Kant y las ciencias. Ed. Pedro Jesús Teruel (op cit.). 48-87. [M]

Satkunanandan, Shalini. “The Extraordinary Categorical Imperative.” Political Theory 39.2 (2011): 234-60. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Many political theorists assume that Kant’s categorical imperative can only present itself to politics epistemologically — that is, as a test or procedure for acquiring more certain knowledge of duties. This study retrieves the ontological aspect of the categorical imperative by showing that the Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals is a conversion narrative. In the Groundwork Kant describes a transformative encounter with the categorical imperative as a principle that discloses our (ordinarily concealed) ontological condition. This encounter opens a new mode of being characterized by the feeling of awe. In its ontological aspect, the categorical imperative discloses human freedom and demands an unflagging thoughtfulness, but offers no material guidance about duties. When understood in both its ontological and epistemological aspects, the categorical imperative offers a rich portrait of human responsibility and can help illuminate the ethical stance appropriate to politics without becoming a standard to be imposed upon politics.

Sauerwald, Gregor. “Kant resucitado junto a un renacimiento de Hegel en las últimas generaciones de la teoría crítica.” [Spanish] Philosophica 37 (2011): 111-27. [M] [online]

Saunders, Joe. Rev. of Custom and Reason in Hume: A Kantian Reading of the First Book of the Treatise, by Henry Allison (2008). Kant Studies Online (2011): 229-41; posted December 17, 2011. [M] [online]

Schapiro, Tamar. “Foregrounding Desire: A Defense of Kant’s Incorporation Thesis.” Journal of Ethics 15.3 (2011): 147-67. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper I defend Kant’s Incorporation Thesis, which holds that we must ‘incorporate’ our incentives into our maxims if we are to act on them. I see this as a thesis about what is necessary for a human being to make the transition from ‘having a desire’ to ‘acting on it’. As such, I consider the widely held view that ‘having a desire’ involves being focused on the world, and not on ourselves or on the desire. I try to show how this view is connected with a denial of any deep distinction between reason and inclination. I then argue for an alternative view of what ‘having a desire’ involves, one according to which it involves being focused both on the world and on ourselves. I show how this view fits naturally with the Kantian distinction between reason and inclination, accounts for independent intuitions about ‘having a desire’, and supports the Incorporation Thesis. I then make some further suggestions about how we might conceive of the object of incorporation.

Schäfer, Rainer. “Das bipolare Ich - Analytische und synthetische Einheit der Apperzeption in Kants Kategoriendeduktion.”  Die Begründung der Philosophie im Deutschen Idealismus. Ed. Elena Ficara (op cit.). 245-72. [WC]

Schark, Marianne. “Wie aktuell ist Kants Auflösung des Naturteleologie-Problems?” Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy 14 (2011): 125-54. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Is Kant’s solution to the problem of natural teleology still relevant? In the science of biology the notions of purposiveness and function continue to have a widespread use. This use appears problematic if one has to understand purposiveness and functions as mind-dependent, that is, as relational properties that an entity acquires only as a means in the context of the achievement of some end present in the mind of some intentional agent. The paper takes a close look at Kant’s argumentation for why we are obliged to think teleologically about organisms and at his non-naturalistic solution of the problem of natural teleology. Finally, the power of Kant’s solution is discussed in comparison to the two main contemporary naturalistic analyses of the notion of function in the philosophy of biology, namely the etiological theory and the causal ‘role account’ of functions.

Schedler, George. “Retributivism and Fallible Systems of Punishment.” Criminal Justice Ethics 30.3 (2011): 240-66. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The author discusses the desert-based retributivism. He argues from a desert-based retributive point of view that no past or present human system of punishment is just. He explains how desert-based retributivism leads to the conclusion of the syllogism, with particular emphasis on philosopher Immanuel Kant’s account. The author also explores the difficulties that his argument raises for retributivist views such as that of Kant.

Scherer, Berta Rieg. “The Concept of Virtue in Kant.” Poiésis - Revista do Programa de Pós-Graduação em Educação 4.7 (2011): 79-90. [online] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The aim of this paper is to present a reflection on the concept of virtue in Immanuel Kant, philosopher of the eighteenth century. It is intended to show the scope of action of the design concept of virtue establishing the difference between the doctrine of law and the doctrine of virtue. We discuss, among other things, the definition of virtue, the universal principles of metaphysics of morals in the treatment of a doctrine of pure reason and the difference between the doctrine of virtue and the duties of virtue. We write about the understanding of Kant regarding to the practice of virtue seen as a moral habit, which is distinguished by a repetition of the habit of unthinking actions. We still refer to the similarities on the design of a concept of good will and the design of the concept of virtue, but also emphasize the importance of good will to the practice of moral law within the moral theory of Kant.
O objetivo deste artigo é apresentar uma reflexão sobre o conceito de virtude em Immanuel Kant, filósofo do século XVIII. Pretende-se mostrar o âmbito de ação da concepção do conceito de virtude estabelecendo a diferença entre a doutrina do direito e a doutrina da virtude. Abordamos, dentre outros pontos, a definição do conceito de virtude, os princípios universais da metafísica dos costumes no tratamento de uma doutrina pura da virtude e a diferença entre a doutrina da virtude e os deveres da virtude. Escrevemos sobre o entendimento de Kant no que se refere a pratica da virtude visto como um hábito moral, o qual se distingue do hábito por repetição irrefletida das ações. Ainda nos referimos às semelhanças da concepção do conceito de uma vontade boa e a concepção do conceito de virtude, como também enfatizamos a importância da vontade boa para a prática da lei moral na teoria moral de Kant.

Schick, Friedrike. “Von der Unmöglichkeit eines ontologischen Beweises vom Dasein Gottes. Bleibt das absolutenotwendige Wesen ein denkmögliches Ideal?” Über den Nutzen von Illusionen. Eds. Bernd Dörflinger and Günter Kruck (op cit.). 85-102. [M]

Schick, Stefan. “Die dreifache Stellung des Denkens zur Unmittelbarkeit im Ausgang von Kants Kritik der intellektuellen Anschauung.” Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 59.5 (2011): 679-95. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The paper investigates the philosophical relevance of Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi’s determination of the relation between intuition and discursive mediation in his assertion of an immediate perception of truth. By confronting his conception with Kant’s criticism of immediacy as a philosophical category and Fichte’s notion of an “intellectual intuition” that underlies all acts of mediation, the paper analyzes to what extent one can interpret Jacobi’s theory of an intellectual intuition as the anticipation of Hegel’s concept of an immediacy that is mediated in itself.

Schlicht, Tobias. “Non-conceptual Content and the Subjectivity of Consciousness.” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 19.3 (2011): 491-520. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The subjectivity of conscious experience is a central feature of our mental life that puzzles philosophers of mind. Conscious mental representations are presented to me as mine, others remain unconscious. How can we make sense of the difference between them? Some representationalists (e.g., Tye) attempt to explain it in terms of nonconceptual intentional content, i.e., content for which one need not possess the relevant concept required in order to describe it. Hanna claims that Kant purports to explain the subjectivity of conscious experience in this way. This paper examines this claim in some detail in the context of a more general criticism of this kind of attempt to explain subjectivity and proposes a different reading of Kant that also leads to an alternative account of subjectivity independent from content.

Schlosser, Markus. Rev. of Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity, by Christine M. Korsgaard (2009). The Philosophical Quarterly 61 (2011): 212-14. [online] [M]

Schmidt, James. “Misunderstanding the Question: ‘What is Enlightenment?’: Venturi, Habermas, and Foucault.” History of European Ideas 37.1 (2011): 43-52. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In his 1969 Trevelyan Lectures, Franco Venturi argued that Kant’s response to the question “What is Enlightenment?” has tended to promote a “philosophical interpretation” of the Enlightenment that leads scholars away from the political questions that were central to its concerns. But while Kant’s response is well known, it has been often misunderstood by scholars who see it as offering a definition of an historical period, rather than an attempt at characterizing a process that had significant implications. This article seeks (1) to clarify, briefly, the particular question that Kant was answering, (2) to examine — using Jurgen Habermas’ work as a case in point — the tension between readings that use Kant’s answer as a way of discussing the Enlightenment as a discrete historical period and those readings that see it as offering a broad outline of an “Enlightenment Project” that continues into the present, and (3) to explore how Michel Foucault, in a series of discussions of Kant’s response, sketched an approach to Kant’s text that offers a way of reframing Venturi’s distinction between “philosophical” and “political” interpretations of the Enlightenment.

Schmidt, Manuel. Legitime Gewalt in den Naturzuständen bei Kant. Göttingen: V & R Unipress, 2011. [193 p.] [data] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Doctoral dissertation (Universität Bielefeld, 2010).

Schmidt, Stephan. “Mou Zongsan, Hegel, and Kant: The Quest for Confucian Modernity.” Philosophy East and West 61.2 (2011): 260-301. [MUSE]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This essay discusses the New Confucian philosopher Mou Zongsan (1909–1995), who in a number of highly influential writings in the 1970s attempted a kind of Confucian Aufhebung of Immanuel Kant’s critical philosophy. Section 1 analyzes Mou’s hybrid terminology and demonstrates how his use of Kantian concepts such as intellectual intuition (zhi de zhijue) and autonomy (zi lu) significantly altered the meaning of these terms without making the differences explicit. By relating this particular brand of Kantian Confucianism to the Chinese discourse on modernization — in which New Confucians took a stand against May Fourth iconoclasm — section 2 brings to light the inner strategic logic of Mou Zongsan’s approach, namely a two-step argument for both the possibility and the necessity of Confucian Modernity. The concluding third section traces Mou’s strategic appropriation of Kantian philosophy to his brief but momentous encounter with Hegel’s metaphysics of history in the 1950s. Although Mou Zongsan himself never fully acknowledged his indebtedness to Hegel, the essay demonstrates that it was Hegel who first provided Mou with an understanding of how to enlist Kant’s services in his quest for Confucian Modernity.

Schneider, Ruben. Kant und die Existenz Gottes: eine Analyse zu den ontologischen Implikationen in Kants Lehre vom transzendentalen Ideal. Münster, Westf.: LIT, 2011. [238 p.] [GVK]

Schönecker, Dieter. “Kants Grundlegung über den bösen Willen. Eine kommentarische Interpretation von GMS 457.25-458.5.” Studi Kantiani 24 (2011): 73-91. [M]

 ——, Dennis Schulting, and Niko Strobach. “Kants kopernikanisch-newtonische Analogie.” Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 59.4 (2011): 497-18. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: There is hardly an analogy in the history of philosophy that has been referred to as often as the one that Kant himself draws in the second preface of the Critique of Pure Reason between Copernicus’ revolution in astronomy and his own revolution in metaphysics; and yet there is to the present day no detailed analysis thereof. The analogy is much more complex than meets the superficial eye: In the first passage (B XVI f.), Kant does not draw a simple comparison to Copernicus’ famous heliocentric hypothesis (if he refers to it at all). In the second passage (B XXII, Anm.), Kant connects the reference to Copernicus with a reference to Newton by drawing an extremely rich analogy between the law of gravitation and the moral law of freedom. The revolution in metaphysics is related to the revolution in ethics; that famous analogy of Kant really is a Copernican-Newtonian analogy.

 ——. and Allen W. Wood. Kants Grundlegungen zur Metaphysik der Sitten: ein einführender Kommentar. 4th ed., revised with an updated bibliography. Paderborn/Munich/Vienna/Zürich: Schöningh, 2011. [221 p.] [WC]

 ——. See: Bacin, Stefano and Dieter Schönecker.

Schönwälder-Kuntze, Tatjana. Die Figur des “Wetteifers” und ihre Funktion in Kants Ethik. Halle: Lehrstuhl für Wirtschaftsethik an der Martin-Luther-Univ. Halle-Wittenberg, 2011. [32 p.] [WC]

 ——. “Auf wen oder was antwortet ‘Verantwortung’? Zur Genealogie (und Pathologie) des Verantwortungsdenkens.” Jahrbuch fuer Recht und Ethik 19 (2011): 367-95. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This essay focuses on the current boom of the notion of ‘responsibility’ and asks for what reasons it has emerged. The following argument will take the position that ‘responsibility’ is a rather young name for something that had no philosophically systematic meaning until the second half of the 19th century. That is to say, it was not initially linked to fundamental modern notions like ‘subject’ or ‘freedom’. Even if one can find its semantics in the notion of ‘imputatio’, i.e., liability, as used by Kant and others, it will be outlined that he uses liability in a strictly juridical sense different from the broad use of today. This will be shown in a short genealogy of the notion and the term. Then, the claim will be defended that there nevertheless exists a deep relation between the, pretended and inflated, modern idea of the sovereign subject and the contemporary notion of responsibility, which has to compensate its apparent defects. This will be proved by pointing out the Kantian distinction between intelligible ideas and empirical problems, which theorists are advised to take seriously, at least as long as we have created another notion of sovereign subjectivity which depends on responsibility instead of constituting it. (edited)

Schröder, Wolfgang M. “Freiheit im Großen ist nichts als Natur. Kants Idee zu einer allgemeinen Gechichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht. Einleitung und Erster und Zweiter Satz.” Immanuel Kant, Schriften zur Geschichtsphilosophie. Ed. Otfried Höffe (op cit.). 29-44. [M]

Schulting, Dennis. “Kant’s Idealism: The Current Debate.” Kant’s Idealism. Eds. Schulting and Verburgt (op cit.). 1-25. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article presents an overview of the current debate on Kant’s doctrine of idealism, focussing on the metaphysical interpretations of Ameriks, Allais, Friebe, Langton, Van Cleve and Westphal, and also on Guyer’s recent reassessment of Allison’s latest views.

 ——. “Limitation and Idealism: Kant’s ‘Long’ Argument from the Categories.” Kant’s Idealism. Eds. Schulting and Verburgt (op cit.). 159-91. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: I argue, without offering what Ameriks has called a 'short argument', that idealism follows already from the constraints that the use of the categories, in particular the categories of quality, places on the conceivability of things in themselves. My claim is that, although it is not only possible but also necessary to think things in themselves, it doesn't follow that by merely thinking we have a full grasp of the nature of things in themselves. For support, I look to a much overlooked chapter in the Critique, the Transcendental Ideal, where Kant discusses what it is for a thing to be a thing-in-itself proper, namely something that is thoroughly determined. I claim that the chief reason why, given Kant's view of determinative judgment, we cannot determine a thing-in-itself is because of two connected reasons: (1) a thing-in-itself is already fully determined and therefore not further determinable and (2) we cannot possibly determine all of the thing's possible determinations.

 ——. Rev. of Kant’s Transcendental Arguments: Disciplining Pure Reason, by Scott Stapleford (2008). Kant Studies Online, 105-15; posted March 23, 2011. [M] [online]

 —— and Jacco Verburgt, eds. Kant’s Idealism: New Interpretations of a Controversial Doctrine. Dordrecht/Heidelberg/London/New York: Springer, 2011. [xviii, 259 p.] [contents] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] From the publisher: This key collection of essays sheds new light on long-debated controversies surrounding Kant’s doctrine of idealism and is the first book in the English language that is exclusively dedicated to the subject. Well-known Kantians Karl Ameriks and Manfred Baum present their considered views on this most topical aspect of Kant’s thought. Several essays by acclaimed Kant scholars broach a vastly neglected problem in discussions of Kant’s idealism, namely the relation between his conception of logic and idealism: the standard view that Kant’s logic and idealism are wholly separable comes under scrutiny in these essays. A further set of articles addresses multiple facets of the notorious notion of the thing in itself, which continues to hold the attention of Kant scholars. The volume also contains an extensive discussion of the often overlooked chapter in the Critique of Pure Reason on the Transcendental Ideal. Together, the essays provide a whole new outlook on Kantian idealism. No one with a serious interest in Kant’s idealism can afford to ignore this important book.

 ——. See: Schönecker, Dieter, Dennis Schulting and Niko Strobach.

 ——. See: Banham, Gary, Nigel Hems, and Dennis Schulting, eds.

Schüssler, Ingeborg. “Les mathématiques dans la cosmologie ancienne et dans les sciences modernes de la nature. Aristote et Kant.”  Kant et les sciences. Un dialogue philosophique avec la pluralité des savoirs. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Mai Lequan, and Margit Ruffing (op cit.). 77-85. [M]

Schwaiger, Clemens. Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten — ein intellektuelles Porträt. Studien zur Metaphysik und Ethik von Kants Leitautor. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: frommann-holzboog, 2011. [216 p.] [data] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Forschungen und Materialien zur deutschen Aufklärung, Division II (Monographs on the Philosophy of the German Enlightenment), vol. 24. General editors: Norbert Hinske, Lothar Kreimendahl, and Clemens Schwaiger.
Abstract (from the publisher): Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1714–1762) gilt mit Fug und Recht als der selbständigste aller Wolffianer. Doch hat man kaum je systematisch untersucht, worin – über die Begründung der Ästhetik hinaus – seine denkerische Originalität besteht. Im vorliegenden Band wird der für Kant wichtigste Schulautor als Erkenntnistheoretiker, Psychologe und Moralphilosoph erstmals prononciert aus dem Schatten Wolffs herausgeholt. Nach der jüngsten Pionierübersetzung der Metaphysica ins Deutsche folgt hier eine interpretatorisch wegweisende Detailstudie zu philosophischen Schlüsselthemen des frühvollendeten Hochaufklärers – gerade recht zu den anstehenen Jubiläen (250. Todestag 2012, 300. Geburtstag 2014).

Schwarz, G. and M. Wunsch. “Limitation als Erkenntnisfunktion der Einbildungskraft. Eine Strukturverwandtschaft zwischen reiner Vernunft­erkenntnis und reiner sinnlicher Erkenntnis bei Kant.” Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte 52 (2011): #. [PW]

Sedgwick, Sally. “‘Letting the Phenomena In’: On How Herman’s Kantianism Does and Does Not Answer the Empty Formalism Critique.” Kantian Review 16.1 (2011): 33-47. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In Moral Literacy, Barbara Herman informs us that she will defend an ‘enlarged version of Kantian moral theory’ (Herman 2008: ix). Her ‘enlarged version’, she says, will provide a much-needed alternative to the common but misguided characterization of Kant’s practical philosophy as an empty formalism. I begin with a brief sketch of the main features of Herman’s corrective account. I endorse her claim that the enlarged Kantianism she defends is true to Kant’s intentions as well as successful in correcting the objections she outlines. I then argue that there is another version of the empty formalism worry Herman does not address. Not only does she not address it, but her form of Kantianism provides fuel for its fire.

 ——. “Hegel on the Empty Formalism of Kant’s Categorical Imperative.” A Companion to Hegel. Eds. Stephen Houlgate and Michael Baur (op cit.). 265-80. [PI]

Segura Peraita, Carmen. “Heidegger: La copertenencia de ‘De-sein’ y ser: Una confrontación con Kant.” [Spanish] Pensamiento: Revista de Investigación e Información Filosofíca 67 (2011): 295-320. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In dialogue and confrontation with Kant, Heidegger discovers elements which allow him to deepen his understanding of the copertinence of ‘Dasein’ and being. This is a nontranscendental understanding, which arises in the midst of the unending debate with Kant’s transcendental philosophy. Heidegger considered that a transformation had come about in metaphysics of the upocheimenon-ousia into the “apophantic subject”. This should have reached its culmination with Kant, but in discussion with Kant, Heidegger changed the course, allowing a redefinition of the relationship between subject and object, identifying thinking with being, thus definitively reaffirming his thesis by which being and Dasein are copertinent.

Seidengart, Jean. “La devenir de la Théorie du ciel dans l’oeuvre de Kant et sa réception dans l’astronomie de H. Olbers.”  Kant et les sciences. Un dialogue philosophique avec la pluralité des savoirs. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Mai Lequan, and Margit Ruffing (op cit.). 121-40. [M]

Semenov, Valery E. “Transcendental Logic and Analytic of Concepts.” [Russian] Kantovskij Sbornik 35 (2011): 7-23. [M]

 ——. “Vtoroe primenenie transcendental’noj logiki.” [Russian; The Second Application of Transcendental Logic] Kantovskij Sbornik 37 (2011-3): 18-32. [M]

Senković, Željko. “Horizont egzistencijalne antropologije — Heidegger, Kant, Scheler.” [Croatian] Filozofska istraživanja 31.3 (2011): 523-35. [data/pdf] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Von Kant bis Scheler, als möglichen Höhepunkte in der Wichtigkeit der Fragestellung philosophischer Anthropologie, hat sich eine Tendenz gegenwärtigen Philosophie entwickelt nämlich diejenige, die fordert, dass alle grundlegende philosophische Probleme in den Zusammenhang mit der Frage: was ist der Mensch? gebracht werden sollen. Oft wird gehalten, dass Heideggers Überlegungen nicht in Zusammenhang mit der philosophischen Anthropologie gebracht werden sollen. Hier aber werden wir einen Umriss machen, sowohl hinsichtlich Heideggers Überlegungen über seinen anthropologischen Horizont als auch eine Darstellung von Kant und Scheler, als diejenigen, die an Heidegger einen Einfluss gemacht haben. Diesbezüglich halten wir auch, dass eine Rezeption diesen beiden (Kant und Scheler) in seinem (Heidegger) Werk eigentlich fehlt.

Sensen, Oliver. Kant on Human Dignity. Berlin / Boston: De Gruyter, 2011. [xii, 230 p.] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Kantstudien Ergänzungshefte, vol. 166.

 ——. “Kant’s Conception of Inner Value.” European Journal of Philosophy 19.2 (2011): 262-80. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article addresses a foundational issue in Kant’s moral philosophy, the question of the relation of the Categorical Imperative to value. There is an important movement in current Kant scholarship that argues that there is a value underlying the Categorical Imperative. However, some scholars have raised doubts as to whether Kant has a conception of value that could ground the Categorical Imperative. In this paper I seek to add to these doubts by arguing, first, that value would have to be of a particular kind in order to be the foundation of Kant’s moral philosophy. Second, I argue that Kant does not have such a conception of value, and that his arguments rule out that value could ground his moral philosophy. I then outline an alternative reading of how Kant uses ‘inner value’. My conclusion will be that Kant does not derive the Categorical Imperative from an underlying value. While some of his passages could also be read as if value were foundational for Kant, a close look at these passages and his arguments point away from this conclusion.

Serck-Hanssen, Camilla. “Der Nutzen von Illusionen. Ist die Idee der Seele unentbehrlich?” Über den Nutzen von Illusionen. Eds. Bernd Dörflinger and Günter Kruck (op cit.). 59-70. [M]

Sesemann, V. E. “The Real Attitude and the ‘Pure’ (Attitudeless) Knowledge. From the Manuscript Heritage.” [Russian] Kantovskij Sbornik 36 (2011): 83-89. [M]

Sgarbi, Marco. Immanuel Kant, Critica del Juicio. Translation into Spanish, by Jaime González-Capitel, of an updated version of La logica dell’irrazionale. Madrid: Maia, 2011. [202 p.] [WC]

 ——. “Kant e la filosofia trascendentale scolastica.” [Italian] Giornale Critico della Filosofia Italiana 90 (2011): 163-76. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Since the beginning of the twentieth century the ‘Kant-Forschung’ has attempted to assess the relationship between the medieval doctrine of transcendentals with Kant’s transcendental philosophy. The reason is obvious: it is not clear why a such old-fashion concept for the philosophy of Enlightenment as that of “transcendental” has become one of the fundamental notions of the Kantian thought. The present contribute examines two recent works on the problem of the Scholastic origin of the notion of “transcendental” in Kant’s philosophy and suggests an alternative solution, which is rooted in Königsberg’s ‘Schulmetaphysik’ and in the handbooks that were taught at the Albertina.

 ——. “The Historical Genesis of Kantian Concept of Transcendental.” Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte. 53 (2011): 97-117. [PW]

 ——. “Kant e i figli di Diotima.” [Italian] Iride. 62 (2011): 171-179. [PW]

 ——. “Antropologia trascendentale e spontaneità in Kant.” [Italian] Agorà. Papeles de filosofia. 30 (2011): 49-61. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Aim of the paper is to show that what characterizes transcendentally the human being for Kant is its self-awareness of being a spontaneous being. The spontaneity of the human being is expressed by its higher faculties of the soul that pertain exclusively to it and that are spontaneous. Hence, if the philosophical investigation on anthropology demands the study of the distinctive features of the human beings in comparison to the other living beings, anthropology must deal with the problem of spontaneity. Only in conceiving the human being as a spontaneous being is possible the foundation of an authentic ‘transcendental anthropology’.

 ——. Rev. of Kant-Index, Band 30: Stellenindex und Konkordanz zum Naturrecht Feyerabend: Teilband 1: Einleitung des Naturrechts Feyerabend, edited by Heinrich P. Delfosse, Norbert Hinske, and Gianluca Sadun Bordoni (2010). Rivista di Storia della Filosofia 66.3 (2011): 595-97. [PI]

 ——, ed. See: Lozano, Valerio Rocco and Marco Sgarbi, eds.

Shabel, Lisa. Mathematics in Kant’s Critical Philosophy: Reflections on Mathematical Practice. London: Routledge, 2011. [xii, 178 p.] [WC]

Shaddock, Justin. Rev. of Kant and the Concept of Community, edited by Charlton Payne and Lucas Thorpe (2011). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (July 2011, #35). [online] [M]

Shahabi, Parviz Zia’ and Parish Kusheshi. “Heidegger’s Interpretation of Schematism and Imagination in Kant’s Transcendental Philosophy.” [Farsi] History of Philosophy: Journal of the International Society of the History of Philosophy 1.4 (2011): 25-41. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In Kant’s philosophy, sense data stand at a very short distance from plurality when entering the faculty of understanding; however, they are not completely ready yet for the application and use of a priori forms of understanding. Since these forms perform an act similar to conceptualization, an intermediary is in fact needed to provide these sense data for the application of apriori forms. Kant believes that this intermediary is nothing but the faculty of imagination. The task of this faculty is what he technically calls “schematism”. In fact, the faculty of imagination tries to create a kind of unity and connection between the faculty of sensation and the faculty of understanding which bear no similarity to each other. According to Heidegger, the relation between the cooperation of the faculties of sensation and understanding or, in other words, time and categories to its components is completely a posteriori rather than a priori.

Shell, Susan Meld “Kant’s Conception of the Nation-State and the Idea of Europe.” Kant and the Concept of Community. Eds. Charlton Payne and Lucas Thorpe (op cit.). 226-44. [M]

 ——. “Kant’s Secular Religion: Philosophical Theodicy and The Book of Job.”  Rethinking Kant: 3. Ed. Oliver Thorndike (op cit.). 20-32. [M]

Shen, Aimin. The Limits of Language: A Comparative Study of Kant, Wittgenstein, and Lao Tzu. Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen Press, 2011. [vi, 221 p.] [WC]

Sherman, Nancy. “Aristotle, the Stoics, and Kant on Anger.” Perfecting Virtue: New Essays on Kantian Ethics and Virtue Ethics. Eds. Lawrence Jost and Julian Wuerth (op cit.). 215-40. [M]

Shilliam, Robbie. “Decolonising the Grounds of Ethical Inquiry: A Dialogue between Kant, Foucault and Glissant.” Millenium 39 (2011): 649-65. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this article I seek to decolonise the grounding of dialogue within the Europe-modern condition. I do so by working through two authors who are indispensable to the current canon of IR theory, Immanuel Kant and Michel Foucault, and one author who is largely missing from the canon, Édouard Glissant, the Martiniquean poet and literary critic. With regards to Kant and Foucault, I show how within both there exists at the same time a strong endorsement of the policing of ethical inquiry on the grounds of the European-modern and a weaker resistance to it. With regards to Glissant, I focus on his set of essays entitled Caribbean Discourse to show how he strongly endorses a relational pluralising of the grounds of ethical inquiry while at the same time retaining a weaker accommodation to the European-modern. In the course of these discussions I present each author’s assessment of an adequate ethical faculty in the form of a figure: in Kant, the enlightened philosopher; in Foucault, the creative work of art; and in Glissant, the maroon. In the final section I rehearse a dialogue amongst the three figures that opens up the grounds of ethical inquiry to decolonising impulses.

Shuster, Arthur. “Kant on the Role of the Retributive Outlook in Moral and Political Life.” Review of Politics 73.3 (2011): 425-48. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant is regarded as one of the staunchest advocates of retributive punishment in the modern tradition. This essay makes the case that a careful reexamination of Kant’s account of punishment is necessary, especially in light of liberalism’s characteristic inability to give the powerful moral appeal of retribution its due. Kant attempted to provide a clear analysis of what we mean when we say that morality demands that punishment be “proportional” to the crime. According to Kant, punishment’s retributive aspect — as distinguished from its deterrent or restorative effects — is primarily concerned with redeeming (negative) moral worth. This paper attempts to unpack this claim by examining Kant’s discussions of judicial punishment, the conscience, and divine punishment, respectively. It concludes that as a result of serious unresolved difficulties in his arguments for retribution, Kant manages only to deepen the question of the morality of retribution rather than to give it a decisive answer.

Sidorov, Alexey M. “The ‘Aesthetic Turn’: From Kant and Romanticism to Modern Philosophy.” [Russian] Kantovskij Sbornik 36 (2011): 52-59. [M]

Siebel, Mark. “‘It Falls Somewhat Short of Logical Precision’: Bolzano on Kant’s Definition of Analyticity.” Grazer Philosophische Studien: Internationale Zeitschrift für Analytische Philosophie 82 (2011): 91-127. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant’s famous definition of analyticity states that a judgement is analytic if its subject contains its predicate. Bolzano objects that (i) Kant’s definiens permits an interpretation too wide, (ii) the definiens is too narrow, (iii) the definiendum is too limited, and (iv) the definition does not capture the proper essence of analyticity. Objections (i), (iii) and (iv) can be countered. Objection (ii) remains because, among other things, the Kantian definition has an eye only for an analysis of the subject within a judgement.

Simian V, Rafael. “La existencia y la fundamentación de la metafísica.” [Spanish] Ideas y Valores: Revista Colombiana de Filosofia 60 (2011): 113-41. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article attempts to explain the connection between existence and the objective of the Critique of Pure Reason (the grounding of metaphysics). To that effect, it discusses some of the basic aspects of Kant’s understanding of human knowledge, as well as his conception of objective existence. The analysis carried out includes only that which may be established before (and is assumed by) the ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’ and the ‘Transcendental Analytic’, showing that some of the most significant theses of Kant’s critique follow from these analyses.

 ——. “Perspectiva, unidad y alcance de las críticas kantianas a dos interpretaciones de ‘existe’: ‘Kritik der reinen Vernunft’ A 592-602/B 620-630 (II).” [Spanish] Anuario Filosofico 44.3 (2011): 583-600. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This essay interprets KrV A 592-602/B 620-630 not only as a refutation of the ontological argument, but as the place where Kant faces a more radical question: how is it possible for the human understanding — considered from the point of view of general logic — to predicate existence? The second part argues that Kant’s discussion of the thesis “‘exists’ is not a real predicate” is a contribution to the solution of that question which is independent of the discussion of the ontological argument.

Skees, Murray W. “Kant, Adorno, and the ‘Work’ of Art.” Philosophy and Social Criticism 37.8 (2011): 915-33. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The concept of autonomy has had a central place in the German aesthetic tradition since the eighteenth century, specifically, after Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment. Although Kant denied that aesthetic judgments yield cognitive truth, aesthetic judgments are autonomous in that they do not rely on or presuppose a concern with the object’s purpose, utility, or even its actual existence. For Theodor Adorno, the autonomy of art lies in the work of art, in its production, not specifically in the aesthetic judgments of the subject. This article shows that by shifting autonomy from aesthetic judgments to art production, Adorno effectively makes art the reservoir for human freedom. Although this point is often eluded to in Adorno scholarship by individuals such as Tom Huhn and Lambert Zuidervaart, it is often passed over without additional explanation and discussion.

Skjei, Erling. “A Pyrrhonian Critique of Descartes' Critique of Global Scepticism.” Kant, Here, Now, and How. Eds. Siri Granum Carson, Jonathan Knowles, and Bjørn K. Myskja (op cit.). 95-106. [M]

Skorupski, John. “Impartiality: Kant, Mill, Sidgwick.” Proceedings of the Second World Congress on Henry Sidgwick: Ethics, Psychics, Politics. Eds. Placido Bucolo, Roger Crisp, and Bart Schultz (Catania: CUECM, 2011). 634-79. [PI]

Slote, Michael. “The Problem We All Have with Deontology.” Perfecting Virtue: New Essays on Kantian Ethics and Virtue Ethics. Eds. Lawrence Jost and Julian Wuerth (op cit.). 260-70. [M]

Smit, Houston, and Mark Timmons. “The Moral Significance of Gratitude in Kant’s Ethics.” Southern Journal of Philosophy 49.4 (2011): 295-320. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this essay, we examine the grounds, nature and content, status, acquisition and role, and justification of gratitude in Kant’s ethical system, making use of student notes from Kant’s lectures on ethics. We are especially interested in questions about the significance of gratitude in Kant’s ethics. We examine Kant’s claim that gratitude is a sacred duty, because it cannot be discharged, and explain how this claim is consistent with his insistence that ‘ought’ implies ‘can.’ We argue that for Kant a proper understanding of self-esteem is importantly related to, if not necessary for, possession of the virtue of gratitude.

Smith, Joel. “Strawson on Other Minds.” Transcendental Philosophy and Naturalism. Eds. Joel R. Smith and Peter M. Sullivan (op cit.). 184-208. [M]

 —— and Peter M. Sullivan. “Introduction: Transcendental Philosophy and Naturalism.” Transcendental Philosophy and Naturalism. Eds. Joel R. Smith and Peter M. Sullivan (op cit.). 125. [M]

 —— and Peter M. Sullivan, eds. Transcendental Philosophy and Naturalism. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. [212 p.] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents: Joel Smith and Peter Sullivan, “Introduction: Transcendental Philosophy and Naturalism”; Adrian Haddock, “Davidson and Idealism”; A. W. Moore, “Vats, Sets, and Tits”; Patricia Kitcher, “The Unity of Kant’s Active Thinker”; Robert Stern, “The Value of Humanity: Reflections on Korsgaard’s Transcendental Argument”; Hilary Kornblith, “Reasons, Naturalism, and Transcendental Philosophy”; Penelope Maddy, “Naturalism, Transcendentalism, and Therapy”; Peter Sullivan, “Is logic Transcendental?”; Joel Smith, “Strawson on Other Minds”.

Sneddon, Andrew. “A New Kantian Response to Maxim-Fiddling.” Kantian Review 16.1 (2011): 67-88. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: There has long been a suspicion that Kant’s test for the universalizability of maxims can be easily subverted: instead of risking failing the test, design your maxim for any action whatsoever in a manner guaranteed to pass. This is the problem of maxim-fiddling. The present discussion of this problem has two theses:
(1) That extant approaches to maxim-fiddling are not satisfactory;
(2) That a satisfactory response to maxim-fiddling can be articulated using Kantian resources, especially the first two formulations of the categorical imperative.
This approach to maxim-fiddling draws our attention to a Kantian notion of an offence against morality itself that has largely been overlooked.

Soares, Antônio Jorge. “O problema da equidade da pena na doutrina do direito de Kant.” [Portuguese; The issue of the measure’s fairness in Kant’s doctrine of right] Direito e Liberdade 13.2 (2011): 31-44. [online] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The problem of fairness between offence and penalty constitutes one of the most relevant legal issues since it is closely connected to the everyday practice of the courts and of judges in search of the application of the fair measure in each case examined. This text aims to explore that problem within the Kant’s Doctrine of Right and, thus, the text contains besides the Introduction, Conclusion and References, the following topics: the universal and necessary character of the practical laws; the Principle of Talion: measure and proportionality of the penalty; and, finally, the sovereign’s power of pardoning.

Soin, Maciej. See: Parszutowicz, Przemyslaw and Maciej Soin, eds.

Sparling, Robert Alan. Johann Georg Hamann and the Enlightenment Project. Toronto; Buffalo, N.Y.: University of Toronto Press, 2011. [xx, 341 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents: Enlightenment and Hamann’s reaction. Introduction: the Enlightenment as a historical movement and political project; Transfiguring the Enlightenment: Hamann and the problem of public reason — The politics of metacritique: Hamann contra Kant. Critique and metacritique: Kant and Hamann; Varieties of Copernican turn; The ideas of God and the person — Language and the city in modern natural law: Hamann’s controversy with Moses Mendelssohn. Leviathan and Jerusalem: rights and ‘the laws of wisdom and goodness’; Faith, inside and out: convictions versus actions, eternity versus history; Language and Society — Practical reflections of an impractical man: Hamann contra Frederick II. The language of Enlightenment and the practice of despotism : J.G. Hamann's polemics against Frederick the Great -- Aesthetics : Hamann's anti-artistic aestheticism. Aesthetic, all too aesthetic: Hamann on the battle between poetry and philosophy.

Spector, Stanley J. “Solomon Maimon and Immanuel Kant: The Question of Anti-Semitism.” Romanticism/Judaica: A Convergence of Cultures. Ed. Sheila A. Spector (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publ.). 59-68. [M]

Spetschinsky, Sergueї. “Die Natur in der Kritik der Urteilskraft von Kant.”  Subjekt und Gehirn, Mensch und Natur. Eds. Christoph Asmuth and Patrick Grüneberg (op cit.). 251-59. [WC]

Städtler, Michael. Kant und die Aporetik moderner Subjektivität: zur Verschränkung historischer und systematischer Momente im Begriff der Selbstbestimmung. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2011. [626 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Die äußeren Bedingungen, unter denen gehandelt und gedacht wird, beeinflussen das Denken nicht bloß auf der Ebene der empirischen Inhalte selbst, sondern reichen bis in die denkende Reflexion des Denkvermögens hinein: In philosophischen Konzepten des Selbstbewußtseins koinzidieren formale und historische Elemente. In Form eines kritischen Kommentars der Schriften Kants seit dessen Kritik der reinen Vernunft verfolgt Michael Städtler den begrifflichen Ort von Subjektivität, ausgehend von der Geschichtsphilosophie, durch Politik, Recht, Moral, Erkenntnistheorie und Teleologie hindurch zurück in ihren intelligiblen Kern. Dabei werden Bruchstellen der Kantschen Theorie zugespitzt und exponiert, um an ihnen Momente oder Desiderate historischer Erfahrung sichtbar zu machen.
Damit plädiert der Autor für einen kritisch gewendeten Subjektbegriff, der selbst praktisch und historisch vermittelt ist. Kants Wendung zur Kulturgeschichte in der Kritik der Urteilskraft bietet Anknüpfungspunkte für den Gedanken, durch kollektives vernunftgeleitetes Handeln die objektiven Bedingungen des Handelns selbst aus Vernunft zu gestalten.

Stafecka, Mara. “Kant and the Beginnings of German Transcendentalism: Heidegger and Mamardashvili.” Transcendentalism Overturned. Ed. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (op cit.). 261-68. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Coming from two distinct and in some ways opposite philosophical traditions, Heidegger and Mamardashvili reached a similar conclusion — detachment of knowledge from being causes thinking to lose its authenticity. At the center of their inquiries was the problem of duality of consciousness, indirect acknowledgement of which they found in Kant’s transcendental philosophy. Kant marked the ground on which finite faculties of human beings can be observed and categorized. He unfolded the processes of cognition and self-cognition, naming the prejudices and other limitations that thinking encounters in its interaction with the world. Heidegger and Mamardashvili viewed Kant as a transitional figure who sensed the existence of contradictory elements in thinking, which fully became an object of inquiry only in phenomenology.

Stan, Marius. “Kant and Philosophy of Science Today.” HOPOS: The International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 1.2 (2011): 364-67. [HUM]

 ——. “Rebellious Wolffian: Kant’s Philosophy of Mechanics in 1758.”  Rethinking Kant: 3. Ed. Oliver Thorndike (op cit.). 158-79. [M]

Stang, Nicholas F. “Did Kant Conflate the Necessary and the ‘A Priori’?” Noûs 45.3 (2011): 443-71. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: It is commonly accepted by Kant scholars that Kant held that all necessary truths are a priori, and all a priori knowledge is knowledge of necessary truths. Against the prevailing interpretation, I argue that Kant was agnostic as to whether necessity and a priority are coextensive. I focus on three kinds of modality Kant implicitly distinguishes: formal possibility and necessity, empirical possibility and necessity, and noumenal possibility and necessity. Formal possibility is compatibility with the forms of experience; empirical possibility is compatibility with the causal powers of empirical objects; noumenal possibility is compatibility with the causal powers of things in themselves. Because we cannot know the causal powers of things in themselves, we cannot know what is noumenally necessary and what is noumenally contingent. Consequently, we cannot know whether noumenal necessity is coextensive with a priority. Therefore, for all we know, some a priori propositions are noumenally contingent, and some a posteriori propositions are noumenally necessary. Thus, contrary to the received interpretation, Kant distinguishes epistemological from metaphysical modality.

 ——. Rev. of Kant’s Thinker, by Patricia Kitcher (2011). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (October 2011, #13). [online] [M]

Stanguennec, André. Rev. of Les métamorphoses du transcendantal: Parcours multiples de Kant à Deleuze, edited by Gaetano Rametta (2009). Revue Philosophique de la France et de l’Etranger 201.2 (2011): 293-94. [PI]

 ——. Rev. of Kants Begriff der Sinnlichkeit: Seine Unterscheidung zwischen apriorischen und aposteriorischen Elementen der sinnlichen Erkenntnis und deren lateinische Vorlagen, by Takeshi Nakazawa (2009). Revue Philosophique de la France et de l’Etranger 201.4 (2011): 591-92. [PI]

Stark, Werner. “Kant’s Lectures on ‘Physical Geography’: A Brief Outline of Its Origins, Transmission, and Development: 1754–1805.” Transl. from the German by Olaf Reinhardt. Reading Kant’s Geography. Eds. Stuart Elden and Eduardo Mendieta (op cit.). 69-85. [M]

 ——. “Historical and Philological References on the Question of a Possible Hierarchy of Human ‘Races’, ‘Peoples’, or ‘Populations’ in Immanuel Kant — A Supplement.” Transl. from the German by Olaf Reinhardt. Reading Kant’s Geography. Eds. Stuart Elden and Eduardo Mendieta (op cit.). 87-102. [M]

 ——. “La géographie physique d’Emmanuel Kant – Avec une perspective sur les auteurs français.”  Kant et les sciences. Un dialogue philosophique avec la pluralité des savoirs. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Mai Lequan, and Margit Ruffing (op cit.). 171-90. [M]

Stepanenko, Pedro. “Introspection and Self-knowledge in Kant.” Kant e-Prints 6.1 (2011): 1-11. [online][PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The aim of this paper is to offer a reconstruction of Kant’s objections against Cartesianism concerning self-knowledge using a higher-order thought theory of introspection. After expounding briefly Kant’s critique of Cartesian self-knowledge as knowledge of myself as an individual, I concentrate on interpreting the Kantian statement that Descartes confounds the intuition of the self with the unity of consciousness when he supposes he hasn’t any knowledge of external objects. I argue that this unity of consciousness cannot be the unity of our experiences, because, according to Kant, this unity presupposes knowledge of our experiences, which also presupposes knowledge of their objects. This unity can only amounts to the unity of our thoughts that accompany our experiences.

Stephenson, Andrew. “Kant on Non-Veridical Experience.” Kant Yearbook: Anthropology 3 (2011): 1-22. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper I offer an interpretation of Kant’s theory of perceptual error based on his remarks in the Anthropology. Both hallucination and illusion, I argue, are for Kant species of experience and therefore require the standard co-operation of sensibility and understanding. I develop my account in a conceptualist framework according to which the two canonical classes of non-veridical experience involve error in the basic sense that how they represent the world as being is not how the world is. In hallucination this is due to the misapplication of categories and in illusion to the misapplication of empirical concepts. Yet there is also room in this framework for a distinction in terms of cognitive functionality between the level of experience, which is merely judgementally structured, and that of judgement proper, which involves the free action of a conscious agent. This distinction enables Kant to allow for the otherwise problematic phenomenon of self-aware non-veridicality.

Stern, Robert. Understanding Moral Obligation: Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. [292 p.] [WC] [review] [review]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents: Acknowledgements; References and abbreviations; Introduction; Part I. Kant: 1 Kant, moral realism, and the argument from autonomy; 2. The argument from autonomy and the problem of moral obligation; 3. Kant’s solution to the problem of moral obligation; Part II. Hegel: 4. Hegel’s critique of Kant (via Schiller); 5. Hegel’s solution to the problem of moral obligation; Part III. Kierkegaard: 6. Kierkegaard’s critique of Hegel; 7. Kierkegaard’s solution to the problem of moral obligation; Conclusion: from Kant to Kierkegaard — and back again?; Bibliography.

 ——. “The Value of Humanity: Reflections on Korsgaard’s Transcendental Argument.” Transcendental Philosophy and Naturalism. Eds. Joel R. Smith and Peter M. Sullivan (op cit.). 74-95. [M]

Stevenson, Leslie Forster. Inspirations from Kant: Essays. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. [vii, 181 p.] [WC] [review]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents: Objects of representation: Kant’s Copernican revolution re-interpreted — Synthetic unities of experience — Three ways in which space and time might be said to be transcendentally ideal — The given, the unconditioned, the transcendental object, and the reality of the past — A theory of everything?: Kant speaks to Stephen Hawking — Opinion, belief or faith, and knowledge — Freedom of judgment in Descartes, Spinoza, Hume and Kant — Six levels of mentality — A Kantian defense of freewill.

 ——. “Objects of Representation: Kant’s Copernican Revolution Reinterpreted.” Diametros: An Online Journal of Philosophy 27 (2011): 4-24. [online] [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: I distinguish four questions within Kant’s “problem of reality”: (1) What constitutes propositional content? (2) What constitutes truth? (3) What constitutes referential content? (4) What constitutes successful singular reference? I argue that Kant’s transcendental idealism applies primarily to (3) and understood as: What makes some mental or linguistic items would-be referential representations, and secondly, to (1). But with regard to (4) and (2), we do not create the objects and states of affairs in the world (there are human artifacts, of course, but most of them continue to exist quite independently of our representing activities). However, the contents of our representations in (3) and (1) do depend crucially on our conventions and rules, which are almost always socially learned.

 ——. Rev. of Kant’s Human Being: Essays on His Theory of Human Nature, by Robert B. Louden (2011). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (September 2011, #22). [online] [M]

Stiening, Gideon. “Facetten des Fortschritts: Iselin und Kant.” Isaak Iselin und die Geschichtsphilosophie der europäischen Aufklärung. Eds. Lucas Marco Gisi und Wolfgang Rother (Basel: Schwabe Verlag, 2011). 177-200. [WC]

 ——, ed. See: Grunert, Frank, and Gideon Stiening, eds.

Still, Judith. “Isabelle de Charrière’s Three Women - Adopting and Adapting Hospitality after Kant.” Journal 64.1 (2011): 19-30. [HUM]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This is an analysis of Isabelle de Charrière’s novel Trois femmes (1795) as an engagement with Kant’s ‘Über den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht für die Praxis’ (1793). This long article is a refutation of critics of Kant’s absolute and universal concept of duty and right, not only in theory but also in practice, via analysis of three male philosophers covering the spheres of the ethical interactions of the individual in society, the political contract that founds civil society, and the cosmopolitan sphere of relations between nations. Three Women responds to this by following the fortunes of three Francophone women in Germany, two of whom (a young aristocrat and a servant), refugees from the French Revolution, marry German men in the course of the novel. The third, Constance, a wealthy cosmopolitan widow, also features in the unfinished sequel to the novel in which she tells the tale of a fourth woman, a black slave in Martinique, whose circumstances are even more extreme. I take Kant’s example of ‘safe-keeping’ (or depositum) as a test case for practical ethics, and apply it particularly in the sphere of hospitality as ‘adoption’, of one woman caring for another.

Stockwell, Cory. “Kant and the Sublime Murmur of the We.” Mosaic: A Journal for the Interdisciplinary Study of Literature 42.1 (2011): 19-32. [HUM]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The writer examines the functions of voice, attunement, and unboundedness in Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Judgment. Through an analysis of the “sounds” that this text seems to make, he suggests a Kantian theory of community that is marked by an irreducible openness to the outside.

Stohr, Karen. “Kantian Beneficence and the Problem of Obligatory Aid.” Journal of Moral Philosophy 8 (2011): 45-67. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Common sense tells us that in certain circumstances, helping someone is morally obligatory. That intuition appears incompatible with Kant’s account of beneficence as a wide imperfect duty, and its implication that agents may exercise latitude over which beneficent actions to perform. In this paper, I offer a resolution to the problem from which it follows that some opportunities to help admit latitude and others do not. I argue that beneficence has two components: the familiar wide duty to help others achieve their ends and a narrow duty to avoid indifference to others as end-setters. Although we are not always required to help, we are always required not to be indifferent. When helping someone is the only way not to be indifferent to a person, helping him/her is obligatory. My account avoids certain difficulties with other proposed solutions and can also address an important concern about proximity.

Stolzenberg, Jürgen, ed. See: Rush, Fred and Jürgen Stolzenberg, eds.

 ——, ed. See: Danz, Christian and Jürgen Stolzenberg, eds.

Stone-Davis, Férdia J. Musical Beauty: Negotiating the Boundary between Subject and Object. Eugene, Or.: Cascade Books, 2011. [xvii, 210 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents: The Boethian understanding of the world, the role of beauty, and the value of music — Inhabiting harmony, the world as a series of relations: an examination of the Fundamentals of music — Know thyself, the place of humankind within created beauty: an examination of the Consolation of Philosophy — The Kantian understanding of the world, the role of beauty, and the value of music — The play of harmony, the subjective powers in relation: an examination of the Critique of Judgment — Creating beauty: genius and the work of art — Musical beauty: an enchanted mode of attention.

Strandhagen, Brit. “Aesthetics and Morality in Kant.” Kant, Here, Now, and How. Eds. Siri Granum Carson, Jonathan Knowles, and Bjørn K. Myskja (op cit.). 257-71. [M]

Stratêlatês, Kōnstantinos N. Ho politikos Kant sêmera: ta themelia tou dikaiou, tês idioktêsias kai tês syntagmatikês politeias. [Greek] Thessalonikê: Nêsides, 2011. [331 p.] [WC]

Straulino, Stefano. La “refutación del idealismo” en Kant. [Spanish] Pamplona: Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Navarra, 2011. [102 p.] [WC]

Streit, Peter. Ethik gegen Machtpolitik: Immanuel Kants Friedensschrift im Kontext des Zeitalters der Aufklärung. Bern/New York: Lang, 2011. [253 p.] [data] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Freiburger Studien zur frühen Neuzeit, vol. 14. This is the author’s dissertation (Fribourg, 2011).

Strobach, Niko. See: Schönecker, Dieter, Dennis Schulting and Niko Strobach.

Stroud, Scott R. “Moral Cultivation in Kant and Xunzi.” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 38.4 (2011): 538-55. [PI]

Strube, Werner. “Die Einbildungskraft und ihre Funktionen in Kants Kritik der ästhetischen Urteilskraft.”  Phantasie und Intuition in Philosophie und Wissenschaften. Historische und systematische Perspektiven. Ed. Gudrun Kühne-Bertram (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2011), 273 p. 49-62. [WC]

Sturm, Holger, ed. See: Barth, Christian and Holger Sturm, eds.

Sturm, Thomas. “Freedom and the Human Sciences: Hume’s Science of Man versus Kant’s Pragmatic Anthropology.” Kant Yearbook: Anthropology 3 (2011): 23-42. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In his Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, Kant formulates the idea of the empirical investigation of the human being as a free agent. The notion is puzzling: Does Kant not often claim that, from an empirical point of view, human beings cannot be considered as free? What sense would it make anyway to include the notion of freedom in science? The answer to these questions lies in Kant’s notion of character. While probably all concepts of character are involved in the description and explanation of human action, Kant develops a specific notion of character by distinguishing character as a “mode of thought” (Denkungsart) from character as a “mode of sensing” (Sinnesart). The former notion is distinctively Kantian. Only mode of thought reveals itself in human action such that actions can be seen as linked to an agent’s first-person perspective and the capacity to rationally reflect one’s own intentions and desires. By reference to this concept human actions can be empirically explained qua free actions. The point of this paper is not only to rule out the interpretation that Kant is an incompatibilist concerning the dilemma of freedom and causal determinism. It is also argued that Kant defends a version of soft determinism which is more sophisticated and more adequate for the human sciences than Hume’s.

Sturma, Dieter. “Kant y la actual filosofía de la mente.” [Spanish]  Kant y las ciencias. Ed. Pedro Jesús Teruel (op cit.). 237-43. [M]

Stutz, Reno. “Was macht einen guten Leitfaden für Ortschronisten aus? ‘Geschichte ist Denken über die Zukunft.’ Immanuel Kant.”  Heimathefte für Mecklenburg und Vorpommern 21 (2011): 40-41. [GVK]

Sullivan, Peter. “Is Logic Transcendental?” Transcendental Philosophy and Naturalism. Eds. Joel R. Smith and Peter M. Sullivan (op cit.). 157-83. [M]

 ——. See: Smith, Joel R. and Peter M. Sullivan.

 ——, ed. See: Smith, Joel R. and Peter M. Sullivan, eds.

Surzyn, Jacek. Transcendentalizm Jana Dunsa Szkota i Immanuela Kanta: próba zestawienia [Polish; Transcendental Idealism of John Duns Scotus and Immanuel Kant: An Attempt to Combine. Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, 2011. [175 p.] [WC]

Svare, Helga. Body and Practice in Kant. Dordrecht/London: Springer, 2011. [xii, #328p.] [WC]

Swanton, Christine. “Kant’s Impartial Virtues of Love.” Perfecting Virtue: New Essays on Kantian Ethics and Virtue Ethics. Eds. Lawrence Jost and Julian Wuerth (op cit.). 241-59. [M]

Sweet, Kristi. “Philosophy and the Public Sphere: Kant on Moral Education and Political Critique.” Idealistic Studies 41 (2011): 83-94. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant’s elevation of practical reason to a position of primacy in relation to theoretical reason is certainly well known. With this, though, comes also a new articulation of what the task of philosophy is. This paper addresses how Kant thinks that philosophy must actively promote and work to bring about the essential ends of human life, namely, moral goodness and a just society. This means that philosophers must direct the use of their reason to the public sphere. In this, the primary occupations of philosophy for Kant can be seen to be moral education, which aims at the moral goodness of individuals, and political critique, which seeks to bring about a society in accord with universal law.

Symington, Paul. “Metaphysics Renewed: Kant’s Schematized Categories and the Possibility of Metaphysics.” International Philosophical Quarterly 51.3 (2011): 285-301. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article considers the significance of Kant’s schematized categories in the Critique of Pure Reason for contemporary metaphysics. I present Kant’s understanding of the schematism and how it functions within his critique of the limits of pure reason. Then I argue that, although the true role of the schemata is a relatively late development in Kant’s thought, it is nevertheless a core notion, and the central task of the first Critique can be sufficiently articulated in the language of the schematism. A surprising result of Kant’s doctrine of the schematism is that a limited form of metaphysics is possible even within the parameters set out in the first Critique. To show this, I offer contrasting examples of legitimate and illegitimate forays into metaphysics in light of the condition of the schematized categories.

Szalek, Piotr. “Kant, Hegel and the Puzzles of McDowell’s Philosophy.” Diametros: An Online Journal of Philosophy 29 (2011): 110-23. [abstract] [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The paper seeks to understand the proper motivation of John McDowell’s interest in both Kant and Hegel. It reconstructs his arguments in favour of the Hegelian notion of conceptualized experience, and shows how it affects his reading of Kant’s transcendental philosophy. It concludes with a comparison of McDowell’s position on experience with Hegel’s by pointing out the most important difference regarding the notion of factivity.

Szendy, Peter. Kant chez les extraterrestres: philosofictions cosmopolitiques. Paaris: Éditions de Minuit, 2011. [156 p.] [WC]

Szmyd, Jan. “Transcendentalism Revised: The Impact on Transcendental Consciousness and Structure of Reality Created and Emitted by Mass Media.” Transcendentalism Overturned: From Absolute Power of Consciousness Until the Forces of Cosmic Architectonics. Ed. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (op cit.). 293-303. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The paper considers the influence of the media picture of reality on the mind and subjectivity of a man. It is the influence which is of considerable importance for the molding of the cognitive processes, attitudes towards life, and spirituality of the individuals living in the present times. The ongoing philosophical and scientific explorations of this influence put the fundamental enquiries into the foundations of the classical theory of cognition and epistemology including the classical transcendentalism of Kant and Husserl in question. At the same time they present the possibility and necessity of their thorough revision and verification without absolute rejection. This thesis is supported in the paper by an initial analysis of the mechanism of creation of reality and cognitive functioning of electronic media, mainly television and the Internet, and the consideration of theory and cognitive assumptions of the philosophy of life and human existence of A. T. Tymieniecka and other contemporary philosophical concepts of a man and the cognitive process. The paper also determines the key tasks of the newly formed philosophy/epistemology of the media.

Szwed, Antoni. Rozum wobec chrześcijańskiego Objawienia: Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard. [Polish] Kęty: Wydawnictwo Marek Derewiecki, 2011. [583 p.] [WC]

[top]T    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Tadros, Victor. Rev. of Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy, by Arthur Ripstein (2009). Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 31.1 (2011): 193-213. [JSTOR]

Tafani, Daniela. Beiträge zur Rechtsphilosophie des deutschen Idealismus. Translation from Italian into German by Thomas Vormbaum. Berlin: Münster Lit., 2011. [xiii, 138 p.] [WC]

Tagliavia, Grazia. “Libertà e necessità della metafisica.” Giornale di Metafisica 33 (2011): 141-66. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant’s reflection on the distinction between ‘Grenze’ and ‘Schranke’ affords an opportunity to reconsider the theme of transcendental appearance and, hence, the distance between transcendent and transcendental. In a dialogue with the paper by C. Sini, in this connection it proposes a reading recognizing in Kant an author of metaphysics able to manifest not only the freedom of reason and its activity, but also the need for this freedom to be exclusively entrusted to itself.

Takeda, Seiji. 超解読!はじめてのカント「純粋理性批判」/ Chōkaidoku hajimete no kanto junsui risei hihan. Tokyo: Kodansha, 2011. [318 p.] [WC]

Talavera Fernández, Pedro. “Kant y la idea del progreso indefinido de la humanidad.” [Spanish] Anuario Filosofico 44.2 (2011): 335-71. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The idea of progress that underlies modernity (and which Kant praises) has a very singular trait: its alleged linear, irreversible and necessary character. Here we seek to analyze the fundamental dimensions of the Kantian conception of progress, and to trace its limits, appealing to a reformulation of the notion of progress, not based on autonomy, understood in terms of self-consciousness and self-sufficiency, but on the radical interdependence and solidarity of the human being and on the recovery of the idea of the “common good”.

Tang, Hao. “Transcendental Idealism in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus.” The Philosophical Quarterly 61 (2011): 598-607. [JSTOR]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Wittgenstein’s Tractatus contains an insubstantial form of transcendental idealism. It is insubstantial because it rejects the substantial a priori. Yet despite this, the Tractatus still contains two fundamental transcendental idealist insights, (a) the identity of form between thought and reality, and (b) the transcendental unity of apperception. I argue for (a) by connecting general themes in the Tractatus and in Kant, and for (b) by giving a detailed interpretation of Tractatus 5.6ff., where Wittgenstein talks about solipsism and the metaphysical subject. Tractarian solipsism, on this interpretation, is a special, insubstantial form of transcendental idealism.

Taylor, Robert S. Reconstructing Rawls: The Kantian Foundations of Justice as Fairness. University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2011. [xxiii, 336 p.] [WC] [review] [review]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents: Rawls’s Kantianism — The Kantian conception of the person — The priorities of right and political liberty — The priority of civil liberty — The priority of fair equality of opportunity — The difference principle — Justifying the Kantian conception of the person — The poverty of political liberalism — Conclusion: justice as fairness as a universalistic Kantian liberalism.

Tenenbaum, Sergio. Rev. of Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity, by Christine M. Korsgaard (2009). Ethics 121 (2011): 449-55. [M]

Teruel, Pedro Jesús. “Kant y la audaz aventura de la razón.” [Spanish]  Kant y las ciencias. Ed. Pedro Jesús Teruel (op cit.). 11-13. [M]

 ——. “La recepción de Kant en la Philosophy of Mind. Una revisión crítica desde las fuentes kantianas” [Spanish]  Kant y las ciencias. Ed. Pedro Jesús Teruel (op cit.). 244-302. [M]

 ——, ed. Kant y las ciencias. [Spanish] Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2011. [365 p.] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Essays by Teruel, Rovira, Parellada, Marcucci, Sarmiento, Andaluz, Rivera de Rosales, García Norro, Moya, Brook, Sturma, Grillenzoni, Rosas, Arana, and a bibliography by Vázquez Lobeiras. Some have been previously published.

Teufel, Thomas. “Kant’s Non-Teleological Conception of Purposiveness.” Kant-Studien 102.2 (2011): 232-52. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper I argue, first, that Kant's technical definition of purposiveness in §10 of the third Critique is designed to abstract from all forward-looking considerations (teleological, intentional, normative, etc.) that accompany the conventional understanding of the term. Kant seeks to establish a strictly backward-looking, etiological conception of purposiveness in order to capture the causal link connecting artifacts with their concepts. I argue, second, that he succeeds. Kant’s etiological conception of purposiveness neither collapses into mere mechanism, nor smuggles normative considerations in through the backdoor. I frame my discussion by critically engaging Hannah Ginsborg’s reading of §10 – a leading representative of normative interpretations of Kant’s notion of purposiveness.

 ——. “Kant’s Sensationist Conception of Particularity in the Critique of the (Reflecting) Power of Judgment.” Kant Studies Online, posted March 16, 2011. 51 pp. [M] [online]

 ——. “Wholes That Cause Their Parts: Organic ‘Self’-Reproduction and the Reality of Biological Teleology.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 42.2 (2011): 252-60. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: A well-rehearsed move among teleological realists in the philosophy of biology is to base the idea of genuinely teleological forms of organic self-reproduction on a type of causality derived from Kant. Teleological realists have long argued for the causal possibility of this form of causality — in which a whole is considered the cause of its parts — as well as formulated a set of teleological criteria of adequacy for it. What is missing, to date, is an account of the mereological principles that govern the envisioned whole-to-part causality. When the latter principles are taken into account, we find that there is no version of whole-to-part causality that is mereologically, causally and teleologically possible all at once, as teleological realism requires.

Theis, Robert. La raison et son Dieu: étude sur la théologie kantienne. Paris: Vrin, 2011. [320 p.] [WC]

 ——. “Science et système.”  Kant et la science. La théorie critique et transcendantale de la connaissance. Eds. Sophie Grapotte, Mai Lequan, and Margit Ruffing (op cit.). 43-51. [M]

 ——. “La physico-théologie du jeune Kant. Avec Wolff, au-delà de Wolff.”  Kant et Wolff. Eds. Sophie Grapotte und Tinca Prunea-Bretonnet (op cit.). 31-42. [M]

Thiebaut, Carlos. “Hacia una historia natural del daño desde Sebald a Kant.” [Spanish] Poligrafi 16 (2011): 231-56. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The idea of a nonmetaphysical approach to the question of harm (naming it and facing it) can receive support from the perspective of natural history not only in addressing the inhumanity of past harms, but also in understanding and responding to the moral claim in the cry of “never again!” that these harms elicit. The essay focuses, first, on G. W. Sebald’s texts, especially his ‘Natural History of Destruction’, in order to comprehend how two distinct conceptions of natural history — one deriving from Benjamin and Adorno, the other from Solly Zuckerman’s scientific approach — intertwine in the understanding of past harms. The essay then reflects on the “never again” that such an understanding calls for and argues that it requires moving beyond both these theoretical frames. A new reading of the categorical imperative, in Kant’s formulation of the “law of nature”, is accordingly suggested as a better theoretical approach to confronting the inhumanity of harm and addressing the injustices and other forms of grievance that emerge from such harm.

Thiel, Karsten. See: Malpas, Jeff and Karsten Thiel.

Thies, Christian. “Kants Geschichtsphilosophie aus heutiger Sicht.”  Kant: l’anthropologie et l’histoire. Eds. Olivier Agard and Françoise Lartillot (op cit.). 35-49. [WC]

Thompson, Michael. “Climate, Imagination, Kant, and Situational Awareness.” Journal of Global Ethics 7.2 (2011): 137-47. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The interstate highway system and environment are seldom discussed conjointly in works on climate and sustainability programs. In this essay I employ a metaphor, likening the interstate system to environments, to illustrate a cognitive shortcoming, a failure of imagination, by the organisms found in both. I argue that several failures of the imagination combine to constitute a failure to be aware of the limitations of our situations and the parameters set by climatological considerations. However, by re-engaging with our environment through the use of imaginative exercises, we can become aware of our surrounding in terms of both geographic and organismic limitations of our environment. Furthermore, to develop these sustainable policies, we can employ Kantian ethical deliberations that engage our sense of imagination to become ‘situationally aware’ of our place in the climates we inhabit and of others members of our environment.

Thorndike, Oliver. “Introduction.”  Rethinking Kant: 3. Ed. Oliver Thorndike (op cit.). 1-17. [M]

 ——, ed. Rethinking Kant: 3. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars, 2011. [xiv, 272p.] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Essays by Shell, Rorty, Zöller, Moran, Kemp, Moyar, Stan, McQuillan, Pasternack, Brook, and Guenova.

Thorpe, Lucas. “The Realm of Ends as a Community of Spirits: Kant and Swedenborg on the Kingdom of Heaven and the Cleansing of the Doors of Perception.” Heythrop Journal 52.1 (2011): 52-75. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper I examine the genesis of Kant’s conception of a realm of ends, arguing that Kant first started to think of morality in terms of striving to be a member of a realm of ends, understood as an ideal community, in the early 1760s, and that he was influenced in this by his encounter with the Swedish mystic Emanuel Swedenborg. In 1766 Kant published Dreams of a Spirit Seer, a commentary on Swedenborg’s magnum opus, Heavenly Secrets. Most commentators take Kant’s attitude towards Swedenborg to have been entirely negative, and argue that, at the most, Kant’s encounter with him had a purely negative impact on Kant’s development, inducing him to reject certain of his early metaphysical positions. I argue, in contrast, that Swedenborg had a positive influence on Kant’s development, particularly on his ethics, for Kant’s conception of a realm of ends is modeled on Swedenborg’s conception of heaven as a community of spirits governed by moral laws.

 ——. “Kant on the Relationship between Autonomy and Community.” Kant and the Concept of Community. Eds. Charlton Payne and Lucas Thorpe (op cit.). 63-87. [M]

 ——. “One Community or Many? From Logic to Juridical Law via Metaphysics.” Politics and Metaphysics in Kant. Eds. Sorin Baiasu, Howard Williams, and Sami Pihlström (op cit.). 97-114. [M]

 ——. See: Payne, Charlton, and Lucas Thorpe.

Thull, Philipp. Bürger zweier Welten. Nordhausen: Bautz, 2011. [164 p.] [GVK]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: A work of historical fiction.
From the publisher: Wir schreiben das Jahr 1784. In Königsberg lebt ein kleiner Mann namens Immanuel Kant, der mehrere Welten in sich vereint, ein wahrer Genius auf dem Gebiet des Philosophierens. Sein Tagesablauf gleicht von Anfang bis Ende dem Lauf eines Uhrwerkes. Um sich herum sammelt er zahlreiche Freunde und Bekannte, mit denen er regelmäßig bei Tisch, über allerlei Dinge und nicht selten über vielerlei Menschliches diskutiert. An einem besonderen Tag, einem Sonntag jenes Jahres, trifft er sich erneut mit seinen Freunden und erhält völlig unerwartet einen Brief aus dem entfernten Potsdam. Mit zittrigen Händen öffnet er den Brief und liest das an ihn gerichtete Schreiben seines Königs, Friedrichs des Großen. Endlich ist geschehen, was Kant sich schon seit langem erhofft hatte, Anerkennung durch seinen hochverehrten König zu erlangen. Freudig bricht Kant schließlich am folgenden Tag, in Begleitung seines Schülers Wasianski, gen Potsdam auf. Doch beide erahnen zu diesem Zeitpunkt noch nicht, was sie bald schon erwarten soll: Eine gefährliche Liebschaft, die am Ende drei Menschen das Leben kostet.

Timmermann, Jens. “Value without Regress: Kant’s ‘Formula of Humanity’ Revisited.” European Journal of Philosophy 14 (2011): 69-93. [PW]

 ——. “Good but Not Required? — Assessing the Demands of Kantian Ethics.” Ethics and Moral Philosophy. Ed. Thom Brooks (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2011). 237-57. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: This article first appeared in Journal of Moral Philosophy 2.1 (2005): 9-27.

Timmons, Mark. See: Smit, Houston and Mark Timmons.

Tobón Giraldo, Daniel Jerónimo. “Kant, Baudelaire y la ruptura del ideal neoclásico de la belleza humana.” [Spanish] Estudios de Filosofia 43 (2011): 109-28. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the realm of contemporary visual arts, there hovers over human beauty a tacit ban. The human body is still one of the central themes of art, but it is not in the habit of being represented as beautiful: emphasis is laid on its ugliness, or in the terrible or abject aspects of corporality. This paper tries to understand the process that led to this situation starting from the transformation of the concept of “ideal beauty” between Kant and Baudelaire, which shows a deep connection between the concept of human beauty and the hope for moral progress. We maintain that the break-up of this hope is one of the reasons why modern and contemporary art have rejected so forcefully the representation of ideal beauty.

Toepfer, Georg. “Kant’s Teleology, the Concept of the Organism, and the Context of Contemporary Biology.” Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy 14 (2011): 197-24. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: For Kant, the main aim of teleology in nature is to identify or to segregate as a particular class of objects certain types of causal systems, specifically, systems of interdependent parts. With the development of physiology as a distinct science at the beginning of the 18th century, the idea of interdependence or reciprocity of parts in a system was well established as a fundamental principle for the specification of organisms. Kant combined the ideas of teleology and causal reciprocity in his systems-theoretical foundation of organized beings in nature. In the analysis of such systems teleological thinking, i.e., the focus on end states or outcomes, is prevalent because the outcome of each process is relevant for the perpetuation of the system as a whole. Teleological thinking thus plays a methodological role in Kant’s philosophy of nature. Its status is merely reflective, in that it neither postulates a separate ontological category for living beings nor does it constrain mechanical explanations. But at the same time, teleology is constitutive for a particular class of objects and their scientific study.

Tolley, Clinton. “Kant on the Content of Cognition.” European Journal of Philosophy [Posted online: 22 Nov 2011]. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: I present an argument for an interpretation of Kant’s views on the nature of the ‘content [Inhalt]’ of ‘cognition [Erkenntnis]’. In contrast to one of the longest standing interpretations of Kant's views on cognitive content, which ascribes to Kant a straightforwardly psychologistic understanding of content, and in contrast as well to the more recently influential reading of Kant put forward by McDowell and others, according to which Kant embraces a version of Russellianism, I argue that Kant’s views on this topic are of a much more Fregean bent than has traditionally been admitted or appreciated. I conclude by providing a sketch of how a better grasp of Kant’s views on cognitive content in general can help bring into sharper relief what is, and what is not, at stake in the recent debates over whether Kant accepts a particular kind of cognitive content — namely, non-conceptual content.

Tomaszewska, Anna. “Experience and Conceptual Content in Kant and McDowell: Remarks on ‘Empty Thoughts’ and ‘Blind Intuitions’.” Diametros: An Online Journal of Philosophy 28 (2011): 82-100. [online] [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In Mind and World, John McDowell appeals to Kant’s dictum that thoughts without content are empty and intuitions without concepts are blind as encapsulating the idea of conceptualism about the content of perceptual experience. I argue that the appeal is inadequate, and this for a variety of reasons, one of them being that if Kant endorsed conceptualism along the lines of McDowell, he would be committed to returning to positions which he explicitly criticized, i.e., those of rationalist metaphysics; alternatively, he would lapse into an idealism very much akin to Hegel’s. This is because McDowell’s conceptualism ultimately neglects the role of sensibility in mediating the relation between ‘mind’ and ‘world’, which is crucial to recognizing the limits on cognition which Kant’s doctrine of transcendental idealism imposes upon subjects.

Topakkaya, Arslan. “Die Vernunft in der deutsche Idealismus.” [Turkish] Felsefe Dünyasi: Türk Felsefe Dernegi Yayini 53.1 (2011): 28-40. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Der deutsche Idealismus ist eine der wirkungsmächtigsten Ideenkonstellationen in der Geschichte der Philosophie. Termonologisch tritt “Idealismus” mit Kant in der Philosophie als Selstbezeichnung und als Gegenbegriff gegen “Naturalismus”, “Materialismus”, “Realismus”, “Dogmatismus” auf. Der deutsche Idealismus macht einen Unterschied zwischen Vernunft (als Erkenntnisvermögen) und Verstand (als Wahrnehmungsvermögen). Auf diesem Felde vollziehen sich die Wende vom kritischem zum spekulativen Idealismus. Der Ausgangspunkt lag 1781/87 in Kants gross agnelegtem Versuch, den reinen Vernunftgebrauch kritisch in seinen Schranken zu weisen; aber schon etwa ab 1801 etnwickelten in rascher Folge Fichte Spätwerk, Schelling in seiner Identitäsphilosophie und Hegel spekulative Systeme, in denen die philosophische Vernunft selbst verabsolutiert zu werden scheint, indem sie in Form des absoluten Wissens zur Konzeptualisierung eines wie auch immer zu bestimmenden Absoluten zum Einsatz kommt. Man kann feststellenü dass dem deutschen Idealismus der Flirt der philosophischen Vernunft mit dem Absoluten kurz, heftig und variationsreich war, aber zu keiner stabilen Verbindung führte.

Torralba, José María. “La teoría kantiana de la acción: De la noción de máxima como regla autoimpuesta a la descripción de la acción.” [Spanish] Topicos: Revista de Filosofia (Mexico) 41 (2011): 17-61. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article examines the elements of Kant’s theory of action. First, it considers the way in which the causality of the faculty of desire is determined, and provides a definition of the maxim as a self-imposed practical rule. Second, it suggests interpreting the maxim as the description of the action, according to the structure of practical reasoning (following G. E. M. Anscombe’s theory). The main thesis is that the practical character of Kant’s ethics depends on the first-person perspective (as in the description of the action) and the notion of moral bindingness as the constraint of the will.

Tovias, Gabriel Lemkow. Rev. of Craft Objects, Aesthetic Contexts — Kant, Heidegger and Adorno on Craft, by Sandra Corse (2009). Enrahonar: Quaderns de Filosofía 46 (2011): 196-200. [PI]

Trafimow, David, Gayle Hunt, Stephen Rice, and Kasha Geels. “Using Potential Performance Theory to Test Five Hypotheses about Meta-Attribution.” Journal of General Psychology 138 (2011): 81-93. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Based on I. Kant’s distinction between perfect and imperfect duties and the attribution literature pertaining to that distinction, the authors proposed and tested five hypotheses about meta-attribution. More specifically, violations of perfect duties have been shown to arouse both more negative affect and stronger correspondent inferences than do violations of imperfect duties (e.g., D. Trafimow, I. K. Bromgard, K. A. Finlay, & T. Ketelaar, 2005). But when it comes to making meta-attributions — that is, guessing the attributions others would make — is the affect differential an advantage or a disadvantage? In addition to the null hypothesis of no effect, the authors proposed and tested additional hypotheses about how negative affect might increase or decrease the effectiveness of people’s meta attribution strategies and how even if there is no effect on strategy effectiveness, negative affect could increase or decrease the consistencies with which these strategies could be used.

Trémoulet, Benjamin. “The Structure of the Theoretical Power of Judgment. Kant and the Value of Our Empirical Cognitions.” Kant-Studien 102.1 (2011): 46-68. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper argues that the cognitive status and cognitive value of thoughts should be clarified through a description of the mechanics of the theoretical power of judgment. Three pairs of concepts essentially constitute its tools: 1. determinative and reflective judgments; 2. constitutive and regulative principles; and 3. transcendental and empirical applications. Against the general approach to dealing with these concepts, i.e., against the tendency to consider them as synonymous or as forming a parallel structure, this article sharpens the distinctions between these three pairs of concepts. For that reason the methodological hypothesis according to which there is no inner relation between these respective pairs of concepts will be put to the test. The hypothesis says that these concepts should be prima facie combinable: e. g., one should be able to say what a judgment that is simultaneously transcendental, regulative and determining would be like, or why such a combination is impossible. Combining the three concept-pairs creates eight possibilities that are presented systematically in the table at the end of the article. The discussion shows the precise status of each kind of law of nature and their relationships to empirical experience are described in greater detail.

Trotsak, Alexei I. “The Variants of Solutions to the Problem of Life Saving in a Casuistic Situation by Means of I. Kant’s and A. Schopenhauer’s Ethics.” [Russian] Kantovskij Sbornik 35 (2011): 44-54. [M]

Trucchio, Aldo. Cartografie di guerra: le ragioni della convivenza a partire da Kant. [Italian] Milano: Mimesis, 2011. [227 p.] [WC]

Truwant, Simon. Rev. of Neo-Kantianism in Contemporary Philosophy, edited by Rudolf A. Makkreel and Sebastian Luft (2010). [Dutch] Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 73 (2011): 175-76. [M]

 ——. Rev. of Kant’s ‘Critique of Pure Reason’. Background Source Materials, edited and translated by Eric Watkins (2009). [Dutch] Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 73 (2011): 389-90. [M]

Tsanoff, Radoslav Andrea. Schopenhauer’s Criticism of Kant’s Theory of Experience. New York: Longmans, Green, 1911. Photomechanical reprint: Kessinger Publishing, 2011. [xiii, 77 p.] [WC]

Tubert, Ariela. “Korsgaard’s Constitutive Arguments and the Principles of Practical Reason.” The Philosophical Quarterly 61 (2011): 343-62. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Constitutive arguments for the principles of practical reason attempt to justify normative requirements by claiming that we already accept them in so far as we are believers or agents. In two constitutive arguments for the requirement that we must will universally, Korsgaard attempts first to arrive at the requirement that we will universally from observations about the causality of the will, and secondly to establish that willing universally is constitutive of having a self. Some rational requirements may be established by some version of this second argument, but the strategy does not seem promising when it comes to establishing the requirement that we will universally. I draw on the discussion of Korsgaard to highlight a challenge facing constitutive arguments in general.

Tuschling, Burkhard. “Allgemeine Naturgesetze haben ihren Grund in unserem Verstand. Fakt, Illusion oder Reflexion?” Über den Nutzen von Illusionen. Eds. Bernd Dörflinger and Günter Kruck (op cit.). 133-55. [M]

Tyler, Colin. Rev. of The Limits of Ethics in International Relations: Natural Law, Natural Rights, and Human Rights in Transition, by David Boucher (2009). Kantian Review 16.3 (2011): 478-82. [M]

Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa, ed. Transcendentalism Overturned: From Absolute Power of Consciousness Until the Forces of Cosmic Architectonics. Dordrecht: Springer Verlag, 2011. [xiii, 726 p.] [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Volume 108 of Analecta Husserliana: The Yearbook of Phenomenological Research.
This collection offers a critical assessment of transcendentalism, the understanding of consciousness, absolutized as a system of a priori laws of the mind, that was advanced by Kant and Husserl. As these studies show, transcendentalism critically informed 20th-century phenomenological investigation into such issues as temporality, historicity, imagination, objectivity and subjectivity, freedom, ethical judgment, work, praxis. Advances in science have now provoked a questioning of the absolute prerogatives of consciousness. Transcendentalism is challenged by empirical reductionism. And recognition of the role the celestial sphere plays in life on planet earth suggests that a radical shift of philosophy’s center of gravity be made away from absolute consciousness and toward the transcendental forces at play in the architectonics of the cosmos.

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Ursic, Marko. “Starry Sky as ‘The Greatest Museum of Natural History’: Sublimity of the Sky from Kant to Santayana and Beyond.” Poligrafi 16 (2011): 215-29. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Immanuel Kant, beside Edmund Burke, introduced the term “sublime” ‘das Erhabene’ in his aesthetic considerations of nature. In The Critique of Judgment (1790), Kant distinguished between the concepts of beautiful and sublime, and defined two kinds of sublimity, “mathematical” and “dynamical”, namely relating to the overwhelming greatness and might of an object, respectively. The starry sky is “mathematically sublime” at the utmost sense; an example of “dynamical sublimity” is a stormy ocean. George Santayana in his book The Sense of Beauty (1896) considered the beauty and sublimity of the sky in a rather different manner, as an “infinite smoothness” of the “blue void”, and as the most perfect “diversity” of constellations in the “uniqueness” of vision and mind which “senses” this utmost sublimity in nature. This paper has two principal aims: (1) to compare Kant’s and Santayana’s “aesthetic” visions of the starry sky; (2) to consider whether and in what sense these two visions are relevant for modern cosmology.

Ursin, Lars Øystein. “Harm to Dead Persons.” Kant, Here, Now, and How. Eds. Siri Granum Carson, Jonathan Knowles, and Bjørn K. Myskja (op cit.). 235-56. [M]

[top]V    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Vaida, Iuliana Corina. “The Problem of Agency and the Problem of Accountability in Kant’s Moral Philosophy.” European Journal of Philosophy [Posted online: 15 Sep 2011]. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper discusses the function and scope of incompatibilist or transcendental freedom in Kant’s moral philosophy. The prevailing view among scholars, most notably Allison, is that the function of transcendental freedom is to enable us to articulate a first-person conception of ourselves as rational agents involved in deliberation and choice. Thus, the scope of transcendental freedom is rational agency in general. In order to perform this function, freedom has to be merely conceivable. Pace Allison, I argue that our first-person conception is neutral with respect to causal determinism, and that the function of transcendental freedom is to provide the metaphysical conditions of the possibility of genuine moral responsibility and perfect justice, and to get rid of moral luck. In order to perform this function, transcendental freedom has to be not just conceivable, but metaphysically real. My view suggests that we only have reason to attribute freedom to ourselves in situations in which we are aware that the moral law commands us categorically. We do not have a similar reason to believe we are free in purely prudential choices. Thus, the scope of transcendental freedom is not rational agency in general, but only moral agency.

Valentini, Francesco. “Momenti del confronto con Kant nella ‘Scienza della logica’ di Hegel.” [Italian] Giornale Critico della Filosofia Italiana 90.3 (2011): 492-539. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: According to Hegel, Kant renounces speculation, but he is also the originator of the turning-point in the philosophy which leads to the absolute idealism that is the end of the old metaphysics. Through the analysis of decisive pages of Hegel’s Logics (concept, antitethic of pure reason, the theological idea) we can see that the positions of Hegel and Kant are similar, in particular about the identity of thought and being. Hegel is more interested to Kant’s theoretical scope, which involves the liberty of the spirit and its progressive accomplishment. In the thing-in-itself, expression of the limit of the esoteric Kant, Hegel sees the exigency of the truth: like Hegel, Kant has in fact abandoned its reification, eluding the error of the old metaphysics.

Vandenabeele, Bart. “Schopenhauer on Sense Perception and Aesthetic Cognition.” Journal of Aesthetic Education 45.1 (2011): 37-57. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Schopenhauer’s account of sense perception contains an acute critique of Kant’s theory of cognition. His analysis of the role of the understanding in perception may be closer to Kant’s than he conceded, but his physiological analysis of the role of the senses nonetheless proffers a more plausible account than Kant’s transcendental conception of perception and understanding. Schopenhauer also makes a radically un-Kantian move when he suggests that human cognition is driven by human needs, urges, affects, and desires. The understanding is no mere transcendental faculty but a biological tool. The cerebral system helps the organism survive and express (and fulfill) its needs and wishes. In aesthetic perception, however, the cerebral system now operates detached from the individual will. This “will-less,” aesthetic cognition is pleasurable, not merely because it offers relief from the sufferings that trouble the willing self but also because it procures a heightened and painless state of mind that transcends ordinary cognition of the phenomenal world and generates a deeper insight into the timeless universals behind the mere appearances of things. Thus Schopenhauer not only moves beyond Kant’s transcendental epistemology, supplementing it with an illuminating account of ordinary perception, but also overcomes Kant’s aesthetics by showing that the value of a genuine aesthetic experience cannot be reduced to the value of the (disinterested) pleasure it affords.

 ——. “Het sublieme in de kunst: Van Kant tot Duchamp en verder.” [Dutch] Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 73.4 (2011): 701-33. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant offers the most detailed and convincing account of the mathematical sublime in the history of aesthetics, and justly takes into account the deep grounding of aesthetic appraisal and creativity in experience and cognition. Still, as it stands, his theory cannot adequately explain the aesthetic value of the majority of modern and contemporary artworks. It is argued, then, that a critically upgraded version of Kant’s theory of the mathematical sublime ought to be developed in order to (i) reveal the aesthetic value of so-called ‘antiaesthetic’ art; (ii) substantiate the claim that the aesthetic value of a work of art does not exclusively depend upon sensory properties of the work; (iii) explore the topical relevance of the (mathematical) sublime as a viable aesthetic concept in art theory; and (iv) assess more accurately the crucial relation between form and content, which is essential to art. To enable us adequately to assess the value of modern and contemporary artworks, I develop two new varieties of the sublime, namely the mannerist sublime and the matterist sublime, and connect these with Kant’s theory of aesthetic ideas. Furthermore, it is shown how these two varieties can be successfully employed in order to account for the aesthetic value of modern and contemporary artworks.

Vanden Auweele, Dennis. Rev. of Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy, by Stephen R. Palmquist (2010). Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 73.3 (2011): 562-63. [PI]

Vanderlei Costa da Conceição, Jorge. Rev. of Kant y la Biblia: principios kantianos de exégesis bíblica, by Andrés Lema-Hincapié (2006). [Portuguese] Kant e-Prints 6.1 (2011): 93-101. [online] [PW]

Van de Vijver, Gertrudis, and Eli Noé. “The Constraint Is the Possibility: A Dynamical Perspective on Kant’s Theory of Objectivity.” Idealistic Studies 41 (2011): 95-112. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: A reading of Kant’s viewpoint on objectivity is suggested that finds inspiration in the second part of the third Critique, on living systems. It develops the idea that the need to articulate the distinction between objectivity and subjectivity only emerges to the extent that something resists the anticipative procedures of a living, actively engaged being. The possibility of objective knowledge, so it is argued, rests on the possibility of developing an adequate orientation in a phenomenal world, i.e., the possibility of actively distinguishing an “outside” from an “inside” — this not on the basis of an a priori principle, but by taking into account the punctual resistances and disappointments that appear within contingent encounters leading to pleasure and displeasure. We consider negation as a constitutive factor in the emergence of this very basic distinction, as well as in more elaborate and complex differentiations between objectivity and subjectivity.

Van Erp, Herman. “The Genuine Sublime: Kant on the Sublimity of Moral Consciousness.” The Sublime and its Teleology. Ed. Donald Loose (op cit.). 13-41. [M]

Vanhaute, Liesbet. “Systematic Classification of Purposive Moralization? On why Teoleology is not the (only) Key to Kant’s Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View.” Kant Yearbook: Anthropology 3 (2011): 43-66. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper is intended to place the suggestion that Kant’s Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View is an essentially teleological work, in the right perspective. Kant does indeed make use of teleological judgments in his anthropology, but this form of judgment does not provide an exhaustive characterization of the work. The assumption that it does unduly stretches Kant’s concept of teleological judgment. I investigate the merits and deficiencies of the teleological reading. Though to a certain extent the reading is confirmed by Kant’s critical theory of teleological judgment, it leads to two problematic implications. The teleological reading implies first, that non-teleological disciplines like empirical psychology are too unsystematic to be included in pragmatic anthropology. But though Kant doubted empirical psychology could ever become a full-fledged science, he did believe it could bring about systematic, non-teleological information that is valuable for anthropology. The teleological reading secondly implies that pragmatic anthropology can be classified as ‘moral anthropology’. Contrary to this, it can be argued that pragmatic anthropology as a whole (so not only insofar as it contains empirical psychology) can do without teleological presuppositions. This means that the focus on human morality is not predominant and that Kant’s Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View cannot be reduced to moral anthropology.

 ——. “How Biological is Human History? Kant’s Use of Biological Concepts and Its Implications for History as Moral Anthropology.” Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy 14 (2011): 155-69. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Also published in Hegel Bulletin 32.1-2 (2011):252-268.
Whereas in ‘Idea for a Universal History’ Kant without much hesitation resorts to biological concepts to understand history, this fundamentally changes in Critique of the Power of Judgment. In this work, history and biology are separated; they are understood as two different forms of teleological judgments. The teleological concepts that make history intelligible are divorced from their biological origins and introduced in an explicitly nonbiological way of thinking. I argue that because of this shift, after the Critique of the Power of Judgment Kant’s theory of history cannot any longer function as an independent confirmation of the possibility of human morality.

Van Impe, Stijn. “Kant on Friendship.” International Journal of Arts & Sciences 4.3 (2011): 127-39. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper analyses the taxonomy, distinctive features and evolution of Kant’s conceptions of friendship by examining Kant’s accounts of this topic in his different Lectures on Ethics from the mid 1770’s till early 1790’s and his Metaphysics of Morals from 1797 as well as his scattered remarks on friendship in some of his smaller writings and notes from his manuscript remains. On the basis of this analysis, I show that (1) Kant’s taxonomy of friendship is far more intricate that the distinction between friendship based on need, taste and disposition as Lynch (2005) claims; (2) from the late 1770’s till the late 1790’s, Kant’s writings on friendship display an increasing focus and emphasis on moral friendship, whereas his discussion of friendship of need and taste from the early Lectures on Ethics disappears in his late Lectures on Ethics and the Metaphysics of Morals; (3) although – following Marcucci (1999) – one can distinguish between an ‘anthropological’ or ‘phenomenological’ account of friendship especially in the early Lectures on Ethics and a ‘critical’ or ‘metaphysical’ account of friendship in terms of an interplay of love and respect in the Metaphysics of Morals, the latter account of friendship is not exclusively present in the Metaphysics of Morals but already comes to the fore in the late Lectures on Ethics and even surfaces in some of the early Lectures on Ethics and other ‘pre-critical’ writings; (4) in contrast to his early and late Lectures on Ethics, Kant’s final account of moral friendship in the Metaphysics of Morals seems to suggest that moral friendship is primarily based on respect and opposes or at least brackets love; and (5) Kant’s persistent view on friendship as an idea or ideal of reason that can merely be approximated but never fully achieved is based on different reasons throughout his writings and is ultimately replaced in the Metaphysics of Morals by the view that especially moral friendship may actually exist here and there in the highest degree of its perfection.

Van Ingen, John. “Recent Texts on Kant.” Teaching Philosophy 34.3 (2011): 291-305. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Teaching the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, including teaching Kant’s contribution to selected philosophic topic areas, is both exciting and challenging. Choices of texts become very important both in the preparation and development of those who teach Kant, as well as in the selection of texts for classroom use, once courses have been developed and scheduled. This review article discusses four recent texts published between 2008 and 2010 with an emphasis on pedagogical value. I will offer the reader an initial clarifying overview of the content of each of the four books, including some clarification of organization, approach, and stated purposes. Major theses will be noted and selective discussions will be highlighted for their interest. The review will provide some assessment of the strengths and limitations of each text, including the suitability of each for various levels and purposes of teaching.
Reviewed books: Angelica Nuzzo, Ideal Embodiment: Kant’s Theory of Sensibility (2008), Sally Sedgwick, Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: An Introduction (2008), Thomas E. Hill, Jr., The Blackwell Guide to Kant’s Ethics (2009), and Sharon B. Byrd and Joachim Hruschka, Kant’s Doctrine of Right: A Commentary (2010).

Van Lambalgen, M. See: Achourioti, T. and M. Van Lambalgen.

Varden, Helga. “Kant, Immanuel.” Encyclopedia of Global Justice. Ed. Deen K. Chatterjee (Dordrecht/New York: Springer), xxxvi, 1176 p. 609-10. [WC]

 ——. “Kant, Immanuel: Contemporary Kantian Responses to.” Encyclopedia of Global Justice. Ed. Deen K. Chatterjee (Dordrecht/New York: Springer), xxxvi, 1176 p. 610-13. [WC]

 ——. “A Kantian Conception of Global Justice.” Review of International Studies 37.5 (2011): 2043-57. [JSTOR]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: I start this article by addressing Kant’s question why rightful interactions require both domestic public authorities (or states) and a global public authority? Of central importance are two issues: first, the identification of problems insoluble without public authorities, and second, why a domestic public monopoly on coercion can be rightfully established and maintained by coercive means while a global public monopoly on coercion cannot be established once and for all. In the second part of the article, I address the nature of the institutional structure of individual states and of the global authority. Crucial here, I argue, is Kant’s distinction between private and public right. Private right concerns rightful relations between individual legal subjects, where public right concerns legal subjects’ claims on their public institutions. I propose that the distinction between private and public right should be central to liberal critiques of current legal and political developments in the global sphere.

 ——. “Amartya Sen’s ‘The Idea of Justice’ — Some Kantian Rejoinders.” Social Philosophy Today: Poverty, Justice, and Markets 27 (2011): 217-32. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper raises some critical questions concerning Sen’s view that liberal theories’ typical focus on states and institutions is misplaced. Contrary to Sen, I argue that justice requires enforceable rights, including for the disabled, and that states have a necessary role to play here. I boost my argument for the necessity of states by arguing that rightful resolution of the indeterminacies regarding the application of principles that Sen emphasizes require the establishment of public authorities, including states. Finally, I argue with Kant that close attention should be paid to the distinction between private and public right, and that such a distinction can equip republican theories with the public institutional framework within which indeterminacies, capabilities, and public reason get the importance Sen wants them to have.

 ——. Rev. of Kant's Doctrine of Right: A Commentary, by B. Sharon Byrd and Joachim Hruschka (2010). Jurisprudence 2.2 (2011): 547-59. [PW]

Vasil’eva, Marina Jur’evna. Idealizm Immanuela Kanta. Moscow: Kompanija Dimitrejd Grafik Grupp, 2011. [273 p.] [WC]

Vatter, Miguel. “The People Shall Be Judge: Reflective Judgment and Constituent Power in Kant’s Philosophy of Law.” Political Theory 39.6 (2011): 749-76. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This essay offers an interpretation of Kant’s republicanism in light of the problem of political judgment. Kant is sometimes thought to base his conception of law on an idea of sovereignty drawn from Hobbes and Rousseau, which would leave little room for popular contestation of the state. In this essay, I reconstruct Kant’s account of the rule of law by bringing out the importance of his theory of judgment. I argue that for Kant the civil condition is ultimately characterized by a contest between the judgment of the sovereign and the judgment of the people, which corresponds to the determinative and reflective employments of political judgment, respectively. On this view, popular sovereignty is ultimately located in the people’s power to judge politically and contest publicly the state.

Vázquez Lobeiras, María Jesús. “El ser humano como individuo y la humanidad como ‘condición humana’ y como ‘género humano’ en el pensamiento de Kant.” [Spanish] Agora: Papeles de Filosofia 30.1 (2011): 63-85. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Starting from the different expressions that Kant uses to refer to the human being, the present work focuses the problem of the incommensurability of the individual with the Kantian notion of mankind, so much in his ethical as anthropologic meaning or from the point of view of the philosophy of the religion or of the history. Provided that the full accomplishment of the human condition it is unattainable for the singular individual, it would be possible to qualify Kant’s practical philosophy as ‘empirical realism’ (anthropologic) and simultaneously as ‘practical idealism’ (ethical).

 ——. “Bibliografía.” [Spanish]  Kant y las ciencias. Ed. Pedro Jesús Teruel (op cit.). 335-55. [M]

 ——. Rev. of La Kritik der reinen Vernunft nel contesto della tradizione logica aristotelica, by Marco Sgarbi (2010). [Spanish] Studi Kantiani 24 (2011): 143-46. [M]

Velkley, Richard L. “Extending the Order of Ends: The Meaning of Kant’s Critical Epoch.” Bijdragen, Tijdschrift voor Filosofie en Theologie 72.2 (2011): 201-15. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this article I show that Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason has as its principal aim to demonstrate that the age-old interests of reason in metaphysics are satisfied not through theoretical knowledge but through a practically oriented system of reason based on critical principles. The central idea of the system is the highest good in the world conceived as a project to be realized by the human species in the course of history. The dogmatic efforts to attain knowledge of the unconditioned in its three forms as the ideas of the soul, the world and God, are replaced by the critical efforts to realize the highest good as supported by postulates of freedom, immortality and a supreme being required by morality. The concluding chapters of the Critique, mostly ignored by commentators, elaborate on the ‘telos’ of the critical project. They show that Kant regards critical philosophy as bringing to completion the era of speculative philosophy that began in Greek antiquity and beginning a new epoch of practically oriented reason that truly satisfies the metaphysical interests of reason.

Verburgt, Jacco. “How to Account for Reason’s Interest in an Ultimate Prototype? A Note on Kant’s Doctrine of the Transcendental Ideal.” Kant’s Idealism. Eds. Schulting and Verburgt (op cit.). 237-54. [M]

 ——. Rev. of Kants Grundlegung einer kritischen Metaphysik. Einführung in die ‚Kritik der reinen Vernunft‘, edited by Norbert Fischer (2010). Kant Studies Online (2011): 215-28; posted November 15, 2011. [M] [online]

 ——. See: Schulting, Dennis and Jacco Verburgt, eds.

Verene, Donald Phillip. The Origins of the Philosophy of Symbolic Forms: Kant, Hegel, and Cassirer. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 2011. [xxii, 142 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents: Introduction: schema, substance, and symbol — Linguistic form: the critique of reason becomes the critique of culture — Mythical thought: beginning the ladder of consciousness — Phenomenology of knowledge: taking phenomenology in the Hegelian, not the modern sense — Metaphysics of symbolic forms: spirit, life, and Werk — Logic of the cultural sciences: nature and culture — Animal symbolicum — Human freedom and politics.

Vigo, Alejandro G. “Ética y derecho según Kant.” [Spanish] Topicos: Revista de Filosofia (Mexico) 41 (2011): 105-58. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper discusses Kant’s account of the connection between ethics and right. Firstly, the way Kant includes right in the sphere of morals is considered. Secondly, the difference between moral and juridical legislation is examined in connection with the distinction between internal and external freedom. On this basis, an account of both the function of the principle of coexistence of freedoms and the connection between right and coaction is given. As a result, Kant’s complex position is characterized in terms of the so-called “motivational model” for the distinction between ethics and right.

Völker, Jan. Ästhetik der Lebendigkeit: Kants dritte Kritik. Paderborn: Wilhelm Fink, 2011. [274 p.] [data] [WC]

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Wagner, Wolfgang. See: Geise, Anna and Wolfgang Wagner.

Wahsner, Renate. “Kants Begründung der Ethik - nach Cohen und deren Kritik.”  Ethik als prima philosophia? Ed. Hans-Dieter Klein (op cit.). 151-70. [M]

Waisová, Sárka and Ladislav Cabada. Ethics in Foreign Policy: Postmodern States as the Entrepreneurs of Kantian Ethics. Transl. from Czech by Tereza Bartošková. Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 2011. [197 p.] [data] [WC]

Walker, Mark Thomas. Kant and Morality: Recovering the Categorical Imperative. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. [xi, 452 p.] [WC]

Walker, Ralph C. S. Rev. of The Kantian Aesthetic, by Paul Crowther (2010). Philosophical Quarterly 61 (2011): 859-61. [PW]

Want, Christopher, and Andrzej Klimowski. Introducting Kant: A Graphic Guide. London: Totem Books, 2011. [176 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Originally published in 1966 and 1999 under the title Kant for Beginners.

Waszek, Norbert. “Peut-on, avec Kant, passer de l’etat de droit (Rechtsstaat) à un etat de droit social (sozialer Rechtsstaat)?.”  Kant: l’anthropologie et l’histoire. Eds. Olivier Agard and Françoise Lartillot (op cit.). 185-200. [WC]

Watkins, Brian. “The Subjective Basis of Kant’s Judgment of Taste.” Inquiry 54.4 (2011): 315-36. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant claims that the basis of a judgment of taste is a merely subjective representation and that the only merely subjective representations are feelings of pleasure or displeasure. Commentators disagree over how to interpret this claim. Some take it to mean that judgments about the beauty of an object depend only on the state of the judging subject. Others argue instead that, for Kant, the pleasure we take in a beautiful object is best understood as a response to its qualities, and that, accordingly, feelings of pleasure or displeasure are no different from other representations, such as colors or smells. While I agree that the judgment of taste is best understood as asserting a claim about an object's qualities, I argue that the distinction Kant makes between feelings of pleasure or displeasure and other representations should not be ignored. I show that one's liking or disliking for an object is merely subjective in the sense that its significance depends on what one has made of oneself through one's aesthetic education. The judgment of taste, then, is merely subjective because one must first become the kind of person whose feelings have the right significance at the right time before one can determine whether an object's qualities make it beautiful.

 ——. Rev. of The Kantian Aesthetic: From Knowledge to the Avant-Garde, by Paul Crowther (2010). Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 69.2 (2011): 244-47. [PW]

Watkins, Eric. “Making Sense of Mutual Interaction: Simultaneity and the Equality of Action and Reaction.” Kant and the Concept of Community. Eds. Charlton Payne and Lucas Thorpe (op cit.). 41-62. [M]

Watson, Sean. See: Dunham, Jeremy, Lain Hamilton Grant, and Sean Watson.

Weinrib, Ernest J. “Private Law and Public Right.” The University of Toronto Law Journal 61.2 (2011): 191-211. [JSTOR]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In Kant’s philosophy of law “public right” refers to the condition in which public institutions guarantee rights. This lecture deals with the relationship between public right and the rights of private law. In accordance with corrective justice, private law links the parties to a transaction bilaterally, so that they are subject to correlatively structured bases of liability. In contrast, public right is omnilateral, linking everyone to everyone else. Two normative ideas inform public right: publicness (that public institutions secure everyone’s rights on the basis of reasons that can be known and acknowledged by all) and systematicity (that the norms and institutions of law form a systematic whole). In standard cases public right makes no difference to a private law controversy except to add the dimensions of publicness and systematicity. In some circumstances, however, public right alters the principle on which a court resolves a controversy, without, however, changing the structure and content of the private-law right itself. Kant himself pointed out that publicness can have this effect, as he illustrated in his discussion of market overt. Systematicity operates similarly, sometimes extending and sometimes narrowing the effect of the plaintiff’s right. For instance, the tort of inducing breach of contract expands the effect of the promisee’s right by securing it against everyone. On the other hand, the privilege to preserve property, exemplified in the controversial case of Vincent v Lake Erie, narrows the effect of the plaintiff’s right by subjecting it to conditions that justify its infringement. The effect of public right is to make right holders reciprocally determining participants in the legal system, thereby transforming private law into a community of rights.

Weitkamp, Ursula. Selbstbewusstsein — eine Untersuchung im Anschluss an Immanuel Kant. Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 2011. [186 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Also listed in WorldCat as a 2011 dissertation (Osnabrück).

Welten, Ruud. “Melville’s ‘Sublime Uneventfulness’. Toward a Phenomenology of the Sublime.” The Sublime and its Teleology. Ed. Donald Loose (op cit.). 205-22. [M]

Wenning, Mario. “Kant and Daoism on Nothingness.” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 38.4 (2011): 556-68. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article discusses the concept of nothingness based on Immanuel Kant and Daoism. It mentions that the concept of nothingness provides a promising point of departure if one wants to depict the difference between Western and Eastern philosophy. It also provides Kant’s critique of dogmatic metaphysics and comparing the conception of nothingness in Daoism.

Wenzel, Christian Helmut. 康德美學 / Kang de mei xue [Chinese; Kant’s Aesthetics]. Taipei: Linking, 2011. [ix, xiv, 270 p.] [WC]

Westphal, Kenneth R. “Comments on Graham Bird’s The Revolutionary Kant.” Kantian Review 16.2 (2011): 245-55. [M]

 ——. “Kant’s Moral Constructivism and Rational justification.” Politics and Metaphysics in Kant. Eds. Sorin Baiasu, Howard Williams, and Sami Pihlström (op cit.). 28-46. [M]

 ——. “Kant’s Cognitive Semantics, Newton’s Rule Four of Philosophy and Scientific Realism.” Hegel Bulletin 32.1-2 (2011): 27-49. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason develops a semantics of singular cognitive reference which has important implications for epistemology and for philosophy of science. Kant’s semantics directly and strongly supports Newton’s ‘rule 4 of philosophy’ in ways which support Newton’s realism about gravitational force. I begin with Newton’s ‘rule 4 of philosophy’ and its role in Newton’s justification of realism about gravitational force (§2). I summarize Kant’s semantics of singular cognitive reference (§3), and show that it is embedded in and strongly supports Newton’s Rule 4, that it rules out both Cartesian physics and Cartesian, infallibilist presumptions about empirical justification (§4). This result exposes a key fallacy in Bas van Fraassen’s original argument for his anti-realist constructive empiricism, and in many common objections to realism (§5).

 ——. “Practical reason: categorical imperative, maxims, laws.” Immanuel Kant: Key Concepts. Eds. Will Dudley and Kristina Engelhard (op cit.). 103-19. [M]

Wetzel, Manfred. “Kants Anstoß zur Philosophie des sogen. Deutschen Idealismus.”  Ethik als prima philosophia? Ed. Hans-Dieter Klein (op cit.). 65-98. [M]

Whistler, Daniel. “The Discipline of Pious Reason: Goethe, Herder, Kant.” Moral Powers, Fragile Beliefs: Essays in Moral and Religious Philosophy. Ed. Joseph Carlisle, James Carter, and Daniel Whistler (London: Continuum, 2011). 53-80. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: I argue, building on Philip Goodchild’s ‘Capitalism and Religion’, that the disappearance of the concept of piety from philosophical discourse occurred in late eighteenth-century Germany — specifically, in the emergence of a neo-Spinozist strain in philosophy of religion, which countered the dominant Neoplatonic Renaissance of the period. I trace this conceptual transformation in Goethe, Herder (in his dispute with Francois Hemsterhuis) and Kant. I suggest that the privileging of friendship over love and a stress on scientific disinterestedness are consequences of this shift.

White, Mark D. Kantian Ethics and Economics: Autonomy, Dignity, and Character. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2011. [xi, 270 p.] [content] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents: Kantian ethics, economics, and decision-making — A Kantian-economic theory of choice — Individual in essence, social in orientation — Dignity, efficiency, and the economic approach to law — Consent, Pareto, and behavioral law and economics

Wieland, Nellie. “Finding Love in the Kingdom of Ends.” Jurisprudence 2.2 (2011): 417-23. [PW]

Wike, Victoria S. “Defending Kant Against Noddings’ Care Ethics Critique.” Kant Studies Online, posted January 31, 2011. 26 pp. [M] [online]

Wilks, Anna Frammartino. Rev. of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason: Background Source Materials, edited by Erik Watkins (2009). Philosophy in Review 31 (2011): 160-63. [online] [M]

Williams, Garrath. “‘Intelligible Facts’: Toward a Constructivist Account of Action and Responsibility.” Politics and Metaphysics in Kant. Eds. Sorin Baiasu, Howard Williams, and Sami Pihlström (op cit.). 196-214. [M]

Williams, Howard. “Metaphysical and not just Political.” Politics and Metaphysics in Kant. Eds. Sorin Baiasu, Howard Williams, and Sami Pihlström (op cit.). 215-34. [M]

 ——. Rev. of Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy, by Arthur Ripstein (2009). Review of Politics 73.2 (2011): 339-42. [PI]

 ——, ed. See: Baiasu, Sorin, Howard Williams, and Sami Pihlström, eds.

Wilson, Holly L. “The Pragmatic Use of Kant’s Physical Geography Lectures.” Reading Kant’s Geography. Eds. Stuart Elden and Eduardo Mendieta (op cit.). 161-72. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant gave lectures on physical geography and anthropology and called them cosmopolitan philosophy. His physical geography lectures were intended to teach students not just facts but also how to have practical judgment (Klugheit) and were to prepare students for their place in the world. This article shows how the physical geography lectures were organized for that purpose.

 ——. “The Green Kant: Kant’s Treatment of Animals.” Food Ethics. Ed. Paul Pojman (Boston: Wadsworth Publishing). 12-20. []

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant’s theory of animals is based on his belief that animals have presentations and consciousness and in this are like human beings. When we abuse animals then we are more likely to abuse human beings. But animals are organic beings that have internal purposiveness and hence are ends for which other things are means. In this limited sense animals have intrinsic value.

Wilson, James Lindley, and Jonathan Monten. “Does Kant Justify Liberal Intervention?” Review of Politics 73(4) (2011): 633-47. [PI]

Winkler, Tanja J. Die Freiheit im und vom Staate bei Immanuel Kant. München: Verlag C. H. Beck, 2011. [xv, 288 p.] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Dissertation presented to the Faculty of Law, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, 2008-09.

Withers, Charles W. J. “Kant’s Geography in Comparative Perspective.” Reading Kant’s Geography. Eds. Stuart Elden and Eduardo Mendieta (op cit.). 47-65. [M]

Wittwer, Héctor. Rev. of Ethics Vindicated. Kant’s Transcendental Legitimation of Moral Discourse, by Ermanno Bencivenga (2007). Kant-Studien 102.2 (2011): 135-37. [M]

 ——. Rev. of An Introduction to Kant’s Moral Philosophy, by Jennifer K. Uleman (2010). [German] Kant-Studien 102.2 (2011): 253-55. [M]

Wood, Allen W. “Ethical Community, Church and Scripture.” Immanuel Kant, die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft. Ed. Ottfried Höffe (op cit.). 131-150. [M]

 —— “Kant and Agent-Oriented Ethics.” Perfecting Virtue: New Essays on Kantian Ethics and Virtue Ethics. Eds. Lawrence Jost and Julian Wuerth (op cit.). 58-91. [M]

 —— “Religion, Ethical Community, and the Struggle against Evil.” Kant and the Concept of Community. Eds. Charlton Payne and Lucas Thorpe (op cit.). 121-37. [M]

 —— See: Schönecker, Dieter and Allen W. Wood.

Woolwine, Sarah. “Systematicity in the Critique of Judgment: The Emergence of a Unified Subject.” Journal of Speculative Philosophy 25.4 (2011): 343-58. [HUM]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: A literary criticism is presented of the book Critique of Judgment (Third Critique), by Immanuel Kant. It considers the views of critics Rudolf A. Makreel and John H. Zammito, arguing that the book portrays a unified human subject in whom self-consciousness, which is related to feeling and vitality, unites theoretical reason and practical reason.

Wuerth, Julian. “Moving Beyond Kant’s Account of Agency in the Grounding.” Perfecting Virtue: New Essays on Kantian Ethics and Virtue Ethics. Eds. Lawrence Jost and Julian Wuerth (op cit.). 147-63. [M]

 ——, ed. See: Jost, Lawrence and Julian Wuerth, eds.

Wunsch, Matthias. “The Activity of Sensibility in Kant’s Anthropology. A Developmental History of the Concept of the Formative Faculty.” Kant Yearbook: Anthropology 3 (2011): 67-90. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant usually characterizes sensibility as receptivity. Hence it can seem paradoxical to speak of the “activity of sensibility” in his philosophy. Yet that sensible representations are receptive in origin does not necessarily mean that their content is due to our receptivity alone. In fact, as early as his 1770 inaugural dissertation Kant assumes acts of coordinating the sensible as conditions of sensible knowledge. In the context of his anthropology he then attributes these acts to the so-called “formative faculty” which he conceives as part of sensibility. With the concept of the formative faculty Kant unifies Baumgarten’s conception of the lower cognitive faculty. Moreover he outlines his own theory of the activity of sensibility by means of the formative faculty and its various facets. Furthermore, a closer look at the various transcriptions of Kant’s lectures on anthropology shows that, in the late 1770s, the concept of the imagination supplants that of the formative faculty as the foundation of his conception of an active sensibility, and shows also how the distinction between productive and reproductive imagination is able to stand in for the various facets of the formative faculty. The paper concludes with a brief look at the prospects beyond the field of anthropology.

Wyrwich, Thomas. Moralische Selbst- und Welterkenntnis: die Deduktion des kategorischen Imperativs in der Kantischen Philosophie. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2011. [203 p.] [WC]

 ——“From Gratification to Justice. The Tension between Anthropology and Pure Practical Reason in Kant’s Conception(s) of the Highest Good.” Kant Yearbook: Anthropology 3 (2011): 91-105. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that there is a tension between anthropological and solely ‘pure’ rational elements in Kant’s conceptions of the ‘highest good.’ Whereas ‘happiness’ serves in the second Critique still as a humanly conceptualized form of gratification commensurate to virtue, Kant is searching for a purely moral form of ‘happiness’ — as the objectification of virtue — in his later works. Distancing himself from certain aspects of the postulates, Kant locates this purely moral form in the concept of a (basically punitive) justice. According to the main idea of this paper, moral justice is not exclusively or not even in the first instance an ‘all-too-human’ concept but a demand of pure, divine practical reason itself.

 ——. Rev. of Moral und Recht im Staat nach Kant und Hegel, by Gerold Prauss (2009). Kant-Studien 102.3 (2011): 396-97. [M]

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Yadin-Israel, Azzan. See: Moyn, Samuel and Azzan Yadin-Israel.

Yalçin, Sahabettin. “Is Kant’s God Virtual?” [Turkish] Felsefe Dünyasi: Türk Felsefe Dernegi Yayini 53.1 (2011): 15-27. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper I try to critically examine Kant’s concept of God. According to some Kant scholars Kant’s God is not a real being but just virtual. It is true that Kant rejects the traditional rationalist proofs of God as logically invalid but he also gives his own proof for the existence of God. I here argue that Kant’s position on the traditional theoretical proofs of God is indeed in line with his general epistemological assumptions. Therefore, in order to criticise Kant’s position on these proofs we need to view them from a perspective out of the transcendental philosophy. I also evaluate Kant’s view that his epistemological position saves faith in God. Lastly, in this paper, I try to critically evaluate Kant’s own proof of God which is based on his concept of morality.

Yamane, Yūichirō. カント哲学の射程: 啓蒙・平和・共生 / Kanto tetsugaku no shatei: keimō heiwa kyōsei. [Japanese] Tokyo: Fūkōsha, 2011. [231 p.] [WC]

Yermolaev, Vladimir K. “Kant’s Argumentation in the Scholion to Theorem VI in Nova Dilucidatio: The Problem of Logical Interconnection Between the Theorem and the Scholion.” [Russian] Kantovskij Sbornik 35 (2011): 60-67. [M]

 ——. “Kant’s Argumentation in the Scholion to Theorem VI in Nova Dilucidatio: A New Interpretation.” [Russian] Kantovskij Sbornik 36 (2011): 60-72. [M] [pdf (English)]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Also available in Kantovskij Sbornik. Selected Articles 2010-2011, pp. 58-69. [pdf (English)]
Abstract: This article deals with Kant’s objection to the ontological argument in his early work "A New Elucidation of the First Principles of Metaphysical Cognition". The author offers a new interpretation of Kant’s argumentation.

Ypi, Lea. “Practical Agency, Teleology and System in Kant’s Architectonic of Pure Reason.” Politics and Metaphysics in Kant. Eds. Sorin Baiasu, Howard Williams, and Sami Pihlström (op cit.). 134-51. [M]

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Zammito, John. “Organism: objective purposiveness.” Immanuel Kant: Key Concepts. Eds. Will Dudley and Kristina Engelhard (op cit.). 170-83. [M]

 ——. Rev. of Métaphysique et biologie: Kant et la constitution du concept d’organisme, by Philippe Huneman (2008). History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 33.2 (2011): 282-83. [PI]

Zeidler, Kurt Walter. “Bestimmung und Begründung. Zu Kants Deduktionen der Ideen.”  Gegenstandsbestimmung und Selbstgestaltung. Eds. Christian Krijnen and Kurt Walter Zeidler (op cit.). 297-320. [M]

 ——, ed. See: Krijnen, Christian and Kurt Walter Zeidler, eds.

Zepke, Stephen. “The Sublime Conditions of Contemporary Art.” Deleuze Studies 5.1 (2011): 73-83. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Deleuze’s relationship to Kant is intricate and fundamental, given that Deleuze develops his transcendental philosophy of difference in large part out of Kant’s work. In doing so he utilises the moment of the sublime from the third Critique as the genetic model for the irruption of the faculties beyond their capture within common sense. In this sense, the sublime offers the model not only for transcendental genesis but also for aesthetic experience unleashed from any conditions of possibility. As a result, sensation in both its wider and more specifically artistic senses (senses that become increasingly entwined in Deleuze’s work) will explode the clichés of human perception, and continually reinvent the history of art without recourse to representation. In tracing Deleuze’s ‘aesthetics’ from Kant we are therefore returned to the viciously anti-human (and Nietzschean) trajectory of Deleuze’s work, while simultaneously being forced to address the extent of its remaining Idealism. Both of these elements play an important part in relation to Deleuze’s ‘modernism’, and to the discussion of his possible relevance to contemporary artistic practices.

Zhang, Huiyong. 批判哲学的定向标 : 康德哲学中的道德信仰 / Pi pan zhe xue de ding xiang biao: Kangde zhe xue zhong de dao de xin yang. [Chinese; The guideline of critical philosophy: a study of moral faith in Kant's philosophy] Beijing Shi: Guang ming ri bao chu ban she, 2011. [218 p.] [WC]

Zhang, Xianglong. “Kant’s View on the Parent-Child Relationship and Its Problems — Analyses from a Temporal Perspective as to the Creation and Rearing of a Being Endowed with Freedom.” Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6.1 (2011): 145-60. [online] [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article will probe into Kant’s viewpoints about parent-child relationship so as to demonstrate that they are inspiring on the one hand––for example on dealing with the relationship as that pertinent to the thing in itself, but on the other hand, there are many flaws. His strategy on avoiding the difficulty of “creating by man a being endowed with freedom” depends merely on an one-sided comprehension of time, because according to Kant himself, there is a difference as to the time between sensual forms of intuition and expressive form of transcendental imagination. In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant gives a profound enunciation with respect to the two and the latter is related to “free causality” and “categorical imperative” in his moral philosophy. Once it refers to the rights of a being endowed with freedom and the time it requires to maintain them, it is problematic to assert that the creation of such beings is not concerned with, in any sense whatsoever, time and the sensual, mortal body. What is more, Kant failed to take into full consideration that parents are also beings endowed with freedom whose rights to the child are not totally dependent on the latter’s inherent rights but on their own inherent basis. Granting parents too few natural rights, Kant on the other hand allocates them too much obligations in that the parent-child relation is unbalanced in his field of view. Thirdly, he gives no consideration as to whether or not the empirical process of rearing children itself can also create some rights, which nevertheless, should be taken into account when temporal elements can be found from the very original parent-child relationship.

Zhang, Wei. Prolegomena zu einer materialen Wertethik: Schelers Bestimmung des Apriori in Abgrenzung zu Kant und Husserl. Nordhausen: Bautz, 2011. [174 p.] [data][GVK]

 ——. “Rational a priori or Emotional a priori? Husserl and Scheler’s Criticisms of Kant Regarding the Foundation of Ethics.” Cultura: International Journal of Philosophy of Culture & Axiology 8.2 (2011): 143-58. [HUM]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Based on the dispute between Protagoras and Socrates on the origin of ethics, one can ask the question of whether the principle of ethics is reason or feeling/emotion, or whether ethics is grounded on reason or feeling/emotion. The development of Kant’s thoughts on ethics shows the tension between reason and feeling/emotion. In Kant’s final critical ethics, he held to a principle of “rational a priori.” On the one hand, this is presented as the rational a priori principle being the binding principle of judgment. On the other hand, it is presented as the doctrine of “rational fact” as the ultimate argument of his ethics. Husserl believed that Kant’s doctrine of a rational a priori totally disregarded the a priori essential laws of feeling. Like Husserl, Scheler criticized Kant’s doctrine of a rational a priori, and therefore developed his own theory, of an “emotional a priori”. Both of them focused their critiques on the grounding level of ethics. Scheler, however, did not follow Husserl all the way, but criticized him and reflected on his thoughts. At last, he revealed the primary status of a phenomenological material ethics of value.

Zhao, Jinghua. See: Karatani, Kōjin and Jinghua Zhao.

Zhu, Gaozheng. 从康德到朱熹: 白鹿洞讲演录 / Cong Kangde dao Zhu Xi: Bai lu dong jiang yan lu [Chinese; From Kant to Zhu Xi: The Bailudong Lectures]. Hangzhou: Zhejiang da xue chu ban she, 2011. [311 p.] [WC]

Zhu, Zhirong. 康德美學思想研究 / Kang de mei xue si xiang yan jiu. [Chinese; Thoughts on Kant’s Aesthetics] Taipei: Hong ma yi tu shu jing xiao, 2011. [239 p.] [WC]

Zimmermann, Stephan. Kants “Kategorien der Freiheit”. Berlin / Boston: De Gruyter, 2011. [321 p.] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Kantstudien Ergänzungshefte, vol. 167.

Zinkstok, Job. “Anthropology, Empirical Psychology, and Applied Logic.” Kant Yearbook: Anthropology 3 (2011): 107-30. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant’s anthropology has always been taken as a practical discipline (either moral or pragmatic). Such readings neglect the fact that Kant also envisaged a use of anthropology in logic. In this paper I explore this logical relevance of Kant’s anthropology. I do so by first arguing that Kant’s anthropology is for an important part concerned with empirical psychology. I then show that this empirical psychological part of anthropology is highly relevant for the branch of logic that Kant calls applied logic, viz., the kind of logic that is “directed to the rules of the use of the understanding under the subjective empirical conditions that psychology teaches us”. I illustrate the relevance of anthropology for logic by analyzing Kant’s conception of prejudice and showing how empirical psychological knowledge is used in applied logic to prevent the errors arising from prejudice.

Zirbel, Ilze. “O Lugar da mulher na antropologia pragmática de Kant.” [Spanish] Kant e-Prints 6.1 (2011): 50-68. [online][PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This work seeks to understand some of the statements of Immanuel Kant on the nature of women and the feminine in his writings in Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. In dealing with the character of sex, Kant presents what, in contemporary language, is called "gender differences" (between men and women, male and female) and develops his main argument for the belief in women's "natural weakness": the preservation of the species. To introduce the theme of gender difference, Kant speaks of "production machines" based on different strength levels and nature's desire. Nature is described as responsible for "female weakness". In a similar way, he claims that the allocation of more or less strength, according to the gender of each individual, has the purpose of allowing for physical, rational, and lasting unions between men and women, for the good of mankind. The focus is on theories of the nature and legal incapacity of women in the eighteenth century resulting, to a great extent, from a long debate among different groups within European society in the previous centuries. This article also discusses some of the literary sources that may have influenced the thinking of Kant on this subject and a possible Kantian stance regarding the role of women in Western society.

Zizek, Slavoj. “Foreward: Why Is Kant Worth Fighting For?” Ethics of the Real: Kant, Lacan. Alenka Zupanic (op cit.). vii-xiii. [WC]

Zobrist, Marc. Subjekt und Subjektivität in Kants theoretischer Philosophie: Eine Untersuchung zu den transzendentalphilosophischen Problemen des Selbstbewusstseins und Daseinsbewusstseins. Berlin / New York: De Gruyter, 2011. [viii, 231 p.] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Kantstudien Ergänzungshefte, vol. 163. Originally presented as the author’s Ph.D. dissertation (Universität-Zürich, 2010).

Zöller, Günter. “Der negative und positive Nutzen der Ideen. Kant über die Grenzbestimmung der reinen Vernunft.” Über den Nutzen von Illusionen. Eds. Bernd Dörflinger and Günter Kruck (op cit.). 13-27. [M]

 ——. “Critique: knowledge, metaphysics.” Immanuel Kant: Key Concepts. Eds. Will Dudley and Kristina Engelhard (op cit.). 13-27. [M]

 ——. “Kant’s Political Anthropology.” Kant Yearbook: Anthropology 3 (2011): 131-61. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The essay investigates the anthropological foundations of Kant’s political thought. Section 1 argues for the mutually supplementary relation between the critical theory of reason and the natural history of reason in Kant. Section 2 deals with the implied politics of Kant’s anthropology focusing on the relation between nature and culture. Section 3 addresses the human social character, in particular the dual process of the civilization and the moralization of human beings, in Kant. Section 4 presents the political vocation of the human being elucidating the paradoxical relation between good and evil and the role of civic republicanism in Kant’s political anthropology.

 ——. “Eine »Wissenschaft für Götter«. Die Lebenswissenschaften aus der Sicht Kants.” Lebenswelt und Wissenschaft: XXI Deutscher Kongreß für Philosophie. Ed. Carl Friedrich Gethmann (Hamburg: Meiner, 2011), xvi, 1462 p. 877-92. [WC]

 ——. “Between Rousseau and Freud: Kant on Cultural Uneasiness.”  Rethinking Kant: 3. Ed. Oliver Thorndike (op cit.). 52-77. [M]

 ——. “Kant über die Grenzen der Vernunft/Kant sui limiti della ragione.”  Allargare gli orizzonti della razionalità. Un nuovo compito del pensiero europeo/Die Erweiternmg des Horizonts der Rationalität. Eine neue Aufgabe für das europäische Denken. Ed. Mario Signore (Lecce: Pensa Multimedia, 2011). 295-316. [WC]

Zugno, Fracesca. Hölderlin oltre Kant: verso Hyperion (1794-1797). Padova: Il poligrafo, 2011. [285 p.] [WC]

Zupancic, Alenka. Ethics of the Real: Kant, Lacan. London/New York: Verso Books, 2011. [xiii, 266 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: First published in 2000.

Zuska, Vlastiml. Rev. of Without Criteria: Kant, Whitehead, Deleuze and Aesthetics, by Steven Shaviro (2009). Estetika: The Central European Journal of Aesthetics 48.2 (2011): 254-61. [PI]

Zweig, Arnulf. Rev. of Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: A German-English Edition, by Immanuel Kant, edited and translated by Mary Gregor and Jens Timmermann (2011). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (December 2011, #25). [online] [M]

Zyber, Erik. “Der Widerspenstigen Zähmung: Kants List der Natur.” Zeitschrift für Kulturphilosophie 5.1 (2011): 161-75. [PI]

[top]Dissertations    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Abaci, Uygar. Kant’s Critical Theory of Modality: A Basis for a Moral Metaphysics. Ph.D. diss. University of Pennsylvania, 2011. [515 p.] Advisor: Paul Guyer. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant demonstrates that we can have rational grounds for holding a belief in the existence of supersensible things that we can never know with certainty. I argue that at the basis of this accomplishment lies a hitherto neglected part of Kant’s philosophy: the novel approach Kant brings to the understanding of modalities (possibility, actuality, and necessity). This approach consists in defining modalities in terms of theoretical and practical relations between objects and the subject rather than the ways objects are. Until the mid1760’s, Kant’s views on modalities do not display a deep breakthrough from the prevalent conception in the “school” metaphysics, but rather a revisionist approach. Not yet opposed to conceiving modalities in ontological terms, Kant rejects only the inclusion of modalities as predicates in the concepts of things. Yet, from the mid1760’s onwards, we see in Kant a shift toward an understanding of modalities in more epistemological terms, as pertaining to the relationship between the epistemic subject and objects. Kant’s early revisionist critique develops into a revolutionary theory of modality in the Critique of Pure Reason. This theory introduces a subjectivist perspective according to which to ascribe a modal status to an object is to posit it in relation to the cognitive faculty of the subject, according to the conditions of experience. This new perspective rules out the possibility of any theoretical proof of the existence of supersensible objects such as God, freedom and immortality, thus undermining the cardinal claims of traditional metaphysics. Interestingly enough, this conception of modality enables Kant to reestablish these claims in a different domain. In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant introduces a notion of “practical cognition,” which relies on the ascription of modal categories to objects in accordance with their necessary connections to the moral law. It is in virtue of this use of modality that freedom, God and immortality are postulated to be actual, but only as articles of belief rather than knowledge. Therefore, Kant’s treatment of modality plays an indispensable role both in his theoretical rehabilitation of traditional metaphysics and in his construction of a new metaphysics upon practical premises.

Abresch, Rolf. Kausalität bei Kant: der Mensch zwischen Naturnotwendigkeit und Freiheit. Ph.D. diss. Leipzig Universität. Munich: AVM, 2011. [274 p.] Advisor: Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: The dissertation was defended in 2011; the published book appeared the following year.
Abstract: Die Frage ist noch immer, ob Kausalität als Folge von Ursache und Wirkung gesetzmäßig ist oder nicht und ob Freiheit des menschlichen Wollens und Handelns gegen eine geschlossene, uns streng determinierende naturgesetzliche Kausalität möglich ist. Kant hatte in seiner kritischen Philosophie einen konsistenten transzendentalen Ansatz vorgelegt, der für den Menschen nicht nur eine determinierende naturgesetzliche Kausalität (nexus effectivus) bejaht, sondern auch eine Kausalität aus Freiheit für sittliches Handeln (nexus moralis) und ästhetische Kontemplation und Produktion (nexus aestheticus) postuliert. Im deutschsprachigen Raum fehlte bisher eine fokussierte Monographie zum Thema Kausalität bei Kant trotz der überragenden Bedeutung der Thematik in Kants Philosophie. Die Lücke soll durch diese Arbeit geschlossen werden. Sie soll auch zeigen, inwieweit Kants Ansatz vor allem angesichts moderner Philosophien und Naturwissenschaften gültig bleibt oder nicht. Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer: „Keine auch nur im Ansatz befriedigende Lösung des Determinismus- und Freiheitsproblems ist ohne Durchgang durch Kants Problemexposition und begriffliche Differenzierung denkbar.“

Alam, Justin Shumon. Radical Evil, Freedom and Moral Self-development in Kant’s Practical Philosophy. Ph.D. diss. University of Bristol, 2011. [# p.] Advisor: ??. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant remains an important resource in moral philosophy but the absence of an adequate account of moral self-development constitutes a serious gap in his wider moral theory. This study therefore seeks to illuminate the process through which an agent could develop his moral character within a Kantian framework. Firstly, I reject two interpretations of Kant's account of rational agency each of which, if true, would in its own way render moral development impossible. I also outline the interpretation of Kantian rational agency which I take to be correct and which allows development. Kant thinks development should address our radical evil - an attitude to choice which rejects the demands of the moral law. However, there are tensions in the doctrine of evil which seem to preclude an evil agent's initiating his moral development. I adopt Seiriol Morgan's rational reconstruction of evil which addresses these difficulties. In Morgan's model, the will's freedom gives it overriding reason to choose morality, as this affords it its true freedom and it knows this. This means the will which chooses evil must wilfully accept a false conception of freedom - it must be self-deceived at the most fundamental level of reason-giving. However, self-deception is prima facie paradoxical. This is addressed by applying Jean-Paul Sartre's model of bad faith, an account which can dissolve the paradoxes. What emerges is a picture of evil as a mutually supporting complex of elements involving selfishness, self-conceit and a refusal to acknowledge its own misguided attitude. This is the opponent for morality. Development involves undoing this structure through consciousness of true freedom and pursuing the ends of development such as the purification of motives, whilst remaining vigilant against further deception. In this way, the free will can acquire a character apt to express its full freedom.

Barnes, Corey L. A View of Perception through Kantian Lenses: Toward a Reanalysis of Kant’s Practical Philosophy in the Light of His Theoretical Assertions. Master’s thesis. Howard University, 2011. [68 p.] Advisor: Charles Verharen. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In much of the same manner as Copernicus, Immanuel Kant provides for us a revolutionary way of conceptualizing being that shakes theoretical foundations along with having a very significant impact on practical matters. Kant tells us that: “Up to now it has been assumed that all our cognition must conform to the objects....” Instead, what Kant suggests is that we must consider whether objects must conform to our cognition in attempting to understand both the self and objects. One can see from this that perception, for Kant, must take more of a cognitive role than more traditional stances. Perceptive capacities do not conform to the dimensions of what catch it, but catch only what conforms to the dimensions of cognition. From this, one can see a potential problem with Kant’s theoretical assertions when considering Kant’s practical thinking. Kant practical thinking insists that rational beings are to be treated as ends, never as means, and that any of our maxims are pursuable if and only if they can be followed by every other rational being. Yet, under the doctrine of objects conforming to cognition, how will rational beings be said to get beyond the subjectivity of their own individual cognition with regard to the recognition of humans in the order of fulfilling their practical demands? This is not a problem for the traditional view, as the rational being, in some way, conforms to the object. And as such, fulfilling practical obligations is a matter of recognizing what is there — a process of allowing one’s perceptive faculty to conform to what is objectively beyond it. What is needed, in Kant’s case however, is a way to get from the purely subjective nature of his theoretical assertions to the objectively necessary structure of his practical ones by way of perception.

Beaton, Ryan Stuart. Anti-Utilitarians: Kant, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche on Motivation, Agency and the Formation of a Higher Self. Ph.D. diss. University of Toronto, 2011. [303 p.] Advisor: ??. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This thesis examines the moral philosophical commitments that Kant, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche advance in their respective oppositions to utilitarianism. Though not always under that title, all three reject the claim that promoting happiness is the ultimate end that we pursue, or ought to pursue, through moral principles and values. Kant, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche see this rejection reflected in human nature itself. Each develops a distinctive conception of 'higher self,' or of higher purposes already belonging, in some sense, to each of us, in accordance with which we ought to shape our character. Self-formation, not the mere pursuit of happiness (whether our own or that of others), is thus our true moral project. I focus on each philosopher's account of agency and motivation as the locus in which this view of morality is developed, highlighting the differences that emerge from the details of their respective accounts.
This thesis shows that a tight relation between cognition and motive feeling is central, though in different ways, for Kant, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, to the motivational structure of those actions through which we develop moral character. According to Kant, recognition of being bound by the moral law (our 'practical cognition' of freedom) is indissolubly linked to the feeling of respect for it, which in turn is explicable only through such recognition. For Schopenhauer, the 'intuitive cognition' that our existence as distinct individuals is illusory is the feeling of compassion.
Nietzsche radically expands this point, arguing that, in every act of will, the motive feeling and guiding cognition are uniquely linked. Only a superficial grasp of human motivation supports the idea that pleasure and pain are the common motive forces underlying all our actions. The inner conflict in human nature, the creative tension in self-formation, is not, for Nietzsche, that between a uniquely moral form of motivation and a 'lower' instrumental pursuit of pleasure. Rather, this inner tension, expressed most strikingly and distressingly in extreme ascetic and guilt-ridden strands of Christian morality, is the product of a complex historical conflict between two different modes of behavioural selection—our evolutionary development and the processes of socialization.

Berg, Hein van den. Kant on Proper Science: Biology in the Critical Philosophy and the Opus postumum. Ph.D. diss. Vrije Universiteit (Amsterdam), 2011. [455 p.] Advisor: W. R. de Jong. [online] [WC]

Beydoun, Zaki. Le problème de la signification des catégories: son origine et son traitement réflexif chez Kant. Ph.D. diss. Université Panthéon-Sorbonne, 2011. [291 p.] Advisor: Duportail, Guy-Félix. [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Notre thèse est une interprétation quasi littérale qui accompagne le problème de la signification des catégories tout au long de son traitement chez Kant, depuis sa naissance dans la Lettre à Marcus Hertz du 21 Février 1772 jusqu’à son achèvement dans l’Analytique des principes. Nous tentons, dans notre interprétation, de dévoiler dans son intégralité le rôle fondateur que joue l’exposition des trois synthèses transcendantales, qui intervient dans la première édition de la Critique de la raison pure (deuxième section du chapitre “De la Déduction des concepts purs de l’entendement”), dans le développement terminologique et méthodologique de la philosophie transcendantale. Selon notre interprétation, ce rôle comprend deux moments principaux qui sont inséparables : 1- L’authenticité de la distinction entre trois facultés synthétiques a priori dans la Critique. 2- Le rôle de la méthode de la réflexion introspective dans la Critique. Nous précisons le sens spécifique dans quel nous employons le terme “réflexion introspective” dans notre interprétation: par la réflexion ntrospective sur une représentation, nous entendons une description, guidée par une observation introspective, de la manière dont cette représentation se produit dans l’esprit ou, en d’autres termes, du processus et des opérations représentatives qui sont à l’origine de cette représentation.

Biss, Mavis. Moral Imagination in an Ethics of Principle. Ph.D. diss.  The University of Wisconsin - Madison, 2011. [173 p.] Advisor: Claudia Card. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This thesis presents an extended argument for a positive and direct connection between imagination and moral reasoning. The notion of “creative” moral action has yet to be clarified and situated in relation to traditional accounts of moral reasoning. I draw on recent scholarship in Kantian ethics and develop detailed examples to show how the fundamental Kantian concepts of dignity and respect can be integrated into an explanation of imaginative moral agency. Chapter 1 introduces my project in relation to relevant intellectual history and develops the foundation for my original account of moral imagination as the capacity to generate new possibilities for moral thought and action. In Chapter 2, I argue that, properly interpreted, the capacity to generate new moral possibilities does not fit neatly into the categories of moral perception or moral judgment. In Chapter 3, I use core concepts in Kantian ethical theory to specify the normative content of moral imagination and its role in moral agency. Here I engage the details of Kant’s system of duties, with particular attention to the “imperfect” duties to oneself and others, namely, beneficence and self-development. Chapter 4 explores multiple forms of radical moral imagination, which refers to the creation and revision of moral concepts. How this is possible is puzzling. I compare “bottom-up,” intuition-based explanations of imaginative moral moves that revise shared moral understandings to “top-down,” concept-based explanations and conclude that an approach located between these two poles would be more successful. Chapter 5 develops my alternative account of radical moral imagination as a transition from pre-conceptual experience to conceptual consciousness that accomplishes the modification of moral concepts. I conclude in Chapter 6 by sketching a Kantian line of response to the problem of failed reception, that is, the problem of failing to have one’s actions read as they were willed. Throughout the project, I address worries about the dangers of imagination that threaten to undermine the project of establishing a positive and direct connection between imaginative capacities and moral agency.

Bohnet, Clayton. Logic, Thought, and the Unconditioned: An Essay on Kant and Hegel. Ph.D. diss. Duquesne University, 2011. [347 p.] Advisor: Tom Rockmore. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: How do the different metaphysical assumptions of Kant and Hegel have consequences for their respective philosophies of logic? For Kant formal logic and metaphysics provide two very different accounts of human thought. I show that Hegel claims to unite metaphysics and logic by giving a single account of human thought that can support all forms of cognition. Thought represents the mediating term whereby the relation of metaphysical assumptions and formal logic can be determined. Kant in The Critique of Pure Reason (1781) argues that reason can never have objective knowledge of the absolute. Kant’s view is that thought naturally strives to raise itself from the series of conditioned appearances to the knowledge of the Absolute, but the Absolute stands outside the realm of possible experience, and thus beyond the boundaries of objective knowledge. This ‘striving towards the unconditioned’ can never be satisfied — it is only an ideal that organizes our knowledge, but not a knowledge itself. Hegel’s philosophy offers an other account of the role of the unconditioned in knowledge. Hegel in his early Jena works claims that although Kant’s philosophy contains the seeds of German Idealism, it fails to fully develop the standpoint of an authentic idealism. He claims that Kant should be praised for taking philosophy beyond the dogmatism-skepticism impasse, but he also claims that Kant should be criticized for not recognizing that a new philosophical method is necessary for metaphysics. This new method is what Hegel calls speculative dialectic. In Hegel’s Science of Logic (1812-16) the speculative dialectic is the condition for two novelties in the history of philosophy: (1) logic has a determinate content and is capable of a sufficient determination of truth, and (2) logic and metaphysics become part of the same discourse. These two novelties result in a radical new treatment of the traditional elements of formal logic, and mark perhaps the first significant innovation in logic since its inception with Aristotle.

Bonon, Kléber. Kant philosophe du bonheur? Ph.D. diss. Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris), 2011. [381 p.] Advisor: Isabelle Thomas-Fogiel. [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: La présente étude a pour objet de mettre au jour le fondement logique et épistémologique de l'idée du bonheur chez Kant. Quels sont les critères qui fondent l'idée du bonheur en tant que concept structurant la philosophie kantienne? II s'agit de démontrer comment l'éthique critique tient en cohérence la construction du bonheur dans le respect de la loi morale tout en étant critique de l'eudémonisme. Mais Ie bonheur pensé comme conséquence morale intégrant le processus du Souverain Bien s'inscrit en dehors de la réalité concrète du monde. Ce bonheur sujet de l'espérance repose sur l'imagination pure et la croyance. Il permet certes à Kant la résolution des antinomies de la raison pure, mais reste un simple artifice méthodologique au service de l'élaboration de la morale systématique. Il est clair que par son anti-eudémonisme éthique Kant n'isole pas simplement des fondements de la moralité toute volonté déterminée matériellement, mais expulse, de fait, le bonheur de la facticité de la vie. Dans ces conditions, il est nécessaire de replacer le bonheur dans la réalité de la vie par la constitution du droit au bonheur. Le bonheur n'est pas essentiellement éthique, mais plutôt politique. Il s'agit du droit au bonheur synthétique qui émerge du rapport politique entre la liberté individuelle et l'espace public. Le droit au bonheur se sert de la prudence politique pour inscrire le bonheur en ce monde. Initialement conçu comme destination formelle de la vie, le bonheur est ici acte politique de construction d'un itinéraire au coeur de l'existence terrestre.

Chiang, Wen-Pin. De “Qu’est-ce que l’Homme?” au “Citoyen du monde”: le rapport entre la philosophie et l’anthropologie chez Kant. Ph.D. diss. Université Paris-Est, 2011. [# p.] Advisor: Monique Castillo. [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Dans la Logique, Kant expose clairement le rapport entre sa philosophie et l’anthropologie. Si les trois premières questions (à savoir “Que puis-je savoir?”, “Que dois-je faire?” et “Que m’est-il permis d’espérer?”) peuvent toutes être ramenées à la question “Qu’est ce que l’homme?”, alors quelle anthropologie qui donne la réponse à cette dernière question ? S’agissant du rapport entre l’anthropologie et la philosophie, il existe beaucoup de débats parmi les commentateurs kantiens. Ils tentent d’éclaircir ce rapport soit selon un point de vue de l’anthropologie philosophique, soit selon un point de vue de l’ontologie fondamentale. Mais en tant qu’oeuvre kantienne unique relative à l’anthropologie, l’Anthropologie du point de vue pragmatique est absente dans ce débat dans lequel on peut dire qu’elle a été négligée. La raison qui cause cette situation réside dans la caractéristique empirique présentée par l’Anthropologie du point de vue pragmatique. Cependant, dans la lettre du 4 mai 1793 à Karl Friedrich Stäudlin, Kant lui-même a mentionné qu’il avait fait un cours pendant plus de 20 ans sur cette question anthropologique de “Qu’est ce que l’homme?”. D’après cela, il nous semble que l’Anthropologie du point de vue pragmatique, provenant des notes de ce cours, doit être considérée comme une oeuvre kantienne portant sur “Qu’est ce que l’homme?”. Comment pouvons-nous résoudre cette difficulté existante dans la saisie du rapport entre la philosophie et l’anthropologie chez Kant ? Peut-on la résoudre? Si la réponse est “oui”, quel sera un tel rapport? En effet, dans l’étude du rapport entre la philosophie et l’anthropologie chez Kant, on néglige souvent le rôle clef joué par le concept cosmopolitique. Les trois premières questions sont ramenées à l’anthropologie dans le domaine de la philosophie en son sens cosmopolitique. Que signifie alors la philosophie en son sens cosmopolitique? Quel rapport cette philosophie a-t-elle avec la philosophie selon son concept cosmique qui a été considérée comme la recherche de la doctrine de la sagesse (à savoir le souverain bien). Si l’Anthropologie du point de vue pragmatique peut être conçue comme une oeuvre kantienne portant sur la question “Qu’est ce que l’homme?”, comment devons-nous saisir son rapport avec les trois premières questions? Cette étude cherche à clarifier ce rapport entre la philosophie et l’anthropologie chez Kant et le rôle joué par l’Anthropologie du point de vue pragmatique dans ce rapport selon les “concept cosmique”, “concept cosmopolitique” et le “souverain bien”.

Chiovoloni, Margaret Marie. The Moral Point of View in Hume, Kant and Mill. Ph.D. diss. The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2011. [125 p.] Advisor: Thomas E. Hill, Jr. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Hume, Kant and Mill each approach morality with distinctly different frameworks and methodologies, but it is important to acknowledge that they all share the crucial thought that morality involves an impartial point of view. Hume and Kant both recognize that morality is universal: what is right for one must be right for all. They both use this recognition as the starting point for their investigations. Furthermore, we can interpret Mill’s proof so that it moves from a first-personal point of view to an impartial point of view. By addressing the most serious objections to the role of universality in each of these philosophical systems, I make room for acknowledging the shared ground from which each of these philosophers begin their investigations. Critics of Hume have worried that emphasizing the general point of view in his system will lead to conflicts with those passages in which he denies the role of reason in morality. I argue that these conflicts can be resolved by attending to a distinction between moral reactions and moral judgments. Critics of Kant object to his argument that the universal law formulation is a formulation of the Categorical Imperative by claiming that this general point of view does not accurately pick out worthy maxims. I argue that Kant does not expect the general point of view, as expressed in FUL, alone to do this. Instead, we must also rely on a universal end--humanity--and this insight is expressed in the humanity formulation. Critics of Mill have objected to his proof by objecting to two central premises: that what is desired is desirable, and that if each person’s happiness is desirable, the aggregate happiness is desirable. I argue that it is essential to Mill’s proof that the former is said from the first-person point of view, whereas the latter is said from the moral (general) point of view. The former premise means that the fact that I desire something is evidence to me that it is desirable for me. When we move through the argument to the latter premise, we move to a more general point of view.

Chou, Chiayu. Kant’s Critique of Hobbes? Uncovering the Role and Consequences of Assumption in Political Theory and in the Interpretation of Two Classic Political Theorists. Ph.D. diss. University of York, 2011. [# p.] Advisor: ??. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This thesis uncovers and explores a pervasive tendency in political theory to assume that Hobbes's and Kant’s political philosophies are absolutely opposed. This tendency is traced to deeply-rooted but flawed assumptions, which combine to suggest that Hobbes and Kant are spokesmen for what I term Hobbism and Kantianism. These 'isms' cast a long shadow backwards over Hobbes and Kant’s writings, and obscure understanding of their respective political philosophies and relations between them. The central aim of this thesis is to expose this tendency, its pervasive and distorting effects, and to develop in parallel an alternative view of the theoretical relation between Hobbes and Kant which examines what Hobbes and Kant actually say in their texts without filtering its attention or its results through the assumptions of Hobbism and Kantianism. The thesis addresses four aspects of Hobbes's and Kant’s political philosophies which receive especial prominence in recent treatments of the relationship between the two thinkers: liberty, equality, independence, and international relations. By examining these in detail, this thesis draws attention to complexities in their respective theories which are lost in the shadows of Hobbism and Kantianism. It encourages political theorists to move beyond Hobbism and Kantianism, to shed a new light on their theories. At the same time, it acknowledges affinities between the two thinkers which help to establish the coherence of their respective accounts of politics and the true character of their political theories. In the process it carries the methodological implication that studies of political theory and political theorists should reflect, much more than they do, on the assumptions that precede analysis, to avoid reproducing historically-inherited images of specific political theorists, which bear little relation to the detailed views of the theorists in question, and merely distort understandings of their positions and of politics more generally.

Colaner, Nathan R. Other than Omniscient: An Interpretation and Defense of Kant’s Rejection of Aristotle’s Notion of Finite Reasoning. Ph.D. diss. University of Kansas, 2011. [164 p.] Advisor: Scott Jenkins. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Although actual human omniscience is unimaginable, it is not obvious what it means to be limited with regard to thought. One of Kant’s significant contributions to epistemology was his redefinition of the limits of thought. He is explicit about this when he contrasts human, receptive intuition, and the creative intuition that an infinite being would have. Importantly, judging and reasoning are only necessary for a mind that is first affected by an object through sensibility, which is not the case for a being with creative intuition, since this kind of intuition creates its own object. This means that the intellect of Kant’s God is distinct from the human intellect in kind, since judging and reasoning are essentially finite (or what I will call ‘non-omniscient’) activities; they are already evidence of a finite, human cognition. In contrast, Aristotle argues that human cognition — beyond its capacity for discursivity — is able to contemplate; as we will see, Aristotle argues that contemplation is divine, and so a limited intellect can become more or less like an omniscient intellect depending on the quality of one’s contemplative life. In this work, I want to (1) establish that Kant and Aristotle have incompatible conceptions of non-omniscience, (2) trace the epistemological commitments that motivate their rival positions on non-omniscience, (3) show that their particular views on the legitimacy of metaphysical judgments presuppose their particular interpretations of non-omniscience, and (4) argue that Kant provides a superior analysis of non-omniscience.

Cruz, Manuel A. The Ethical Passing of God: Kant and Levinas. Ph.D. diss. University of Chicago/The Divinity School, 2011. [267 p.] Advisor: Jean-Luc Marion. [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The present work examines whether ethics can give meaning to the idea of God outside the framework of theoretical knowledge and theistic metaphysics. It does so by way of engagement with the philosophies of Immanuel Kant and Emmanuel Levinas. Three questions structure the critical comparison of their thought. (1) Why should God be conceived outside the framework of metaphysics and being? (2) What dimension of ethical life leads to reflection on the meaning of God? (3) What does an ethical idea of God mean? It advocates for an intimate connection between the meaning of God and the form of reasoning by which one approaches the question of God.

Darantière, Louis. Du rôle de la théorie des idées dans la formation du criticisme kantien essai sur l'esthétique transcendantale et sa gestation précritique, comparée à la méthode métaphysique de Descartes et Berkeley. Ph.D. diss. Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris), 2011. [# p.] Advisor: Laurent Jaffro. [WC]

Duncan, Samuel. Kant on Freedom, Reason, and Moral Evil. Ph.D. diss. University of Virginia, 2011. [146 p.] Advisor: Jorge Secada. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In my dissertation I offer a new interpretation of the account of moral evil we find in the Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason and its place in Kant’s ethical theory. I argue that rather than building on his earlier thoughts on moral evil, the Religion marks a fundamental shift in Kant’s views on this subject. In earlier works Kant had attempted to explain immorality as a result either of flaws in our present social arrangements and culture, or as a consequence of the fact that we are finite beings. However, by the time he wrote the Religion he had come to believe that these explanations were incompatible with holding human beings accountable for their actions, and he thought that since evil could only be the result of free choice it was to a large degree incomprehensible. Kant did want to offer an account of immorality with his doctrine of a human propensity to evil, but it is a much more modest account than we find in earlier works. The claim that we see a shift in Kant’s views in the Religion is not unprecedented, but several things distinguish my work from previous interpretations. I examine largely ignored works of Kant’s as well as the work of some of his contemporaries, who are almost completely unknown in Anglophone Kant literature, to provide evidence for my interpretation. I also devote attention to the role that the problem of moral luck played in motivating the theory we find in the Religion. Perhaps most importantly, unlike many of its competitors my interpetation neither trivializes Kant’s claims about the universal evil of humanity nor attributes claims to him that are inconsistent with the Religion as a whole.

Dusch, Christian. Staat und Strafe: eine Studie zum Verhältnis von Staats- und Straftheorie bei Thomas Hobbes und Immanuel Kant. Ph.D. diss. Universität Freiburg, 2011. [322 p.] Advisor: Hans-Helmuth Gander. [online] [WC]

Falk, Johanna. Freiheit als politisches Ziel: Grundmodelle liberalen Denkens bei Kant, Hayek und Böckenförde. Ph.D. diss. Universität Passau,  [251 p.] Advisor: Barbara Zehnpfennig. [data] [WC]

Fink, Kristina. Die sogenannte “Kantkrise” Heinrich von Kleists: ein altes Problem aus neuer Sicht. Ph.D. diss. Universität Wuppertal, 2011. [440 p.] Advisor: ??. [data] [WC]

Fletcher, Michael Joseph. The Cognitive Significance of Kant’s third “Critique”. Ph.D. diss. University of California, Santa Barbara, 2011. [467 p.] Advisor: Anthony Brueckner. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The aim is to motivate Kant’s third Critique (Critique of the Power of Judgment) in terms of the theoretical objectives of the Critique of Pure Reason. To that end, I construct an interpretative framework in which the third Critique’s major philosophical doctrines and innovations can be seen to have a cognitive significance. Specifically, the aim is to show that the third Critique’s interest in natural teleology, objective purposiveness, and physicoteleology is linked to the first Critique’s interest in cognitive systematicity. However, while other cognition-oriented approaches to the third Critique draw mainly from the first Critique’s Transcendental Analytic, my interpretative framework draws largely from the Transcendental Dialectic, specifically its discussions of the “ideas of pure reason.” The investigation is guided by two preliminary issues: (1) Do the ideas of pure reason (IPRs) play some important role within our representational systems? That is, do IPRs serve some cognitive function in Kant’s Representationalist Theory of Mind? If so, what representational function do IPRs perform? (2) If the three types of IPR — self, cosmos, God — can be assigned separate and nonredundant cognitive functions, do these functions operate independently of the other, or is there some higher-order representational objective that links their operation? Under my analysis, IPRs can be assigned differential representational functions under a specification of theoretical reason’s highest-order cognitive aim of representing the material universe as one all-inclusive super-object. The representation of the material universe as a single super-object is functionally equivalent to the representation of all natural products as parts of one integrated whole — one whose internal composition Kant models globally on that of natural organisms. Representing nature as a organized whole can be functionally decomposed into the representation of its component parts (= substances), interactive structure, and a system for ordering multiple interactive structures hierarchically. By functioning as a program of a priori cognitive directives that contribute jointly to the mind’s representation of nature as a multi-level system of interactive structure, IPRs subserve reason’s highest-order cognitive end of representing all natural products as parts of a single structured super-object.

Franco, Paul L. The Constitutive A Priori and the Structure of Physical Knowledge. Ph.D. diss. University of Pennsylvania, 2011. [315 p.] Advisor: Paul Guyer. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: My dissertation aims to answer two questions: first, what does it mean for certain elements of knowledge to be constitutive of the possibility of physical knowledge and how is it connected to a priority? Second, given that constitutive elements can be abandoned and new ones adopted in response to logical, mathematical, and physical findings, what distinguishes them from mere empirical statements? In answering these questions, I claim that physical knowledge is made possible by certain a priori elements of knowledge that provide the criteria for making well-formed, precise, and determinate empirical statements about objects, their behavior, and their relationships in space and time. Without the framework provided by constitutive a priori elements, meaningful, scientific knowledge of the physical world is impossible. The main claim, guiding questions, and methodology of my dissertation have deep historical roots. After identifying in chapter one Kant’s major methodological contribution to the study of the structure of physical knowledge, chapters two and three show how Hans Reichenbach and C.I. Lewis modify Kant’s account in direct response to the developments in relativity theory, mathematics, and logic. Next, I consider objections to these accounts raised by W.V. Quine. In chapters four and five I show how Quine’s objections can be answered. First, I show that Rudolf Carnap - the ostensible target of Quine’s criticisms - offers an account of the distinction between the a priori and the empirical that is not grounded in a commitment to the analytic/synthetic distinction. Second, I show the ways in which Michael Friedman’s contemporary account challenges Quine’s claim that his account better captures the structure of physical knowledge. I also highlight certain problems with Friedman’s semantic account of constitutivity. Finally, in the last chapter, I synthesize the past insights of the Neo-Kantian theories of the structure of physical knowledge to arrive at an account of the objectivity of physical knowledge. I explain the importance of the pragmatic and epistemological - rather than merely semantic - roles of the a priori in relation to the objects of physical knowledge and suggest that objectivity is tied directly to the satisfaction of pragmatic criteria.

Fulkerson-Smith, Brett Alan. Experimentation in Transcendental Philosophy on the Transition from Experimental Confirmation in Kant’s “Critique of Pure Reason” to Experimental Discovery in Fichte's “Foundations of the Entire Wissenschaftslehre”. Ph.D. diss. University of Kentucky, 2011. [269 p.] Advisor: Daniel Breazeale. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The dissertation defends the thesis that, owing primarily to the requirements of scientific philosophy elaborated by K.L. Reinhold and Solomon Maimon, the role of experimentation in transcendental philosophy develops from confirmation modeled on natural science in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason to discovery modeled on mathematics in Fichte's Foundations of the Entire Wissenschaftslehre. Having established, in Chapter 2, that Francis Bacon allows that illuminating experiments should be conducted at theoretical crossroads where the correct path is indeterminate, I argue, in Chapter 3, that the experiment of pure reason in the Critique is an illuminating experiment, since the Antinomy of Pure Reason in which it occurs is a theoretical crossroads about the fundamental principle that will allow metaphysics to become a science. Chapter 4 explicates the two necessary facts that the experiment of pure reason must establish in order to decisively determine the correctness of the doctrine of transcendental idealism. I conclude my study of the experiment of pure reason in Chapter 5 with an account of its skeptical and dialectical methods.
Chapter 6 establishes that Fichte's use of experimentation in transcendental philosophy is different than Kant's use of the same. For the former, experiments reveal, rather than confirm, philosophical truths. In Chapter 7, I argue that the method of the experiments with the productive imagination that Fichte discusses in his first presentation of the Wissenschaftslehre require construction in intellectual intuition in accordance with the principle of determinability on the part of the philosopher undertaking them. The thesis of Chapter 8 is that the method of the observational experiment that informs the pragmatic history of the human mind that Fichte presents in the Foundations of the Entire Wissenschaftslehre. is intellectual intuition. Through it, the philosopher is able to cognize the series of necessary acts through which the I constructs, for itself, the concept of itself in intellectual intuition.

Gauthier, Élaine. Les fondements naturels du jugement moral: rationalisme et sentimentalisme à l'ère des neurosciences. Ph.D. diss. Université du Québec à Montréal, 2011. [iii, 135 p.] Advisor: Vincent Guillin. [online] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Ce mémoire porte sur les fondements naturels du jugement moral et l'objectif principal de ce travail est de faire ressortir l'importance de revoir nos conceptions philosophiques sur ce sujet. C'est en nous appuyant sur deux principaux modèles philosophiques, le sentimentalisme et le rationalisme, que nous identifions les éléments constitutifs du jugement moral. L'étude de ces modèles se réfère aux travaux de David Hume et Emmanuel Kant et permet de souligner que la définition du rôle des émotions et de la raison dans la formation du jugement moral diffère dans chacune de ces conceptions. Ensuite, c'est en nous appuyant sur le modèle intuitionniste social proposé par Jonathan Haidt que nous étudions l'influence humienne sur la conception contemporaine du jugement moral. La problématique soulevée se trouvant essentiellement dans une dichotomie entre les définitions que proposent les modèles sentimentaliste et rationaliste en ce qui a trait aux rôles respectifs des émotions et de la raison, nous tentons d'éclairer le problème en exposant différentes études neuroscientifiques sur la question afin de reconsidérer les définitions présentées. Pour ce faire, nous nous intéressons à la question morale d'un point de vue phylogénique et ontogénique. D'abord, en étudiant les fondements génétiques, les bases neuronales, les fondements émotionnels et les mécanismes fondamentaux, ensuite en étudiant les déterminants sociaux et culturels. Finalement, nous concluons avec l'idée que les théories philosophiques contemporaines peuvent tirer certains bénéfices en considérant les observations scientifiques récentes au sujet des fondements du jugement moral.

Gómez Sánchez, César. Existencia y deber: el gestarse del nihilismo en Heidegger en confrontacion crítica con Kant. [Spanish] Ph.D. diss. Universidad de Granada, 2011. [xxi, 396 p.] Advisor: Miguel García-Baró and Luis Sáez Rueda. [WC]

Gonzalez Vallejos, Miguel. Die Wende im Begriff der praktischen Gesetze bei Kant. Ph.D. diss. Universität Konstanz, 2011. [# p.] Advisor: ??. [PQ]

Harrington, Katie. Responding to the Scandal of Scepticism: Kant’s Fourth Paralogism and the Refutation of Idealism. Ph.D. diss. University of Sheffield, 2011. [# p.] Advisor: ??. [PQ]

Heftler, Scott. Kant’s Analytic-Geometric Revolution: Ostensive Judgement As Algebraic Time-State Relation in the Critique of Pure Reason.. Ph.D. diss. University of Texas, Austin, 2011. [312 p.] Advisor: Kathleen Higgins. [M]

Hempel, Tinko. Die Emanzipation der reflektierenden Urteilskraft: eine Untersuchung zur Kritik der Urteilskraft von Immanuel Kant. Ph.D. diss. Berlin, Humboldt-Universität, 2011. [227 p.] Advisor: ??. [WC]

Holberg, Erica A. Pleasure and the Nature of the Ethical Subject. Ph.D. diss. The University of Chicago, 2011. [317 p.] Advisor: Candace Vogler. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: I argue it is a mistake to conclude from the indisputable truth that pleasure can be contrary to moral goodness that pleasure has at most a shallow connection to our good and is therefore dispensable for moral philosophy. I show how Aristotle and surprisingly, Kant argue for a non-trivial connection between good action and pleasure. My purpose in examining how each of these philosophers defends a deep connection between pleasure and the attainment of our good is both to further the scholarship on these historical figures and to challenge the basic assumption that pleasure is of negligible importance for contemporary ethics. The ambition of both Kant and Aristotle is to provide a theoretical account of a neglected truth from hedonism, that the attainment of our good is pleasant, but to utilize this truth in defense of the virtuous life as the best, most pleasant life. Aristotle and Kant are able to provide complex accounts of pleasure’s relation to moral goodness because they draw upon a resource that contemporary ethicists have disavowed: a metaphysically rich conception of the nature of the ethical subject. For Aristotle, the nature in question for ethical inquiry is human nature, whereas for Kant, it is finite dependent rational nature (a category inclusive of, but not limited to, humans). In the light of this metaphysically rich picture of our nature as ethical agents, Aristotle and Kant can claim that some activities are intrinsically pleasant for us, according to our nature, even though some people may not experience these pleasures. Moreover, Aristotle and Kant are able to argue that pleasure is intrinsic to good, virtuous action, without pleasure thereby constituting what good action is for the ethical agent. I argue that the tasks of moral philosophy, which include accounting for the substantive role pleasure plays in orienting the virtuous person towards virtuous conduct, demand a more robust conception of the ethical agent and also of pleasure than that found in contemporary moral theory.

Horeau, Mathieu. Raison et absolu: histoire d’une triangulation (Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard), 2 vols. Ph.D. diss. Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris), 2011. [597 p.] Advisor: Hélène Politis. [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Notre thèse examine la manière dont Kierkegaard a su s'approprier les grandes interrogations de la tradition philosophique à partir d'un ensemble de problèmes constitués sur le sol de l'idéalisme allemand. II s'agit de savoir si l'achèvement hégélien de la métaphysique n'accomplit la philosophie que pour en faire un dogmatisme supérieur. En identifiant la raison et l'absolu, que Kant avait radicalement dissociés, Hegel surmonte toute dévaluation sceptique du discours philosophique. Mais à quel prix ? Réactivant certains arguments kantiens sans pourtant faire retour à Kant, la pensée paradoxale de Kierkegaard ressaisit les rapports dialectiques de la raison et de l'absolu pour conjurer l'hubris de la spéculation autant que l'insuffisance du formalisme transcendantal. Nous travaillons donc à défendre Kierkegaard en tant que philosophe, la destination authentiquement religieuse de l'oeuvre ne devant pas occulter sa portée philosophique, qui concerne notre époque.

Johnson, Russell. Designing a Sublime Painting of the Grand Canyon. Master’s thesis. Prescott College, 2011. [109 p.] Advisor: Michael Cuddington.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This is a thesis about social and personal transformation, a discussion of the aesthetic experience of the sublime and beautiful as described by Burke, Kant, and Ruskin. This serves as groundwork to contextualize late nineteenth-century paintings of the Grand Canyon by Thomas Moran. Moran’s first painting in 1874 evokes the sublime whereas his later paintings 1892-1920 are more characteristic of beauty. He also promoted the Grand Canyon as a tourist destination and a viable place for artists to practice their talents. This idea inspired me to design a representation of the Grand Canyon that conveys the sublime as I experience it on backpacking trips there. In doing so, I developed a creative process; translating photographs from my hikes to charcoal sketches, to oil studies, to a culminating painting. My intention is to inspire viewers to contemplate nature’s grandeur. The methods used in this thesis include historical research, visual analysis, and an examination of direct experiences and of artistic processes.

Kessler, Michael Joel. Freedom, Authority, & Neutrality: A Kantian Account of Political Legitimacy. Ph.D. diss. Harvard University, 2011. [244 p.] Advisor: Christine M. Korsgaard. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This dissertation develops an account of the relationship between neutrality and political legitimacy. One way of ensuring that states respect the freedom and equality of citizens, given the fact of pluralism, is by requiring that political power be used in a way that is neutral between various conceptions of how it is good to live. In Chapter One I argue that we can divide theories of neutrality into narrow and wide conceptions. Using Rawls’ political theory as a prominent example of narrow neutrality, I argue that this view fails to adequately protect the freedom and equality of citizens. In Chapter Two I provide an interpretation of Kant’s theory of political freedom. According to this view, all interferences with freedom must preserve reciprocal relations between citizens with very different conceptions of the good. On a Kantian view, we have a pre-political right to live under conditions of mutual independence with others. I argue that only a state governed by a wide principle of neutrality could realize a condition of this kind. I develop this view of neutrality in Chapters Three and Four through a Kantian account of public reasons. I show that political authority can only have the powers it does if it reasons in a way that could embody the united will of all citizens. This is only possible if political decisions are given in a way that leaves aside values that lack a basis in public reason. I show how this norm applies both the content of the law, but also to the procedures through which laws are enacted. Further, I show how a Kantian state justifies public institutions for health, a basic income, and education. In Chapters Five and Six I apply the Kantian conception of neutrality to the legitimacy of public funding for the arts, and the use of non-coercive political influence. I show that the use of political power in these cases must aim at a public purpose, while also demonstrating equal concern for the range of values citizens hold. I conclude that political legitimacy involves a fundamental commitment to employing public reasons whenever these are available. This means adopting a wide conception of neutrality on the grounds that this provides the best protection for the freedom and equality of each citizen.

Kim, Eun Ha. Kant und die moderne Medientheorie Anschauung - Bild/Zeichen - Begriff. Ph.D. diss. Universität Würzburg, 2011. [149 p.] Advisor: ??. [data] [WC]

Kukla, Todd Anthony. Kant’s Theory of Cognition: An interpretation of the argument of the transcendental deduction. Ph.D. diss. University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2011. [326 p.] Advisor: Arthur Melnick. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The purpose of Kant’s transcendental deduction in the Critique of Pure Reason is to prove that certain concepts not derived from experience (called categories) apply to and govern the objects of our experience. Kant seeks to dispel Hume’s skeptical assertion that concepts such as cause and substance fail to identify features of reality. His proof appeals to our cognitive abilities, and he argues that, if the application of these concepts to experience makes cognition of objects possible, then these concepts must apply to any object that we can cognize. However, there is extensive disagreement in the secondary literature on the nature of the ability named by the term “cognition.” What is this capacity that the categories make possible? My dissertation provides an answer to this question. First, I argue that “cognition” refers to the phenomenon of intentionality. This means that the capacity for mental representations to refer to, or be about, objects is made possible by the application of the categories to experience. Second, I argue that cognition is the capacity to intend the full scope of objects in space and time — including the past, the future, and remote space. Many commentators focus only on Kant’s theory of perception, according to which rudimentary sensory information is synthesized into the perception of an object. Although the categories do play a role in synthesizing perceptions, I argue that more importantly they play a role in enabling the representation of objects that are not given in perception. On the reading I defend, the categories ground our ability to represent the wider spatio-temporal world. I term this ability “global intentionality.” In the first part of the dissertation, I argue against epistemological interpretations of the nature of cognition. According to this reading, the categories make empirical knowledge possible. This reading situates Kant within a philosophical tradition that is concerned with knowing whether our representations are accurate or correct portrayals of the world, and commentators have sought to find in Kant’s project a refutation of empirical knowledge and external world skepticism. I argue that instead of ensuring correctness of representation, the application of the categories to experience is necessary for the more basic capacity for representations to be about the world in the first place. The first part concludes by showing that the scope of intentionality is global. I appeal to the Postulates, Antinomies, and Analogies, as well as the Deduction, to support this claim. In the second part of the dissertation, I develop Kant’s theory of global intentionality. I argue that he offers a rule-based analysis, according to which intentional representations are simply rules for encountering objects. Since on Kant’s view objects are spatio-temporal in nature, rules for encountering them take the form of instructions for repositioning oneself in space and time, such that, if obeyed, would put one in their perceptual vicinity. I claim that this view is in many respects similar to William James’s understanding of cognition. Kant’s position, however, raises a special problem for representation of the past, because it is not possible to formulate rules that would put one in the vicinity of a past object. I argue that Kant’s proof of the category of substance is designed to solve this problem.

Lallier, Andrew Ragsdale. Writing Duty: Religion, Obligation and Autonomy in George Eliot and Kant. Master’s thesis. University of Tennessee/Knoxville, 2011. [137 p.] Advisor: Allen Dunn. [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Connections between George Eliot and Immanuel Kant have been, for the most part, neglected. However, we have good reason to believe that Eliot not only read Kant (as well as many who were directly influenced by Kant), but substantially agreed with him on critical and moral issues. This thesis investigates one of the issues on which Kant and Eliot were most closely aligned, the need for duty in morality. Both the English novelist and the German philosopher upheld a vision of duty that could command absolutely while remaining consonant with human freedom and grounding a sense of moral dignity. This vision runs throughout the works of both writers, but is first developed and takes on a particular urgency in the works examined in this thesis, ranging from some of their early publications to Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason and Eliot’s Romola. The first chapter discusses duty in the wider context of debates about Divine Command Morality, in which the good is defined by its accord with the will or command of God, and which both Kant and Eliot resisted in formulating their own moral visions (while maintaining the language of law and command). This chapter also discusses evidence we have for Eliot’s familiarity with Kant and establishes critical context for this paper. The second chapter discusses religion — in particular, religious enthusiasm — as a necessary background for duty, which exists in the absence of theological certitude, even as it seeks to preserve something of religion’s capacity to command and its popular scope. Kant’s path to the first Critique led through works foundational for, but also sometimes at odds with, the priorities and conclusions of critical science, and Eliot’s first novel was preceded by a critical career that paints a quite different picture of religion than the sympathetic portrait of Dinah Morris. The third chapter deals with three dimensions of duty in Kant and Eliot, autonomy, reflection and respect, primarily through the second Critique and The Mill on the Floss. In the conclusion, I turn to Romola to illustrate the conflict and indeterminative power inherent in this conception of duty.

Landrum, Ty. The Idea of Humanity. Ph.D. diss. University of Virginia, 2011. [185 p.] Advisor: Talbot Brewer. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This dissertation explores the idea of humanity and its normative role in practical thought. The moral resonance of the idea, such as we find it today, owes much to Kant’s Groundwork, where he insists that humanity has absolute value. In Kant’s view, all of us, as agents of reason, can be moved from sheer appreciation for the absolute value of humanity, and through such appreciation, we can realize our inner worth as human beings. I adopt this analytical determinant of Kant’s philosophy, but I rework its substance considerably. I argue that the moral content of the idea of humanity is not fixed by the timeless nature of reason itself, but it requires articulation through the mode of action by which we express our inner worth as human beings. I contend that we each stand to contribute something to the articulation of the content of humanity through action of the relevant sort, and thus I radicalize Kant’s notion that we are equally authoritative agents of humanity. Despite his pronounced recognition of the moral distinctness of persons, Kant attempted to homogenize and even depersonalize humanity. I argue that humanity defies that kind of impersonal definition. The normative content of the idea of humanity gains definition through distinctive human activities, viz., those that express our inner worth or dignity as radically singular beings. This is why the requirements of dignity can have an irreducibly personal character, such that the immediate demands of dignity cannot always be captured in universal and impersonal principles of conduct. It follows from this fact, I argue, that what is required for each person to realize her dignity as a human being is not, as Kant imagined, something that philosophers can ascertain for posterity through sheer reflection. It is something that each person must continually rediscover for herself through the treacherous ordeal of seeking to live a truly human life.

Landy, Margo. The Moral Point of View in Hume, Kant, and Mill. Ph.D. diss. University of North Carolina, 2011. [# p.] Advisor: Thomas E. Hill. []

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In my dissertation I interpret Modern ethical theories from a perspective that has so far been overlooked by scholars in the field: as all beginning with a shared premise concerning the essential role of an impartial point of view in morality. Beginning here allows me to present an interpretation of three major figures of the period, Hume, Kant and Mill, that is both philosophically compelling and textually accurate. It also allows me to understand these figures as genuinely engaging in the same project. I argue that the most tenable interpretation of the arguments that these figures present is one according to which these arguments move from a premise about the universality of the moral point of view to a conclusion about what morality demands.
I interpret Hume as a cognitivist, and I argue that purported conflicts between his emphasis on the general point of view and his denial that reason plays a role in morality can be resolved by attending to a distinction between moral reactions and moral judgments. Moral reactions are the feelings we have when we have properly taken up the general point of view, and moral judgments are judgments about moral reactions. While reason has a proper place in moral judgment, it does not play a role in determining virtue and vice, which are instead determined by the reactions we have from the moral point of view.
Critics of Kant object to his argument that the universal law formulation is a formulation of the Categorical Imperative by claiming that this general point of view does not accurately pick out worthy maxims. I argue that Kant does not expect the general point of view, as expressed in the universal law formulation, alone to pick out worthy maxims. His argument depends also on the existence of a universal end — humanity — and this insight is expressed in the humanity formulation.
Critics of Mill have objected to his proof by focusing on to two central premises: that what is desired is desirable, and that if each person’s happiness is desirable, the aggregate happiness is desirable. I argue that the former premise is meant to be accepted only from the first-person point of view: the fact that I desire something is the best evidence to me that it is desirable for me. The latter premise, on the other hand, only becomes tenable when considered from the moral (general) point of view: from this perspective we recognize that there is nothing special about my happiness, and therefore the aggregate happiness is desirable.

Latta, Marcy. Kant’s Problem Regarding Others: Knowing, Seeing, and Treating Others as Free. Ph.D. diss. University of Pennsylvania, 2011. [211 p.] Advisor: Paul Guyer. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant’s transcendental framework appears to generate an intractable problem about the possibility of cognizing other beings as free. While I can apprehend that I am free on the basis of my consciousness of being obligated under the moral law, Kant’s epistemology seems to preclude, in principle, the possibility of cognizing that another being is free. Because it is by virtue of freedom that a being deserves moral consideration, this epistemological problem has significant implications for morality. After canvassing the, by my lights, unsuccessful attempts of Fichte, Christine Korsgaard, and Allen Wood to resolve this epistemological problem of how we might rationally determine which among the various beings we encounter fall under the category of humanity, I instead seek to undercut the problem rather than to solve it directly on its own terms. I show that Kant’s assumption that there are other free beings to be recognized is in conflict with a core insight of his doctrine of transcendental idealism. I then draw from Schopenhauer to propose an alternative, although nevertheless Kantian, metaphysical view of the relationship between freedom and appearance, according to which freedom might uniformly underly and unite all of nature. While this view allows for a rich plurality within nature, as to the underlying essence of nature, all is folded into a single, vastly enlarged, free self. This metaphysical view paves the way for an alternative epistemology by which we can perceive how we should see and treat apparent others. First, I appeal to an argument by Paul Guyer that shows that, whereas Kant’s transcendental idealism appears to have generated the original epistemological problem, it is by virtue of this doctrine that Kant can countenance a role for feeling in moral recognition and motivation. I then look to Nomy Arpaly, Elisabeth Camp, John McDowell, and Martha Nussbaum, among others, to develop an account of an affect-laden, normatively-constrained mode of moral perception by which we can see apparent others as ourselves and thus as free, in accordance with what may be the underlying metaphysical reality, and, in turn, be disposed to treat them as we would ourselves.

LeBlanc, Richard. Kant and the Meaning of Freedom in Hegel’s “Phenomenology of Spirit”. Master’s thesis. University of Ottowa (political studies), 2011. [106 p.] Advisor: Douglas Moggach. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Relying mainly on R. B. Pippin's and D. Moggach's interpretative works on Kant and Hegel, the thesis tackles the problem of the reception of Kant by Hegel. It does so by looking into the impact of Kant’s first critique on the Preface, the Introduction and the first par of the section Self-consciousness of the Phenomenology of Spirit. Three Kantian conditions for there to be freedom are identified and shown to be reinterpreted by Hegel in a continuist perspective. These three conditions are spontaneity, reflectivity and negativity which propels and retains the free Kantian subject in the Hegelian becoming of reality.

Lee, Eunah. Ethics of World Citizens : Kantian Cosmopolitanism. Ph.D. diss. State University of New York at Stony Brook, 2011. [187 p.] Advisor: Lorenzo C. Simpson. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The goal of this dissertation is to defend the Kantian cosmopolitan ideal in the context of contemporary debate about global ethics. Kant’s cosmopolitanism has been criticized for its sharp dualism between morality and legality, which deprives it of the very potential for a practical project toward perpetual peace that it promises. This line of objection, famously raised by Hegel, enables a competing conception of cosmopolitanism. Although Hegel’s situated or rooted conception of self and state provides us with relevant resources, Kant’s ideal cannot or should not be replaced by Hegelian principles. An adequate appropriation of Kant’s espousal of cosmopolitan rights that has been modified to accommodate Hegelian insights ought to endorse global efforts to economically and politically empower vulnerable global citizens in our time. At the end of the 20th century, John Rawls drew a sharp distinction between domestic and global justice under the banner of “realistic utopianism.” However, a form of cosmopolitan vision seems inevitable even to correct forms of profound domestic injustice. Drawing on Amartya Sen’s work, this dissertation instead examines a conception of development that may eschew charges of metaphysical as well as political imperialism. A defense of Kantian cosmopolitan principles requires, in turn, a closer examination of a so-called chasm between moral universalism and political inegalitarianism implied in Kant’s work. Revisiting recent debates on Kant’s racism invites us to think that a cosmopolitan responsibility suggests not only the need to ensure formal rights of global others, but also the urgency to nurture our emotions toward these others. In short, the moderate cosmopolitanism that this dissertation endorses as the most suitable principle of global ethics has a Kantian face with a Humean heart across and inside borders.

Leech, Jessica F. The Varieties of Modality: Kantian Prospects for a Relativist Account. Ph.D. diss. University of Sheffield, 2011. [268 p.] Advisors: Fabrice Correia (Geneva) and Bob Hale (Sheffield). [PQ] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The aim of this thesis is to present and motivate the relative modality view, whereby at least the non-logical alethic kinds of modality are mere relative forms of logical modality. The first chapter is devoted to presenting the relative modality view in general, providing a correct formulation, and considering some arguments for and against. The next chapter considers the particular challenges raised for the view by some essentialists. The third chapter turns to look at logical modality, the bedrock of the relative modality view, and presents an example of an account of logical necessity which suits it well. I argue that logical necessity is that necessity implicated in a deductively valid argument, and hence that its source is to be found in an account of the laws of logic. I argue that the laws of logic are constitutive-normative laws of thought. The fourth chapter takes a more historical turn. Here I argue that Kant can be understood as advocating a relative modality view, in particular for what he calls "real modality". In the fifth and final chapter I will draw on the conclusions of the preceding chapters to present a Kantian relative account of metaphysical necessity. Metaphysical necessity is that which follows, as a matter of logical necessity, from conditions on our having any experience of an objective world. I argue why this Kant-inspired kind of relative necessity is well-suited to play the role of metaphysical necessity, and consider how the view accommodates contemporary views about features of metaphysical necessity and its typical cases.

Leichtweis, Ursula. Vom Bezug der Kunst zur Natur bei Kant, Schelling und Goethe. Ph.D. diss. Universität-Kassel, 2011. [299 p.] Advisor: ??. [WC]

Love, Brandon. The interpretations and implications of Kant’s two experiments in Religion. Master’s thesis. Trinity Evangelical Divinity School, 2011. [vii, 153 p.] Advisor: ??. [WC]

Lowell, Brian Anthony Harrington. The Problem of Welfare in the Political Philosophy of Immanuel Kant. Master’s thesis. Catholic University of America, 2011. [iv, 76 p.] Advisor: ??. [WC]

MacDonald, Stuart. The Ontologization of Practical Man: The political theories of Marx and Arendt as a response to the ‘problem of freedom’ in Hume and Kant. Master’s thesis.  Memorial University of Newfoundland, 2011. [107 p.] Advisor: ??. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this thesis, I argue that the political theories of Karl Marx and Hannah Arendt can be interpreted as responses to Kant who, in attempting to conceive of how freedom could be possible in the face of Humean scepticism, concluded that freedom was only possible outside of the phenomenal world. I argue that they share a foundation in that their political theories are ultimately responses to Kant, both of them rejecting the ontological precedence given by Kant and the majority of the thinkers throughout the history of philosophy to the abstract properties of reason and thought in humanity, and instead ontologizing the practical. From this ontological shift, Marx and Arendt ultimately grounded humanness in the practical and the worldly , by showing that although Hume’s scepticism about freedom with respect to necessity may be correct, freedom is, at base, a practical question with respect to constraint, and it is only by considering it in this light that freedom can be adequately ‘brought back’ to the ‘phenomenal’ world.

Mallard, Alison. Freedom Under the Law: Right and Revolution in Kant’s Theory of Justice. Ph.D. diss. London School of Economics and Political Science (government), 2011. [263 p.] Advisor: Katrin Flikschuh. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This thesis addresses the "air of paradox" that continues to plague Kant’s absolute prohibition of revolution. In seeking to identify the source of this contention, I investigate a possible inconsistency within Kant’s Doctrine of Right as a doctrine of external freedom. Taking my lead from Christine Korsgaard's idea of ―perverted justice‖, I explore the idea that states can exist that undermine their own purpose, in their denial of the freedom which is their end. Establishing the possibility of perverted justice takes us into an inquiry into the nature of Kant’s moral theory as a theory of freedom, and specifically, the particular kind of freedom that Right takes as its end. I take the contrast between the ethical and juridical domains as my point of departure, defending Kant’s strict division between the two domains. In doing so I defend the moral status of Right against commentators who exclude it on grounds of its external nature, arguing for a conception of practical freedom that is broader than the internal freedom of autonomy, and hence can include Right under its scope. From this I offer an account of external freedom as acting in accordance with the Universal Principle of Right, which is nothing more than the constraint of one's choice under universal law. In conclusion, I argue that Right (justice) cannot be frustrated in the way that Korsgaard's idea of perverted justice suggests, due to the formal nature of external freedom. Obedience to positive law cannot deny external freedom in the way she suggests; rather, our constraint under law is constitutive of our freedom as the end of political society. There is therefore no inconsistency to be found within Kant’s Doctrine of Right between the idea of external freedom as the end of Right and his absolute prohibition of revolution.

Marwah, Inder Singh. A Matter of Character: Moral Psychology and Political Exclusion in Kant and Mill. Ph.D. diss. University of Toronto, 2011. [299 p.] Advisor: Ronald Beiner. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: What kind of agent does liberal political thought presuppose? Who is the subject inhabiting modern, liberal conceptions of political order? This dissertation is a study of liberal character-formation, of the kinds of persons, subjects and citizens underlying seminal works in the liberal tradition. More specifically, it explores the forms of character and agency sustaining Immanuel Kant’s and John Stuart Mill’s moral and political philosophies, as well as problems of exclusion and marginalization faced by agents who are, either naturally or circumstantially, unable to develop a properly liberal character. The project is guided by three central aims. The first is expository: the dissertation draws to light the substantial attention that Kant and Mill both devoted to the moral psychology of progressive, liberal agency, and to the conditions, processes and mechanisms forming a liberal character. The second aim is critical, examining the ways in which these ideals of liberal character stand to constrain the inclusiveness and equality at the centre of liberal moral and political doctrines. The final aim is evaluative, reflecting on how we might situate problems of exclusion, both within the broader architectures of Kant’s and Mill’s respective philosophical systems, and in relation to the liberalisms that we inherit from them.

May, Joshua David. The Possibility of Acting from Duty. Ph.D. diss. University of California, Santa Barbara, 2011. [272 p.] Advisor: Aaron Zimmerman. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Is it possible for us to do what we ought simply because we recognize it as such? Kant famously thought that only such actions — those done “from duty” — have moral worth. He illustrates this with several examples, which examine doing the right thing (e.g., a shopkeeper charging an inexperienced customer the normal price for goods) from different motives. There has been substantial debate about whether such a standard for moral worth is simply too high. But the question of this dissertation is a more psychological one: Can we act from duty? Consider the many brave rescuers of Jews in Nazi Europe. Why did they voluntarily engage in such altruistic acts, risking their own well-being in the process? Motivational Kantians , myself included, maintain that at least sometimes we can do such things ultimately because we recognize we ought to do so. This capacity requires at least two others: (1) the ability to act on ultimately altruistic motives (since duty sometimes requires altruism), and (2) the ability of our normative beliefs to produce new motivations in us without the assistance of antecedent ones (since recognition is a cognitive state). But these capacities are ruled out by the following two theses. Psychological egoism maintains that we are always ultimately motivated by what we perceive to be in our own self-interest. Motivational Humeanism claims that beliefs can only generate new desires that serve or further an antecedent desire. By focusing on recent philosophical arguments and empirical work from psychology to neuroscience, I argue that these two rival views are implausible. While egoism is almost universally rejected by philosophers, the arguments against it are utterly lacking. I argue that a proper attack on it must appeal to psychological research on empathy-induced helping. Humeanism, however, is arguably the dominant view in philosophy. Yet I argue that, like egoism, there is virtually no reason to believe it. While I do not purport to have conclusively argued for the existence of the capacity to act from duty, I contend this defense against two main challengers renders it a live possibility.

Meguid, Ahmed Abdel. The Hermeneutics of Religious Imagination and Human Nature in Kant and Ibn al-`Arabi. Ph.D. diss. Emory University, 2011. [277 p.] Advisor: David Carr. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The dissertation investigates and synthesizes under-explored dimensions of Immanuel Kant’s and Muhyi ad-Din ibn al-’Arabi’s (d.1240) philosophy of religion. In contrast with mainstream Kantian scholarship that reduces the role of God in his thought to its moral use, this work argues that the idea of God plays a decisive role in his definition of the ‘human-being.’ Building on recent scholarship on the problem of defining the ‘human’ in the Critique of Judgment , it argues that only the idea of God allows imagination to define the ‘human-being’ by hermeneutically connecting the realm of rational ideas with that of spatial-temporal experience. The dissertation then shows that Ibn al-’Arabi, generally viewed as a Muslim mystic tout court , held parallel philosophical views of the ‘human-being’ and the faculty of imagination. It then demonstrates that Ibn al-’Arabi overcame salient problems that Kant faced by outlining the implications of this philosophical view for concrete religious experience and putting forward a more elaborate account of the hermeneutical dimension and uses of the idea of God.

Messina, James Anthony. Kant’s Hidden Ontology of Space. Ph.D. diss. University of California, San Diego, 2011. [xi, 234 p.] Advisor: Eric Watkins. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the Transcendental Aesthetic of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant famously claims that space is the a priori form of outer intuition (the ‘Form Thesis’). Inspired by P.F. Strawson’s discussion of it, a number of prominent contemporary philosophers have seen in this claim a brilliant and distinctly Kantian insight about the relationship between space and objective experience. Unfortunately, Kant commentators, whose job it is to determine the precise meaning of the Form Thesis, the nature of Kant’s argument for it, and its relationship to Kant’s claims about space later in the Critique (in particular, in the Transcendental Analytic), have made little progress in their efforts. As I argue, this is because they have failed to see that Kant’s Form Thesis is part of a larger metaphysics of space and is only intelligible in terms of it. In my dissertation, I interpret Kant’s Form Thesis in light of his (largely unexplored) views about the relationship between space and mutual interaction (which Kant calls ‘community’), and about the ontological grounding of various spatial properties. I argue that Kant’s Form Thesis is part of a rich metaphysics of space that combines realist and idealist elements, and that takes as its starting point a very general characterization of space as the ground of the possibility of the community of the things in it.

Mudd, Alexandra Rome. Unity in Thought and Action: The Categorical Imperative as the Common Principle of Reason in Kant. Ph.D. diss. University of Cambridge (history and philosophy of science), 2011. [# p.] Advisor: ??. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant is celebrated for insisting on the unity of reason. Both our theoretical and practical endeavours, he claims, are grounded in one and the same rational faculty. The centrality of this claim to Kant’s thought can hardly be overstated, and yet Kant scholars notoriously struggle to say what it means. This thesis offers a novel interpretation of this fundamental, yet highly controversial, claim. I argue that Kant’s conception of reason is unified through the supreme principle of practical reason, the Categorical Imperative, and wholly practical in character. I begin supporting my central claim by arguing that theoretical reason’s regulative function, as Kant accounts for it in the “Transcendental Dialectic” of the Critique of Pure Reason, is essentially practical. By this I mean that the regulative principles theoretical reason provides in helping us gain knowledge of nature are practical imperatives designed to guide us in the activity of thinking. It follows from my reading of theoretical reason that reason may be a unified faculty since its function across all domains is to provide practical standards for guiding our activity, theoretical activity included. My argument for the claim that the Categorical Imperative is reason’s common principle follows from my distinctive reading of Kant on theoretical reason. For if it is true that even our theoretical use of reason is practical, then it too must be subject to practical reason’s supreme law. In seeking to make plausible this claim, I argue that far from being a specifically moral principle that guides only ethical decision making, the Categorical Imperative establishes requirements for all our practical activity, theoretical activity included. It follows from my account of the Categorical Imperative that it may be the common principle of reason since its authority ranges over the theoretical domain. I complete the argument of my thesis by showing that the supreme principle of theoretical reason derives from the Categorical Imperative. According to my account, this principle – the command to seek cognitive unity – specifies what it means to comply with the Categorical Imperative in our manner of thinking. Reason is therefore unified, in my account, because its sole function is practical guidance and because this guidance is grounded in the Categorical Imperative. My thesis challenges the standard practice of interpreting Kant’s practical and theoretical philosophies independently of each other, and points the way toward a distinctively Kantian account of epistemic responsibility with the Categorical Imperative at it’s centre.

Mumbrú Mora, Alejandro. El Problema de la sensibilización del ámbito de la moralidad en Kant. [Spanish] Ph.D. diss.  Universitat de Barcelona, 2011. [221 p.] Advisor: Salvi Turró. [WC]

Nance, Jerome Michael. Freedom in General: The General Will in Classical German Philosophy. Ph.D. diss. University of Pennsylvania, 2011. [322 p.] Advisor: Paul Guyer. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: My thesis tracks the attempts of Kant, Fichte, and Hegel to incorporate two Rousseauian concepts - the “general will” and “moral freedom” - into their political thought. Rousseau’s idea is that a person is free just in case she is subject only to her own will, not the will of any other. How, then, can a person be both free and subject to the laws of the state? Two conditions must be met. First, the laws must objectively express the general will of the society’s citizens for the common good. Second, citizens must subjectively identify with the general will of the state as expressive of their own will - in other words, citizens must have general wills. If these two conditions are met, then citizens enjoy what Rousseau calls “moral freedom.” In keeping with this two-part analysis, I argue that Kant provides a compelling account of the necessary objective content of the general will, while Fichte and especially Hegel provide sophisticated analyses of the social conditions under which citizens are able, subjectively, to develop and maintain general wills. According to Kant, the general will as embodied in the institutions of the state must secure the rule of law, a system of property rights, a republican government, and the welfare of the poor. But the existence of a state in accordance with these principles is not yet sufficient to secure the moral freedom of its citizens. For that, citizens also must have general wills. The concept of recognition , introduced by Fichte and then developed by Hegel, is the key to understanding how socio-political institutions can encourage citizens to will the common good and thus have general wills. If political institutions provide sites of recognition between citizens and the state, then citizens are able to identify consciously with the general will of the state. Thus I argue that by combining elements from Kant, Fichte, and Hegel, we can arrive at the outlines of a complete theory of justice constructed around the idea of the general will that meets both the objective and subjective conditions of Rousseauian moral freedom.

O’Dowd, Ornaith. The Responsibilities of Reason: Kant and Care. Ph.D. diss. City University of New York, 2011. [viii, 215 p.] Advisor: Sibyl A. Schwarzenbach. [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: I argue that care, as a moral value and a practice of moral significance, should have a place in Kantian ethics. There is neither and ethic of care nor an ethic of justice as such but rather simply ethics, which includes care and justice, as well as other values. Kantian ethics has been criticized in the care literature for allegedly devaluing emotion, exalting abstraction over attention to context, and offering a flawed conception of persons. I argue that a close reading of Kant’s texts reveals these objections to be unsuccessful. I show how care can be understood in a Kantian theoretical framework. Finally, I examine care as a political value and the caring society as a model of social, political, and economic organization.

Papish, Laura V. Against Constructivism in Kantian Ethical Theory. Ph.D. diss. Northwestern University, 2011. [234 p.] Advisor: Richard Kraut. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this dissertation I defend moral realism both as a reading of Kant’s ethical theory and as an independent view about the nature of moral obligations. I argue that the constructivist alternative fails on both fronts. As readers of Kant, I show that constructivists misrepresent his views about the relationship between moral principles and the faculty of reason, as well as his claims about what distinguishes pure from empirical practical reason. I develop these arguments in Chapters One and Two of the dissertation. The contemporary defenses of constructivism I examine in Chapters Three through Five — including those of Christine Korsgaard and T.M. Scanlon — prove untenable because these views either rely on indefensible claims about human agency or ultimately collapse into realism about moral values and obligations. The outcome of these arguments is support for a realist reading of Kant and for the viability of realist approaches to ethics more generally.

Platz, Jeppe. Freedom, Justice, and the Social Contract: A Study in the Moral and Political Philosophies of Rousseau and Kant. Ph.D. diss. University of Pennsylvania, 2011. [316 p.] Advisor: Samuel Freeman. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The theme of this dissertation is the relation between freedom and justice. I approach this theme by studying the relation between freedom and justice in the philosophies of Rousseau and Kant. I argue that the moral and political philosophies of Rousseau and Kant can be understood in terms of the interplay between the norms of moral freedom and liberty, and I show how they have different understandings of the relation between these norms, and, therefore, offer two different views on the relation between freedom and justice. I identify three basic contrasts. First, there is a difference in the kind of freedom that they think is the primary concern of justice: Rousseau thinks justice is primarily about moral freedom, while Kant thinks that it is primarily about liberty. Second, there is a difference in the way that they think justice is concerned with freedom: Rousseau thinks that justice requires the promotion of moral freedom, while Kant thinks that justice requires that the exercise of freedom of each respects the equal rights to liberty of all. Third, there is a difference in their views on when justice is fully satisfied: for Rousseau, justice is satisfied if the social conditions are maximally conducive to the moral freedom, while for Kant, justice is fully satisfied when the exercise of freedom of each is consistent with the equal freedom of all others. The contrasts between Rousseau and Kant can be drawn quite sharply. For Rousseau, liberty is a requirement of justice, for Kant, justice is the requirements of liberty. For Rousseau justice is about promoting the human good; for Kant justice is not about the human good. So, for Rousseau, justice is only fully satisfied by a nation of angels (for only then would all realize the ideal of moral freedom); for Kant, justice could be fully satisfied by a nation of devils (if no devil’s rights are violated).

Printzlau, Gry Ardal. Trust and Ethical Selfhood. Ph.D. diss. University of Copenhagen, Det Teologiske Fakultet, 2011. [228 p.] Advisor: ??. [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents:Aim and structure (13), Six theses (16), Basic reflectivity (17), Hannah Arendt and the human condition (20), Immanuel Kant and the judgment of experience (22), 1 The problem of trust (25), 1.1 Overview of the field: basic trust and strategic trust (27), 1.2 Critical thought and ethical understanding (38), 1.3 Openness and secrecy (45), 1.4 Ethical trust (48), 1.4.1 Judging trustworthiness (49), 1.4.2 Asymmetry (53), 1.4.3 Is trust always a good? (54), 1.4.4 Can I meaningfully trust what is morally unsound? (57), 1.5 Initiatory conclusion (61), 2 Trust and torture (63), 2.1 Torture, lack of trust, and self-estrangement (64), 2.1.1 The essence of torture is the destruction of the person (67), 2.2 Loss of trust and loss of world (72), 2.2.1 The person in pain (77), 2.2.2 Losing meaning (79), 2.2.3 Selfhood, transcendence, agency (81), 2.2.4 Self-betrayal and distrust of self (86), 2.2.5 Intimacy and alienation (88), 2.2.6 Distrust and lack of trust (89), 2.2.7 Disorientation (91), 2.3 Implications (95), 3 Problematic selfhood (97), 3.1 What is a relationship? (100), 3.2 The self in contemporary phenomenology (103), 3.3 Signification and proximity (111), 3.3.1 Starting from the subject anew (113), 3.3.2 Reason arrives with the other (118), 3.3.3 Freedom as heteronomy (124), 3.3.4 The unicity of the I (128), 3.3.5 Saying and signification: the positive story (133), 3.4 Excursion: the ambition to understand (138), 3.4.1 The failure of understanding as a basis of responsibility (139), 3.4.2 A Lévinasian moment (141), 3.5 Summing up: problematic orientation (144), 4 Basic reflectivity: from saying to the said (147), 4.1 Judging trustworthiness (151), 4.1.1 The judging self (153), 4.2 The four movements of the analytic of the beautiful (159), 4.2.1 Disinterested and...

Prunea, Alexandra. L’avènement de la métaphysique kantienne. Recherche sur l’interprétation ontologique de Kant. Ph.D. diss. Université Paris-Sorbonne, 2011. [# p.] Advisor: Jean-Luc Marion. [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The main purpose of this thesis is to study a decisive period in the reception of Kant’s philosophy — the so-called ontological interpretation of Kant — which, as of 1924, superseded the prevailing view of the time and averred the existence and pertinence of Kant’s metaphysics, defending its rightful inclusion among classical ontologies. The first representatives of this new exegetic trend — H. Heimsoeth, M. Wundt and M. Campo, as well as, later on, G. Martin and L. Honnefelder — had a determining influence on Kantian studies which led to a change of perspective perceived at the time as an “advent” and a “renaissance” of metaphysics. We also analyse the premises of this reading and identify them at the end of the 19th century, when the metaphysical dimension of Kantian criticism was brought to light owing to ambitious philological and philosophical research on Kant’s manuscript notes and lectures. Other elements, like F. Paulsens’s writings and the reading of Kant’s transcendental philosophy on the background of the doctrine of the transcendentals, also contributed significantly to its emergence. The second part of this work deals with Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant. Even if Heidegger does not belong to the metaphysical current, he considers the Critique of Pure Reason as a foundation of metaphysics and as an ontology of the known being. The third part of this thesis focuses on some aspects of Kant’s complex relationship to his predecessor Ch. Wolff, and analyses, in light of recent scholarship, the influence which the latter may have had on the young Kant and on critical philosophy — and especially on his conception of ontology.

Reed, Ryan Lee. Unnatural? Thinking About Kant on Same-Sex Marriage. Master’s thesis. University of California, Davis, 2011. [46 p.] Advisor: Robert S. Taylor and John T. Scott. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper asks and offers an answer to the question: Could it be worth thinking about Kant on same-sex marriage? Admittedly, with his reputation for sexual repressiveness, Kant’s views on the subject may appear obvious. Nonetheless, in exploring Kant’s thinking on issues of sex and marriage, I discover that Kant’s theory is able to offer unexpected support for same-sex marriage. I first consider the moral problem that Kant sees in sexual desire and his argument that marriage offers the sole solution to that problem. Then, building upon Kant’s notions of non-ideal conditions, permissive laws, and fair equality of opportunity, I discover a path to same-sex marriage rights.

Repovž, Živa. Tri sinteze in temporalnost: časovni karakter upodobitve moči v treh sintezah transcendentalne dedukcije kritike čistega uma. Ph.D. diss. Univ. v Ljubljani, 2011. [43 p.] Advisor: Zdravko Kobe. [WC]

Santos, Rafael Padilha Dos.  A Moral e a justiça no pensamento de Immanuel Kant. [Portuguese]  Ph.D. diss.  Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, 2011. [240 p.]  Advisor: Maria de Lourdes Alves Borges. [online] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The subject of this work is the morality and justice in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, morality as a field of knowledge turned to human con- duct, justice as a central condition to complete the ultimate scope of the doctrine of right within the limits of pure reason, which is the institution of universal and perpetual peace: States under a Republican Constitu- tion, a world Republic and a universal community. Justice is a broad theme in Kant`s philosophy and it can be conceived in the state of na- ture, civil state, from conformity to empirical laws, from conformity to rational principles, relations between individuals, between States and between States and individuals. To manage this issue this study ana- lyzed the whole system of Kantian practical philosophy, specially hig- hlighted issues about the moral and the ethical and legal binomial in Kant`s philosophy. In general, it is clear that justice in Kant conforms to external laws, be them natural laws (a priori rational principles) or posi- tive laws. With the idea of justice Kant enthrones rational standards on the foundation of political and legal order, and does so by drawing spe- cial relevance to the work of the juridical scientists, to be cultivated to the enlightenment through the public use of their reason, illuminating changes in society toward a civil society that administers the universal right, that provides maximum freedom and safeguards the limits of this freedom by ensuring that humanity fully develop their best provisions.

Sarbazevatan, Sourena.  La place de Jean-Jacques Rousseau dans la philosophie kantienne de l'éducation. Ph.D. diss. Université de Montréal, 2011. [# p.] Advisor: Claude Piché. [online] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The decisive influence of Immanuel Kant in the course of modern philosophy is incontrovertible. In a sense, had it not been for this monumental figure of the 18th century, philosophy would have never reached the flair to convey the existential, analytical and phenomenological questions of modernity. However, if Kant set the agenda for any posterior thought, he was not himself Kantian until Jean-Jacques Rousseau disenchanted him. In this regard, if the Genevois philosopher communicated his philosophy in the guise of an education, philosophy in itself is defined by the education of humanity. It is indeed this perspective of Rousseau that put the German philosopher on the right track to find the ultimate goal of philosophy in the moral education as the sum and substance of the practical philosophy. The objective of this study is to shed some lights on the unparalleled role of Jean-Jacques Rousseau in Kant’s philosophy of education as the harbinger of the universal ethics beyond the dogmas of a blind theology: the question which still remains crucial today.

Schwenkler, Angela Marie. Prolegomena to a Kantian Theory of Moral Judgment. Ph.D. diss. University of Notre Dame, 2011. [iv, 205 p.] Advisor: Karl Ameriks. [online] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this dissertation, I draw insight about what constitutes a good theory of moral judgment from Aristotle and, in particular, from John McDowell’s appropriation of him in “Virtue and Reason.” Articulating a set of desiderata for a theory of moral judgment, I consider whether Kant has the resources from which we could construct a similar theory of moral judgment while also retaining what I take to be advantageous aspects of his moral theory more generally. I turn to an examination of recent work in Kant’s theory of theoretical judgment — in particular, the work of Beatrice Longuenesse in Kant and the Capacity to Judge — in order to find out what, for Kant, guides and makes possible theoretical judgment. Finding that theoretical judgment has at its core a teleological impulse to judge, I then show how this insight both can and cannot be applied to the case of moral judgment.

Shaddock, Justin Bertin. Kant’s transcendental methodology: An essay on justification, objectivity, and subjectivity in Kant’s transcendental deduction of the categories. Ph.D. diss. The University of Chicago, 2011. [154 p.] Advisor: Robert Pippin. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: I argue for a new interpretation of Kant’s methodology in his transcendental deduction. I focus on Kant’s idea that the self-knowledge of our finite cognitive subject can justify our metaphysical knowledge of empirical objects. My primary contribution to the literature is to distinguish two kinds of self-knowledge in Kant, which I do by pulling apart two strands in his thinking on our subjectivity. On one hand, there are Kant’s merely subjectivist doctrines of how we cannot help but think, and of how things cannot but appear to us. On the other hand, there is Kant’s methodology. This includes his transcendental method — which is to ask, “What is it for our cognitive faculty to be finite?” — and his methodological idealism, according to which the answers to the questions, “What is it to be a finite cognitive subject?” and “What is it to be an empirical object?” come together.

Silva, André Luiz da. A Relação entre ética e direito na filosofia de Immanuel Kant. [Portuguese] Ph.D. diss. Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, 2011. [139 p.] Advisor: Delamar Volpato Dutra. [online] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Em 1797, Immanuel Kant publicou A Metafísica dos Costumes, texto que compõe o sistema de sua filosofia prática e subdividi-se em uma doutrina do direito e uma doutrina da virtude. Tal trabalho filosófico gera interpretações distintas por parte de estudiosos, especialmente acerca da relação entre ética e direito no pensamento kantiano. Não obstante, é possível dizer que esta relação precisa ser esclarecida a partir dos conceitos kantianos de Moral, Ética e Direito, para expor o fundamento das leis éticas e das leis jurídicas e a forma de apreendê-las, e também para estabelecer uma diferença entre Ética e Direito, para a qual se recorre ao conceito de legislação. Não apenas a Ética, mas também o Direito tem, numa interpretação específica, de justificar-se por meio da moral envolvendo, portanto, também a concepção de Crítica no sentido de desenvolver o conceito de liberdade. Entendendo que ao estabelecer as relações entre a legislação ética e a legislação jurídica, a partir de uma unidade comum, bem como sua diferenciação, seja possível elaborar os conceitos racionais puros do Direito e da Ética, que constituem o programa de uma metafísica dos costumes, o propósito do presente trabalho é expor a relação entre ética e direito no pensamento de Immanuel Kant, buscando apontar os fundamentos críticos da filosofia prática kantiana bem como sua articulação com a liberdade humana.

Stankovic, Sasa. The Ethics of Kant’s Practice: Or Deleuze’s Repetition of Kant. Ph.D. diss. University of Guelph, 2011. [266 p.] Advisor: Jay Lampert. [online] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: I suppose that the term ‘knowledge’ can refer to various kinds of activities. In this thesis I study only one of them. I am interested in the kind of knowledge that cannot be separated from its object. In other words, I am interested in knowledge that is at the same time the object that it knows. I take ethics to be this kind of knowledge. This thesis is a study of certain works by Immanuel Kant and Gilles Deleuze. It argues that for these two thinkers what there is just is what is known in this sense. In other words, what there is just is what should be. In Kant the thing in itself is an ethical concept that we know through actualization. In Deleuze difference in itself is an ethical concept that we know through repetition.

Su, Ya. How is Happiness Possible? A Study of Kant’s Concept of Happiness. [Chinese] Ph.D. diss. University, 2011. [# p.] Advisor: ??. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The issue of happiness is an important part of Kantian philosophy. In recent years, this issue received widespread attention from the foreign academic researchers (see Introduction), but in academic circles of our country, the study on this problem is still blank. This paper attempts to prove that the issue of happiness in Kant’s philosophy plays an important role by sorting out Kant’s thoughts, then attempts to make a reasonable answer to this question, "How is happiness possible ". In this article, the answer to this question is divided into the following four aspects: first, for the human beings, what is happiness; second, whether the person has the right to pursue their own happiness; Third, if one has the right to pursue own happiness, then what kind of happiness should people pursue; Fourth, how should people achieve this happiness. People here are divided into two levels, namely, as individuals and as whole human beings. Although except the Kantian Perfectionism in the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant did not have a systematic answer to that question, but in fact, the problem of happiness throughout the whole practice philosophy of Kant, and occupies a unique position in Kant’s philosophy. Kant’s answer to that question contains in these concepts that "the realm of ends" in the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, "the highest good" in the Critique of Practical Reason, "duties of right and duties of virtue" in the Metaphysics of Moral, and "the ethical community" in the Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone. Although in Kant’s view, whether one's own happiness or the happiness of others even the universal happiness of human beings can not provide the basis for the moral law, but Kant also believes that, happiness distributed quite exactly in proportion to morality amounts to the highest good of a possible world. More importantly, Kant established the right of individuals to pursue their own happiness by law in the On the Common Saying: That may be right in theory but does not work in practice. In the Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View and other articles, Kant even saw the human pursuit of happiness as the driving force of historical development. It can be seen that Kant’s answer to the question of happiness is not limited in the context of moral philosophy, but also in his political philosophy and historical philosophy. On this basis, the paper attempts to pursue Kant’s answer to the question of happiness. The article's structure is as follow: Introduction starting with the object and the scope of this article, points out that the theoretical sources and historical background of this issue, in order to analyze the unique theoretical and practical significance of this topic in today's society; reviews the research status of the topic to explore the space of this topic; elaborates the innovation and inadequacy of this article. The first chapter starting with Kant’s definition of happiness elaborates what is happiness in Kant’s view, and the position of happiness in Kant’s philosophy, and clarifies the key difference between the Kantian doctrine and the eudaemonism described by Kant is that Kant thought only people who have virtue are worthy of happiness. The second chapter analyzes what is morality in Kant’s view, what is the moral motion and how to measure and determine the moral worth. On this basis, the paper's third chapter interprets Kant’s idea of the highest good, and proved that the highest good is an ideal in Kant’s thought, and the pursuit of this ideal is the duty for all human beings. This fourth chapter shows that Kant thought that people have legal right to pursuit their own happiness, but this right has its own limitations, that is, the freedom of others. On this basis, this chapter analyzes Kant’s thought that against violent revolution, pursuing the permanent peace and advocating the freedom of speech. The conclusion of this article gives the final answer to this problem " How is happiness possible", that is, in Kant’s view, the pursuit of happiness rely on the full development of endowment, which is self enlightenment. Therefore, human history can be seen as people first joint as a political community, and ultimately into the universal human moral community.

Täschner, Anna. Mensch und Staat bei Immanuel Kant zu den anthropologischen Grundlagen seiner politischen Theorie. Ph.D. diss. Köln Universität, 2011. [252 p.] Advisor: ??. [data] [WC]

Tinguely, Joseph J. Orientation: Kant and the Aesthetic Content of Cognition. Ph.D. diss. New School University, 2011. [236 p.] Advisor: Jay M. Bernstein. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: My dissertation is motivated by the conviction that contemporary debates about the role of conceptuality in cognition and perception suffer from the general neglect of Kant’s Critique of Judgment. More specifically, I set out to show how Kant’s aesthetics harbors a fully defensible account of empirical cognition capable of overcoming the deficits inherent in both the empiricist and conceptualist alternatives. The overarching argument of the dissertation is that the notion of orientation as used by Kant offers one concrete example in which our affective capacities are drawn on in perception and cognition. I begin in Chapter 1, “Orientation in Kant”, with a close analysis of the essay of 1786 and argue against standard interpretations that rather than fitting in neatly as a midway point between the epistemology and metaphysics of the first Critique and the aesthetics of the third, the largely overlooked question of how we orient ourselves in the world puts a curious strain on central tenets of Kant’s own critical system, in particular, the conviction that affects are merely subjective and therefore “feeling is not a faculty whereby we represent things, but lies outside our whole faculty of knowledge” (A801/B829 n.a). In that case, the moment of worldly orientation, as it arises briefly in a minor essay, proves to be at odds with Kant’s official and systematic division of labor between the subjectivity of aesthetics and the objectivity of epistemology. But the leading thread of the dissertation is that, on closer consideration, orientation is not a momentary departure from Kant’s own better judgment but brings full circle a line of thought opened up by the “Copernican Turn” according to which the objects of experience and knowledge are not corrupted, but rather made possible in the first instance, by the disclosive and judgmental capacities of human subjectivity. In its basics, the notion of orientation requires that the “Copernican” insight into how our human subjectivity makes the objects of experience available to cognition is not be limited to our discursive or conceptual capacities but must include our affective sensibilities as well. If the first chapter amounts to an “analysis” of the notion of orientation, the remaining chapters offer a “deduction” or demonstration why a functional ability to orient ourselves must already be built into our ground-level ability to experience and make sense of the empirical world. In Chapter 2, “The Double-Function of the Imagination”, I use developments in the third Critique to fill-out the enthymematic doctrine of the “productive imagination” as presented in the first Critique for the purpose of identifying where an orientational capacity can be located in a Kantian account of mind. In order to make an orienting imagination not only tenable as a reading of Kant but plausible in itself, I work to demystify Kant’s otherwise cryptic claim that the mental function of “apprehension” by which we passively sense empirical content is the “same power” as the “exhibition” of concepts by which we actively make sense of the world (5:279). With the double-function of the imagination as both passive and active firmly in hand, I then turn in Chapter 3, “Taste and the Intentionalist Accounts of Pleasure”, to unknot the convoluted relationship between the imagination and the feeling of pleasure in aesthetic judgments of taste. I set out to argue, against several prominent interpretations, that judgments of taste are not judgments made about a feeling of pleasure but rather are judgments made by way of a feeling of pleasure (viz. pleasure is not the referent but the form of judgments of taste). Over and against causal and priority theories of the role of pleasure in judgments of taste, I defend an “internalist” or “intentionalist” account of aesthetic judgment according to which pleasure plays an internal and active role in bringing form to an aesthetic object and is thus part of the judgment itself. Having located the feeling of aesthetic pleasure in the double-function of the imagination, I will have assembled out of Kant’s account of taste all of the pieces needed to build out to the notion of orientation in which affective states are discriminatory of our ground-level, basic experiences of objects in the world. The move “From Taste to Orientation” is the goal of Chapter 4 but first requires showing that the intentional role played by pleasure in aesthetic judgment can be extended to other affects or feelings. Establishing that the feeling at play in aesthetic judgment cannot, in principle, be limited to pleasure amounts to a negative defense of orientation. I conclude the chapter, however, by trying to show that there are sufficient resources within the third Critique to prefigure a more satisfying positive defense of orientation.

Tinio, Jerilyn. Idealism in Kant and Berkeley: A Defense of Berkeley’s Concept of Objectivity. Master’s thesis. University of Wisconsin/Milwaukee, 2011. [60 p.] Advisor: ??. [WC]

Valdez, Edgar. Pre-postulate a priori Intuition: Revisiting Kant’s Account of Space. Ph.D. diss. State University of New York at Binghamton, 2011. [211 p.] Advisor: Robert Guay. [WC]

Viprey, Doris. Banalité et radicalité du mal ce qu'il y a de kantien dans la “banalité du mal” décrite par Hannah Arendt et recherche de ce qui résiste à la comparaison. Ph.D. diss. Université de Franche-Comté, 2011. [58 p.] Advisor: Hervé Touboul. [WC]

Walden, Kenneth Edward Dale. One and the same reason. Ph.D. diss. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2011. [# p.] Advisor: Richard Holton and Rae Langton. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: My dissertation is about the relationship between theoretical and practical reason. I argue that these two kinds of reason are unified in important respects. In Chapter One I argue that there is a single, fundamental kind of reasoning (roughly, unrestrained self-reflection) and that theoretical and practical reason ought to be understood as instances of this more fundamental kind of reasoning, distinguished only by their subject matter. I then argue that two formulations of Kant’s Categorical Imperative jointly codify the activity of this basic reasoning. Therefore, the Categorical Imperative is, in this sense, the supreme principle of reason. In Chapter Two I show how the very abstract norms formulated in Chapter One can be sharpened if we connect them to the conditions of human agency. I argue that the demands of being an agent require us to submit to a procedure of negotiation and legislation with other agents that is similar to the contractualism of Hobbes and Rawls. The difference between my view and theirs is that my contractualism, because it is tied to our agency, issues in categorical requirements. In Chapter Three I develop a theory of normative concepts that satisfies two demands that have appeared incompatible: the demand that our normative concepts be intimately connected to human nature and the demand that normative items be things we aspire to, and thus things that are relevantly beyond us and our activities. I show how we can satisfy both of these desiderata through an open-ended constructivism that understands normative items as transcendent ideals. In Chapter Four I argue that a robust, philosophically serviceable distinction between theoretical judgments about the world and practical judgments about what one ought to do cannot be sustained because these two kinds of judgments are inextricably entangled. They are entangled because we must employ both kinds of judgment to fully explain actions. This fact entails that practical and theoretical judgments occupy a single holistic theory.

Winkelman, Steven J. The Moral Status of the Deceased in Kant’s Ethics. Master’s thesis. University of Wisconsin/Milwaukee, 2011. [44 p.] Advisor: ??. [WC]

Wood, Mia Claudia. A Standpoint for Critique: The Metaphorical Status of Critique in Kant’s “Critique of Pure Reason”. Ph.D. diss. University of South Carolina, 2011. [280 p.] Advisor: Martin Donougho.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: I argue that critique is an epistemologically significant Kantian metaphor for transcendental self-consciousness. This claim is complex, involving two antecedent propositions: (1) there is a Kantian theory of metaphor; (2) critique is such a metaphor.
In Chapter 1, I argue that theorizing about metaphor is too diverse to allow for anything but the arbitrary adoption of a single theory that can be applied to critique. Were I to make such a move, I could then arguably misrepresent Kant. So, in Chapter 2, I turn directly to Kant’s third Critique, specifically §49, and argue that Kant’s theory of aesthetic ideas is a plausible theory of metaphor — more plausible than is his theory of symbolically exhibited ideas, which I take to be analogies. The two central features of a Kantian metaphor are that it allows one to adopt a variety of standpoints from which to contemplate or think rational ideas, and that built into the capacity to adopt standpoints for this purpose is the ability to think from both particular and universal points of view — e.g., to make subjective claims that have universal validity.
Chapter 3 involves the argument that critique is a Kantian metaphor. This argument relies on the success of the main argument in Chapter 2, along with the etymological and socio-historical analyses of critique as adopting standpoints. This argument leads to the claim that critique is a metaphor for transcendental self-consciousness. Since critique as a Kantian metaphor reflects the capacity not only to adopt a variety of standpoints for contemplating the nature and scope of knowledge, but also for attempting to press past epistemological boundaries, we have to find a feature of the mind that is the source of that capacity. On the interpretation of transcendental self-consciousness as the only such feature of the mind, I conclude it to be the source of critique as a Kantian metaphor. From this it follows that critique as a Kantian metaphor has epistemological significance. That is because transcendental self-consciousness must be presupposed in all judgments.

Yeum, Sung Jun. Der Lebensbegriff in Kants kritischer Philosophie. Ph.D. diss. Humboldt-Universität, Berlin, 2011. [225 p.] Advisors: Volker Gerhardt and Beatrix Himmelmann. [online] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In my thesis, I intended to make a contribution to the understanding of the concepts of life, action and culture in the Critique of Pure Reason. As my research results show, these concepts, closely connected to each other in an organized system, play a crucial role in regard to the problems of the subjective deduction and objective deduction of the concepts of the understanding — the discussion of the former being “of great importance” regarding Kant’s primary purpose, while the latter constitutes a “substantial” “primary purpose”.

Zhong, Hui. Kant’s Problem of Schematism and its Modern Criticism. Ph.D. diss. The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2011. [173 p.] Advisor: ??. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This thesis focuses on the problem of Immanuel Kant’s Schematism. I also research the further development of the subject, which is made by the modern Analytic philosopher Peter F. Strawson and the Continental philosopher Martin Heidegger. I argue that “schema” means the ways of giving metaphysics originally; thereby I define all the philosophers’ relevant works as a ground-laying of metaphysics. It finally belongs to the realm of ontology. Compared with the theories of categories in the history of philosophy, schematism is more fundamental, because it is the procedure which generates the common framework of experiences shared by all human beings. Kant’s schematism indicates that all kinds of categories would be meaningful in their process of application only by means of temporalized schema. Strawson changes the traditional mode of theory of categories into an approach of [conceptual scheme] . Heidegger successfully explores the pre-theoretical horizon by displaying the characteristic of ecstatical temporality which is hidden in schematism. Poring over these thoughts, we can find a new foundation for metaphysics or even philosophy itself, in which it would be connected with our ordinary ways of speaking, thinking and living, though people always think the foundation is foreign. I analyze the theories of these three philosophers in this thesis respectively, and also discuss the differences between them. For example, Kant uses simultaneity and succession as the transcendental time’s criteria, but Heidegger’s temporal dimensions are having been, present, and futurity. We can also find that Strawson and Heidegger choose the different ways to interpret Kant’s problem in different background of the concept of truth. Discovering these theoretical views would help us clarify the rules which are operated in the practical space of thinking.

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I thank Andrey Zilber for his kind assistance with the articles from the Russian journal Kantovskij Sbornik, and Rodica Croitoru for her help with many of the items from the Romanian literature.