[2011]  Kant Bibliography 2012  [2013]

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[top]Kant    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Editions and translations of the writings of Immanuel Kant

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[See also the items listed under Collections]

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“Earthquakes” (1756)

 ——.  Scritti sui terremoti. [Italian] Translated by Augusto Placanica, edited by Maurizio Barletta. Rome: Robin, 2012. [97 p.]. [WC]

“Versuch einiger Betrachtungen über den Optimismus” (1759)

 ——.  “Versuch einiger Betrachtungen über den Optimismus.” Edited and introduced by Marco Sgarbi. Philosophical Academic Programs of the German Enlightenment. Eds. Seung-Kee Lee, Riccardo Pozzo, Marco Sgarbi, and Dagmar von Wille (op cit.). 177-88. [M]

“Die falsche Spitzfindigkeit der vier syllogistischen Figuren erwiesen” (1762)

 ——.  “Die falsche Spitzfindigkeit der vier syllogistischen Figuren erwiesen.”  Edited and introduced by Marco Sgarbi. Philosophical Academic Programs of the German Enlightenment. Eds. Seung-Kee Lee, Riccardo Pozzo, Marco Sgarbi, and Dagmar von Wille (op cit.). 189-210. [M]

“Versuch den Begriff der negativen Größen in die Weltweisheit einzuführen” (1763)

 ——.  “Versuch den Begriff der negativen Größen in die Weltweisheit einzuführen.” Edited and introduced by Tommaso Tuppini. Philosophical Academic Programs of the German Enlightenment. Eds. Seung-Kee Lee, Riccardo Pozzo, Marco Sgarbi, and Dagmar von Wille (op cit.). 211-50. [M]

“Nachricht von der Einrichtung seiner Vorlesungen” (1765)

 ——.  “Nachricht von der Einrichtung seiner Vorlesungen in dem Winterhalbenjahre, von 1765-1766.” Edited and introduced by Tommaso Tuppini. Philosophical Academic Programs of the German Enlightenment. Eds. Seung-Kee Lee, Riccardo Pozzo, Marco Sgarbi, and Dagmar von Wille (op cit.). 251-65. [M]

“Rezension zu Peter Moscati” (1771)

 ——. “Resenha do escrito de Moscati: 'Da diferença corpórea essencial entre a estrutura dos animais e a dos homens', de Immanuel Kant.” [Portuguese] Translated by Alexandre Hahn. Kant e-Prints 7.2 (2012): 4-6. [M] [online]

“Von den verschiedenen Racen der Menschen” (1775)

 ——.  “Von den verschiedenen Racen der Menschen.” Edited and introduced by Mario Longo. Philosophical Academic Programs of the German Enlightenment. Eds. Seung-Kee Lee, Riccardo Pozzo, Marco Sgarbi, and Dagmar von Wille (op cit.). 267-87. [M]

Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1781)

 ——.  Crítica da Razão Pura. [Portuguese] Translated by Fernando Costa Mattos. Petrópolis: Ed. Vozes, 2012. [621 p.] [WC]

 ——.  純粋理性批判 / Junsui risei hihan. [Japanese] Translated by Sumihiko Kumano. Tokyo: Sakuhinsha, 2012. [863 p.] [WC]

 ——.  純粋理性批判: 7 / Junsui risei hihan: 7. [Japanese] Translated by Gen Nakayama. Tokyo: Kobunsha, 2012. [361 p.] [WC]

 ——.  Kritika v predelach tol’ko razuma. [Russian] Translated by N. M. Sokolov. Moscow: Kniznyj dom "LIBROKOM", 2012. [304 p.] [WC]

Prolegomena (1783)

 ——.  Prolegomena. [Dutch] Translated by Jabik Veenbaas and Willem Visser. Amsterdam: Boom, 2012. [176 p.] [WC]

“Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?” (1784)

 ——.  Contestación a la pregunta: ¿qué es la Ilustración? [Spanish] Translated by Baltasar Espinosa, Roberto Rodríguez Aramayo, and Concha Roldán Panadero. Madrid: Taurus, 2012. [138 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Translations into Spanish of the following: [Enlightenment] [Perpetual Peace] [Conflict of the Faculties (sel.)] [Conjectural Beginning].

Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (1785)

 ——.  Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. [English] Translated and edited by Mary J. Gregor and Jens Timmermann, with an introduction by Christine M. Korsgaard. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012. [xliv, 87 p.] [WC]

 ——.  道德形而上学原理 / Dao de xing er shang xue yuan li. [Chinese] Translated by Litian Miao. Shanghai: Shang hai ren min chu ban she, 2012. [115 p.] [WC]

 ——.  道徳形而上学の基礎づけ / Dotoku keijijogaku no kisozuke. [Japanese] Translated by Gen Nakayama. Tokyo: Kobunsha, 2012. [410 p.] [WC]

“Bestimmung des Begriffs einer Menschenrasse” (1785)

 ——. “Determinação do conceito de uma raça humana, de Immanuel Kant.” [Portuguese] Translated by Alexandre Hahn. Kant e-Prints 7.2 (2012): 28-45. [M] [online]

“Erste Fassung der Einleitung in die Kritik der Urteilskraft” (1789)

 ——.  Prima introduzione alla “Critica della capacità di giudizio”. [Italian] Translated by Francesco Valagussa. Italian-German edition. Milan: Mimesis, 2012. [159 p.]

Kritik der Urteilskraft (1790)

 ——.  Critica della capacità di giudizio. [Italian] Translated by Leonardo Amoroso. Milan: Rizzoli, 2012. [898 p.] [WC]

 ——.  Critica del discernimiento. [Spanish] Translated by Roberto R. Aramayo and Salvador Mas. Madrid: Alianza, 2012. [784 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Significantly revised second edition (1st edition: 2003).

 ——.  Analytique du beau: texte intégral. [French] Translated by Jules Barni, analysis by Ole Hansen-Løve. Paris: Hatier, 2012. [127 p.] [WC]

Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft (1793)

 ——.  Religija unutar granica pukog uma. [Croatian] Translated by Kiril Miladinov. Zagreb: Naklada Breza, 2012. [186 p.] [WC]

 ——.  纯然理性界限内的宗教（注释本）/ Chun ran li xing jie xian nei de zong jiao (zhu shi ben). [Chinese] Translated by Qiuling Li. Beijing: Zhongguo ren min da xue chu ban she, 2012. [189 p.] [WC]

 ——.  الدين في حدود مجرد الʻقل.. [Arabic] Translated by Fathi al-Muskini. Beirut, 2012. [ p.] [WC]

 ——.  Kritika v predelach tolʹko razuma. [Russian] Translated by N. M. Sokolov. Moscow: Knižnyj dom "LIBROKOM", 2012. [304 p.] [WC]

“Über den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht für die Praxis” (1793)

 ——.  Etika eta politika: Bakearen auzia. [Basque] Translated by Esteban Antxustegi Igartua and Josu Zabaleta Imaz; introduction by Antonio Hermosa Andújar. Bilbao: Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea, Argitarapen Zerbitzua, 2012. [lviii, 207 p.] [WC]

Zum ewigen Frieden (1795)

 ——.  Naar de eeuwige vrede: een filosofisch ontwerp, 2nd expanded edition. [Dutch] Translated by Thomas Mertens and Edwin van Elden, preface and annotations by Thomas Mertens. Amsterdam: Boom, 2012. [129 p.] [WC]

 ——.  Sobre la paz perpetua. [Spanish] Translated by Kimana Zulueta Fülscher. Madrid: Akal, 2012. [128 p.] [WC]

“Über ein vermeintes Recht, aus Menschenliebe zu lügen” (1797)

 ——.  ¿Hay derecho a mentir? la polémica Inmanuel Kant/Benjamin Constant sobre la existencia de un deber incondicionado de decir la verdad. [Spanish] Translated by Eloy Garcia, introduction by Gabriel Albiac. Madrid: Tecnos, 2012. [lxxvii, 43 p.] [WC]

Der Streit der Facultäten (1798)

 ——.  “A Draft of Kant’s Reply to Hufeland: Autograph, Transcription, and English Translation.” [English] Transcription by Wolfgang G. Bayerer, translated by Yvonne Unna. Kant-Studien 103.1 (2012): 1-24. [M]

 ——. 학부들의 논쟁: 세 편으로 이루어진 학부들의 논쟁. [Korean] Translated by Oh Jin Seok. Seoul, 2012. [262 p.] [WC]

Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht abgefaßt (1798)

 ——. 实用人类学 / Shi yong ren lei xue. [Chinese] 2nd edition. Translated by Xiaomang Deng. (Publisher), 2012. [238 p.] [WC]

 ——. Hva er mennesket? antropologi i pragmatisk perspektiv. [Norwegian] Translated by Øystein Skar, introduction by Lars Fr. H. Svendsen. Oslo: Pax Forlegger, 2012. [242 p.] [WC]

Über Pädagogik (1803)

 ——. Sobre a pedagogia. [Portuguese] Translated by João Tiago Proença. Lisbon: Edições 70, 2012. [80 p.] [WC]

Nachlaß

 ——. “Reflexões sobre filosofia moral da década de 1770.” [German/Portuguese] Translated, and with an introduction (pp. 127-33) and comments, by Diego Kosbiau Trevisan. Cadernos de Filosofia Alemã: Crítica e Modernidade 19 (2012): 127-58. [M] [online]

Lecture Notes

 ——.  Antropología Collins. [Spanish] Translated by Alejandro García Mayo. Madrid: Escolar y Mayo, 2012. [344 p.] [WC]

 ——.  Enciclopedia filosófica: o un breve compendio de todas las ciencias filosóficas a partir de las lecciones del señor profesor Immanuel Kant, seguido de una selección de reflexiones de lógica y metafísica del legado manuscrito de Kant. [Spanish] Translated by José M García Gómez del Valle. Girona: Palamedes, 2012. [119 p.] [WC]

Miscellaneous

 ——.  Kant zum Vergnügen. Edited by Volker Gerhardt. Stuttgart: Reclam, 2012. [182 p.] [WC]

 ——.  Etica, genio e sublime in Kant. [Italian] Translated by Piero Giordanetti. Milan: Mimesis, 2012. [231 p.] [WC]

Collections

[Espinoza/Aramayo/Roldán 2012] Contestación a la pregunta: ¿qué es la Ilustración? [Spanish] Translated by Baltasar Espinoza, Roberto Rodríguez Aramayo, and Concha Roldán Panadero. Madrid: Taurus. [138 p.]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Translations of: “What is Enlightenment?” (1784), “Perpetual Peace (1795), a selection from “Conflict of the Faculties” (1798), and “Conjectural Beginning” (1786).

[Jankowski 2012]; Pisma po roku 1781. [Polish] Translated by Marek Jankowski. Toruń: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika, 2012. [508 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Vol. 6 of Dzieła zebrane.

[Kupś 2012] Prolegomena do wszelkiej przyszłej metafizyki, która ma wystąpić jako nauka; Ugruntowanie metafizyki moralności; Metafizyczne podstawy przyrodoznawstwa; Krytyka praktycznego rozumu. [Polish] Edited by Tomasz Kupś, translated by Benedykt Bornstein and Mirosław Żelazny.  Toruń: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika, 2012. [576 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Translations of Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaften, and Kritik der praktischen Vernunft.

[Riconda 2012] Scritti di filosofia della religione. [Italian] Edited by Giuseppe Riconda; translated by Gaetano Durante, Andrea Poma, and Giuseppe Riconda. Milan: Ugo Mursia Editore, 2012/1989. [308 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: 1st published in 1989. Includes translations into Italian of Letters to Lavater (1775), "On the Miscarriage of All Philosophical Trials in Theodicy" (1791), Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (1793), "The End of all Things" (1794), and the first part of The Conflict of the Faculties (1798).

[Watkins 2012] Natural Science. [English] Edited by Eric Watkins, translated by Lewis White Beck, Jeffrey B. Edwards, Olaf Reinhardt, Martin Schonfeld, and Watkins. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012. [xviii, 802 p.] [M] [review]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents:
1. Thoughts on the true estimation of living forces and assessment of the demonstrations that Leibniz and other scholars of mechanics have made use of in this controversial subject, together with some prefatory considerations pertaining to the force of bodies in general (1746-1749) Translated by Jeffrey B. Edwards and Martin Schönfeld;
2. Examination of the question whether the rotation of the Earth on its axis by which it brings about the alternation of day and night has undergone any change since its origin and how one can be certain of this, which [question] was set by the Royal Academy of Sciences in Berlin as the prize question for the current year (1754) Translated by Olaf Reinhardt;
3. The question, whether the Earth is ageing, considered from a physical point of view (1754) Translated by Olaf Reinhardt;
4. Universal natural history and theory of the heavens or essay on the constitution and the mechanical origin of the whole universe according to Newtonian principles (1755) Translated by Olaf Reinhardt;
5. Succinct exposition of some meditations on fire (1755) Translated by Lewis White Beck;
6. On the causes of earthquakes on the occasion of the calamity that befell the western countries of Europe towards the end of last year (1756) Translated by Olaf Reinhardt;
7. History and natural description of the most noteworthy occurrences of the earthquake that struck a large part of the Earth at the end of the year 1755 (1756) Translated by Olaf Reinhardt;
8. Continued observations on the earthquakes that have been experienced for some time (1756) Translated by Olaf Reinhardt;
9. New notes to explain the theory of the winds, in which, at the same time, he invites attendance at his lectures (1756) Translated by Olaf Reinhardt;
10. Plan and announcement of a series of lectures on physical geography with an appendix containing a brief consideration of the question: whether the West winds in our regions are moist because they travel over a great sea (1757) Translated by Olaf Reinhardt;
11. New doctrine of motion and rest and the conclusions associated with it in the fundamental principles of natural science while at the same time his lectures for this half-year are announced (1758) Translated by Olaf Reinhardt;
12. Review of Silberschlag's work: theory of the fireball that appeared on 23 July 1762 (1764) Translated by Eric Watkins;
13. Notice of Lambert's correspondence (1782) Translated by Eric Watkins;
14. On the volcanoes on the Moon (1785) Translated by Olaf Reinhardt;
15. Something concerning the influence of the Moon on the weather (1794) Translated by Olaf Reinhardt;
16. Physical geography (1802).

[Wood/Louden 2012] Lectures on Anthropology. [English] Edited by Allen W. Wood and Robert B. Louden, translated by Robert R. Clewis, Robert B. Louden, G. Felicitas Munzel, and Allen W. Wood.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012. [xii, 627 p.] [M] [review]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents:
1. Anthropology Collins (excerpts) — transl. by Allen W. Wood;
2. Anthropology Parow (excerpts) — transl. by Allen W. Wood;
3. Anthropology Friedländer (complete) — transl. by G. Felicitas Munzel;
4. Anthropology Pillau (excerpts) — transl. by Allen W. Wood;
5. Menschenkunde (excerpts) — transl. by Robert B. Louden;
6. Anthropology Mrongovius (complete) — transl. by Robert R. Clewis;
7. Anthropology Busolt (excerpts) — transl. by Allen W. Wood;

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[top]A    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Abela, Paul.  “Kant on Receptivity and Representation.”  Contemporary Kantian Metaphysics: New Essays on Time and Space.  Eds. Roxana Baiasu, Graham Bird, and A. W. Moore (op cit.). 23-40. [M]

Abresch, Rolf.  Kausalität bei Kant: der Mensch zwischen Naturnotwendigkeit und Freiheit.  Munich: AVM, 2012. [274 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Originally presented as a Ph.D. dissertation (Leipzig, 2011).

Agam-Segal, Reschef. “Kant’s Non-Aristotelian Conception of Morality.” Southwest Philosophy Review 28.1 (2012): 121-33. [PDC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: I make a case for a non-Aristotelian reading of Kant’s moral philosophy. In particular, I distinguish between two activities called “self-legislation”: Aristotelian and Kantian. Aristotelian self-legislation is the activity of determining the organizing principle of our own practical life. Every action of ours takes part in this project, which is thus part of the principle of every action. In contrast, not all actions are acts of Kantian self-legislation. To legislate for ourselves in this sense is to be involved in an internal legal drama in which we demand of ourselves, by an internal force, to respect moral duties. Moral normativity, I argue, is thus separated from practical normativity in general. Kant’s notion of self-legislation is part of an attempt to substantiate an absolute conception of morality: to substantiate the idea that our value is higher than that of other things, and yet incomparable. I argue that the notion of self-legislation cannot be part of such an account if understood the Aristotelian way.

Agazzi, Emilio. La filosofia della storia e della politica nel pensiero di Immanuel Kant. [Italian] Milan: Mimesis, 2012. [220 p.] [WC]

Aichele, Alexander.  “Ich denke was, was Du nicht denkst, und das ist Rot: John Locke und George Berkeley über abstrakte Ideen und Kants logischer Abstraktionismus.”  Kant-Studien 103.1 (2012): 25-46. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The paper discusses Berkeley’s classical critique of Locke’s theory of generating concepts by abstraction, rebuts it and shows that concerning, at least, the forming of empirical concepts even Kant holds a Lockean position of abstractionism. After having analyzed the meaning of “idea” Berkeley’s use of his own concept of abstraction to launch his attack on the Lockean one, which according to Berkeley affirms the possibility of forming simple abstract concepts, is scrutinized. Since Locke doesn’t maintain that and Kant, as it is shown in the last step, himself agrees to the Lockean kind of abstractionism post-Lockean esp. Humean critique on Kant concerning this point ends also in nothing.

Akbarian, Reza, Hossein Ghasemi, Mohammad Mohammad Rezayi, et al. “Kant and Mulla Sadra’s Solution to the Problem of Moral Relativism.” [Farsi] Philosophy and Kalam (Falsafe va Kalam-e Eslami) 45.1 (2012): p145-70. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Moral relativism is the philosophical theory that morality is relative that different moral truths hold for different individuals or different societies. Individual and social differences and variety of needs in different ages has posed this question whether morality is relative or absolute? Although Kant and Mulla Sadra belong to different reflective systems but both have common problems in this topic. Both have founded moral laws upon “practical reason” to deliver them from relativism risk. In Kant, “moral law” and “pure practical reason” have universality, and human as “pure intelligence” and “tendency toward highest good” becomes eternal. In Mulla Sadra, human is a “comprehensive reality” that comprehends universal realities in speculative sphere and particular acts in practical sphere. Also on the basis of “imagination immateriality” and “individual unity of soul”, human and soul habits are eternal. In this article we critically analyze and compare viewpoints of Kant and Mulla Sadra about the problem of moral relativism.

Allais, Lucy.  “Perceiving Distinct Particulars.”  Contemporary Kantian Metaphysics: New Essays on Time and Space.  Eds. Roxana Baiasu, Graham Bird, and A. W. Moore (op cit.). 41-66. [M]

Allison, Henry E.  Essays on Kant.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. [xiv, 289 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents: Commentary on section nine of the Antinomy of pure reason — Where have all the categories gone? Reflections on Longuenesse’s reading of Kant’s transcendental deduction — Kant and the two dogmas of rationalism — Transcendental realism, empirical realism, and transcendental idealism — We can act only under the idea of freedom — On the very idea of a propensity to evil — Kant’s practical justification of freedom — The singleness of the categorical imperative — Kant on freedom of the will — Is the Critique of Judgment "post-critical"? — Reflective judgment and the application of logic to nature: Kant’s deduction of the principle of purposiveness as an answer to Hume — The Critique of Judgment as a "true apology" for Leibniz — Kant’s antinomy of teleological judgment — The gulf between nature and freedom and nature’s guarantee of perpetual peace — Kant’s conception of Aufklarung — Teleology and history in Kant: the critical foundations of Kant’s philosophy of history — Reason, revelation, and history in Lessing and Kant.

 ——. “Kant’s Practical Justification of Freedom.”  Kant on Practical Justification: Interpretive Essays. Eds. Mark Timmons and Sorin Baiasu (op cit.). 284-99. [M]

Almeida, Guido Antônio de.  “Self-Consciousness and Objective Knowledge in the Transcendental Deduction of the Critique of Pure Reason.”  Kant in Brazil.  Eds. Frederick Rauscher and Daniel Omar Perez (op cit.). 26-55. [M]

 ——.  “Critique, Deduction, and the Fact of Reason.”  Kant in Brazil.  Eds. Frederick Rauscher and Daniel Omar Perez (op cit.). 127-54. [M]

Altman, Matthew C.  Kant and Applied Ethics: The Uses and Limits of Kant’s Practical Philosophy.  Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012. [336 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents: Introduction: Why Kant Now — Applying Kant's Ethics. Part Introduction — Animal Suffering and Moral Character — Kant's Strategic Importance for Environmental Ethics — Moral and Legal Arguments for Universal Health Care — The Scope of Patient Autonomy — Kantian Arguments against Kant's Conclusions. Part Introduction — Subjecting Ourselves to Capital Punishment — Same-Sex Marriage as a Means to Mutual Respect — Limitations of Kant's Theory. Part Introduction — Consent, Mail-Order Brides, and the Marriage Contract — Individual Maxims and Social Justice — The Decomposition of the Corporate Body — Becoming a Person — Conclusion: Emerging from Kant's Long Shadow — Bibliography — Index.

Alvis, Jason Wesley. “Taking Kant to the Picture Show: A Prolegomena to Any Future Film Theory.” Glimpse 14 (2012): pages. [PDC]

Ameriks, Karl.  Kant’s Elliptical Path.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. [360 p.] [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] From the publisher: Kant’s Elliptical Path explores the main stages and key concepts in the development of Kant’s Critical philosophy, from the early 1760s to the 1790s. Karl Ameriks provides a detailed and concise account of the main ways in which the later Critical works provide a plausible defence of the conception of humanity’s fundamental end that Kant turned to after reading Rousseau in the 1760s. Separate essays are devoted to each of the three Critiques, as well as to earlier notes and lectures and several of Kant’s later writings on history and religion. A final section devotes three chapters to post-Kantian developments in German Romanticism, accounts of tragedy up through Nietzsche, and contemporary philosophy. The theme of an elliptical path is shown to be relevant to these writers as well as to many aspects of Kant’s own life and work.

The topics of the book include fundamental issues in epistemology and metaphysics, with a new defense of Ameriks’s ‘moderate’ interpretation of transcendental idealism. Other essays evaluate Kant’s concept of will and reliance on a ‘fact of reason’ in his practical philosophy, as well as his critique of traditional theodicies, and the historical character of his defense of religion and the concepts of creation and hope within ‘the boundaries of mere reason’. Kant's Elliptical Path will be of value to historians of modern philosophy and Kant scholars, while its treatment of several literary figures and issues in aesthetics, politics, history, and theology make it relevant to readers outside of philosophy.

 ——. “Is Practical Justification in Kant Ultimately Dogmatic?”  Kant on Practical Justification: Interpretive Essays. Eds. Mark Timmons and Sorin Baiasu (op cit.). 153-75. [M]

 ——.  “Kant, Human Nature, and History after Rousseau.”  Kant’s Observations and Remarks: A Critical Guide.  Eds. Susan Meld Shell and Richard Velkley (op cit.). 247-65. [M]

 ——. “The Question is Whether a Purely Apparent Person is Possible.”  Spinoza and German Idealism. Eds. Eckart Förster and Yitzhak Y. Melamed (op cit.). 44-58. [WC]

Amora, Kleber. “Alguns elementos para a compreensão do conceito de substância em Kant.” [Portuguese; Some elements for the understanding of Kant’s concept of substance] Kant e-Prints 7.2 (2012): 46-69. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article presents some elements of Kant’s works such as analogy, schematism, and productive imagination that are necessary to establish his concept of substance and decisive to distance him not only from dogmatism but also from empiricism. In addition to this, it aims to show how Kant’s account of substance incorporates Leibniz’s notion of monade definitely freed from its speculative features.

Anderson, Pamela Sue.  “The Philosophical Significance of Kant’s Religion: ‘Pure Cognition of’ or ‘Belief in’ God.”  Faith and Philosophy 29.2 (2012): 151-62. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In my response-paper, I dispute the claim of Firestone and Jacobs that “Kant’s turn to transcendental analysis of the moral disposition via pure cognition is perhaps the most important new element of his philosophy of religion” (In Defense of Kant’s Religion, 233). In particular, I reject the role given — in the latter — to “pure cognition.” Instead I propose a Kantian variation on cognition which remains consistent with Kant’s moral postulate for the existence of God. I urge that we treat this postulate as regulative. So, in place of pure cognition, “belief in” God grounds our hope for perfect goodness.

 ——.  “Metaphors of Spatial Location: Understanding Post-Kantian Space.”  Contemporary Kantian Metaphysics: New Essays on Time and Space.  Eds. Roxana Baiasu, Graham Bird, and A. W. Moore (op cit.). 169-96. [M]

Anderson-Gold, Sharon. “Philosophers of Peace: Hobbes and Kant on International Order.” Hobbes Studies 25.1 (2012): 6-20. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In their theories of international order, Hobbes and Kant are not as far apart as earlier interpreters have claimed. Both consider peace between states and mutual respect for their sovereign independence to be necessary for securing domestic order. For both Hobbes and Kant, order arises from the very “independency” of states in a manner that is different from the independence of individuals in a state of nature. Both regard the independency of states and their commitment to the prosperity of their subjects as principles that support a long-term orientation toward peaceable cooperation. The most significance difference between Hobbes and Kant concerning international order arises from Kant’s attributing to individuals a cosmopolitan right that makes the international order more subject to potential conflict concerning the rights of individuals, but also gives his theory a stronger normative framework for the development of shared norms than what is found in Hobbes’s political theory.

André, José Gomes. “O conceito de antagonismo na filosofia política de Kant.” [Portuguese; The concept of antagonism in Kant’s political philosophy] Trans/Form/Ação: Revista de Filosofia 35.2 (2012): 31-49. [M]

Andreanský, Eugen.  “Kant’s Philosophy of Religion and Practical Rationality.” [Slovak]  Filozofia 67.3 (2012): 195-207. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The paper deals with Kant’s philosophy of religion as related to his theory of practical rationality. The introductory parts explain the foundations and place of the philosophy of religion in Kant’s works. A special attention is paid to the relationship between religion and morality in Kant’s practical philosophy. The social dimension of religion as conceived by Kant is explained as well. Finally, the paper offers a description of the main features of Kant’s practical rationality.

Angelova, Emilia. Rev. of Reading Kant’s Geography, ed. by Stuart Elden and Eduardo Mendieta (2011). Comparative and Continental Philosophy 4.1 (2012): 151-57. [PW]

Araujo, Saulo de Freitas.  Rev. of Kant and the Human Sciences: Biology, Anthropology and History, edited by Alix Cohen (2009). History of the Human Sciences 25.1 (2012): 140-45. [HUM]

Arendt, Hannah. Das Urteilen: Texte zu Kants Politischer Philosophie. Edited by Ronald Beiner. Munich: Piper, 2012. [255 p.] [WC]

Arias-Albisu, Martín. “Acerca de la relación entre los dos tipo de esquemas de las ideas de la razón en la Crítica de la razón pura de Kant.” [Spanish] Areté: revista de filosofía 24.1 (2012): 7-24. [WC]

Arndt, Andreas.  See: Jaeschke, Walter and Andreas Arndt.

[top] B    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Bader, Ralf M.  “The Role of Kant’s Refutation of Idealism.”  Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 94.1 (2012): 53-73. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper assesses the role of the refutation of idealism with in the Critique of Pure Reason, as well as its relation to the treatment of idealism in the first education and to transcendental idealism more generally. It will be argued that the refutation of Idealism and the fourth paralogism of the first edition are consistent and that their consistence can be explained by reference to the distinction between appearances and phenomena. While the fourth paralogism appeals to the fact that space is a form of intuition to establish that the immediate objects of awareness, namely appearances, that are represented as being in space really are in space and classify as spatial objects, the refutation attempts to show that at least some of these outer appearances are empirically real and have objective correlates, namely phenomena. By appealing to this distinction we can make sense of the idea that the refutation is an extension of the transcendental deduction. While the deduction, considered on its own, constitutes a ‘regressive argument’, the refutation allows us to turn the transcendental analytic into a ‘progressive argument’ that proceeds by the synthetic method — the method that Kant attributed to the Critique in the Prolegomena. Accordingly, we will see that the refutation occupies a crucial role in the analytic. This understanding of the refutation as attempting to establish the existence of phenomena that correspond to empirically real appearances also explains why Kant placed the refutation of idealism after the second postulate, rather than leaving it in the transcendental dialectic amongst the paralogisms.

Bagnoli, Carla.  “Morality as Practical Knowledge.”  Analytic Philosophy 53.1 (2012): 61-70. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article highlights the merits of Stephen Engstrom’s attempt of placing Kant’s ethics in the tradition of practical cognitivism, in contrast to intuitionist and antirealist ways of appropriating Kant’s legacy. In particular, it focuses on two issues: first, the special character of practical knowledge — as opposed to theoretical knowledge and craft expertise; and second, the apparent tension between the demands of morality and the requirements of instrumental reason, when this is understood as driven by concerns for happiness, prudence, and personal integrity. In contrast to Engstrom, the author argues for a form of practical cognitivism that is constructive and importantly refers to the constitutive role of moral sensibility.

Baiasu, Roxana.  “Space and the Limits of Objectivity: Could There Be a Disembodied Thinking of Reality?”  Contemporary Kantian Metaphysics: New Essays on Time and Space.  Eds. Roxana Baiasu, Graham Bird, and A. W. Moore (op cit.). 207-29. [M]

 ——, Graham Bird, and A. W. Moore.  “Introduction.”  Contemporary Kantian Metaphysics: New Essays on Time and Space.  Eds. Roxana Baiasu, Graham Bird, and A. W. Moore (op cit.). 1-20. [M]

 ——, Graham Bird, and A. W. Moore, eds.  Contemporary Kantian Metaphysics: New Essays on Time and Space.  Houndmills/New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. [xi, 300 p.] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents: Paul Abela, “Kant on receptivity and representation”; Lucy Allais, “Perceiving distinct particulars”; John Campbell, “Is spatial awareness required for object perception?”; Steven Crowell, “The normative in perception”; Graham Bird, “Is there any value in Kant’s account of mathematics?”; Leslie Stevenson, “Thinking of everything? Kant speaks to Stephen Hawking”; Jeff Malpas and Günter Zöller, “Reading Kant topographically: From critical philosophy to empirical geography”; Pamela Sue Anderson, “Metaphors of spatial location: understanding post-Kantian space”; A.W. Moore, “Bird on Kant’s mathematical antinomies”; Roxana Baiasu, “Space and the limits of objectivity: Could there be a disembodied thinking of reality?”; Michael Inwood, “Heidegger on time”; Françoise Dastur, “Time and subjectivity: Heidegger’s interpretation of the Kantian notion of time”; Dan Zahavi and Søren Overgaard, “Time, space and body in Bergson, Heidegger and Husserl”.

Baiasu, Sorin. “Introduction: Practical Justification in Kant.”  Kant on Practical Justification: Interpretive Essays. Eds. Mark Timmons and Sorin Baiasu (op cit.). 1-21. [M]

 ——. “Kant’s Rechtfertigung and the Epistemic Character of Practical Justification.”  Kant on Practical Justification: Interpretive Essays. Eds. Mark Timmons and Sorin Baiasu (op cit.). 22-41. [M]

 ——, ed. See: Timmons, Mark, and Sorin Baiasu, eds.

Bailey, Tom.  Rev. of Kantian Deeds, by Henrik Jøker Bjerre (2010). British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20.5 (2012): 1039-41. [M]

Banham, Gary.  “New Works on Kant’s Practical Philosophy.”  Kant Studies Online (2012): 1-22; posted April 2, 2012. [M] [online]

 ——.  “Kantian Friendship.”  Critical Communities and Aesthetic Practices: Dialogues with Tony O’Connor on Society, Art, and Friendship.  Eds. Francis Halsall, Julia Jansen, and Sinéad Murphy (Dordrecht: Springer, 2012). 171-80. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The purpose of this contribution is to address an apparent paradox in Kant’s treatment of friendship. In describing friendship Kant uses the device of thinking of it as involving an essential tension between respect and love. This tension is pictured in terms of the relationship between attraction and repulsion that Kant elsewhere uses in framing his understanding of the dynamic forces at work in the natural world. However, this reference to natural law is one that is peculiar given that Kant understands friendship as a form of ideal relation that is not dependent on empirical forms of feeling, a paradox accentuated by his general reference to love and respect. In the paper I argue that the nature of this paradoxical device requires recourse to Kant’s general use of analogy in practical philosophy, which depends on his notion of the “typic” and that this is employed in relation to the formula of humanity, and requires reference to the idea of another person in its understanding of “respect”.

 ——.  Rev. of Kant’s Theory of Virtue: The Value of Autocracy, by Anne Margaret Baxley (2010). British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20.2 (2012): 415-17. [M]

 ——, Dennis Schulting, and Nigel Hems, eds.  The Continuum Companion to Kant.  New York/London: Continuum, 2012. [xiv, 394 p.] [M] [review]

Baranzke, Heike. “Was bedeutet „Ehrfurcht“ in Albert Schweitzers Verantwortungsethik? Eine Begriffsanalyse im Vergleich mit Schwantje, Kant, Goethe und Nietzsche.” Synthesis Philosophica 53.1 (2012): 7-29. [online] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Aufgrund der Tatsache, dass Albert Schweitzer seine Ethik der Ehrfurcht vor dem Leben auf Anorganisches wie auf die Gesellschaft und die Welt im Ganzen beziehen kann, nimmt der Beitrag anstelle des Gegenstandsbereichs den Begriff der Ehrfurcht in den Blick. Immanuel Kants und Johann Wolfgang von Goethes Konzeptionen säkularer Ehrfurcht weisen den Weg zu Schweitzers Ehrfurcht als einer Verschränkung des ethischen Selbst- und Weltverhältnisses des menschlichen Subjekts als Ergebnis einer konsequent reflektierten Selbstkultivierung zur Verantwortungsbereitschaft. Mit Nietzsche verweigert sich Schweitzer jeglicher normativen Ausformulierung seiner Haltungsethik, die als ihr einziges normatives Prinzip die grenzenlose Bereitschaft, Leben zu erhalten und zu fördern und sich der Vernichtung von Leben zu enthalten, akzeptiert.

 ——. “‘Sanctity-of-Life’—A Bioethical Principle for a Right to Life?” Ethical Theory & Moral Practice 15.3 (2012): 295-308. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: For about five decades the phrase “sanctity-of-life“ has been part of the Anglo-American biomedical ethical discussion related to abortion and end-of-life questions. Nevertheless, the concept’s origin and meaning are unclear. Much controversy is based on the mistaken assumption that the concept denotes the absolute value of human life and thus dictates a strict prohibition on euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide. In this paper, I offer an analysis of the religious and philosophical history of the idea of “sanctity-of-life.” Drawing on biblical texts and interpretation as well as Kant’s secularization of the concept, I argue that “sanctity” has been misunderstood as an ontological feature of biological human life, and instead locate the idea within the historical virtue-ethical tradition, which understands sanctification as a personal achievement through one’s own actions.

Barron, Anne. “Kant, Copyright, and Communicative Freedom.” Law and Philosophy 31.1 (2012): 1-48. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The rapid recent expansion of copyright law worldwide has sparked efforts to defend the ‘public domain’ of nonpropertized information, often on the ground that an expansive public domain is a condition of a ‘free culture’. Yet, questions remain about why the public domain is worth defending, what exactly a free culture is, and what role (if any) authors’ rights might play in relation to it. From the standard liberal perspective shared by many critics of copyright expansionism, the protection of individual expression by means of marketable property rights in authors’ works serves as an engine of progress towards a fully competitive ‘marketplace of ideas’ — though only if balanced by an extensive public domain from which users may draw in the exercise of their own expressivity. This article shows that a significantly different, and arguably richer, conception of what a free culture is and how authors’ rights underpin it emerges from a direct engagement with the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. For Kant, progress towards a fully emancipated (i.e., a ‘mature’ or ‘enlightened’) culture can ‘only’ be achieved through the critical intellectual activity that public communication demands: individual expressive freedom is only a condition, not constitutive, of this ‘freedom to make public use of one’s reason in all matters’. The main thesis defended in this article is that when Kant’s writings on publicity (critical public debate) are read in relation to his writings on the legal organization of publishing, a necessary connection emerges between authors’ rights — as distinct from copyrights — and what Jürgen Habermas and others have named the public sphere. I conclude that it is the public sphere, and not the public domain as such, that should serve as the key reference point in any evaluation of copyright law’s role in relation to the possibility of a free culture.

Barth, Roderich. “Kant als Philosoph des Neuprotestantismus.”  Kant und die Religion — die Religionen und Kant. Eds. Reinhard Hiltscher and Stefan Klingner (op cit.). 119-36. [M]

Bartsch, Volker.  Ich und andere: Hume - Rousseau - Kant.  Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2012. [347 p.] [WC]

Basterra, Gabriela. “Subjectivity at the Limit: Valázquez, Kant, Levinas.” Diacritics 40.4 (2012): 46-70. [JSTOR]

Bauer, Nathan.  “A Peculiar Intuition: Kant’s Conceptualist Account of Perception.”  Inquiry 55.3 (2012): 215-37. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Both parties in the active philosophical debate concerning the conceptual character of perception trace their roots back to Kant’s account of sensible intuition in the Critique of Pure Reason. This striking fact can be attributed to Kant’s tendency both to assert and to deny the involvement of our conceptual capacities in sensible intuition. He appears to waver between these two positions in different passages, and can thus seem thoroughly confused on this issue. But this is not, in fact, the case, for, as I will argue, the appearance of contradiction in his account stems from the failure of some commentators to pay sufficient attention to Kant’s developmental approach to philosophy. Although he begins by asserting the independence of intuition, Kant proceeds from this nonconceptualist starting point to reveal a deeper connection between intuitions and concepts. On this reading, Kant’s seemingly conflicting claims are actually the result of a careful and deliberate strategy for gradually convincing his readers of the conceptual nature of perception.

Baum, Manfred. Ontologie und Transzendentalphilosophie bei Kant.”  Metaphysik — Ästhetik — Ethik. Eds. Antonino Falduto, Caroline Kolisang, and Gabriel Rivero (op cit.). 13-27. [WC]

Baxley, Anne Margaret.  “The Problem of Obligation, the Finite Rational Will, and Kantian Value Realism.”  Inquiry 55.6 (2012): 567-83. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Robert Stern’s Understanding Moral Obligation is a remarkable achievement, representing an original reading of Kant’s contribution to modern moral philosophy and the legacy he bequeathed to his later-eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century successors in the German tradition. On Stern’s interpretation, it was not the threat to autonomy posed by value realism, but the threat to autonomy posed by the obligatory nature of morality that led Kant to develop his critical moral theory grounded in the concept of the self-legislating moral agent. Accordingly, Stern contends that Kant was a moral realist of sorts, holding certain substantive views that are best characterized as realist commitments about value. In this paper, I raise two central objections to Stern’s reading of Kant. The first objection concerns what Stern identifies as Kant’s solution to the problem of moral obligation. Whereas Stern sees the distinction between the infinite will and the finite will as resolving the problem of moral obligation, I argue that this distinction merely explains why moral obligations necessarily take the form of imperatives for us imperfect human beings, but does not solve the deeper problem concerning the obligatory nature of morality — why we should take moral norms to be supremely authoritative laws that override all other norms based on our non-moral interests. The second objection addresses Stern’s claim that Kantian autonomy is compatible with value realism. Although this is an idea with which many contemporary readers will be sympathetic, I suggest that the textual evidence actually weighs in favor of constructivism.

Bazhanov, Valentin A. “Кантианские мотивы в логике и философии науки. Идея единства априорного и эмпирического знания.” [Russian; Kantian motives in logic and philosophy of science. Idea of Unity of a priory and empirical knowledge] Kantovskij Sbornik 41.3 (2012): 18-25. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant insisted on the inherent unity of a priori and empirical elements of cognition. To what extent further progress of philosophy and exact sciences confirmed (or modified) original Kant ideas?
I'm inclined to judge that apriorism in its modest version do not contradict to modest type of empiricism. Real practice of logical and mathematical reasoning provides pry conjunctions of a priori and empirical elements of cognitive processes. We can find their harmonic combinations of mentioned standpoints and thus to confirm the validity of Kant idea related to inherent unity of a priori and empirical elements within contemporary philosophy of science. Apriorism along with empiricism contain powerful heuristic potential.

Beck, Lewis White. James Boswell visita al profesor Kant. Translated into Spanish by Miquel Martínez-Lage. Segovia: La Uña Rota, 2012. [77 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: I have not been able to inspect this volume, but listings on the internet make no mention of Beck as the author, presenting this text as instead coming from James Boswell’s pen. Beck first published this spoof as Mr. Boswell dines with Professor Kant: being a part of James Boswell’s Journal, until now unknown, found in the Castle of Balmeanach on the Isle of Muck in the Inner Hebrides (Edinburgh: Tragara Press, 1979), later reprinted by Thoemmes Press in 1995.

Beckenkamp, Joãosinho.  “Symbolization in Kant’s Critical Philosophy.”  Kant in Brazil.  Eds. Frederick Rauscher and Daniel Omar Perez (op cit.). 348-58. [M]

Behnke, Andreas. “Eternal peace, perpetual war? A critical investigation into Kant’s conceptualisations of war.” Journal of International Relations and Development 15.2 (2012): 250-71. [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Most discussions of Immanuel Kant’s political theory of international politics focus on his work on Eternal Peace and its normative and empirical relevance for contemporary international relations and international law. Yet for all his concern with peace, Kant’s work is characterised by a fascinating preoccupation with the concept of war and its role in human history. The purpose of this essay is to investigate critically Kant’s different conceptualisations of war and to evaluate his writing as a critique against contemporary versions of Liberal war and peace, as well as recent attempts to reduce war to an immanent logic of biopolitics.

Beiser, Frederick.  Rev. of Neo-Kantianism in Contemporary Philosophy, ed. by Rudolf A. Makkreel and Sebastian Luft (2010). Journal of the History of Philosophy 50.1 (2012): 145-46. [M]

Belás, Ľubomír. “Kantova filozofia kultúry a fenomén multikulturalizmu.” Studia Philosophica Kantiana 2012.1 (2012): 43-49. [M] [online]

 ——. “Od obˇcianskej spoloˇcnosti a politického spoloˇcenstva k morálnemu celku. Ku Kantovým sociálno-teoretickým názorom.” [Slovak; From Civil Society and Commonwealth towards Moral Whole. On Kant’s Socio-Theoretical Views] Studia Philosophica Kantiana 2012.2 (2012): 37-49. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The paper presents Kant’s views on society which are accentuated within his philosophical development. From this aspect the author wants to point out the precise, consistent efforts of the philosopher to give plausible, essentially philosophically acceptable and convincing interpretation of the society formation and its gradual transformations defined also by an evidentiary conclusive way of reasoning. The elaboration of the problem has its basis in Kant’s philosophy of history, the important results of which come into productive links with other areas of Kant’s initiative, such as practical philosophy and philosophy of law. At the end of the paper the author highlights some aspects of Kant’s socio-theoretical views relevant to the examination of contemporary society in terms of its problematic status.

Belov, Vladimir N. “Русское неокантианство: история и особенности развития.” [Russian; Russian Neokantianism: history and characteristics of its development] Kantovskij Sbornik 39.1 (2012): 27-39. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article is dedicated to the analysis of the development of Neokantianism in Russia. The originality of Russian Neokantianism is marked, which was due to the cultural and historical peculiarities of the formation of the domestic philosophical thought. The stages and specific character of the development of Russian Neokantianism are considered by example of the creation of A. I. Vvedenskij, B. V. Jakovenko and V. E. Sesemann.

Benbassat, Roi. “Kierkegaard’s Relation to Kantian Ethics Reconsidered.” Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook (2012): 49-74. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The aim of this article is to elucidate the difference between Kierkegaard's conception of ethics and that of Kant. Contrary to recent attempts to bring Kierkegaard's ethical thought close to that of Kant and even to identify their concepts of ethics, I wish to determine the structural difference between these two concepts and to stress its importance. Although I acknowledge that Kierkegaard, through his well-known polemic with Hegel, does return to Kant's ethical thought, I hold that this is in order to develop an alternative ethical view — the existentialist view — which is neither Hegelian nor Kantian.

Benediktová Vetrovcová, Marie. “The Kantian Motives of Space in Gauss’ Differential Geometry.” [Czech] Filozofia 67.6 (2012): 476-84. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The aim of this contribution is to show the Kantian concept of space as a hidden presupposition of Gauss’s geometrical treatises. First, the introduction of mathematization, origins of mathematics and geometry is depicted on the philosophical background of Husserl’s phenomenology as one possible interpretation of space. Further, Kant’s ideas on mathematics and space are summarized. The motivations of Gauss’s differential geometry exemplify the revolution in mathematics in 19th century. In conclusion Kantian motives of space in Gauss’s differential geometry as the intrinsic geometry of a curved surface are shown.

Benhabib, Seyla.  “Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Kant: Sovereignty and International Law.”  Political Theory 40.6 (2012): 688-713. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Carl Schmitt’s critique of liberalism has gained increasing influence in the last few decades. This article focuses on Schmitt’s analysis of international law in The Nomos of the Earth, in order to uncover the reasons for his appeal as a critic not only of liberalism but of American hegemonic aspirations as well. Schmitt saw the international legal order that developed after World War I, and particularly the “criminalization of aggressive war,” as a smokescreen to hide U.S. aspirations to world dominance. By focusing on Schmitt’s critique of Kant’s concept of the “unjust enemy,” the article shows the limits of Schmitt’s views and concludes that Schmitt, as well as left critics of U.S. hegemony, misconstrue the relation between international law and democratic sovereignty as a model of top–down domination. As conflictual as the relationship between international norms and democratic sovereignty can be at times, this needs to be interpreted as one of mediation and not domination.

Benjamin, Andrew.  “Towards an Affective Structure of Subjectivity. Notes on Kant’s An Answer to the Question: What is the Enlightenment?”  Parallax 18.4 (2012): 26-41. [HUM]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article reviews the book Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment: Critical Essays, edited by Paul Guyer and compares it with an essay “An Answer to the Question: What is the Enlightenment? written by Immanuel Kant. It is stated that the essay showcases emergence of both subjectivity and rationality. The subject’s being-in-place locates the domain in which affect occurs at the same time locating the interrelationship between affect and place within a conception of historical time.

Bernasconi, Robert.  “True Colors: Kant’s Distinction Between Nature and Artifice in Context.”  Klopffechtereien – Missverständnisse – Widersprüche? Methodische und methodologische Perspektiven auf die Kant-Forster-Kontroverse.  Eds. Rainer Godel and Gideon Stiening (op cit.). 191-207. [M]

Bernecker, Sven.  “Kant on Spatial Orientation.”  European Journal of Philosophy 20.4 (2012): 519-33. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper develops a novel interpretation of Kant’s argument from incongruent counterparts to the effect that the representations of space and time are intuitions rather than concepts. When properly understood, the argument anticipates the contemporary position whereby the meaning of indexicals cannot be captured by descriptive contents.

Beyrau, Michael.  Die Pflicht zur bürgerlichen Gesellschaft: Kants Lehre von der sittlichen Notwendigkeit des Staates.  Hamburg: Kovac, 2012. [169 p.] [WC]

Bhattacharyya, Krishnachandra. Implications of Kant’s Philosophy: Kantadarsaner Tatparyya. Translated from the Bengali by J N Mohanty; Tara Chatterjea. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. [248 p.] [WC]

Bianchi, Francesco M. “È dell'Illuminismo la Ragione Pura della filosofia trascendentale Kantiana?” Il realismo della ragione: Kant dai lumi alla filosofia contemporanea. Ed. Stefano Poggi (op cit.). 249-56. [M]

Bies, Michael.  Im Grunde ein Bild: die Darstellung der Naturforschung bei Kant, Goethe und Alexander von Humboldt.  Göttingen: Wallstein, 2012. [371 p.] [WC]

Billioud, Sébastien.  Thinking through Confucian Modernity: A Study of Mou Zongsan’s Moral Metaphysics.  Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2012. [xii, 255 p.] [WC]

Bird, Graham.  “Is There Any Value in Kant’s Account of Mathematics?”  Contemporary Kantian Metaphysics: New Essays on Time and Space.  Eds. Roxana Baiasu, Graham Bird, and A. W. Moore (op cit.). 109-27. [M]

 ——.  See: Baiasu, Roxana, Graham Bird, and A. W. Moore.

 ——.  See: Baiasu, Roxana, Graham Bird, and A. W. Moore, eds.

Bitran, Maurice.  “Remarque philologique sur le terme «Classe» dans le §11 de la Critique de la raison pure.”  Kant-Studien 103.2 (2012): 234-36. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: § 11 of the Critique of Pure Reason, intended to strengthen the explanation of the categories in the second edition, introduces in its two first remarks the important distinction between the mathematical and the dynamical that will occur also in other later works. In these remarks Kant creates a two-fold grouping within the categories, which seems to be spoilt by a lexical weakness concerning the terms «Classe» and «Abtheilung». As this textual anomaly does not rest on any philosophical foundation we propose a correction aiming at expressing the original Kantian thought.

Blomme, Henny.  “The Completeness of Kant’s Metaphysical Exposition of Space.”  Kant-Studien 103.2 (2012): 139-62. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the first edition of his book on the completeness of Kant’s table of judgments, Klaus Reich shortly indicates that the B-version of the metaphysical exposition of space in the Critique of Pure Reason is structured following the inverse order of the table of categories. In this paper, I develop Reich’s claim and provide further evidence for it. My argumentation is as follows: Through analysis of our actually given representation of space as some kind of object (the formal intuition of space in general), the metaphysical exposition will show that this representation is secondary to space considered as an original, undetermined and as such unrepresentable intuitive manifold. Now, following Kant, the representation of any kind of object involves diversity, synthesis and unity. In the case of our representation of space as formal intuition, this involves, firstly, a manifold a priori, i.e. space as pure form, delivered by the transcendental Aesthetic, secondly, a figurative, productive synthesis of that manifold, and, thirdly, the unity provided by the categories. Analysing our given representation of space – the task of the metaphysical exposition – amounts to dismantling its unity and determine its characteristics with respect to the categories.

Boboc, Alexandru. “Contribuţii neokantiene în teoria categoriilor.” [Romanian; Neo-kantian Contributions in the Theory of Categories] Studii de teoria categoriilor 4 (2012): 27-38. [RC]

Boehm, Omri.  “Kant’s Regulative Spinozism.”  Kant-Studien 103.3 (2012): 292-317. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The question of Kant’s relation to Spinozist thought has been virtually ignored over the years. I analyze Kant’s pre-critical ‘possibility-proof’ of God’s existence, elaborated in the Beweisgrund, as well as the echoes that this proof has in the first Critique, in beginning to uncover the connection between Kant’s thought and Spinoza’s. Kant’s espousal of the Principle of Sufficient Reason [PSR] for the analysis of modality during the pre-critical period committed him, I argue, to Spinozist substance monism. Much textual evidence suggests that he was aware of this commitment. However, by transforming the PSR into a regulative principle the critical Kant has transformed his pre-critical proof into a regulative ideal. He is thereby (consciously) committed, I argue, to regulative Spinozism.

 ——. “Kant’s Idea of the Unconditioned and Spinoza’s: the Fourth Antinomy and the Ideal of Pure Reason.”  Spinoza and German Idealism. Eds. Eckart Förster and Yitzhak Y. Melamed (op cit.). 27-43. [WC]

 ——.  Rev. of Kant and Spinozism: Trancendental Idealism and Immanence from Jacobi to Deleuze, by Beth Lord (2011). British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20.5 (2012): 1041-45. [HUM]

Bojanowski, Jochen.  “Is Kant a Moral Realist?”  Kant Yearbook: Kant and Contemporary Moral Philosophy 4 (2012): 1-22. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In “The Sources of Normativity” Christine Korsgaard attempts to defend Kant’s moral ontology as a kind of moral realism. She does so by way of drawing a distinction between substantial and procedural moral realism. After dismissing substantial realism as dogmatic and defending procedural moral realism, she goes on to claim that Kant’s view is best described as procedural moral realism. It has been argued against Korsgaard that procedural moral realism is a misnomer and that it turns out to be an anti-realist position. I don’t think that this criticism is correct and I will defend Korsgaard against the subjectivist objections that have been leveled against her. However, my main concern is to show why even Korsgaard’s procedural moral realism is still not completely in line with Kant’s own epistemological and ontological commitments. In contrast to Korsgaard, I argue that Kant’s conception of reason as a capacity that is “by itself practical” commits him to a position which is best described by what I will call “moral idealism.” Practical reason is not merely a faculty for cognizing some testing procedure that would reliably distinguish between good and bad maxims. In Kant, practical cognition consists in cognition of what I ought to do such that I do it, i.e. bring the object of my cognition into existence through a kind of self-affection.

 ——.  “Ist Kant ein Kompatibilist?”  Sind wir Bürger zweier Welten? Freiheit und moralische Verantwortung im transzendentalen Idealismus.  Eds. Mario Brandhorst, Andree Hahmann, and Bernd Ludwig (op cit.). 59-76. [M]

Boldyrev, Ivan A.  Rev. of Kantian Ethics and Economics: Autonomy, Dignity, and Character, by Mark White (2011). Journal of the History of Philosophy 50.2 (2012): 298-99. [M]

Bonaccini, Juan Adolfo.  See: Perez, Daniel Omar and Juan Adolfo Bonaccini.

Borges, Maria de Lourdes.  “A Typology of Love in Kant’s Philosophy.”  Kant in Brazil.  Eds. Frederick Rauscher and Daniel Omar Perez (op cit.). 271-82. [M]

Bornmüller, Falk. Selbstachtung: Anspruch und normative Geltung affirmativer Selbstverhältnisse. Berlin: DeGruyter, 2012. [x, 262 p.] [WC] [data]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Die Begründung der Selbstachtung als unmittelbar einsichtige Voraussetzung für das Handeln aus Freiheit bei Kant bedarf einer umfassenden Revision, da hier der phänomenale Gehalt und die tatsächliche Genese reflexiver Selbstbezugnahmen unberücksichtigt bleiben. Ausgehend von einer begriffsgeschichtlichen und systematischen Rekonstruktion affirmativer Selbstverhältnisse wird eine alternative Erklärung vorgeschlagen. Moralische Einsicht ist damit in angemessener Weise wieder vom einzelnen, jeweils auf sich selbst bezugnehmenden Subjekt her zu verstehen.

Bouton, Christoph.  “Idéalité transcendantale ou réalité absolue du temps? Temps du sujet et temps du monde chez Kant.”  Kant-Studien 103.4 (2012): 429-47. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: If we reduce time to an a priori form of human intuition as Kant did, and if we think that time is nothing in itself and outside of the human subject, then how can we make sense of the age and history of earth or of the universe — a history going back far beyond the emergence of humanity? The issue to be decided is whether this objection can be raised against Kant without being guilty of anachronism, and to consider the possible answers that could be formulated. After considering the ideality of time, the aporias of the subjectivity of time and the idea of an indefiniteness of time as elaborated in the First Antinomy, this paper argues for the need to reassess the thesis of the absolute reality of time.

Boxill, Bernard and Thomas E. Hill, Jr.  “Kant and Race.”  The Philosophy of Race, vol. 1: Philosophy and the History of Race, Race in the History of Philosophy.  Ed. Paul C. Taylor (London/New York: Routledge). 144-65. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Originally published in Bernard Boxill, ed.  Race and Racism.  New York: Oxford University Pres, 2003.  448-71.

Brady, Emily. “Reassessing Aesthetic Appreciation of Nature in the Kantian Sublime.” Journal of Aesthetic Education 46.1 (2012): 91-109. [PI]

Brandhorst, Mario.  “Woran scheitert Kants Theorie der Freiheit?”  Sind wir Bürger zweier Welten? Freiheit und moralische Verantwortung im transzendentalen Idealismus.  Eds. Mario Brandhorst, Andree Hahmann, and Bernd Ludwig (op cit.). 279-310. [M]

 ——, Andree Hahmann, and Bernd Ludwig.  “Einleitung.”  Sind wir Bürger zweier Welten? Freiheit und moralische Verantwortung im transzendentalen Idealismus.  Eds. Mario Brandhorst, Andree Hahmann, and Bernd Ludwig (op cit.). 7-34. [M]

 ——, Andree Hahmann, and Bernd Ludwig, eds.  Sind wir Bürger zweier Welten? Freiheit und moralische Verantwortung im transzendentalen Idealismus.  Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 2012. [398 p.] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Kant-Forschungen, vol. 20. 
Contents: Mario Brandhorst, Andree Hahmann, Bernd Ludwig: Einleitung — Dietmar H. Heidemann: Über Kants These: »Denn, sind Erscheinungen Dinge an sich selbst, so ist Freiheit nicht zu retten« — Jochen Bojanowski: Ist Kant ein Kompatibilist? — Tobias Rosefeldt: Kants Kompatibilismus — Dieter Schönecker: Kants Grundlegung über den bösen Willen. Eine kommentarische Interpretation von GMS III 457.25-458.5 — Andree Hahmann: Ist »Freiheit die Wahrheit der Notwendigkeit«? Das Ding an sich als Grund der Erscheinung bei Kant — Bernd Ludwig: Was weiß ich vom Ich? Kants Lehre vom Faktum der reinen praktischen Vernunft, seine Neufassung der Paralogismen und die verborgenen Fortschritte der Kritischen Metaphysik im Jahre 1786 — Heiner Klemme: Spontaneität und Selbsterkenntnis. Kant über die ursprüngliche Einheit von Natur und Freiheit im Aktus des »Ich denke« (1785-1787) — Geert Keil: Kann man nichtzeitliche Verursachung verstehen? Kausalitätstheoretische Anmerkungen zu Kants Freiheitsantinomie — Kenneth Westphal: Die positive Verteidigung Kants der Urteils- und Handlungsfreiheit, und zwar ohne transzendentalen Idealismus — Mario Brandhorst: Woran scheitert Kants Theorie der Freiheit? — Reinhard Brandt: »Sei ein rechtlicher Mensch (honeste vive)« - wie das? — Susanne Brauer: Alternative zu Kant? Freiheit nach Hegel in den Grundlinien zur Philosophie des Rechts.

Brandt, Reinhard.  “Kant as Rebel against the Social Order.”  Kant’s Observations and Remarks: A Critical Guide.  Eds. Susan Meld Shell and Richard Velkley (op cit.). 185-97. [M]

 ——.  “Die Idee der Universität und Der Streit der Fakultäten.”  Kants “Streit der Fakultäten” oder der Ort der Bildung zwischen Lebenswelt und Wissenschaften.  Ed. Ludger Honnefelder (op cit.). 45-65. [M]

 ——.  “»Sei ein rechtlicher Mensch (honeste vive)« — wie das?”  Sind wir Bürger zweier Welten? Freiheit und moralische Verantwortung im transzendentalen Idealismus.  Eds. Mario Brandhorst, Andree Hahmann, and Bernd Ludwig (op cit.). 311-59. [M]

Brassington, Ian.  “The Concept of Autonomy and its Role in Kantian Ethics.”  Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 21.2 (2012): 166-76. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Among bioethicists, and perhaps ethicists generally, the idea that we are obliged to respect autonomy is something of a shibboleth. Appeals to autonomy are commonly put to work to support legal and moral claims about the importance of consent, but they also feed a wider discourse in which the patient’s desires are granted a very high importance and medical paternalism is regarded as almost self-evidently indefensible.

Brauer, Susanne.  “Alternative zu Kant? Freiheit nach Hegel in den Grundlinien zur Philosophie des Rechts.”  Sind wir Bürger zweier Welten? Freiheit und moralische Verantwortung im transzendentalen Idealismus.  Eds. Mario Brandhorst, Andree Hahmann, and Bernd Ludwig (op cit.). 361-81. [M]

Brewer, Kimberly and Eric Watkins.  “A Difficulty Still Awaits: Kant, Spinoza, and the Threat of Theological Determinism.”  Kant-Studien 103.2 (2012): 163-87. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In a short and much-neglected passage in the second Critique, Kant discusses the threat posed to human freedom by theological determinism. In this paper we present an interpretation of Kant’s conception of and response to this threat. Regarding his conception, we argue that he addresses two versions of the threat: either God causes appearances (and hence our spatio-temporal actions) directly or he does so indirectly by causing things in themselves which in turn cause appearances. Kant’s response to the first version is that God cannot cause appearances directly because they depend essentially on the passive sensibility of finite beings. Kant’s response to the second version is that human beings are endowed with transcendental freedom, which blocks the causal transitivity that is presupposed by this version. We also contrast his position on this topic with Leibniz’s and Spinoza’s.

Brignone, Marco.  La duplicità dell’uomo: la dialettica antinomica in Kant e Pascal. [Italian]  Milan: Alboversorio, 2012. [144 p.] [WC]

Browning, Gary.  Rev. of The Founding Act of Modern Ethical Life: Hegel’s Critique of Kant’s Moral and Political Philosophy, by Ido Geiger (2007). History of Political Thought 33.1 (2012): 169-73. [PI]

Brum Torres, João Carlos.  “Intuitive Knowledge and De Re Thought.”  Kant in Brazil.  Eds. Frederick Rauscher and Daniel Omar Perez (op cit.). 56-80. [M]

Brumlik, Micha. “Kant und die Tora.”  Kant und die Religion — die Religionen und Kant. Eds. Reinhard Hiltscher and Stefan Klingner (op cit.). 105-17. [M]

Bubbio, Paolo Diego. “Kierkegaard’s Regulative Sacrifice: A Post-Kantian Reading of Fear and Trembling.” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20.5 (2012): 691-723. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The present paper suggests to consider Kierkegaard’s use of Abraham’s story in Fear and Trembling in regulative terms, that is, to consider it as a model – not for our moral behaviour but rather for our religious behaviour. To do so, I first rely on recent literature to argue that Kierkegaard should be regarded as a distinctively post-Kantian philosopher: namely, a philosopher who goes beyond Kant in a way that is nevertheless true to the spirit of Kant’s original critical philosophy. Then, I present a post-Kantian reading of Fear and Trembling, focusing on the problematic implications that result from comparing this text with Hegel’s theory of recognition. Finally, I submit that sacrifice in Fear and Trembling is a regulative notion in a Kantian sense. This interpretation addresses some of the most problematic aspects of the text. I conclude that the regulativity of sacrifice may be regarded as an important and perhaps an essential component of Kierkegaard’s overall philosophical strategy.

Burcher, Paul.  “The Noncompliant Patient: A Kantian and Levinasian Response.”  Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 37.1 (2012): 74-89. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: When a patient fails to follow the advice or prescription of a physician, she is termed to be “noncompliant” by the medical community. The medical community’s response to and understanding of patient noncompliance fails to acknowledge noncompliance as either a relational failure between physician and patient or as a patient choice. I offer an analysis of Immanuel Kant and Emmanuel Levinas that refocuses the issue of noncompliance by examining the physician role, the doctor-patient relationship, and the nature of responsibility.

Bynum, Gregory Lewis.  “Immanuel Kant’s Account of Cognitive Experience and Human Rights Education.”  Educational Theory 62.2 (2012): 185-201. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this essay Gregory Bynum seeks to show that Immanuel Kant's thought, which was conceived in an eighteenth-century context of new, and newly widespread, pressures for nationally institutionalized human rights-based regimes (the American and French revolutions being the most prominent examples), can help us think in new and appreciative ways about how to approach human rights education more effectively in our own time. Kant’s discussion of moral experience features prominently in Bynum’s analysis, which emphasizes the following: Kant’s conception of a Categorical Imperative to treat humanity as an end in itself; his conscious avoidance of, and his discussion of the necessity of avoiding, the limitations of empiricist and rationalist extremes of thought; and his discussion of moral experience in interrelated individual, community, and global aspects. Bynum demonstrates the usefulness of Kant’s approach by using it as a lens through which to appreciatively examine an Japanese-born university professor’s account of her ultimately successful effort to teach American students about U.S.-instigated human rights violations abroad.

[top] C    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Caimi, Mario.  “The Logical Structure of Time According to the Chapter on the Schematism.”  Kant-Studien 103.4 (2012): 415-28. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Usually, when studying schematism we devote almost exclusive attention to the study of the modifications that the categories suffer when combined with time. Instead, we have focused our attention on the determinations that time receives when combined with the categories. Departing from the definition of the transcendental schemata as “determinations of time”, an attempt is made to establish the various determinations that time receives from each one of the categories, as these perform the determination of time in schematism. The categories of quantity allow us to think of time as a series of homogeneous unities; the categories of quality show each instant of time as a receptacle able to receive the different intensities (degrees) of the real; the categories of relation establish a rule-dependent order on the flow of time; finally, the categories of modality determine the whole of time forming a collective unity that gathers or embraces each one of the instants of time preserving its specificity (its individual features).

Calori, François. “Racionalidade prática e sensibilidade em Kant.” [Portuguese] Cadernos de Filosofia Alemã: Crítica e Modernidade 20 (2012): 13-54. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article intends to investigate the relationship between practical reason and sensibility in Kant’s moral philosophy. The analysis of the sentiment of respect in the third chapter of the Analytic of the Critique of Practical Reason is its main purpose. In this famous text, sensibility, which has been disqualified in the first chapter as the possible foundation of the moral law, receives a new moral signification with the feeling of respect, identified as the unique mobile of practical reason. But in order to understand the exact signification of this sentiment of respect and of its function as mobile, one has to study the evolution of Kant’s philosophy on the question of the sensible dimension of morality in the pre-critical period and to take into account the subsequent reflections of the Doctrine of virtue upon the so-called «aesthetic preconditions of the mind’s receptivity to duty». The interpretation of respect as moral sentiment is not only important for the comprehension of practical philosophy as a systematic whole. It is also a crucial notion for the understanding of sentiment as a fundamental faculty of the mind, and for the interpretation of the nature of sensibility in Kant’s transcendental philosophy.

Camera, Francesco. “Fede morale e fede biblica. La risposta di Kant a Lavater.” Il realismo della ragione: Kant dai lumi alla filosofia contemporanea. Ed. Stefano Poggi (op cit.). 105-12. [M]

Campbell, Catherine Galko.  Rev. of Reconstructing Rawls: The Kantian Foundations of Justice as Fairness, by Robert S. Taylor (2011). Ethics 122.3 (2012): 632-37. [PW]

Campbell, John.  “Is Spatial Awareness Required for Object Perception?”  Contemporary Kantian Metaphysics: New Essays on Time and Space.  Eds. Roxana Baiasu, Graham Bird, and A. W. Moore (op cit.). 67-80. [M]

Caranti, Luigi. La pace fraintesa: Kant e la teoria della pace democratica. [Italian] Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2012. [206 p.] [WC]

Carroll, Anthony J. Rev. of Kant, Religion, and Politics, by James J. DiCenso (2011). Religious Studies 48.4 (2012): 547-51. [PW]

Castillo Vegas, Juan. Los grandes errores: los sofismas kantianos. Burgos: Universidad de Burgos, 2012. [335 p.] [WC]

Castree, Noel. Rev. of Reading Kant’s Geography, ed. by Stuart Elden and Eduardo Mendieta (2011).  Annals of the Association of American Geographers 102.1 (2012): 256-58. [JSTOR]

Cavallar, Georg. “Cosmopolitanisms in Kant’s Philosophy.” Ethics and Global Politics 5.2 (2012): 95-118. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Interpretations of Kant usually focus on his legal or political cosmopolitanism, a cluster of ideas revolving around perpetual peace, an international organisation, the reform of international law, and what Kant has termed cosmopolitan law or the law of world citizens (‘Weltbürgerrecht’). In this essay, I argue that there are different cosmopolitanisms in Kant, and focus on the relationship among political, legal or juridical, moral and ethico-theological cosmopolitanisms. I claim that these form part of a comprehensive system and are fully compatible with each other, given Kant’s framework. I conclude that it is not self-evident that one can pick out some elements of this greater system as if they were independent of it.

 ——.  Rev. of Kant and Education: Interpretations and Commentary, edited by Klas Roth and Chris W. Surprenant (2011). Kantian Review 17.3 (2012): 527-30. [M]

 ——.  Rev. of Immanuel Kant: Zum ewigen Frieden und Auszüge aus der Rechtslehre: Kommentar, by Oliver Eberl and Peter Niesen (2011). Kantian Review 17.2 (2012): 367-69. [M]

Chadwick, Ruth.  See: Williams, Garrath and Ruth Chadwick.

Chaly, Vadim A. “Антропологические основания политической теории Джона Ролза.” [Russian; Anthropological foundations of John Rawls' political theory] Kantovskij Sbornik 42.4 (2012): 35-41. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The analysis of Rawls’ anthropological model, underlying his theory of justice, reveals its complex basis: on one hand, it is an attempt to attach broader and deeper Kantian philosophical foundations to the “ratonal egoist” of classical utilitarianism (idea of autonomy, ability of self-determination through moral law); on the other hand, the notion of “life plan”, emphasizing the rationality of human interests and actions and opening a possibility for happiness, connects Rawls’ theory to Aristotle’s virtue ethics and to contemporary communitarianism.

Chance, Brian.  “Scepticism and the Development of the Transcendental Dialectic.”  British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20.2 (2012): 311-31. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant’s response to scepticism in the Critique of Pure Reason is complex and remarkably nuanced, although it is rarely recognized as such. In this paper, I argue that recent attempts to flesh out the details of this response by Paul Guyer and Michael Forster do not go far enough. Although they are right to draw a distinction between Humean and Pyrrhonian scepticism and locate Kant’s response to the latter in the Transcendental Dialectic, their accounts fail to capture two important aspects of this response. The first is that Kant’s response to Pyrrhonian scepticism is also a response to Hume. The second is that aspects of this response are decidedly positive. In particular, I argue (1) that Kant believed Hume’s scepticism manifested important elements of Pyrrhonian scepticism and (2) that both Pyrrhonian scepticism and Hume had a significant positive influence on the development of the Transcendental Dialectic.

Cheng, Chung-Ying.  “World Humanities and Self-Reflection of Humanity: A Confucian-Neo-Confucian Perspective.”  Journal of Chinese Philosophy 39.4 (2012): 476-94. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article presents and develops Zhu Xi’s Neo-Confucian theory of heart-mind-will and human nature as the source and basis for the understanding of humanity. This article next shows how Kant and Confucius could be said to share the same vision of humanity in light of one particular historical connection between them. Finally, I have explored four forms of knowledge in light of a distinction between feeling and observation as well as their basic unity. This gives rise to our vision of humanity as world-rooted, and so indicates further how it can serve as a grounding for world-humanities.

Chernov, Sergey A. “Нулевая философия.” [Russian; Null-philosophy] Kantovskij Sbornik 42.4 (2012): 12-21. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article offers an analysis of the concept of mystical experience and its relation to science and philosophy in connection with E. A. Torchinov's research and in the context of Kant's doctrine of human "metaphysical disposition", the nature and purpose of philosophy.

Chiba, Kiyoshi.  Kants Ontologie der raumzeitlichen Wirklichkeit: Versuch einer anti-realistischen Interpretation der Kritik der reinen Vernunft.  Berlin / Boston: De Gruyter, 2012. [xi, 427 p.] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Kantstudien Ergänzungshefte 168. Originally appeared as the author’s Ph.D. dissertation (Bonn-Universität, 2010).
Abstract: Diese Abhandlung verteidigt gegen die heute vorherrschenden realistischen Interpretationen des kantischen transzendentalen Idealismus eine anti-realistische Zwei-Welten-Interpretation. Zudem wird Kants Anti-Realismus mithilfe der von Michael Dummett und Crispin Wright entwickelten analytischen Begrifflichkeit präzisiert. Diese erweist sich als fruchtbar nicht nur für die Analyse der kantischen Position selbst, sondern auch für ein klares Verständnis dermannigfaltigen Interpretationsansätze des transzendentalen Idealismus.

Chignell, Andrew.  “Introduction: On Defending Kant at the AAR.”  Faith and Philosophy 29.2 (2012): 144-50. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: I briefly describe the unusually contentious author-meets-critics session that was the origin of the book symposium below. I then try to situate the present symposium within broader contemporary scholarship on Kant.

 ——. “Kant, Real Possibility, and the Threat of Spinoza.” Mind 121 (2012): 635-75. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the first part of the paper I reconstruct Kant's proof of the existence of a ‘most real being’ while also highlighting the theory of modality that motivates Kant’s departure from Leibniz’s version of the proof. I go on to argue that it is precisely this departure that makes the being that falls out of the pre-critical proof look more like Spinoza’s extended natura naturans than an independent, personal creator-God. In the critical period, Kant seems to think that transcendental idealism allows him to avoid this conclusion, but in the last section of the paper I argue that there is still one important version of the Spinozistic threat that remains.

 ——.  Rev. of Kants Vorsehungskonzept auf dem Hintergrund der deutschen Schulphilosophie und -theologie, by Ulrich Lehner (2007). Journal of the Philosophy of History 6.1 (2012): 143-47. [HUM]

Chlewicki, Jaciej.  Kant a problem filozofii religii. [Polish]  Bydgoszcz: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Kazimierza Wielkiego, 2012. [276 p.] [WC]

Cicovacki, Predrag. “Reason and faith: a comparison of Immanuel Kant and Albert Schweitzer.”  From Faith in Reason to Reason in Faith: Transformations in Philosophical Theology from the Eighteenth to Twentieth Centuries. Eds. Wayne Cristaudo and Hueng Wah Wong (Lanham: University Press of America, 2012). 111-26. [WC]

Class, Monika.  Coleridge and Kantian Ideas in England, 1796-1817: Coleridge’s Responses to German Philosophy.  London/New York: Bloomsbury, 2012. [xiv, 245 p.] [WC]

Clewis, Robert R.  “Kant’s Distinction between True and False Sublimity.”  Kant’s Observations and Remarks: A Critical Guide.  Eds. Susan Meld Shell and Richard Velkley (op cit.). 116-43. [M]

Çörekçioglu, Hakan. “The History of Violence and Remembrance in Kant and Benjamin.” [Turkish] FLSF: Felsefe ve Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi [Journal of Philosophy and Social Sciences] 13 (2012): 1-9. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This study focuses on the connection between history, historiography and the political aspect of remembrance, as established by Kant and Walter Benjamin. Kantian history is hypothetical-progressive, whereas Benjamin’s departure point is critique of progress. Even though both philosophers agree on the connection between historiography and the political aspect of the faculty of remembrance, they differ in the methodological instruments of remembrance. Yet, both philosophers envisage human as a being in his own historical situatedness with ethical and political responsibilities.

Cohen, Alix.  “Enabling the Realization of Humanity: The Anthropological Dimension of Education.”  Kant and Education: Interpretations and Commentary.  Eds. Klas Roth and Chris W. Surprenant (op cit.). 152-62. [M]

 ——.  “Kant’s ‘Curious Catalogue of Human Frailties’ and the Great Portrait of Nature.”  Kant’s Observations and Remarks: A Critical Guide.  Eds. Susan Meld Shell and Richard Velkley (op cit.). 144-62. [M]

Colombo, Enrico. Rev. of La fragilità della virtù: Dall’antropologia alla morale e ritorno nell’epoca di Kant, by Laura Anna Macor (2011).  Rivista di Storia della Filosofia 67.2 (2012): 436-38. [PI]

Costa, António Martins da. O pensamento filosófico português contemporâneo: a recepção de Kant em Leonardo Coimbra. [Portuguese] Porto: Universidade católica, 2012. [522 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Originally presented as a Ph.D. dissertation (Universidade católica portuguesa, 2010).

Costa Rego, Pedro.  “The Purposiveness of Taste: An Essay on the Role of Zweckmässigkeit in Kant’s Critique of Aesthetic Judgment.”  Kant in Brazil.  Eds. Frederick Rauscher and Daniel Omar Perez (op cit.). 305-20. [M]

Costelloe, Timothy M. The Sublime: From Antiquity to the Present. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012. [xiii, 304 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: See the following essays:
Melissa McBay Merritt (The Moral Source of the Kantian Sublime),
Paul Guyer (The German Sublime after Kant).

Crelier, Andrés.  Rev. of La comprensión del lenguaje en la Crítica de la razón pura, by Daniel Leserre (2008). Kant-Studien 103.2 (2012): 266-68. [M]

Croitoru, Rodica. “Alegerea binelui suveran şi necesitatea supoziţiei unui autor înţelept al lumii.” [Romanian; The Choice of the Supreme Good and the Necessity of Assuming a Wise Author of the World] Datoria: perspectivă multidisciplinară. Ed. Ana Bazac (Bucharest: Edit. Academiei Române, 2012). [RC]

 ——. “Armonia lumii prin frumos.” [Romanian; The Beautiful Harmony of the World] Studii de istoria filosofiei universale 20 (2012): 119-28. [M]

Crone, Katja.  “Pre-conceptual Aspects of Self-consciousness in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.”  Kant’s Philosophy of the Unconscious.  Eds. Piero Giordanetti, Riccardo Pozzo, and Marco Sgarbi (op cit.). 131-46. [M]

Crowell, Steven.  “The Normative in Perception.”  Contemporary Kantian Metaphysics: New Essays on Time and Space.  Eds. Roxana Baiasu, Graham Bird, and A. W. Moore (op cit.). 81-106. [M]

Cubo, Óscar.  Kant: Sentido común y subjetividad. [Spanish]  Pozuelo de Alarcón: Plaza y Valdés, 2012. [236p.] [WC]

 ——.  Rev. of Kant über das Erhabene. Rekonstruktion und Weiterführung der kritischen Theorie des Erhabenen Kants, by Kap Hyun Park (2009). Kant-Studien 103.2 (2012): 264-66. [M]

 ——.  Rev. of Sentido y subjetividad. Un análisis del problema del autoconocimiento en la filosofía trascendental de Kant, by Claudia Jáuregui (2008). Kant-Studien 103.3 (2012): 380-83. [M]

Cuffaro, Michael E. “Kant and Frege on Existence and the Ontological Argument.” History of Philosophy Quarterly 29.4 (2012): 337-54?. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Ontological arguments for the existence of God attempt to prove God's existence through an analysis of the concept of God. They have a long history: in the West, the first known ontological argument was proposed by Anselm of Canterbury in 1078. Despite having been generally looked upon with disfavor by theologians (Toner 1909), ontological arguments have, interestingly, remained a popular topic with philosophers, and some (for example, Malcolm 1960, Plantinga 1974) have continued to defend them. Part of the fascination with the argument, no doubt, is that it seems so obviously unsound, yet it has proven so difficult to convincingly refute. Russell writes, "The argument does not, to a modern mind, seem very convincing, but it is easier to feel convinced that it must be fallacious than it is to find out precisely where the fallacy lies" (2004 [1946], Bk. 3, Pt. 1, §11).

Curtis-Wendlandt, Lisa.  “No Right to Resist? Elise Reimarus’s Freedom as a Kantian Response to the Problem of Violent Revolt.”  Hypatia 27.4 (2012): 755-73. [HUM]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: One of the greatest woman intellectuals of eighteenth-century Germany is Elise Reimarus, whose contribution to Enlightenment political theory is rarely acknowledged today. Unlike other social contract theorists, Reimarus rejects a people’s right to violent resistance or revolution in her philosophical dialogue Freedom (1791). Exploring the arguments in Freedom, this paper observes a number of similarities in the political thought of Elise Reimarus and Immanuel Kant. Both, I suggest, reject violence as an illegitimate response to perceived political injustice in a way that opposes Locke’s strong voluntarism and the absolutism of Hobbes. First, they emphasize the need to maintain the legal state as a precondition for the possibility of external right. Second, they share an optimistic view of the inherently ‘just’ nature of the tripartite republican state. And finally, Reimarus and Kant both outline an alternative, nonviolent response to political injustice that consists in the freedom of public expression and a discourse on the moral enlightenment of man.

Custer, Olivia.  L’exemple de Kant.  Leuven: Peeters, 2012. [x, 410 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: This appears to have originally appeared as the author’s dissertation (Paris École des hautes études en sciences sociales, 2005), directed by Jacques Derrida.
Abstract: L'exemple de Kant" s'emploie à montrer que l'examen de la fonction de l'exemple permet de situer les enjeux essentiels de la philosophie critique de Kant, aussi bien dans le domaine théorique que dans le domaine pratique. Nous examinons les rôles attribués par Kant aux exemples ("Darstellung" d'un objet, preuve de possibilité de la vertu, outil rhétorique ou encore oeuvre de jugement politique), pour ensuite analyser les difficultés qu'il y a à justifier la possibilité de ces rôles dans les termes mêmes de sa pensée. Cette étude est aussi un plaidoyer pour l'importance de la troisième "Critique" dans l'économie de l'oeuvre kantienne puisqu'il s'agit de montrer d'une part, que c'est là que la méthode transcendantale fait l'épreuve de ses propres limites, et, d'autre part, que Kant y élabore une réponse originale au scepticisme - par le biais d'une théorie originale de l'exemple.

 ——.  “Angling for a Stranglehold on the Death Penalty.”  Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (2012): 160-73. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Responding to Elizabeth Rottenberg’s invitation to consider good signs, I first raise a question about ‘good’ and ‘too good’ signs by referring to a letter of Louis Althusser’s that describes the risk that ‘too good’ signs will be misread. I then turn to the distinction Rottenberg makes between deconstructive signs and Immanuel Kant’s historical signs. Borrowing an image from Jacques Derrida’s The Animal That Therefore I Am (2008), I suggest that we think of the task of abolition of the death penalty as requiring a particular kind of strangulation of Kantian discourse, a strangulation that would reach the center of its nervous system and disarm its powers without putting it to death. Finally, I turn to a recent initiative by a Belgian nongovernmental organization (Groupe d’action dans l’interet des animaux or Global Action in the Interest of Animals [GAIA]) in their campaign to abolish the practice of castrating piglets without anesthetic, reading it as an example of a strategy that mobilizes the discourse of rights while at the same time undermining the sovereign power that sustains it. This provides an image of the sort of stranglehold with a certain lightness of touch that, I argue, Derrida’s work on the death penalty prescribes as the task for unconditional abolition.

[top] D    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Dall’Agnol, Darlei.  “On the Faktum of Reason.”  Kant in Brazil.  Eds. Frederick Rauscher and Daniel Omar Perez (op cit.). 109-26. [M]

 ——, ed. See: Tonetto, Milene Consenso, Alessandro Pinzani, and Darlei Dall’Agnol, eds.

Danz, Christian. “Endliche Freiheit. Luthers und Kants Freiheitsverständnis im Kontext von Augustins Schrift De libero arbitrio.”  Die Gnadenlehre als salto mortale der Vernunft? Ed. Norbert Fischer (op cit.). 191-208. [M]

Dastur, Françoise.  “Time and Subjectivity: Heidegger’s Interpretation of the Kantian Notion of Time.”  Contemporary Kantian Metaphysics: New Essays on Time and Space.  Eds. Roxana Baiasu, Graham Bird, and A. W. Moore (op cit.). 253-69. [M]

Davey, Nicholas.  “In between Word and Image: Philosophical Hermeneutics, Aesthetics, and the Inescapable Heritage of Kant.”  Critical Communities and Aesthetic Practices: Dialogues with Tony O’Connor on Society, Art, and Friendship.  Eds. Francis Halsall, Julia Jansen, and Sinéad Murphy (Dordrecht: Springer, 2012). 23-35. [PI]

Davies, Paul.  Rev. of Kant and Spinozism: Transcendental Idealism and Immanence from Jacobi to Deleuze, by Beth Lord (2011). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (April 2012, #13). [online] [M]

Davis, Andrew Alexander. “Schema and Bild: The Act Bridging Potentiality and Actuality.” Idealistic Studies 42.1 (2012): 57-68. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Immanuel Kant’s “Schema” and J. G. Fichte’s “Bild” are parallel figures of activity that serve as bridges. For both Kant and Fichte, it is not the image/schema taken as product that is primary, but the act of imaging. I show how Fichte leans on the Kantian argumentation of the schematism in order to attempt bridging the gulf critical philosophy leaves between theoretical and practical philosophy. My broader purpose is to indicate how two German Idealists emphasize activity as a way of solving philosophical problems.

Dean, Richard.  “Moral Education and the Ideal of Humanity.”  Kant and Education: Interpretations and Commentary.  Eds. Klas Roth and Chris W. Surprenant (op cit.). 139-51. [M]

 ——. “A Plausible Kantian Argument Against Moralism.” Social Theory and Practice 38.4 (2012): 577-97. [PDC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: There seems to be something wrong with passing moralistic judgments on others’ moral character. Immanuel Kant’s ethics provides insight into an underexplored way in which moralistic judgments are problematic, namely, that they are both a sign of fundamentally poor character in the moralistic person herself and an obstacle to that person’s own moral self-improvement. Kant’s positions on these issues provide a basically compelling argument against moralistic judgment of others, an argument that can be detached from the most controversial elements of Kantian ethics to stand as plausible and instructive in its own right.

DeBord, Charles E.  “Kant, Fichte, and the Act of the I.”  Philosophy Study 2.1 (2012): 9-18. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Fichte’s various articulations of the Wissenschaftslehre (“theory of scientific knowledge”) are self-conscious attempts to systematize Kant’s critical philosophy. Fichte’s notion of the pure I (‘ich’) serves as the theoretical starting-point for his exposition of transcendental idealism, and in many ways this concept is analogous to Kant’s notion of the transcendental unity of apperception explained in the ‘Critique of Pure Reason’. This paper argues that although Fichte and Kant agree on (1) the active nature of the pure I, (2) the distinction between pure and empirical apperception, and (3) skepticism concerning the possibility of theoretical knowledge of any positive (i.e., noumenal) content of the pure I, their respective notions of pure apperception differ in that Kant affirms the conceptual priority of the pure I to its objects while Fichte denies the same. Fichte’s departure from Kant on this point foreshadows many later recognition theories of consciousness, e.g., those of Hegel and Marx.

 ——.  “Geist and Communication in Kant’s Theory of Aesthetic Ideas.”  Kantian Review 17.2 (2012): 177-90. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In his Critique of the Power of Judgement, Kant explicates the creation of works of fine art (schöne Kunst) in terms of aesthetic ideas. His analysis of aesthetic ideas claims that they are not concepts (Begriffe) and are therefore not definable or describable in determinate language. Nevertheless, Kant claims that aesthetic ideas are communicable via spirit (Geist), a special mental ability he associates with artistic genius. This paper argues that Kant’s notion of Geist is central to his analysis of fine art’s expressive power. The notion of Geist constitutes a conceptual link between Kant’s aesthetic theory and that of G. W. F. Hegel, for whose analysis Geist is the subject.

Deckard, Michael.  Rev. of Kant and Milton, by Sanford Budick (2010). Philosophy in Review 32.5 (2012). [online] [M]

Dedek, Helge. “A Particle of Freedom: Natural Law Thought and the Kantian Theory of Transfer by Contract.” Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 25.2 (2012): 313-46. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Modern contract law theorists frequently invoke Kantian ideas to conceptualize contract as a form of immediate transfer. The Kantian theory of contract itself is eclectic: Kant makes use of the main conceptual building blocks of Natural Law (in particular Grotian) contract doctrine – promise and transfer. Yet Kant re-arranges and adapts them to his own epistemology and conceptual system. I submit that because of this connection, additional light can be shed on Kant’s theory of contract by placing it in the context of contemporary Natural Law discourse. One of the most outspoken critics of contract theory in the Grotian tradition was then famous (and now apocryphal) legal philosopher Theodor Schmalz. Schmalz faulted Natural Law thought for conceptualizing contract as transfer by fallaciously – “subreptively”– explaining the normative event of creating an obligation through the model of the empirical transfer of physical objects. Kant’s theory reads like a response to this critique: Kant avoids modelling contract on the transfer of property. Rather, he explains any transfer as contractual, brought about by a unified will.

De Freitas Araujo, Saulo.  Rev. of Kant and the Human Sciences: Biology, Anthropology, and History, by Alix Cohen (2009). History of the Human Sciences 25.1 (2012): 140-45. [PI]

Degen, Andreas.  “Concepts of Fascination, from Democritus to Kant.”  Journal of the History of Ideas 73.3 (2012): 371-93. [MUSE]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This study presents a historical-systematic outline of the conceptual history of fascination. The argumentation is oriented to the term “fascination” and takes into consideration the variance of the scientific explanations and basic theoretical approaches linked to it. For the period of the Greek Antique up to the eighteenth century this article distinguishes four transitive approaches: the substance-based, the epistemological, the psychological and the erotic approach. A fifth approach, which is derived from the epistemological approach, defines fascination as intransitive. It dates from the eighteenth century and is the basis of the modern concepts of fascination.

Deligiorgi, Katerina.  The Scope of Autonomy: Kant and the Morality of Freedom.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. [xiv, 233 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents: Introduction: autonomy: specification of a term, recognition of a problem — Moral knowledge: pure reason and the law — Moral action: normativity, motivation and autonomous willing — Freedom as constraint: the morality of autonomy — Knowing hearts: emotion, value, and judgement — The scope of autonomy: agency, freedom, and morality.

 ——.  Rev. of The Form of Practical Knowledge: A Study of the Categorical Imperative, by Stephen Engstrom (2009). Kantian Review 17.2 (2012): 369-74. [M] [online]

 ——.  Rev. of Culture as Mediation: Kant on Nature, Culture, and Morality, by Ana Marta González (2011). Kantian Review 17.3 (2012): 519-21. [M]

Deutscher, Max. “In Sensible Judgement.” Symposium: Canadian Journal of Continental Philosophy 16.1 (2012): 203-25. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Only in being pleased at what is done can I judge it as right. Kant is correct, nevertheless, then my motive is not the object of my judgment’s concern. In working to make a good judgment, it is not pleasure but the right result that one seeks. In taking the jury’s decision to be right, one is pleased at it — one takes pleasure in it. At the same time, it would shift attention from judgment’s proper object to find the point of the justice of the decision in one’s having been pleased.

Di Bella, Santi. “Uso pubblico della ragione e ruolo pubblico della facoltà filosofica nell'illuminismo di Kant.” Il realismo della ragione: Kant dai lumi alla filosofia contemporanea. Ed. Stefano Poggi (op cit.). 173-79. [M]

DiCenso, James.  Kant’s Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason: A Commentary.  Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012. [ix, 269 p.] [WC] [review]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant’s Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason is one of the great modern examinations of religion’s meaning, function and impact on human affairs. In this volume, the first complete English-language commentary on the work, James J. DiCenso explains the historical context in which the book appeared, including the importance of Kant’s conflict with state censorship. He shows how the Religion addresses crucial Kantian themes such as the relationship between freedom and morality, the human propensity to evil, the status of historical traditions in relation to ethical principles, and the interface between individual ethics and social institutions. The major arguments are clearly and precisely explained, and the themes are highlighted and located within Kant’s mature critical philosophy, especially his ethics. The commentary will be valuable for all who are interested in the continuing relevance of religion for contemporary inquiries into ethics, public institutions and religious traditions.

Dicker, Georges.  “Kant’s Refutation of Idealism: Once More Unto the Breach.”  Kantian Review 17.2 (2012): 191-95. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In ‘Kant's Refutation of Idealism’ (Noûs, 47), I defend a version of the Refutation, pioneered by Paul Guyer in Kant and the Claims of Knowledge, whose core idea is that the only way that one can know the order of one’s own past experiences, except in certain rare cases, is by correlating them with the successive states of perceived external objects that caused the experiences. Andrew Chignell has offered a probing critique of my reconstruction of Kant’s argument (Philosophical Quarterly, 60), and I have responded (Philosophical Quarterly, 61). In a rebuttal of my response, Chignell raises three new objections (Philosophical Quarterly, 61). My purpose in this paper is to reply to these.

Dierken, Jörg.  “Philosophie und Theologie: Zur vernünftigen Bildung des Glaubens nach Kant.”  Kants “Streit der Fakultäten” oder der Ort der Bildung zwischen Lebenswelt und Wissenschaften.  Ed. Ludger Honnefelder (op cit.). 89-108. [M]

Dietzsch, Steffen. “Kant der Europäer.”  Transzendentalphilosophie und die Kultur der Gegenwart. Eds. Steffen Dietzsch and Udo Teitz (op cit.). 1-13. [M]

 —— and Leila Kais. “Das Lachen in Kants Anthropologie: Uber ein Desiderat der Kantforschung.”  Transzendentalphilosophie und die Kultur der Gegenwart. Eds. Steffen Dietzsch and Udo Teitz (op cit.). 203-21. [M]

 —— and Udo Teitz, eds. Transzendentalphilosophie und die Kultur der Gegenwart: Festschrift für Wilfried Lehrke. Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 2012. [ix, 342 p.] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents: Steffen Dietzsch, “Kant der Europäer”
Udo Tietz, “Das Sichtbare und das Unsichtbare. Ein Versuch über das Apriori”
Hartmut Hecht, “Nisi ipse intellectus. Individualität und Erkenntnis bei Leibniz”
Horst Schröpfer, “‘Die Critik der reinen Vernunft...ist die vollständige Idee der Transscendentalphilosophie’: Schack Hermann Ewald verteidigte das Apriori des kritischen Systems von Immanuel Kant”
Norbert Hinske, “Ein unbeachtet gebliebener Kommentar zu Kants Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten aus dem Jahre 1784”
Gideon Freudenthal, “Anschauung und Verstand in geometrischen Konstruktionen: Kant und Maimon”
Werner Wolff, “Merkmalslogik, Syllogistik-Theorie und Negation bei Johann Heinrich Lambert — Ein zu Unrecht vergessener Mitstreiter Kants”
Werner Stelzner, “Divergenzen zwischen Glaube und Behauptung: Lüge und Verschlossenheit als Formen von Unaufrichtigkeit”
Heinz Härtl, “Kantianer um 1800”
Steffen Dietzsch und Leila Kais, “Das Lachen in Kants Anthropologie: Uber ein Desiderat der Kantforschung”
Katja Tenenbaum, “Aus Kants Tischgesellschaft”
René-Marc Pille, “Wenn Thalia Clio zur Hilfe ruft. Der Rückgriff auf die Geschichte als ästhetischer Imperativ des Schillerschen Theaters”
Friedrich Tomberg, “Vermutungen über ein lebenspraktisches Apriori im Anschluss an Marx — Zur Neubestimmung des Verhältnisses von wissenschaftlicher Weltauffassung und Religion”
Lothar Kreiser, “Friedrich Eduard Benekes Verständnis der Logik und seine Bearbeitung der Syllogistik”
Ernst Wolfgang Orth, “Die Kultur des Wissens in der Philosophie des Neukantianers Alois Riehl”
Klaus-Dieter Eichler, “Platon-Lektüre als ‘philosophisches Grundereignis’. Die Bestimmung des ‘wahren’ Sophisten im platonischen Dialog Sophistes: Ein Beitrag Piatons zur ‘Transzendentalphilosophie’?”
Hans Jörg Sandkühler, “Weder Stillstand der Geschichte noch Haben des Ganzen. Über Paradoxien enzyklopädischer Philosophie”

di Giovanni, George.  “On Chris L. Firestone and Nathan Jacobs’s In Defense of Kant’s Religion: A Comment.”  Faith and Philosophy 29.2 (2012): 163-69. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this comment on Firestone and Jacobs’s book, In Defense of Kant’s Religion, I take issue with (1) the authors’ strategy in demonstrating that it is possible to positively incorporate religion and theology into Kant’s critical corpus, and (2) their intention to focus on the coherence of Kant’s theory without necessarily recommending it for Christianity. Regarding (1), I argue that in pursuing their strategy the authors ignore the fact that Kant has transposed what appear to be traditional religious doctrines to a completely different level of reflection, in effect turning them into imaginary tropes intended to mask otherwise irreducible contradictions in his view of human agency. As for (2), I claim that the authors’ intention runs the risk of being disingenuous, since Kant presented his religion as the true religion, opposing it to historical Christianity (unless the latter, of course, is re-interpreted according to his own precepts).

Diop, El Hadj Ibrahima.  “Die Kant-Forster-Kontroverse über Menschenrassen als Wendepunkt der europäischen Afrikadiskurse.”  Klopffechtereien – Missverständnisse – Widersprüche? Methodische und methodologische Perspektiven auf die Kant-Forster-Kontroverse.  Eds. Rainer Godel and Gideon Stiening (op cit.). 179-89. [M]

Di Ronza, Edvige. La questione della metafisica in Kant: appunti e riflessioni preliminari. [Italian] Naples: Giannini, 2012. [92 p.] [WC]

Dörflinger, Bernd. “Kant über das Ende der historischen Religionen.”  Kant und die Religion — die Religionen und Kant. Eds. Reinhard Hiltscher and Stefan Klingner (op cit.). 159-75. [M]

 ——. “Kants Ethikotheologie und die Pflicht zur Beförderung des höchsten Guts.” Theologie und Glaube 102.1 (2012): 45-68. [PW]

 —— and Günter Kruck, eds. Worauf Vernunft hinaussieht: Kants regulative Ideen im Kontext von Teleologie und praktischer Philosophie. Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 2012. [196 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Studien und Materialien zur Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. 84.
Contents: Papers from a conference held Sept. 4-5, 2009, in Frankfurt/Main.
Claudio La Rocca, “Von den regulativen Funktionen des Urteilskraftprinzips”
Günter Zöller, “Reflexion und Regulation: Kant über Begriffe und Prinzipien der Vernunft in der Kritik der Urteilskraft”
Rudolf Langthaler, “‘Worauf Vernunft hinaussieht’: eine Leitperspektive in der Entfaltung der Idee des ‘Reichs der Zwecke’ bei Kant”
Christian Hamm, “Der ‘Wille’ der Natur und die ‘Natur’ der Vernunft”
Michael Städtler, “Geschichte zwischen Natur und Begriff: Aporien und Perspektiven von Kants Versuchen, Geschichte zu denken”
Günter Kruck, “Freiheit: eine regulative Idee”
Camilla Serck-Hanssen, “Das radikale Böse, das ich und die Illusion der praktischen Vernunft”
Burkhard Tuschling, “‘Blosse’ Idee und ‘unbezweifelte praktische Realität’: Recht, Staat, Gerechtigkeit und Ewiger Friede bei Kant”
Bernd Dörflinger, “Die personifizierte Idee des Guten: zugleich ein Beitrag zu Kants Christologie”
Ernst Wolfgang Orth, “Kants regulative Idee im Verständnis Helmuth Plessners”

Dombrowski, Daniel. Rev. of Deep Empiricism: Kant, Whitehead, and the Necessity of Philosophical Theism, by Derek Malone-France (2006).  Review of Metaphysics 66.2 (2012): 375-76. [M]

Dorrien, Gary J.  Kantian Reason and Hegelian Spirit: The Idealistic Logic of Modern Theology.  Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012. [x, 605 p.] [WC]

 ——. “Kantian Concepts, Liberal Theology, and Post-Kantian Idealism.” American Journal of Theology and Philosophy 33.1 (2012): 5-31. [PI]

Dottarelli, Luciano. Maneggiare assoluti: Immanuel Kant, Primo Levi e altri maestri. Padova: Il prato, 2012. [96 p.] [WC]

Doyle, Michael W.  Liberal Peace: Selected Essays.  London: Routledge, 2012. [243 p.] [WC]

Doyle, Tsarina.  “The Kantian Background to Nietzsche’s Views on Causality.”  Journal of Nietzsche Studies 43.1 (2012): 44-56. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article addresses the Kantian background to Nietzsche’s metaphysics. Focusing on the issues of causality and force, I argue that Nietzsche’s will to power thesis emerges in response to Kant’s approach to the question of causality. I contend that Nietzsche sides with Kant, contrary to Schopenhauer, in his identification of force with efficient causality, indicating his approval of Kant’s restriction of the objective applicability of the concept of causality to the phenomenal sphere. However, Nietzsche contends that Kant fails to fully execute his project due to his retention of the thing-in-itself as the realm in which the inner determinations of things reside. I argue that Nietzsche makes it his task to complete the Kantian project by reconciling force with its disinherited inner determinations at the level of phenomena rather than things-in-themselves.

Drăghici, M. A. “Some Methodological Aspects towards an Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.” Rev. Roum. Phil. 56.2 (2012): pp. [RC]

Drzazgowska, Ewa. “The Role of Kant’s Philosophy in the Romantic Turn in the Philosophy of Language.” [Polish] Kwartalnik Filozoficzny 40.2 (2012): 49-64. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The aim of the paper is to examine the beginning of the romantic turn as regards the relation between language, thought and reality. The author claims that Kant’s critical philosophy played an important role. First, Kant’s philosophy had a conservative influence: the categories presented in the Critique of Pure Reason led scholars to seek for universal notions in diverse languages more intensively. But, secondly, it engendered the objection of Hamann and Herder, which led to the explicit formulation of the thesis of how language influences thinking. Thirdly, in spite of their “metacriticism” of Kant, it was due to the transcendental turn that Hamann and Herder could consider the relation between language and reality. And last but not least, Kant’s teleological conceptions gave a frame for the romantic theory of language as organism, which subsequently evolved into the modern system approach.

Dubbink, Wim and Bert van de Ven.  “On the Duties of Commission in Commercial Life. A Kantian Criticism of Moral Institutionalism.”  Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15.2 (2012): 221-38. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In latter-day discussions on corporate morality, duties of commission are fiercely debated. Moral institutionalists argue that duties of commission — such as a duty of assistance — overstep the boundaries of moral duty owed by economic agents. “Moral institutionalism” is a newly coined term for a familiar position on market morality. It maintains that market morality ought to be restricted, excluding all duties of commission. Neo-Classical thinkers such as Baumol and Homann defend it most eloquently. They underpin their position with concerns that go to the core of liberalism — the dominant western political theory that sustains the ideals of both the free market and the free, rational person. Those authors claim that liberalism calls for a fully differentiated market because it resents the politicization of the market. Fully differentiated markets exclude duties of commission. They also claim that full differentiation of the market closes the troublesome gap between moral motivation and moral virtue. Full differentiation redeems the promise of “easy virtue”. In this paper moral institutionalism will be rejected from a Kantian point of view, mostly inspired by Herman’s thesis on the invisibility of morality. Liberalism may perhaps ban the politicization of the market; it does not forbid its moralization. The idea of a fully differentiated market must also be rejected because it is either morally over-demanding (to the morally autonomous person) or morally hazardous (to the person with failing moral motivation). Contrary to what the moral institutionalists claim, right action, morally, is actually quite difficult in fully differentiated markets.

Duichin, Marco. “Kant pacifista? Illuminismo, guerra e pace perpetua.” Il realismo della ragione: Kant dai lumi alla filosofia contemporanea. Ed. Stefano Poggi (op cit.). 113-21. [M]

Duncan, Sam.  “Moral Evil, Freedom and the Goodness of God: Why Kant Abandoned Theodicy.”  British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20.5 (2012): 973-91. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant proclaimed that all theodicies must fail in ‘On the Miscarriage of All Philosophical Trials in Theodicy’, but it is mysterious why he did so since he had developed a theodicy of his own during the critical period. In this paper, I offer an explanation of why Kant thought theodicies necessarily fail. In his theodicy, as well as in some of his works in ethics, Kant explained moral evil as resulting from unavoidable limitations in human beings. God could not create finite beings without such limitations and so could not have created humans that were not prone to committing immoral acts. However, the work of Carl Christian Eberhard Schmid showed Kant that given his own beliefs about freedom and the nature of responsibility one could not account for moral evil in this way without tacitly denying that human beings were responsible for their actions. This result is significant not only because it explains an otherwise puzzling shift in Kant's philosophy of religion, but also because it shows that the theodicy essay provides powerful evidence that Kant’s thinking about moral evil and freedom underwent fundamental shifts between early works such as the Groundwork and later works like the Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason.

Dunlop, Katherine.  “Kant and Strawson on the Content of Geometrical Concepts.”  Nous 46.1 (2012): 86-126. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article focuses on Immanuel Kant's concept of sensible representation (intuition), considering his view of geometry. It also argues on P. F. Strawson’s interpretation suggesting that Kant intends to explain the imaginative activity by which people recognize concepts. It discusses aspects of Kant’s theory of geometry relative to topics including the definition of concept, mathematical concepts as factitious a priori, and heterogeneity between concept and intuition.

Duque, Félix.  “Illusion and Strategy of Reason.”  Kant’s Philosophy of the Unconscious.  Eds. Piero Giordanetti, Riccardo Pozzo, and Marco Sgarbi (op cit.). 61-75. [M]

 ——. “Kant und Hegel über das Selbe.”  Metaphysik — Ästhetik — Ethik. Eds. Antonino Falduto, Caroline Kolisang, and Gabriel Rivero (op cit.). 45-64. [WC]

Duso, Giuseppe. Idea di libertà e costituzione repubblicana nella filosofia politica di Kant. Milan: Polimetrica, 2012. [125 p.] [WC]

Dutoit, Thomas.  “Kant’s Retreat, Hugo’s Advance, Freud’s Erection; or, Derrida’s Displacements in his Death Penalty Lectures.”  Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (2012): 107-35. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article analyzes the role played by Immanuel Kant’s defense of the death penalty, in the first and the second years of Jacques Derrida’s Death Penalty Seminars, delivered from 1999 to 2001. Regarding the first year, the initial part of this article charts how Derrida introduces Kant’s writings that purport to elaborate the categorical imperative of the death penalty, not by Kant’s primary arguments but rather precisely through Kant’s concession of an exception to this categorical imperative, concerning the impunity of a mother’s infanticide. Derrida’s lectures juxtapose Kant’s philosophy of the death penalty with Victor Hugo’s claim for the inviolability of life, and in doing so, the sessions introduce other examples of the applicability of the death penalty to mothers who have killed their children. What is at stake is the status of philosophy relative to the death penalty. Concerning the second year, the latter part of this article isolates the logic of Kant’s categorical imperative, as deconstructed by Derrida, through recourse to the additions that Kant was obliged to append to his initial argument — those involving precisely sex crimes. The article follows how Derrida thoroughly takes apart both the simplicity of Kant’s categorical imperative of the death penalty by means of the complications that are its abyssal foundation and the phallogocentrism of Freud’s sexual oppositions through the extraction of insights into another thinking of sexual difference that Freud’s categories foreclosed.

Dyck, Corey W.  “Chimerical Ethics and Flattering Moralists: Baumgarten’s Influence on Kant’s Moral Theory in the Observations and Remarks.”  Kant’s Observations and Remarks: A Critical Guide.  Eds. Susan Meld Shell and Richard Velkley (op cit.). 38-56. [M]

Dziuda, Karol. Filozofia dziejów Immanuela Kanta. [Polish; “The Philosophy of History of Immanuel Kant”] Jastrzębie-Zdrój: Wydawnictwo Black Unicorn, 2012. [158 p.] [WC]

[top] E    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Ebels-Duggan, Kyla. “Kant’s Political Philosophy.” Philosophy Compass 7.12 (2012): 896-909. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant’s political theory stands in the social contract tradition, but departs significantly from earlier versions of social contract theory. Most importantly Kant holds, against Hobbes and Locke, that we have not merely a pragmatic reason but an obligation to exit the state of nature and found a state. Kant holds that each person has an innate right to freedom, but it is possible to simultaneously honor everyone’s right only under the rule of law. Since we are obligated to respect each person’s right to freedom, and can do so only in a state, we are obligated to submit to the authority of the state if we have one, and to establish one if we do not. In the first half of the essay I reconstruct this argument in more detail. In the second half I survey four points of controversy: (i) What is the relationship between Kant’s political philosophy and his moral philosophy? (ii) How does the innate right to freedom support the postulate that we are permitted to acquire property and other private rights? (iii) How does the postulate support an obligation to found the state? (iv) How should we understand Kant’s views about political revolutions?

Eichler, Klaus-Dieter. “Platon-Lektüre als ‘philosophisches Grundereignis’. Die Bestimmung des ‘wahren’ Sophisten im platonischen Dialog Sophistes: Ein Beitrag Piatons zur ‘Transzendentalphilosophie’?”  Transzendentalphilosophie und die Kultur der Gegenwart. Eds. Steffen Dietzsch and Udo Teitz (op cit.). 295-321. [M]

Ellis, Elisabeth.  “Introduction to Kant’s Political Theory.”  Kant’s Political Theory: Interpretations and Applications.  Ed. Elisabeth Ellis (op cit.). 1-24. [M]

 ——, ed.  Kant’s Political Theory: Interpretations and Applications.  University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2012. [viii, 256 p.] [WC] [review]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents:
Onora O’Neill, Kant and the Social Contract Tradition;
Arthur Ripstein, Kant and the Circumstances of Justice;
Thomas W. Pogge, Is Kant’s Rechtslehre a ‘Comprehensive Liberalism’?;
Louis-Philippe Hodgson, Realizing External Freedom: The Kantian Argument for a World State;
Robert S. Taylor, The Progress of Absolutism in Kant’s Essay ‘What is Enlightenment?’;
Michaele Ferguson, Unsocial Sociability: Perpetual Antagonism in Kant’s Political Thought;
Ian Hunter, Kant’s Political Thought in the Prussian Enlightenment;
Mika LaVaque-Manty, Kant on Education;
John Christian Laursen, Kant, Freedom of the Press, and Book Piracy.

Emundts, Dina.  “Kants Kritik an der traditionellen Metaphysik.”  Kants Prolegomena: ein kooperativer Kommentar.  Eds. Holger Lyre and Oliver Schliemann (op cit.). 195-214. [M]

Engstrom, Stephen. “Summary of The Form of Practical Knowledge.” Analytic Philosophy 53.1 (2012): 58-60. [PI]

 ——. “Bringing Practical Knowledge into View: Response to Bagnoli, Hill, and Reath.” Analytic Philosophy 53.1 (2012): 89-97. [PI]

Esposito, Costantino. “Kant e l'invenzione dell'Ontoteologia.” Il realismo della ragione: Kant dai lumi alla filosofia contemporanea. Ed. Stefano Poggi (op cit.). 123-46. [M]

Esteves, Julio.  “The Noncircular Deduction of the Categorical Imperative in Groundwork III.”  Kant in Brazil.  Eds. Frederick Rauscher and Daniel Omar Perez (op cit.). 155-72. [M]

Euler, Werner.  “Einheit der Abstammung oder Gattungseinteilung? Kants Begriff der (Menschen-) Rasse als Idee einer Naturgeschichte.”  Klopffechtereien – Missverständnisse – Widersprüche? Methodische und methodologische Perspektiven auf die Kant-Forster-Kontroverse.  Eds. Rainer Godel and Gideon Stiening (op cit.). 55-96. [M]

Evans, C. Stephen.  Rev. of Understanding Moral Obligation: Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard, by Robert Stern (2011). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (July 2012, #23). [online] [M]

[top] F    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Failla, Mariannina. Dell'esistenza: glosse allo scritto kantiano del 1762. [Italian] Macerata: Quodlibet, 2012. [134 p.] [WC]

 ——. Poter agire: letture kantiane. [Italian] Pisa: ETS, 2012. [122 p.] [WC]

Falduto, Antonino. “Das Gefühl als Empfänglichkeit und die Bedeutung einer Ästhetik der Sitten. Anmerkungen zu Birgit Recki.”  Metaphysik — Ästhetik — Ethik. Eds. Antonino Falduto, Caroline Kolisang, and Gabriel Rivero (op cit.). 137-53. [WC]

 ——, Caroline Kolisang, and Gabriel Rivero, eds.  Metaphysik — Ästhetik — Ethik: Beiträge zur Interpretation der Philosophie Kants.  Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2012. [199 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents:
Manfred Baum, Metaphysik. Ontologie und Transzendentalphilosophie bei Kant;
Till Hoeppner, Die Reflexivität der Transzendentalphilosophie und die Herleitung der Kategorien: Ergänzungen zu Manfred Baum;
Félix Duque, Kant und Hegel über das Selbe;
Gabriel Rivero, Kants Konzeption der Selbsterkenntnis der Vernunft: Anmerkungen zu Félix Duque Heiner F. Klemme, Ästhetik und Ethik. Johann Georg Sulzers "vermischte Sittenlehre": ein Beitrag zur Vorgeschichte und Problemstellung von Kants Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten;
Saneyuki Yamatsuta, Kant über die Popularphilosophie und den Begriff der Achtung: Anmerkungen zu H.F. Klemmes Johann Georg Sulzers "vermischte Sittenlehre";
Birgit Recki, Kants Ästhetik der Sitten : ein Beitrag zum Problem der moralischen Motivation; Gabriele Tomasi, Das Gefühl als Empfänglichkeit und die Bedeutung einer Ästhetik der Sitten: Anmerkungen zu Birgit Recki — Gefühl und Erkenntnis in Kants Konzeption der ästhetischen Erfahrung;
Thomas Höwing, Tomasi über die Grundform der ästhetischen Erfahrung bei Kant.

Falk, Johanna.  Freiheit als politisches Ziel: Grundmodelle liberalen Denkens bei Kant, Hayek und Böckenförde.  Frankfurt/Main: Campus Verlag, 2012. [251 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Originally a Ph.D dissertation (Universität Passau, 2011).

Feloj, Serena. Il sublime nel pensiero di Kant. [Italian] Bresca: Morcelliana, 2012. [270 p.] [WC] [contents]

Fenves, Peter.  “Absent an Even Finer Feeling: A Commentary on the Opening of Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime.”  Kant’s Observations and Remarks: A Critical Guide.  Eds. Susan Meld Shell and Richard Velkley (op cit.). 219-33. [M]

Ferguson, Benjamin.  “Kant on Duty in the Groundwork.”  Res Publica 18.4 (2012): 303-19. [HUM]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Barbara Herman offers an interpretation of Kant’s Groundwork on which an action has moral worth if the primary motive for the action is the motive of duty. She offers this approach in place of Richard Henson’s sufficiency-based interpretation, according to which an action has moral worth when the motive of duty is sufficient by itself to generate the action. Noa Latham criticizes Herman’s account and argues that we cannot make sense of the position that an agent can hold multiple motives for action and yet be motivated by only one of them, concluding that we must accept a face-value interpretation of the Groundwork where morally worthy actions obtain only when the agent’s sole motive is the motive of duty. This paper has two goals, one broad and one more constrained. The broader objective is to argue that interpretations of moral worth, as it is presented in the Groundwork, depend on interpretations of Kant’s theory of freedom. I show that whether we can make sense of the inclusion of nonmoral motives in morally worthy actions depends on whether the ‘always causal framework’ is consistent with Kant’s theory of freedom. The narrow goal is to show that if we adopt an ‘always causal’ framework for moral motivation, then Herman’s position and her critique of the sufficiency-based approach fail. Furthermore, within this framework I will specify a criterion for judging whether an action is determined by the motive of duty, even in the presence of nonmoral motives. Thus, I argue Latham’s conclusion that we must accept a face-value interpretation is incorrect.

Ferguson, Frances. “Reflections on Burke, Kant, and Solitude and the Sublime.” European Romantic Review 23.3 (2012): 313-17. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This essay reviews Edmund Burke’s and Immanuel Kant’s views on the sublime as the author had earlier addressed them in Solitude and the Sublime. Her reflections focus on the importance of the rise of interest in aesthetics as a distinctive kind of experience in the eighteenth century and the Romantic era, on how aesthetic experience (in Kant’s view) sits in relation to pure reason and practical reason, on the importance of aesthetic experience in recruiting first-person testimony, and on the importance of aesthetic discussions for emphasizing, first, the necessity that aesthetic experience be a response to an actual concrete object (in the beautiful) and, second, the significance of the mathematical sublime in showing human representational capacities themselves as objects of aesthetic experience.

Ferguson, Michaele.  “Unsocial Sociability: Perpetual Antagonism in Kant’s Political Thought.”  Kant’s Political Theory: Interpretations and Applications.  Ed. Elisabeth Ellis (op cit.). 150-69. [M]

Ferrari, Massimo. “Cassirer, Kant e l'Aufklärung.” Il realismo della ragione: Kant dai lumi alla filosofia contemporanea. Ed. Stefano Poggi (op cit.). 181-208. [M]

Ferraris, Maurizio. “Kant e gli oggetti sociali.” Il realismo della ragione: Kant dai lumi alla filosofia contemporanea. Ed. Stefano Poggi (op cit.). 285-94. [M]

Ferreiro, Héctor. “El argumento ontológico y la muerte de la metafísica: dos visiones complementarias Kant y Hegel.” [Spanish; The ontological argument and the end of metaphysics: two complementary approaches Kant and Hegel] Veritas 57.3 (2012): 99-120. [online] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The core of Kant’s criticism of the ontological argument is the thesis that existence is not a real predicate capable of being added to the concept of an object. The concept of the most perfect or the most real being is a subjective content that is as such completely determined, that is to say, that already has all the determinations that define that concept as such. Therefore, to know if that object also exists in the real world is indispensable that the subject has an intuition of it. The absence of such intuition is, according to Kant, an insuperable obstacle for the different attempts to prove the existence of God. Although Hegel agrees in principle with Kant ́s claim that existence must not be conceived as a real predicate, he considers, however, that to understand it as the position of the already exhaustively determined concept of the object does not imply a true overcoming of the particular notion of existence that is at the base of the ontological argument. In this article I defend the claim that Hegel ́s counter-criticism of Kant ́s criticism of the ontological argument is actually a radicalization of Kant ́s general critique of metaphysics.

Ferri, Sabrina.  “Vittorio Alfieri’s Natural Sublime: The Physiology of Poetic Inspiration.”  European Romantic Review 23.5 (2012): 555-74. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This essay examines Vittorio Alfieri’s representation of the natural sublime in his autobiography, Vita scritta da esso (1804), and situates it in the context of the eighteenth-century philosophical discourse on the aesthetics of the sublime. A comparative analysis of its relation to Burke’s physiological sublime, as opposed to Kant’s rationalistic model, shows how Alfieri’s description of the sublime is in line with the body-centered Burkean system. In fact, Alfieri’s natural sublime is a corporeal experience that stresses the primacy of the senses at the expense of reason. Following Longinus, however, Alfieri poses the question of the sublime in terms of poetic inspiration and describes a physiology of creativity that involves both the bodily passions and the imagination. By situating Alfieri’s sublime in a wider European context, the essay provides a conceptual framework to comprehend more fully Alfieri’s ideas about the psychology of literary inspiration and the creative process. Finally, Alfieri’s treatment of the natural sublime points to a non-Kantian line of development for the Romantic sublime and sheds light on the complex nature of late-eighteenth-century aesthetic theory.

Ferry, Luc. Kant et les Lumières. la science et la morale. Paris: Le Figaro, 2012. [96 p.] [WC]

Ficara, Elena. Skeptizismus und Philosophie: Kant, Fichte, Hegel. Amsterdam/New York: Rodopi, 2012. [237 p.] [WC]

 ——. “Skeptizismus und die Begründung der Philosophie bei Kant und Hegel.” Fichte-Studien 39 (2012): 95-109. [HUM]

 ——. Rev. of Kant and Skepticism, by Michael N. Forster (2008). Fichte-Studien 40 (2012): 309-12. [PDC]

Filippaki, Eleni.  “Kant on Love, Respect, and Friendship.”  Kant Yearbook: Kant and Contemporary Moral Philosophy 4 (2012): 23-48. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper focuses on Kant’s claim that friendship is governed by a polarity between love and respect conceived as attractive and repulsive forces. It argues that interpreting this polarity is crucial for understanding Kant’s moral vision and how it is anything but inimical to an ethics of intimacy. More specifically, it shows that the notion of attractive and repulsive moral forces is a key element for understanding both Kant’s theory of friendship and its importance for the ethical vision of the Metaphysics of Morals as a whole. The tension between love and respect underlies all moral relations, whether universal and impersonal, or particular and personal, and, moreover, echoes the attractive and repulsive struggle that Kant believes governs the material world. The picture of Kantian morality that emerges against this background is thus one where individuals constantly strive both to retain their agency and open up to others by acknowledging and embracing ends other than one’s own, hence finding themselves in a constant struggle for balance. Part I examines Kant’s claim against his theory of matter and force. Part II argues that intimate, personal friendships provide only the most concrete and specific example of the tensions inherent in the kind of universal friendship that Kantian morality requires of all. The final part, offered as a variation upon the theme, sketches a reply to Rae Langton’s critique of Kant’s morality and theory of friendship.

Fink, Kristina.  Die sogenannte “Kantkrise” Heinrich von Kleists: ein altes Problem aus neuer Sicht.  Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2012. [440 p.]  [data] [WC]

Fioraso, Nazzareno. De Königsberg a España: la filosofía española del siglo XIX en su relación con el pensamiento kantiano. [Spanish] Valencia: EDICEP, 2012. [238 p.] [WC]

Firestone, Chris L.  “A Response to Critics of In Defense of Kant’s Religion.”  Faith and Philosophy 29.2 (2012): 193-209. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This essay replies to four critics of In Defense of Kant’s Religion (IDKR). In reply to Gordon E. Michalson, Jr., I argue that the best pathway for understanding Kant’s Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (Religion) is to conduct close textual analysis rather than giving up the art of interpretation or allowing meta-considerations surrounding Kant’s personal and political circumstances to govern one’s interpretation. In response to George di Giovanni, I contend that his critique is dismissive of theologically robust readings of Kant for reasons that have very little to do with what Religion actually asserts. Pamela Sue Anderson’s essay, I argue, reads Kant on God according to an empirically-biased stream of British interpretation which makes Kant’s transcendental philosophy appear foreign to its rationalist heritage. Lastly, in response to Stephen R. Palmquist, I suggest that his reading of Kant’s two experiments is done not only in a vacuum, but also according to a perspectival interpretation of Kant that goes beyond what Kant’s writings actually maintain.

Fischer, Luise. Rev. of Reading Kant’s Geography, edited by Stuart Elden and Eduardo Mendieta (2011). H-HistGeog (February 2012). [online] [M]

Fischer, Norbert. “Einführung: ‘Natur’, ‘Freiheit’ und ‘Gnade’ im Spannungsfeld von Augustinus und Kant.”  Die Gnadenlehre als salto mortale der Vernunft? Ed. Norbert Fischer (op cit.). 15-49. [M]

 ——. “‘Glaubenslehren sind Gnadenbezeigungen’. Ansätze zur Gnadenlehre in der Philosophie Immanuel Kants.”  Die Gnadenlehre als salto mortale der Vernunft? Ed. Norbert Fischer (op cit.). 285-310. [M]

 ——. “Zu Kants ‘moralisch-bestimmtem Monotheismus’.”  Kant und die Religion — die Religionen und Kant. Eds. Reinhard Hiltscher and Stefan Klingner (op cit.). 193-212. [M]

 ——, ed.  Die Gnadenlehre als salto mortale der Vernunft?: Natur, Freiheit und Gnade im Spannungsfeld von Augustinus und Kant.  Freiburg im Breisgau/München: Verlag Karl Alber, 2012. [368 p.] [contents] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: See the essays by Fischer, Danz, Seidl, Sirovätka, and Forschner.

 ——. “Autonomie et transcendance: deux thèmes fondamentaux de l'encyclique Fides et ratio dans la pensée d'Augustin et de Kant.”  Confiance dans la raison. Ed. Philippe Capelle-Dumont (Paris: Parole et Silence). 261-86. [WC]

Fleischacker, Samuel. What is Enlightenment? London/New York: Routledge, 2012. [ix, 235 p.] [WC]

Flonta, Mircea. 20 de întrebări şi răspunsuri despre Immanuel Kant. [Romanian; 20 Questions and Answers about Immanuel Kant] Bucharest: Humanitas, 2012. [201p.] [WC]

Förster, Eckart.  The Twenty-Five Years of Philosophy: A Systematic Reconstruction.  [German: Die 25 Jahre der Philosophie: Eine systematische Rekonstruktion].  Transl. by Brady Bowman.  Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012. [xi, 408 p.] [WC]

 —— and Yitzhak Y. Melamed, eds. Spinoza and German Idealism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012. [xii, 285 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: See the essays by Ameriks, Boehm, and Melamed.

Fonnesu, Luca. “Kant e la 'certezza morale'.” Il realismo della ragione: Kant dai lumi alla filosofia contemporanea. Ed. Stefano Poggi (op cit.). 147-69. [M]

 ——.  Rev. of Kant’s ‘Critique of Practical Reason’: A Critical Guide, edited by Andrews Reath and Jens Timmermann (2010). Rivista di Filosofia 103.1 (2012): 168-70. [PI]

Forman, David.  “Kant on Moral Freedom and Moral Slavery.”  Kantian Review 17.1 (2012): 1-32. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant’s account of the freedom gained through virtue builds on the Socratic tradition. On the Socratic view, when morality is our end, nothing can hinder us from attaining satisfaction: we are self-sufficient and free since moral goodness is (as Kant says) “created by us, hence, is in our power”. But when our end is the fulfilment of sensible desires, our satisfaction requires luck as well as the cooperation of others. For Kant, this means that happiness requires that we get other people to work for our ends; and this requires, in turn, that we gain control over the things other people value so as to have influence over them. If this plan for happiness is not subordinated to morality, then what is most valuable to us will be precisely what others value. This is the root of the ‘passions’ that make us evil and make us slaves whose satisfaction depends on others. But, significantly, this dependence is a moral slavery and, hence, does not signal a loss, or even diminishment of the kind of freedom required for moral responsibility.

 ——.  “Principled and Unprincipled Maxims.”  Kant-Studien 103.3 (2012): 318-36. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant frequently speaks as if all voluntary actions arise from our maxims as the subjective principles of our practical reason. But, as Michael Albrecht has pointed out, Kant also occasionally speaks as if it is only the rare person of “character” who acts according to principles or maxims. I argue that Kant’s seemingly contradictory claims on this front result from the fact that there are two fundamentally different ways that maxims of action can figure in the deliberation of the agent: an agent can act on a maxim either because it promises agreeable results or because he deems it to be an intrinsically correct principle of action. Kant describes a maxim of the latter sort as “firm” and as indicative of “character” in the honorific sense. If the agent’s commitment to his maxim is instead conditional on its agreeable results, we can say he does not act “on principle” and in that sense does not act on maxims at all: rather than aiming at a set of results because the action that produces them conforms to his maxim, he acts according to his maxim because doing so promises (and only as long as it promises) the results he desires. Such an agent thus lacks the principled maxims of a person of character since his maxims are always for sale to the highest bidder. Kant allows that an evil person can approximate the ideal of a principled indifference to results, but claims that only morally good action can be wholly principled. This is also why maxims of action in conformity with duty can be acquired gradually through habituation whereas an authentically moral maxim must instead arise from a “revolution” in thought.

Formosa, Paul.  “From Discipline to Autonomy: Kant’s Theory of Moral Development.”  Kant and Education: Interpretations and Commentary.  Eds. Klas Roth and Chris W. Surprenant (op cit.). 163-76. [M]

Forrester, Stefan. “Why Kantian Symbols Cannot Be Kantian Metaphors.” Southwest Philosophy Review 28.2 (2012): 107-27. [PDC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: There is some limited contemporary scholarship on the theory of metaphor Kant appears to provide in his Critique of Judgment. The dominant interpretations that have emerged of Kant’s somewhat nascent account of metaphors are what I refer to as the symbolist view, which states that Kantian symbols should be viewed as Kantian metaphors, and the aesthetic idea view, which holds that Kant defined metaphors as aesthetic ideas (which is a technical notion in his aesthetic theory). In this essay, I claim that the symbolist view of Kantian metaphors is not plausible and that we should accept the aesthetic idea view in its stead. The jumping off points for my discussion are two fairly recent essays on the subject: A. T. Nuyen’s (1989) “The Kantian Theory of Metaphor” and Kirk Pillow’s (2001) “Jupiter’s Eagle and the Despot’s Hand Mill: Two Views of Metaphor in Kant.” Nuyen defends the symbolist view of Kantian metaphor and Pillow defends a split view, i.e., Pillow thinks Kant has a dual-aspect view of metaphor that can bear both the symbolist and the aesthetic idea interpretations. Although I make use of some of Pillow’s objections against the symbolist view, I conclude that both he and Nuyen are wrong in thinking that Kantian symbols have any relationship to Kantian metaphors at all. Lastly, I will provide my own positive account of Kant’s theory of metaphors as well as show how this debate affects Kant’s overall aesthetic theory.

Forschler, Scott.  “From Supervenience to ‘Universal Law’: How Kantian Ethics Become Heteronomous.”  Kant Yearbook: Kant and Contemporary Moral Philosophy 4 (2012): 49-68. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant’s desiderata for a supreme principle of practical reasoning and morality require that the subjective conditions under which some action is thought of as justified via some maxim be sufficient for judging the same action as justified by any agent in those conditions. This describes the kind of universalization conditions now known as moral supervenience. But when he specifies his “formula of universal law” (FUL) Kant replaces this condition with a quite different kind of universality: the judgment that some agent could rationally (i.e., without willing the frustration of his own valued ends) will his adoption of some maxim under the condition that this would cause all agents in his world to adopt it as well. Our wills typically lack this efficacy, so requiring that our wills conform to what would be rational for a hypothetical agent in this situation to will is a heteronomous requirement. Several intuitively wrong maxims pass Kant’s test but fail the test of supervenience, because they generate no contradiction in a world of universal compliance but do so in non-ideal worlds, demonstrating the inadequacy of the FUL and the logical superiority of moral supervenience.

Forschner, Maximilian. “Der formale Grund des Bösen bei Immanuel Kant.”  Die Gnadenlehre als salto mortale der Vernunft? Ed. Norbert Fischer (op cit.). 268-84. [M]

 ——.  “Spolocenstvo vo viere. Poznámsky ku Kantovmu pojmu cirkvi.” [Slovak; “A Community of Faith: Remarks on Kant’s Conception of Church”]  Filozofia 67.4 (2012): 303-14. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The paper is based on the assumption that in Kant’s system of morality is not rooted in religion — just the opposite, the religion is rooted in morality. According to Kant, morality necessarily leads to religion by which he understands the knowledge of all our duties, not only as categorical commands of our own reason but also as commands of God. The author therefore tries to answer the questions arising from this context: why is there the need for faith and religion? And why is there even the need for institutional community, i.e., church? Is the reason of an individual not sufficient enough to recognize our duties? Is the moral feeling achieved by reason of every single man, i.e., feeling of respect before the law, not enough to motivate us to fulfill our duties? How should the church look like in Kant’s view to perform its potentially useful function?

Forster, Michael N.  “Kant’s Philosophy of Language?”  Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 74.3 (2012): 485-511. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The critical Kant has often been read as a sort of dualist concerning the relation of thought and concepts to language — most famously by Hamann in his Metacritique of 1784, but also by many other commentators since. However, recent German scholarship has ascribed to Kant the same sort of anti-dualistic insight into the essential dependence of thought and concepts on language that Hamann and Herder became famous for. Which interpretation is right? This article argues that there is textual evidence supporting both interpretations, but that it belongs to different periods of Kant’s development: the dualism belongs to the period of the three Critiques, lasting until about 1790, after which Kant switched to anti-dualism. The article also argues that during the period of the three Critiques Kant gave an exaggerated impression of the strength of the dualism to which he was committed, before eventually abandoning it in the later period, and that in both cases this was largely due to the influence of Hamann and Herder, which in the first case caused Kant to try to distance himself from their position and in the second case eventually caused him to accept it.

Foucault, Michel. 칸트의 인간학에 관하여: 실용적 관점에서 본 인간학 서설 / K'ant'ŭ ŭi in'ganhak e kwanhayŏ: siryongjŏk kwanchŏm esŏ pon in'ganhak sŏsŏl. [Korean] Translation of Introduction à l’Anthropologie into Korean by Kim, Kwang-ch'ŏl. Seoul: Munhak kwa Chisŏngsa, 2012. [201 p.] [WC]

Francisco, Iracheta. “La libertad práctica y trascendental en la Crítica de la razón pura.” [Spanish; Practical and Transcendental Freedom in the Critique of Pure Reason] Ideas y Valores: Revista Colombiana de Filosofia 61 #150 (2012): 91-125. [online] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract:The article discusses the connection between practical and transcendental freedom in the Critique of Pure Reason, in order to reveal the difficulties faced by Kant when he relates these two meanings of freedom in the context of critical philosophy. Interpreters have generally understood the relation between these two meanings of freedom as ontological or conceptual. The objective of this article, however, is to show that neither of those interpretations manages to overcome the rationalist and empiricist dogmatism that, according to Kant, support the positions of the proponents of the Thesis and the Antithesis, respectively.

Franco, Paul L.  “Are Kant’s Concepts and Methodology Inconsistent with Scientific Change? Constitutivity and the Synthetic Method in Kant.”  HOPOS: The International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 2.2 (2012): 321-53. [HUM]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Sympathetic commentators on Kant’s account of physical knowledge agree that while philosophy of science has much to gain from Kant’s notion of constitutive a priori principles, Kant’s conceptual and methodological resources are inconsistent with the possibility of scientific change. In this article, I argue that this received view is lacking since Kant’s claim that a unique set of a priori principles structures our knowledge for all time is not central to his account of the constitutive a priori. Two underemphasized points of Kant’s theory bear this out. First, Kant applies ‘a priori’ widely to include non-truth-evaluable elements of knowledge. As such, Kant primarily understands the necessity that attaches to these elements in light of the constitutive role they play in knowledge rather than in terms of truth for all time. Second, Kant uses two methods to establish the existence of constitutive a priori principles: the analytic and the synthetic. On my interpretation, while scientific change has discredited the analytic method, the synthetic method remains viable. In this way, I offer a new perspective on the ways in which Kant’s theory of the constitutive a priori can ground Neo-Kantian philosophies of science like those of Hans Reichenbach and Michael Friedman.

Freudenthal, Gideon. “Anschauung und Verstand in geometrischen Konstruktionen: Kant und Maimon.”  Transzendentalphilosophie und die Kultur der Gegenwart. Eds. Steffen Dietzsch and Udo Teitz (op cit.). 113-38. [M]

Fremstedal, Roe.  “Kierkegaard’s Double Movement of Faith and Kant’s Moral Faith.”  Religious Studies 48.2 (2012): 199-220. [HUM]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The present article deals with religious faith by comparing the so-called double movement of faith in Kierkegaard to Kant’s moral faith. Kierkegaard’s double movement of faith and Kant’s moral faith can be seen as providing different accounts of religious faith, as well as involving different solutions to the problem of realizing the highest good. The double movement of faith in Fear and Trembling provides an account of the structure of faith that helps us make sense of what Kierkegaard means by religious faith in general, as well as to understand better the relation between philosophy and Christian thinking in Kierkegaard. It is argued that previous scholarship has described the relation between Kierkegaard and Kant in a misleading manner by interpreting Kant as an ethicist and overlooking the role of grace in Kant.

 ——.  “Original Sin and Radical Evil: Kierkegaard and Kant.”  Kantian Review 17.2 (2012): 197-225. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: By comparing the theories of evil found in Kant and Kierkegaard, this article aims to shed new light on Kierkegaard, as well as on the historical and conceptual relations between the two philosophers. The author shows that there is considerable overlap between Kant’s doctrine of radical evil and Kierkegaard’s views on guilt and sin and argues that Kierkegaard approved of the doctrine of radical evil. Although Kierkegaard’s distinction between guilt and sin breaks radically with Kant, there are more Kantian elements in Kierkegaard than was shown by earlier scholarship. Finally, Kierkegaard provides an alternative solution to the problem of the universality of guilt, a problem much discussed in the literature on Kant.

 ——. “The Moral Makeup of the World: Kierkegaard and Kant on the Relation between Virtue and Happiness in this World.” Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook (2012): 25-48. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: While it is commonly held that natural evil and suffering undermine religious belief, Kant and Kierkegaard both argue that religion and ethics presuppose discontentment, hardship, and uncertainty. Both argue that moral purity requires that this world be imperfect both in the sense of having restricted knowledge and in the sense that virtue does not lead to happiness. Thus, both thinkers make constitutive assumptions about the moral structure of the world on practical grounds. But whereas Kant insists that there must be some connection in this world between morality and happiness, Kierkegaard tends to deny this, portraying this world either as amoral (in 1843–46) or as evil (in 1850–55).

Friedman, Michael.  “Newton and Kant: Quantity of Matter in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science.”  Southern Journal of Philosophy 50.3 (2012): 482-503. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Immanuel Kant’s Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (1786) provides metaphysical foundations for the application of mathematics to empirically given nature. The application that Kant primarily has in mind is that achieved in Isaac Newton’s Principia (1687). Thus, Kant’s first chapter, the Phoronomy, concerns the mathematization of speed or velocity, and his fourth chapter, the Phenomenology, concerns the empirical application of the Newtonian notions of true or absolute space, time, and motion. This paper concentrates on Kant’s second and third chapters — the Dynamics and the Mechanics, respectively — and argues that they are best read as providing a transcendental explanation of the conditions for the possibility of applying the (mathematical) concept of quantity of matter to experience. Kant again has in mind the empirical measures of this quantity that Newton fashions in the Principia, and he aims to make clear, in particular, how Newton achieves a universal measure for all bodies whatsoever by projecting the static quantity of terrestrial weight into the heavens by means of the theory of universal gravitation. Kant is not attempting to prove a priori what Newton has established empirically but, rather, to clarify the character of Newton’s mathematization by building Newton’s empirical measures into the very concept of matter that is articulated in the Metaphysical Foundations.

 ——.  “Kant on Geometry and Spatial Intuition.”  Synthese 186.1 (2012): 231-55. [HUM]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: I use recent work on Kant and diagrammatic reasoning to develop a reconsideration of central aspects of Kant’s philosophy of geometry and its relation to spatial intuition. In particular, I reconsider in this light the relations between geometrical concepts and their schemata, and the relationship between pure and empirical intuition. I argue that diagrammatic interpretations of Kant’s theory of geometrical intuition can, at best, capture only part of what Kant’s conception involves and that, for example, they cannot explain why Kant takes geometrical constructions in the style of Euclid to provide us with an a priori framework for physical space. I attempt, along the way, to shed new light on the relationship between Kant’s theory of space and the debate between Newton and Leibniz to which he was reacting, and also on the role of geometry and spatial intuition in the transcendental deduction of the categories.

 ——.  “Philosophie der Naturwissenschaft im Idealismus und Neukantianismus.”  Internationales Jahrbuch des Deutschen Idealismus/International Yearbook of German Idealism: Philosophie und Wissenschaft/Philosophy and Science, eds. Jürgen Stolzenberg and Fred Rush. 8 (2012): 3-37. [M]

 ——.  “Geometria e Intuição espacial em Kant.” [Portuguese; Kant on Geometry and Spatial Intuition] Translated from the English by José Oscar de Almeida Marques & Andréa Faggion. Kant e-Prints 7.1 (2012): 2-32. [M] [online]

 ——.  “Reconsidering the Dynamics of Reason: Response to Ferrari, Mormann, Nordmann, and Uebel.”  Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 43.1 (2012): 47-53. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: I address the points raised by the four commentators by indicating how I have been thinking about extending and expanding my perspective since Dynamics of Reason (2001). This involves reinterpreting the Kantian distinction between understanding and sensibility, and thereby rethinking the relativized a priori. I connect these ideas with experimental contexts and technology, as well as with the wider culture context. I suggest implications for the relationships among science, democracy, and religion — and eventually reconceptualizing Kant’s original Enlightenment project.

 ——.  “The Prolegomena and Natural Science.”  Kants Prolegomena: ein kooperativer Kommentar.  Eds. Holger Lyre and Oliver Schliemann (op cit.). 299-326. [M]

Frierson, Patrick R.  “Two Concepts of Universality in Kant’s Moral Theory.”  Kant’s Observations and Remarks: A Critical Guide.  Eds. Susan Meld Shell and Richard Velkley (op cit.). 57-76. [M]

[top] G    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Gabriel, J. “Forced to be Free, Not Free to be Slaves.” Journal of Value Inquiry 46.1 (2012): 39-50. [M]

Garcia, Ernesto V.  “A New Look at Kantian Respect for Persons.”  Kant Yearbook: Kant and Contemporary Moral Philosophy 4 (2012): 69-90. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper, I argue that we can identify three different kinds of ‘respect for persons’ in Kant’s writings: (1) respect as ‘honor’ or ‘esteem’ based upon a person’s unequal comparative value vis-à-vis other people; (2) ‘political respect’ based upon a person’s equal comparative value vis-à-vis other people; and (3) ‘moral respect’ based upon a person’s absolute and incomparable value vis-à-vis non-rational animals and things. My approach challenges standard readings of Kant in two ways. First, contra many of Kant’s critics and defenders, I argue that he explicitly recognizes more partial ways we can respect people in terms of (1) respect as ‘honor’ or ‘esteem.’ Second, contra dominant contractualist readings of Kant, I argue that such views mistakenly conflate (2) ‘political respect’ which involves treating people in ways they would agree to based on principles of mutual reciprocity and fairness and (3) ‘moral respect’ for people as ends-in-themselves. I conclude by examining the overall relevance of this approach for recent debates about political liberalism. In the end, I argue that this new Kantian framework offers us a highly systematic, principled, and perhaps even exhaustive taxonomy for capturing the many different ways in which we can respect people in general.

García Marzá, Domingo.  “Kant’s Principle of Publicity: The Intrinsic Relationship between the Two Formulations.”  Kant-Studien 103.1 (2012): 96-113. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant’s principle of publicity is now acquiring an increasingly important role within democratic theory, and specifically within the new theories of institutional design. However, the principle has received little attention from classical Kantian scholars, and any consideration is usually limited to the negative formulation. Thus, the critical potential — the potential for social change and transformation that the principle encompasses — is neglected, precisely when it is needed more than ever in the context of today’s increasingly complex and globalised political and economic relations. The aim of the present paper is to offer a new reading of the principle of publicity that can explain the intrinsic relationship between the two formulations of the principle Kant sets out in the second part of the appendix to ‘Zum ewigen Frieden’. I attempt to argue that the two formulations can be interpreted as two necessary steps in the process of institutionalising moral ideas; in other words, as two complementary criteria to explain the meaning of a politics that can be called just. Furthermore, I will attempt to show how in the same text Kant points to a third formulation of the principle related to the generation of trust. I, therefore, put forward an interpretation of the principle that contributes to institutional design both the need for transparency and the requirement of agreement, and that may be empirically tested through the notion of trust.

García Pérez, Natalia S. “El ‘hombre entero’ de Simmel: una crítica de las bases antropológicas de la ética kantiana y de la economía monetaria.” Agora: Papeles de Filosofia 31.1 (2012): 61-83. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper aims at demonstrating that in light of Simmel’s concept of ‘whole man’ or ‘personality’ a certain structural isomorphism between the Kantian ethical man and the economic modern man becomes apparent. We analyze in the first place the criticism which Simmel directs from that concept at the anthropological conception presupposed in the Kantian ethics. In the second place, we examine the relation generated between man and culture as a consequence of the development of money economy and of what Simmel calls ‘tragedy of culture’, seeking to demonstrate that the mentioned relation produces a type of individuality which, from the whole man’s point of view, appears as equivalent to the one presupposed in the Kantian ethics. Finally, we compare the ways of valuation of Kantian ethics and money economy with the type of normativity that suits the whole man.

Gardner, Sebastian.  “Schopenhauer’s Contraction of Reason: Clarifying Kant and Undoing German Idealism.”  Kantian Review 17.3 (2012): 375-401. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Schopenhauer’s claim that the essence of the world consists in Wille encounters well-known difficulties. Of particular importance is the conflict of this metaphysical claim with his restrictive account of conceptuality. This paper attempts to make sense of Schopenhauer’s position by restoring him to the context of post-Kantian debate, with special attention to the early notebooks and Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason. On the reconstruction suggested here, Schopenhauer’s philosophical project should be understood in light of his rejection of post-Kantian metaphilosophy and his opposition to German Idealism.

Garrido, Juan-Manuel.  El imperativo de la humanidad: La fundamentación estética de los derechos humanos en Kant. [Spanish]  Santiago de Chile: Orjikh Editores, 2012. [91 p.] [WC]

Gartenberg, Zachary Mica.  “Intelligibility and Subjectivity in Peirce: A Reading of His ‘New List of Categories’.”  Journal of the History of Philosophy 50.4 (2012): 581-610. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: An essay is presented that discusses philosophical views of philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce expressed in his essay “On a New List of Categories,” which is related to Peirce’s reading of the book Critique of Pure Reason, by Immanuel Kant. The author argues against scholar T. L. Short that Peirce is not engaged in a transcendental deduction of categories akin to Kant’s deduction, but is only a kind of metaphysical deduction of fundamental categories.

Giesinger, Johannes.  “Kant’s Account of Moral Education.”  Educational Philosophy and Theory 44.7 (2012): 775-86. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: While Kant’s pedagogical lectures present an account of moral education, his theory of freedom and morality seems to leave no room for the possibility of an education for freedom and morality. In this paper, it is first shown that Kant’s moral philosophy and his educational philosophy are developed within different theoretical paradigms: whereas the former is situated within a transcendentalist framework, the latter relies on a teleological notion of human nature. The second part of this paper demonstrates that the core ideas of Kant’s moral philosophy are also present in his pedagogy. This means that the problem of moral education must be solved within the transcendentalist framework. It is finally claimed that Kant himself outlines a solution to this problem in his pedagogical lectures.

Gilgen, Peter. Lektüren der Erinnerung: Lessing, Hegel, Kant. Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 2012. [231 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Originally presented as the author’s thesis (Ph.D., Stanford University, 1999) under the title: The Aporia of Recollection.

 ——.  “Plurality without Harmony: On Hannah Arendt’s Kantianism.”  Philosophical Forum 43.3 (2012): 259-75. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article examines political theorist Hannah Arendt’s critiques of German philosopher Immanuel Kant. Particular attention is given to Arendt’s essay “What Is Existential Philosophy?” in which she describes Kant’s historical impact and theories of ontology. Specific works by Kant mentioned in the discussion include Metaphysics of Morals and Critique of Judgment, as well as topics such as political philosophy, English philosopher Onora O’Neill, and the philosophy of common sense.

Giordanetti, Piero.  Rivoluzione copernicano-newtoniana e sentimento in Kant. [Italian]  Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 2012. [237 p.] [WC]

 ——.  “The Unconscious as Root of Kant’s A Priori Sentimentalism.”  Kant’s Philosophy of the Unconscious.  Eds. Piero Giordanetti, Riccardo Pozzo, and Marco Sgarbi (op cit.). 77-88. [M]

 ——, Riccardo Pozzo, and Marco Sgarbi, eds.  Kant’s Philosophy of the Unconscious.  Berlin / Boston: De Gruyter, 2012. [vi, 329 p.] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Essays: Patricia Kitcher, Kant’s Unconscious ‘Given’;
Dietmar H. Heidemann, The ‘I think’ Must Be Able to Accompany All My Representations: Unconscious Representations and Self-consciousness in Kant;
Félix Duque, Illusion and Strategy of Reason;
Piero Giordanetti, The Unconscious as Root of Kant’s a priori Sentimentalism;
Tanehisa Otabe, Genius as a Chiasm of the Conscious and Unconscious: A History of Ideas Concerning Kantian Aesthetics;
Anne Pollok, Kant’s Defeated Counterpart: Moses Mendelssohn on the Beauty, Mechanics, and Death of the Human Soul;
Katja Crone, Pre-conceptual Aspects of Self-consciousness in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason;
Tommaso Tuppini, Kant, Blows of Tears;
Nuria Sánchez Madrid, A Linneaus of Human Nature: The Pragmatic Deduction of Unconscious Thought in Kant’s Lectures on Anthropology;
Seung-Kee Lee, Logical Forms, Indeterminacy, and the Subjective Unity of Consciousness in Kant;
Dennis Schulting, Non-apperceptive Consciousness;
Tom Rockmore, Kant on Unconscious Mental Activity.

Glimpel, Christoph. “Braucht der Gottesgedanke die Moral? Überlegungen zur Eigenständig­keit des Gottesgedankens in kritischer Auseinandersetzung mit Kants Verhältnisbestimmung von Moral und Gottesgedanke.”  Kant und die Religion — die Religionen und Kant. Eds. Reinhard Hiltscher and Stefan Klingner (op cit.). 40-57. [M]

Godel, Rainer.  “Mediale Strategien.”  Klopffechtereien – Missverständnisse – Widersprüche? Methodische und methodologische Perspektiven auf die Kant-Forster-Kontroverse.  Eds. Rainer Godel and Gideon Stiening (op cit.). 293-323. [M]

 —— and Gideon Stiening.  “Die Kunst des akademischen Streitens. Zur Einführung in eine Kontroverse über eine Kontroverse.”  Klopffechtereien – Missverständnisse – Widersprüche? Methodische und methodologische Perspektiven auf die Kant-Forster-Kontroverse.  Eds. Rainer Godel and Gideon Stiening (op cit.). 7-15. [M]

 —— and Gideon Stiening, eds.  Klopffechtereien – Missverständnisse – Widersprüche? Methodische und methodologische Perspektiven auf die Kant-Forster-Kontroverse.  Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 2012. [328 p.] [M]

Godelek, Kamuran.  Rev. of Understanding Moral Obligation: Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard, by Robert Stern (2011). Metapsychology Online Reviews 16.39 (posted 2012 Sep 25). [online] [M]

Golden, Timothy J.  “From Epistemology to Ethics: Theoretical and Practical Reason in Kant and Douglass.”  Journal of Religious Ethics 40.4 (2012): 603-28. [HUM]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The aim of this essay is to provide a philosophical discussion of Frederick Douglass’s thought in relation to Christianity. I expand upon the work of Bill E. Lawson and Frank M. Kirkland — who both argue that there are Kantian features present in Douglass as it relates to his conception of the individual — by arguing that there are similarities between Douglass and Kant not only concerning the relationship between morality and Christianity, but also concerning the nature of the soul. Specifically, I try to show that the moral weakness of slaveholding Christianity that Douglass attacked is found in the ecclesial formation of the slaveholding Christian church; it is a formation that begins with epistemology, but ignores ethics. I conclude, in part, that both Douglass and Kant reject a Cartesian psychological dualism in favor of a conception of the soul that is more attentive to one’s moral development.

Goldman, Avery.  Kant and the Subject of Critique: On the Regulative Role of the Psychological Idea.  Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2012. [249 p.] [WC] [review]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents: Introduction: the circularity of critique — The ideas of reason — The boundary of phenomena and noumena — The designation of the region of experience in the Critique of pure reason — Transcendental reflection: interpreting the amphiboly via §76 of the Critique of Judgment — The paralogisms of pure reason: in search of a regulative principle for transcendental reflection — Transcendental method: the orientation of critique.
Publisher's Description: Immanuel Kant may seem to begin his inquiries into the nature of the self with an uncritical conception of cognitive limits, but in Kant and the Subject of Critique, Avery Goldman argues that there is an inquiry into these very limits in Kant’s own writings. Goldman focuses on Kant’s introduction of an initial reflective act or “transcendental reflection” in the Critique of Pure Reason, and as he ranges widely through Kant’s work as a whole, he brings forward an interpretation of this orienting reflection. Unlike Heidegger who set this system aside, Goldman not only uncovers the circularity of the Kantian system, but shows how it is fundamental to transcendental philosophy, thus offering an original way to conceive of the self or subject of Kantian critique.

Goldman, Loren.  “In Defense of Blinders: On Kant, Political Hope, and the Need for Practical Belief.”  Political Theory 40.4 (2012): 497-523. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant’s progressive philosophy of history is an integral aspect of his critical system, yet it is often ignored or even treated as an embarrassment by contemporary scholars. In this article, I defend Kant and argue for the continuing relevance of his regulative assumption of historical progress. I suggest, furthermore, that the first-person stance of practical belief exemplified in Kant’s conception of hope offers new resources for thinking about the relationship between the ideal and the real in political theory.

Golob, Sacha.  “Heidegger on Kant, Time and the ‘Form’ of Intentionality.”  British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21.2 (2012): 345-67. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Between 1927 and 1936, Martin Heidegger devoted almost one thousand pages of close textual commentary to the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. This article aims to shed new light on the relationship between Kant and Heidegger by providing a fresh analysis of two central texts: Heidegger’s 1927/8 lecture course Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and his 1929 monograph Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. I argue that to make sense of Heidegger’s reading of Kant, one must resolve two questions. First, how does Heidegger’s Kant understand the concept of the transcendental? Second, what role does the concept of a horizon play in Heidegger’s reconstruction of the Critique? I answer the first question by drawing on Cassam’s model of a self-directed transcendental argument (‘The role of the transcendental within Heidegger’s Kant’), and the second by examining the relationship between Kant’s doctrine that ‘pure, general logic’ abstracts from all semantic content and Hume's attack on metaphysics (‘The role of the horizon within Heidegger’s Kant’). I close by sketching the implications of my results for Heidegger's own thought (‘From Heidegger's Kant to Sein und Zeit’). Ultimately, I conclude that Heidegger’s commentary on the Critical system is defined, above all, by a single issue: the nature of the ‘form’ of intentionality.

Goubet, Jean-François.  Des maîtres philosophes? La fondation de la pédagogie générale par l'Université allemande.  Paris: Classiques Garnier, 2012. [565 p.] [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note:

Grapotte, Sophie.  Rev. of Kant and the Scandal of Philosophy: The Kantian Critique of Cartesian Scepticism, by Luigi Caranti (2007). Kant-Studien 103.2 (2012): 254-57. [M]

Gray, Sally Hatch.  “Kant’s Race Theory, Forster’s Counter, and the Metaphysics of Color.”  Eighteenth Century: Theory & Interpretation 53.4 (2012): 393-412. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article discusses the race theory developed by German philosopher Immanuel Kant, especially in his anthropological treatise Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime (German: Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen). Particular focus is given to Kant’s thoughts on aesthetic judgment and the metaphysics of beauty and color and their connection to the ethnological travel writings of German naturalist Georg Forster.

Gressis, Robert.  Rev. of The Blackwell Guide to Kant’s Ethics, edited by Thomas E. Hill, Jr. (2009). Journal of Moral Philosophy 9.2 (2012): 302-4. [PI]

 ——.  Rev. of Kant, Religion, and Politics, by James J. DiCenso (2011). Ethics 123.1 (2012): 146-49. [PW]

Griffith, Aaron M.  “Perception and the Categories: A Conceptualist Reading of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.”  European Journal of Philosophy 20.2 (2012): 193-222. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Article first published online: 4 Apr 2010.
Abstract: Philosophers interested in Kant’s relevance to contemporary debates over the nature of mental content — notably Robert Hanna and Lucy Allais — have argued that Kant ought to be credited with being the original proponent of the existence of 'nonconceptual content'. However, I think the 'nonconceptualist' interpretations that Hanna and Allais give do not show that Kant allowed for nonconceptual content as they construe it. I argue, on the basis of an analysis of certain sections of the A and B editions of the Transcendental Deduction, for a 'conceptualist' reading of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. My contention is that since Kant’s notion of empirical intuition makes essential reference to the categories, it must be true for him that no empirical intuition can be given in sensibility independently of the understanding and its categories.

Grün, Klaus-Jürgen.  Rev. of Kant und der Gottesbegriff: Eine Interpretation, edited by Ernst Horneffer and Klaus Horneffer (2010). Kant-Studien 103.1 (2012): 129-31. [M]

Guyer, Paul.  “Examples of Moral Possibility.”  Kant and Education: Interpretations and Commentary.  Eds. Klas Roth and Chris W. Surprenant (op cit.). 124-138. [M]

 ——.  “Schopenhauer, Kant and Compassion.”  Kantian Review 17.3 (2012): 403-29. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Schopenhauer presents his moral philosophy as diametrically opposed to that of Kant: for him, pure practical reason is an illusion and morality can arise only from the feeling of compassion, while for Kant it cannot be based on such a feeling and can be based only on pure practical reason. But the difference is not as great as Schopenhauer makes it seem, because for him compassion is supposed to arise from metaphysical insight into the unity of all being, thus from pure if theoretical reason, while for Kant pure practical reason works only by effecting a feeling of respect (in the ‘Critical’ works) or by cultivating, i.e. affecting, natural dispositions to moral feeling (in the ‘post-Critical’ works). I argue that Kant’s is the more realistic theory on this point.

 ——.  “Passion for Reason: Hume, Kant, and the Motivation for Morality.”  Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 86.2 (2012): 4-21. [M]

 ——. “Constructivism and Self-constitution.”  Kant on Practical Justification: Interpretive Essays. Eds. Mark Timmons and Sorin Baiasu (op cit.). 176-200. [M]

 ——.  “The Prolegomena and the Critique of Pure Reason.”  Kants Prolegomena: ein kooperativer Kommentar.  Eds. Holger Lyre and Oliver Schliemann (op cit.). 277-98. [M]

 ——. “The German Sublime after Kant.” The Sublime: From Antiquity to the Present. Ed. Timothy M. Costelloe (op cit.). pages??. [WC]

 ——.  Rev. of Kant-Index, Band 30: Stellenindex und Konkordanz zum Naturrecht Feyerabend: Teilband 1: Einleitung des Naturrechts Feyerabend, edited by Heinrich P. Delfosse, Norbert Hinske, and Gianluca Sadun Bordoni (2010). Ratio Juris: An International Journal of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law 25.1 (2012): 110-16. [PI]

 ——.  Rev. of Kant’s Moral Metaphysics: God, Freedom, and Immortality, edited by Benjamin J. Bruxvoort Lipscomb and James Krueger (2010). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (April 2012, #25). [online] [M]

 ——.  “Freedom as the Foundation of Morality: Kant’s Early Efforts.”  Kant’s Observations and Remarks: A Critical Guide.  Eds. Susan Meld Shell and Richard Velkley (op cit.). 77-98. [M]

[top] H    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Haag, Johannes.  “Die Prüfung der kritischen Philosophie.”  Kants Prolegomena: ein kooperativer Kommentar.  Eds. Holger Lyre and Oliver Schliemann (op cit.). 255-75. [M]

 ——.  “Die Funktion von Grenzbegriffen.”  Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 60.6 (2012): 993-1001. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The discussion of the hermetical §§76/77 of Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment is the center-piece of Eckart Förster’s groundbreaking Die 25 Jahre der Philosophie. The decisive methodological tool employed by Kant in those sections is the use of limiting concepts such as intellectual intuition and intuitive intellect. Förster’s discussion of the use of limiting concepts in those paragraphs is outlined and ultimately – despite some criticism in exegetical detail – assessed as the right way to reconstruct the intricate argument of those important sections.

Haeberlin, Mártin P. See: Weber, Thadeu, and Mártin P. Haeberlin.

Hahmann, Andree.  “Freiheit und Ding as sich.”  Kants Prolegomena: ein kooperativer Kommentar.  Eds. Holger Lyre and Oliver Schliemann (op cit.). 215-34. [M]

 ——.  “Ist »Freiheit die Wahrheit der Notwendigkeit«? Das Ding an sich als Grund der Erscheinung bei Kant.”  Sind wir Bürger zweier Welten? Freiheit und moralische Verantwortung im transzendentalen Idealismus.  Eds. Mario Brandhorst, Andree Hahmann, and Bernd Ludwig (op cit.). 135-53. [M]

 ——.  See: Brandhorst, Mario, Andree Hahmann, and Bernd Ludwig.

 ——.  See: Brandhorst, Mario, Andree Hahmann, and Bernd Ludwig, eds.

Hahn, Alexandre. “Ensaio introdutório à "Resenha do escrito de Moscati: 'Da diferença corpórea essencial entre a estrutura dos animais e a dos homens', de Immanuel Kant".” [Portuguese] Kant e-Prints 7.2 (2012): 1-3. [M] [online]

 ——. “Ensaio introdutório à "'Determinação do conceito de uma raça humana', de Immanuel Kant".” [Portuguese] Kant e-Prints 7.2 (2012): 7-27. [M] [online]

Hamm, Christian.  “Freedom in Appearance: Notes on Schiller and His Development of Kant’s Aesthetics.”  Kant in Brazil.  Eds. Frederick Rauscher and Daniel Omar Perez (op cit.). 321-36. [M]

Hanna, Robert.  “The Kantian’s Revenge: On Forster’s Kant and Skepticism.”  Kantian Review 17.1 (2012): 33-45. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This is a critical study of Michael Forster’s Kant and Skepticism. I begin by briefly summarizing the central argument of the book, chapter by chapter, and by compressing it into a two-part thesis: (1) the primary philosophical motivation behind Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason is to respond to radical Pyrrhonian skepticism about human reason, not to Humean skepticism, Cartesian “veil of perception” skepticism, or Berkeleyan skeptical metaphysical phenomenalism, (2) Ultimately, Kant has no philosophically adequate response to Pyrrhonian radical scepticism about human reason when this radical scepticism is applied to the basic assumptions of Kant’s own “reformed metaphysics,” i.e., transcendental idealism. I then develop five critical worries about Forster’s two-part thesis.

Hare, John. “The Place of Kant’s Theism in his Moral Philosophy.”  Kant on Practical Justification: Interpretive Essays. Eds. Mark Timmons and Sorin Baiasu (op cit.). 300-14. [M]

Harris, John. “Can Kant’s Three Formulations of the Categorical Imperative Be Unified?” Southwest Philosophy Review 28.2 (2012): 91-94. [PDC]

Härtl, Heinz. “Kantianer um 1800.”  Transzendentalphilosophie und die Kultur der Gegenwart. Eds. Steffen Dietzsch and Udo Teitz (op cit.). 195-201. [M]

Hay, Carol. “Respect-Worthiness and Dignity.” Dialogue 51 (2012): 587-612. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: argue that failing to fulfill the Kantian obligation to protect one’s rational nature might actually vitiate future instances of this obligation. To avoid this conclusion, I argue that, contrary to the received view among Kant scholars, the feature in virtue of which someone has unconditional and incomparable value is not the same feature in virtue of which she is owed the respect that constrains how she may be treated. Even though someone who fails to attempt to protect her rational nature fails to respect herself, and even though this moral failing does make her lose a certain kind of value, her obligations to respect herself remain.

Hebbeler, James C.  “The Principles of the First Critique.”  Review of Metaphysics 65.3 (2012): 555-79. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the Critique of Pure Reason Immanuel Kant claims that he is offering, at least in outline, a science of reason grounded on principles. Given Kant’s frequent but diverse use of the term ‘principle’ throughout the work, it is unclear what exactly this term is supposed to signify, whether there are more or less fundamental principles and on what basis, and how the diverse instances of them might form a unified science of theoretical reason. The aim of this paper is to provide answers to these questions by arguing for a theory of Kant’s principles grounded in Kant’s teleological conception of theoretical reason. Such a teleological conception of reason has implications for a proper understanding of the highly disputed metaphysical results of the Critique.

Hecht, Hartmut. “Nisi ipse intellectus. Individualität und Erkenntnis bei Leibniz.”  Transzendentalphilosophie und die Kultur der Gegenwart. Eds. Steffen Dietzsch and Udo Teitz (op cit.). 59-77. [M]

Heck, José Nicolau.  “Right and the Duty to Resist, or Progress toward the Better.”  Kant in Brazil.  Eds. Frederick Rauscher and Daniel Omar Perez (op cit.). 189-205. [M]

Heidemann, Dietmar H. Kant and Non-Conceptual Content. London: Routledge, 2012. [ix, 227 p.] [WC]

 ——.  “The ‘I think’ Must Be Able to Accompany All My Representations: Unconscious Representations and Self-consciousness in Kant.”  Kant’s Philosophy of the Unconscious.  Eds. Piero Giordanetti, Riccardo Pozzo, and Marco Sgarbi (op cit.). 37-59. [WC]

 ——.  “Über Kants These: »Denn, sind Erscheinungen Dinge an sich selbst, so ist Freiheit nicht zu retten«.”  Sind wir Bürger zweier Welten? Freiheit und moralische Verantwortung im transzendentalen Idealismus.  Eds. Mario Brandhorst, Andree Hahmann, and Bernd Ludwig (op cit.). 35-57. [M]

 ——, ed.  Kant Yearbook: Kant and Contemporary Moral Philosophy.  Berlin: De Gruyter, 2012. [163 p.] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Kant Yearbook, vol. 4.
Contents:
Jochen Bojanowski, Is Kant a Moral Realist?;
Eleni Filippaki, Kant on Love, Respect, and Friendship;
Scott Forschler, From Supervenience to ‘Universal Law’: How Kantian Ethics Become Heteronomous;
Ernesto V. Garcia, A New Look at Kantian Respect for Persons;
Chun-Yip Lowe, Kant’s Social Contract: A New Transcendental Principle in Political Philosophy;
Adrian M. S. Piper, Kant’s Two Solutions to the Free Rider Problem;
Toby Svoboda, Duties Regarding Nature: A Kantian Approach to Environmental Ethics.

Heinz, Marion. “Immanuel Kant.” Handbuch Kulturphilosophie. Ed. editor (Stuttgart: J. B. Mezler, 2012). 70-78. [M]

Hems, Nigel.  See: Banham, Gary, Dennis Schulting, and Nigel Hems, eds.

Henrich, Dieter.  “Concerning Kant’s Earliest Ethics: An Attempt at a Reconstruction.”  Kant’s Observations and Remarks: A Critical Guide.  Eds. Susan Meld Shell and Richard Velkley (op cit.). 13-37. [M]

Herbert, Gary B.  “Bringing Morality to Appearances: Kant’s Theory of Education.”  Kant and Education: Interpretations and Commentary.  Eds. Klas Roth and Chris W. Surprenant (op cit.). 81-93. [M]

Herrmann, Kay. Apriori im Wandel: für und wider eine kritische Metaphysik der Natur. Heidelberg: Winter, 2012. [230 p.] [WC]

Hicks, John. “Sensus Communis: On the Possibility of Dissent in Kant’s ‘Universal Assent’.” Diacritics 40.4 (2012): 106-29. [JSTOR]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract:

Hidalgo, Oliver.  Kants Friedensschrift und der Theorienstreit in den Internationalen Beziehungen.  Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2012. [223 p.] [WC]

Hill, Jr., Thomas E.  Virtue, Rules, and Justice: Kantian Aspirations.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. [vii, 372 p.] [M] [review] [review]

[Note] [Hide Note] Publisher's Description:Thomas E. Hill, Jr., interprets, explains, and extends Kant’s moral theory in ways that highlight its relevance to contemporary ethics. The book is divided into four sections. The first three essays cover basic themes: they introduce the major aspects of Kant’s ethics; explain different interpretations of the categorical imperative; and sketch a ‘constructivist’ reading of Kantian normative ethics distinct from the Kantian constructivisms of Onora O’Neill and John Rawls. The next section is on virtue, and the essays collected here discuss whether it is a virtue to regard the natural environment as intrinsically valuable; address puzzles about moral weakness; contrast ideas of virtue in Kant’s ethics and in ‘virtue ethics’; and comment on duties to oneself, second-order duties, and moral motivation in Kant’s doctrine of virtue. Four essays on moral rules propose human dignity as a guiding value for a system of norms rather than a self-standing test for isolated cases, contrast the Kantian perspectives on moral rules with rule-utilitarianism and then with Jonathan Dancy’s moral particularism, and distinguish often conflated questions about moral relativism. Hill goes on to outline a Kantian position on two central issues. In the last section of the book, three essays on practical questions show how a broadly Kantian theory, if critical of Kant’s official theory of law, might revisit questions about revolution, prison reform, and forcible interventions in other countries for humanitarian purposes. In the final essay, Hill develops the implications of Kant’s doctrine of virtue for the responsibility of bystanders to oppression.

 ——.  “Practical Reason, the Moral Law, and Choice.”  Analytic Philosophy 53.1 (2012): 71-78. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This brief commentary on Stephen’s Engstrom’s The Form of Practical Knowledge: A Study of the Categorical Imperative highlights some of its important and original features and then focuses on how Kant can make sense of common phenomena of moral weakness and intentional wrongdoing. If the will is just practical reason understood as a capacity to exercise efficacious judgment about what is good and the moral law is its principle, then it seems that a will to do wrong must always be a misguided attempt to do right. A mere ‘choice’ not based on a judgment of what is good could not be attributed to an agent’s will. Knowingly and willfully doing wrong seems impossible. Engstrom’s subtle interpretation raises this old problem in a new way.

 ——.  See: Boxill, Bernard and Thomas E. Hill.

Hiltscher, Reinhard. “Kant als Materialist.”  Kant und die Religion — die Religionen und Kant. Eds. Reinhard Hiltscher and Stefan Klingner (op cit.). 15-40. [M]

 ——.  Rev. of Philosophie als System. Prinzipientheoretische Untersuchungen zum Systemgedanken bei Hegel, im Neukantianismus und in der Gegenwartsphilosophie, by Christian Krijnen (2008). Kant-Studien 103.2 (2012): 259-63. [M]

 —— and Stefan Klingner, eds. Kant und die Religion — die Religionen und Kant. Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 2012. [232 p.] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Vol. 83 of Studien und Materialien zur Geschichte der Philosophie. The papers originated in a March 2011 conference held in Dresden.
Contents:
Reinhard Hiltscher, “Kant als Materialist”
Reinhard Hiltscher, “Kant als Materialist”
Christoph Glimpel, “Braucht der Gottesgedanke die Moral? Überlegungen zur Eigenständig­keit des Gottesgedankens in kritischer Auseinandersetzung mit Kants Verhältnisbestimmung von Moral und Gottesgedanke”
Alexander Riebel, “Vernunft und Glaube bei Kant und Hegel”
Klaus Konhardt, “‘... etwas, was er lieben kann’. Bemerkungen zu Kants Lehre vom höchsten Gut als Endzweck des Menschen”
Margit Wasmaier-Sailer, “Das religiöse Gefühl bei Kant und im Frühidealismus. Perspektiven für heutige Debatten um religiöse Erfahrung”
Micha Brumlik, “Kant und die Tora”
Roderich Barth, “Kant als Philosoph des Neuprotestantismus”
Roman Seidel, “Kants Autonomiebegriff: Chance oder Gefahr für die Religion? Positionen der Kantrezeption in Iran heute”
Bernd Dörflinger, “Kant über das Ende der historischen Religionen”
Stefan Klingner, “Kant und die Zweckmäßigkeit religiösen Glaubens”
Norbert Fischer, “Zu Kants ‘moralisch-bestimmtem Monotheismus’”
Christian Papsthart, “Gottesbezug in der europäischen Verfassung? Eine kantische Antwort”.

Hinske, Norbert. “Ein unbeachtet gebliebener Kommentar zu Kants Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten aus dem Jahre 1784.”  Transzendentalphilosophie und die Kultur der Gegenwart. Eds. Steffen Dietzsch and Udo Teitz (op cit.). 107-12. [M]

 ——. “Chi sono gli eredi dell'illuminismo?” Il realismo della ragione: Kant dai lumi alla filosofia contemporanea. Ed. Stefano Poggi (op cit.). 235-45. [M]

 ——, Michael Albrecht, Heinrich P. Delfosse, Bernd Straßburg, Jeannine Huster, and Lothar Kreimendahl, eds.  Kant-Index, Bd. 36: Stellenindex und Konkordanz zu den "Gedanken von der wahren Schätzung der lebendigen Kräfte".  Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 2012. [#, # p.] [WC]

Hirsch, Philipp-Alexander.  “Wege zur Freiheit? Offene Fragen der Kantischen Rechts- und politischen Philosophie.”  Kant-Studien 103.4 (2012): 494-98. [M]

 ——. Kants Einleitung in die Rechtslehre von 1784: Immanuel Kants Rechtsbegriff in der Moralvorlesung "Mrongovius II" und der Naturrechtsvorlesung "Feyerabend" von 1784 sowie in der "Metaphysik der Sitten" von 1797. Göttingen: Universitätsverlag Göttingen, 2012. [xvi, 137 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Revised and enlarged Master’s thesis (Universität-Göttingen, 2011).

Hodgson, Louis-Philippe.  “Realizing External Freedom: The Kantian Argument for a World State.”  Kant’s Political Theory: Interpretations and Applications.  Ed. Elisabeth Ellis (op cit.). 101-34. [M]

Hoeppner, Till. “Die Reflexivität der Transzendentalphilosophie und die Herleitung der Kategorien.”  Metaphysik — Ästhetik — Ethik. Eds. Antonino Falduto, Caroline Kolisang, and Gabriel Rivero (op cit.). 29-44. [WC]

Hoesch, Matthias.  “Lässt Kants Völkerbund als Mitgliedsstaaten nur Republiken zu?”  Kant-Studien 103.1 (2012): 114-25. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: It often seems to be an unquestioned presupposition that Kant’s concept of the federation of states is limited to states with a republican constitution. In this paper, I argue, firstly, that this presupposition is unwarranted and, secondly, that there are further problems as regards the interpretation of Kant’s international law.

Höffe, Otfried.  Kants Kritik der praktischen Vernunft: eine Philosophie der Freiheit.  Munich: C. H. Beck, 2012. [456 p.] [data] [M]

 ——. “Anthropology and Metaphysics in Kant’s Categorical Imperative of Law: An Interpretation of Rechtslehre, §§B and C.”  Kant on Practical Justification: Interpretive Essays. Eds. Mark Timmons and Sorin Baiasu (op cit.). 110-24. [M]

Hohendahl, Peter Uwe.  “Nature and the Autonomy of Art: Adorno as a Reader of Kant.”  Philosophical Forum 43.3 (2012): 247-57. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article examines German philosopher Theodor W. Adorno’s views on the work of German philosopher Immanuel Kant. According to the author, Adorno’s early work Dialectic of Enlightenment strongly criticized Kant and his influence on rationalism and fascism. However, the author also analyzes Adorno’s positive assessment of Kant’s approaches to areas such as his epistemology, moral philosophy, and aesthetic theory following World War II.

Honnefelder, Ludger, ed.  Kants “Streit der Fakultäten” oder der Ort der Bildung zwischen Lebenswelt und Wissenschaften.  Berlin: Berlin University Press, 2012. [373p.] [data] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: See especially the essays by Brandt, Wood, and Dierken.

Hoorn, Tanja van.  “Was heißt und zu welchem Ende studiert man Naturgeschichte?”  Klopffechtereien – Missverständnisse – Widersprüche? Methodische und methodologische Perspektiven auf die Kant-Forster-Kontroverse.  Eds. Rainer Godel and Gideon Stiening (op cit.). 163-77. [M]

Hörner, Richard.  Hobbes Menschenrechtskonzeption, Kants Idee des Friedens und heutige Menschenrechtsproblematiken.  Wörth am Rhein: SCL, 2012. [228 p.] [data] [WC]

Hosokawa, Ryoichi. 要請としてのカント倫理学 / Yosei to shiteno kanto rinrigaku. [Japanese] Fukuoka: Kyushudaigakushuppankai, 2012. [350 p.] [WC]

Hounsokou, Annie.  “‘Exposing the Rogue in Us’: An Exploration of Laughter in the Critique of Judgment.”  Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy 16.2 (2012): 317-36. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant’s treatment of laughter in section 54 of the Critique of Judgment is intriguing: he places laughter among the arts, but does not deem it serious enough to be a fine art. According to Kant, laughter is an agreeable art, and ministers only to the senses. But when he describes to us what laughter actually does, it turns out that this bodily phenomenon is actually a moral phenomenon akin to the sublime in that it elevates and humbles us at the same time. This paper revisits Kant’s aesthetic themes, shows the distinctive role of laughter in the third Critique, and explores the possibilities of a true reunification of law and freedom through laughter.

Höwing, Thomas. “Tomasi über die Grundform der ästhetischen Erfahrung bei Kant.”  Metaphysik — Ästhetik — Ethik. Eds. Antonino Falduto, Caroline Kolisang, and Gabriel Rivero (op cit.). 187-95. [WC]

Huggler, Jørgen.  “Culture and Paradox in Kant’s Philosophy of Education.”  Kant and Education: Interpretations and Commentary.  Eds. Klas Roth and Chris W. Surprenant (op cit.). 94-106. [M]

Hunter, Ian.  “Kant’s Political Thought in the Prussian Enlightenment.”  Kant’s Political Theory: Interpretations and Applications.  Ed. Elisabeth Ellis (op cit.). 170-207. [M]

[top] I    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Inwood, Michael.  “Heidegger on Time.”  Contemporary Kantian Metaphysics: New Essays on Time and Space.  Eds. Roxana Baiasu, Graham Bird, and A. W. Moore (op cit.). 233-52. [M]

Ion, Dora.  Kant and International Relations Theory: Cosmopolitan Community-Building.  Milton Park/New York: Routledge, 2012. [x, 172 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents: Part I. Kant: 1. Kant, moral realism, and the argument from autonomy; 2. The argument from autonomy and the problem of moral obligation; 3. Kant’s solution to the problem of moral obligation; Part II. Hegel: 4. Hegel’s critique of Kant (via Schiller); 5. Hegel’s solution to the problem of moral obligation; Part III. Kierkegaard: 6. Kierkegaard’s critique of Hegel; 7. Kierkegaard’s solution to the problem of moral obligation; Conclusion: from Kant to Kierkegaard — and back again?; Bibliography.

Ivaldo, Marco.  Ragione pratica: Kant, Reinhold, Fichte. [Italian]  Pisa: ETS, 2012. [354 p.] [WC]

[top] J    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Jaarsma, Pier, Petra Gelhaus, and Stellan Welin.  “Living the Categorical Imperative: Autistic Perspectives on Lying and Truth Telling — Between Kant and Care Ethics.”  Medicine, Health Care, and Philosophy 15.3 (2012): 271-77. [PI/MEDLINE]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Lying is a common phenomenon amongst human beings. It seems to play a role in making social interactions run more smoothly. Too much honesty can be regarded as impolite or downright rude. Remarkably, lying is not a common phenomenon amongst normally intelligent human beings who are on the autism spectrum. They appear to be ‘attractively morally innocent’ and seem to have an above average moral conscientious objection against deception. In this paper, the behavior of persons with autism with regard to deception and truthfulness will be discussed in the light of two different ethical theories, illustrated by fragments from autobiographies of persons with autism. A systemizing ‘Kantian’ and an empathizing ‘ethics of care’ perspective reveal insights on high-functioning autism, truthfulness and moral behavior. Both perspectives are problematic from the point of view of a moral agent with autism. High-functioning persons with autism are, generally speaking, strong systemizes and weak empathizers. Particularly, they lack ‘cognitive empathy’ which would allow them to understand the position of the other person. Instead, some tend to invent a set of rules that makes their behavior compatible with the expectations of others. From a Kantian point of view, the autistic tendency to always tell the truth appears praiseworthy and should not be changed, though it creates problems in the social life of persons with autism. From a care ethics perspective, on the other hand, a way should be found to allow the high-functioning persons with autism to respect the feelings and needs of other persons as sometimes overruling the duty of truthfulness. We suggest this may even entail ‘morally educating’ children and adolescents with autism to become socially skilled empathic ‘liars’.

Jackson, Jeffrey Martin. “Cosmopolitanism and Working-Through the Past.” Theory, Culture and Society 29.3 (2012): 122-44. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Certain of Kant’s political essays suggest that the project of sociopolitical emancipation should be seen as a process of working ourselves out of affective attachments to pathological social relations. This aspect of Kant’s thinking is read through Marx’s materialist notion of commodity fetishism, which provides a paradigmatic approach to understanding the ways in which concrete forms of sociality either thwart or facilitate the process of emancipation. It is then suggested that Freud’s notion of the work of mourning can help to clarify the possibility of breaking with the fixated attachments that contribute to our own domination. In this light, the author considers the respective accounts of the relationship between Freudian theory and Kantian cosmopolitanism given by Julia Kristeva and Judith Butler in light of Theodor Adorno’s materialist account of working through the past. Reading Freud with Adorno offers a more coherent clarification of the concrete conditions of possibility of cosmopolitanism.

Jacobs, Nathan A.  “A Response to Critics of In Defense of Kant’s Religion.”  Faith and Philosophy 29.2 (2012): 210-28. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this essay, I reply to the above four critics of In Defense of Kant’s Religion (IDKR). In reply to George di Giovanni, I highlight the interpretive differences that divide the authors of IDKR and di Giovanni, and argue that di Giovanni’s atheist reading of Kant does not follow, even granting his premises. In reply to Pamela Sue Anderson, I show that if her reading of Kant is accurate, Kant’s own talk of God becomes empty and contemptible by his own lights, and I then show how her empirical bias prompts a significant misreading of IDKR. In reply to Stephen Palmquist, I expose four fallacious maneuvers in his paper, which comprise the bulk of his essay. And in reply to Michalson, I address a series of minor concerns raised in his essay, and then set the record straight on the motives behind IDKR in general and my own take on Kant’s compatibility (or lack thereof) with Christianity in specific.

Jaeschke, Walter. “Immanuel Kant und G.W.F. Hegel: Vernunftrecht und Geschichte.”  Von der religiösen zur säkularen Begründung staatlicher Normen: zum Verhältnis von Religion und Politik in der Philosophie der Neuzeit und in rechtssystematischen Fragen der Gegenwart. Eds. Ludwig Siep, Thomas Gutmann, Bernhard Jakl, and Michael Städtler (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2012). 119-40. [WC]

 —— and Andreas Arndt.  Die klassische deutsche Philosophie nach Kant: Systeme der reinen Vernunft und ihre Kritik, 1785-1845.  Munich: Beck, 2012. [749 p.] [data] [WC]

James, David.  “The Role of Evil in Kant’s Liberalism.”  Inquiry 55.3 (2012): 239-61. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Carl Schmitt distinguishes between political theories in terms of whether they rest on the anthropological assumption that man is evil by nature or on the anthropological assumption that man is good by nature, and he claims that liberal political theory is based on the latter assumption. Contrary to this claim, I show how Kant’s liberalism is shaped by his theory of the radical evil in human nature, and that his liberalism corresponds to the characterization of liberalism that Schmitt himself offers. My discussion of this issue will be shown to have certain implications with respect to the view that for Kant evil is the product of society. I show that this view is mistaken insofar as it fails to recognize that Kant’s political philosophy implies that human beings require the type of society that best suits their radically evil natures, namely, a commercial one in which the “vices of culture” largely have free play, while the state’s role is limited to that of preventing the antagonisms found in society leading to the mutual destruction of its members.

Janaway, Christopher.  “Necessity, Responsibility and Character: Schopenhauer on Freedom of the Will.”  Kantian Review 17.3 (2012): 431-57. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper gives an account of the argument of Schopenhauer’s essay On the Freedom of the Human Will, drawing also on his other works. Schopenhauer argues that all human actions are causally necessitated, as are all other events in empirical nature, hence there is no freedom in the sense of liberum arbitrium indifferentiae. However, our sense of responsibility or agency (being the ‘doers of our deeds’) is nonetheless unshakeable. To account for this Schopenhauer invokes the Kantian distinction between empirical and intelligible characters. The paper highlights divergences between Schopenhauer and Kant over the intelligible character, which for Schopenhauer can be neither rational nor causal. It raises the questions whether the intelligible character may be redundant to Schopenhauer’s position, and whether it can coherently belong to an individual agent, suggesting that for Schopenhauer a more consistent position would have been to deny freedom of will to the individual.

Jensen, David.  “Kant and a Problem of Motivation.”  Journal of Value Inquiry 46.1 (2012): 83-96. [HUM]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article focuses on the views of philosopher Immanuel Kant on the primary problem of moral philosophy. It highlights the arguments made by Kant in his book Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals on moral philosophy and its primary problem. It also explores the comparison and contradiction of the views of Michael Smith and his arguments in his book The Moral Problem.

John, Eileen.  “Beauty, Interest, and Autonomy.”  Journal of Aesthetics & Art Criticism 70.2 (2012): 193-202. [HUM]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The author explores the role of the aesthetic experience in one’s life, focusing on the idea of aesthetic autonomy and how the aesthetic experience affects one’s interactions with others. The author discusses the practice of aesthetic judgment and gives an overview of the ideas of personal autonomy and aesthetic autonomy, drawing on the ideas of philosopher Immanuel Kant as well as the novel “The Bluest Eye” by Toni Morrison. The author draws on Kant and jazz musician John Coltrane’s song “My Favorite Things” in discussing how the aesthetic experience affects sociability.

Johnston, James Scott.  “Kant as Moral Psychologist?”  Kant and Education: Interpretations and Commentary.  Eds. Klas Roth and Chris W. Surprenant (op cit.). 177-92. [M]

Jütten, Timo.  “Adorno on Kant, Freedom and Determinism.”  European Journal of Philosophy 20.4 (2012): 548-74. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper I argue that Adorno’s metacritique of freedom in Negative Dialectics and related texts remains fruitful today. I begin with some background on Adorno’s conception of 'metacritique' and on Kant’s conception of freedom, as I understand it. Next, I discuss Adorno’s analysis of the experiential content of Kantian freedom, according to which Kant has reified the particular social experience of the early modern bourgeoisie in his conception of unconditioned freedom. Adorno argues against this conception of freedom and suggests that freedom is always conditioned by our embodiment and by our social and historical situation. Finally, I turn to Adorno’s criticism of Kant’s discussion of freedom and determinism in the Critique of Pure Reason and argue that while his philosophical argument against Kant fails, his metacritical argument remains suggestive. Scepticism about freedom arises when the standpoint of theoretical reason encroaches upon the standpoint of practical reason and assimilates persons to things.

[top] K    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Kais, Leila. See: Dietzsch, Steffen und Leila Kais.

Kalinnikov, Leonard Aleksandrovič. “«Мыслить себе предмет и познавать предмет не есть… одно и то же», или Э. Т. А. Гофман и «Трансцендентальная аналитика».” [Russian; ‘To think of an object and to know an object is...not the same’, or E. T. A. Hoffmann and ‘Transcendental analytic’] Kantovskij Sbornik 39.1 (2012): 14-26. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the article the question is raised about the Kantianism of E. T. A. Hoffmann on the example of the story from The Night Stories, which shows that the transcendental reflection as an important gnoseological form makes the practical sense in the human life.

 ——. “«Житейские воззрения кота Мурра…» в зеркале житейских и метафизических воззрений Э. Т. А. Гофмана. Часть I.” [Russian; The Life and Opinions of Tomcat Murr... in light of worldly and metaphysical views of Ernst Theodor Wilhelm Hoffmann. Part I] Kantovskij Sbornik 40.2 (2012): 30-47. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The paper attempts to demostrate that E. T. A. Hoffmann’s novel The Life and Opinions of Tomcat Murr... has build in accordance with the classification of anthropological types in Kant’s work Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft.

 ——. “«Житейские воззрения кота Мурра…» в зеркале житейских и метафизических воззрений Эрнста Теодора Амадея Гофмана. Часть II.” [Russian; The Life and Opinions of Tomcat Murr... in light of worldly and metaphysical views of Ernst Theodor Wilhelm Hoffmann. Part II] Kantovskij Sbornik 41.3 (2012): 35-48. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The paper attempts to demostrate that E. T. A. Hoffmann’s novel The Life and Opinions of Tomcat Murr... has build in accordance with the classification of anthropological types in Kant’s work Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft.

 ——. “«Житейские воззрения кота Мурра…» в зеркале житейских и метафизических воззрений Э. Т. А. Гофмана. Часть III.” [Russian; The Life and Opinions of Tomcat Murr... in the light of worldly and metaphysical views of Ernst Theodor Wilhelm Hoffmann. Part III] Kantovskij Sbornik 42.4 (2012): 59-69. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article sets out to demonstrate that E. T. A. Hoffmann’s novel The Life and Opinions of Tomcat Murr... is cvonstructed in accordance with the classification of anthropological types given n Kant’s work Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft.

Kamata, Yasuo. “Schopenhauer und Kant. Rezeption der „transzendentalen Analytik“ der Kritik der reinen Vernunft in der Frühphilosophie Schopenhauers.” ethic@ 11.2 (2012): 59-72. [M] [online]

Kane, John.  “Democracy and World Peace: The Kantian Dilemma of United States Foreign Policy.”  Australian Journal of International Affairs 66.3 (2012): 292-312. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: When liberal democracies pursue idealistic goals they invite accusations of naivety and impracticality; if they act on strictly realistic premises they are accused of hypocrisy or betrayal of ideals. The author explores the consequences of this idealism–realism dilemma using the example of United States foreign policy and the particular case of Woodrow Wilson and the Covenant of the League of Nations. The author examines its theoretical roots by analysing the work of Immanuel Kant, who laid down the influential moral–political ideal of a democratic peace but posited so stark a theoretical gulf between morality and politics as to make the ideal seem unreachable. Kant tried to show how a world resistant to morality might nevertheless evolve towards one in which moral action had real political effect — a necessary condition, he believed, for an international federation of republics committed to peaceful coexistence. The implausibility of his account reveals the problematic nature of the idealism–realism divide, but also, in its attempt to bridge that divide, points the way towards a genuinely ethical–practical foreign policy founded in political prudence.

Kaniowski, Andrzej Maciej, Ewa Wyrębska, and Tomasz Michałowski, eds. Rechtsstaatlichkeit Kant. Łódź: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, 2012. [166 p.] [WC]

Kanygina, Yuliya.  Rev. of Self-Improvement: An Essay in Kantian Ethics, by Robert N. Johnson (2011). Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15.5 (2012): 707-08. [PW]

Kapr, Victor. “Kuhne: Selbstbewußtsein und Erfahrung bei Kant und Fichte: Über Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der Transzendentalphilosophie.” Fichte-Studien 40 (2012): 313-21. [HUM]

Katrechko, Sergey L. “Трансцендентальная теория опыта и современная философия науки.” [Russian; The transcendental theory of experience and modern philosophy of science] Kantovskij Sbornik 42.4 (2012): 22-34. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article sets out to develop a transcendental theory of science based on the original interpretation and modern development of Kant’s transcendentalism (theory of experience). The author shows that modern (postpositivistic and analytical) philosophy of science follows the spirit of Kant’s “Copernican revolution” as “the new method of thought” [CPR, B XVIII].

Kaufman, Alexander.  “Rawls and Kantian Constructivism.”  Kantian Review 17.2 (2012): 227-56. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: John Rawls’s account of Kantian constructivism is perhaps his most striking contribution to ethics. In this paper, I examine the relation between Rawls’s constructivism and its foundation in Kantian intuitions. In particular, I focus on the progressive influence on Rawls’s approach of the Kantian intuition that the substance of morality is best understood as constructed by free and equal people under fair conditions. Rawls’s focus on this Kantian intuition, I argue, motivates the focus on social contract that grounds both his accounts of the original position and of reflective equilibrium. Critics, including Onora O’Neill and Larry Krasnoff, object that Rawls’s view distorts various aspects of Kantian moral reasoning. I argue that these objections (i) exaggerate the distinctions between Kant’s and Rawls’s decision procedures and (ii) reflect an unnecessarily constricted view of Kant’s moral thought.

Kauhaus, Hanna. Biblische Bildung: Studien zum Bibelverständnis Immanuel Kants und Johann Georg Hamanns. Jena: IKS Garamond, 2012. [125 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Presented as a Master’s thesis.

Keil, Geert.  “Kann man nichtzeitliche Verursachung verstehen? Kausalitätstheoretische Anmerkungen zu Kants Freiheitsantinomie.”  Sind wir Bürger zweier Welten? Freiheit und moralische Verantwortung im transzendentalen Idealismus.  Eds. Mario Brandhorst, Andree Hahmann, and Bernd Ludwig (op cit.). 223-57. [M]

Keller, Sean.  “Beauty, Genius, Epigenesis: The Kantian Origins of Contemporary Architecture.”  Journal of Architectural Education 65.2 (2012): 42-51. [HUM]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This essay explores parallels between computationally based architecture — here represented by the work of Greg Lynn — and three major themes in the aesthetic theory of Immanuel Kant: aesthetic value (beauty), artistic generation (genius), and natural generation (epigenesis). Further, it interprets architecture’s place within Kant’s aesthetics as antinomic — that is to say, inexorably contradictory — and suggests that this interpretation offers a theoretical basis for the entanglement of computational methods with typological concerns.

Kelley, Kathleen. Rev. of Kant’s Concept of Genius: Its Origin and Function in the Third Critique, by PaulW. Bruno (2010). Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 33.1 (2012): 247-50. [PDC]

Kharitonova, Alyona M. “Понятие тела и проблема научности новоевропейской метафизики: от Декарта к Канту.” [Russian; The concept of body and the problem of demarcation in new European metaphysics: from Descartes to Kant] Kantovskij Sbornik 40.2 (2012): 7-29. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The origin of science and the demarcation between science and metaphysics are the main features of early modern period. This demarcation faces a particular problem with conceptualisation of body, which can be considered both as just physical body and as closely bound up with spirit. Different ways of explaining the interaction between mind and body form the complex tradition, which significantly influenced Kant’s precritical writings. Limitation of the crucial distinction between these two substances to the empirical sphere and the view on soul and body as homogeneous phenomena are the main peculiarities of Kant's position.

Ki An, Yoon. Transzendentale und empirische Subjektivität im Verhältnis: Das reziproke Seinsverhältnis der beiden Subjektivitäten in Kants Transzendentalphilosophie. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2012. [204 p.] [WC]

Kihara, Jun. 境界と自由: カント理性法論における主権の成立と政治的なるもの / Kyokai to jiyu: Kanto risei horon ni okeru shuken no seiritsu to seijitekinaru mono. Tokyo: Seibundo, 2012. [226 p.] [WC]

Kim, Eun Ha. Kant und die moderne Medientheorie: Anschauung — Bild, Zeichen — Begriff. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2012. [149 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Originally presented as the author’s thesis (Ph.D.; Würzburg, 2011).

Kitcher, Patricia.  “Kant’s Unconscious ‘Given’.”  Kant’s Philosophy of the Unconscious.  Eds. Piero Giordanetti, Riccardo Pozzo, and Marco Sgarbi (op cit.). 5-36. [M]

Kivelä, Ari. “From Immanuel Kant to Johann Gottlieb Fichte — Concept of Education and German Idealism.”  Theories of Bildung and Growth: Connections and Controversies between Continental Educational Thinking and American Pragmatism. Eds. Pauli Siljander, Ari Kivelä, and Ari Sutinen (Rotterdam: Sense Publishers). 59-86??. [WC]

Kleingeld, Pauline. Kant and Cosmopolitanism: the Philosophical Ideal of World Citizenship. Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012. [xvi, 215 p.] [WC]

 ——. “Immanuel Kant (1724-1804).”  The Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law. Eds. Bardo Fassbender and Anne Peters (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 1122-26. [M]

Klemme, Heiner F.  “Die Aufhebung von ‘Humes Zweifel’.”  Kants Prolegomena: ein kooperativer Kommentar.  Eds. Holger Lyre and Oliver Schliemann (op cit.). 169-93. [M]

 ——. “Johann Georg Sulzers „vermischte Sittenlehre“. Ein Beitrag zur Vorgeschichte und Problemstellung von Kants Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten”  Metaphysik — Ästhetik — Ethik. Eds. Antonino Falduto, Caroline Kolisang, and Gabriel Rivero (op cit.). 91-106. [WC]

 ——.  “Spontaneität und Selbsterkenntnis. Kant über die ursprüngliche Einheit von Natur und Freiheit im Aktus des »Ich denke« (1785-1787).”  Sind wir Bürger zweier Welten? Freiheit und moralische Verantwortung im transzendentalen Idealismus.  Eds. Mario Brandhorst, Andree Hahmann, and Bernd Ludwig (op cit.). 195-22. [M]

Klingner, Stefan.  Technische Vernunft: Kants Zweckbegriff und das Problem einer Philosophie der technischen Kultur.  Berlin: De Gruyter, 2012. [xii, 334 p.] [PW] [contents]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Kant-Studien Ergänzungshefte, vol. 172.
Publisher’s Note: This work attempts to overcome the prejudice that Kant's philosophy is inadequate for a reflection of the cultural world. The author explores the possibility of a cultural philosophy based upon a Kantian notion of culture, and contends that Kant's understanding of philosophy can be viewed as a theory of technical reason. The line of argument reveals that it is possible to reconstruct at least the outlines of a Kantian philosophy of culture.

 ——. “Kant und die Zweckmäßigkeit religiösen Glaubens.”  Kant und die Religion — die Religionen und Kant. Eds. Reinhard Hiltscher and Stefan Klingner (op cit.). 177-92. [M]

 ——, ed. See: Hiltscher, Reinhard and Stefan Klingner, eds.

Kloes, Andrew.  “Four Calls for Religious Reforms in the 1780s: Urlsperger, Joseph II of Austria, Immanuel Kant and Friedrich Wilhelm II of Prussia.”  European Journal of Theology 21.2 (2012): 148-55. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The religious life of German-speaking Europe became increasingly variegated during the second half of the eighteenth century. This fact may be observed through the writings of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Karl Heinrich Bogatzky, Hermann Samuel Reimarus, August Wilhelm Friedrich and Friedrich Freiherr von Hardenberg. The changes were the result of an important shift in European culture: in this period the foundation of religion and what was necessary to constitute religious legitimacy was shifting from the will of sovereigns to the consensus beliefs of the peoples. This second phenomenon may be observed through four different calls for religious reforms that were made between 1780 and 1788 by Joseph II, the ruler of the Habsburg domains in Central Europe and the Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire; Friedrich Wilhelm II, the king of Prussia; Immanuel Kant, the professor of logic and metaphysics at the world’s second oldest Protestant university; and Johann August Urlsperger, a Lutheran pastor and one of the few German corresponding members of the London-based Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge. Their different calls for reform illustrate this trend as well as how religious consensus in German society began to fragment and reform around multiple expressions of belief and unbelief.

Kohler, George Y. “Is there a God an sich?: Isaac Breuer on Kant’s Noumena.” AJS Review 36.1 (2012): 121-39. [JSTOR]

Kolesnoré, Pascal. Histoire et liberté: éclairages kantiens. Paris: Harmattan, 2012. [298 p.] [WC]

Kolisang, Caroline.  See: Falduto, Antonino, Caroline Kolisang, and Gabriel Rivero, eds.

Kong, Camillia.  “The Normative Source of Kantian Hypothetical Imperatives.”  International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20.5 (2012): 661-90. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper offers a critique of Christine Korsgaard’s interpretation of Kantian instrumental reason. Korsgaard understands Kantian hypothetical imperatives to share a common normative source with the categorical imperative – namely self-legislating, human rational agency. However, her reading of Kantian hypothetical imperatives is problematic for three reasons. Firstly, Korsgaard’s agent-centred approach renders incoherent Kant’s analytic-synthetic division. Secondly, by minimising the dualistic framework of Kant’s practical philosophy the dialectical character of practical rationality is lost: norms of instrumental reasoning therefore become confused with those of moral reasoning. Thirdly, this in turn curtails the distinct critical authority of pure practical rationality over instrumental choice. The paper argues that we need to understand the normativity of instrumental rationality through the lens of Kant’s dualisms. An alternative interpretation is offered which highlights how the norms of hypothetical imperatives appeal to standards of theoretical cognition and practical efficiency rather than the self-legislative demands of pure practical reason.

Konhardt, Klaus. “‘... etwas, was er lieben kann’. Bemerkungen zu Kants Lehre vom höchsten Gut als Endzweck des Menschen.”  Kant und die Religion — die Religionen und Kant. Eds. Reinhard Hiltscher and Stefan Klingner (op cit.). 69-86. [M]

Koronkiewicz, Malgorzata. “Problem tresci niepojeciowej w filozofii Immanuela Kanta.” [Polish] Archiwum Historii Filozofii i Mysli Spolecznej 57 (2012): 107-22. [WC]

Kosch, Michelle. “Introduction (to the issue).” Philosophical Forum 43.3 (2012): 243-46. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This special issue presents the proceedings of the third Legacy of Kant conference, held at Cornell University in September 2011. Two contrasts with the preceding conferences in the series (proceedings published in this journal in 2008 [39:2] and 2010 [41:1–2]) are worth noting at the outset. First, the period after the second world war saw a globalization of Kantianism, and so unlike the preceding two volumes this one covers French and North American figures as well as German ones. Second, the topic of this volume is not Kant’s reception or revival in some earlier period (an item of historical interest whose contemporary relevance could then itself be wondered about), but rather Kant’s importance for the practice of philosophy as it is done today. Since no special case needs to be made for the contemporary relevance of contemporary Kantianism, a brief introduction will suffice.

Kossler, Matthias.  “The ‘Perfected System of Criticism’: Schopenhauer’s Initial Disagreements with Kant.”  Kantian Review 17.3 (2012): 459-78. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper the attempt is made to show how Schopenhauer’s critique of Kant leads from initial disagreements to a fundamental modification, even a new formation, of the Kantian concepts of understanding, reason, imagination, perception, idea and thing-in-itself. The starting point and the core of his critique is the demand for the appreciation of intuitive knowledge which is apart from and independent of reason. The intuitive knowledge goes back to images and its highest form is aesthetic contemplation. Without a participation of concepts it is sufficient to explain objective reality. Particularly on the basis of Schopenhauer’s critical examination of Kant’s schematism it can be shown that his alternative conception of an image-based objectivity of experience is to be taken seriously, even if the way he presents it sometimes gives the impression of a mere misunderstanding of Kant’s theory of cognition.

Krasnoff, Larry. “Voluntarism and Conventionalism in Hobbes and Kant.” Hobbes Studies 25.1 (2012): 43-65. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant’s relation to Hobbesian voluntarism has recently become a source of controversy for the interpretation of Kant’s practical philosophy. Realist interpreters, most prominently Karl Ameriks, have attacked the genealogies of Kantian autonomy suggested by J. B. Schneewind and Christine Korsgaard as misleadingly voluntarist and unacceptably anti-realist. In this debate, however, there has been no real discussion of Kant’s own views about Hobbes. By examining the relation of Hobbes’ voluntarism to a kind of conventionalism, and through a reading of Kant’s most explicit discussion of Hobbes, in “Theory and Practice,” I argue that Kant’s criticism of Hobbes is much more limited than it might first appear. Rather than rejecting Hobbes’ voluntarism and conventionalism entirely, Kant ends up criticizing only Hobbes’ understanding of the relation between these doctrines. The essay thus defends Schneewind’s and Korsgaard’s histories of modern moral philosophy, and raises doubts about realist readings of Kant’s practical philosophy.

 ——. “Constructing Practical Justification: How Can the Categorical Imperative Justify Desire-based Actions?”  Kant on Practical Justification: Interpretive Essays. Eds. Mark Timmons and Sorin Baiasu (op cit.). 87-109. [M]

Kreiser, Lothar. “Friedrich Eduard Benekes Verständnis der Logik und seine Bearbeitung der Syllogistik.”  Transzendentalphilosophie und die Kultur der Gegenwart. Eds. Steffen Dietzsch and Udo Teitz (op cit.). 269-82. [M]

Krijnen, Christian and Andrzej Jan Noras, eds. Marburg versus Südwestdeutschland: philosophische Differenzen zwischen den beiden Hauptschulen des Neukantianismus . Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2012. [208 p.] [WC]

Krouglov, Alexei N.  Kant i kantovskaia filosofiia v russkoi khudozhestvennoi literature.  Moscow: Kanon+, 2012. [479 p.] [WC]

 ——.  “‘Mein Leben gleicht einem Roman …’: Kants Schüler Friedrich August Hahnrieder und seine Geschichte.”  Kant-Studien 103.2 (2012): 242-53. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The life story of Kant’s student F. A. Hahnrieder (1765/6–1829) provides us with new examples of the application of the categorical imperative. Kant has given his opinion about that. The biography of Hahnrieder suggests that Kant has not always insisted on the uniqueness of the interpretation of the categorical imperative. He has also admitted other, “paradoxical”, “unusual”, but not “fantastic” interpretations. Kant has even respected a radical interpretation of the categorical imperative. On the base of the archive data, numerous mistakes about Hahnrieder were corrected in biographies of Kant and in the Akademie-Ausgabe.

Kruck, Günter, ed. See: Dörflinger, Bernd and Günter Kruck, eds.

Kucherenko, Alexander V. “Кант, неокантианство и представители феноменологии о рефлексии и редукции.” [Russian; Kant, Neokantians, and Phenomenologists of Reflection and Reduction] Kantovskij Sbornik 39.1 (2012): 7-13. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article is devoted to the comparison of Kant’s methodology and phenomenology, which provide insight into the area of pure consciousness. Divergences in levels of its understanding are marked, disagreements concerning values of reflection and reduction between Kant and Neo-Kantian philosophers and representatives of phenomenology come to light. The analysis of the basic concept of phenomenology, intentionality, is carried out by means of Kant aprioristic forms.

Kuehn, Manfred.  “Kant on Education, Anthropology, and Ethics.”  Kant and Education: Interpretations and Commentary.  Eds. Klas Roth and Chris W. Surprenant (op cit.). 55-68. [M]

 ——.  “Von der Grenzbestimmung der reinen Vernunft.”  Kants Prolegomena: ein kooperativer Kommentar.  Eds. Holger Lyre and Oliver Schliemann (op cit.). 235-54. [M]

Kuhn, Kristina.  “Zur Bedenklichkeit des Marginalen: Kant und die Reisebeschreibung.”  Klopffechtereien – Missverständnisse – Widersprüche? Methodische und methodologische Perspektiven auf die Kant-Forster-Kontroverse.  Eds. Rainer Godel and Gideon Stiening (op cit.). 245-70. [M]

Kulak, Avron. “Between Kierkegaard and Kant: Dividing Faith and Reason.” Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook (2012): 75-100. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this study I pose the question of the relationship between Kierkegaard's teleological suspension of ethics based on faith and Kant's metaphysical grounding for morality based on reason. I show, first, that Kierkegaard develops two distinct conceptions of ethics in Fear and Trembling, one of which he directly aligns with faith, and, second, that what Kant calls morality in the Grounding is utterly to be distinguished from the conception of ethics that, for Kierkegaard, is suspended by faith. Overall, I argue that what Kierkegaard and Kant together show is that faith possesses a self-critical rationality and reason a faithful core.

Kuliniak, Radoslaw. Spory filozoficzne Christiana Garvego z Immanuelem Kantem. Cz. 1, Polemika wokól pierwszego wydania “Krytyki czystego rozumu”. [Polish] Cracow: Aureus, 2012. [160 p.] [WC]

Küpper, Joachim. “Uti and frui in Augustine and the Problem of Aesthetic Pleasure in the Western Tradition (Cervantes, Kant, Marx, Freud).” MLN 127.5 (2012): S126-55. [JSTOR]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract:

Kusan, Emil. “Aspects and Implications of Kant’s Notion of Freedom.” [Croatian] Filozofska Istrazivanja 125 (2012): 79-91. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper aims to critically examine and evaluate the whole of Kant’s philosophy from the perspective of the notion of freedom. Freedom, both in its negative and positive capacity, as well as in it’s purely practical sense, serves as a cornerstone of Kant’s philosophical enquiry and the one true medium of the mind both in the practical and theoretical sense. Along with the aforementioned negative-positive dichotomy, freedom can further be distinguished as being one with the concept of the autonomy of the mind. Through this connection, freedom becomes, as its ‘ratio essendi’, practically one with the moral law itself, the latter being a form of the former. From the idea of freedom, various implications emerge, which have been dealt with through the course of the essay. In this respect, particular attention is paid to Kant’s notion of ‘will’ and some of the misunderstandings it managed to create among notable Kant scholars like L. W. Beck and N. Hartmann.

Kuznetsova, I. S. Immanuil Kant . Kaliningrad: Izd-vo Baltiiskogo federal’nogo un-ta im., 2012. [100 p.] [WC]

[top] L    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Laerke, Mogens. Rev. of L’Idée de théodicée de Leibniz à Kant: héritage, transformations, critiques, edited by Paul Rateau (2009). The Leibniz Review 22 (2012): 157-59. [PDC]

Lafont, Cristina.  “Agreement and Consent in Kant and Habermas: Can Kantian Constructivism be Fruitful for Democratic Theory?”  Philosophical Forum 43.3 (2012): 277-95. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: An essay is presented in which the author discusses the impact of German philosopher Immanuel Kant’s philosophy on moral theory. According to the author, Kant’s theories have formed what is known as “Kantian constructivism“ and influenced the work of philosophers such as John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas. Particular attention is given to the philosophy behind the concepts of agreement and consent and their application to areas such as law enforcement, justice, and politics.

Lambert, Gregg.  “Kant’s Bastards: Deleuze and Lyotard.”  Philosophical Forum 43.3 (2012): 345-56. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article examines the inheritance of theories in philosophy. Particular attention is given to French philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Jean-François Lyotard, who the author states break this trend through introducing new concepts of approaching historical texts that attempt to avoid philosophical tradition. Interpretations of German philosopher Immanuel Kant’s work Critique of Judgment by both Deleuze and Lyotard are discussed as modernized versions of Kantian views of aesthetics.

Landim, Raúl.  “Predicative Judgments and Existential Judgments: Apropos Kant’s Critique of the Cartesian Ontological Argument.”  Kant in Brazil.  Eds. Frederick Rauscher and Daniel Omar Perez (op cit.). 81-97. [M]

Landy, David.  Rev. of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason: An Introduction and Interpretation, by James R. O’Shea (2012). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (July 2012, #4). [online] [M]

Landy, Margo.  Rev. of Perfecting Virtue: New Essays on Kantian Ethics and Virtue Ethics, edited by Lawrence Jost and Julian Wuerth (2011). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (June 2012, #42). [online] [M]

Langan, Jeffrey.  The Influence of the French Revolution on the Lives and Thought of John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, Edmund Burke, Mary Wollstonecraft, Immanuel Kant, and Pius Vi: The End of Conservatism.  Lewiston: Edwin Mellen, 2012. [180 p.] [PI]

Langbehn, Claus.  Vom Selbstbewusstsein zum Selbstverständnis: Kant und die Philosophie der Wahrnehmung.  Paderborn: Mentis, 2012. [363 p.] [WC]

Lapointe, Sandra.  “Is Logic Formal? Bolzano, Kant, and the Kantian Logicians.”  Grazer Philosophische Studien 85.1 (2012): 11-32. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the wake of Kant, logicians seemed to have adhered to the idea that what is distinctive of logic is its “formality”. In the paper, I discuss the distinction Kant draws between formality and generality of logic and argue that he ultimately conflates the two notions. I argue further that Kant’s views on the formality of logic rest on a series of non trivial assumptions concerning the nature of cognition. I document the way in which these assumptions were received in his successors. In the second part of the paper I focus on Bolzano’s criticism of the Kantian position and his redefinition of the notion of form. I argue that while what contemporary, post-Tarskian philosophers generally understand as the formality of logic ought to be traced back to Bolzano there are also important differences between the two positions.

 ——.  “Introduction”  Grazer Philosophische Studien 85.1 (2012): 1-10. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: The guest editor’s introduction to a special volume of the journal on the topic of Bolzano & Kant.

La Rocca, Claudio. “Illuminismo e forme di razionalità. Kant e la ragione come fine.” Il realismo della ragione: Kant dai lumi alla filosofia contemporanea. Ed. Stefano Poggi (op cit.). 263-84. [M]

Laursen, John Christian.  “Kant, Freedom of the Press, and Book Piracy.”  Kant’s Political Theory: Interpretations and Applications.  Ed. Elisabeth Ellis (op cit.). 225-37. [M]

 ——.  Rev. of Imperfect Cosmopolis: Studies in the History of International Legal Theory and Cosmopolitan Ideas, by Georg Cavallar (2011). Kantian Review 17.3 (2012): 516-19. [M]

 ——.  Rev. of Kantian Courage: Advancing the Enlightenment in Contemporary Political Theory, by Nicolas Tampio (2012). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (December 2012, #18). [online] [M]

La Vaque-Manty, Mika.  “Kant on Education.”  Kant’s Political Theory: Interpretations and Applications.  Ed. Elisabeth Ellis (op cit.). 208-24. [M]

Lee, Michael G. The German Mittelweg: Garden Theory and Philosophy in the Time of Kant. London: Routledge, 2012. [xi, 335 p.] [WC]

Lee, Seung-Kee.  “Self-Determination and the Categories of Freedom in Kant’s Moral Philosophy.”  Kant-Studien 103.3 (2012): 337-50. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant speaks of our capacity to be “self-determining […] in certain […] laws holding firm a priori” (KrV, B 430). Here the “laws” refer to the categories of freedom introduced in KpV. The categories of freedom, then, are necessary for self-determination. I first explain how Kant employs the notion of determination in his theoretical philosophy. I then explain how the notion is utilized also in his practical philosophy, particularly in connection to the act of determining the forms of willing that make morality possible. I conclude by answering the question, Why are the categories of freedom necessary for self-determination? Understanding why the categories of freedom are required for self-determination will also help clarify the nature and function of Kant’s categories of freedom, which have puzzled many scholars.

 ——.  “Logical Forms, Indeterminacy, and the Subjective Unity of Consciousness in Kant.”  Kant’s Philosophy of the Unconscious.  Eds. Piero Giordanetti, Riccardo Pozzo, and Marco Sgarbi (op cit.). 233-70. [M]

 ——, Riccardo Pozzo, Marco Sgarbi, and Dagmar von Wille, eds.  Philosophical Academic Programs of the German Enlightenment: A Literary Genre Recontextualized. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: frommann-holzbook, 2012. [xviii, 399 p.] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Includes newly edited and introduced reprints of Kant’s academic programs: Versuch einiger Betrachtungen über den Optimismus (1759), Die falsche Spitzfindigkeit der vier syllogistischen Figuren erwiesen (1762), Versuch den Begriff der negativen Größen in die Weltweisheit einzuführen (1763), Nachricht von der Einrichtung seiner Vorlesungen in dem Winterhalbenjahre von 1765-1766 (1765), and Von den verschiedenen Racen der Menschen (1775).

Leech, Jessica.  “Kant’s Modalities of Judgment.”  European Journal of Philosophy 20.2 (2012): 260-84. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Article first published online: 4 Apr 2010.
Abstract: This paper proposes a way to understand Kant’s modalities of judgment — problematic, assertoric, and apodeictic — in terms of the location of a judgment in an inference. Other interpretations have tended to understand these modalities of judgment in terms of one or other conventional notion of modality. For example, Mattey (1986) argues that we should take them to be connected to notions of epistemic or doxastic modality. I shall argue that this is wrong, and that these kinds of interpretation of the modality of judgments cannot be reconciled with a key claim made by Kant, namely, that the modality of a judgment does not contribute to its content, and has nothing to do with the matter that is judged. I offer an alternative interpretation based upon Kant’s explicating these modalities in terms of the location of a judgment in an inference, whereby the modality of a judgment is determined by the role a judgment plays in a given course of reasoning. If I am right, then Kant in fact presents an intriguing thesis pertaining to the inferential status and potential of all our judgments.

Leichtweis, Ursula.  Vom Bezug der Kunst zur Natur bei Kant, Schelling und Goethe.  Kassel: Kassel University Press, 2012. [300 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Originally presented as the Ph.D dissertation (Kassel, 2011).

Lemanski, Jens.  “Die Königin der Revolution. Zur Rettung und Erhaltung der Kopernikanischen Wende.”  Kant-Studien 103.4 (2012): 448-71. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The paper distinguishes three interpretations of Kant’s so called ‘Copernican Revolution’: an epistemological, a hermeneutical and a scientific-theoretical or methodological one. It is argued that the ‘scientific-theoretical reading’ can be based on new historical evidence. Kant borrowed the metaphors ‘army of stars’ (‘Sternenheer’) and ‘spectator’ (‘Zuschauer’) from Johann Heinrich Lambert and used them in a context similar to Lambert’s. This suggests that Kant’s formula “first thoughts of Copernicus” (“den ersten Gedanken des Copernicus”) refers, again following Lambert, to the first 9 chapters of Copernicus’ De revolutionibus, which contain a change from inductive geocentrism to deductive heliocentrism. This interpretation is itself no revolution: Johann Baptist Schad claimed in 1800 that metaphysics must be regarded as a deductive rather than an inductive science. Kant explicitly agreed.

Lequan, Mai.  Rev. of Le souverain bien chez Kant, by Laurent Gallois (2008). Kant-Studien 103.1 (2012): 126-29. [M]

Lessing, Theodor. Studien zur Wertaxiomatik — Der Bruch in der Ethik Kants. Leipzig: Superbia, 2012. [220 p.] [WC]

Librett, Jeffrey S.  “Aesthetics in Deconstruction: Derrida’s Reception of Kant’s Critique.”  Philosophical Forum 43.3 (2012): 327-44. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article looks at French philosopher Jacques Derrida’s analysis of German philosopher Immanuel Kant. It focuses on Derrida’s essays “The Parergon” and “Economimesis” that concern Kant’s book Critique of Judgement, with particular attention to theories of reflexive judgment, aesthetics, and teleology. Other topics discussed include the philosophy of reason, autonomy, and art.

Lima, Francisco Jozivan Guedes. “A fundamentação moral das relações internacionais pré-jurídicas a partir de Kant.” [Portuguese; The moral foundations of pre-juridical international relations based on Kant] Contexto 34.2 (2012): 471-99. [online] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This research presents the moral foundations of pre-juridical international relations based on the preliminary articles of Immanuel Kant's Towards Perpetual Peace. These articles establish the minimal moral conditions through which individuals, states and people are protected against the abuses of the state of nature. Without them, international relations are subject to positive law or to political realism. These moral elements make up the fundamental principles which, to Kant, constitute the legitimacy of international relations.

Lipscomb, Benjamin J. Bruxvoort.  Rev. of Kant’s Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason: A Commentary, by James J. DiCenso (2012). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (December 2012, #7). [online] [M]

Lisímaco, Parra. “Teoría estética e historia del arte. Kant, Wölfflin, Warburg.” [Spanish; Aesthetic Theory and History of Art: Kant, Wölfflin, Warburg] Ideas y Valores: Revista Colombiana de Filosofia 61 #150 (2012): 9-35. [online] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: On the basis of the reflections of two well-known art historians of the 29th century, Heinrich Wölfflin and Aby Warburg, the article examines the validity of two central aspects of Kantian aesthetic theory: on the one hand, the possibility of providing fully complete judgments of taste, which would justify their transcendental deduction, and, on the other hand, their involvement in cultural and social life, that is, the significance of aesthetic experience as emphasized in the Kantian doctrine of taste.

Liu, Yu.  “Celebrating Both Singularity and Commonality: The Exemplary Originality of the Kantian Genius.”  International Philosophical Quarterly 52.1 (2012): 99-116. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant’s notion of genius and the related idea of exemplary originality in the Critique of Judgment have been read by Paul Guyer and Timothy Gould as implying a zero-sum game in which all creative artists are willy-nilly patricidal in relation to their predecessors and suicidal in relation to their successors. By way of challenging this interesting but ultimately repugnant reading, and especially its modernist and postmodernist frame of reference, this essay takes a close look at Kant’s sustained interest in the monumental change of English garden design in the early eighteenth century and at the provocative implication of this hitherto generally overlooked interest for a radically different reading of Kant’s thoughts on the exemplary originality of genius.

Ljuis, D. G. Immanuil Kant: ego zizn i istoriceskoe znacenie. [Russian] Moscow: Librokom, 2012. [#, # p.] [WC]

Lofts, S. G.  Rev. of The Origins of the Philosophy of Symbolic Forms: Kant, Hegel, and Cassirer, by Donald Phillip (2011). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (October 2012, #2). [online] [M]

Longuenesse, Béatrice.  “Kant’s ‘I’ in ‘I Ought To’ and Freud’s Superego.”  Aristotelian Society 86 suppl. (2012): 19-39. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: There are striking structural similarities between Freud’s ego and Kant’s transcendental unity of apperception, which for Kant grounds our use of ‘I’ in ‘I think’. There are also striking similarities between Freud’s superego and Kant’s account of the mental structure that grounds our use of ‘I’ in the moral ‘I ought to’. The paper explores these similarities on three main points: the conflict of motivations internal to the mind, the relation between discursive and pre-discursive representation of moral motivation, and the unconscious character of moral motivation. The suggestion is that Freud offers resources for a naturalized account (an account in terms of the causal development of empirical human beings) of just those features of our moral motivation that, according to Kant, seem to make it least amenable to a naturalistic explanation. How much of a revision of Kant’s analysis of moral justification is thereby entailed is beyond the purview of the paper.

Loose, Donald, ed.  The sublime and its teleology: Kant, German idealism, phenomenology.  Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2012. [vi, 230 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents: Donald Loose, Introduction: The Kantian Sublime and Its Aftermath; Herman van Erp, The Genuine Sublime: Kant on the Sublimity of Moral Consciousness; Birgit Recki, Kant's Aesthetics of Morals; Donald Loose, The Dynamic Sublime as the Pivoting Point between Nature and Freedom in Kant; Arthur Kok, Sublimity, Freedom, and Necessity in the Philosophy of Kant; Christian Krijnen, Teleology in Kant's Philosophy of Culture and History: A Problem for the Architectonic of Reason; Paul Cobben, The Lord and the Sublime: Free Life's Transcendence of Finitude; Jacob Rogozinski, The Sublime Monster; Simon Critchley, The Tragical Sublime; Frans van Peperstraten, The Sublime and the Limits of Metaphysics; Ruud Welten, Melville's `Sublime Uneventfulness'. Toward a Phenomenology of the Sublime.

Loparic, Zeljko.  “The Fundamental Problem of Kant’s Juridical Semantics.”  Kant in Brazil.  Eds. Frederick Rauscher and Daniel Omar Perez (op cit.). 206-35. [M]

Lorenz, Hilmar.  Kants lutherische Fundamentaltheologie: systematischer Kommentar zu Kants "Kanon der reinen Vernunft".  Berlin: Lit, 2012. [366 p.] [WC]

Louden, Robert B.  “‘Not a Slow Reform, but a Swift Revolution’: Kant and Basedow on the Need to Transform Education.”  Kant and Education: Interpretations and Commentary.  Eds. Klas Roth and Chris W. Surprenant (op cit.). 39-54. [M]

 ——.  “National Character via the Beautiful and Sublime?”  Kant’s Observations and Remarks: A Critical Guide.  Eds. Susan Meld Shell and Richard Velkley (op cit.). 198-216. [M]

 ——.  Rev. of Kant’s Theory of Virtue: The Value of Autocracy, by Anne Margaret Baxley (2010). Journal of the History of Philosophy 50.1 (2012): 142-43. [M] [online]

 ——.  Rev. of Self-Improvement: An Essay in Kantian Ethics, by Robert N. Johnson (2011). Ethics 122.4 (2012): 811-15. [PW]

 ——.  Rev. of Perfecting Virtue: New Essays on Kantian Ethics and Virtue Ethics, edited by Lawrence Jost and Julian Wuerth (2011). Kantian Review 17.1 (2012): 161-66. [M]

 ——.  Rev. of Kant und die Wissenschaften vom Menschen, by Thomas Sturm (2009). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (June 2012, #20). [online] [M]

 ——, ed.  See: Kant, Immanuel, Lectures on Anthropology.

Løvlie, Lars.  “Kant’s Invitation to Educational Thinking.”  Kant and Education: Interpretations and Commentary.  Eds. Klas Roth and Chris W. Surprenant (op cit.). 107-23. [M]

Lowe, Chun-Yip.  “Kant’s Social Contract: A New Transcendental Principle in Political Philosophy.”  Kant Yearbook: Kant and Contemporary Moral Philosophy 4 (2012): 91-112. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The aim of this paper is to show that Kant’s social contract can be deemed to be another version of his universal law of right and a new transcendental principle in political philosophy. Since this new principle involves the idea of transcendental freedom, upon which Kant’s concept of obligation is built, this paper shows that the concept of the freedom of compatibilism, which has been inexplicitly accepted in modern political philosophy, cannot be the basis of such an obligation. Since Rawls’s intention is to build up a deontological political theory against utilitarianism, he applies many important concepts of Kant’s moral philosophy to the theory. However, to tackle the problem of stability, in his new argument on the theory of justice Rawls appeals to the concept of the overlapping consensus in order to support the conception of moral persons as free and equal. Through Rawls’s modification of his theory of justice, widely recognized as a milestone in political philosophy, it is possible to see the problem raised by this modification and the importance of Kant’s transcendental freedom in modern political philosophy.

Ludwig, Bernd.  “Was weiß ich vom Ich? Kants Lehre vom Faktum der reinen praktischen Vernunft, seine Neufassung der Paralogismen und die verborgenen Fortschritte der Kritischen Metaphysik im Jahre 1786.”  Sind wir Bürger zweier Welten? Freiheit und moralische Verantwortung im transzendentalen Idealismus.  Eds. Mario Brandhorst, Andree Hahmann, and Bernd Ludwig (op cit.). 155-94. [M]

 ——.  See: Brandhorst, Mario, Andree Hahmann, and Bernd Ludwig.

 ——.  See: Brandhorst, Mario, Andree Hahmann, and Bernd Ludwig, eds.

Luft, Sebastian.  Rev. of Kant and Phenomenology, by Tom Rockmore (2011). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (July 2012, #42). [online][M]

Lundestad, Erik. “Pragmatisme vs. Liberalisme: Om Dewey og Kant.” [Norwegian; Pragmatism vs. Liberalism; on Dewey and Kant] Norsk filosofisk tidsskrift 47.2 (2012): 75-87. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: John Deweys pragmatism is based on the notion that we can do without the kind of a priori conditions which we can find, for instance in Kant. Such conditions, however, do a job. They enable us to distinguish between experience here and now and experience as such. If we are to do without such conditions, Dewey therefore argues, there must be some way of «reconstructing» these distinctions so that they can be upheld within an empirical framework. In this article I discuss whether this kind of reconstruction is possible by way of focusing on Dewey’s ethics. The conclusion is that it is not possible, since the autonomy of the subject only can be upheld in distinction to an empirical approach to the self.

Lundestad, Øystein.  Rev. of Kant’s Doctrine of Right: A Commentary, by B. Sharon Byrd and Joachim Hruschka (2010). Kantian Review 17.1 (2012): 166-71. [M]

Lutterbeck, Klaus-Gert.  “Normativität des Faktischen? Integrale Wissenschaft vom Menschen und ihre Folgen.”  Klopffechtereien – Missverständnisse – Widersprüche? Methodische und methodologische Perspektiven auf die Kant-Forster-Kontroverse.  Eds. Rainer Godel and Gideon Stiening (op cit.). 97-117. [M]

Lynch, Greg. “The Semantics of Self-Knowledge in The Refutation Of Idealism.” Kant Studies Online (2012): 172-202; posted August 29, 2012. [M] [online]

Lyre, Holger.  “Inkongruente Gegenstücke und Idealismus-Vorwurf.”  Kants Prolegomena: ein kooperativer Kommentar.  Eds. Holger Lyre and Oliver Schliemann (op cit.). 85-102. [M]

 —— and Oliver Schliemann, eds.  Kants Prolegomena: Ein kooperativer Kommentar.  Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 2012. [352 p.] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents: Essays by Holger Lyre, Oliver Schliemann, Georg Mohr, Lisa Shabel, Konstantin Pollok, Michael Wolff, Heiner F. Klemme, Dina Emundts, Andree Hahmann, Manfred Kuehn, Johannes Haag, Paul Guyer, and Michael Friedman.

[top] M    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Macleod, Colin.  Rev. of Reconstructing Rawls: The Kantian Foundations of Justice as Fairness, by Robert S. Taylor (2011). Philosophy in Review 32.2 (2012): 149-50. [online] [PW]

Maet, Frank. Rev. of The Sublime and Its Teleology. Kant — German Idealism — Phenomenology, by Donald Loose (2012). Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 74.3 (2012): 583-85. [PW]

Mahoozi, Reza.  “A Critique of the Epistemological Nature and Scope of Philosophical Concepts in Kant’s Philosophy from the Viewpoint of the Transcendent Philosophy.” [Farsi]  Kheradname-ye Sadra Journal 17.2 (2012): 73-88. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: According to Kant, in order to gain experience, as a necessary and universal knowledge of entities and nature, we need several philosophical and, sometimes, logical concepts which, based on Hume’s analyses, are not rooted in experience. This problem prompted Kant to consider the origin of these concepts in the mind and explain their ontological nature as content-free forms and patterns which grant knowledge only if they acquire their content from pure and empirical intuitions. This approach has initially resulted in limiting man’s knowledge to the realm of experience. Besides, in the acquisition of this knowledge, the activity of the mind leads to a kind of idealism and denying the realistic aspects of knowledge. The present paper, after clarifying the epistemological scope of philosophical concepts in Kant’s philosophy and analyzing the resulting philosophical consequences, intends to demonstrate the falsity of this standpoint based on the analyses of the transcendent philosophy from the whatness and quality of the acquisition of knowledge, in general, and philosophical concepts (secondary philosophical intelligible), in particular.

Makkreel, Rudolf A.  “Relating Aesthetic and Sociable Feelings to Moral and Participatory Feelings: Reassessing Kant on Sympathy and Honor.”  Kant’s Observations and Remarks: A Critical Guide.  Eds. Susan Meld Shell and Richard Velkley (op cit.). 101-15. [M]

Maliks, Reidar.  Rev. of Kant and Cosmopolitanism: The Philosophical Ideal of World Citizenship, by Pauline Kleingeld (2011). Metaphilosophy 43.5 (2012): 714-18. [HUM]

Malpas, Jeff and Günter Zöller.  “Reading Kant Topographically: From Critical Philosophy to Empirical Geography.”  Contemporary Kantian Metaphysics: New Essays on Time and Space.  Eds. Roxana Baiasu, Graham Bird, and A. W. Moore (op cit.). 146-65. [M]

Maly, Sebastian.  Kant über die symbolische Erkenntnis Gottes.  Berlin / Boston: De Gruyter, 2012. [xiv, 461 p.] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Kantstudien Ergänzungshefte, vol. 165.

Mander, William J. “T. H. Green, Kant, and Hegel on Free Will.” Idealistic Studies 42.1 (2012): 69-89. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Scholars have remained undecided how much the British Idealists owe to Hegel, how much to Kant, and how much they may be credited with minting a new intellectual coinage of their own. By way of a detailed examination of T. H. Green’s metaphysics of free will and how it stands to both its Kantian and its Hegelian predecessors, this paper attempts to make some headway on that longstanding question of pedigree. It is argued that by translating previously naturalistic considerations about free will into Kantian or atemporalist terms, Green makes some useful and important advances. But he still remains subject to the tension between libertarian and autonomous approaches to the issue. It might be wondered whether any theory could ever reconcile these two approaches, but it is argued that by filtering his Kantianism through a more Hegelian lens, Green manages somewhat to reduce the friction between these two perspectives and to get closer to his ideal of a unified theory of human free will.

Marafioti, Rosa Maria. “Ai confini dell'idealismo trascendentale: la 'asintoticità' dell'esperienza nell'Opus Postumum di Kant.” Il realismo della ragione: Kant dai lumi alla filosofia contemporanea. Ed. Stefano Poggi (op cit.). 69-79. [M]

Marcolungo, Ferdinando Luigi. “Kant e il possibile. In margine al 'Beweisgrund'.” Il realismo della ragione: Kant dai lumi alla filosofia contemporanea. Ed. Stefano Poggi (op cit.). 35-49. [M]

Mariña, Jacqueline.  Rev. of Kant, Religion, and Politics, by James J. Dicenso (2011). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (May 2012, #26). [online] [M]

Marra, Jennifer.  Rev. of The Kantian Aesthetic: From Knowledge to the Avantgarde, by Paul Crowther (2010). Review of Metaphysics 66.1 (2012): 138-40. [M]

Martel Paredes, Víctor Hugo. “¿Hay realmente derechos inalienables?: una interpretación de la teoría político-moral kantiana.” [Spanish] Cuadernos de ética y filosofía política 1.1 (2012): 11-26. [WC]

Martell, James A. “Kant, Dignity, and the Gay Bathhouse.” Queer Philosophy. Presentations of the Society for Lesbian and Gay Philosophy, 1998‒2008. Eds. Raja Halwani, Carol V. A. Quinn, and Andy Wible (Amsterdam/New York: Rodopi, 2012). 371-80. [M]

Marthaler, Ingo. Bewusstes Leben: Moral und Glück bei Immanuel Kant. Berlin / Boston: De Gruyter, 2012. [190 p.] [WC]

Martínez Adame, Carmen. “The parallelogram law in the works of d’Alembert and Kant.” Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 27.3 (2012): 365-88. [PDC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: We compare two approaches given to the parallelogram law as a fundamental notion in eighteenth century mechanics. The authors we study are Kant and d’Alembert and we use the context created by Newton’s Principia as our point of departure.

Marwah, Inder S. “Bridging Nature and Freedom? Kant, Culture, and Cultivation.” Social Theory and Practice 38.3 (2012): 385-406. [PDC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In recent years, Kant’s lesser-known works on anthropology, education, and history have received increasing scholarly attention, illuminating his views on human nature, moral psychology, and historical development. This paper contributes to this literature by exploring Kant's conceptualization of culture. While recent commentary has drawn on Kant's “impure ethics” to suggest that his anti-imperialism and cosmopolitanism reflect a concern for the preservation of different cultures, I argue that this misinterprets the nature and function of culture in Kant’s thought. Rather than regarding culture as a constitutive good, I argue that Kant understands culture as a transitory good, as a sphere of individual and collective cultivation drawing humanity towards its teleologically given end: the perfection of our rational capacities. This suggests that only certain kinds of culture--those that “prepare [humanity] for a sovereignty in which reason alone is to dominate”--are valuable for Kant. Given this, I argue that Kant’s view of culture in fact presents far greater problems than prospects for theorizing an anti-imperial and cosmopolitan politics.

Mavouangui, David.  La philosophie de Kant et l'éducation, with an introduction by Abel Kouvouama.  Paris: l'Harmattan, 2012. [232 p.] [WC]

McCarty, Richard.  “The Right to Lie: Kantian Ethics and the Inquiring Murderer.”  American Philosophical Quarterly 49.4 (2012): 331-44. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Few challenges facing Kantian ethics are more famous and formidable than the so-called "case of the inquiring murderer." It appears in some form today in most introductory ethics texts, but it is not a new objection. Even Kant himself was compelled to respond to it, though by most accounts his response was embarrassingly unpersuasive. A more satisfactory reply can be offered to this old objection, however. It will be shown here that Kantian ethics permits lying to inquirers asking wrong questions, and that, therefore, it can be right to lie to a murderer inquiring whether his intended victim is hiding in your house. We begin by reviewing a now popular and plausible-sounding defense of the right to lie. Finding it unsuccessful, we turn next to scrutinize the type of question asked. The case of the inquiring murderer cannot be presented without supposing that the murderer's inquiry is unevadable. As we shall then see, in Kantian ethics it is usually wrong to ask such questions.

McClelland, Tom.  “In Defense of Kantian Humility.”  Thought 1.1 (2012): 62-70. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kantian Humility (KH) holds that the intrinsic properties of objects are unknowable for agents such as ourselves. Categorial properties, such as being an object, present a potential threat to KH. Cowling (2010) argues that knowing KH to be true requires knowledge of categorial properties. However, if such properties are shown to be intrinsic properties, then KH is committed to their being unknowable. I defend KH by presenting three alternative responses to this challenge. First, that categorial properties are not properties in the sense relevant to KH. Second, that if they are properties, they are not intrinsic properties. Third, that if they are intrinsic properties, KH is not committed to their being unknowable. I also show how these responses can be applied to a related objection to KH offered by Moore (2001).

McTavish, Chris Henry.  Rev. of Anthropology, History & Education, by Immanuel Kant, edited and translated by Robert B. Louden and Günter Zöller (2007). Philosophy in Review 32.2 (2012): 108-10. [online] [PW]

 ——.  Rev. of Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals: A Critical Guide, edited by Lara Denis (2010). Philosophy in Review 32.6 (2012): 457-59. [online] [PW]

McWherter, Dustin. The Problem of Critical Ontology: Bhaskar contra Kant. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. [200 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: By pitting Roy Bhaskar’s attempt to rehabilitate ontology in the philosophy of science against Kant’s attempt to replace traditional ontology with an account of cognitive experience, this book defends the possibility of critical ontology. After an introduction to Kant’s and Bhaskar’s conceptions of ontology and philosophical method, it is argued that Kant’s transcendental idealism cannot be defended as a non-ontological doctrine since it harbours problematic ontological assumptions. Then, it is argued that a properly modified version of Bhaskar’s ‘transcendental analysis of experimental activity’ makes a convincing case that natural necessity is constituted by transcendentally real causal powers instead of a priori conceptual synthesis. The result is a critique of transcendental idealism and defence of transcendental realism that should appeal to those interested in critical realism, Kant’s theoretical philosophy, speculative realism and the critique of ‘correlationism’, or the relation between natural science, metaphysics, and epistemology.

 ——.  “Transcendental Idealism and Ontological Agnosticism.”  Kantian Review 17.1 (2012): 47-73. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Since the initial reception of the ‘Critique of Pure Reason’ transcendental idealism has been perceived and criticized as a form of subjective idealism regarding space, time, and the objects within them, despite Kant’s protestations to the contrary. In recent years, some commentators have attempted to counter this interpretation by presenting transcendental idealism as a primarily epistemological doctrine rather than a metaphysical one. Others have insisted on the metaphysical character of transcendental idealism. Within these debates, Kant’s rejection of ontology (of the kind exemplified by Wolff and Baumgarten) has received comparatively little treatment, although it is often acknowledged. The present essay seeks to contribute to the secondary literature on Kant by offering an analysis of this claim and elaborating its consequences for transcendental idealism. This will take the form of a critical examination of transcendental idealism’s supposed ontological agnosticism — that is, its disavowal of any ontological claims. The overall conclusion is that Kant’s rejection of ontology is deeply problematic, and to such an extent that it may be necessary to reconsider the possibilities of defending transcendental idealism as a purely epistemological, nonontological doctrine.

Melamed, Yitzhak Y. “‘Omnis determinatio est negatio’: Determination, Negation, and Self-Negation in Spinoza, Kant, and Hegel.”  Spinoza and German Idealism. Eds. Eckart Förster and Yitzhak Y. Melamed (op cit.). 175-96. [M]

 ——, ed. See: Förster, Eckart and Yitzhak Y. Melamed, eds.

Merritt, Melissa McBay. “The Moral Source of the Kantian Sublime.” The Sublime: From Antiquity to the Present. Ed. Timothy M. Costelloe (op cit.). 37-49. [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: A crucial feature of Kant's critical-period writing on the sublime is its grounding in moral psychology. Whereas in the pre-critical writings, the sublime is viewed as an inherently exhausting state of mind, in the critical-period writings it is presented as one that gains strength the more it is sustained. I account for this in terms of Kantian moral psychology, and explain that, for Kant, sound moral disposition is conceived as a sublime state of mind.

Michalson, Jr., Gordon E.  “In Defense of Not Defending Kant’s Religion.”  Faith and Philosophy 29.2 (2012): 181-92. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This essay underscores the significant contribution Firestone and Jacobs make through the very thorough way their book surveys the wide range of recent scholarship bearing on Kant’s Religion. The essay then argues, however, that the complex scaffolding designed to summarize and categorize the varied responses to Kant has the effect of muting the authors’ own very bold interpretive stance. This point is particularly true with respect to their account of the compatibility of Kant’s Religion with the Christian tradition. In addition, the essay suggests that the judicial metaphor of “defense” is overplayed, forcing certain interpretations of Kant into potentially misleading positions for the sake of the interpretive scheme.

Mieszkowski, Jan.  Rev. of Looking Away: Phenomenality and Dissatisfaction, Kant to Adorno, by Rei Terada (2009). Comparative Literature Studies 49.3 (2012): 469-72. [MUSE]

Mihina, František. “Peirce a Kantov odkaz.” [Slovak; Peirce and Kant’s Legacy] Studia Philosophica Kantiana 2012.2 (2012): 15-36. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Ch. S. Peirce saw I. Kant as his direct predecessor. In his project of scientific philosophy or scientific metaphysics he drew upon Kant’s intellectual legacy. The architectonics of Peirce’s philosophy is closely connected with Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Yet, Peirce could preserve the autonomy of his own reasoning. The paper offers an analysis of Kant’s multifold influence upon Peirce’s philosophy.

 ——.  “Kant and Peirce.” [Slovak]  Filozofia 67.3 (2012): 181-94. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Charles S. Peirce saw I. Kant as his direct predecessor. In his projects of scientific philosophy or scientific metaphysics he drew upon Kant’s intellectual legacy. The architectonics of Peirce’s philosophy is closely connected with Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Yet, Peirce could preserve the autonomy of his own reasoning. The paper offers an analysis of Kant’s multifold influence upon Peirce’s philosophy.

Mikalsen, Kjartan Koch. Rev. of Politics and Metaphysics in Kant, edited by Sorin Baiasu, Sami Pihlström, and Howard Williams (2011).  Kant Studies Online, posted November 27, 2012 (2012): 278-89. [M] [online]

Mikołajczyk, Hubert. Kant i postkantowskie projekty nowożytności i współczesności: impresje filozoficzne. Słupsk: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Akademii Pomorskiej, 2012. [163 p.] [WC]

Miller, Richard W.  “Rawls and Global Justice: A Dispute over a Kantian Legacy.”  Philosophical Forum 43.3 (2012): 297-309. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: An essay is presented that looks at American philosopher John Rawls’ theory of global justice and the influence of German philosopher Immanuel Kant. The author is critical of Rawls’ opponents who argue against his interpretation of Kant and claim that Rawls does not adequately consider political duties concerning transnational help and economic interdependence when designing a global justice system. Other topics covered include cosmopolitanism, commerce, and poverty.

Moehler, Michael. “A Hobbesian Derivation of the Principle of Universalization.” Philosophical Studies 158.1 (2012): 83-107. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this article, I derive a weak version of Kant’s categorical imperative within an informal game-theoretic framework. More specifically, I argue that Hobbesian agents would choose what I call the ‘weak principle of universalization’, if they had to decide on a rule of conflict resolution in an idealized but empirically defensible hypothetical decision situation. The discussion clarifies (i) the rationality requirements imposed on agents, (ii) the empirical conditions assumed to warrant the conclusion, and (iii) the political institutions that are necessary to implement the derived principle. The analysis demonstrates the moral significance of the weak principle of universalization and its epistemic advantage over the categorical imperative.

Mohr, Georg.  “Urteilstheoretische Vorklärung zum Metaphysikbegriff.”  Kants Prolegomena: ein kooperativer Kommentar.  Eds. Holger Lyre and Oliver Schliemann (op cit.). 31-60. [M]

Molina Cantó, Eduardo. “Moral, religión y política en I. Kant.” [Spanish] Ideas y Valores: Revista Colombiana de Filosofia 61 #148 (2012): 131-44. [online] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: At the end of the Critique of Judgment, Kant addresses the problem of the proofs of the existence of God and carries out a detailed examination of the only proof he considers capable of eliciting assent: the moral proof. The article reviews the path followed by Kant in order to reach the idea of a moral author of the world on the basis of his analysis of the purposiveness of nature, and shows how this argument is linked to Kant’s ethical-political doctrine as set forth in his other works.

Moore, A. W.  “Bird on Kant’s Mathematical Antinomies.”  Contemporary Kantian Metaphysics: New Essays on Time and Space.  Eds. Roxana Baiasu, Graham Bird, and A. W. Moore (op cit.). 197-206. [M]

 ——.  “Freedom, Temporality, and Belief: A Reply to Hare.”  Kant on Practical Justification: Interpretive Essays. Eds. Mark Timmons and Sorin Baiasu (op cit.). 315-18. [M]

 ——.  See: Baiasu, Roxana, Graham Bird, and A. W. Moore.

 ——.  See: Baiasu, Roxana, Graham Bird, and A. W. Moore, eds.

Moore, John Allphin.  See: Pubantz, Jerry and John Allphin Moore.

Moran, Kate A.  Community and Progress in Kant’s Moral Philosophy.  Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2012. [x, 264 p.] [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Immanuel Kant’s moral philosophy has often been criticized for ignoring a crucial dimension of community in its account of the lives that agents ought to lead. Historical and contemporary critics alike often paint Kant’s moral theory, with its emphasis on rationality, as overly formalistic and unrealistically isolating. Against these criticisms, Kate A. Moran argues that Kant’s moral philosophy reserves a central role for community in several important respects. In the first part of her book, Moran asserts that Kant’s most developed account of the goal toward which agents ought to strive is actually a kind of ethical community. Indeed, Kant claims that agents have a duty to pursue this goal. Moran argues that this duty entails a concern for the development of agents’ moral characters and capacities for moral reasoning, as well as the institutions and relationships that aid in this development. Next, Moran examines three specific social institutions and relationships that, according to Kant, help develop moral character and moral reasoning. In three separate chapters, Moran examines the role that moral education, friendship, and participation in civil society play in developing agents’ moral capacities. Far from being mere afterthoughts in Kant’s moral system, Moran maintains that these institutions are crucial in bringing about the end of an ethical community.

Moran, Richard.  “Kant, Proust, and the Appeal of Beauty.”  Critical Inquiry 38.2 (2012): 298-329. [PI]

Moretto, Antonio. “La topologia della limitazione in Lambert e Kant. Conoscenza esatta e conoscenza approssimata.” Il realismo della ragione: Kant dai lumi alla filosofia contemporanea. Ed. Stefano Poggi (op cit.). 15-34. [M]

Mori, Massimo. “Il pensiero tedesco contemporaneo e l'illuminismo.” Il realismo della ragione: Kant dai lumi alla filosofia contemporanea. Ed. Stefano Poggi (op cit.). 209-33. [M]

Mortera, Emanuele Levi.  “Stewart, Kant, and the Reworking of Common Sense.”  History of European Ideas 38.1 (2012): 122-42. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Dugald Stewart was the first metaphysician of any significance in Britain who attempted to take account of Kantian philosophy, although his analysis appears generally dismissive. Traditionally this has been imputed to Stewart’s poor understanding of Kant and to his efforts to defend the orthodoxy of common sense. This paper argues that, notwithstanding Stewart’s reading, Kant’s philosophy helped him in a reconsideration and reassessment of common-sense philosophy. In his mature works — the Philosophical Essays (1810), the second volume of the Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind (1814), and the second part of his historical dissertation (1815-1821) — Stewart’s analysis of Kantian philosophy is far from being uniform. In the first two works, he takes a cautious approach to transcendentalism, showing some interest in the challenge it might represent for common sense; in the last, he turns to rash criticism. This change may appear confusing and inconsistent unless considered in the light of a precise ‘nationalistic’ strategy. In fact, once Stewart had taken from Kantian philosophy what he deemed useful for his own aims, he eventually dismissed it in order to show that his reworked version of common sense was the most original and most consistent outcome of the whole Anglo-Scottish philosophical tradition.

Motta, Giuseppe.  Die Postulate des empirischen Denkens überhaupt: KrV A 218-235/B 265-287: ein kritischer Kommentar.  Berlin / Boston: De Gruyter, 2012. [ix, 332 p.] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Kantstudien Ergänzungshefte, 170; a lightly expanded version of his Ph.D. dissertation (Universität-Trier, 2011).

 ——.  Rev. of Necessity and Possibility: The Logical Strategy of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, by Kurt Mosser (2008). Kant-Studien 103.3 (2012): 390-92. [M]

Moutsopoulos, E. Rev. of Fericire şi lege morală la Kant [Happiness and Moral Law in Kant], by Rodica Croitoru (2008).  Cercet. Fil. Psih. 4.1 (2012): 119-21. [RC]

Müller, Jörg Paul. Perspektiven der Demokratie: vom Nationalmythos Wilhelm Tell zur Weltsicht Immanuel Kants. Bern: Stämpfli, 2012. [xiii, 180 p.] [WC]

Münz, Teodor. “Nietzscheho kritika Kantovej metafyziky.” [Slovak; Nietzsche’s Critique of Kant’s Metaphysics] Studia Philosophica Kantiana 2012.2 (2012): 50-66. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Nietzsche paid great attention to Kant’s metaphysics and based on its critique he clarified his noetic opinions. Nietzsche understood metaphysics mainly as stagnancy, motionlessness, shallow statement about uniformity of things and their common, general features. The course of events is stopped by the notions created by reason and language which at the same time express common features of things, substances. But they do not exist because there are not two identical motionless things. And this is how Kant’s a priori features of subject should look like and which Nietzsche rejected. He also paid attention to Kant’s thing-in-itself with which he dealt from various points of view. Nietzsche rejected objective existence of a thing as a solid limited group of features because he saw a projection of non-existing human “I” and his features outside the subject, i.e. anthropomorphism in it. Then, there is no thing-in-itself. Nietzsche rejected it for several reasons and slid into positions of subjective idealism. Nevertheless, he accepted the existence of other people, subjects as he called them, which influence each other.

Muñoz Redón, Josep. La paloma quejica: Immanuel Kant. [Spanish] Barcelona: Octaedro, 2012. [47 p.] [WC]

Munzel, G. Felicitas.  Kant’s Conception of Pedagogy: Toward Education for Freedom.  Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2012. [468 p.] [contents] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents: Part 1. Historic and philosophic context: eighteenth-century conceptions of education, Enlightenment, and human self-understanding — 1. The eighteenth-century as a pedagogical age — 2. Texts and movements: consequences of human self-understanding for conceptions of education — Part 2. Attempt at a pedagogical instauration — 3. Kant's idea of education — 4. Formal transcendental principles for education for inner freedom: condition for and critical counterpart to external freedom — 5. Toward material principles fulfilling formal conditions for education for freedom: philosophy as paideia and the liberal arts — Epilogue: relevance for today.

 ——.  “Relative Goodness and Ambivalence of Human Traits: Reflections in Light of Kant’s Pedagogical Concerns.”  Kant’s Observations and Remarks: A Critical Guide.  Eds. Susan Meld Shell and Richard Velkley (op cit.). 165-84. [M]

Mureşan, Valentin. Trei teorii etice: Kant, Mill, Hare. Bucharest: Ed. Universitatii, 2012. [?? p.] [WC]

[top] N    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Nachtomy, Ohad.  “Leibniz and Kant on Possibility and Existence.”  British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20.5 (2012): 953-72. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper examines the Leibnizian background to Kant’s critique of the ontological argument. I present Kant’s claim that existence is not a real predicate, already formulated in his pre-critical essay of 1763, as a generalization of Leibniz’s reasoning regarding the existence of created things. The first section studies Leibniz’s equivocations on the notion of existence and shows that he employs two distinct notions of existence — one for God and another for created substances. The second section examines Kant’s position in his early paper of 1763. My claim is that Kant’s view of existence in 1763, namely that it is not a predicate, is strongly related to the logical notion of possibility, formulated by Leibniz and accepted by Kant.

Nadai, Bruno. “A moralidade no mundo: o sumo bem e a filosofia da história kantiana.” [Portuguese] Cadernos de Filosofia Alemã: Crítica e Modernidade 20 (2012): 55-80. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper has two sections. At first, I present an approach to Kant’s concept of the highest good that tries to show its systematic place within Kant’s practical system. Against established interpretations, I sustain that the highest good does not hinder autonomy; instead, it allows Kant to deal with problems that were left aside when he was elaborating the grounding of morality. Then, I compare the concept of the highest good with the idea of moral progress in Kant’s philosophy of history. In the light of this comparison, I discuss the thesis according to which this progress can be interpreted as an alternative to the postulate of soul immortality and the interpretation according to which moral historical progress allows a possible and more concrete representation of how the sensible world can come closer to the idea of a moral world

Nance, Michael. “Kantian Right and the Categorical Imperative: Response to Willaschek.” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20.4 (2012): 541-56. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In his 2009 article ‘Right and Coercion,’ Marcus Willaschek argues that the Categorical Imperative and the Universal Principle of Right are conceptually independent of one another because (1) the concept of right and the authorization to use coercion are analytically connected in Kant’s ‘Doctrine of Right’, but (2) the authorization to coerce cannot be derived from the Categorical Imperative. Given that the principle of right just is a principle of authorized coercion, the fact that the authorization to coerce cannot be derived from the Categorical Imperative implies that the Principle of Right cannot be derived from the Categorical Imperative. Against this claim, I first argue that a satisfactory deduction of the concept of right can be constructed out of the Categorical Imperative, the fact that we are embodied, and the fact that we act from motives other than duty. I then argue that the insufficiency of the Categorical Imperative, by itself, to generate the Principle of Right does not prevent us from interpreting the Principle of Right as a specification of the Categorical Imperative. I develop this point by means of an analogy with Kant’s discussion of the moral law and the Categorical Imperative in the Groundwork.

Nascimento, Amos. Rev. of Reading Kant’s Geography, edited by Stuart Elden and Eduardo Mendieta (2011). Radical Philosophy Review 15.2 (2012): 399-403. [PDC]

Nasu, Seigen.  闇への論理 : カントからシェリングへ / Yami eno ronri : kanto kara sheringu e. [Japanese; “From Kant to Schelling: Logic to Darkness”]  Tokyo: Kōjinsha, 2012. [259 p.] [WC]

Neal, Robert J. M.  “Kant’s Ideality of Genius.”  Kant-Studien 103.3 (2012): 351-60. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: To say that a work of fine art is beautiful because it has been produced by a genius introduces a determinate concept precluding a judgment of the work’s beauty by way of a pure judgment of taste. What Kant in fact proposes is that we judge a work to be the product of genius as a consequence of our judgment of its beauty. As Kant explains in KU §58, when we judge the beautiful in fine art it is the indeterminacy of the mode of mental activity in which aesthetic ideas arise which permits us to interpret idealistically the purposiveness in the work, on which account we regard it as the product of genius. This article examines in particular KU §50 concerning the combination of genius and taste, and the puzzling assertion in KU §51 that all beauty is the expression of aesthetic ideas.

Nerurkar, Michael.  Amphibolie der Reflexionsbegriffe und transzendentale Reflexion: das Amphibolie-Kapitel in Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft.  Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2012. [194 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Revised Ph.D dissertation (Stuttgart, 2010).

Newton, K. M. “George Eliot, Kant, and Free Will.” Philosophy & Literature 36.2 (2012): 441-56. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: If George Eliot is a determinist, how can she justify judging her characters on moral grounds? The most influential discussion of her determinism concludes that she believed one overcomes its depressing effects by understanding it. But this view is contradicted by her assertion that free will is a “practical” necessity, even a necessary fiction. Kantian moral theory is strongly present in her work as is shown by her use of Kantian terms, but it is grounded nonmetaphysically. Rationality and the will are essential if one is to feel free to choose. Her concept of whole self in relation to moral choice has links with Bergsonian theory.

Ng, Julia.  “Kant’s Theory of Experience at the End of the War: Scholem and Benjamin Read Cohen — A Commentary.”  MLN 127.3 (2012): 462-84. [MUSE]

Niederberger, Andreas.  Rev. of Demokratie und Frieden. Kants Friedensschrift in den Kontroversen der Gegenwart, by Oliver Eberl (2008). Kant-Studien 103.3 (2012): 383-87. [M]

Nikonova, Svetlana B. “Философия Канта и основания процесса эстетизации в современной культуре.” [Russian; Kant’s philosophy and foundations of the process of aesthetization in contemporary culture] Kantovskij Sbornik 39.1 (2012): 45-54. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article discusses the possibility of detecting the grounds of the aesthetization process in modern culture in the structure of the Kantian philosophy. The connection of Kant’s aesthetics with science and morality is traced, and also Kant’s influence on the romantic philosophy of art is revealed. The loss of its classical boundaries by modern aesthetics is shown as originated in the Kantian philosophy, though it was this very philosophy in which these boundaries were once defined.

Nisbet, H. B.  Rev. of Essays on Kant, Schelling, and German Aesthetics, by Henry Crabb Robinson, edited by James Vigus (2010). Modern Language Review 107.3 (2012): 970-71. [HUM]

Nitzan, Lior. “Externality, Reality, Objectivity, Actuality: Kant’s Fourfold Response to Idealism.” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophi 94.2 (2012): 147-77. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: To many critics, Kant’s refutation of Descartes’s problematic idealism seems like an explicit adoption of Berkeley’s dogmatic idealism. My exposition intends to show that this is not the case. The discussion of externality, reality and objectivity is intended to demonstrate that the question regarding the status of external objects can only be considered within the realm of appearances. The discussion of actuality is intended to show how we can indeed distinguish the genuine from the illusive within this realm (and only within it). I intend to show that Kant’s refutation of idealism succeeds specifically because it does not assign any role to the thing-in-itself within this refutation and focuses entirely on the inherent features of phenomenal objects.

Nizhnikov, Sergey Anatolievich.  “On the Specific Traits of Russian Kantianism.”  Filozofia 67.3 (2012): 254-61. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The paper focuses on the influence of I. Kant and German classical philosophy on Russian philosophical thought. It deals with the challenge of “returns to Kant” in Russian philosophical culture. Kant’s philosophy stimulates the field of the metaphysics of faith. The paper shows that in their confrontation with German classical thought, and especially with Kant’s philosophy, Russian philosophers have various aims and use various methodologies and languages. Further, it shows Kant’s philosophical legacy from two different points of view represented by two philosophical magazines — ‘Logos’ and ‘Way’. The paper also explains the importance of the notions of Kantianism and neo-Kantianism in Russian philosophical thought from the 1850s up to the present day. Attention is paid in particular to A. I. Vvedensky and his understanding of the relationship between faith and reason as well as his confrontation with the philosophy of I. Kant.

 ——. “The Foundations of Moral Policy: I. Kant, F. Dostoevsky and Others.” Studia Philosophica Kantiana 2012.2 (2012): 67-76. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Der vorliegende Beitrag beschäftigt sich mit den Varianten der Wechselbeziehung zwischen Gewalt und Gewaltlosigkeit anhand der Werke von I. Kant und F. Dostojewski, das Konzept der humanistischen Politik formulierend: ein tugendhaftes Ziel kann man nur mit tugendhaften Mitteln erreichen. Hauptunterschied zwischen den abgegrenzten Varianten der Wahrnehmung der Wechselbeziehungen zwischen Moral und Politik wird im Kontext der geistigen und intellektuellen Traditionen definiert. Im Beitrag werden Dispute über Berechtigung von Gewaltanwendung analysiert, die in der russischen Philosophie schon mehr als ein Jahrhundert präsent sind. Die bei I. Iljin entwickelte Polemik hinsichtlich der Doktrin von L. Tolstoi über den Non-Widerstand gegen das Böse mit Kraft fand gleich Anklang bei N. Berdjajew und anderen Denkern des vergangenen Jahrhunderts. Angeregt durch die Werke von N. Machiavelli und I. Kant überlebte diese Polemik bis heute. Der Autor versucht aufgrund eines sorgfältigen Studiums der Urquellen das Konzept der humanistischen Politik zu betonen, wobei der pazifistische Non-Widerstand als unmoralisch betrachtet wird. Er behauptet, dass man die Lösung der gegenwärtigen globalen - sowohl internationalen als auch internen - Probleme nur aufgrund der humanistischen Politik der Gewaltlosigkeit (d.h. aufgrund des Non-Widerstands gegen das Böse mit Kraft, was den Widerstand gegen das Böse mit Gewalt nicht ausschließt, aber manchmal benötigt) finden kann. Die Grundsätze dieser Politik wurden schon in der „Achsenzeit“ durch Weltreligionen und Philosophie entdeckt und später bei I. Kant, F. Dostojewski, M. Gandhi, M. L. King u a. entwickelt.

Noras, Andrzej Jan, ed. See: Krijnen, Christian and Andrzej Jan Noras, eds.

Northoff, Georg.  Das disziplinlose Gehirn - was nun, Herr Kant? auf den Spuren unseres Bewusstseins mit der Neurophilosophie.  Munich: Irisiana, 2012. [312 p.] [WC]

 ——.  “Immanuel Kant’s Mind and the Brain’s Resting State.”  Trends in Cognitive Sciences 16.7 (2012): 356-59. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The early philosopher Immanuel Kant suggested that the mind’s intrinsic features are intimately linked to the extrinsic stimuli of the environment it processes. Currently, the field faces an analogous problem with regard to the brain. Kant’s ideas may provide novel insights into how the brain’s intrinsic features must be so that they can be linked to the neural processing of extrinsic stimuli to enable the latter’s association with consciousness and self.

Nowotniak, Justyna. “Jakim Kant byl psychologiem?” [Polish]  Archiwum Historii Filozofii i Mysli Spolecznej 57 (2012): 123-56. [WC]

Nour, Soraya.  “Cosmopolitanism: Kant and Kantian Themes in International Relations.”  Kant in Brazil.  Eds. Frederick Rauscher and Daniel Omar Perez (op cit.). 246-70. [M]

Nuzzo, Angelica. “A Question of Method: Transcendental Philosophy, Dialectic, and the Problem of Determination.” Fichte-Studien 39 (2012): 37-66. [HUM]

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O’Connell, Eoin.  “Happiness Proportioned to Virtue: Kant and the Highest Good.”  Kantian Review 17.2 (2012): 257-79. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper considers two contenders for the title of highest good in Kant's theory of practical reason: happiness proportioned to virtue and the maximization of happiness and virtue. I defend the ‘proportionality thesis’ against criticisms made by Andrews Reath and others, and show how it resolves a dualism between prudential and moral practical reasoning. By distinguishing between the highest good as a principle of evaluation and an object of agency, I conclude that the maximization of happiness and virtue is a corollary of the instantiation of the proportionality thesis.

Oehler-Klein, Sigrid.  “Kontext und Bedeutung des wissenschaftlichen Arguments in Georg Forsters Kant-Kritik.”  Klopffechtereien – Missverständnisse – Widersprüche? Methodische und methodologische Perspektiven auf die Kant-Forster-Kontroverse.  Eds. Rainer Godel and Gideon Stiening (op cit.). 135-62. [M]

Ohreen, David E. and Roger A. Petry.  “Imperfect duties and Corporate Philanthropy: A Kantian Approach.”  Journal of Business Ethics 106.3 (2012): .367-81 [PsychINFO]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Nonprofit organizations play a crucial role in society. Unfortunately, many such organizations are chronically underfunded and struggle to meet their objectives. These facts have significant implications for corporate philanthropy and Kant’s notion of imperfect duties. Under the concept of imperfect duties, businesses would have wide discretion regarding which charities receive donations, how much money to give, and when such donations take place. A perceived problem with imperfect duties is that they can lead to moral laxity; that is, a failure on the part of businesses to fulfill their financial obligations to nonprofit organizations. This article argues the problem of moral laxity rests on a misinterpretation of Kantian ethics and, therefore, is really not a problem at all. As such, we argue corporate philanthropy while an imperfect duty should be interpreted more akin to perfect duties and, as a consequence, moral laxity does not arise for those corporations committed to acting on the basis of the moral law. More specifically, firms have duty-based obligations on the basis of benevolence, and as good corporate citizens, to help fund non-profit organizations.

Olen, Peter.  Rev. of Self, Language, and World: Problems from Kant, Sellars, and Rosenberg, edited by James R. O'Shea and Eric M. Rubenstein (2010). International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20.2 (2012): 303-7. [PI]

Olsson, Gunnary. Rev. of Reading Kant’s Geography, ed. by Stuart Elden and Eduardo Mendieta (2011).  Geografiska Annaler 94.1 (2012): 83-87. [JSTOR]

O’Neill, Onora.  “Kant and the Social Contract Tradition.”  Kant’s Political Theory: Interpretations and Applications.  Ed. Elisabeth Ellis (op cit.). 25-41. [M]

Onnasch, Ernst-Otto.  “Das Manuskript von Kants Brief an Kiesewetter vom 13. Oktober 1797.”  Kant-Studien 103.2 (2012): 237-41. [M]

Oroño, Matías H. Rev. of Arte y Naturaleza: El concepto de ‘Técnica de la naturaleza’ en la ‘Kritik der Urteilskraft’ de Kant, by Silvia del Luján Di Sanza (2010). Ideas y Valores: Revista Colombiana de Filosofia 61 #148 (2012): 153-54. [online] [M]

Orth, Ernst Wolfgang. “Die Kultur des Wissens in der Philosophie des Neukantianers Alois Riehl.”  Transzendentalphilosophie und die Kultur der Gegenwart. Eds. Steffen Dietzsch and Udo Teitz (op cit.). 283-93. [M]

O’Shea, James R.  Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason: An Introduction and Interpretation.  Durham, England: Acumen, 2012. [236 p.] [WC] [review]

Ostaric, Lara.  “Kant on the Normativity of Creative Production.”  Kantian Review 17.1 (2012): 75-107. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this essay, I argue that a genius’ creation consists of a special unity of free human activity and nature, whereby ‘nature’ signifies not just another aspect of, but rather something that transcends, creative subjectivity. This interpretation of a genius’ creative process throws a new light on a special normative status of a genius’ rule, i.e., its originality and exemplarity. With respect to the former, I demonstrate that because the organizing principle of the works of genius remains inscrutable to our limited human understanding, a work of genius appears to the observer’s limited cognitive capacities as undetermined and, hence, as contingent and original. With respect to the latter, I show how a genius must evolve within the context of her own tradition and how this ‘humbleness’ of a genius still allows for a multiplicity of coexistent schools or genres with their own distinct standards of excellence.

Otabe, Tanehisa.  “Genius as a Chiasm of the Conscious and Unconscious: A History of Ideas Concerning Kantian Aesthetics.”  Kant’s Philosophy of the Unconscious.  Eds. Piero Giordanetti, Riccardo Pozzo, and Marco Sgarbi (op cit.). 89-101. [M]

Overgaard, Søren.  See: Zahavi, Dan and Søren Overgaard.

Owen, David.  “Symposium on Ripstein’s Force and Freedom: Introduction.”  European Journal of Philosophy 20.3 (2012): 447-49. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] See the articles by Laura Valentini, Andrea Sangiovanni, Miriam Ronzoni, Garrath Williams, and a reply by Arthur Ripstein.
Abstract: This introduction provides a very brief sketch of the fundamental claims of Arthur Ripstein’s Force and Freedom before locating the criticisms of his interlocutors in relation to those claims. Valentini and Sangiovanni are situated as critics of the Kantian frame, while Ronzoni and Williams are critics situated within that frame.

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Palencik, Joseph. “Kant and the Limitations of Legitimized Historical Knowledge.” International Philosophical Quarterly 52.4 (2012): 405-20. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant’s emphasis on the individual knower often overshadows the social dimension in his thought. In particular, it is infrequently recognized that he has a coherent and well-developed theory of testimony. In this paper I develop Kant’s view of testimony and argue for the important distinction that he holds between historical belief derived from testimony and what I shall call mere belief. While beliefs of the former type can be justified and often amount to instances of knowledge, beliefs of the second type are not justified, cannot lead to knowledge, and yet may still be legitimately held.

Palermo, Sandra Viviana. Tra critica e metafisica: Luigi Scaravelli lettore di Kant. Pisa: ETS, 2012. [220 p.] [WC] [contents]

Palmquist, Stephen R.  “Cross-Examination of In Defense of Kant’s Religion.”  Faith and Philosophy 29.2 (2012): 170-80. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article extends the metaphorical trial posed by the authors of In Defense of Kant’s Religion by cross-examining them with two challenges. The first challenge is for the authors to clarify their claim that they are the first interpreters to present “a holistic and linear interpretation” of Kant’s Religion that portrays it as containing a “transcendental analysis” of religious concepts, given that several of the past interpreters whose works they survey in Part 1 conduct a similar type of analysis. The second is to compare the assumption pervading Part 2 of their book, that Kant conducts his first “experiment” in the first three Pieces and the second experiment in the Fourth Piece of Religion, with the previously defended view that the two experiments are weaved throughout all four Pieces. After observing several dangers this assumption poses for affirmative interpreters of Kant’s philosophy of religion, I conclude by showing how the authors’ problem-driven hermeneutic led them to downplay various portions of Kant’s text.

 ——. “Mapping Kant's Architectonic onto the Yijing via the Geometry of Logic.” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 39 (2012): 93-111. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Both Kant’s architectonic and the Yijing can be structured as four perspectival levels: 0 + 4 + 12 + (4 x 12) = 64. The first, unknowable level is unrepresentable. The geometry of logic provides well-structured maps for levels two to four. Level two consists of four basic gua (2, 64, 63, 1), corresponding to Kant’s category-headings (quantity, quality, relation, modality). Level three’s twelve gua, derived logically from the initial four, correspond to Kant’s twelve categories. Level four correlates the remaining 48 gua (in twelve sets of four) to Kant’s theory of the four university faculties (philosophy, theology, law, medicine), and to four categorially organized (twelve-fold) domains comprising his philosophical system.

 ——. “Could Kant's Jesus Be God?” International Philosophical Quarterly 52.4 (2012): 421-37. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Although Kant had a high regard for Jesus as a moral teacher, interpreters typically assume that his philosophy disallows belief in Jesus as God. Those who regard Kant as a moral reductionist are especially likely to offer a negative construal of the densely-argued subsection of his 1793 Religion that relates directly to this issue. The recent “affirmative” trend in Kant-scholarship provides the basis for an alternative reading. First, theologians must regard Jesus as human so that belief in Jesus can empower believers to become good. Second, theologians may refer to Jesus as divine by identifying his disposition as exemplifying the “archetype of perfect humanity.” Third, Judeo-Christian history poses an empirical problem that theologians can solve by interpreting Jesus’s divinity according to the schematism of analogy. While this does not constitute a robust (identifiably Christian) doctrine of Jesus’s divinity, it does provide clear guidelines for formulating such a tenet of historical faith.

 ——. “To Tell the Truth on Kant and Christianity: Will the Real Affirmative Interpreter Please Stand Up!” Faith and Philosophy 29.3 (2012): 340-46. [PDC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: After reviewing the history of the “affirmative” approach to interpreting Kant’s Religion, I offer four responses to the symposium papers in the previous issue of Faith and Philosophy. First, incorrectly identifying Kant’s two “experiments” leads to misunderstandings of his affirmation of Christianity. Second, Kant’s Critical Religion expounds a thoroughgoing interpretation of these experiments, and was not primarily an attempt to confirm the architectonic introduced in Kant’s System of Perspectives. Third, the surprise positions defended by most symposium contributors render the “affirmative” label virtually meaningless. Finally, if Kant is read as constructing perspectival philosophy, not theology, the compatibility of his positions with Christianity stands.

Papadaki, Lina.  “Abortion and Kant’s Formula of Humanity.”  HumanaMente: Journal of Philosophical Studies 22 (2012): 145-65. [online] [M]

Papsthart, Christian. “Gottesbezug in der europäischen Verfassung? Eine kantische Antwort.”  Kant und die Religion — die Religionen und Kant. Eds. Reinhard Hiltscher and Stefan Klingner (op cit.). 213-32. [M]

Parsons, Charles.  From Kant to Husserl: Selected Essays.  Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2012. [xiv, 242 p.] [WC] [review]

Pasternack, Lawrence.  “Kant on the Debt of Sin.”  Faith and Philosophy 29.1 (2012): 30-52. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant follows Christian tradition by asserting that humanity is sinful by nature, that our sinful nature burdens us with an infinite debt to God, and that it is possible for us to undergo a moral transformation that liberates us from sin and from its debt. Most of the secondary literature has focused on either Kant’s account of sin or our liberation from it. Far less attention has been paid to the debt in particular. The purpose of this paper is to explore the nature of this debt, why Kant regards it as infinite, and what becomes of it for those who undergo a moral transformation.

Patnaik, Nishad. Rev. of Kant and Phenomenology, by Tom Rockmore (2011). Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 33.1 (2012): 250-59. [PDC]

Paulson, Stanley L.  Rev. of Neo-Kantianism in Contemporary Philosophy, edited by Rudolf A. Makkreel and Sebastian Luft (2010). European Journal of Philosophy 20.3 (2012): 507-12. [PW]

Pawlik, Michael. “Rechtsphilosophie.” Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft 124.3 (2012): 778-804. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: This review of the literature discusses the following books concerning Kant’s philosophy of law/justice:
Ralf Buttermann, Die Fiktion eines Faktums. Kants Suche nach einer Rechtswissenschaft *Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2011).
David Kräft, Apriorität und Positivität des Rechts nach Kant (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2011).
Tanja J. Winkler, Die Freiheit im und vom Staate bei Immanuel Kant (München: C. H. Beck, 2011).
Wawrzinek, Cora, Die „wahre Republik“ und das „Bündel von Kompromissen“: Die Staatsphilosophie Immanuel Kants im Vergleich mit der Theorie des amerikanischen Federalist (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2009).

Peppino, Santiago Esteban. Rev. of Immanuel Kant: Crítica del juicio, by Marco Sgarbi (2011). [Spanish] Kant e-Prints 7.2 (2012): 70-80. [M] [online]

Peres, Daniel Tourinho.  “Right, History, and Practical Schematism.”  Kant in Brazil.  Eds. Frederick Rauscher and Daniel Omar Perez (op cit.). 236-45. [M]

Perez, Daniel Omar and Juan Adolfo Bonaccini.  “Two Centuries of Kantian Studies in Brazil.”  Kant in Brazil.  Eds. Frederick Rauscher and Daniel Omar Perez (op cit.). 14-25. [M]

 ——.  See: Rauscher, Frederick and Daniel Omar Perez, eds.

Perni, Romina. Diritto, storia e pace perpetua: un'analisi del cosmopolitismo kantiano. [Italian] Pisa: ETS, 2012. [202 p.] [WC]

Perrottet, Claude. Au-delà du criticisme kantien: la méthode critique-intuitive dans la première philosophie de la religion de Paul Tillich. Quebec: Presses de l'Université Laval, 2012. [403 p.] [WC]

Peterson, Jonathan.  Rev. of Kant and Applied Ethics: The Uses and Limits of Kant’s Practical Philosophy, by Matthew C. Altman (2011). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (June 2012, #30). [online] [M]

Pettoello, Renato.  “‘De nobis ipsis silemus’: Sulla morte di Immanuel Kant.” [Italian]  Rivista di Storia della Filosofia 67.1 (2012): 203-13. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The description of Immanuel Kant’s last days and of the phrenological and craniometric studies of his skull gives the author the opportunity to discuss the philosophical validity of biographies and more in general to re-examine the vexata quaestio of the relationship between philosophy and history of philosophy. Here the author supports the thesis that, for the most part, any reference to the biographies of philosophers is essentially of no use — their works have to be judged as such, independently of whoever wrote them and also to a large extent of the historical context — and that there is the need to get back to a philosophical history of philosophy, while still maintaining the very rigorous approach to which the history of philosophy has accustomed us in the last few decades.

Phillips, James. “The Case for a Convergence of the Beautiful and the Sublime: Kant, Aesthetic Form, and the Temptations of Appearance.” Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 43.2 (2012): 161-77. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In §25 of the third critique Immanuel Kant points to a convergence of the beautiful and the sublime. According to Kant, when we judge something to be sublime, we judge it to be absolutely great. The role of magnitude in these judgements is not restricted to the physical dimensions of the object but extends to all its properties: as Kant says in §25, in the analytic of the sublime, we call even the beauty of an object great or small. The preceding analytic of the beautiful provides, however, no means for quantifying free beauty. Can the beauty of an object, therefore, be so great that it tips over into the sublime? This article attempts to expound the formalism of beauty in terms of the ideas.

Pietras, Alicja.  “Karl Jaspers’ Post-Neo-Kantian Project of Metaphysics.” [Polish]  Kwartalnik Filozoficzny 40.1 (2012): 25-40. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper I propose an interpretation of Karl Jaspers’s project of metaphysics as a form of post-neo-Kantianism. Jaspers makes Kantian philosophy one of the most important starting points of his own philosophical thinking. But, like Nicolai Hartmann and Martin Heidegger, he rejects the neo-Kantian epistemological interpretation of Kant’s philosophy. Neo-Kantians claimed that Kant rejected metaphysics and wished to set up the theory of cognition as a new philosophia prima. In opposition to this, Jaspers emphasizes the metaphysical sense of Kant’s philosophy. Moreover, in his project of the philosophy of the ‘Umgreifenden’ he gives a positive meaning to transcendental physiology, the part of metaphysics which, according to the common reading of Kant, was definitely rejected by him.

Pille, René-Marc. “Wenn Thalia Clio zur Hilfe ruft. Der Rückgriff auf die Geschichte als ästhetischer Imperativ des Schillerschen Theaters.”  Transzendentalphilosophie und die Kultur der Gegenwart. Eds. Steffen Dietzsch and Udo Teitz (op cit.). 233-41. [M]

Pimenta, Pedro.  “Reading the Appendix to Kant’s Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment.”  Kant in Brazil.  Eds. Frederick Rauscher and Daniel Omar Perez (op cit.). 337-47. [M]

Pinkard, Terry.  Rev. of The Twenty-Five Years of Philosophy: A Systematic Reconstruction, by Eckart Förster (2011). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (September 2012, #26). [online] [M]

Pinzani, Alessandro, ed. See: Tonetto, Milene Consenso, Alessandro Pinzani, and Darlei Dall’Agnol, eds.

Piper, Adrian M. S.  “Kant’s Two Solutions to the Free Rider Problem.”  Kant Yearbook: Kant and Contemporary Moral Philosophy 4 (2012): 113-142. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant identifies what are in fact Free Riders as the most noxious species of polemicists: those who attack metaphysical beliefs in the existence of God, freedom or immortality as lacking empirical proof, in order to conceal the flimsy metaphysical foundations of their own cynicism. Kant thinks polemic reduces the stature and authority of reason to a method of squabbling that destabilizes social equilibrium and portends disintegration into the Hobbesian state of nature. In the first Critique, Kant agrees with Hobbes that this process can only be reversed through consensual agreement to relinquish the unlimited freedom of this state for the authority of law. He proposes two textually related solutions to the Free Rider problem: First, a critique of reason in its polemical use in the first Critique, and, in the Groundwork, its application to the Free Rider’s self-defensive polemical subterfuge. Second, he argues that promise-keeping is a perfect duty that allows no exceptions “to the advantage of inclination.” These two solutions appear as connected steps in Kant’s attempted derivation of perfect and imperfect duties from the categorical imperative. The questionable success of the derivation does not affect the independent merit of either solution. The first enables us to better appreciate the role of those laws in structuring and regulating our empirical agency. The second enables us to mend the Social Contract and reverse our descent into Hobbes’ state of nature. The first solution enables us to see the point of the second.

 ——. “Kant’s Self-Legislation Procedure Reconsidered.” Kant Studies Online (2012): 203-77; posted October 20, 2012. [M] [online]

Pissis, Jannis.  Kants transzendentale Dialektik: Zu ihrer systematischen Bedeutung.  Berlin / Boston: De Gruyter, 2012. [x, 233 p.] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Kantstudien Ergänzungshefte 169; lightly revised version of the author’s Ph.D. dissertation (Freie Universität Berlin, 2010).

Pluder, Valentin. Die Vermittlung von Idealismus und Realismus in der Klassischen Deutschen Philosophie: eine Studie zu Jacobi, Kant, Fichte, Schelling und Hegel. Stuttgart: frommann-holzboog, 2012. [730 p.] [WC]

Pogge, Thomas W.  “Is Kant’s Rechtslehre a ‘Comprehensive Liberalism’?”  Kant’s Political Theory: Interpretations and Applications.  Ed. Elisabeth Ellis (op cit.). 74-100. [M]

Poggi, Stefano, ed. Il realismo della ragione: Kant dai lumi alla filosofia contemporanea. Milan: Mimesis, 2012. [305 p.] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents:
Moretto, Antonio. "La topologia della limitazione in Lambert e Kant. Conoscenza esatta e conoscenza approssimata."
Marcolungo, Ferdinando Luigi. "Kant e il possibile. In margine al 'Beweisgrund'."
Tatasciore, Carlo. "Fra dogmatismo e criticismo."
Marafioti, Rosa Maria. "Ai confini dell'idealismo trascendentale: la 'asintoticità' dell'esperienza nell'Opus Postumum di Kant."
Schwaiger, Clemens. "La teoria della libertà di Baumgarten. Una mediazione nella controversia tra Christian Wolff e Joachim Lange."
Camera, Francesco. "Fede morale e fede biblica. La risposta di Kant a Lavater."
Duichin, Marco. "Kant pacifista? Illuminismo, guerra e pace perpetua."
Esposito, Costantino. "Kant e l'invenzione dell'Ontoteologia."
Fonnesu, Luca. "Kant e la 'certezza morale'."
Di Bella, Santi. "Uso pubblico della ragione e ruolo pubblico della facoltà filosofica nell'illuminismo di Kant."
Ferrari, Massimo. "Cassirer, Kant e l'Aufklärung."
Mori, Massimo. "Il pensiero tedesco contemporaneo e l'illuminismo."
Hinske, Norbert. "Chi sono gli eredi dell'illuminismo?"
Bianchi, Francesco M. "È dell'Illuminismo la Ragione Pura della filosofia trascendentale Kantiana?"
Rizzi, Erminio. "Le ragioni di una necessaria correzione del criticismo kantiano."
La Rocca, Claudio. "Illuminismo e forme di razionalità. Kant e la ragione come fine."
Ferraris, Maurizio. "Kant e gli oggetti sociali."

Pollok, Anne.  “Kant’s Defeated Counterpart: Moses Mendelssohn on the Beauty, Mechanics, and Death of the Human Soul.”  Kant’s Philosophy of the Unconscious.  Eds. Piero Giordanetti, Riccardo Pozzo, and Marco Sgarbi (op cit.). 103-30. [M]

 —— and Konstantin Pollok.  “Cassirer’s Kant: From the Animal Morale to the Animal Symbolicum.”  Internationales Jahrbuch des Deutschen Idealismus/International Yearbook of German Idealism: Philosophie und Wissenschaft/Philosophy and Science, eds. Jürgen Stolzenberg and Fred Rush. 8 (2012): 282-315. [M]

Pollok, Konstantin. Kants Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft. Ein kritischer Kommentar. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2012. [557 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Kant-Forschungen, vol. 13.

 ——.  “Wie sind Erfahrungsurteile möglich?”  Kants Prolegomena: ein kooperativer Kommentar.  Eds. Holger Lyre and Oliver Schliemann (op cit.). 103-25. [M]

 ——.  See: Pollok, Anne and Konstantin Pollok.

Polka, Brayton.  “The Metaphysics of Thinking Necessary Existence: Kant and the Ontological Argument.”  European Legacy 17.5 (2012): 583-91. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: I argue in my paper that, when the “twofold standpoint,” in terms of which Kant undertakes to set metaphysics upon the revolutionary path of critical reason, is truly assessed, we discover that the fundamental distinction that he makes between subject and object, between thinking (together with desiring and willing) and knowing, between thinking the thing in itself and knowing objects of possible experience, or between freedom and nature, recapitulates the ontological argument demonstrating the necessary relationship between thought and existence.

Poole, Randall A.  “Religious Toleration, Freedom of Conscience, and Russian Liberalism.”  Kritika: Explorations in Russian & Eurasian History 13.3 (2012): 611-34. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The essay explores the influence of 17th-century proponent of religious toleration and founder of Rhode Island Roger Williams and 18th-century German philosopher Immanuel Kant on early 20th-century Russian imperial thoughts on religion and liberalism. Topics considered include Russian philosophers Petr Struve and Pavel Novgorodtsev, the October 17, 1905 Manifesto signed by Tsar Nicholas II, liberalism, and freedom of conscience.

Porcheddu, Rocco. “Praktisches Selbstbewusstsein und Autonomie bei Fichte, Frankfurt und Kant.” Fichte-Studien 40 (2012): 271-96. [HUM]

Pozzo, Riccardo.  Rev. of Knowledge, Reason, and Taste. Kant’s Response to Hume, by Paul Guyer (2008). Kant-Studien 103.3 (2012): 392-93. [M]

 ——. Rev. of Kant und die Wissenschaften vom Menschen, by Thomas Sturm (2009).  Isis 103.3 (2012): 597-98. [JSTOR]

 ——, ed.  See: Giordanetti, Piero, Riccardo Pozzo, and Marco Sgarbi, eds.

 ——, ed.  See: Lee, Seung-Kee, Riccardo Pozzo, Marco Sgarbi, and Dagmar von Wille, eds.

Pradelle, Dominique.  Par-delà la révolution copernicienne: sujet transcendantal et facultés chez Kant et Husserl.  Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2012. [407 p.] [WC]

Proulx, Jeremy Paul.  Rev. of Kant’s Concept of Genius: Its Origin and Function in the Third Critique, by Paul W. Bruno (2010). British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20.3 (2012): 633-36. [PW]

Pubantz, Jerry and John Allphin Moore. Is There a Global Right to Democracy? A philosophical analysis of peacekeeping and nation building.  Lewiston, NY: Mellen, 2012. [x, 316 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents: The evolution of the international organization-nation-state relationship — The philosophical basis for international organizations' promotion of democracy: Kant, his acolytes and challengers — Rights: plural definitions — International organizations and the promotion of democracy — Challenges to the realization of a global right to democracy — Citizenship and the global right to democracy: cosmopolitan hope and evolution.

[top] Q    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Quarfood, Marcel.  “Discursivity and Transcendental Idealism.”  Kant’s Idealism.  Eds. Schulting and Verburgt (op cit.). 143-58. [M]

[top] R    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Rabaté, Jean-Michel.  “Beckett’s Three Critiques: Kant’s Bathos and the Irish Chandos.”  Modernism / modernity 18.4 (2012): 699-719. [M]

Rand, Sebastian.  “Apriority, Metaphysics, and Empirical Content in Kant’s Theory of Matter.”  Kantian Review 17.1 (2012): 109-34. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper addresses problems associated with the role of the empirical concept of matter in Kant’s Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, offering an interpretation emphasizing two points consistently neglected in the secondary literature: the distinction between logical and real essence, and Kant’s claim that motion must be represented in pure intuition by static geometrical figures. I conclude that special metaphysics cannot achieve its stated and systematically justified goal of discovering the real essence of matter, but that Kant requires this failure for his larger philosophical presentation of the dialectic that ‘irremediably attaches to human reason’ (A298/B354).

Rapp, Dietrich. Tatort Erkenntnisgrenze. Die Kritik Rudolf Steiners an Immanuel Kant. Protokoll eines Forschungsprojektes. Heidelberg: Monon, 2012. [197 p.] [WC]

Rastovic, Milos.  “Kant’s Copernican Revolution.”  Philosophy Study 2.1 (2012): 19-26. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In Critique of Pure Reason, Kant explains his critical method “as an experiment” in metaphysics. The aim of that “experiment” is to establish “an entire revolution” in philosophical thinking, which was initiated by the Copernican revolution in cosmology in order to find the secure path, and its possibility application to metaphysics. Kant’s aim in Critique of Pure Reason is to rescue metaphysics from a “blind groping” by undertaking a revolution in metaphysics as Copernicus has brought to cosmology. Kant’s Copernican turn consists in the assertion that the possibility of knowledge requires that “the objects must conform to our cognition.” From Kant’s view, we can know only what we “construct,” “make,” or “produce” as a necessary condition of knowledge, but we cannot know the mind-independent external world, i.e., the world which is independent of us. Kant’s epistemological constructivism is the central point to his Copernican revolution.

Rathke, Kurt-Dietrich.  Der Begriff Person bei Kant und neurologische Erkenntnisse: moralisches Gesetz und Freiheit, Uberlegungen aus einer rechtswissenschaftlichen Sicht.  Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2012. [87 p.] [WC]

Rauscher, Frederick.  “Introduction.”  Kant in Brazil.  Eds. Frederick Rauscher and Daniel Omar Perez (op cit.). 1-13. [M]

 ——.  “A New Resource for Kant’s Political Philosophy.” Kantian Review 17.2 (2012): 357-65. [PI]

 ——.  “The Second Step of the B-Deduction.”  European Journal of Philosophy [Posted online: 4 Apr 2012]. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper offers a new interpretation of Kant’s puzzling claim that the B-Deduction in the Critique of Pure Reason should be considered as having two main steps. Previous commentators have tended to agree in general on the first step as arguing for the necessity of the categories for possible experience, but disagree on what the second step is and whether Kant even needs a second step. I argue that the two parts of the B-Deduction correspond to the two aspects of a priori cognition: necessity and universality. The bulk of the paper consists of support for the second step, the universality of the categories. I show that Kant’s arguments in the second half of the B-Deduction aim to define the scope of that universality for possible experience by considering the possibilities of divine intellectual intuition, of non-human kinds of sensible intuition, and of apperception of the self. In these ways Kant delimits the boundaries of the applicability of the categories and excludes any other possible experience for human beings.

 ——.  Rev. of Stellenindex und Konkordanz zum ‘Naturrecht Feyerabend’: Einleitung des ‘Naturrechts Feyerabend’, edited by Heinrich P. Delfosse, Norbert Hinske and Gianluca Sadun Bordoni (2010). Kantian Review 17.2 (2012): 357-65. [M]

 —— and Daniel Omar Perez, eds.  Kant in Brazil.  Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2012. [xii, 375 p.] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: (from the editors) Kant in Brazil is a collected volume of essays conceived at the 2005 International Kant Congress in Sao Paulo as a way to make accessible to Anglophone Kant scholars some of the best work on Kant produced by Brazilian scholars.
Contents: Frederick Rauscher, Introduction;
Daniel Omar Perez and Juan Adolfo Bonaccini, Two Centuries of Kantian Studies in Brazil;
Guido Antônio de Almeida, Self-Consciousness and Objective Knowledge in the Transcendental Deduction of the Critique of Pure Reason;
João Carlos Brum Torres, Intuitive Knowledge and De Re Thought;
Raúl Landim, Predicative Judgments and Existential Judgments: Apropos Kant’s Critique of the Cartesian Ontological Argument;
Valerio Rohden, An Experiment with Practical Reason;
Darlei Dall’Agnol, On the Faktum of Reason;
Guido Antônio de Almeida, Critique, Deduction, and the Fact of Reason;
Julio Esteves, The Noncircular Deduction of the Categorical Imperative in Groundwork III;
Ricardo Ribeiro Terra, The Distinction between Right and Ethics in Kant’s Philosophy;
José Nicolau Heck, Right and the Duty to Resist, or Progress toward the Better;
Zeljko Loparic, The Fundamental Problem of Kant’s Juridical Semantics;
Daniel Tourinho Peres, Right, History, and Practical Schematism;
Soraya Nour, Cosmopolitanism: Kant and Kantian Themes in International Relations;
Maria de Lourdes Borges, A Typology of Love in Kant’s Philosophy;
Valerio Rohden, The Meaning of the Term Gemüt in Kant;
Ricardo Ribeiro Terra, Between Prescriptive Poetics and Philosophical Aesthetics;
Pedro Costa Rego, The Purposiveness of Taste: An Essay on the Role of Zweckmässigkeit in Kant’s Critique of Aesthetic Judgment;
Christian Hamm, Freedom in Appearance: Notes on Schiller and His Development of Kant’s Aesthetics;
Pedro Pimenta, Reading the Appendix to Kant’s Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment;
Joãosinho Beckenkamp, Symbolization in Kant’s Critical Philosophy.

Rayman, Joshua.  Kant on Sublimity and Morality.  Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2012. [xvi, 216 p.] [WC]

Reath, Andrews. “A High Plains Drifter: Remarks on Engstrom’s The Form of Practical Knowledge.” Analytic Philosophy 53.1 (2012): 79-88.

 ——. “Formal Approaches to Kant’s Formula of Humanity.”  Kant on Practical Justification: Interpretive Essays. Eds. Mark Timmons and Sorin Baiasu (op cit.). 201-28. [M]

 ——.  Rev. of Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals: A Critical Guide, edited by Lara Denis (2010). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (May 2012, #20). [online] [M]

Reçber, Mehmet Sait.  “Religion after Enlightenment: The Case for Islam.”  Islam & Christian-Muslim Relations 23.3 (2012): 305-14. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article analyses from an Islamic viewpoint the Enlightenment call to take up the intellectual and moral responsibility of using one's reason and understanding in religious matters. The first and second sections present a critical examination of the ideas of reason and justification advanced by Enlightenment philosophers such as Kant, and a counter-development of these ideas after the Enlightenment as exemplified in MacIntyre’s thought. Having concluded that both of these approaches are untenable for a variety of reasons, the final section argues that a meta-epistemological perspective stipulated by Islam can both square with the original call of the Enlightenment and shed light on further discussion of various issues such as reason, religion and revelation.

Recki, Birgit. “Kants Ästhetik der Sitten. Ein Beitrag zum Problem der moralischen Motivation.”  Metaphysik — Ästhetik — Ethik. Eds. Antonino Falduto, Caroline Kolisang, and Gabriel Rivero (op cit.). 121-35. [WC]

Reisert, Joseph R.  “Kant and Rousseau on Moral Education.”  Kant and Education: Interpretations and Commentary.  Eds. Klas Roth and Chris W. Surprenant (op cit.). 12-25. [M]

Reitemeyer, Ursula. “Kants bildungsgeschichtlicher Entwurf der Moderne in weltbürgerlicher Absicht.” Studia Philosophica Kantiana 2012.1 (2012): 22-42. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The paper deals with one of the most current issues as the subject matter of the author’s philosophical-critical interest is a review of the problem of globalization. Following this historical turn in which the market took control not only over regions or cultural forms but also, directly or not, over all nations and cultures of the world, the author claims that it is necessary to go back to those theoreticians of modern times who did not want to leave the explanation of this process of expansion to technical and practical sciences only. In this context, she suggests that the philosopher who specified the difference between instrumental and practical reason in a precise, exact and resolute way was the founder of German transcendental philosophy, Immanuel Kant, who consistently relied on the idea of unity of reason. According to the author there are significant differences in opinions whether the growing network of regional markets and cultures is subordinate to moral law and there emerges a question about the extent to which the people who produce economic profit are included in its use or the profit is unfairly distributed only to those who give work. This is the cardinal question of present-day state of affairs. The author then points out that there is a difference between pragmatic and moral perspective and that neoliberalism only uses pragmatic argumentation which triumphantly claims capitalism to be the most successful economic form, but at the same time suppresses the disturbing fact that two thirds of inhabitants of the Earth are forced to live in poverty. Thus, she refers to Kant’s teleological project of history of culture and history of humankind which cannot be understood as if humankind automatically developed its rational potential and the idea of cosmopolitanism was written into human nature. The idea of cosmopolitan community cannot be derived from empirical reality but it is a logical consequence of cultural-historical interpretation of human history which does not allow the development on the basis of coincidence but follows the plan of nature based on fundaments of purposively arranged nature. Of course, the purposively arranged nature is the same theoretical construct as morally developing humankind, but without this telos internally belonging to nature in general, humankind cannot be understood as development of education and formation of man and culture. An important moment in the course of history is creation of a legal civil state and progress towards a legal regulation of political relationships among particular nations and states. However, this is Kantian practical-theoretical approach. Historical catastrophes of the 20th century which present the fate of places – symbols, as Verdun, Auschwitz, Stalingrad, Hiroshima, have demonstrated the boundaries of narrow pragmatism which functions without any historical and cultural reflection. On the basis of a precise analysis of Kant’s philosophy of history (including his concept of Enlightenment) there is a possibility of transcendental project of cosmopolitan society which can symbolize a mirror for the ruling elite. If they do not use it, in extremis, an obvious amorality and inhumanity of instrumental reason will happen. This is Kant’s legacy for future generations but, in a broad sense, also Kant’s esteem as a thinker of modern times because, at the same time, it is possible that this legacy means the last chance for this epoch.

Renker, Jan.  Markt und Gerechtigkeit: Untersuchungen zum Selbstverständnis des Bürgers im Ausgang von Rawls, Kant und Hegel .  Würzburg: Ergon-Verlag, 2012. [306 p.] [WC]

Ribeiro dos Santos, Leonel. Ideia de uma heurística transcendental: ensaios de meta-epistemologia kantiana. [Portuguese] Lisbon: Esfera do Caos, 2012. [248 p.] [WC]

 ——. Regresso a Kant: Ética, Estética, Filosofia Política. [Portuguese] Lisbon: Imprensa Nactional-Casa da Moeda, 2012. [549 p.] [M]

Riebel, Alexander. “Vernunft und Glaube bei Kant und Hegel.”  Kant und die Religion — die Religionen und Kant. Eds. Reinhard Hiltscher and Stefan Klingner (op cit.). 59-68. [M]

Riha, Rado. Kant in drugi kopernikanski obrat v filozofiji. [Slovenian] Ljubljana: Zalozba ZRC, 2012. [422 p.] [WC]

Rimkus, Edvardas. “Rae Langton’s Interpretation of the Kantian Problem of the Thing-in-Itself.” [Lithuanian] Problemos: Mokslo darbai [Problems: Research Papers] 81 (2012): 144-56. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The paper presents and examines Rae Langton’s approach to the Kantian problem of noumena. Langton treats the distinction between noumena and phenomena as a distinction between two kinds of properties of the thing-in-itself. Phenomena are externally manifested qualities of noumena. Appearance is the power generated by noumena. Noumena also have intrinsic properties or the inner nature, which are not externally manifest and thus are not accessible to cognition. The paper criticizes such conception of intrinsic properties, since it extends the scope of application of Kant’s intellectual a priori categories and are not compatible with the possible significance of noumena as nonconceptual things independent of sensory receptivity.

Ripstein, Arthur.  “Form and Matter in Kantian Political Philosophy: A Reply.”  European Journal of Philosophy 20.3 (2012): 487-96. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper responds briefly to four reviews of Force and Freedom. Valentini and Sangiovanni criticize what they see as the excessive formalism of the Kantian enterprise, contending that the Kantian project is circular, because it defines rights and freedom together, and that this circularity renders it unable to say anything determinate about appropriate restrictions and permissions. I show that the appearance of circularity arises from a misconstrual of the Kantian idea of a right. Properly understood, Kantian rights are partially indeterminate, but not in a way that causes problems for the account. Ronzoni and Williams seek to broaden the reach of public right, arguing that Kant's abstract approach overlooks pressing questions of social and political life, (Ronzoni) and that public right should allow for democratic deliberation about purposes that go beyond the requirement that a state provide a rightful condition for its members (Williams). I argue that the Kantian view makes room for these factors, but that each must be understood in relation to the formal constraints of right.

 ——.  “Kant and the Circumstances of Justice.”  Kant’s Political Theory: Interpretations and Applications.  Ed. Elisabeth Ellis (op cit.). 42-73. [M]

Rivero, Gabriel. “Kants Konzeption der Selbsterkenntnis der Vernunft. Anmerkungen zu Félix Duque.”  Metaphysik — Ästhetik — Ethik. Eds. Antonino Falduto, Caroline Kolisang, and Gabriel Rivero (op cit.). 65-87. [WC]

 ——, ed.  See: Falduto, Antonino, Caroline Kolisang, and Gabriel Rivero, eds.

Rizzi, Erminio. “Le ragioni di una necessaria correzione del criticismo kantiano.” Il realismo della ragione: Kant dai lumi alla filosofia contemporanea. Ed. Stefano Poggi (op cit.). 257-62. [M]

Robinson, Daniel N.  How is Nature Possible? Kant’s Project in the First Critique.  London/New York: Continuum, 2012. [xii, 200 p.] [WC] [review]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents: Preliminaries — The larger context: Germany and the enlightenment — The possibility of metaphysics — The pure intuitions and the analogies of experience — Idealisms and their refutation — Concepts — Judgment — Whose experience?: the self and outer sense — The discipline of reason: paralogisms, antinomies, and freedom.

Robinson, Hoke. “Shaddock on Categoriality in Kant’s 1st Critique.” Southwest Philosophy Review 28.2 (2012): 69-73. [PDC]

Robson, Gregory. “The Ontological Proof: Kant’s Objections, Plantinga’s Reply.” Kant Studies Online (2012): 122-71; posted August 26, 2012. [M] [online]

Rockmore, Tom.  Rev. of Continental Idealism: Leibniz to Nietzsche, by Paul Redding (2009). Philosophy in Review 32.1 (2012): 48-50. [online] [PW]

 ——.  “Kant on Unconscious Mental Activity.”  Kant’s Philosophy of the Unconscious.  Eds. Piero Giordanetti, Riccardo Pozzo, and Marco Sgarbi (op cit.). 305-326. [M]

Rödl, Sebastian. “Why Ought Implies Can.”  Kant on Practical Justification: Interpretive Essays. Eds. Mark Timmons and Sorin Baiasu (op cit.). 42-56. [M]

Rohden, Valerio.  “An Experiment with Practical Reason.”  Kant in Brazil.  Eds. Frederick Rauscher and Daniel Omar Perez (op cit.). 98-108. [M]

 ——.  “The Meaning of the Term Gemüt in Kant.”  Kant in Brazil.  Eds. Frederick Rauscher and Daniel Omar Perez (op cit.). 283-94. [M]

Rohloff, Waldemar.  “Kant’s Argument from the Applicability of Geometry.”  Kant Studies Online (2012): 23-50; posted April 2, 2012. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper I develop a reading of Kant’s argument from geometry based on distinguishing the roles of pure versus applied geometry. Once these roles are properly distinguished, I argue that the argument from geometry is not susceptible to the problems concerning the development and applications of non-Euclidean geometry, which are often thought to undermine the argument.

 ——.  “From Ordinary Language to Definition in Kant and Bolzano.”  Grazer Philosophische Studien 85.1 (2012): 131-49. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper I discuss Kant’s and Bolzano’s differing perspectives on ordinary natural language. I argue that Kant does not see ordinary language as providing semantically organized content and that, as a result, Kant does not believe that ordinary language is sufficiently well-developed to support philosophical analysis and definition. By contrast, for Bolzano, the content given in ordinary language are richly structured entities he calls ‘propositions in themselves’. This contrast in views is used to explain Bolzano’s criticism of Kant’s belief that definition is impossible for philosophical concepts. It is also used to explain Bolzano’s criticism of Kant’s methods of exposition of philosophical concepts.

Rohs, Peter.  Rev. of Wie ist Freiheit möglich? Eine Untersuchung über das Lösungspotential zum Determinismusproblem in Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft, by Stefan Gerlach (2010.)  Kant-Studien 103.1 (2012): 131-36. [M]

Rojka, Lubos.  Rev. of La nascita dell’ateismo: Dai clandestini a Kant, by Stefano Curci (2011). Gregorianum 93.1 (2012): 204-5. [PI]

Rolf, Sibylle.  “Humanity as an Object of Respect: Immanuel Kant’s Anthropological Approach and the Foundation of Morality.”  Heythrop Journal 53.4 (2012): 594-605. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article deals with Kant’s understanding of personhood and autonomy. It highlights the connection of autonomy and human dignity within Kant’s appreciation of morality, and indicates how his distinction between the empirical and transcendental spheres enables Kant to extend dignity even to humans who are not actually autonomous. Turning to contemporary approaches within ethics that refer to Kant but omit this transcendental framework, it defends the necessity of a trans-empirical frame within the Kantian system and hints at consequences for bioethics. It concludes that Kant works with neither an absolutist notion of freedom in terms of solipsistic autarky, nor an empirical freedom and autonomy that begin and end at certain points of time.

Rollmann, Veit-Justus.  Rev. of The Problem of Free Harmony in Kant’s Aesthetics, by Kenneth F. Rogerson (2008). Kant-Studien 103.2 (2012): 257-59. [M]

 ——.  Rev. of Der Skeptizismus und die Transzendentalphilosophie. Deutsche Philosophie am Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts, by Luis Eduardo Hoyos (2008). Kant-Studien 103.3 (2012): 387-90. [M]

Ronzoni, Miriam.  “Politics and the Contingent: A Plea For A More Embedded Account of Freedom as Independence.”  European Journal of Philosophy 20.3 (2012): 470-78. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This contribution defends Ripstein’s attempt to reconstruct Kant’s political philosophy as entirely and consistently grounded on the idea of people’s innate right to freedom as independence, in particular with respect to charges of circularity raised by other contributors to this symposium. However, it also argues that, if the concept of freedom as independence is to provide a foundation for a full-blown account of political justice, a richer interpretation of it should be provided. In other words, we must be willing to make controversial and empirically informed claims about what counts as a threat to our freedom as independence under specific circumstances. We must have a more embedded account of freedom as independence, one that engages with the contingencies of politics and of the human condition.

Rorty, Amélie and James Schmidt, eds.  Kant’s “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim”: A Critical Guide.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012. [270 p.] [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Contributions by Amélie Rorty, James Schmidt, Henry E. Allison, Karl Ameriks, Manfred Kuehn, Jerome Schneewind, Allen Wood, Paul Guyer, Barbara Herman, Pauline Kleingeld, Eckart Förster, Genevieve Lloyd, Terry Pinkard, and Rüdiger Bittner.

Rosefeldt, Tobias.  “Kants Kompatibilismus.”  Sind wir Bürger zweier Welten? Freiheit und moralische Verantwortung im transzendentalen Idealismus.  Eds. Mario Brandhorst, Andree Hahmann, and Bernd Ludwig (op cit.). 77-109. [M]

Rosenkoetter, Timothy.  “Kant and Bolzano on the Singularity of Intuitions.”  Grazer Philosophische Studien 85.1 (2012): 89-129. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant and Bolzano agree that intuitions are non-accidentally singular, but each offers more than one explanation of why this is the case. One model, exemplified by Bolzano’s explication of intuitions as “this”-representations, posits a type of representation which is such that it can only have one object. A very different explanation, prominent in Kant’s Transcendental Aesthetic, has recourse to the fact that certain classes of objects (spaces and times) can have only one instance, and argues on this basis that some representations with those contents are singular. This paper surveys various versions of these two explanations and uses each philosopher’s answers to shed light on the other’s.

Roth, Klas.  “Freedom and Autonomy in Knowledge-Based Societies.”  Kant and Education: Interpretations and Commentary.  Eds. Klas Roth and Chris W. Surprenant (op cit.). 214-25. [M]

 ——.  “Education and a progressive orientation towards a cosmopolitan society.”  Ethics and Education 7.1 (2012): 59-73. [PsychINFO]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Robin Barrow claims in his ‘Moral education’s modest agenda’ that ‘the task of moral education is to develop understanding, at the lowest level, of the expectations of society and, at the highest level, of the nature of morality… [that is, that moral education] should go on to develop understanding, not of a particular social code, but of the nature of morality—of the principles that provide the framework within which practical decisions have to be made’ [Barrow, R. 2006. Moral education’s modest agenda. Ethics and Education 1, no. 1: 3–13.]. Barrow’s words are noteworthy not only because he sets out to define the ‘modest’ agenda of moral education in terms of principles, but also because he asserts that education is important for teaching students to understand morality in such terms. However, even though he is arguing that understanding morality is important in terms of principles, he says little about their function or status, or how we cultivate ourselves so that we act in agreement with and are motivated by the principles of practical reason. In this article I therefore discuss two distinctive features of human beings and offer a Kantian notion of morality as a response to Barrow’s development of an understanding of morality in terms of principles. I argue that the principles Kant suggests are constitutive of action, and that we both develop our understanding and also value our humanity when we act in agreement with and are motivated by the suggested principles, and cultivate our predispositions (technical, pragmatic and moral). Moreover, I argue that we reach the goal of ‘a progressive organization of citizens of the earth into and toward the species as a system that is cosmopolitically united’ [Kant, I. 2006b. Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view. Trans. Robert B. Louden. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.] when we, inter alia, value our humanity and comply with the principles of practical reason, in practice.

 —— and Chris W. Surprenant, eds.  Kant and Education: Interpretations and Commentary.  New York: Routledge, 2012. [xxiv, 233 p.] [M] [review]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents: Klas Roth and Chris W. Surprenant, “Introduction: The highest good — the moral endeavor of education; Chris W. Surprenant, “Kant’s Contribution to Moral Education”; Joseph R. Reisert, “Kant and Rousseau on Moral Education”; Phillip Scuderi, “Rousseau, Kant, and the Pedagogy of Deception”; Robert B. Louden, “‘Not a slow reform, but a swift revolution’: Kant and Basedow on the Need to Transform Education”; Manfred Kuehn, “Kant on Education, Anthropology, and Ethics”; Richard Velkley, “Educating through Perplexity: Kant and the German Enlightenment”; Gary B. Herbert, “Bringing Morality to Appearances: Kant’s Theory of Education”; Jørgen Huggler, “Culture and Paradox in Kant’s Philosophy of Education”; Lars Løvlie, “Kant’s Invitation to Educational Thinking”; Paul Guyer, “Examples of Moral Possibility”; Richard Dean, “Moral Education and the Ideal of Humanity”; Alix Cohen, “Enabling the Realization of Humanity: the Anthropological Dimension of Education”; Paul Formosa, “From Discipline to Autonomy: Kant’s Theory of Moral Development”; James Scott Johnston, “Kant as Moral Psychologist?”; Susan Meld Shell, “Kant on the Humanities”; Klas Roth, “Freedom and Autonomy in Knowledge-Based Societies”.

Roy, Louis. “Does Christian Faith Rule out Human Autonomy?” Heythrop Journal 53.4 (2012): 606-23. [M]

Ruffing, Margit.  “Kant-Bibliographie 2010.”  Kant-Studien 103.4 (2012): 499-538. [M]

 ——. “Moral Bildung and Cosmopolitanism According to Kant.” Studia Philosophica Kantiana 12.1 (2012): 9-21. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Dass Kants Lehren von Personenrecht und Völkerrecht, seine Theorien der Menschenrechte und Rechtsstaatlichkeit weit über die Fachphilosophie hinaus diskutiert werden und Eingang in existierende Rechts- und Staatsverfassungen gefunden haben, ist unumstritten – „Kant“ wird mit „UNO“ assoziiert. Mir geht es in diesem Beitrag darum, auf die immer noch aktuelle Bedeutung hinzuweisen, die die persönliche Auseinandersetzung mit Kants Ethik für das Zusammenleben der Menschen in jeder Art und Größe von Gemeinwesen und Gemeinschaft haben kann. Deshalb werden im Folgenden die Grundzüge der Gesinnungsethik Kants skizziert, um die Wirkkraft und den weiten Horizont dieser moralphilosophischen Reflexionen verstehbar zu machen: Moralische Bildung, wie Kant sie versteht, ist unabdingbare Voraussetzung für ein weltbürgerliches Bewusstsein; Kants Auffassung kann bis heute dafür fruchtbar gemacht werden, das Zusammenleben von Menschen aus heterogenen Kulturen und Traditionen (z.B. auf dem engen europäischen Raum, aber auch hinsichtlich den Anforderungen der „Globalisierung“) erfolgreich zu gestalten. „Bildung“ wird dabei nicht in erster Linie als erzieherische und indoktrinierende Aktivität aufgefasst, sondern auch als eine in der menschlichen Natur angelegte Entwicklung der Persönlichkeit aus dem Antrieb der individuellen Vernunft zum Selbstverständnis als gattungshaftem Vernunftwesen.

 ——.  Rev. of Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten: ein intellektuelles Porträt Studien zur Metaphysik und Ethik von Kants Leitautor, by Clemens Schwaiger (2011). Rivista di Filosofia 103.1 (2012): 173-75. [PI]

Russell, Francey.  “Unity and Synthesis in the Ego Ideal: Reading Freud’s Concept through Kant’s Philosophy.”  American Imago 69.3 (2012): 353-83. [HUM]

[top] S    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Sage, N. W.  “Original Acquisition and Unilateralism: Kant, Hegel, and Corrective Justice.”  Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 25.1 (2012): 119-36. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In an original acquisition of property, a person acquires an unowned object by taking control of it. Contemporary Kantians claim this is problematic because the acquirer ‘unilaterally’ imposes new obligations on others — contrary to Kant’s requirement that no person’s action constrain others’ freedom. This article rejects Kantians’ proposed solutions to the ‘unilateralism’ problem (which involve the creation of a ‘civil condition’ of public legal institutions). In any event, it argues, from a Kantian standpoint there is no problem in the first place: original acquisition does not constrain others’ ‘freedom’ in the Kantian sense of that term. This explains why Hegel, whose account of property otherwise resembles Kant’s, saw no problem. It also means property is explicable in terms of corrective justice, rather than distributive justice.

Salikov, Alexey.  “Kants Projekt des ewigen Friedens im Kontext der modernen Politik.”  Kant-Studien 103.3 (2012): 377-79. [M]

 ——. “Русские в «Кант-штудиен». Часть II: 1954—2012.” [Russian; The Russians in Kant-Studien. Part 2 (1954—2010)] Kantovskij Sbornik 40.2 (2012): 96-111. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article is the second part of the research concerning the publications of Russian scholars in Kant-Studien, the leading periodical dedicated to Kantian studies and the most important print of the International Kant Society. The article describes the history of publications of Russian authors from 1974 to 2008.

 ——. “Интерпретация идей трактата «К вечному миру» И. Канта в современной либеральной теории демократического мира.” [Russian; The interpretation of the ideas of I. Kant’s treatise Perpetual Peace in the modern liberal democratic peace theory] Kantovskij Sbornik 42.4 (2012): 42-49. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article focuses on the interpretation of ideas of Kant’s Perpetual Peace treatise in the modern democratic peace theory. Despite the fact that the advocates of the theory consider Kant’s perpetual peace project the political and philosophical framework of their concept, the analysis shows that the democratic peace theory misinterprets many ideas of Kant.

Sánchez Madrid, Nuria.  “A Linneaus of Human Nature: The Pragmatic Deduction of Unconscious Thought in Kant’s Lectures on Anthropology.”  Kant’s Philosophy of the Unconscious.  Eds. Piero Giordanetti, Riccardo Pozzo, and Marco Sgarbi (op cit.). 177-232. [M]

 ——. “Filosofia, tom e ilusão musical em Kant: Da vivificação sonora do ânimo à recepção do tom da razão.” [Portuguese; Philosophy, tone, and musical illusion in Kant: from the vivification of mind by sound to the reception of the tone of reason] Trans/Form/Ação: Revista de Filosofia 35.1 (2012): 47-72. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article intends, firstly, to enrich the study of the role that the concept of tone plays in Kantian idea of reason, by extending it to the analysis of music as art of sounds, which the Critique of Judgment fulfills. Secondly, it aims to determine the grounds that could explain why the mathematics, due to the specificity of the philosophical method and the physical reception of music, respectively, are itself incapable to express the procedures of reason and of the art of sounds. Finally, it points out a similarity between reason and music concerning their common rejection of succumbing to the Schwärmerei, although the distance which divides them as two contrary ways to exercise and promote the life and its feeling.

 ——. “Kant e Freud sobre o superego: apetite de vingança, princípios do Direito e sentimento do sublime.” [Portuguese; Kant and Freud on the superego: revenge appetite, principles of right and feeling of sublime] ethic@ 11.3 (2012): 203-25. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper aims at aiming to set out some similarities and differences in Kant’s and Freud’s approach to the force of reason as the main mover of human action. Firstly, I direct the attention to the procedure of passions as desire’s modulations which hinder any equitable assessment of the subject’s means and goals, getting to supersede completely the reason’s function. Secondly, I focus on the topic of the passionate vengeance as example of the procedure of passion in contrast to the legitimate appetite of justice. Finally, I compare the Kant’s and Freud’s strategies of explanation about the process by which reason establishes a lasting governance over the senses, in order to reconsider the outspread thesis according to which the Freudian superego would overlap entirely Kant’s model of practical reason. The last part of the article argues that Kant’s practical rationality provides with elements enough to detect in superego’s commands the presence of a moral dogmatism, which is inconsistent with the goals of the Enlightenment.

Sánchez Rodríguez, Manuel.  “Logica naturalis, Healthy Understanding and the Reflecting Power of Judgment in Kant’s Philosophy.”  Kant-Studien 103.2 (2012): 188-206. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The aim of this article is to explore the origin of the difficulty of founding the reflecting power of judgment as Kant outlines it in the Preface of the third Critique. Although a foundation for this faculty was only established in 1790, we must interpret it as a critical solution to an old problem, which Kant had already recognized around 1770. Through his comprehension of the meaning of healthy understanding and native wit he already confirms the impossibility of determining the correctness of our judging activity from the use of rules. This approach of the problem must be understood in the context of the controversy about the concept ‘logica naturalis’ in the Leibniz-Wolffian aesthetics and logic. In close conjunction with this tradition, Kant already tries to offer an elucidation of the question of judging through the aesthetics.

Sandkühler, Hans Jörg. “Weder Stillstand der Geschichte noch Haben des Ganzen. Über Paradoxien enzyklopädischer Philosophie.”  Transzendentalphilosophie und die Kultur der Gegenwart. Eds. Steffen Dietzsch and Udo Teitz (op cit.). 323-34. [M]

Sangiovanni, Andrea.  “Can the Innate Right to Freedom Alone Ground a System of Public and Private Rights?”  European Journal of Philosophy 20.3 (2012): 460-69. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The state regulates the way in which social power is exercised. It sometimes permits, enables, constrains, forbids how we may touch others, make offers, draw up contracts, use, alter, possess and destroy things that matter to people, manipulate, induce weakness of the will, coerce, engage in physical force, persuade, selectively divulge information, lie, enchant, coax, convince, ... In each of these cases, we (sometimes unintentionally) get others to act in ways that serve our interests. Which such exercises of power should the state forbid? Which should it permit? An intuitively appealing way to answer this question is, with Ripstein and Kant, to point to the role of freedom: exercises of social power can be legitimately prohibited when (and only when) they restrict people’s freedom. But this raises a further question: How do we identify when such exercises of power make people unfree in the relevant sense? Ripstein, in defending Kant, draws a crucial distinction between actions that subject others’ wills to our choices (and which it would therefore be presumptively legitimate for the state to forbid) and actions that merely affect the contexts in which others act (and which it would therefore be presumptively illegitimate for the state to forbid). I query that distinction, and argue that the idea of independence cannot bear, on its own, the weight it is expected to bear within the Kantian framework.

Sardinha, Diogo.  “Le Kant de Foucault, une lecture téléologique de l’anthropologie.”  Kant-Studien 103.3 (2012): 361-69. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Foucault’s main thesis in his Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology is that the meaning of Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View can only be entirely grasped in the light of certain notes concerning the human being, assembled in the Opus Postumum. He asserts that the discourses held on human beings in the Anthropology and the introduction to the Logic are temporary – though necessary – moments in the transition from the critical to the transcendental philosophy: the latter is the accomplishment of Kantian philosophy, to which the former was only a Propädeutik. In this paper I call this a ‘teleological reading’ of the Anthropology, one which certainly has the merit of integrating this book in the evolution of Kant’s thought, but which can also be misleading, since it rarely considers the book Anthropology in itself. Hence, Foucault carries out what is more of a study of ‘Kant’s philosophy from an anthropological point of view’ rather than a study of the Anthropology. In the end, I also indicate the way in which this method enables us to distinguish his philosophical position both from Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant and from Sartre’s humanism.

Sargentis, Konstantinos. “Moral Motivation in Kant.” Kant Studies Online (2012): 93-121; posted June 12, 2012. [M][online]

Saunders, Joe.  Rev. of Kantian Deeds, by Henrikk Jøker Bjerre (2010). Kantian Review 17.3 (2012): 513-16. [M]

Schadow, Steffi.  Achtung für das Gesetz: Moral und Motivation bei Kant.  Berlin: De Gruyter, 2012. [xviii, 328 p.] [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Kant-Studien Ergänzungshefte, vol. 171; originally the author’s Ph.D dissertation (Goethe-Universität, Frankfurt-am-Main, 2009).
Publisher’s Note: How can what we view as morally correct be the motive force for our actions? This work investigates this question with a view to Kant’s action theory and moral philosophy, based on a close textual reading. The author argues that Kant’s response to the question of moral motivation is a theory of practical rationality in which the practical importance of moral reasons as motives is made understandable through a theory of moral-rational sensibility.

Schäfer, Rainer. “Kombinationen von Fundamentalismus, Kohärentismus und Skepsis bei Kant, Fichte und Hegel als Antworten auf Probleme gegenwärtiger Epistemologie.” Fichte-Studien 39 (2012): 67-94. [HUM]

Scheible, Hartmut.  Kritische Äesthetik. Von Kant bis Adorno.  Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2012. [382 p.] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: See ch. 1: “Die Emanzipation des Ästhetischen durch Kant: Geschmack und Gemeinsinn,” pp. 17-78.

Schellekens, Elisabeth.  “Immanuel Kant.”  Aesthetics: The Key Thinkers.  Ed. Alessandro Giovannelli (London/New York: Continuum). 61-74. [WC]

Scheuerman, William E.  “Realism and the Kantian Tradition: A Revisionist Account.”  International Relations 26.4 (2012): 453-77. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In contemporary international political theory, ‘Cosmopolitanism’ is typically juxtaposed to ‘Realism’, with many varieties of the former building on Kantian moral and political ideals, and the latter presumably rejecting Kant and his aspiration for far-reaching global reform. In agreement with a growing body of scholarship that seeks to challenge conventional views of Realism, this essay attends to the surprisingly complex views of the Kantian legacy (including Hans Kelsen, perhaps the most important neo-Kantian international thinker in the last century) within its ranks. Not all Realists have been unambiguously critical of Kant, and when in fact they have criticized him, they have done so for many different reasons. First-generation Realists (e.g. E. H. Carr, John Herz, Hans Morgenthau, Reinhold Niebuhr, Frederick Schuman and Georg Schwarzenberger) offered an ambivalent reading of Kantianism consistent with their endorsement of the ultimate desirability of major alterations to the global status quo, whereas second-generation Realists (i.e. Henry Kissinger and Kenneth Waltz) tended to read Kant so as to transform him into a forerunner of their own anti-reformist and institutionally conservative versions of Realism. An examination of Realism’s rendezvous with Kantianism not only helps draw a more differentiated portrayal of Realism than is still found in much scholarship, but it also helps us understand how Realism dramatically changed within a relatively short space of time during the immediate postwar decades. It also points to some important potential starting points for a more fruitful exchange between Cosmopolitans and Realists.

Schliemann, Oliver.  “Die Aufgabe einer Grundlegung der Metaphysik.”  Kants Prolegomena: ein kooperativer Kommentar.  Eds. Holger Lyre and Oliver Schliemann (op cit.). 11-30. [M]

 ——.  See: Lyre, Holger and Oliver Schliemann, eds.

Schmidt, Daniela.  Rev. of Selbstbewußtsein und Erfahrung bei Kant und Fichte, by Frank Kuhne (2007). Hegel-Studien 46 (2012): 292-97. [M]

Schoelandt, Chad Van.  Rev. of Reconstructing Rawls: The Kantian Foundations of Justice as Fairness, by Robert S. Taylor (2011). Journal of Value Inquiry 46.1 (2012): 123-29. [PW]

Schoellner, Karsten. “Kant’s Ethics of Virtue.” Fichte-Studien 39 (2012): 176-84. [HUM]

Scholem, Gershom.  “On Kant.”  Translated by Julia Ng. MLN 127.3 (2012): 443-46. [MUSE]

 ——.  “Against the Metaphysical Exposition of Space.”  Translated by Julia Ng. MLN 127.3 (2012): 456-61. [JSTOR]

Schönecker, Dieter.  “Once Again: What is the ‘First Proposition’ in Kant’s Groundwork? Some Refinements, a New Proposal, and a Reply to Henry Allison.”  Kantian Review 17.2 (2012): 281-96. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Discussing the concept of duty in Groundwork 1, Kant refers to a ‘second proposition’ and a ‘third proposition’, the latter being a ‘Folgerung aus beiden vorigen’. However, Kant does not identify what the ‘first proposition’ is. In this paper, I will argue that the first proposition is this: An action from duty is an action from respect for the moral law. I defend this claim against a critique put forward by Allison according to which ‘respect’ is a concept that is not, and could not be, introduced in paragraphs 9–13 of Groundwork 1. Further, I will argue that the first proposition as I understand it can also be reconstructed as the conclusion (‘Folgerung’) of a deductive argument proper; however, I will also discuss the option that ‘Folgerung’ could be understood as a corollary rather than a conclusion. Finally, Allison's own interpretation will be criticized.

 ——.  “Kants Grundlegung über den bösen Willen. Eine kommentarische Interpretation von GMS III 457.25-458.5.”  Sind wir Bürger zweier Welten? Freiheit und moralische Verantwortung im transzendentalen Idealismus.  Eds. Mario Brandhorst, Andree Hahmann, and Bernd Ludwig (op cit.). 111-33. [M]

 ——.  Rev. of Kant’s Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals: A Commentary, by Henry E. Allison (2011). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (April 2012, #3). [online] [M]

Schröpfer, Horst. “‘Die Critik der reinen Vernunft...ist die vollständige Idee der Transscendentalphilosophie’: Schack Hermann Ewald verteidigte das Apriori des kritischen Systems von Immanuel Kant.”  Transzendentalphilosophie und die Kultur der Gegenwart. Eds. Steffen Dietzsch and Udo Teitz (op cit.). 79-106. [M]

Schulting, Dennis.  Kant’s Deduction and Apperception: Explaining the Categories.  Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. [xiv, 306 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents: Introduction: the Categories and Apperception — The 'Herz' Question — The Quid Juris — The Master Argument — The Unity in Thought. On the Guiding Thread — Apperception and the Categories of Modality — Apperception and the Categories of Relation — Apperception and the Categories of Quality — Apperception and the Categories of Quantity — From Apperception to Objectivity.

 ——.  “Kant, Non-Conceptual Content and the ‘Second Step’ of the B-Deduction.”  Kant Studies Online (2012): 51-92; posted May 28, 2012. [M] [online]

 ——.  “Non-apperceptive Consciousness.”  Kant’s Philosophy of the Unconscious.  Eds. Piero Giordanetti, Riccardo Pozzo, and Marco Sgarbi (op cit.). 271-303. [M]

 ——. Rev. of L’universo kantiano. Filosofia, scienze, sapere, edited by Stefano Besoli, Claudio La Rocca, and Riccardo Martinelli (2010).  Studi Kantiani 25 (2012): 159-61. [M]

 ——.  See: Banham, Gary, Dennis Schulting, and Nigel Hems, eds.

Schulzke, Marcus.  “Kant’s Categorical Imperative, the Value of Respect, and the Treatment of Women.”  Journal of Military Ethics 11.1 (2012): 26-41. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper explores the relevance of Kant’s categorical imperative to military ethics and the solution it suggests for improving the treatment of women in the military. The second formulation of the categorical imperative makes universal respect for humanity a moral requirement by asserting that one must always treat other people as means in themselves and never as merely means to an end. This principle is a promising guide for military ethics and can be reconciled with the acts of violence required by war. This paper argues that it can also regulate soldiers’ relations to each other and that it may contribute to reorienting military culture in a way that overcomes the biases against female military personnel.

Schüssler, Rudolf.  “Kant und die Kasuistik: Fragen zur Tugendlehre.”  Kant-Studien 103.1 (2012): 70-95. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: With the casuistic questions in the Doctrine of Virtue Kant seems finally to accept, as some commentators believe, that duties allow for case-wise exceptions or at least mitigation in practice. We will show that this is a misinterpretation. The casuistic questions of the “doctrine of virtue” are no casuistry in the Kantian sense of the term. Kant never uses the terms “casuistic question” and “casuistry” interchangeably. His understanding of casuistry as a rule-directed activity shows a good understanding of the high casuistry of the baroque era. Kant admits that there is room for casuistry in the “doctrine of virtue”, but he does not practice casuistry there. His casuistic questions merely serve didactic purposes, testing whether readers have really understood the strictness of the moral law or the meaning of moral terms. The casuistic questions of the “doctrine of virtue” are not meant to provide the fine tuning of moral action that Kant associates with casuistry.

Schwaiger, Clemens. “La teoria della libertà di Baumgarten. Una mediazione nella controversia tra Christian Wolff e Joachim Lange.” Il realismo della ragione: Kant dai lumi alla filosofia contemporanea. Ed. Stefano Poggi (op cit.). 83-103. [M]

Scuderi, Phillip.  “Rousseau, Kant, and the Pedagogy of Deception.”  Kant and Education: Interpretations and Commentary.  Eds. Klas Roth and Chris W. Surprenant (op cit.). 26-38. [M]

Seagrave, S. Adam.  Rev. of Reconstructing Rawls: The Kantian Foundations of Justice as Fairness, by Robert S. Taylor (2011). American Political Thought 1.1 (2012): 173-76. [JSTOR]

Sedgwick, Sally S.  Hegel’s Critique of Kant: From Dichotomy to Identity.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. [xii, 194 p.] [WC] [review]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents: Introduction — Intuitive versus discursive forms of understanding in Kant’s critical philosophy — Organic unity as the ‘true unity’ of the intuitive intellect — Hegel on the ‘subjectivity’ of Kant’s idealism — Hegel on the transcendental deduction of the first critique — Subjectivity as part of an original identity — The question-begging nature of Kantian critique: Kant on the arguments of the Antinomies.

Sedová, Tatiana.  “Kant a novokantovstvo — bádenská a marburská škola.” [Slovak]  Filozofia 67.1 (2012): 89-91. [HUM]

Seidel, Roman. “Kants Autonomiebegriff: Chance oder Gefahr für die Religion? Positionen der Kantrezeption in Iran heute.”  Kant und die Religion — die Religionen und Kant. Eds. Reinhard Hiltscher and Stefan Klingner (op cit.). 137-58. [M]

Seidl, Horst. “Natur und Freiheit bei Augustinus und Kant.”  Die Gnadenlehre als salto mortale der Vernunft? Ed. Norbert Fischer (op cit.). 233-47. [M]

Seifert, Johanna. Freiheit als politisches Ziel: Grundmodelle liberalen Denkens bei Kant, Hayek und Böckenförde. Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2012. [230 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: First presented as a doctoral dissertation (Universität Passau, 2011).
From the publisher: In westlichen Demokratien ist Freiheit ein allgegenwärtiger Begriff, oft gilt sie als das Ziel von Politik. Johanna Seifert stellt diese Annahme infrage und vergleicht den Freiheitsbegriff dreier liberaler Grundmodelle: den rechtsstaatlichen Liberalismus Kants, den Wirtschaftsliberalismus von Hayeks und den sozialstaatlichen Liberalismus Böckenfördes. Der inhaltliche und strukturelle Vergleich dieser Theorien zeigt, dass Freiheit in politischen Theorien nicht als Wert an sich, sondern gewissermaßen als Katalysator für andere Werte dient.

Sgarbi, Marco.  Kant on Spontaneity.  London/New York: Continuum, 2012. [147 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents: Introduction: the problem of spontaneity in Kant — History: spontaneity from Leibniz to Kant — Metaphysics: spontaneity and the problem of the unconditioned — Logic: spontaneity and the problem of knowledge — Ethics: spontaneity and the problem of acting — Aesthetics and biology: spontaneity and the problems of feeling and life — Anthropology: spontaneity and the problem of human nature — Conclusion.

 ——.  “Introduction.”  Kant’s Philosophy of the Unconscious.  Eds. Piero Giordanetti, Riccardo Pozzo, and Marco Sgarbi (op cit.). 1-3. [M]

 ——. “Il Cielo Stellato Sopra di Me e la Legge Morale in Me. Osservazioni Sul Sublime e Sulla Logica Dell’irrazionale in Kant.” [Italian] Philosophica 39 (2012): 45-54. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: «Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the more often and steadily reflection is occupied with them: the starry heaven above me and the moral law within me.». With these famous words written on paper and inscribed in stone, Immanuel Kant concludes the Critique of Practical Reason. In this paper, I intend to show how this sentence is closely linked with: 1) the kantian doctrine on the sublime and 2) to the foundation of the logic of the irrational in the Critique of Judgement.

 ——.  Rev. of Kant and Phenomenology, by Tom Rockmore (2010). Rivista di Filosofia 103.1 (2012): 171-73. [PI]

 ——.  Rev. of Mente, cerebro y antropología en Kant, by Pedro Jesús Teruel (2008). Rivista di Filosofia 103.1 (2012): 178-80. [PI]

 ——, ed.  See: Giordanetti, Piero, Riccardo Pozzo, and Marco Sgarbi, eds.

 ——, ed.  See: Lee, Seung-Kee, Riccardo Pozzo, Marco Sgarbi, and Dagmar von Wille, eds.

Shabel, Lisa.  “Zu Kants Frage ‘Wie ist reine Mathematik möglich?’.”  Kants Prolegomena: ein kooperativer Kommentar.  Eds. Holger Lyre and Oliver Schliemann (op cit.). 61-84. [M]

Shaddock, Justin B. “Justification, Objectivity, and Subjectivity in Kant’s Transcendental Deduction of the Categories.” Southwest Philosophy Review 28.1 (2012): 177-85. [PDC]

Shapshay, Sandra.  “Schopenhauer’s Transformation of the Kantian Sublime.”  Kantian Review 17.3 (2012): 479-511. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Schopenhauer singles out Kant’s theory of the sublime for high praise, calling it ‘by far the most excellent thing in the Critique of Aesthetic Judgement’, yet, in his main discussion of the sublime, he ridicules Kant’s explanation as being in the grip of scholastic metaphysics. My first aim in this paper is to sort out Schopenhauer’s apparently conflicted appraisal of Kant's theory of the sublime. Next, based on his Nachlaß, close readings of published texts and especially of his account of the experience of tragic drama, I offer a reconstruction of Schopenhauer’s theory of the sublime which understands it – against prevailing scholarly views – as a transformation of rather than as a real departure from the Kantian explanation. Finally, I suggest that my interpretation of Schopenhauer’s theory of the sublime has far-reaching consequences for a proper understanding of his views on freedom.

Sharp, Robert.  “The Dangers of Euthanasia and Dementia: How Kantian Thinking Might be Used to Support Non‐voluntary Euthanasia in Cases of Extreme Dementia.”  Bioethics 26.5 (2012): 231-35. [PI/PsycINFO]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Some writers have argued that a Kantian approach to ethics can be used to justify suicide in cases of extreme dementia, where a patient lacks the rationality required of Kantian moral agents. I worry that this line of thinking may lead to the more extreme claim that euthanasia is a proper Kantian response to severe dementia (and similar afflictions). Such morally treacherous thinking seems to be directly implied by the arguments that lead Dennis Cooley and similar writers to claim that Kant might support suicide. If rationality is the only factor in valuing a human life, then the loss of that rationality (however such loss might be defined) would allow us to use essentially utilitarian thinking in order to support non-voluntary euthanasia, since the patients themselves would no longer be moral agents that demand respect.

Shaviro, Steven. Without criteria: Kant, Whitehead, Deleuze, and aesthetics. Cambridge/London: MIT Press, 2012. [xvi, 174 p.] [WC]

Shaw, Christopher David.  On Exceeding Determination and the Ideal of Reason: Immanuel Kant, William Desmond and the Noumenological Principle.  Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2012. [viii, 136 p.] [WC]

Shell, Susan.  “Kant on the Humanities.”  Kant and Education: Interpretations and Commentary.  Eds. Klas Roth and Chris W. Surprenant (op cit.). 193-213. [M]

 ——.  Rev. of Kant and Cosmopolitanism: The Philosophical Ideal of World Citizenship, by Pauline Kleingeld (2011). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (August 2012, #17). [online] [M]

 —— and Richard Velkley.  “Introduction: Kant as Youthful Observer and Legislator.”  Kant’s Observations and Remarks: A Critical Guide.  Eds. Susan Meld Shell and Richard Velkley (op cit.). 1-9. [M]

 —— and Richard Velkley, eds.  Kant’s Observations and Remarks: A Critical Guide.  New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012. [xv, 286 p.] [M][review]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents: Susan Meld Shell and Richard Velkley, “Introduction: Kant as Youthful Observer and Legislator”; 1. Dieter Henrich, “Concerning Kant’s Earliest Ethics: An Attempt at Reconstruction”; 2. Corey W. Dyck, “Chimerical Ethics and Fluttering Moralists: Baumgarten’s Influence on Kant’s Moral Theory in the Observations and Remarks”; 3. Patrick R. Frierson, “Two Concepts of Universality in Kant’s Moral Theory”; 4. Paul Guyer, “Freedom as the Foundation of Morality: Kant’s Early Efforts”; 5. Rudolf A. Makkreel, “Relating Aesthetic and Sociable Feelings to Moral and Participatory Feelings: Reassessing Kant on Sympathy and Honor”; 6. Robert R. Clewis, “Kant’s Distinction between True and False Sublimity”; 7. Alix Cohen, “Kant’s ‘Curious Catalogue of Human Frailties’ and the Great Portrait of Nature”; 8. G. Felicitas Munzel, “Relative Goodness and Ambivalence of Human Traits: Reflections in Light of Kant’s Pedagogical Concerns”; 9. Reinhard Brandt, “Kant as Rebel against the Social Order”; 10. Robert B. Louden, “National Character via the Beautiful and Sublime?”; 11. Peter Fenves, “Absent an Even Finer Feeling: A Commentary on the Opening of Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime”; 12. John H. Zammito, “The Pursuit of Science as Decadence in Kant’s Remarks in Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime”; 13. Karl Ameriks, “Kant, Human Nature, and History after Rousseau”.

Silber, John.  Kant’s Ethics: The Good, Freedom, and the Will, with a preface by Manfred Kuehn.  Boston: de Gruyter, 2012. [xiv, 363 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents: The context of Kant's ethics — The Copernican revolution in ethics : the good reexamined — Kant's doctrine of will — The moral good and the natural good — The highest good as the material object of moral volition — The highest good as immanent and as transcendent — The moral task : the embodiment of the highest good — Kant's procedural formalism, or, the role of judgment in Kant's procedural formalism — The role of judgment in the embodiment of the highest good — Summary and assessment — Appendix. Kant at Auschwitz.

Silva, Fernando Manuel Ferreira da. “Das Gespräch zwischen Hölderlin, Hegel und Schelling über Kants Antinomien.” Philosophica 37 (2012): 55-67. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: «Die Art, wie er den Mechanismus der Natur mit ihrer Zweckmäßigkeit vereiniget, scheint mir eigentlich den ganzen Geist seines Systems zu enthalten»: This quotation, which originated the present essay, is solely extracted from a letter sent by Hölderlin to Hegel, and yet, it condensates three different approaches from the three Tübingen friends to the problem of Kant’s philosophy of religion and to its possible resolution between 1795 and 1796.
From this epistolary dialogue emerges a simultaneous study of Kant, originated by the growing dissension towards the orthodox thought of the Stift. The turning point – or the maximum cumulative point – of this discordance happens precisely with the discovery of the «spirit of Kant’s system», as a combined explanation of the religious and philosophical phenomena [«Die Art, wie er den Mechanismus der Natur mit ihrer Zweckmässigkeit vereiniget»]. This, I think, is something which the three friends discover gradually and not independently from the concept of «providence», which Kant himself, according to Hölderlin, had used to «attenuate his antinomies», which Hegel uses in his first religious writings and the initial formation of his own philosophy and which Schelling will later explore in his System of Transcendental Idealism. In a word, providence is consensually the comprehension axis between man, God and nature and, thus, the explanatory link between the antinomical poles which regulate human existence. On the other hand, however – this being the aspect I would like to stress –, this decisive moment for a whole generation, for the history of philosophy itself, means the consummation of a new revolutionary perspective born in Kant, a new vision of the absolute and the divine and, therefore, a new way to write philosophy about philosophy, less philosophical than before, to the extent that the new situation of man and his reflection within the problem ultimately destined them – as is the case in the three young philosophers – to silence and death. The final aim of this essay is, therefore, to know what this «last step of philosophy» is and what dies along with it, what such a step may have meant and what it already foretold in terms of the development of philosophy.

Sirovátka, Jakub. “Das Sollen und das Böse als Themen der Philosophie Kants.”  Die Gnadenlehre als salto mortale der Vernunft? Ed. Norbert Fischer (op cit.). 248-67. [M]

Sisáková, Oľga. “Kant a Diltheyov projekt „kritiky historického rozumu“.” [Slovak; Kant and Dilthey’s Project of “Critique of Historical Reason”] Studia Philosophica Kantiana 2012.2 (2012): 3-14. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The presented paper attempts to introduce one of the most extensively designed and influential programs of the philosophical criticism in the history of methodological emancipation of the humanities. It is based on the discussion about the position of the “critique of historical reason” in Dilthey’s work as a whole. The focus is on whether the project is a literal “criticism” or thematic analogy, and to what extent is it actually possible to reconcile critical intentions of Kant’s philosophy and Dilthey’s philosophy of life. Dilthey sees the possibility of the “criticism” in the historical character of life, in the fact that life can be understood from life itself. The author consequentially examines Dilthey’s epistemological standpoint, modified by the historical consciousness, as well as the epistemological character of his empiricism. She focuses on Dilthey’s rejection of the philosophical claim to universality and on his more comprehensive understanding of the inner experience that philosopher supports by anthropological assumptions. Dilthey’s rejection of epistemological formalism was joined by the author with his emphasis on the self-reflexivity of the humanities and the transition from the Kantian epistemology to understanding reason of hermeneutics of life.
In the interpretation of this intellectual shift the author analyzes Dilthey’s reasoning procedure from “inner coherence” as an empirical basis on which she builds the “context” of the spiritual life and the Lebenswelt. The author links Dilthey’s shift towards hermeneutics with the tasks of the program of his “criticism” and inclines to M. Riedel’s view, according to which Dilthey in the course of the realization of his project gradually replaced the “metaphysics of justifying reason” by the “metaphysics of understanding reason”. However, this does not diminish Dilthey’s contribution to the development of the methodology and philosophy of science as well as his approach to the crisis of science and philosophy – both found response throughout the 20th century.

Sloan, Phillip R.  “How Was Teleology Eliminated in Early Molecular Biology?”  Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 43.1 (2012): 140-51. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper approaches the issue of the status of teleological reasoning in contemporary biology through a historical examination of events of the 1930s that surrounded Niels Bohr’s efforts to introduce ‘complementarity’ into biological discussions. The paper examines responses of three theoretical physicists in response to Bohr — Ernst Pascual Jordan (1902-80), Erwin Schrödinger (1887-1961), and Max Delbrück (1906-81). It is claimed that none of these physicists sufficiently understood Bohr’s ‘critical’ teleological arguments, which are traced to the lineage of Kant and Harald Høffding and their respective resolutions of the antinomy of teleological judgment. The positions of these four historical actors are discussed in terms of Ernst Mayr’s distinction of ‘teleological,’ ‘teleomatic,’ and ‘teleonomic’ explanations. A return to some of the views articulated by Bohr, and behind him, to Høffding and Kant, is claimed to provide a framework for reintroducing a ‘critical’ teleology into biological discussions. (edited)

Smit, Houston and Mark Timmons. “Kant’s Grounding Project in The Doctrine of Virtue.”  Kant on Practical Justification: Interpretive Essays. Eds. Mark Timmons and Sorin Baiasu (op cit.). 229-68. [M]

Soboleva, Maja.  “Der Begriff der Tatsache in der Kant-Forster-Kontroverse.”  Klopffechtereien – Missverständnisse – Widersprüche? Methodische und methodologische Perspektiven auf die Kant-Forster-Kontroverse.  Eds. Rainer Godel and Gideon Stiening (op cit.). 119-32. [M]

 ——. “К методологии гуманитарных наук на пути реформы логики.” [Russian; Towards methodology of humanities on the way to reform in logic] Kantovskij Sbornik 41.3 (2012): 57-65. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article discusses several options for developing the methodology of the humanities by means of the "reform of logic" which is understood as the "organon" of cognition. I argue that the theories of Hermann Cohen, Wilhelm Windelband and Ernst Cassirer deliver the examples for the transition from epistemology to philosophy of culture, and the theories of Wilhelm Dilthey and Georg Misch modify the theory of knowledge into hermeneutics of life.

Spinelli, Letícia Machado. “Kant e o sumo bem comunitário.” [Portuguese; Kant and the collective highest good] ethic@ 11.1 (2012): 37-57. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: What we propose to do here is to explain the concept of highest good as collective good, in which the concept of the highest good is conceived from the perspective of a good built and shared by all. This concept was presented by Kant in the third part of Religion within the boundaries of mere reason, context which it is dedicated to addressing the notion of moral progress in terms of an ethical community.

Stabel, Jürgen.  “Der Begriff der Gleichzeitigkeit bei Kant und Einstein.”  Kant-Studien 103.1 (2012): 47-69. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper, compatibility between Kant’s comprehension of space and time and that of the SRT is shown. First, a derivation of the decisive transformations of Lorentz is given based on Kant’s comprehension of space and time. Second, it is demonstrated, following a discussion of Kant’s third analogy, that the different notions of simultaneity, as formulated by Kant and Einstein, are indeed fully compatible (in contrast to published literature). It is shown that Kant’s notion of simultaneity does unfold to the notion of spacelikeness (Minkowski space theory). The paper concludes that an empirical comprehension of time in a Euclidean space, compatible to Kant’s transcendental concept of space and time, can only be given by the space-time relationships of the SRT.

Stambovsky, Phillip. “Idealism, Scientia Intuitiva, and Scientific Philosophy.” The Review of Metaphysics 66.2 (2012): 339-52. [PDC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: “Considered objectively, there can be only one human reason, there ... can be only one true system of philosophy from principles, in however many different and even conflicting ways one has philosophized about the same proposition”—so declares Kant in the Vorrede to the “Doctrine of Right.” Kant makes this observation in the process of framing a striking claim: “prior to the development of critical philosophy there had been no philosophy at all.” Eckart Förster adduces this claim as a point of departure for undertaking “to grasp and understand the single [sic] thought” that orients his ambitious new study, Twenty-Five Years of Philosophy: A Systematic Reconstruction. It is thus with reference to Kant’s pronouncement that Förster propounds his book’s lead thought, or at least the first part of it: “philosophy begins in 1781 and ends in 1806,” this in the sense that over those twenty-five years “philosophy became a science, thereby also arriving at knowledge of itself.” Förster sets himself the task of elucidating the “internal dynamic” of the “fundamental idea” that informs the philosophical-historical thesis to which he keys his investigation. The fundamental idea in question is the classic speculative problematic of objective knowledge, which in the Kantian context of Förster’s study takes the form of the issue of how it is that we know (discursively, intuitively) “the supersensible substrate of appearances.” Beyond simply anatomizing this issue, however, the author engages “to reproduce its immanent development,” systematically “reconstructing” it through interlinked analyses of seminal writings of Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Goethe, and Hegel.

Stang, Nicholas F.  “A Kantian Reply to Bolzano’s Critique of Kant’s Analytic-Synthetic Distinction.”  Grazer Philosophische Studien 85.1 (2012): 33-61. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: One of Bolzano’s objections to Kant’s way of drawing the analytic-synthetic distinction is that it only applies to judgments within a narrow range of syntactic forms, namely, universal affirmative judgments. According to Bolzano, Kant cannot account for judgments of other syntactic forms that, intuitively, are analytic. A recent paper by Ian Proops also attributes to Kant the view that analytic judgments beyond a limited range of syntactic forms are impossible. I argue that, correctly understood, Kant’s conception of analyticity allows for analytic judgments of a wider range of syntactic forms.

 ——.  “Kant on Complete Determination and Infinite Judgement.”  British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20.6 (2012): 1117-39. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the Transcendental Ideal Kant discusses the principle of complete determination: for every object and every predicate A, the object is either determinately A or not-A. He claims this principle is synthetic, but it appears to follow from the principle of excluded middle, which is analytic. He also makes a puzzling claim in support of its syntheticity: that it represents individual objects as deriving their possibility from the whole of possibility. This raises a puzzle about why Kant regarded it as synthetic, and what his explanatory claim means. I argue that the principle of complete determination does not follow from the principle of excluded middle because the externally negated or ‘negative’ judgement ‘Not (S is P)’ does not entail the internally negated or ‘infinite’ judgement ‘S is not-P.’ Kant’s puzzling explanatory claim means that empirical objects are determined by the content of the totality of experience. This entails that empirical objects are completely determinate if and only if the totality of experience has a completely determinate content. I argue that it is not a priori whether experience has such a completely determinate content and thus not analytic that objects obey the principle of complete determination.

Stanley, Timothy.  “Barth after Kant?”  Modern Theology 28.3 (2012): 423-45. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Barth consistently comments on Kant’s importance for his early thought in his autobiographical sketches, letters, and even more explicitly in his 1930 lectures on Kant in his Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century. Interestingly, however, little attention has been paid to these latter lectures on Protestant history in the secondary literature. In part, this oversight has been due to the manner in which Barth’s theology has been thought to overcome Kant’s influence much earlier on in his intellectual development. Hence, although commentators such as Merold Westphal, Simon Fisher and Bruce McCormack have developed keen interest in Kant’s influence upon Barth’s early work, even engaging Barth’s Neo-Kantian context in great detail, my contention is that Barth’s later interpretation of Kant is crucial to his intellectual development, and gives further insight into Barth’s legacy for contemporary theology today. My aim in what follows is to refigure the relationship between Barth’s early appropriation and critique of Kant, and the more onto-theological issues at stake in his later Protestant history lectures. In so doing, we can begin to discern in Barth, not an abandonment or disregard for the metaphysical questions of being, but rather, the call to face them all the more rigorously.

Stark, Werner. “Immanuel Kant Ueber Pädagogik: Eine Vorlesung wie jede andere?” Jahrbuch für historische Bildungsforschung 18 (2012): 147-68. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: An English translation was published in Robert R. Clewis, ed., Reading Kant’s Lectures (Berlin / Boston: DeGruyter, 2015), pp. 259-76.

Stelzner, Werner. “Divergenzen zwischen Glaube und Behauptung: Lüge und Verschlossenheit als Formen von Unaufrichtigkeit.”  Transzendentalphilosophie und die Kultur der Gegenwart. Eds. Steffen Dietzsch and Udo Teitz (op cit.). 167-94. [M]

Stephenson, Andrew.  Rev. of Kant’s Theory of the Self, by Arthur Melnick (2009). European Journal of Philosophy 20.1 (2012): 187-92. [online] [PI]

Sterba, James.  Rev. of Reconstructing Rawls: The Kantian Foundations of Justice as Fairness, by Robert S. Taylor (2011). Review of Metaphysics 66.1 (2012): 172-73. [M]

Stern, Robert.  Understanding Moral Obligation: Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard.  Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012. [xiv, 277 p.] [WC] [review]

 ——.  “A Reply to My Critics.”  Inquiry 55.6 (2012): 622-54. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper, I respond to three commentators on my book Understanding Moral Obligation: Kant, Hegel Kierkegaard. Anne Margaret Baxley focuses on my treatment of Kant, Dean Moyar on my treatment of Hegel, and William Bristow on my treatment of Kierkegaard. In this reply, I try to show how the critical points that they raise can be addressed.

 ——. “Kant, Moral Obligation, and the Holy Will.”  Kant on Practical Justification: Interpretive Essays. Eds. Mark Timmons and Sorin Baiasu (op cit.). 125-52. [M]

Stevenson, Leslie.  “Thinking of Everything? Kant Speaks to Stephen Hawking.”  Contemporary Kantian Metaphysics: New Essays on Time and Space.  Eds. Roxana Baiasu, Graham Bird, and A. W. Moore (op cit.). 128-45. [M]

Stiening, Gideon.  “‘[E]s gibt gar keine verschiedenen Arten von Menschen.’ Systematizität und historische Semantik am Beispiel der Kant-Forster-Kontroverse über den Begriff der Menschenrasse.”  Klopffechtereien – Missverständnisse – Widersprüche? Methodische und methodologische Perspektiven auf die Kant-Forster-Kontroverse.  Eds. Rainer Godel and Gideon Stiening (op cit.). 19-53. [M]

 ——.  See: Godel, Rainer and Gideon Stiening

 ——.  See: Godel, Rainer and Gideon Stiening, eds.

Stolovich, Leonid N. “Как посмертная маска Канта оказалась в Тарту? Неожиданная находка в архиве Художественного музея Тартуского университета.” [Russian; How did Kant’s death mask end up in Tartu? Surprising finding at the archive of Art Museum of Tartu University] Kantovskij Sbornik 40.2 (2012): 93-95. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article tells how Kant’s deathmask ended up in the Museum of Classical Antiquities of the University of Tartu.

Straßburg, Bernd, ed.  Kant-Index, Bd. 36: Sect. 3, Indices zum Corpus der vorkritischen Schriften ; 36,1, Stellenindex und Konkordanz zu den "Gedanken von der wahren Schätzung der lebendigen Kräfte": Teilbd. 1, Einleitung, Hauptindex und Konkordanz (A - F).  Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 2012. [lv, 362 p.] [WC]

 ——.  Kant-Index, Bd. 36: Sect. 3, Indices zum Corpus der vorkritischen Schriften; 36,2, Stellenindex und Konkordanz zu den "Gedanken von der wahren Schätzung der lebendigen Kräfte": Teilbd. 2, Konkordanz (G - Z) und Sonderindices.  city: publisher, 2012. [viii, 365-790 p.] [WC]

Stratton-Lake, Philip. Kant, Duty and Moral Worth. Hoboken: Taylor and Francis, 2012. [166 p.] [WC]

Streit, Peter. Ethik gegen Machtpolitik. Immanuel Kants Friedensschrift im Kontext des Zeitalters der Aufklärung. Bern: Peter Lang, 2012. [253 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Vol. 14 of Freiburger Studien zur frühen Neuzeit.
Originally presented as a Ph.D. dissertation (Universität-Freiburg, 2011; Advisor: Volker Reinhardt).

Streubel, Thorsten.  “Was ist der Mensch? – Das Gehirn-Geist-Problem aus kantischer Sicht. Plädoyer für eine transzendentale Anthropologie.”  Kant-Studien 103.3 (2012): 370-76. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: It is the aim of the following considerations to use Kantian epistemology to advance the current debate about the relation between mind and brain. First of all the naturalistic assumption that all mental phenomena are based on neuronal processes is called into question. Secondly it is shown (by discussing the philosophical conclusions of Gerhard Roth’s book The Brain and its Reality) that naturalism leads necessarily to an absurd constructivism that is very similar to Kant’s transcendental position, but which conflicts with naturalism’s empirical premise. In spite of the progress in brain research Kant’s transcendental approach is still a promising attempt to treat philosophical problems, especially the problem about the relation between mind, brain and world.

Stroe, C. “Contribuţia lui Grigore Tăuşan la receptarea Criticii lui Kant în filosofia românească.” [Romanian; The Contribution of Grigore Tăuşan in the Reception of Kant’s Critique in Romanian Philosophy] Cercet. Fil. Psih. 4.1 (2012): 55-60. [RC]

Sturm, Thomas.  “What’s Philosophical about Kant’s Philosophy of the Human Sciences?”  Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 43.1 (2012): 203-7. [PI]

 ——.  “Kant über die dreifache Beziehung zwischen den Wissenschaften und der Philosophie.”  Internationales Jahrbuch des Deutschen Idealismus/International Yearbook of German Idealism: Philosophie und Wissenschaft/Philosophy and Science, eds. Jürgen Stolzenberg and Fred Rush. 8 (2012): 60-82. [M]

Sugita, Satoshi. カント哲学と現代 : 疎外・啓蒙・正義・環境・ジェンダー / Kanto tetsugaku to gendai: Sogai keimo seigi kankyo jenda. [Japanese] Otsu: Korosha, 2012. [350 p.] [WC]

Surprenant, Chris W.  “Kant’s Contribution to Moral Education.”  Kant and Education: Interpretations and Commentary.  Eds. Klas Roth and Chris W. Surprenant (op cit.). 1-11. [M]

 ——, ed.  See: Roth, Klas and Chris W. Surprenant, eds.

Svetlic, Rok. “Kant in civilna nepokorscina.” [Slovenian; Kant and Civil Disobedience] Dignitas Ljubljana: Nova revija 53/54 (2012): 25-36. [WC]

Svoboda, Toby.  “Duties Regarding Nature: A Kantian Approach to Environmental Ethics.”  Kant Yearbook: Kant and Contemporary Moral Philosophy 4 (2012): 143-164. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Many philosophers have objected to Kant’s account of duties regarding non-human nature, arguing that it does not ground adequate moral concern for non-human natural entities. However, the traditional interpretation of Kant on this issue is mistaken, because it takes him to be arguing merely that humans should abstain from animal cruelty and wanton destruction of flora solely because such actions could make one more likely to violate one’s duties to human beings. Instead, I argue, Kant’s account of duties regarding nature grounds much stronger limitations on how humans may treat non-human animals and flora, since such duties are rooted in the imperfect duty to increase one’s own moral perfection. This duty proscribes actions affecting non-human nature that decrease one’s moral perfection, such as those that cause organisms unnecessary harm. Moreover, the duty to moral perfection prescribes (but does not strictly require) actions affecting non-human nature that increase one’s moral perfection, such as those that benefit organisms. Given this interpretation, I show that, contrary to a widely held view, Kant’s moral philosophy can ground a coherent and robust approach to environmental ethics.

Sweet, Alec Stone. “A cosmopolitan legal order: Constitutional pluralism and rights adjudication in Europe.” Global Constitutionalism 1.1 (2012): 53-90. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The European Convention on Human Rights is rapidly evolving into a cosmopolitan legal order: a transnational legal system in which all public officials bear the obligation to fulfill the fundamental rights of every person within their jurisdiction. The emergence of the system depended on certain deep, structural transformations of law and politics in Europe, including the consolidation of a zone of peace and economic interdependence, of constitutional pluralism at the national level, and of rights cosmopolitanism at the transnational level. Framed by Kantian ideas, the paper develops a theoretical account of a cosmopolitan legal system, provides an overview of how the ECHR system operates, and establishes criteria for its normative assessment.

Symington, Paul. Rev. of Kant and Phenomenology, by Tom Rockmore (2011).  Review of Metaphysics 66.2 (2012): 380-82. [M]

Szyrwinska, Anna.  “In Search of Elements of Pietistic Doctrine in Kant’s Ethics.” [Polish]  Kwartalnik Filozoficzny 40.1 (2012): 5-23. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The inquiry regarding the role that pietistic theology played in the development of Immanuel Kant’s moral philosophy should be a significant part of an examination of the evolution of Kant’s philosophical ideas. However, the identification of pietistic influences in Kant’s ethics may be problematic, for it takes place not only on a historical-biographical level, but also on the level of pure philosophical and semantical analysis. Moreover, there are a number of stereotypes about the topic that the researcher must face. The paper presents the method and process of analyzing Kant’s reception of pietistic ideas.

[top] T    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Takada, Makoto. カント実践哲学とイギリス道徳哲学: カント・ヒューム・スミス / Kanto jissen tetsugaku to igirisu dotoku tetsugaku: Kanto hyumu sumisu. city: Azusashuppansha, 2012. [276 p.] [WC]

Tampio, Nicholas.  Kantian Courage: advancing the enlightenment in contemporary political theory.  New York: Fordham University Press, 2012. [xii, 255 p.] [WC] [review]

Tang, Wenming. 隐秘的顛覆: 牟宗三,康德与原始儒家 / Yin mi de dian fu: Mou Zongsan, Kangde yu yuan shi Rujia. [Chinese; Secret subversion: Mou Zongsan, Kant, and originary Confucianity] Beijing: Sheng huo, du shu, xin zhi san lian shu dian, 2012. [327 p.] [WC]

Tao, Yue.  道德形而上学 : 牟宗三與康德之间 / Dao de xing er shang xue: Mou Zongsan yu Kangde zhi jian.  Beijing: Zhongguo she hui ke xue chu ban she, 2012. [277 p.] [WC]

Täschner, Anna.  Mensch und Staat bei Immanuel Kant: zu den anthropologischen Grundlagen seiner politischen Theorie.  Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2012. [252 p.] [WC]

Tatasciore, Carlo. “Fra dogmatismo e criticismo.” Il realismo della ragione: Kant dai lumi alla filosofia contemporanea. Ed. Stefano Poggi (op cit.). 51-68. [M]

Taylor, Robert S.  “The Progress of Absolutism in Kant’s Essay ‘What is Enlightenment?’.”  Kant’s Political Theory: Interpretations and Applications.  Ed. Elisabeth Ellis (op cit.). 135-49. [M]

Teitz, Udo, ed. See: Dietzsch, Steffen, and Udo Teitz, eds.

Tenenbaum, Katja. “Aus Kants Tischgesellschaft.”  Transzendentalphilosophie und die Kultur der Gegenwart. Eds. Steffen Dietzsch and Udo Teitz (op cit.). 223-32. [M]

Tenenbaum, Sergio.  “The Idea of Freedom and Moral Cognition in Groundwork III.”  Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84.3 (2012): 555-89. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant’s views on the relation between freedom and moral law seem to undergo a major, unannounced shift. In the third section of the Groundwork, Kant seems to be using the fact that we must act under the idea of freedom as a foundation for the moral law. However, in the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant claims that our awareness of our freedom depends on our awareness of the moral law. I argue that the apparent conflict between the two texts depends on a reading of the opening paragraphs of Groundwork III, and on an interpretation of Kant’s claim that we “act under the idea of freedom”, that is implausible on textual and on philosophical grounds. I then present an alternative interpretation of what Kant means by “acting under the idea of freedom” and of the opening paragraphs of Groundwork III. I argue that the only substantive conclusion of these paragraphs is that no theoretical proof of freedom is necessary. Moreover I argue that although these paragraphs raise concerns about the validity of the moral law, these concerns and Kant’s answers to them, do not give rise to any significant conflict with his views in the Critique of Practical Reason.

Terra, Ricardo Ribeiro.  “The Distinction between Right and Ethics in Kant’s Philosophy.”  Kant in Brazil.  Eds. Frederick Rauscher and Daniel Omar Perez (op cit.). 173-88. [M]

 ——.  “Between Prescriptive Poetics and Philosophical Aesthetics.”  Kant in Brazil.  Eds. Frederick Rauscher and Daniel Omar Perez (op cit.). 295-304. [M]

Tester, Steven.  Rev. of Kant und die Beweußtseinstheorien des 18. Jahrhunderts, by Falk Wunderlich (2005). Philosophical Forum 43.3 (2012): 357-58. [PI]

Teufel, Thomas.  “What Is the Problem of Teleology in Kant’s Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment?”  SATS 12.2 (2012): 198-236. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In his teleological antinomy in the Dialectic of the Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment, Kant presents two competing views of the explanatory power of causal mechanism for a science of origins. Kant expresses both the positive (thesis) view and the negative (antithesis) view in the guise of merely regulative principles for the reflecting power of judgment. The regulativity of these principles is usually taken to entail: i. Kant's demotion of causal mechanism to an explanatory principle of heuristic, merely subjectively necessary status; ii. the possibility of mechanically inexplicable phenomena in nature. I argue that neither consequence ensues. Kant in both thesis and antithesis of his teleological antinomy is as firmly committed to the universal necessity of judging natural origins mechanistically as he ever was and would be. Accordingly, Kant is fully committed to the mechanical explicability of all causal processes (including organic processes) in nature. At issue in the antinomy is, instead, the universal sufficiency of judging natural origins mechanistically.

 ——.  “What Does Kant Mean by ‘Power of Judgement’ in his Critique of the Power of Judgement.”  Kantian Review 17.2 (2012): 297-326. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The notion of ‘power of judgement’ in the title of Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgement is commonly taken to refer to a cognitive power inclusive of both determining judgement and reflecting judgement. I argue, first, that this seemingly innocuous view is in conflict both with the textual fact that Kant attempts a Critical justification of the reflecting power of judgement – only – and with the systematic impossibility of a transcendentally grounded determining power of judgement. The conventional response to these difficulties is to point out that, Kant’s systematic ambitions in the third Critique notwithstanding, reflection, qua concept-forming synthesis, is too closely tied to determination to be a cognitive power in its own right. I argue, second, that this response is question-begging, since the notion of reflection it employs is not only not one central to the third Critique but one antecedently tied to the understanding. I argue, third, that Kant’s discussion, in the pivotal §§76–7, of our cognitive relation to sensible particularity addresses an epistemic problem present (but not raised) in the Critique of Pure Reason. This is the problem of the synthesizability, qua absolute unity, of unsynthesized intuitions. Solving this problem requires Critical justification of a principle of reflection. It follows that Kant’s systematic ambitions in the third Critique are appropriate. Given the problem Kant seeks to address, he must offer what he takes himself to be offering: a Critique of the (Reflecting) Power of Judgement.

Theis, Robert.  La raison et son Dieu: étude sur la théologie kantienne.  Paris: J. Vrin, 2012. [318 p.] [WC]

 ——. “‘Herauslesen’ versus ‘Hineinlegen’? Über spekulative Theologie und Religionsphilosophie am Beispiel von Anselm und Kant.” Archiwum Historii Filozofii i Mysli Spolecznej 57 (2012): 95-106. [WC]

Tietz, Udo. “Das Sichtbare und das Unsichtbare. Ein Versuch über das Apriori.”  Transzendentalphilosophie und die Kultur der Gegenwart. Eds. Steffen Dietzsch and Udo Teitz (op cit.). 15-58. [M]

Tilkorn, Anne, ed. Motivationen für das Selbst: Kant und Spinoza im Vergleich.  Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2012. [155 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents: Inja Stracenski, “Der Wille und die Vernunft Kant und Spinoza über die Grundlagen der Ethik”
Anne Tilkorn, “Gefühle, selbstgewirkt”
Birgit Recki, “Kant über Achtung und Glauben. Leistung und Probleme seines motivationstheoretischen Beitrags”
Caroline Sommerfeld-Lethen, “Alles eine Sache der Gewohnheit Kants und Spinozas moralistische Ethik”
Ursula Renz, “Die moralische Dimension von Selbstverhältnissen”
Gabor Boros and Peter Gulyäs, “Admiratio und generositas Wie Spinoza einen Faden von Descartes aufnimmt, zerreißt und die zwei Teile Kant überreicht”
Manfred Walther, “Konsistenz der Maximen Universalisierbarkeit und Moralität nach Spinoza und Kant”
Felicitas Krämer, “Aktuelle Perspektiven auf den Zusammenhang von Tugend, Moral und Gefühl Rosalind Hursthouse, Kant und Spinoza im Vergleich”

Timmons, Mark. See: Smit, Houston and Mark Timmons.

 —— and Sorin Baiasu, eds. Kant on Practical Justification: Interpretive Essays. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2012. [xi, 324 p.] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents: Sorin Baiasu, “Introduction: Practical Justification in Kant” — Sorin Baiasu, “Kant’s Rechtfertigung and the Epistemic Character of Practical Justification” — Sebastian Rödl, “Why Ought Implies Can” — Allen W. Wood, “Kant on Practical Reason” — Larry Krasnoff, “Constructing Practical Justification: How Can the Categorical Imperative Justify Desire-based Actions?” — Otfried Höffe, “Anthropology and Metaphysics in Kant’s Categorical Imperative of Law: An Interpretation of Rechtslehre, §§B and C” — Robert Stern, “Kant, Moral Obligation, and the Holy Will” — Karl Ameriks, “Is Practical Justification in Kant Ultimately Dogmatic?” — Paul Guyer, “Constructivism and Self-constitution” — Andrews Reath, “Formal Approaches to Kant’s Formula of Humanity” — Houston Smit and Mark Timmons, “Kant’s Grounding Project in The Doctrine of Virtue” — Howard Williams, “Kant and Libertarianism” — Henry E. Allison, “Kant’s Practical Justification of Freedom” — John Hare, “The Place of Kant’s Theism in his Moral Philosophy” — A. W. Moore, “Freedom, Temporality, and Belief: A Reply to Hare”

Tolley, Clinton.  “The Generality of Kant’s Transcendental Logic.”  Journal of the History of Philosophy 50.3 (2012): 417-46. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper I suggest a new interpretation of the relations of inherence, causation and conception in Spinoza. I discuss the views of Don Garrett on this issue and argue against Della Rocca’s recent suggestion that a strict endorsement of the PSR leads necessarily to the identification of the relations of inherence, causation and conception. I argue that (1) Spinoza never endorsed this identity, and (2) that Della Rocca’s suggestion could not be considered as a legitimate reconstruction or friendly amendment to Spinoza’s system because it creates several severe and irresolvable problems in the system.
In the first part of the paper, I present the considerations and arguments that motivated Don Garrett’s and Della Rocca’s interpretations. In the second part, I present and examine several problems that result from Della Rocca’s reading. In the third and final part, I (1) present my own view on the relation among inherence, causation, and conception; (2) offer a new interpretation of the conceived through relation in Spinoza; and finally, (3) defend and justify the presence of (non-arbitrary) bifurcations at the very center of Spinoza’s system.

 ——.  “Bolzano and Kant on the Nature of Logic.”  History & Philosophy of Logic 33.4 (2012): 307-27. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Here I revisit Bolzano’s criticisms of Kant on the nature of logic. I argue that while Bolzano is correct in taking Kant to conceive of the traditional logic as a science of the activity of thinking rather than the content of thought, he is wrong to charge Kant with a failure to identify and examine this content itself within logic as such. This neglects Kant’s own insistence that traditional logic does not exhaust logic as such, since it must be supplemented by a transcendental logic that will in fact study nothing other than thought’s content. Once this feature of Kant’s views is brought to light, a much deeper accord emerges between the two thinkers than has hitherto been appreciated, on both the nature of the content that is at issue in logic and the sense of logic’s generality and formality.

 ——.  “Bolzano and Kant on the Place of Subjectivity in a Wissenschaftslehre.”  Grazer Philosophische Studien 85.1 (2012): 63-88. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Throughout his career, Bolzano presents his account of knowledge and science as an altenrative to ‘the Critical philosophy’ of Kant and his followers. The aim of this essay is to evaluate the success of Bolzano’s own account — and especially, its heavy emphasis on the objectivity of cognitive content — in enabling him to escape what he takes to be the chief shortcomings of the ‘subjective idealist philosophy’. I argue that, because Bolzano’s own position can be seen to be beset by problems that are both recognizably similar to, and possibily even worse than, those that he takes to afflict Kant’s account of the elements of our knoweldge, Bolzano's attempt to fully overcome the alleged vices of Kant’s idealism by ‘extruding’ semantic content from the mind must be judged to be less than satisfactory.

Tomasi, Gabriele. “Gefühl und Erkenntnis in Kants Konzeption der ästhetischen Erfahrung.”  Metaphysik — Ästhetik — Ethik. Eds. Antonino Falduto, Caroline Kolisang, and Gabriel Rivero (op cit.). 137-53. [WC]

Tomberg, Friedrich. “Vermutungen über ein lebenspraktisches Apriori im Anschluss an Marx — Zur Neubestimmung des Verhältnisses von wissenschaftlicher Weltauffassung und Religion.”  Transzendentalphilosophie und die Kultur der Gegenwart. Eds. Steffen Dietzsch and Udo Teitz (op cit.). 243-68. [M]

Tomida, Yasuhiko.  Locke, Berkeley, Kant: from a naturalistic point of view.  Hildesheim: Olms, 2012. [xv, 220 p.] [WC]

Tønder, Lars. “Remember Tolerance Differently: Kant and the Politics of Becoming Tolerant.” Teoria: Rivista di Filosofia 32.1 (2012): 93-108. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This essay questions the linear conception of history which often accompanies the way contemporary democratic theory tends to disavow tolerance’s discontinuities and remainders. In the spirit of Foucault’s genealogy of descent, the idea is to develop a new sense of tolerance’s history, not by invoking a critique external to contemporary democratic theory, but by witnessing the history of tolerance paraliptically, with an eye to what it obscures and yet presupposes.

Tonetto, Milene Consenso, Alessandro Pinzani, and Darlei Dall’Agnol, eds. Investigações Kantianas I: um debate plural. Florianópolis, Brazil: Editora Fundação Boiteux, 2012. [254 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: (the essays are not listed separately in this bibliography)
Darlei Dall' Agnol (The idealist interpretation of Kant's meta-ethics),
Frederick Rauscher (Realism and anti-realism in Kant's meta-ethics: A reply to Professor Dall'Agnol),
Werner Euler (The art of keeping healthy: some remarks on Kant’s philosophy of medicine),
Alessandro Pinzani (Licença para matar),
Milene Consenso Tonetto (O conceito de dignidade na Doutrina da virtude de Kant),
Paulo César Nodari (Kant e a paz: a função dos artigos preliminares),
Charles Feldhaus (Teria Habermas se equivocado ao ler Zum ewigen Frieden de Immanuel Kant?),
Jean-Christophe Merle (Equidade em Kant e seus contemporâneos),
Maria Borges (Paixão e deliberação na filosofia Kantiana),
Nuria Sánchez Madrid (Da reflexão sobre o Decorum à formação do conceito de Sociedade civil: as Vorlesugen über Anthropologie de Kant em diálogo com B. Gracián e Chr. Thomasius),
Ubirajara Rancan de Azevedo Marques (Revisitando a doutrina do esquematismo),
Alberto Pirni (Convivere con verità penultime? Un percorso Kantiano),
Virginia Figueiredo (A reflexão como a chave da crítica do gosto, ou, Pode a reflexão ser um sentimento?).

Topuz, Muhammet. “The Effect of Social Paradigm to Philosophical Thought: The Case of Stoa and Kant.” Beytulhikme: An International Journal of Philosophy vol (2012): pp. [online][M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: With the city government in Ancient Greek giving its place to the central empire, the human should be redefined according to the new social paradigm. The Hellenistic philosophy could be considered as a product of this effort. A similar situation is ruling also for the Europe after Middle Age. The downturn of the feudality, with the rise of the bourgeoisie instead of it, makes a new human definition mandatory in such a social condition. Enlightenment philosophy could be considered also a product of this effort. The similarities between two human definitions presented in two different time period tried to be established, with Stoicism and Kant patterns, within this essay.

Tosto, Maria Grazia. Schematismo trascendentale e spazio: contributi filosofici per una psicologia come scienza. [Italian] Roma: Aracne, 2012. [191 p.] [WC]

Trevisan, Diego Kosbiau. “O problema da linguagem no discurso filosófico kantianocomo questão político-jurídica.” [Portuguese] Cadernos de Filosofia Alemã: Crítica e Modernidade 20 (2012): 81-100. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper presents some elements for a political-legal interpretation of the philosophical language in and following Kant ́s philosophy. Kant conceives of the distinctiveness of his own method of presentation, or at least the one he considers the most appropriate in philosophy, as a language issue which is formulated, curiously, according to political-legal paradigms: the possibility of communicability of thought refuses the use of a “lordly tone”, be it in a pedantic dogmatism which suppresses the sensibility or in a sentimental enthusiasm which arrogates to itself a godly language that hampers the universalism presupposed in every shared expression of knowledge. The aim of this paper is to introduce some passages in which Kant outlines this analogy and lays down, in political-legal terms, the conditions of possibility for a free and public use of reason under the form of a language question.

Trozak, Aleksej.  Rev. of Immanuel Kant: Traktate: Rezensionen: Briefe, edited by Leonard A. Kalinnikov (2009). Kant-Studien 103.1 (2012): 136-37. [M]

Tucker, Irene. The Moment of Racial Sight: A History. Chicago/London: The University of Chicago Press, 2012. [xiv, 274 p.] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: See especially chapter 1: "Kant's Dermatology; or, The Racialization of Skin" (pp. 15-74).

Tuppini, Tommaso.  “Kant, Blows of Tear.”  Kant’s Philosophy of the Unconscious.  Eds. Piero Giordanetti, Riccardo Pozzo, and Marco Sgarbi (op cit.). 147-75. [M]

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Underwood, Lori J.  Rev. of Kant: The Three Critiques, by Andrew Ward (2006). Teaching Philosophy 35.1 (2012): 108-11. [PI]

Unna, Yvonne.  “A Draft of Kant’s Reply to Hufeland: Autograph, Transcription (Wolfgang G. Bayerer) and English Translation (Yvonne Unna).”  Kant-Studien 103.1 (2012): 5-24. [M]

 ——.  “A Draft of Kant’s Reply to Hufeland: Key Questions of Kant’s Dietetics and the Problem of Its Systematic Place in His Philosophy.”  Kant-Studien 103.3 (2012): 271-91. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article provides an introduction to an autograph draft of a letter on dietetics Kant wrote to the physician Christoph Wilhelm Hufeland and uses it as a springboard for the critical discussion of Kant’s dietetics as well as its systematic place in his philosophy. The final draft of Kant’s letter to Hufeland became the third part of The Conflict of the Faculties. The article argues that Kant (1) assigns dietetics, understood as the regulation of the traditional nonnaturals, to philosophy and not to medicine; (2) that he regards moral health as the basis for physical health; and (3) that his view of the systematic place of dietetics in his philosophy is inconsistent.

[top] V    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Valagussa, Francesco.  L’arte del genio: note sulla terza critica. [Italian]  Milan: Mimesis, 2012. [158 p.] [contents] [WC]

Valdez, Edgar J.  “Kant’s A Priori Intuition of Space Independent of Postulates.”  Kantian Review 17.1 (2012): 135-60. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Defences of Kant’s foundations of geometry fall short if they are unable to equally ground Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometries. Thus, Kant’s account must be separated from geometrical postulates. I argue that characterizing space as the form of outer intuition must be independent of postulates. Geometrical postulates are then expressions of particular spatializing activities made possible by the ‘a priori’ intuition of space. While Amit Hagar contends that this is to speak of noumena, I argue that a Kantian account of space as the form of outer attention-directing remains seated in the subject.

 ——.  Rev. of Rethinking Kant, vols. 1 and 2 edited by Pablo Muchnik (2008/2010). Kantian Review 17.3 (2012): 521-27. [M]

Valdez, Inés.  “Perpetual What? Injury, Sovereignty and a Cosmopolitan View of Immigration.”  Political Studies 60.1 (2012): 95-114. [HUM]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Can Kantian cosmopolitanism contribute to normative approaches to immigration? Kant developed the universal right to hospitality in the context of late eighteenth-century colonialism. He claimed that non-European countries had a sovereign right over their territory and the conditions of foreigners’ visits. This sovereign prerogative limited visitors’ right to hospitality. The interconnected and complementary system of right he devised is influential today, but this article argues that maintaining the complementarity of the three realms involves reconsidering its application to contemporary immigration. It situates Kant’s Perpetual Peace within the context of debates about conquest and colonialism and argues that Kant’s strict conception of sovereignty is justified by his concern in maintaining a realm of sovereignty that is complementary with cosmopolitanism and his prioritization of mutual agreements in each of the realms, particularly in a context of international power asymmetry. In Kant’s time, European powers appropriated cosmopolitan discourses to defend their right to visit other countries and it was necessary to strengthen non-Europeans’ sovereign claims. The strength and hostility of the visitors made limited hospitality and strong sovereignty act in tandem to keep away conquerors, expanding cosmopolitanism. Today, individuals from poor countries migrate to wealthier ones where they are subject to a sovereign authority that excludes them. Sovereignty and cosmopolitanism no longer work complementarily, but rather strengthen powerful state actors vis-à-vis non-citizens subject to unilateral rule. Maintaining the pre-eminence of the right to freedom, the article suggests that only through the creation of ‘cosmopolitan spaces’ of politics can we reproduce today the complementarity that Kant envisioned. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Valentini, Laura.  “Kant, Ripstein and the Circle of Freedom: A Critical Note.”  European Journal of Philosophy 20.3 (2012): 450-59. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Much contemporary political philosophy claims to be Kant-inspired, but its aims and method differ from Kant’s own. In his recent book, Force and Freedom, Arthur Ripstein advocates a more orthodox Kantian outlook, presenting it as superior to dominant (Kant-inspired) views. The most striking feature of this outlook is its attempt to ground the whole of political morality in one right: the right to freedom, understood as the right to be independent of others’ choices. Is Ripstein’s Kantian project successful? In this research note I argue that it is not. First, I suggest that Ripstein’s notion of freedom is viciously circular. It is meant to ground all rights, but in fact it presupposes an account of those rights. Second, I show that — independently of its inability to ground a whole political morality — such a moralized understanding of freedom is normatively unappealing.

Valentini, Tommaso.  “La filosofia politica di Kant: Chiliasmo filosofico e diritto cosmopolitico.” [Italian]  Acta Philosophica: Pontificia Universita della Santa Croce 21.1 (2012): 101-24. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper deals with Kant’s view of a “philosophical chiliasmus”, by which it is to be understood the political hope of a perpetual peace between the world’s states. In his philosophical and political writings, Kant shows how this peace can be achieved through diplomatic means, trying to define the original concept of a “cosmopolitical right” (Weltbürgerrecht). This paper aims at highlighting the modernity of Kant’s political perspective, which has been renewed and developed in the twentieth century by many philosophers and jurists as Hans Kelsen and John Rawls.

Vanden Auweele, Dennis. Rev. of Kant, Schopenhauer and Morality. Recovering the Categorical Imperative, by Mark Thomas Walker (2012). Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 74.2 (2012): 359-61. [PW]

Vandenabeel, Bart.  “Aesthetic Disinterestedness in Kant and Schopenhauer.”  Estetika: The Central European Journal of Aesthetics 49.1 (2012): 45-70. [HUM]

 ——.  “Beauty, Disinterested Pleasure, and Universal Communicability: Kant’s Response to Burke.”  Kant-Studien 103.2 (2012): 207-33. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Although Kant (wrongly) holds that the universal communicability of aesthetic judgments logically follows from the disinterested character of the pleasure upon which they are based, Kant’s emphasis on the a priori validity of judgments of beauty can be viewed as a rebuttal of the kind of empiricist arguments that Burke offers to justify the social nature of the experience of beauty. I argue that the requirement of universal communicability is not a mere addition to the requirement of universal validity and is far more relevant to an adequate characterisation of the beautiful than has customarily been assumed. I further argue that the ‘exemplary necessity’ of pure judgments of taste, if understood correctly, reveals beauty’s primordial social significance, enabling us to become alive to a profound universal solidarity among aesthetic subjects.

Van de Vijver, Gertrudis.  “Friends of Wisdom?”  Foundations of Science 17.1 (2012): 5-7. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This commentary addresses the question of the meaning of critique in relation to objectivism or dogmatism. Inspired by Kant’s critical philosophy and Husserl’s phenomenology, it defines the first in terms of conditionality, the second in terms of oppositionality. It works out an application on the basis of Salthe’s (Found Sci 15 4(6):357-367, 2010a) paper on development and evolution, where competition is criticized in oppositional, more than in conditional terms.

Van Eekert, Geert.  “De wet in het verkeerde daglicht gesteld: Kant over deugd, autocratie en de hang naar het kwaad.” [Dutch; “Misrepresenting Moral Law. Kant on Virtue, Autocracy, and the Propensity to Evil”]  Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 74.1 (2012): 65-101. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In Metaphysical Principles of Virtue (1797) Kant wants to demonstrate how human beings should put the moral law into practice in their individual lives. This article intends to contribute to the research on the picture of human nature Kant had in mind while defining virtue and specifying the duties of virtue. First of all, it is shown that this picture is not only more refined than is generally assumed, but also compatible with Kant’s theory of radical evil that was developed in the first part of Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone (1793). With the exception of one footnote, however, Kant seems to pass over that theory without comment in Metaphysical Principles of Virtue. He even seems to assume time and again that the enemy of virtue is the human being’s sensuous nature, while according to the first part of Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone sensuous nature contains too little to provide a ground of moral evil. Does Kant’s 1793 theory of evil play no part anymore in his 1797 theory of virtue? In the remainder of this article I want to argue from two different angles that this is too rash a conclusion. First of all, I will criticize Anne Baxley’s objections to the way in which Kant, while introducing the concept of autocracy, distinguishes between human beings and finite holy beings. I will argue that this distinction, despite Baxley’s comments, does make sense if it is associated with Kant’s theory of radical evil. Secondly, I want to show why it appears to be so difficult from a Kantian perspective to confront the human being’s propensity to evil in a direct manner.

Vanzo, Alberto.  Kant e la formazione dei concetti.  Trento: Verifiche, 2012. [218 p.] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: How do we form concepts like those of three, bicycle and red? According to Kant, we form them by carrying out acts of comparison, reflection and abstraction on information provided by the senses. Kant’s answer raised numerous objections from philosophers and psychologists alike. Kant e la formazione dei concetti argues that Kant is able to rebut those objections. The book shows that, for Kant, it is possible to perceive objects without employing concepts; it explains how, given those perceptions, we can form categories and empirical concepts; and it argues that theories like Kant’s - abstractionist theories of concept formation - are more plausible than is often assumed.

 ——.  “Kant on Experiment.”  Rationis Defensor: Essays in Honour of Colin Cheyne.  Ed. James Maclaurin (Dordrecht: Springer, 2012). 75-96. [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper illustrates Immanuel Kant’s views on the role of experiments in natural science, focusing on their relations with hypotheses, laws of nature, and the heuristic principles of scientific enquiry. Kant’s views are contrasted with the philosophy of experiment that was first sketched by Francis Bacon and later developed by Robert Boyle and Robert Hooke.
Kant holds that experiments are always designed and carried out in the light of hypotheses. Hypotheses are derived from experience on the basis of a set of heuristic principles. The function of experiments is testing hypotheses in order to either reject them as false, or else to transform them into empirical laws of nature. To this end, we must integrate the hypotheses that are confirmed by experiments with the a priori principles which are the foundations of natural science.
Compared with Bacon, Boyle, and Hooke, Kant has elaborate views on the one hand, on how our theoretical and pre-theoretical assumptions bear on experimental practice, and on the other hand, on how the results of experimental activity can be integrated with theories to advance our knowledge of nature. However, Kant overstates the dependence of experiments on theories.

 ——.  “Kant on Truth-Aptness.”  History & Philosophy of Logic 33.2 (2012): 109-26. [PI][online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Many scholars claimed that, according to Immanuel Kant, some judgements lack a truth-value: analytic judgements, judgements about items of which humans cannot have experience, judgements of perception, and non-assertoric judgements. However, no one has undertaken an extensive examination of the textual evidence for those claims. Based on an analysis of Kant’s texts, I argue that: (1) according to Kant, only judgements of perception are not truth-apt. All other judgements are truth-apt, including analytic judgements and judgements about items of which humans cannot have experience. (2) Kant sometimes states that truth-apt judgements are actual bearers of truth or falsity only when they are taken to state what is actually the case. Kant calls these judgements assertoric. Other texts ascribe truth and falsity to judgements, regardless of whether they are assertoric. Kant’s views on truth-aptness raise challenges for correspondentist and coherentist interpretations of Kant’s theory of truth; they rule out the identification of Kant’s crucial notion of objective validity with truth-aptness; and they imply that Kant was not a verificationist about truth or meaning.

Varden, Helga.  “A Kantian Critique of the Care Tradition: Family Law and Systemic Justice.”  Kantian Review 17.2 (2012): 327-56. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Liberal theories of justice have been rightly criticized for two things by care theorists. First, they have failed to deal with private care relations’ inherent (inter)dependency, asymmetry and particularity. Second, they have been shown unable properly to address the asymmetry and dependency constitutive of care workers’ and care-receivers’ systemic conditions. I apply Kant’s theory of right to show that current care theories unfortunately reproduce similar problems because they also argue on the assumption that good care requires only virtuous private individuals. Giving up this assumption enables us to solve the problems regarding both private care relations and systemic injustice.

 ——. “A Feminist, Kantian Conception of the Right to Bodily Integrity: The Cases of Abortion and Homosexuality.”  Out from the Shadows: Analytical Feminist Contributions to Traditional Philosophy. Eds. Sharon L. Crasnow and Anita M. Superson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 33-57. [PI]

Veca, Salvatore. Kant. Milan: BookTime, 2012. [48 p.] [WC]

Velkley, Richard.  “Educating through Perplexity: Kant and the German Enlightenment.”  Kant and Education: Interpretations and Commentary.  Eds. Klas Roth and Chris W. Surprenant (op cit.). 69-80. [M]

 ——.  See: Shell, Susan Meld and Richard Velkley.

 ——.  See: Shell, Susan Meld and Richard Velkley, eds.

Verweij, Jan. Kant-tekening van een Horrearius: de rol van het magazyn voor de critische wijsgeerte en de geschiedenis van Dezelve in de Kantreceptie in Nederland. [Dutch] Nijmegen: Wolf, 2012. [370 p.] [WC]

Vignola, Jacopo and Paolo Vignola. Sulla propria pelle: la questione trascendentale tra Kant e Deleuze. [Italian] Rome: Aracne, 2012. [220 p.] [WC]

Virone, Giacomo Maria. Synthetic a priori and Mathematical Account in Kant’s Philosophy. Milan: LED, 2012. [257 p.] [WC] [contents]

von Wille, Dagmar, ed. See: Lee, Seung-Kee, Riccardo Pozzo, Marco Sgarbi, and Dagmar von Wille, eds.

Vorderobermeier, Konrad.  Sinnlichkeit und Verstand: zur transzendentallogischen Entfaltung des Gegenstandsbezugs bei Kant.  Berlin / Boston: De Gruyter, 2012. [x, 308 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Quellen und Studien zur Philosophie, vol. 110.

[top] W    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Walker, Mark Thomas. Kant, Schopenhauer and Morality: Recovering the Categorical Imperative. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. [xi, 452 p.] [WC]

Walsh, Sean Drysdale.  “Kant’s Theory of Right as Aristotelian Phronesis.”  International Philosophical Quarterly 52.2 (2012): 227-46. [HUM]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Many philosophers believe that a moral theory, given all the relevant facts, should be able to determine what is morally right and wrong. It is commonly argued that Aristotle’s ethical theory suffers from a fatal flaw: it places responsibility for determining right and wrong with the virtuous agent who has phronesis rather than with the theory itself. It is also commonly argued that Immanuel Kant’s ethical theory does provide a concept of right that is capable of determining fight and wrong in specific cases. I argue, however, that Kant never gives a determinate moral theory of fight. Rather, I argue that Kant’s moral theory is similar in many ways to that of Aristotle, in that it still holds that a moral agent with phronesis, rather than the theory, determines what is right. Kant’s practical philosophy was not so much meant to tell us fight and wrong as to prevent bad moral theory from corrupting our moral common sense, and it is our moral common sense that determines fight and wrong naturally.

Wang, Ping. 目的论视域下的康德历史哲学 / Mu de lun shi yu xia de Kangde li shi zhe xue. [Chinese; Kant's philosophy of history from a teleological point of view] Shanghai: Shanghai Jiaotong University Press, 2012. [181 p.] [WC]

Ward, Andrew.  Starting with Kant.  London/New York: Continuum, 2012. [xiv, 176 p.] [WC]

Ware, Owen.  Rev. of Kant and Education: Interpretations and Commentary, edited by Klas Roth and Chris W. Surprenant (2012). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (March 2012, #19). [online] [M]

Wasmaier-Sailer, Margit. “Das religiöse Gefühl bei Kant und im Frühidealismus. Perspektiven für heutige Debatten um religiöse Erfahrung.”  Kant und die Religion — die Religionen und Kant. Eds. Reinhard Hiltscher and Stefan Klingner (op cit.). 87-104. [M]

Watkins, Eric.  “Kant, Sellars, and the Myth of the Given.”  Philosophical Forum 43.3 (2012): 311-26. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article compares the philosophical views of American philosopher Wilfrid Sellars and South African philosopher John McDowell to those of German philosopher Immanuel Kant. Specific attention is placed on the “myth of the given,” a concept from Sellars that deals with sense data and criticizes the theory that knowledge of what is perceived is independent of the conceptual processes which create perception. Other topics covered include sensations, cognition, and epistemology.

 ——.  “Kraft und Gesetz: Hegels Kant-Kritik im Kapitel „Kraft und Verstand“ der Phänomenologie des Geistes.”  Internationales Jahrbuch des Deutschen Idealismus/International Yearbook of German Idealism: Philosophie und Wissenschaft/Philosophy and Science, eds. Jürgen Stolzenberg and Fred Rush. 8 (2012): 228-50. [M]

 ——.  See: Brewer, Kimberly and Eric Watkins.

 ——, ed.  See: Kant, Immanuel, Natural Science.

Webber, Jonathan.  “A Law unto Oneself.”  Philosophical Quarterly 62 (2012): 170-89. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: We should understand the concept of self-legislation that is central to Kant’s moral philosophy not in terms of the enactment of statute, but in terms of the way in which judges make law, by setting down and refining precedent through particular judgements. This paper presents a descriptive model of agency based on self-legislation so understood, and argues that we can read Kant’s normative ethics as based on this view of agency. It is intended to contribute to contemporary debates in moral psychology and to exegetical discussion of Kant.

Weber, Thadeu, and Mártin P. Haeberlin. “Equidade na Doutrina do direito de Kant: Um direito que, não sendo um direito, enfraquece a “tese da independência.” [Portuguese; Equity on Kant’s Doctrine of Right: A right that, not being a right, weakens the ‘independence thesis’] Veritas 57.3 (2012): 121-37. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The present paper has the purpose of making a critical approach of the so called “independence thesis” (Unabhängigkeitsthese) between Law and Ethics based on the Kantian text about equity in his Doctrine of Law. To this critical approach, a weakening of the “independence thesis” is demonstrated according to some endogenous concepts of the Kant work, which we believe deals with an oblique opening of the Kantian’s law to ethics. To demonstrate this, we follow a methodological analytic way divided in three moments: (i) an analysis of the concept of law in Kant; (ii) an explanatory approach of the “independence thesis”; and (iii) a critical approach of the “independence thesis”.

Wee, Cecilia.  “Descartes’s Ontological Proof of God’s Existence.”  British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20.1 (2012): 23-40. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper argues that an examination of the ontology that underpins Descartes’s ‘Fifth Meditation’ ontological proof of God’s existence will contribute to a better understanding of the nature and structure of the proof. Attention to the Cartesian meditator’s development of this ontology in earlier meditations also makes clear why this proof could not have been asserted before the ‘Fifth Meditation’. Finally, it is argued that Kant’s objections against the ontological proof have no force against Descartes’s particular version of the proof.

Weil, Éric. Problemas kantianos. [Portuguese] Translated from the French by Luiz Paulo Rouanet. São Paulo: Realizações editora, 2012. [167 p.] [WC]

Weisman, Tama. “The Role of Kant’s “Schematism of the Pure Concepts of Understanding” in Hannah Arendt’s Theory of Judgment.” The International Journal of the Humanities: Annual Review 10 (2012): 1-13. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Never finished, Hannah Arendt’s project “The Life of the Mind” was to include a third section, “Judging.” Indications of what she would have written can be culled from her lecture course: “Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy.” This essay examines the centrality of Kant’s Schematism of the Pure Concepts of Understanding in Arendt’s conception of judgment. Through this analysis, the central roles of imagination and communicability as they relate to judgment are examined. Further, the essay clarifies and emphasizes the importance of Arendt’s insistence on distinction and specificity as they relate to conceptual analysis and thus to judgment.

Wenzel, Christian Helmut.  “Do Negative Judgments of Taste Have a priori Grounds in Kant?”  Kant-Studien 103.4 (2012): 472-93. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: When contrasting something with its opposite, such as positive numbers with negative numbers, repulsion with attraction, good and evil, beauty and ugliness, Kant sometimes says the latter are not merely cases of negation or privation of the former, but that they have their own, independent grounds. But do negative judgments of taste really have a priori grounds? There are two kinds of negative judgments of taste: “This is not beautiful” and “This is ugly”. Can they be a priori judgments? Or are they always impure and without a priori basis? In this essay, I will argue that they can be pure a priori judgments. I will give detailed analyses of examples involving part-whole relationships, objects of art, and aesthetic ideas. In addition, detailed discussions of opposing interpretations will be offered.

Werle, Dirk.  “Problemgeschichte und Konstellationsforschung.”  Klopffechtereien – Missverständnisse – Widersprüche? Methodische und methodologische Perspektiven auf die Kant-Forster-Kontroverse.  Eds. Rainer Godel and Gideon Stiening (op cit.). 271-91. [M]

Wesche, Tilo.  “Moral und Glück: Hoffnung bei Kant und Adorno.”  Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 60.1 (2012): 49-71. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant and Adorno alike have assumed that hope plays a central role in the relation between ethics and happiness. After comparing some of their different interpretations of hope, this paper traces the philosophical account of the concept of hope which Kant and Adorno, however, agree on. They both see hope as essential for bridging the gulf between normativity and realities. Hope, they argue, features a weaker doxastic state than belief but a stronger one than wishful thinking. For Kant, the question, “what may I hope?” is part of the interests of human reason. By modifying this conception of hope, Adorno advocates a notion of hope, which accounts for a critique of religion and metaphysics.

Westphal, Kenneth R.  “Die positive Verteidigung Kants der Urteils- und Handlungsfreiheit, und zwar ohne transzendentalen Idealismus.”  Sind wir Bürger zweier Welten? Freiheit und moralische Verantwortung im transzendentalen Idealismus.  Eds. Mario Brandhorst, Andree Hahmann, and Bernd Ludwig (op cit.). 259-77. [M]

White, Eric.  Rev. of Kant’s Critical Philosophy: The Doctrine of the Faculties, by Gilles Deleuze, transl. by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (1985). European Legacy 17.4 (2012): 572. [HUM]

Wild, Marcus.  “Intuitionen, intuitiver Verstand und Intuition.”  Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 60.6 (2012): 1011-18. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Against Kant, Eckart Förster claims that Goethe’s methodology of intuitive understanding is a real possibility for us. Firstly, this essay shows that this methodology has to be strictly distinguished from the questionable use of intuitions in contemporary analytic philosophy; secondly, strong parallels between Goethe’s intuitive understanding and Bergson’s intuition are put forward. Both use intuitions as a tool to find essence concepts for natural kinds. Moreover, the parallels help naturalists (like me) to detach Förster’s important insight from the idealistic context.

Willaschek, Marcus.  “The Non-Derivability of Kantian Right from the Categorical Imperative: A Response to Nance.”  International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20.4 (2012): 557-64. [M]

Willat, Edward.  Kant, Deleuze, and Architectonics.  New York: Continuum, 2012. [xi, 174 p.] [WC]

Wille, Matthias.  Transzendentaler Antirealismus: Grundlagen einer Erkenntnistheorie ohne Wissenstranszendenz.  Berlin / Boston: De Gruyter, 2012. [xiv, 665 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Quellen und Studien zur Philosophie, vol. 106.
First presented as a Habilitationsschrift (Universiẗat-Münster, 2010).

Williams, Garrath.  “Between Ethics and Right: Kantian Politics and Democratic Purposes.”  European Journal of Philosophy 20.3 (2012): 479-86. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Force and Freedom insists that, “Freedom, understood as independence of another person’s choice, is [all] that matters.” In this paper I suggest that this premise leads Ripstein to an instrumentalization of democracy that neglects a properly public and collective notion of freedom. The paper first criticizes Ripstein’s key argument against any extension of public purposes beyond the upholding of persons’ “independence of others’ choice.” More constructively, the paper then suggests that a space of public freedom is opened up when people deliberate in order to form and pursue democratic purposes. Citizens may act together to promote ends that they think are worthwhile, without dominating one another or restricting individual freedom.

 —— and Ruth Chadwick.  “Responsibilities for Healthcare: Kantian Reflections.”  Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 21.2 (2012): 155-65. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper explores some ways in which Immanuel Kant’s ethical theory can be brought to bear on professional and health-care ethics. Health-care professionals are not mere individuals acting upon their own ends. Rather, their principles of action must be defined in terms of participation in a cooperative endeavor. This generates complex questions as to how well their roles mesh with one another and whether they comprise a well-formed collective agent. We argue that Kant’s ethics therefore, and perhaps surprisingly, requires us to consider the institutions, procedures, and politics that decide who should play what part in a complex collective enterprise. Likewise, professional responsibility involves — alongside a readiness to play one’s individual part — a concern for these collective aspects of health care.

Williams, Howard.  Kant and the End of War: A Critique of Just War Theory.  Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. [vi, 204 p.] [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: An exploration of Immanuel Kant’s account of war and the controversies that have arisen from its interpretation. This book brings the ideas of Kant’s critical philosophy to bear on one of the leading political and legal questions of our age: under what circumstances, if any, is recourse to war legally and morally justifiable? Kant stands almost unchallenged as one of the major thinkers of the European Enlightenment. This issue was strikingly brought to the fore by the 2003 war in Iraq. The book critiques the tradition of just war thinking and suggests how international law and international relations can be viewed from an alternative perspective that aims at a more pacific system of states. Instead of seeing the theory of just war as providing a stabilizing context within which international politics can be carried out, Williams argues that the theory contributes to the current unstable international condition. The just war tradition is not the silver lining in a generally dark horizon but rather an integral feature of the dark horizon of current world politics. Kant was one of the first and most profound thinkers to moot this understanding of just war reasoning and his work remains a crucial starting point for a critical theory of war today.

 ——. “Natural Rights in Hobbes and Kant.” Hobbes Studies 25.1 (2012): 66-90. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Both Hobbes and Kant tackle the issue of natural right in a radical and controversial way. They both present systematic, secular theories of natural law in a highly religious age. Whereas Hobbes transforms natural right by placing the rational individual bent on self-preservation at the centre of political philosophy, Kant transforms natural right by putting the metaphysical presuppositions of his critical philosophy at the heart of his reasoning on politics. Neither attempts to provide an orthodox view of natural right as directly or indirectly derived from God’s commands, although subsequent to their philosophical deduction as natural rights or laws both do not entirely repudiate the idea that these rights or laws can be portrayed as having divine support.

 ——. “Kant and Libertarianism.”  Kant on Practical Justification: Interpretive Essays. Eds. Mark Timmons and Sorin Baiasu (op cit.). 269-83. [M]

Williams, Jessica J.  “How Conceptually Guided Are Kantian Intuitions?”  History of Philosophy Quarterly 29.1 (2012): 57-78. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The distinction Kant draws between the faculties of sensibility and understanding and the representations associated with them, intuitions and concepts, has been a point of interest to several contemporary philosophers engaged in the debate over the possibility of nonconceptual mental content. John McDowell has offered a strong conceptualist interpretation of Kantian intuitions, while Lucy Allais and Robert Hanna have used Kantian intuitions as the model for nonconceptual mental content. In this paper, I will argue that the interpretations offered by McDowell, Hanna, and Allais are problematic insofar as they either overlook or misconstrue crucial aspects of Kant’s account of cognition, including the role of the imagination in the synthesis of intuitions and its relationship to the understanding, and the distinction between the categories and empirical concepts.

Wilson, Daniel.  Rev. of The Kantian Aesthetic: From Knowledge to the Avant-Garde, by Paul Crowther (2010). Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90.3 (2012): 616. [PW]

Wilson, Jeffrey L.  Rev. of Historical Dictionary of Kant and Kantianism, by Helmut Holzhey and Vilem Mudroch (2005). Journal of the History of Philosophy 50.2 (2012): 300-01. [M]

Wilson, Holly L.  Rev. of Kant’s Theory of Evil: An Essay on the Dangers of Self-love and the Aprioricity of History, by Pablo Muchnik (2009). Journal of the History of Philosophy 50.3 (2012): 462-63. [M]

Wolff, Michael.  “Die Analyse der Erfahrung in Kants Prolegomena.”  Kants Prolegomena: ein kooperativer Kommentar.  Eds. Holger Lyre and Oliver Schliemann (op cit.). 127-67. [M]

 ——.  “Recht und Universität bei Kant.”  Kants “Streit der Fakultäten” oder der Ort der Bildung zwischen Lebenswelt und Wissenschaften.  Ed. Ludger Honnefelder (op cit.). 66-88. [M]

Wolff, Werner. “Merkmalslogik, Syllogistik-Theorie und Negation bei Johann Heinrich Lambert — Ein zu Unrecht vergessener Mitstreiter Kants.”  Transzendentalphilosophie und die Kultur der Gegenwart. Eds. Steffen Dietzsch and Udo Teitz (op cit.). 139-65. [M]

Wood, Allen W. “Kant on Practical Reason.”  Kant on Practical Justification: Interpretive Essays. Eds. Mark Timmons and Sorin Baiasu (op cit.). 57-86. [M]

 —— and Songsuk Susan Hahn, eds.  The Cambridge History of Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century (1790-1870.  Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012. [xvi, 992 p.] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: See especially the essays by Pippin (The Kantian Aftermath: Reaction and Revolution in German Philosophy), Horstmann (The Unity of Reason and the Diversity of Life: The Idea of a System in Kant and in Nineteenth-Century philosophy).

 ——, ed.  See: Kant, Immanuel, Lectures on Anthropology.

Wunderlich, Falk.  “Philosophiegeschichte, Ideengeschichte und das Verhältnis von Philosophie und Wissenschaften im 18. Jahrhundert.”  Klopffechtereien – Missverständnisse – Widersprüche? Methodische und methodologische Perspektiven auf die Kant-Forster-Kontroverse.  Eds. Rainer Godel and Gideon Stiening (op cit.). 211-23. [M]

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Xie, Wenyu. “Kant’s Better Man and the Confucian Junzi.” Frontiers of Philosophy in China 7.3 (2012): 481-97. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This essay attempts to compare Kant's better man and the Confucian junzi in the Zhongyong, and argues that Kant's idea of the better man, which expresses human self-improvement in ultimate freedom, is in fact a conception very similar to that of the Confucian junzi, which denotes an ideal human being in cheng. Kant attributes the lack of emphasis on self-improvement in Westem culture to the Christian conception of grace, and demonstrates the possibility of self-improvement on the ground of ultimate freedom. We may call this treatment "the Confucian solution" in Kant's thought. My intention is to explicate the conceptual commonality between the better man and the junzi and demonstrate the Confucian element in Kant's religious thought.

Xu, Yanhang. 从形而上学的道德理念到日常化的反思活动: 审美视野中的康德与维特根斯坦哲学比较研究 / Cong xing er shang xue de dao de li nian dao ri chang hua de fan si huo dong: shen mei shi ye zhong de Kangde yu Weitegensitang zhe xue bi jiao yan jiu. [Chinese] Hangzhou: Zhejiang da xue chu ban she, 2012. [221 p.] [WC]

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Yamatsuta, Saneyuki. “Kant über die Popularphilosophie und den Begriff der Achtung. Anmerkungen zu H. F. Klemmes Johann Georg Sulzers vermischte Sittenlehre”  Metaphysik — Ästhetik — Ethik. Eds. Antonino Falduto, Caroline Kolisang, and Gabriel Rivero (op cit.). 107-19. [WC]

Yankah, Ekow N. “Crime, Freedom, and Civic Bonds: Arthur Ripstein’s Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy.” Criminal Law and Philosophy: An International Journal for Philosophy of Crime, Criminal Law and Punishment 6.2 (2012): 255-72. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: There is no question Arthur Ripstein’s Force and Freedom is an engaging and powerful book which will inform legal philosophy, particularly Kantian theories, for years to come. The text explores with care Kant’s legal and political philosophy, distinguishing it from his better known moral theory. Nor is Ripstein’s book simply a recounting of Kant’s legal and political theory. Ripstein develops Kant’s views in his own unique vision illustrating fresh ways of viewing the entire Kantian project. But the same strength and coherence which ties the book to Kant’s important values of independence blinds the work to our shared moral ties grounded in other political values. Ripstein’s thoughts on punishment are novel in that he embeds criminal law, both in its retributivist and consequentialist facets, into Kant’s overarching political philosophy to show how criminal law can be seen as one aspect of the supremacy of public law. But a criminal law solely focused on the preservation of freedom takes little notice of the ways criminal law need expand its view to account for how a polity can restore the victim of a crime back to civic equality, reincorporate offenders after they have been punished and cannot leave past offenders isolated and likely to reoffend, resulting in the rotating door prison system and communities of innocents who remain preyed upon by career criminals. Lastly, a political theory that does not prize our civic bonds will ignore the startling Balkanization of our criminal punishment practices, where policing, arresting and imprisonment become tools of racial and social oppression. In illustrating the benefits in viewing criminal law as a coherent part of Kant’s political theory of freedom, Ripstein also highlights what is absent. It then becomes clear that though Kant presents one important facet of punishment, only a republican political theory can meet the most pressing moral demands of punishment by reminding us that criminal law must be used to preserve and strengthen civic society.

Yermolaev, Vladimir K. “Кант о «логическом возражении» против онтологического доказательства: фрагмент R 3706. Часть I.” [Russian; Kant on «logical objection» to ontological argument: fragment R 3706. Part I] Kantovskij Sbornik 41.3 (2012): 49-56. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This study is dedicated to the ideas, expressed in manuscript R 3706, where Kant criticizes the traditional refutation of ontological argument, which is based on the distinction between “ideal” and “real” judgments. The relation of this criticism to Kant’s argumentation in Nova dilucidatio and the preceding polemic over ontological argument is analyzed.

 ——. “Кант о «логическом возражении» против онтологического доказательства: фрагмент R 3706. Часть II.” [Russian; Kant on the “logical objection” to the ontological argument: fragment R 3706. Part II] Kantovskij Sbornik 42.4 (2012): 70-77. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article considers the manuscript fragment R 3706, in which Kant criticises the traditional objection to the ontological argument based on the ideal-real judgement distinction. The author analyses the relation of this criticism to Kant’s argumentation in Nova dilucidatio and the earlier polemic on the ontological argument.

Yeum, Sung Jun. “Самопознание разума как жизненный процесс в трансцен-дентальной диалектике Канта.” [Russian; Self-knowledge of Reason as a vital phenomenon in Kant’s transcendental dialectic] Kantovskij Sbornik 41.3 (2012): 26-34. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This study attempts to interpret the process of self-knowledge of reason in the transcendental dialectic as a vital phenomena. In the transcendental dialectic, a thesis and antithesis arises from the division of reason, which can not happen in the death of reason. Dogmatism and skepticism, which had been derived from a division of reason, have formed the history of philosophy. The disputes between the thesis and the antithesis, or the dogmatism and skepticism could be regarded as a battlefields or a war in the history of philosophy. Nevertheless, the aims of these disputes or wars is to cultivate the reason, which in other words is the process of self-knowledge of reason.

Yilmaz, Erdal. “Kant’ın Teorik ve Pratik Felsefesinde Hüküm ve Nesnellik.” Dîvân: Disiplinlerarasi Calismalar Dergisi 32.1 (2012): 97-127. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article aims to explain the judgement and the foundations of its objectivity with reference to both Kant’s theoretical philosophy, which focuses on theoretical reason, and his practical philosophy, that focuses on practical reason. Becuase adjudication is related to knowing and the objectivity of judgment is related to the objectivity of knowledge in his theoretical philosophy, we will try to explain what theoretical judgment is and how its objectivity can be maintained in terms of the conditions and limits of the human being’s ability to know. In the practical philosophy of Kant, because adjudication is related to the actor’s will that is associated with decision-making, and the objectivity of judgment is related to the context of determining of the will, we will examine what practical judgment is and how its objectivity can be maintained by analyzing that what kinds of relations the will enter into for decision-making.

[top] Z    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Zagirniak, Mikail J. “Понятие ценности у Г. Риккерта и его интерпретация в философии С. И. Гессена.” [Russian; H. Rickert’s notion of value and its interpretation in S. I. Hessen’s philosophy] Kantovskij Sbornik 39.1 (2012): 40-44. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper investigated the historical and philosophical context of the notions of “tradition” and the “purpose-task” in the philosophy of Sergius Hessen. The article identified the meaning of values and hierarchy of values of Heinrich Rickert in definition of the notions of “tradition” and “purpose-task” and the main principle of their interaction.

Zahavi, Dan.  Rev. of Kant and Phenomenology, by Tom Rockmore (2011). TLS (29 Jun 2012): 28. [HUM]

 —— and Søren Overgaard.  “Time, Space and Body in Bergson, Heidegger and Husserl.”  Contemporary Kantian Metaphysics: New Essays on Time and Space.  Eds. Roxana Baiasu, Graham Bird, and A. W. Moore (op cit.). 270-97. [M]

Zákutná, Sandra. “Kant a Herder v kontexte filozo­fie­dejín ­(komentár k štúdii­ Sharon­ Anderson-Gold).” Studia Philosophica Kantiana 2012.1 (2012): 50-58. [M] [online]

Zambrana, Rocío. “Kant’s Hyperbolic Formalism.” Idealistic Studies 42.1 (2012): 37-56. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Hegel famously argued that Kantian Moralität is an empty formalism. This article offers a defense of Kant’s formalism and suggests that it is crucial to Hegel’s own idealism. My defense, however, depends on reading Kantian morality non-morally, as a theory of normative authority. Through a reading of the Grundlegung and Religion, the article delineates Kant’s hyperbolic formalism — the insistence on giving an account of the form of rational agency by isolating willing from all content. The article accordingly assesses Kant’s understanding of autonomy as a matter of institution-subjection. It also critically engages Henry Allison’s groundbreaking work on Kant. Hegel follows Kant in arguing that determinacy is a matter of institution-subjection, and in the Logic provides a radically formalist justification of the role of normative authority in determinacy. Unlike Kant, who articulates institution-subjection as a matter of an isolated subject, Hegel shows that institution-subjection is a matter of social practices.

Zammito, John H.  “The Lenoir Thesis Revisited: Blumenbach and Kant.”  Studies in the History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 43.1 (2012): 120-32. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Timothy Lenoir launched the historical study of German life science at the end of the 18th century with the claim that J. F. Blumenbach’s approach was shaped by his reception of the philosophy of Immanuel Kant: a ‘teleomechanism’ that adopted a strictly ‘regulative’ approach to the character of organisms. It now appears that Lenoir was wrong about Blumenbach’s understanding of Kant, for Blumenbach’s Bildungstrieb entailed an actual empirical claim. Moreover, he had worked out the decisive contours of his theory and he had exerted his maximal influence on the so-called ‘Göttingen School’ before 1795, when Lenoir posits the main influence of Kant’s thought took hold. This has crucial significance for the historical reconstruction of the German life sciences in the period. The Lenoir thesis can no longer serve as the point of departure for that reconstruction.

 ——.  “The Pursuit of Science as Decadence in Kant’s Remarks in ‘Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime’.”  Kant’s Observations and Remarks: A Critical Guide.  Eds. Susan Meld Shell and Richard Velkley (op cit.). 234-46. [M]

 ——.  “The Forster-Kant Controversy: The rovocations of Interdisciplinarity.”  Klopffechtereien – Missverständnisse – Widersprüche? Methodische und methodologische Perspektiven auf die Kant-Forster-Kontroverse.  Eds. Rainer Godel and Gideon Stiening (op cit.). 225-43. [M]

 ——.  “Should Kant have Abandoned the “Daring Adventure of Reason”? The Interest of Contemporary Naturalism in the Historicization of Nature in Kant and Idealist Naturphilosophie.”  Internationales Jahrbuch des Deutschen Idealismus/International Yearbook of German Idealism: Philosophie und Wissenschaft/Philosophy and Science, eds. Jürgen Stolzenberg and Fred Rush. 8 (2012): 130-64. [M]

Zerbudis, Ezequiel. “Incongruent Counterparts and the Origin of Kant’s Distinction between Sensibility and Understanding.” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 94.3 (2012): 326-52. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the present paper I challenge what I take to be a common view concerning Kant's intellectual development between 1768 and 1770, namely, the idea that the phenomenon of incongruent counterparts has played an important role in his adoption of the thesis that sensibility and understanding are of a completely different nature. My argument has two parts. First, I try to show that the phenomenon was not considered by Kant, in 1768, as requiring any change in his conception of the cognitive faculties. On the contrary, he seems to provide an account of the knowledge of counterparts that is completely in accordance with his previous views on that matter. Second, I show that the discussion of counterparts in his 1770 Dissertation played no role in either eliciting or justifying his endorsement of dualism.

Zilber, Andrey S. “«Кантовская теория политики» в «экзистенциальном либерализме» Герхардта.” [Russian; ‘Kant’s theory of politics’ in the ‘existential liberalism’ of Gerhardt] Kantovskij Sbornik 42.4 (2012): 50-58. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article focuses on the interpretation of Immanuel Kant’s political views in V. Gerhardt’s “existential liberalism”. The author considers the basic elements of the “theory of politics” presented in this interpretation, emphasises the components of interpretation per se and additional reception, and offers a critical analysis of certain conclusion from the general point of view of contemporary discussion on Kant’s political works.

Zinkin, Melissa.  “Kant and the Pleasure of ‘Mere Reflection’.”  Inquiry 55.5 (2012): 433-53. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant refers to the pleasure that we feel when judging that an object is beautiful as the pleasure of “mere reflection”. Yet Kant never makes explicit what exactly is the relationship between the activity of “mere reflection” and the feeling of pleasure. I discuss several contemporary accounts of the pleasure of taste and argue that none of them is fully accurate, since, in each case, they leave open the possibility that one can reflect without having a feeling of pleasure, and hence allow a possible skepticism of taste. I then present my own account, which can better explain why Kant thinks that when one reflects one must also have a feeling of pleasure. My view, which emphasizes the role of attention in Kant, depicts well what we do when we judge something to be beautiful. It can also suggest a way to explain the relation between judgments of taste and moral feeling, and begin to show how the faculty of feeling fills a gap in the system of our cognitive faculties.

 ——.  “Kant on Negative Magnitudes.”  Kant-Studien 103.4 (2012): 397-414. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant’s 1763 essay, Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative Magnitudes into Philosophy, is one of the least discussed of all his pre-critical writings. When it is referred to, it is usually just to note a few passages that anticipate Kant’s later, Critical philosophy. I argue that instead of understanding these early anticipations of the Critical philosophy as separable from Kant’s discussion of negative magnitudes, we should take their origin in Kant’s investigation of negative magnitudes to be of central importance, since it can help us to understand aspects of Kant’s Critical view of cognition where negative magnitudes still play a role. I argue that negative magnitudes suggest to Kant a kind of cognitive activity that is neither the spontaneity of discursive thought nor the receptivity of the senses. Rather it is an “effort” of the mind, of which we are conscious through a feeling. I show that Kant’s early views about negative magnitudes are retained in his Critical philosophy.

Zöller, Günter. “Reflexion und Regulation. Kant über Begriffe und Prinzipien der Vernunft in der Kritik der Urteilskraft.”  Worauf die Philosophie hinaussieht. Kants regulative Ideen im Kontext von Teleologie und praktischer Philosophie. Eds. Bernd Dörflinger and Günter Kruck (op cit.). 31-48. [WC]

 ——. “Ursprung. Kants kritische Originalität.”  Urworte. Zur Geschichte und Funktion erstbegründender Begriffe. Eds. Michael Ott and Tobias Döring (Munich: Fink, 2012). 121-34. [WC]

 ——.  See: Malpas, Jeff and Günter Zöller.

Zuanazzi, Giovanni.  Rev. of Il male radicale in Kant, by Karl Jaspers, transl. by Roberto Celada Ballanti (2011). Acta Philosophica: Pontificia Universita della Santa Croce 21.1 (2012): 192-95. [PI]

Zuckert, Rachel.  “History, Biology, and Philosophical Anthropology in Kant and Herder.”  Internationales Jahrbuch des Deutschen Idealismus/International Yearbook of German Idealism: Philosophie und Wissenschaft/Philosophy and Science, eds. Jürgen Stolzenberg and Fred Rush. 8 (2012): 38-59. [M]

Zupančič, Alenka.  Ethics of the Real: Kant and Lacan.  London: Verso, 2012. [288 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: First publication: Verso, 2000.

 ——. Etica del reale: Kant, Lacan. [Italian]  Translated from the English by Luigi Francesco Clemente. Naples: Orthotes, 2012. [276 p.] [WC]

Zurzban, Robert, Peter DeScioli, and Daniel Fein.  “Hamilton vs. Kant: Pitting Adaptations for Altruism against Adaptations for Moral Judgment.”  Evolution and Human Behavior 33.4 (2012): 323-33. [PsychINFO]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Prominent evolutionary theories of morality maintain that the adaptations that underlie moral judgment and behavior function, at least in part, to deliver benefits (or prevent harm) to others. These explanations are based on the theories of kin selection and reciprocal altruism, and they predict that moral systems are designed to maximize Hamiltonian inclusive fitness. In sharp contrast, however, moral judgment often appears Kantian and rule-based. To reconcile this apparent discrepancy, some theorists have claimed that Kantian moral rules result from mechanisms that implement simple heuristics for maximizing welfare. To test this idea, we conducted a set of studies in which subjects (N = 1290) decided whether they would kill one person to save five others, varying the relationship of the subject with the others involved (strangers, friends, brothers). Are participants more likely to observe the Kantian rule against killing in decisions about brothers and friends, rather than strangers? We found the reverse. Subjects reported greater willingness to kill a brother or friend than a stranger (in order to save five others of the same type). These results suggest that the rule-based structure of moral cognition is not explained by kin selection, reciprocity, or other altruism theories.

[top] Dissertations    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Alain, Vincent.  Analyse et distinction La logique des notions en Allemagne de 1684 à 1790. Quelques remarques pour servir à l'étude des réceptions par Christian Wolff et Emmanuel Kant des Meditationes de Cognitione, Veritate et Ideis de Leibniz. [Analysis and Distinction. Logic of notions in Germany : 1684-1790. Some remarks for the study of the reception of Leibniz's Meditationes de Cognitione, Veritate et Ideis by Christian Wolff and Immanuel Kant]  Ph.D. diss.  Université Paris-Sorbonne, 2012. [# p.]  Advisor: Michel Fichant. [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Leibniz published in 1684 a short opuscule, Meditationes de Cognitione, Veritate et Ideis. This Leibniz's essay of few pages is a true discours de la méthode for the German philosophy. This research tries to justify this declaration and restores the reception of this short text by Christian Wolff and Immanuel Kant. This work studies the development of the Begriffsanalyse in Germany. But, what means analysis for Wolff and for Kant? The study of this logic of notions, its bond to mathematics and with the Cartesian conception of Mathesis universalis, clarifies the Kantian distinction between dogmatic method and dogmatism. This inquiry goes back to the Leibnizian origin of the classical division of analytic and synthetic judgments. This work comes to an end by the study of Eberhard's critic of the Critic. In short, like Michel Fichant formulated, this study wants to make manifest that "behind German words of Kant lay down Latin words of Leibniz".

Aleshire, Zoe Heather.  Kant’s beard: an inclusive feminist ethic.  Master’s thesis.  Washington State University, 2012. [v, 48 p.]  Advisor: Matt Stichter. [online] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant is well known as being considered anti feminist in the purview of his ethics. Here, I examine the feminist claims of DeBeauvoir and Irigaray in contrast to the metaphysics and ethics of Kant to determine whether these claims of androcentricism are in fact exclusionary of women and others who do not fit the “ideal” of masculinity. I argue that Kant's ethics are in fact androcentrist in nature, but do not wish to abandon his ethical project altogether. Instead, women need an “extra step” to consider themselves fully human under his metaphysical foundation, but the universalist thesis must remain in order to preserve the moving parts of the Kantian ethical framework. I am dedicated to the preservation of the Categorical Imperative, and my project is to unite a feminist critique of Kant's assumptions about universal agency with the specifically Kantian conception of rational personhood while remaining sympathetic to both parties.

Bauer, John W.  Against Lying: Some Historical Arguments in Favor of Moral Absolutism.  Master’s thesis.  University of South Carolina, 2012. [117 p.]  Advisor: Christopher Tollefsen. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Beginning with Augustine of Hippo, an unbroken lineage of philosophical arguments has been in place supporting an absolutist prohibition against all lies, a lineage that has often been referred to as the absolutist ‘tradition’ against lying. This paper explores this so-called tradition by first examining Augustine’s view. Augustine argued that lying is always wrong because it is an act that is always intrinsically duplicitous. The paper then explicates the positions of three subsequent philosophical figures, figures that shared Augustine’s view and together with him span 15 centuries of the history of philosophy. These three individuals - Thomas Aquinas, Baruch Spinoza, and Immanuel Kant - were not only major philosophical figures who shared the same absolutist view against lying, but they were also figures who undertook dramatically different approaches to philosophy.
Ultimately, this thesis seeks to uncover why lying is always wrong. In this regard, my intent is not to construct a set of arguments from scratch, but rather to enlist the arguments of what I take to be the four most important philosophers of the absolutist tradition. As such, my approach is historical and exegetical rather than analytical or phenomenological. I shall argue that the rule prohibiting all lying first established by Augustine has been advanced, and perhaps in many ways further developed, by Aquinas, Spinoza, and Kant. This paper will conclude by suggesting that Augustine’s main arguments have been consistently maintained by three philosophically dissimilar philosophers who followed him. Augustine’s central arguments, I argue, are as follows: (1) the duplicity of a lie is against the order of reason; (2) lies always do incommensurable harm to the self; (3) a lie always constitutes a breach of faith; and (4) lies undermine trust, which is basic to society.

Bernhardt, Emil.  Estetikk og fremmedgjøring: En undersøkelse i lys av Kant. [Norwegian]  Master’s thesis.  University of Oslo, 2012. [83 p.]  Advisor: Stig Hareide. [online] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this thesis I try to develop the idea of a relationship between aesthetics and alienation. More concretely, I will argue that alienation is a precondition for having an aesthetic experience. As this means using the concept of alienation in a special, unusual manner, it will be important to take a closer look at that specific concept. I will argue that the concept of alienation traditionally has been used in what I call a diagnostic way. Against this traditional understanding of alienation, I will argue that alienation could also be regarded as a resource. In order to grasp this nuance it will be necessary to discuss a shift of the concept of alienation, and hence a turn from a diagnostic to a articulating function will be of central importance. In the discussion of the relation between alienation and aesthetic experience, I will mainly draw upon the aesthetics of Immanuel Kant and his so-called third critique, Critique of the Power of Judgement from 1790. In particular the division between determining and reflective judgement will be important here. My aim is to show that the concept of alienation is suitable when it comes to articulating aspects of aestethetics – partly of the aesthetical discussion of epistemological questions in general, partly of features of the aesthetic experience.

Bhardwaj, Kiran.  Kant’s Moral Philosophy and the Role of the Highest Good.  Master’s thesis.  The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2012. [47 p.]  Advisor: Thomas E. Hill, Jr. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Described as the union of complete virtue and complete happiness in accordance with such virtue, the concept of the highest good draws together Kant’s account of moral virtue with special features of humans: our need for happiness and hopes for justice. However, the highest good fails to perform its function in Kant’s theory if either of two strong criticisms holds: if it is inconsistent with Kant’s account of moral motivation, or if it is unimportant in moral action. I argue that a historical survey of Kant’s explanation of the highest good shows how improved argumentation in the later works helps Kant to resolve any apparent inconsistency. And while the highest good is not important in everyday moral action, I conclude that we should use it to resolve worries about the futility of moral action. As a result, the highest good has an undeniably central role in Kant’s ethics.

Blecher, Ian.  Kant and the Meaning of Existence: A Modal Account.  Ph.D. diss.  University of Pittsburgh, 2012. [75 p.]  Advisor: Stephen Engstrom [online] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: It is a distinctive claim of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason that what exists outside the mind is always represented under a modality — i.e. as possible, actual or necessary. The interest of this claim is not widely appreciated. Most commentators have ignored it; a few have rejected it out of hand. Since the Critique presents modality as a basic aspect of human knowledge, however, this is a serious oversight. My dissertation is an attempt to rectify it. The main idea is that, for Kant, the knowledge of what exists is connected with a certain kind of progress in the mind — a progress from the capacity to know (possibility) to the act of this capacity, (actuality), and finally to the perfection of that act (necessity). To the extent that the representation of this progress figures in our knowledge of what exists, such knowledge is thus at least implicitly modal. I argue, however, that Kant also intends something stronger: viz. that knowledge of what exists is constituted by its representation within the progress of modalities. It follows that modality is not just one feature of this knowledge among others, but its characteristic form.

Brown, Joel N.  Kant, Derivative Influence, and the Metaphysics of Causality.  Ph.D. diss.  Syracuse University, 2012. [182 p.]  Advisor: Frederick C. Beiser. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant tells us in the Prolegomena’s autobiographical note that Hume interrupted his dogmatic slumber. This declaration has traditionally dictated the interpretive limits of Kant’s causal theory. That dogmatic slumber has been largely misunderstood, and as a result, so has Kant’s metaphysics of causality. The pre-critical Kant was not exposed to Hume’s skepticism of necessary connection precisely because he too subscribed to a theory in which substances are not necessarily connected. Instead, Kant’s enduring metaphysics of causality, which Kant refers to as ‘Derivative Influence’ or ‘Generally Established Harmony,’ remained largely intact even through his Copernican revolution. This thesis traces the elements of Kant’s enduring metaphysics of cause from his pre-critical work to the Critique. It also covers Kant’s actual slumber which consisted in his not having a viable, ready-to-hand answer to explain to Hume how we have access to the causal concept. To overcome the impasse and to give a viable account, Kant endeavors to relocate the causal schema, formally thought of as being in the mind of God, to the finite mind. The previously overlooked elements of Kant’s causal metaphysics give insight into Kant’s treatment of causality in the Second and Third Analogies of Experience. There, Kant looks to sustain Newtonian arguments while also explaining how independent existents gain co-existence with other existents.

Carr, Cheri Lynne.  Deleuze’s Critical Philosophy: The Differential Theory of the Faculties.  Ph.D. diss.  The University of Memphis, 2012. [203 p.]  Advisor: Mary Beth Mader. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This dissertation argues that a sustained treatment of Gilles Deleuze’s relationship to Immanuel Kant is essential to a refined understanding of Deleuze’s thought in his seminal work, Difference and Repetition (1968). Five years before writing Difference and Repetition Deleuze published Kant’s Critical Philosophy (1963), a short but comprehensive survey of Kant’s work that introduced within the general triadic structure of Kant’s critiques a more finely-grained structure oriented around the concept of faculties or capacities of thought. Kant’s Critical Philosophy sees Deleuze using Kant’s recurrent descriptions of the relationships between the faculties of thought as an organizing principle to reveal the unity of Kant’s practice of critique as it developed toward realizing its own standard of immanence. Deleuze’s charge that Kant ultimately betrays this standard due his unwillingness to question the claims of morality itself is the catalyst for Deleuze’s thinking in Difference and Repetition. There, Deleuze produces a differential theory of faculties through a revision and recuperation of Kant’s doctrine of faculties, but without explicitly linking it to a new critical practice. This dissertation brings to light the new critical practice implicit in Deleuze’s thought by comparing the doctrine of faculties from Kant’s Critical Philosophy with the differential theory of faculties from Difference and Repetition. What it shows is that in Difference and Repetition Deleuze carries out his own “critique of reason”, an immanent critique that is not satisfied to remain at the level of the a priori conditions of experience but seeks to account for experience’s genesis. Deleuze’s critique contests the claims of morality at the heart of Kant’s conservatism by developing a non-psychologistic theory of faculties as relations of power, by exposing the non-rational basis of rationality through a genetic analysis of “common sense”, and by forcing thought to internalize how powerless it is to attain absolute moral insight. The methodological correlations drawn between Kant’s Critical Philosophy and Difference and Repetition allow the dissertation to conclude by raising important questions about the extent to which Deleuze’s critique breaks with its Kantian antecedent, particularly as regards its practical commitments.

Caviglia Marconi, Alessandro.  La religión a la luz de la moral: un estudio del concepto kantiano de religión. [Spanish]  Master’s thesis.  Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2012. [202 p.]  Advisor: Ciro Alegría. [WC]

Davezac, David.  Normativité et temporalité dans l'éthique kantienne.  Ph.D. diss.  Université de Toulouse-Le Mirail, 2012. [575 p.]  Advisor: Jean-Christophe Goddard. [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The thesis is centered on the notion of practical temporality. It studies the connection between normativity and temporality by showing that in knowledge, objectivity is produced by a schematism of the categories of the understanding, which allows to connect and to apply the universal concepts, a priori and internal, to one given sensitive private individual, while in practice, the categories of freedom make a practical synthesis possible within the desires, but at once, without passing through the schematism of imagination. It is not any more a question of legislating on one given sensitive and of ordering it, but of producing a reality or an effectiveness which is the "resolution of the will", in a absolutely immediate way. Now, if a morally determined will has been produced, there should be a practical temporality in which this causality through freedom will operate . This notion was not elaborated by Kant but it seems necessary to think of it to understand the effectiveness of moral Law. Indeed, the problem of the applicability of the unconditioned pure principle in the time of transcendental aesthetics is incomprehensible because if it applies in the time then we have to conclude that it is itself a priori conditioned and if it applies outside time, we reach the conclusion that the intelligible character is timeless, eternal and unchanging, which invalidates practical freedom as goodwill. Our thesis aims at answering this problem by showing that the moral Law is active and becomes a duty only by the person who is not unchanging but who has to be seen as practical temporality and duratio nouménon (duration made infinite by the postulate of the Dialectic of practical reason).

Deng, Yi.  Toward “Free Trade” from Kant’s Cosmopolitan Ideal.  Ph.D. diss.  University of Minnesota, 2012. [vii, 146 p.]  Advisor: Sarah W. Holtman and Joseph I. Owens. [online] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: My dissertation aims to present a coherent Kantian justice in terms of Kant's publicity principle. The theoretical construction arises from inquiries about the case of China's soybean market shift after its accession to the WTO, and holds the practical aims of diagnosing injustices and prescribing individuals', states' and global institutions' responsibilities in rectifying injustices. Specifically, I advocate for publicity as negotiable consent, which could entail active citizenship and moral politicians. By appealing to publicity as negotiable consent, I argue that the Chinese soybean case involves injustice, and provide corresponding expansions of Kant's cosmopolitan right, republicanism, and a federalism of free states as conditions for justice. The puzzling relationship between the WTO and federalism of free states suggests the need to address connections between trade liberalization and cosmopolitan ideal. By appealing to the I-Ching, I present the dynamic balance of Yin and Yang as a model for the interaction between capital and labor in the context of global justice. The interdependent yin-yang indicates that the discrepancy between theoretical predictions from the WTO and empirical evidence in the Chinese soybean case has resulted from the WTO's neglect of mobility differentiations among the factors of production. At the end of my dissertation, an appropriate capital-labor relation prescribed by yin-yang leads to practical suggestions for the WTO. Emphasizing a mixture of bottom-up and top-down restrictions, both "publicity as negotiable consent" and yin-yang energize an account of Kantian justice as a dynamic theory which is continually responding to the uncertain, complicated, but practical issues.

Diehl, Catharine Elizabeth.  The Theory of Intensive Magnitudes in Leibniz and Kant.  Ph.D. diss.  Princeton University [Comparative Literature], 2012. [353 p.]  Advisor: Daniel Heller-Roazen. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This dissertation demonstrates the fundamental importance of the problem of intensive magnitudes for Leibniz and Kant. While their work has generated an immense scholarly literature, the systematic role of the concept of intensive magnitude has been neglected. I argue that attending to the problem of degree-valued properties reveals new connections among Leibniz’s and Kant’s metaphysical, epistemological, and aesthetic concerns. I show that they struggle to provide a unified theory of degree-valued properties, drawing on many aspects of their theoretical and practical philosophies. The problem of intensive magnitudes provides a new perspective on the relationship between Leibniz and Kant that reduces it neither to simple continuity nor to discontinuity. In addition, tracing the development of theories of intensive magnitudes shows that standard accounts of the rise of aesthetics in the eighteenth century miss the links between questions of taste and feeling and broader epistemological and metaphysical concerns; these accounts thus fail to appreciate the specific importance of eighteenth-century aesthetic theory for philosophy as a whole. In an introductory chapter, I show that Leibniz’s theory of intensive magnitudes draws on two distinct sources: the discussion of the je ne sais quoi in the seventeenth century and the long tradition of reflection concerning the problem of the intensification and remission of forms. The first chapter argues that Leibniz provides a new account of the individuation of substances on the basis of their intensive magnitudes. In the second I turn to a consideration of Leibniz’s law of continuity — the principle that nature never makes leaps — and demonstrate the way in which this principle grounds Leibniz’s theory of petites perceptions and the je ne sais quoi. Chapter 3 reconstructs Kant’s argument in the Critique of Pure Reason for the a priori principle that the “real” corresponding to sensation has an intensive magnitude. The concluding chapter considers whether representations contained in a single instant are simple and argues that, according to Kant’s account in the Analytic of the Sublime, the instant is not a constituent of objective cognition but arises from the feeling of limitation.

Ehrsam, Raphaël.  Le problème du langage chez Kant.  Ph.D. diss.  Université Panthéon-Sorbonne, 2012. [592 p.]  Advisor: Jocelyn Benoist. [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: La philosophie kantienne présente une pensée du langage structurée selon trois axes: la théorie génétique de l'apprentissage linguistique, la théorie de la signification des énoncés et la théorie de la communication. (1) La théorie génétique étudie l'acquisition individuelle des capacités et des représentations. Kant interroge dans cette perspective le rôle de l'ouïe et des règles grammaticales dans la formation des concepts, la fonction du pronom personnel "je" comme fondement de la personnalité, la place des formules impératives et du dialogue dans l'éducation morale. (2) La théorie sémantique étudie l'usage et la validité des concepts. Sur le plan théorique, Kant adopte en général une conception correspondantiste non métaphysique de la vérité et présente les objets sensibles comme le domaine de référence fondamental de nos énoncés. En outre, il identifie les formes fondamentales du discours et les principes de l'application des termes à la perception, avant d'exposer le rôle méthodologique des Idées transcendantales. Sur le plan pratique, il montre selon quels principes les termes prescriptifs et les expressions descriptives s'articulent au sein des énoncés moraux. (3) Enfin la théorie de la communication épouse la question de l'usage effectif et optimal de nos pouvoirs intellectuels et moraux. A ce dernier niveau, Kant dégage les fonctions et les normes générales de la communication, déduit de ces principes un art de la conversation et une défense inédite de la liberté d'expression, et conclut à la nécessité d'une interdiction juridique stricte du mensonge.

Farkas, Sarah Elizabeth.  Uniting Right and Duty: Hegel’s Critical Appropriation of Kant’s “Metaphysics of Morals”.  Ph.D. diss.  Boston University, 2012. [152 p.]  Advisor: C. Allen Speight. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Both Kant and Hegel were concerned with the possibility of unifying the notions of right and duty within an overarching ethical theory. Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals (MdS ) is a paradigmatic example of a failed attempt at this kind of unification. Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (PR ), it is argued, both inherits and overcomes the problems inherent in Kant’s work. This dissertation, with its emphasis on the importance of connecting right and duty in a systematic ethics, provides a new critique of the MdS and an account of the PR as putting forth an ethics that corresponds to the actual motivational structure of moral agents. Chapter One demonstrates that Kant’s attempt to unify the concepts of right and duty in the MdS fails. It is argued here that Kant grounds the concept of right within his moral framework and thus absorbs right entirely into his ethics. Chapter Two addresses early Hegelian sources that seriously engage Kant’s MdS . Emphasis is placed upon the way in which the concern of Hegel’s project in the PR , the unification of right and duty, is present in his earliest work and the fact that the narrative that Hegel puts forth is a direct reading of and response to Kant’s MdS . Chapter Three treats the realms of abstract right and morality that Hegel constructs in the PR with a focus on how Hegel both appropriates the structure of MdS and levels an implicit critique at Kant. This chapter pays special attention to the way in which Hegel ensures the distinction between right and morality while binding them together inextricably. Chapter Four concludes that what can be gained through Hegel’s successful integration of right and duty lies in his “right of subjective satisfaction,” the right of the subject to find her satisfaction in whatever action she may be obligated to perform. In this way, right and duty become united within the subject, and as a result she has a right to identify with her actions in order to truly consider herself a free agent.

Ferrié, Christian.  La politique entre réforme et révolution: le sens de la position kantienne.  Ph.D. diss.  Paris II, 2012. [# p.]  Advisor: Géraldine Muhlmann. [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Modern political thought has admitted the dichotomy between reform and revolution. Reformism has turned it into a principle that currently dominates our minds. But isn't politics irremediably torn between reform and revolution?Kant's politics is an ideal paradigm to pose the problem of the relation between reform and revolution. At Burke's initiative, the modern opposition between reform and revolution is formed at that time as a reaction to the revolutions in Europe. Kant accepts the opposition between reforms adopted by the sovereign and the revolution done by the people. But his well-known sympathy for the French Revolution leads him to elaborate a pragmatic political philosophy that takes into account the historico-political conditions of the implementation of the republican principles defended by the Revolution. Stimulated by a revolutionary spirit, Kantian reformism means to successfully establish the political process of republicanisation thanks to reform, while doing justice to the necessity of the natural process of the revolution which reacts to the oppression of liberty. According to the philosopher of the Revolution, (revolutionary) reform accomplishes the revolution.So as to show it, one must place Kant's politics in his time. Part I makes clear its historical and semantic context: the Kantian refutation of the right to rebel is directed against the Monarchomachists; the Kantian way of articulating reform to revolution is inscribed in the tradition of a consensus between reform and revolution implemented by the Enlightenment. Part II charts the creation of the 'reformist' dichotomy between reform and revolution by German Burkians: rather than the destructive violence of the Revolution, they opted for a conservative reform that managed only to bring about ad hoc improvements to the monarchic institutions. Kant, on the contrary, turns out to be the secret theoretician of a revolutionary reform which totally upsets the monarchic system: to show this, part III deciphers the revolutionary spirit of his political thought.

Giddy, Patrick.  Authority, religion and man: a philosophical propaedeutic to a secular understanding of authority in the Christian faith, with special reference to Kant, Hegel and Kierkegaard.  Master’s thesis.  Stellenbosch University, 2012. [289 leaves]  Advisor: ??. [WC]

Haber, Ana.  Ethics of Tragic Heroism: Moral Autonomy as Lawgiving Rebellion in Kant, Hegel and Kafka.  Ph.D. diss.  State University of New York at Binghamton [Comparative Literature], 2012. [399 p.]  Advisor: William Haver. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This dissertation aims to prove that Kant’s notion of autonomy and Hegel’s notion of spirituality have nothing to do with common-minded pragmatism or bourgeois-consumerist reasonableness. They are both founded upon the premise that what is most uniquely, distinctly and authentically particular in each particularity, lives in deepest communion with what is most universal about human race as a whole. One acquires the meaning of this deep communion only through a pitiless, autonomous questioning of all given contents of justice inscribed in right, morals, habits, politics, religion or economics that are externally proclaimed to be valid. Upon this merciless questioning, one reaches the zero-point of absolute uncertainty regarding the very notions of good, right and justice. This depletes universality from its hefty, imperative sturdiness and lets particularity live in desperate fluctuation from one ground of incertitude to another. When particularity dares to accept that universality is irremediably empty — that no god or external authority will ever come to authoritatively fill it with content — she can become moral, lawgiving particularity. She then realizes that the determination of the content of good is the sole responsibility of her particular action, of her own deep engagement with the universal as idea and the universal as the entirety of the social, public sphere. Externalization of authentic, unique particularity through action is the only true universality that human beings are capable of. Particularity which is able to achieve this is the age-old Slave’s Desire for recognition which, through the nameless throbbing of anxiety, keeps plaguing the public sphere so long as there are rights that remain unrecognized. Kafka’s writing is imbued with the here described rationality of Desire. Unlike Kant and Hegel, Kafka is extremely pessimistic about the prospect of implementing Desire into the social sphere. He correctly perceives that in our time, Desire is sacrificed for the sake of extolling the irrationality of caprices and whims into the definitive yardsticks of human freedom. Desire (with capital “D”), as the ground of rational volition, loses the battle with the irrationality of desires, drives and inclinations, for the latter are inscribed in the ever-growing mass mentality.

Hausmann, Iris Isabella.  Philosophiam criticam arti medicae non esse inimicam: Dass die kritische Philosophie der ärztlichen Kunst nicht feindlich gegenübersteht. Die Umsetzung der Kritischen Philosophie Kants in der Medizin der Aufklärung diskutiert in der medizinischen Dissertation von Benedikt Gebel aus dem Jahr 1794.  M.D. diss.  Institut für Ethik und Geschichte der Medizin/Tübingen-Universität, 2012. [166 p.]  Advisor: U. Wiesing. [online] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The generalised skepsis characterising the period of enlightenment included a critical approach to the basis of medicine. The evidence of its frailty and uncertainess led to a crisis of its fundaments. Application of a new, stable, and secure theory of cognition should donate medicine credibility, make possible a further evolution, and a classification under the sciences. At the beginning of the reception of Kant´s philosophy, in 1794 in Frankfurt/Oder, emerges the dissertation of the medical student Benedict Gebel, with the titel Philosophia critica arti medicae non esse inimicam. According to his contemporary collegues, the philosophic physicians and in analogy to the Arkesilas-article, as one of the first he emphasizes the way in which translation of the critical philosphy to medicine could lead to its refinement: application of Kant´s theory of cognition would point out its sources, give clear laws and keep medicine in its limits. The apriority as unique source of science would classify medicine unto the arts, but this art would gain securness and become "systematic" by observance and experience. This dissertation is a translation of the original latin text and discussion of Gebel´s and the philosophic physicians´ ideas.

Hildebrand, Carl H.  Kant and Moral Responsibility.  Master’s thesis.  University of Ottawa, 2012. [119 p.]  Advisor: Andrew Brook. [online] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This project is primarily exegetical in nature and aims to provide a rational reconstruction of the concept of moral responsibility in the work of Immanuel Kant, specifically in his Critique of Pure Reason (CPR), Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (GR), and Critique of Practical Reason (CPrR). It consists of three chapters – the first chapter interprets the idea of freedom that follows from the resolution to the Third Antinomy in the CPR. It argues that Kant is best understood here to be providing an unusual but cogent, compatibilist account of freedom that the author terms meta-compatibilism. The second chapter examines the GR and CPrR to interpret the theory of practical reason and moral agency that Kant develops in these works. This chapter concludes by evaluating what has been established about Kant’s ideas of freedom and moral agency at that point in the project, identifying some problems and objections in addition to providing some suggestions for how Kantian ethics might be adapted within a consequentialist framework. The third chapter argues that, for Kant, there are two necessary and jointly sufficient conditions (in addition to a compatibilist definition of freedom) that must obtain for an individual to qualify as responsible for her actions.

Hoffmann, Thomas.  Zum Problem eines Bewusstseins bei Tieren am Paradigma der kantischen Theorie des Bewusstseins.  Ph.D. diss.  Universität-Trier, 2012. [174 p.]  Advisor: Bernd Dörflinger and Michael Albrecht. [online] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: First of all, the following thesis is supported and defended: On the basis of Kant’s theory of human consciousness or rather human cognition it is necessary to consider animals as having features of transcendental subjectivity as well. Then this thesis is critically related to Kant’s theory of human consciousness or rather human cognition. To support the named thesis two aspects of Kant’s theory of human consciousness or rather human cognition are considered: On the one hand, Kant’s conception of space and time as the a priori forms of intuition of a transcendental subject – insofar as animals intuit in space and time, they must also be endowed with these a priori forms of intuition; on the other hand, the dependency of the consciousness of apprehension on acts of synthesis, which cannot originate in the faculty of sensibility. These acts depend on the unity of the transcendental subject, in (non-human) animal as well as in human consciousness. In the extensive final part of the paper – and after Kant’s theories of the specific purposiveness of organisms, of animation in general and of non-human mentality have also been examined –, two aspects of Kant’s conception of human consciousness or rather human cognition are critically discussed on the basis of the above outlined trains of thought. Firstly, it is discussed whether Kant’s thesis that reason or transcendental subjectivity is, so to speak, an organic and indissoluble unity, “in which […] every part exists for the sake of all the others as all the others exist for its sake” (B XXIII), should still be defended. This discussion is indispensable, as it seems that the necessity of ascribing features of transcendental subjectivity to animals in a certain degree breaks up the organic unity of reason or rather of transcendental subjectivity. Furthermore, it is considered if it is not judicious to refer to the features of transcendental subjectivity in animals as self-consciousness. Insofar as animals have the empirical apperception or the inner sense (or the consciousness of apprehension), it is in this regard in their case as in our case a transcendental subject that is conscious of itself (of its representations), if not necessarily knowing of itself as such a subject as well. Thus, it is rather the recognition of oneself as such a transcendental subject that distinguishes man from non-human animals.

Homma, Yoshihiro.  L’auto-détermination par la loi. Kant et la question du sujet.  Ph.D. diss.  Université de Strasbourg, 2012. [# p.]  Advisor: Jacob Rogozinski. [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The purpose of this research aims at demonstrating that there is a specific conception of the Self in Kant. According to the author, the fundamental of the subjectivity in Kant can be found in the free will acting under the law that it gives to itself. For Kant the moral law is the law I give to myself. Nevertheless, the law is understood as an imperative that I give to myself by using the second person, that is to say that one is addressed by the moral law under the imperative form " you must ". It means that I consider myself as the "you" to whom the law is addressed. To me, the law is an imperative addressed by the other person, that is to say an imperative coming from outside. Thus, it might be possible to consider that when I give to myself the law it is the same as if I obey the other law, which is addressed to me with the second person? Or, shall we say that I consider myself as the other person who obeys the law? By the term "the other", the author means the internal otherness existing in the action of self-determination resulting from the law. This is related to the question of identifying the enlightenment of the other's status, which is involved in the action of self-determination given by the law. Although I have to deal with myself in the self-determination given by the law, the other is involved in the relation that opposes myself, when I give to myself the law, to me as the subject who obeys the law. The subjectivity might be interpreted as the test of the otherness existing in the Self. The fact that I consider myself as "the other" in the self-determination given by the law, can be seen as the test of the otherness existing in the Self and this is what the author aims at clarifying based on his works on Kant's thoughts.

Horner, Christopher. The Fate of Judgement: Hannah Arendt, the Third Critique and Aspects of Contemporary Political Philosophy. Ph.D. diss. University of Roehampton, 2012. [276 p.] Advisor: Zachary Leader. [PQ] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this work I examine the role of judgment in the writings of Hannah Arendt. I argue that consideration of this concept helps to shed light on her important contribution to political philosophy, and in particular on the often overlooked radical aspects of her work. Judgment lies at the heart of a cluster of characteristically ‘Arendtian’ themes: those of natality, plurality, narrative and the relation between political action, thought and disclosure, as well as her notions of political public space and its relation to past and future. I argue that in adapting Kant’s conception of judgment as presented in his Critique of Judgment, Arendt also inherits a problematic pair of ideas associated with it: ‘Taste’ and sensus communis. These concepts, I suggest, raise questions of authority, exclusion and participation that were already politically coded in Kant. Examining the part they came to play in Arendt’s thought helps us to see a significant problematic for a political thought that would aspire to be critical and radical. Specifically, it exposes two closely interlinked questions: that of the limits of the political (its character and distinctiveness) and that of the political subjects themselves (the notion of proper and improper political subjects). I conclude that an engagement with the role of reflective judgment in Arendt is an illuminating and important way to understand both the radical current in Arendt’s thought and the challenge faced by any radical political thought at the opening of the twenty-first century.

Huseyinzadegan, Dilek.  Politics, History, Critique: An Interpretation of Kant's Political Philosophy in Light of His Critical-Regulative Method.  Ph.D. diss.  DePaul University, 2012. [258 p.]  Advisor: Avery Goldman. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: My dissertation offers the following three benefits with regard to a renewed interpretation of Kant’s political philosophy:
1)I will demonstrate that Kant’s essays on history and politics are not dogmatic, unimportant, or of minor significance, but employ a critical principle of teleology, following on the critical-regulative method developed in the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Judgement.
2) Such a holistic and systematic reading of Kant’s historico-political writings will reveal that Kant’s political philosophy cannot be construed as a mere extension of his moral theory. There is a distinction between how Kant theoretically justifies his normative assumptions about history and politics and how he posits teleogical practical goals based on theses assumptions. Thus, I will question whether we can read any of Kant’s historico-political writings in unambiguously moral terms. In addition, I will show that cosmopolitanism, and idea that is often considered to be the centerpiece of these short writing, is not the only legacy of Kant’s political thought.
3) Finally, I will show that by means of his critical-regulative method Kant is able to reflect on his own historical circumstances with a view to propose a teleological universal history, and a political theory based on such a philosophy of history. Thus, a regulative teleological understanding of his own socio-historical reality is crucial to Kant’s political philosophy. This suggests that a philosophy of history is always already pragmatic in orientation and that for Kant there is a close relationship between history and politics. Thus, Kant’s political thought builds on this critical-teleological account of history, and finds its confirmation in such a regulative ground.
In short, in this project as a whole I uncover the contemporary legacy of Kant’s philosophy of history and political theory through a close analysis of what I label his critical-regulative method. I argue that Kant’s often ignored writing on history and politics are closely connected to this method that he develops in his three Critiques; thus these minor writings are not dogmatic or insignificant but squarely fit in with his critical system. Then I show that his critical-regulative method has implications for Kant’s contemporary political legacy.

Jankowiak, Timothy P.  Sensation and Intentionality in Kant’s Theory of Empirical Cognition.  Ph.D. diss.  University of California, San Diego, 2012. [340 p.]  Advisor: Eric Watkins. [online][PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The core project of this dissertation is twofold. First, it provides a reconstruction of Kant's theory of how sensation contributes to the cognition of physical objects in the spatiotemporal world. It is first shown how sensation acquires a representational function through its relation to the mental states that Kant labels "intuitions." In intuitions, a posteriori sensations are combined with the a priori representation of space to produce nonconceptual representations of sensory qualities arrayed in space. These intuitions yield our most basic representations of objects in the world. Then it is shown how the data given in sensory intuitions allows for the application of some of our most basic conceptual representations of these objects, most importantly the concepts of "reality" and "actuality." We can represent something as real because sensations allow us to determine the "intensity" of an object's physical density and sensible qualities. We can represent an object as actual when the representation of that object coheres with the rest of our sensory representations of the natural world. Second, it is argued that a careful analysis of the "intentionality" of our sensory representations reveals the ontological status of the objects of cognition to be quite minimal. The empirical objects we represent in experience, Kant thinks, have no existence beyond their being what is articulated by the representational contents of intentionally–directed mental states. This, it is argued, is the proper understanding of Kantian idealism, and it is shown that this interpretation is maximally consistent with Kant's relevant writings on the issue. These two projects are by no means distinct, for Kant argues that intentional relations to empirical objects are possible only because of the a posteriori matter given in sensation. The most novel contribution of the project lies in showing how Kant's theory of the ontological status of appearances can be understood as a consequence of his theory of how sensations make possible our intentionally-directed empirical representations.

Johnston, Walter Anthony.  The Power of Judgment: Aesthetics and Politics in Kant, Hegel, and Kleist.  Ph.D. diss.  Princeton University, 2012. [312 p.]  Advisor: Daniel Heller-Roazen. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This dissertation demonstrates the fundamental importance of Kant’s theory of judgment for Hegel and Kleist. While the work of these three authors has generated an immense scholarly literature, the theory of judgment they jointly articulate has remained inadequately understood. I argue that Kant’s move to make the power of judgment fundamental to the practical use of reason transforms the relationship between aesthetic, epistemological, and practical concerns in the work of all three authors. In the midst of revolutions in France and elsewhere, I furthermore contend, Kant, Hegel, and Kleist each struggle to articulate forms of reflective practical judgment capable of accounting for freedom’s existence in the world. Isolating this shared problem of reflective practical judgment clarifies the complex relationship between these closely interrelated and yet strongly divergent author’s views on a range of different topics. Tracing the development of a theory of reflective practical judgment throughout their works also shows how standard accounts of the relationship between French politics and German letters around 1800 frequently err. By interpreting this relationship as that between concrete action, on the one hand, and passive contemplation on the other, or rather between actual politics and mere aesthetics, these accounts fail to appreciate how Kant’s thought undoes the opposition between judgment and action upon which they rely. They accordingly miss the specific way in which Kant not only establishes the terrain upon which Hegel’s and Kleist’s works unfold, but also arguably ushers in the historical epoch within which we still think and act today.
In Chapter One, I show how Kant’s occasional writings on history and late work on politics at once parallel and refract the development of the theory of judgment in his major critical works. Kant’s writings on history and politics are, I contend, shaped by the tension between reflective and determinant judgment he develops in his major works. Though he does not resolve this tension in these lesser known writings, he does elaborate the historical and political dimension of his theory of judgment, and gestures toward the radical reworking of the concepts of both history and politics that a full synthesis of his practical philosophy and theory of judgment might entail. Such a synthesis would take place, I suggest, on the basis of the concept of time upon which Kant builds the notion of practical reflective judgment one finds nascent the writings I analyze.
In Chapter Two, I show how Hegel’s early writings on the “fate” of Christianity and Phenomenology of Spirit contain a profound historicization of the division between reflective and determinant judgment as it is articulated in Kant’s major works. In Kant’s move to restrict the palpable synthesis of freedom and nature to the subject’s reflective judgment of its own presentative faculty, I suggest, Hegel sees as a fateful dereliction of objectivity and politics alike. I furthermore maintain that it is the Kantian division of reflective and determinate judgment that Hegel attempts to reconcile with the power of forgiveness in the final passages of the Phenomenology, and that his manifest failure to do so reinscribes the “fate” that forgiveness would overcome as judgment’s insuperable and historically generative difference from itself.
Chapter Three reads Kleist’s early epistolary reflections and literary meditations on the experience of aimlessness as responses to Kant’s discovery of non-teleological judgment as key to the reflective synthesis of nature and freedom. I begin by showing how a preoccupation with Kantian aimlessness subtends Kleist’s reflections on travel and on the prospect of study abroad; his confessions regarding his turn to writing literature; his development of a theory of tragedy; and his description of the nature of artistic creativity. In the chapter’s second section, I read Kleist’s Penthesilea as an allegory of the author’s failure to discern a higher purpose animating the apparently purposeless capacity for literary creation. By depicting his heroine’s aimlessness as the enemy of all, I furthermore maintain, Kleist’s play sheds light on hitherto unexplored political implications of the palpable purposelessness of freedom in Kant. In Kleist’s hands, the peculiar power of purposelessness simultaneously blocks Hegel’s attempt at a dialecticohistorical incorporation of freedom’s negativity and interrupts Kant’s own move to motivate purposelessness as the sublimely negative pleasure attending conscience’s call.

Kahn, Samuel.  The Intersection of Right and Good in Kant's Metaphysics of Morals.  Ph.D. diss.  Stanford University, 2012. [# p.]  Advisor: Allen W. Wood. []

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: My dissertation focuses on the ways that erroneous beliefs contributing to conclusions about what we morally ought to do can and cannot be legitimately employed within a Kantian context. I approach this issue through questions about Kant's theory of conscience and the role of conscience in moral decision-making. According to the standard reading of Kant's ethics, there is a single set of objectively correct duties for all agents. On my reading, by way of contrast, an agent's duties are determined to some extent by his/her beliefs about the world. In other words, I give a defense of a kind of limited pluralism within Kant's ethics. I do this by arguing for three main claims. First, I argue (in chapters 1 and 2) that in Kant's ethics agents with similar core values but different beliefs about how the world works will arrive at very different (but nonetheless reasonable) conclusions about what they ought to do in particular situations. Second, I argue (in chapters 3 and 4) that according to Kant an agent who acts according to his/her conscience is behaving permissibly. And third, I argue (in chapters 5 and 6) that for Kant juridical duties are fundamentally different from ethical duties, so an ethical pluralism could be represented in a single (Kantian) state despite the fact that there are limits as to what counts as reasonable. In this way, I hope to show that even within Kant's system of objective value, because agents might have different beliefs about how the world works, there is no determinable set of judgments for a set of circumstances that exists independently of those agents' beliefs and intentions. To put this another way (to bring out where I diverge from the now-standard reading of Kant's ethics), I am arguing that the results of Kant's moral standard, the Categorical Imperative (CI), are radically underdetermined without information about an agent's beliefs about how the world works. One can determine whether something is permissible for an ideal agent (with only true beliefs); one can determine whether something is permissible for some given, fallible agent; but one cannot determine whether something is permissible simpliciter, for it is indeterminate. In slogan form, the underlying idea of this is that for Kant permissibility does not exist in a vacuum. We can make judgments about permissibility only for a given context, and part of that context includes information about an agent and his/her beliefs about how the world works.

Kenny, Katherine.  L’amour imparfaitement rationnel: La conception de l’amour dans la moralite kantienne.  Master’s thesis.  University of Ottawa, 2012. [110 p.]  Advisor: Douglas Moggach. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Cette thèse cherche à expliquer le concept de l’amour chez Emmanuel Kant. Elle essaye de catégoriser les différentes définitions de ce concept. Elle tente d’analyser ces définitions en utilisant trois clés d’analyse : la raison et l’émotion, la liberté et la communauté et la distance et la proximité. Chaque élément est aussi analysé dans la perspective de la nature du sujet kantien pour le comparé au devoir d’amour.

Klein, Joel Thiago. Kant e a ideia de uma história universal nos limites da razão. [Portugese] Ph.D. diss. Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, 2012. [353 p.] Advisor: Maria de Lourdes Alves Borges. [M][online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The present PhD dissertation attempts to provide a comprehensive and systematic interpretation of Immanuel Kant's philosophy of history and will defend three main positions: first, that Kant sustains in his historical-political works the possibility of the progress of a moral virtue; second, that the project of a universal history is grounded essentially in a practical perspective of reflective judgment; third, that a universal history constitutes an indispensable part of a moral image of the world as well as of the architectonic of pure reason.

Kohl, Markus.  Kant on Freedom, Nature, and Normativity.  Ph.D. diss.  University of California, Berkeley, 2012. [383 p.]  Advisor: Hannah Ginsborg and Jay Wallace. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In typical debates about freedom, compatibilists and incompatibilists dispute whether and how one can defuse the threat that a naturalistic worldview seems to pose for our conception of free will. Proponents of both sides standardly take it for granted that natural causality is a potential threat only for practical deliberation, and that no corresponding worries arise for our self-conception as theorizers who make up their mind about what to believe about the world.
I show that Kant rejects this standard dichotomy between practice and theory. He holds that we must both act and believe 'under the idea of freedom': the standpoint of theoretical reasoning, the very source of the naturalistic worldview, must itself rely on the idea of freedom (or spontaneity) and thus cannot expose free will as an illusion. This line of thought, I argue, casts a refreshing new light on debates about what kind of freedom is worth having; and it provides an intriguing defense of our freedom from natural necessity.
I argue that Kant's conception of theoretical freedom is as anti-naturalistic as his conception of practical freedom. This twofold anti-naturalism derives from Kant's conviction that both our practical and our epistemic orientation depend on representations that we cannot attribute to natural causes without losing our grip on their objective validity. These include, in the practical case, the categorical imperative and, in the theoretical case, the principle of sufficient reason, which states that natural events are causally necessitated. Since we do not derive these representations from sense perception, our commitment to them must, within a wholly naturalistic framework, be traced to the influence of contingent psychological processes in the vein of Hume's 'customs'. The concession that our attitudes are the product of such customs challenges our conviction that we form these attitudes on the basis of objective reasons.
Against prevailing interpretations, I show that this line of thought plays an indispensable role in Kant's defense of free will against attacks from the theoretical standpoint. Kant's point is that someone occupying this standpoint must rely on her cognitive freedom from natural necessity: that is, she must take her beliefs about the natural causes of actions to be responsive to objective theoretical reasons, and here she cannot concede that the representation of causal necessity is merely the product of the workings of non-rational psychological processes. So the naturalistic perspective cannot expose freedom as an illusion. This provides the idea of free will with a robust invulnerability against an exclusively naturalistic worldview.

Kuperus, M.  Een behoefte in absoluut noodzakelijk opzicht : de Godsidee bij Immanuel Kant. [Dutch]  Master’s thesis.  Universiteit van Tilburg, 2012. [xi, 32 p.]  Advisor: D.A.A. Loose. [WC]

Lamborn, Jennifer Lynne.  Two Standpoints and the Transcendental Distinction: An Analysis of Kant’s Conception of Freedom.  Master’s thesis.  University of Wyoming, 2012. [98 p.]  Advisor: Ed Sherline. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant draws two principal distinctions in his critical work: the transcendental distinction of the first Critique, and the two standpoint distinction introduced in the Groundwork. While there are apparent reasons to equate these distinctions, I argue that we must separate them for at least two reasons. First, if we collapse these distinctions, we lose the philosophical resources argued for by Kant in the first Critique, resources that are essential to his theory of freedom. Second, if we separate them, we make conceptual space for an analysis of Kant’s conception of freedom, thereby generating additional philosophical resources. Contra the interpretation of transcendental idealism that equates the standpoint distinction with the transcendental distinction, I argue that Kant’s doctrine of the primacy of practical reason entails that the standpoint of the subject is “integrated.” Additionally, I claim that for Kant, there are two kinds of intelligible cause: the “broad intelligible cause” that grounds the theoretical standpoint and the “narrow intelligible cause” that grounds the practical standpoint. Finally, the account I present offers responses to certain difficulties recognized in Kant’s account of freedom.

Lau, Po Hei.  A Hidden Dialogue: Mou Zongsan and Heidegger on Finitude and Transcendence.  Ph.D. diss.  The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2012. [289 p.]  Advisor: Tze Wan Kwan. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: It is well-known that Mou’s system of philosophy is constructed through a transformation of Kant’s philosophy. Both critics and followers of Mou make their stance based on the apparently intimate relation of his thought to Kant’s philosophy. My own inquiry will broaden this scope by trying to demonstrate how Mou’s much-discussed Kantianism is rooted in his close reading of Heidegger’s Kant interpretation. Under Heidegger’s influence, Mou’s own reading of Kant and his system of philosophy focus on the concepts of “finitude” and “transcendence”. Now the purpose of my thesis is twofold: first, the system of Mou’s philosophy should be reassessed through a dialogue with Heidegger, not merely with Kant; second, it will be shown how the reconstruction of the Chinese philosophy through concepts like “finitude” and “transcendence” is possible.
This thesis is divided into five chapters. The first chapter reviews the state of current scholarship on Mou’s relation to Heidegger. This issue is largely neglected. I will argue that it is Heidegger who plays a crucial role in Mou’s philosophical development. The second and the third chapters are concerned with the similarity of their approaches to philosophy, i.e. the transformation from a philosophy of life to ontology. The following two chapters focus on the two fundamental concepts of both Mou and Heidegger — finitude and transcendence. I will investigate how Mou inherits Heideggerian concepts and uses them to articulate his own ontology. Taking this backdrop into consideration, the purpose of Mou’s emphasis on intellectual intuition comes to the foreground, which I understand not as the result of a misunderstanding of Kant’s, but as his strategy in response to Heidegger’s fundamental ontology.

Leland, Patrick.  Kant and the Semantics of Mental Content (1755-1781).  Ph.D. diss.  The Johns-Hopkins University, 2012. [183 p.]  Advisor: Eckart Förster. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In contemporary philosophy of mind, proponents of compositionality about mental content assert concepts are explanatorily prior to their occurrence in more complex, propositional forms of thought. Against this, others argue concepts are explanatorily dependent on the uses which are made of them, paradigmatically acts of judgment and inference.
Important antecedents of this contemporary debate are discernible in 18th century German philosophy. Early modem philosophers prior to Kant appear to have been more or less unanimous in assuming a compositional view of mental content. Hans Sluga and Robert Brandom have asserted Kant broke with this tradition and formulated a novel commitment to the semantic primacy of judgment. This is the view that conceptual content is explanatorily dependent on its role in acts of judgment. This dissertation offers the first historically detailed study of Kant’s commitment to this view, and it does so as part of a broader examination of developments in his semantics of mental content from 1755 to 1781.
Chapter 1 explains a rather unusual claim advanced in the Nova dilucidatio (1755) concerning “the soul’s infinite perception of the universe.” Interpreted with reference to the writings of Kant’s predecessors and contemporaries, I argue this claim implies a set of distinct and heretofore largely unrecognized commitments constitutive of Kant’s early philosophy of mind.
Chapter 2 then uses this account to explicate Kant’s earliest expressed commitment to the semantic primacy of judgment. I begin by describing the prevailing compositional view of mental content and its appropriation by Kant’s predecessors and contemporaries. I then explain how within the technical idiom of early 18 th century German philosophy Kant formulated a seemingly original commitment to the semantic primacy of judgment.
Finally, Chapter 3 describes important developments in Kant’s semantics of mental content from 1762 through the publication of his magnum opus in 1781. I discuss his short-lived commitment to semantic empiricism; his explicit rejection of semantic nativism; the semantic implications of his response to the problem of a priori, veridical reference; the meaning of the phrase ‘empirische Anschauung’; and his commitment to the semantic primacy of judgment in Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1781).

Lin, Yueh-Mei.  Reason and Care: Constructing an Inclusive Moral Theory for Civic Education.  Ph.D. diss.  University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2012. [227 p.]  Advisor: Pradeep Dhillon. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: My thesis tackles the debate regarding (in)compatibility of rational moral philosophy and caring theory. My thesis argues and demonstrates that by unifying Noddings’ caring theory with ethic(s) of care presented by scholars from social and political science, in both practice and on relational grounds, the new caring theory not only is compatible with rational moral philosophy, but is also more inclusive and capable of facing challenges derived from the modern age of information technology.
My thesis first identifies four core components presented by various caring theorists and then integrates them into what I call a neocaring theory. These four components are: caring nature, caring as activity, contextuality or motivation replacement, and relational ontology. Second, I apply both Merleau-Ponty’s theory of intersubjectivity and Nagarjuna’s philosophy of dependent co-arising to bridge the gap between Noddings’ caring theory and Tront-Hankivsky’s interconnection and interdependent nature. This new relational ground or relational ontology, therefore, expands to embrace three characteristics of human existence: first, that the fabric of human existence is the synthesized field of subjectivity and objectivity, the public and the private, as well as rationality and affectivity; second, human life is an ongoing process of becoming and synthesizing; and third, humans and sociopolitical activity are interconnected and interdependent with each other, and thereby, they are mutually conditioned and supplementary.
Based on the four core components and three characteristics of neocaring theory, I construct my neocaring theory of autonomy, and meanwhile demonstrate the ways in which Kant’s moral autonomy is included in this new theory. In the final chapter, I conclude my thesis by showing the differences that the neocaring theory of autonomy can make, compared to the theories of Kant and neoliberalism, with respect to tackling problems emerging from the modern digital age, and administrating higher education, respectively. Lastly, my thesis shows the ways in which a moral education will affect our society and the formation of citizenship, and the ways in which this neocaring theory of autonomy can help to nurture students’ caring minds and ability to reflect on the interdependent nature of human existence to become positive netcitizens in the digital age.

Lott, Joshua R.  The Rationality of Teleology: Purposiveness and the Concept of the Human in Kant, Rousseau, and Hume.  Ph.D. diss.  Tulane University, 2012. [288 p.]  Advisor: Richard Velkley. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: I interpret Kant’s concept of teleology as a reply to both Hume’s criticism of intelligent design, as put forth in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, and to Rousseau’s discovery of the teleological problem of reason. I argue that Kant develops both a superior critique of intelligent design and a superior concept of teleology than that which can be drawn from Hume, since Kant justifies the principle of purposiveness as both rational and necessary a priori. Moreover, I will argue that Kant more thoroughly and more systematically exploits the concept of teleology than did Rousseau. Chapter 1 summarizes Hume’s principles and his critique of intelligent design. Chapter 2 presents Rousseau’s conception of teleology through a reading of his principle of natural goodness. Chapter 3 emphasizes Kant’s conception of reason and the system of nature in his Critique of Pure Reason, suggesting that Kant’s conception of reason as primarily practical suitably rebuts Hume’s instrumental view of reason while extending the implications of Rousseau’s discoveries. Kant’s connection between the autonomy of reason and the pursuit of a teleological system of nature supplies the foundation of Kant’s reply to Hume’s conception of teleology. Chapter 4 establishes that Kant’s deduction of the principle of reflective judgment in the "Introduction to the Critique of Judgment" reveals the teleological principle as subjectively necessary a priori and not merely psychological. Chapter 5 traces the argument of the "Analytic of Teleological Judgment," establishing that Kant’s analysis of teleological judgment exceeds Hume’s both in terms of its content and its usefulness in scientific inquiry. Chapter 6 examines Kant’s resolution to the Antinomy of Teleological Judgment, which culminates in his contrast between the human "discursive intellect" and an "intuitive intellect," suggesting that a teleological principle is only valid for human understanding, reinforcing his conception of teleology. Chapter 7 examines the "Methodology of Teleological Judgment," where Kant identifies human beings as autonomous moral agents as the final purpose of the system of nature. I claim that Kant’s argument fortifies his conception of reason, teleology, and his moral philosophy, providing human beings with more for which to hope than does Hume.

Lu-Adler, Huaping.  Kant’s Conception of Logical Extension and Its Implications.  Ph.D. diss.  University of California, Davis, 2012. [168 p.]  Advisor: Henry E. Allison. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: It is a received view that Kant’s formal logic (or what he calls “pure general logic”) is thoroughly intensional. On this view, even the notion of logical extension must be understood solely in terms of the concepts that are subordinate to a given concept. I grant that the subordination relation among concepts is an important theme in Kant’s logical doctrine of concepts. But I argue that it is both possible and important to ascribe to Kant an objectual notion of logical extension according to which the extension of a concept is the multitude of objects falling under it. I begin by defending this ascription in response to three reasons that are commonly invoked against it. First, I explain that this ascription is compatible with Kant’s philosophical reflections on the nature and boundary of a formal logic. Second, I show that the objectual notion of extension I ascribe to Kant can be traced back to many of the early modern works of logic with which he was more or less familiar. Third, I argue that such a notion of extension makes perfect sense of a pivotal principle in Kant’s logic, namely the principle that the quantity of a concept’s extension is inversely proportional to that of its intension. In the process, I tease out two important features of the Kantian objectual notion of logical extension in terms of which it markedly differs from the modern one. First, on the modern notion the extension of a concept is the sum of the objects actually falling under it; on the Kantian notion, by contrast, the extension of a concept consists of the multitude of possible objects — not in the metaphysical sense of possibility, though — to which a concept applies in virtue of being a general representation. While the quantity of the former extension is finite, that of the latter is infinite — as is reflected in Kant’s use of a plane-geometrical figure (e.g., circle, square), which is continuum as opposed to discretum, to represent the extension in question. Second, on the modern notion of extension, a concept that signifies exactly one object has a one-member extension; on the Kantian notion, however, such a concept has no extension at all — for a concept is taken to have extension only if it signifies a multitude of things. This feature of logical extension is manifested in Kant’s claim that a singular concept (or a concept in its singular use) can, for lack of extension, be figuratively represented only by a point — as opposed to an extended figure like circle, which is reserved for a general concept (or a concept in its general use). Precisely on account of these two features, the Kantian objectual extension proves vital to Kant’s theory of logical quantification (in universal, particular and singular judgments, respectively) and to his view regarding the formal truth of analytic judgments.

MacDougall, D. Robert.  Kant and the Political Context of Contemporary Bioethics.  Ph.D. diss.  Saint Louis University, 2012. [314 p.]  Advisor: Griffin Trotter. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This dissertation critically examines the incorporation of normative political philosophy in the contemporary bioethics literature addressing laws and public policies. It is argued that contemporary bioethics literature has substantially neglected to make positive use of normative political philosophy in questions regarding laws and policies, when such use is seemingly strictly necessary. The author defends this thesis by critically examining the use of Kant’s moral philosophy in contemporary bioethics debates about laws and public policies. The author argues that Kant’s moral philosophy is often used in contemporary bioethics debates in a manner at odds with Kant’s own understanding of its relevance for laws and public policies. Kant did not believe that principles suitable for the analysis of the morality of actions could be applied unproblematically to questions of law or public policy. The failure to heed Kant’s careful distinction between moral and political philosophy is characteristic of contemporary neglect of political philosophy in general. After giving an overview of previous incorporation of political philosophy in bioethics literature in general and in Kantian bioethics literature in particular, the author explains the difference between moral and political philosophy as Kant saw it, and develops a reading of Kant’s political philosophy. Kant’s political philosophy is applied to two contemporary bioethics issues. The author argues first that, contrary to the consensus of contemporary Kantians, Kant himself would have supported a market in solid organs, and that this question is necessarily one involving political (and not merely moral) philosophy. Attempts to legally prohibit the sale of kidneys violate innate right, despite the fact that such sales are morally forbidden. Second, it is argued that contemporary notions of autonomy have failed to give a satisfying moral grounding to the legal standards of disclosure governing informed consent. Kant’s political philosophy, by appealing to a united will, clarifies the moral authority of a government to set what is essentially an arbitrary, but normatively necessary, set of standards for disclosure.

Manos, James A.  A Critique of Political Self-deception: Kant and Freud at the Edge of Critical Theory.  Ph.D. diss.  DePaul University, 2012. [223 p.]  Advisor: Tina Chanter. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the spirit of Kantian critique this dissertation pursues the enlightenment project of examining the limits of reason and its political ramifications. Beginning from the claim that psychoanalysis is the inheritor of the Kantian project, this dissertation argues the limits of political reason lie beyond the concepts of overcoming and mastery. While traditionally this conversation has been occupied with the concept of ideology, this dissertation draws on the Freudian concept of self-deception. It contends the concept of ideology contains the seeds of its own overcoming, and thus cannot represent the limits of political reason. In contrast to ideology, this dissertation claims the Freudian concept of disavowal indicates the limits of not only rationality, but also political rationality. As such, the political ramifications of a critique focused on the limits of rationality must grapple with the phenomenon of disavowal, a phenomenon that blatantly defies the logic of non-contradiction. This dissertation concludes that this form of critique would demand turning political thought toward historical manifestations that continue to exist but are not recognized, such as the relationship between slavery and prisons as articulated in the 13th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.

Ng, Julia Chi Yan.  Conditions of Impossibility: Failure and Fictions of Perpetual Peace.  Ph.D. diss.  Northwestern University, 2012. [334 p.]  Advisor: Samuel Weber and Peter D. Fenves. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This dissertation identifies and describes the self-consciously impossible character of Kant’s “Towards Perpetual Peace” (1795), which ironically makes possible alternative theories of political agency that do no rely on the presumption that human beings can build a world in which they protect themselves from every conceivable threat. One such alternative theory, I argue, develops in the early work of Walter Benjamin and Gershom Scholem, for whom the perpetual peace project turns into an exploration of the fictions that accompany and precede every determination of possibility imposed by the self-organization of embodied subjectivity. Unsettling the logic that grounds action in the organization of human life, a generally unseen dimension of Kant’s projection of the just society gives rise to theories of human power and divine violence in Benjamin and Scholem that express a concept of life preceding and exceeding what is deemed “possible” for human subjectivity. The impossibility of perpetual peace thus becomes, for them, a promise that the impossible — figured in the science fiction of Paul Scheerbart, above all — cannot be dismissed whenever human organization breaks out of its self-organization’s syndromes. The Introduction examines the duplicity of the word “peace” in context of the military-architectural provenance of the “equilibrium of powers” upon which the idea of perpetual peace is modeled before and after Kant. Chapter One shows that Benjamin revises Kantian “possible experience” to uncover parameters with which our efficacy in the world might not run afoul of freedom’s apparent irreconcilability with nature. Chapter Two shows how Scholem conceives of agency in Jewish life on the basis of the mathematical actual infinite and the extra-European character of Paul Scheerbart’s fictional writings. Chapter Three recounts Benjamin’s and Scholem’s mathematical revision of Hermann Cohen’s Kants Theorie der Erfahrung in demonstration that genuine cosmopolitanism must hold Kant’s concept of space as one but not the only possible formal constitution of perception. Chapter Four elaborates Benjamin’s theory of a non-injurious and thus genuinely cosmopolitical space on the basis of Scheerbart’s and Bruno Taut’s concept of glass as geopolitical sensorium. In the Conclusion, Benjamin’s “Towards the Critique of Violence” is reinterpreted as an indication of the impasse to which any attempt to “execute” perpetual peace must arrive, and as a turn towards a theory of nonhuman agency and the nature of matter absent a viable inheritable theory of potentiality.

Nyholm, Sven R.  On the Universal Law and Humanity Formulas.  Ph.D. diss.  University of Michigan, 2012. [223 p.]  Advisor: Elizabeth S. Anderson. [WC/PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This dissertation is a philosophical commentary on the Prussian Enlightenment philosopher Immanuel Kant’s “Universal Law” and “Humanity” formulations of the categorical imperative (i.e. the most basic principle of morality or virtuousness). The former says to choose one’s basic guiding principles (or “maxims”) on the basis of their fitness to serve as universal laws, the latter to always treat the humanity in each person as an end, and never as a means only. Commentators and critics have been puzzled by Kant’s claim that these are two alternative statements of the same basic law, and have raised various objections to Kant’s suggestion that these are the most basic formulas of a fully justified human morality. This dissertation offers new readings of these two formulas, shows how, on these readings, the formulas do indeed turn out being alternative statements of the same basic moral law, and in the process responds to many of the standard objections raised against Kant’s theory. Its first chapter briefly explores the ways in which Kant draws on his philosophical predecessors such as Plato (and especially Plato’s Republic) and Jean-Jacque Rousseau. The second chapter offers a new reading of the relation between the universal law and humanity formulas by relating both of these to a third formula of Kant’s, the “Law of Nature” formula, and also to Kant’s ideas about laws in general and human nature in particular. The third chapter considers and rejects some influential recent attempts to understand Kant’s argument for the humanity formula, and offers an alternative reconstruction instead. Chapter four considers what it is to flourish as a human being in line with Kant’s basic formulas of morality, and argues that the standard readings of the humanity formula cannot properly account for its relation to Kant’s views about the highest human good.

Padui, Raoni Pascoal.  From the Transcendental to the Ontological: Hegel, Heidegger, and the Legacy of Transcendental Idealism.  Ph.D. diss.  University, 2012. [306 p.]  Advisor: Walter Brogan. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this dissertation I argue that Hegel and Heidegger can be best understood as engaged in an immanent critique and internal reformulation of Kant’s transcendental idealism. I show that viewing their respective projects from this common ground allows one to understand the divergent paths they take in their attempt to overcome what they see as the overly epistemological and formal aspects of transcendental philosophy. While both turn to an ontological and historical understanding of the transcendental conditions encountered in Kant, Hegel attempts to further complete the critical project of self-grounding and self-determination, while Heidegger tries to show a necessary and constitutive finitude that renders any complete self-determination impossible. I conclude by arguing that the difficulty in accounting for the ontological independence of nature in both Hegel and Heidegger betray the extent to which they are still heirs to the tradition of transcendental idealism.

Pascoe, Jordan.  Cosmopolitanism and Colonialism: Marriage, Race, and Kant’s Philosophy of Family.  Ph.D. diss.  City University of New York, 2012. [359 p.]  Advisor: Sibyl Schwarzenbach. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: As concerns with global interconnectedness have moved cosmopolitanism to the center of political philosophy, interest in Kant’s cosmopolitan arguments has surged. Kant’s vision of cosmopolitanism and his claims to universalism have been attacked by feminist theorists, critical race theorists, postmodernists, and African philosophers, and have been defended — just as adamantly — by contemporary moral and political philosophers who argue that his mature cosmopolitanism involves both a rejection of his racist views and a critique of European colonialism. This project counters those claims through an examination marriage and the family as central elements of the institutional order that shapes Kant’s political vision.
Marriage is, at first glance, an odd pathway into an interrogation of Kant’s universalism. I argue that, to understand Kant’s universalism, we must examine the institutions that organize his political thought and condition his account of personhood, independence, and equality. By focusing on Kant’s philosophy of the family, which I understand as a particular construction of marriage, labor, and the household that organizes political spaces and subjectivities, I am able to show how the domestic realm plays a central role in Kant’s political arguments, by operating as an enclosed juridical space within which rights and responsibilities are radically transformed. All intimacies and interdependencies are contained within the domestic realm, which in turn allows the Kantian political subject to emerge as independent and fully rational in the public sphere. Because Kant’s political subject is conditioned by the domestic sphere in this way, his account of political rights and freedoms is dependent upon a particular juridical order and on the invisible labor of wives and domestic servants to maintain the illusion of external freedom in the public sphere.
This analysis of the family offers a new vantage point from which to understand the role of race in Kant’s political philosophy: if Kant’s political subject is conditioned by a particular construction of marriage and the family, then the exclusions that undermine his universalism depend not simply on his own racist and sexist views, but on a structural argument internal to his account of the rightful political state. In other words, personhood in Kant’s political philosophy is institutionally structured. This move towards an institutionally organized account of personhood suggests that the theory of race that undergirds Kant’s mature cosmopolitanism has shifted away from the forms of racism that organized colonial rule in the New World and instead presages the “colonial racism” developed in colonial Africa in the 19th and 20th centuries.
Building on this analysis of the philosophy of the family and the role of race in Kant’s arguments, this project asks how, concretely, Kant thought a united cosmopolitan world might be achieved. By tracing Kant’s own account of the necessary features of a cosmopolitan world, this project argues that the juridical cosmopolitanism Kant envisions might take a form strikingly similar to the forms of colonial rule developed in Africa in the late 19th century. It imagines Kant’s cosmopolitan arguments in Africa by examining the colonial transformations wrought by Indirect Rule in colonial Nigeria, and by focusing on the transformations of the household, the family, and of the position of women produced by the introduction of “rightful” European rule. By exploring this transformation from the perspective of the African women who were most disenfranchised by the new institutional order it entailed, this project argues that, owing to the cooperation of colonial racism and a patriarchal philosophy of the family, Kant’s vision of a rightful juridical order would in fact produce a radical reduction of the rights of women. In making this argument, it shows how contemporary Western and feminist projects have replicated Kant’s cosmopolitan assumptions by introducing schemes of rights that continue to depend on a hidden and often sexist philosophy of the family.
Thus, this project shows, first, that Kant’s political subject is conditioned by a particular construction of family and the domestic sphere, and that the exclusions that undermine his universalism depend not simply on his own racist and sexist views, but on a structural argument internal to his account of Right. Second, by introducing a distinction between colonial forms of racism, and by highlighting the differences between early and late colonial practices, it demonstrates that Kant’s mature cosmopolitanism is not a rejection of colonialism but a move towards the emerging logics of late colonialism. It argues that contemporary theorists who draw on Kantian claims about the importance of well-functioning institutions to cosmopolitanism must engage with the raced and gendered assumptions built into Kant’s account of institutions, and consider alternative institutional constellations. By offering African feminist challenges to Kant’s philosophy of the family, this project suggests one method for a more radically inclusive de-colonial cosmopolitan philosophy.

Patnaik, Nishad. Time, Space and Finitude: Kant and Husserl on the Question of Transcendental Logic. Ph.D. diss. New School University, 2012. [436 p.] Advisor: James Dodd. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This study argues that Kantian transcendental idealism and Husserlian phenomenology are distinct yet structurally analogous responses to the unfolding of enlightened reason, and the paradox in which it comes to be entangled in its critical/metaphysical striving. Through an examination of the Kantian and Husserlian 'critiques' of the formal logic of their times, we argue that notwithstanding the difference in these 'Logics', and consequently, the quite distinct formulations of their transcendental logical critiques, this structural analogy extends; 1) to the appraisal and thematization of the processes that lead to the impasse of modern rationality; 2) in and through such thematization, to the renewal of its arche teleological sense that becomes necessarily obscured and distorted in the course of this striving. This original animating sense lies in our fundamental capacity for autonomy; in our irreducibility to the 'natural' realm through which we are nevertheless, conditioned and in which we are always already situated.
We claim that the grounds for this structural analogy, both in its negative and positive dimensions, as formulated in 1) and 2), must be sought in the spatio—temporal discursivity of finite reason that both thinkers bring to light. For both, it is the irreducible interrelation between space and time; i.e. the necessary spatialization of time and the temporalization of space, as it conditions the 'synthetic unity' of finite thought constitutive of the phenomenal realm, that, when it is unthematized or unreflected, leads to this inevitable distortion (reification) in the inner "dialectical" movement of reason. The propaedeutic task of a transcendental critique of logic therefore, is to show how this 'dialectic' results, on the one hand, to the reification of reason in the empty positivity of its own formal—objective formations, and on the other, in its reification in the negativity of pure (self) transcendence. Thus, the modes in which our lack of exhaustive determination with respect to nature, are negotiated, result either in the denial of our autonomy or the denial of the heteronomy of nature, i.e. in "pure" empiricism/rationalism or "pure" skepticism (culminating in nihilism).
On the other hand, we argue that for both, it is the reflective-intuitive thematization of this movement, (which amount to a mode of self-thematization or objectification), that unearths the synthetic-constitutive or genetic dimension of 'objectivity' as such. This reflective intuitive performance, through which the 'static', spatialized formal synthetic unities/objectivities of reason (logic) are temporally reanimated in their very synthetic emergence, while again being given qua reflected schema or re-presentation of such synthetic activity, indicates the sense in which our spatio-temporal finitude, rather than being a merely negative constraint, is productive of our objective-phenomenal realm of (possible) experience. Consequently, it clarifies the manner in which this reflective enactment of the spatio-temporal movement of reason constitutes a re-articulation of the interrelation between autonomy and heteronomy, such that neither is reducible to the other.

Perrier, Raymond Everett.  A Comparative Analysis of Immanuel Kant’s and Soren Abaye Kierkegaard’s Theories of Human Nature.  Master’s thesis.  Candler School of Theology, Emory University, 2012. [iv, 64 p.]  Advisor: David S. Pacini. [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The theory of human nature that is represented by Soren Abaye Kierkegaard’s pseudonym Anti-Climacus in the book Sickness unto Death, has rarely been compared with the works of the late Enlightenment thinker Immanuel Kant. This project will fill that gap through three essays comparing Kant’s and Anti-Climacus’s perspectives on the conditions that create a human self, the proper pursuit of metaphysics, and the practical need for morality. My hope is that these comparative analyses will imply a reading of Kierkegaard’s theory of human nature, found in the Sickness unto Death, which is comparable and even dependent on the Kantian tradition of thinking. In light of this reading of Kierkegaard’s Sickness unto Death, the relationship between Kant and Kierkegaard will be cast in a positive light, which will suggest that Kierkegaard is only properly understood when his positive relationship with Kant is recognized.

Phillips, Luke.  Aestheticism from Kant to Nietzsche.  Ph.D. diss.  Indiana University, 2012. [218 p.]  Advisor: Paul D. Eisenberg. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant argues that moral and aesthetic judgments are independent of each other. Like most philosophers since Plato he also finds inner beauty and moral goodness to be very closely connected. By separating moral reasoning from taste while maintaining they both have validity for judging human character, Kant opens the door for the fascinating view that there could be conflict between beauty and goodness. I call the view that there is such a rivalry `aestheticism’ and I explore its development from Kant through Schiller, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche.
Kant thinks, despite the independence of the beautiful and the good, they find harmony in virtuous character. He sets up the Aestheticist line of thought, arguing in a much neglected passage in the third Critique that the ideal of beauty consists in the expression of the moral through the human figure. Schiller elaborates the demands taste makes with regard to the best type of life through his concept of grace, the way of acting in which one both rationally chooses and aesthetically prefers one’s virtuous conduct and so performs his duty cheerfully, without feeling the burden of moral constraint. He argues that to be beautiful in the deep sense one must be moral.
The two later thinkers are not as optimistic about the harmony of aesthetics and morality, at least morality in Kant’s sense. They see the relationship between the independent moral and aesthetic standards as one of irresolvable conflict. Kierkegaard separates the aesthetic “lifestyle” from the moral one and argues that there is no rational standard for deciding between them. This strand of thought culminates in Nietzsche’s “revaluation” of morality. Ultimately, Nietzsche’s view is best understood as a rejection of the Kantian dualism between beauty and goodness and an attempt to unify aesthetics and morality once more in a higher conception of morality.
Although the Kantian view of the independence of moral and aesthetic values is and has been very popular, one of my main goals is to show the plausibility of the view that there is no clear distinction between them when it comes to the evaluation of human character and conduct.

Pickett, Howard Young.  The Ethics of Theatricality: Kant, Kierkegaard, and Levinas on the Limits of Sincerity & Authenticity.  Ph.D. diss.  University of Virginia, 2012. [485 p.]  Advisor: James Childress. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Modernity bears the marks of a singular obsession with self-congruence - i.e., with the agreement between what I seem to be and what I actually am. What remains all but ignored, however, is the way that obsession, whether for “sincerity” or “authenticity,” might render ethics itself impossible. “The Ethics of Theatricality” examines the ethical problems generated by an unqualified exaltation of self-congruence. Just as importantly, it also examines more-or-less theatrical - arguably hypocritical - solutions to those problems as they appear, albeit surprisingly, in the writings of some of self-congruence’s own most outspoken advocates: Immanuel Kant, Søren Kierkegaard, and Emmanuel Levinas. Specifically, thinking alongside Kant, Kierkegaard, and Levinas respectively, one realizes that the idealization of sincerity tends to forget: (1) that the self may not be worthy of expression; (2) that the self may not be amenable to expression; and (3) that the self may become unethically narcissistic in the act of self-expression. By highlighting modernity’s ambivalence towards the pretense and role-playing sometimes necessary for the development of moral character, “The Ethics of Theatricality” offers a new appraisal not only of the ethics of theatricality, but also of the theatricality of ethics. In the end, I conclude that the only self-congruence worthy of pursuit - in fact, the only one worthy of the name “self-congruence” - is a fundamentally ironic and relational one that lies well beyond either the expressivism of sincerity or the individualism of authenticity.

Pillard, Eric. An Assessment of J. G. Hamann’s System of Language as an Answer to Kant’s Boundary of Reason Concerning the Knowledge of God. Master’s thesis. Oral Roberts University (theological and historical studies), 2012. [78 p.] Advisor: ??. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Johann Georg (J. G.) Hamann was labeled the "Magnus of the North." Although obscure, he is a voice against the call for reason alone within the period of history known as the Enlightenment. Scholarship is finding that Hamann provided an argument against the dominant emphasis of rationality found in the modern philosophy developed within the Enlightenment. Hamann calls attention to a proper use and definition of language. For Hamann, humanity is defined by the communication and use of language. Language is a system of symbols that represents the essence of the being and is built on established definitions within the communicating relationship. Therefore, all use of language must be built upon established, meaningful symbols for language to exist and contain meaning.
Chapter 1 introduces the reader to the historical Period of the Enlightenment. Chapter 2 presents Hamann's biography and his theology and philosophy. Chapter 3 examines Hamann's engagement against Enlightenment philosophy. The final chapter summarizes Hamann's arguments and examines present-day applications.

Pinheiro Walla, Alice. The concept of happiness in kant's moral, legal and political philosophy. Ph.D. diss. University of St. Andrews, 2012. [# p.] Advisor: Jens Timmermann. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This doctoral thesis analyzes the systematic role of Kant's conception of happiness in his moral, legal and political theory. Although many of his conclusions and arguments are directly or indirectly influenced by his conception of human happiness, Kant's underlying assumptions are rarely overtly discussed or given much detail in his works. Kant also provides different and apparently incompatible definitions of happiness. This research explores the domains of Kant's practical philosophy in which his conception of happiness plays a systematic role: the relation between the natural need of human beings to pursue happiness and the ends-oriented structure of the human will; Kant's anti-eudaimonism in ethical theory; Kant's claim that we have an indirect duty to promote our own happiness and the problem that under certain circumstances, the indeterminacy of happiness makes it not irrational to choose short term satisfaction at the costs of one's overall, long term happiness, given Kant's conception of non-moral choice as expectation of pleasure; Kant's justification of the duty to adopt the happiness of others as our ends (the duty of beneficence) and the latitude and eventual demandingness of this duty; finally, since Kant also subsumes subsistence needs and welfare under the concept of happiness of individuals, I also engage with the question of state provision for the poor in the Kantian Rechtsstaat and explore Kant's conception of equity or fairness (Billigkeit) as an alternative to the traditional minimalist and the welfare interpretations of the Kantian state.

Remington, Clark A.  Originary Temporality: An Essay on Heidegger’s Being and Time and his Interpretation of Kant.  Ph.D. diss.  The University of Chicago, 2012. [305 p.]  Advisor: James Conant. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The keystone of Heidegger’s Being and Time is originary temporality, which is supposed to be a non-sequential, triadic structure that makes sense of not only the sequential triad of ordinary time (past, present, and future) but all of the other triadic structures of Being and Time. Extant scholarly attempts to say what oriinary time is fail to get hold of it. They have much to say about sequential time, which is the time that is manifest in what Heidegger calls the ‘care structure’. But nowhere in the commentary on Being and Time do we find an account of originary time that fits what Heidegger says about it. I offer a novel account of originary time: one that lives up to Heidegger’s description of it as a triad of non-sequential moments that demonstrates the unity and articulation of all of Heidegger’s triads. Drawing on Sebastian Rödl’s work on temporal logic, I identify a triad of temporal “gestures” that we can recognize in the moments of originary time. My account makes sense of the twists and turns of Heidegger’s text on originary temporality. I go on to investigate Heidegger’s controversial Kant interpretation. Heidegger claimed that Being and Time and his book Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics were about the same problem, and that the triadic structures of both books were grounded in originary time. My account of originary time lets us follow up on these claims. I offer an interpretation of Heidegger’s Kant that demonstrates the fruitfulness of my account. At the same time I show how an understanding of Heidegger’s Kant can illuminate Being and Time and how an understanding of Being and Time can illuminate Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant, particularly Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics.

Saidi, Arash.  Kant in China : A Study on the Introduction and Interpretation of Immanuel Kant's Philosophy from Late Qing China.  Master’s thesis.  University of Oslo, 2012. [# p.]  Advisor: name. [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This thesis examines the introduction and interpretation of Kant from late Qing China.The thesis is divided into five parts. The first part introduces the historical context in which Kant was introduced and interpreted. The historical context considers both China and Japan, due to the use of Japanese sources by the early authors writing on Kant’s philosophy. The historical analysis also examines some aspects of the reception of Western science and philosophy when these can provide insight into the reception of Kant. The second part introduces Kant’s philosophy. The third part is an analysis of the first substantial Chinese texts on Kant by the Journalist and author Liang Qichao (梁启超, 1873 – 1929). The fourth part is an analysis of the scholar and poet Wang Guowei (王国维, 1877 – 1927) and his texts on Kant.

Salvetti, Florence.  Judaïsme et christianisme chez Kant: du respect de la loi à son accomplissement dans l'amour.  Ph.D. diss.  Institut catholique de Paris, 2012. [287 p.]  Advisor: Jérôme de Gramont and Jean-Louis Vieillard-Baron. [WC]

Saunders, Bret Jeremy.  Descartes’s Divided Imagination and Its Legacy in Kant and Hegel.  Ph.D. diss.  University of Dallas, 2012. [283 p.]  Advisor: Dennis L. Sepper. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This dissertation traces the contours of the tension between philosophy and its literature as this struggle played out in modern continental "rationalism," which denied the tools of the imagination explicitly yet relied pervasively on rhetoric and metaphor. Filling a significant lacuna in the scholarly literature, the present study of rhetoric and metaphor in Descartes, Kant, and Hegel argues that the great modern philosophers after the "turn to the subject" were torn between establishing a universal, rational foundation for human knowledge and meeting the demands of communication imposed by the historicity of their discourse rhetoric — by rhetoric, ordinary language, and pre-theoretical experience. I call this tension the "divided imagination." By this I mean, more precisely, the tension between the use of the imagination (metaphors, analogies, rhetoric) in scientific practice and philosophical psychologies claiming to distinguish the imagination precisely from "pure reason." "Divided imagination" also designates the oscillation and interplay between two kinds of images , namely, between the "clear and distinct" mathematical imagination and its ordinary, pre-theoretical side — at once more colorful and less acknowledged. The specific emphases and elements "in tension" are somewhat different in each of the philosophers studied. For example, whereas Descartes's mature theory of mind admits the first kind of tension insofar as his account of "pure intellection" uses images, Kant, on the other hand, is characterized more by the second tension: we argue that he does not in fact produce the colorless, structural theory of mind to which he lays claim. Despite these differences, the project traces four main interpretive threads — rhetoric, the method of analysis, philosophical psychology, and "foundational metaphors" — throughout the major works of Descartes, Kant, and Hegel, exploring the ways in which these seminal moderns use metaphor to analyze, demarcate and present the structure of human cognition. I disclose the basic metaphors functioning as an overarching framework for their analyses, but which remained unexamined in themselves. By following the traces of the divided imagination, I argue for and develop an account of modern philosophical poiesis, which modern philosophy was never willing to give of itself.

Shields, Daniel.  Aquinas and the Kantian Principle of Treating Persons As Ends in Themselves.  Ph.D. diss.  The Catholic University of America, 2012. [263 p.]  Advisor: Tobias Hoffmann. [online] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This dissertation addresses the question of whether and on what terms Aquinas would accept Kant’s principle that one must always treat all persons as ends in themselves, and never merely as means. This question is of considerable interest given the wide contemporary acceptance of Kant’s principle and yet it has, to my knowledge, never received as sustained a consideration as I will give it.
To answer this question I make a distinction between a finis cuius and finis cui. A finis cuius is an end in the sense of a value that is to be attained, and a finis cui is an end in the sense of someone for whom a value is to be attained. Aquinas holds that one must treat persons as ends in both of these senses. Nevertheless, no created person is a supreme finis cui or an ultimate finis cuius.
For Aquinas, God is the end of the natural law and all of the moral life is ordered towards Him. “Love God with all your heart” is the primary precept of the natural law. Aquinas does not mean that the whole moral life is ordered towards one’s own personal happiness with God. Such a view would involve always using other persons as mere means. Rather, God is to be loved as both the supreme finis cui and the ultimate finis cuius. God offers Himself to man as a common good and must be loved as such. This means that one must love other persons as fellow participants in the common good and as those for whom the common good is intended. This is to say that one must treat his neighbor as a finis cui.
Aquinas further holds that one must love one’s neighbor as oneself, that is to say, with the love of friendship. This requires valuing the other person as a finis cuius — thus wanting to be in community with him — in addition to willing his good as a finis cui. Such love perfects a natural tendency purposefully implanted in man by God and is necessary if the community is to flourish.

Speitz, Michele.  Technologies of the Sublime, 1750-1861.  Ph.D. diss.  University of Colorado at Boulder, 2012. [212 p.]  Advisor: Jeffrey N. Coz. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: “Technologies of the Sublime, 1750-1861” investigates a specific strand of sublime discourse, the material sublime, to reveal how it emerges in conversation with Romantic-era mechanical innovations and empirical speculations. Moreover, this project uncovers the ways in which mechanized civil and cultural artifacts such as the modern suspension bridge and early seismological instruments mediate the natural power confronted in the sublime. For example, following the initial wave of responses to the infamous Lisbon quake of 1755, written by diverse figures such as Immanuel Kant, Jonathan Winthrop, and Thomas Paine, authors around the globe relayed to British readers measurements of quakes, conjectures as to their causes, and reports on bewildering technologies such as the geophone and the seismograph. Closer to home, Robert Southey immortalized Thomas Telford, the Scottish “Colossus of Roads” and “Father of Civil Engineering,” for creating “Neptune’s Staircase” (a canal-works) and for completing a bridge in 1826 that resembles “a spider’s web in the air.” Literary depictions of such inorganic creations figure a unique mechanical other against which Romantic humanism and Romantic depictions of nature arise. Each chapter examines technology, theories of the sublime, and literary texts to show how literary works identified with the sublime engage major mechanical undertakings of the late-eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The first section charts natural events mediated by technologies, moving from the depths of the earth rattled by earthquakes and volcanoes and measured by seismographs, to the earth’s surface which humanity reconfigures and attempts to conquer through roads, bridges, and canals. The concluding chapters examine how this material qua technological sublime reconfigures the human. By reading eighteenth- and nineteenth-century accounts of proto-seismological instruments and innovative landscape technologies alongside paradigmatic accounts of the aesthetic of the sublime authored by Keats, Shelley, and Hazlitt, this study brings to light previously unacknowledged technological resonances and mechanical valences integral to various Romantic iterations of sublime discourse.

Spetschinsky, Sergueï.  Le passage entre théorique et pratique dans la philosophie transcendantale d’Immanuel Kant. [The Transition between Theoretical and Practical Immanuel Kant's Transcendental Philosophy]  Ph.D. diss.  Universite Libre de Bruxelles, 2012. [# p.]  Advisor: Marc Peeters and Christoph Asmuth. [WC]

Stacey, Matthew.  Kant on Sex and Marriage: What Kant Should Have Said.  Master’s thesis.  University of Victoria (Canada), 2012. [88 p.]  Advisor: Scott Woodcock. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This thesis examines Kant’s claims about the morally problematic nature of sexual desire and activity, as well as the necessity of marriage in order to allow for permissible sexual relations. It shows that, based on Kant’s assumptions regarding the problematic nature of sex, his own solution, marriage, does not allow for permissible sex. My work then proceeds to explain the position Kant should have taken on this matter based on the Formula of Humanity as well as perfect duties to self and other. Finally, it suggests that sexual pleasure can involve a temporary suspension of humanity, and thus be morally problematic.

Stevenson, Michael Robert.  Subjectivity and Selfhood in Kant, Fichte and Heidegger.  Ph.D. diss.  Columbia University, 2012. [286 p.]  Advisor: Frederick Neuhouser. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant once said that the “whole field of philosophy” is guided by the fundamental question, “What is the human being?” Kant himself, and even more so his Idealist successors, addressed this question by offering transcendental theories of human subjectivity. My dissertation explores the philosophical development of the Kantian and post-Kantian theories of subjectivity and their relationship to the often neglected theory of selfhood in Heidegger’s Being and Time. After examining the issues in Kant’s theory which were decisive motivating factors for the post-Kantian Idealists — namely the metaphysical status of the apperceptive I and the unity of reason — I explore Fichte’s metaphysics of subjectivity and his attempt to demonstrate the unity and self-sufficiency of reason. Finally, I argue that the early Heidegger’s theory of finite human existence is best understood as an extension of and corrective to the classical Idealist tradition. I attempt to cash out two of Heidegger’s claims: (1) that his own “fundamental ontology” is pre-figured by Kant’s theory of subjectivity, and (2) that the crucial insights in his reading of Kant share much with the Idealists but also “move in the opposite direction” from them. I argue that Heidegger’s theory of selfhood gives an account of the sui generis features of human existence which unifies our theoretical and practical activities while avoiding the stronger Idealist claims regarding the self-sufficiency and self-legitimacy of reason.

Storey, Ian N.  The Taste of Politics: Kant’s Theory of Judgment and Belonging in the Modern World.  Ph.D. diss.  The University of Chicago [Political Science], 2012. [317 p.]  Advisor: Patchen Markell. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This dissertation examines the critical role that expressions of judgment play in the everyday negotiation of social and political belonging. In the sociopolitical thought of Immanuel Kant, judgments of taste provided a way of asserting one’s presence and contesting one’s place in society, through a unique kind of claim for status as a judge embedded in those judgments. Through engagements with Hannah Arendt, Martin Heidegger, Jacques Rancière, and others, I argue that Kant’s theory of taste makes possible a radically egalitarian rethinking of some of the most foundational institutional boundary-markers of belonging - including state citizenship, social class, and national identity - by relocating the social bases for political membership.

Svoboda, Toby. Duties Regarding Nature: A Kantian Approach to Environmental Ethics. Ph.D. diss. Pennsylvania State University, 2012. [284 p.] Advisor: John Christman. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This dissertation develops a Kantian approach to environmental ethics. After critically examining traditional approaches in environmental ethics that recognize direct duties to nonhuman nature, I argue instead that human beings have indirect duties regarding non-human nature. Specifically, I contend that humans have a duty to abstain from causing unnecessary harm to non-human organisms, because doing so erodes one’s virtuous dispositions.
In the Doctrine of Virtue, Immanuel Kant holds that human beings have duties “regarding” flora and non-human animals. These duties regarding nature arise from a direct duty a human being has to herself, namely the duty to increase her own moral perfection. I argue that such moral perfection is constituted by possessing traditionally recognized virtues, such as benevolence. Kant mentions animal cruelty and wanton destruction of flora as examples of actions that diminish one’s moral perfection and hence violate one’s duty to moral perfection. I argue that one ought to abstain from such actions because they cause unnecessary harm to organisms, a kind of action that erodes one’s virtuous dispositions and hence violates one’s duty to moral perfection. Moreover, benefiting a non-human organism can increase one’s moral perfection, because such beneficence is a way of cultivating virtues and hence fulfilling one’s duty to increase one’s own moral perfection.
Kant’s account of organisms, primarily presented in the Critique of Judgment, provides a basis for understanding what it means to harm and benefit non-human organisms. According to this account, human investigators are warranted in taking organisms to be natural purposes, or entities that are natural yet also exhibit teleological features of design. In particular, Kant holds that to judge an organism as purposive is to judge it as an entity that ought to be a particular way. I use the term “natural goods” to refer to those states and functions that are constitutive of what an entity ought to be as a natural purpose. I argue that judgments about the natural goods of a given kind of organism are best exemplified by the assessment of relevant experts. This conception of natural goods helps ground duties regarding non-human organisms: since organisms have natural goods, it is possible to harm and benefit them by inhibiting or promoting the achievement of their natural goods. These considerations ground a robust, virtue-oriented environmental ethic that has significant advantages over traditional approaches to environmental ethics.

Telivuo, Julius.  Ideat in concreto: Gilles Deleuzen teoria ideoista Immanuel Kantin transsendentaalisen idean käsitteen kritiikkinä ja jatkokehittelynä.  Master’s thesis.  University of Helsinki, 2012. [81 p.]  [online] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The thesis discusses the concept of the idea and the problem of the ground of experience in Gilles Deleuze’s (1925-1995) Difference and Repetition and Immanuel Kant’s (1724-1804) Critique of Pure Reason. Deleuze develops Kant’s notion of problematic ideas further and formulates a critique of the Kantian conditions of the possibility of experience.
The method of the work is a critical and comparative study of the source literature. The research interest is systematic: the historico-exegetical remarks serve to motivate Deleuze’s theory and the interpretations implied by it. They are not to be understood as partaking in an interpretive discussion concerning the philosophical canon as such. The principal object of interest in the thesis is Deleuze’s theory of ideas. Deleuze adopts Kant’s definition of ideas as problems or problematic principles and he constructs his theory in close connection with the conceptual apparatus of the Critique of Pure Reason. The thesis begins with a short survey of Plato’s concept of ideas, to which both Deleuze and Kant refer.
Through a critical study, the thesis seeks to support Deleuze’s claim of the ideas as concrete problems and as the genetic principles of the objects of experience. Deleuze criticises the Kantian conditions of the possibility of experience for their externality with regard to real experience: Kant’s conceptual and sensible conditions of experience are the internal conditions only of possible experience. On the other hand, transcending all possible experience, the ideas are for Kant fundamentally problematic concepts, which preclude all concrete interpretations. However, they too lend themselves to a legitimate employment as regulative principles of knowledge and experience. According to Deleuze, the Kantian conceptual structures determine experience only externally and do not constitute the ground for real experience. He maintains that this ground is to be conceived as a problematic, genetic structure. He elaborates this problematic nature of the idea with the mathematical concept of the differential, which paves the way to the formulation of ideas as problematic, yet internally determined in differential relations and immanent in relation to objects of experience. Thus for Deleuze, ideas are concrete, completely determined problems, which experience manifests only in its partial solutions.

Thomson, Cameron Matthew. Morality, id est, Worthiness to be Happy: Kant’s Retributivism, the ‘law’ of unhappiness, and the Eschatological Reach of Kant’s ‘Law of Punishment’. Ph.D. diss. University of Edinburgh, 2012. [xvi, 281 p.] Advisor: Nicholas Adams. [PQ] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Throughout his work, Kant regularly glosses ‘morality’ (and cognate expressions) as ‘worthiness to be happy’ (Würdigkeit glücklich zu sein). As a rule, Kant’s commentators do not find this remarkable. Correctly understood, however, Kant’s gloss on ‘morality’ is remarkable indeed. This thesis shows why. In it, I argue that whenever we encounter Kant’s gloss, we are faced with an implicit, durable cluster of unjustified commitments; that these commitments both antedate and survive his ‘critical period’; that they are fundamentally practical in nature (i.e., that they are unexamined commitments to particular practices); and that these commitments entail a number of problematic theological consequences. I argue, in particular, that Kant’s gloss is a habit that signals, obscurely and implicitly, his antecedent commitments to the practice of capital punishment, on the one hand, and to a particular set of practical attitudes towards the happiness and unhappiness of immoral agents, on the other. I show that this habit has key implications for Kant’s thinking about the agent that he calls ‘God.’ My point of departure is Kant’s claim, in his Religion, that the human being’s particular deeds are imputable to her ‘all the way down,’ only on condition that the underlying ‘disposition’ (Gesinnung) from which they arise (according to their kind, qua moral or immoral) is imputable to her as well—that is, only if her (im)moral character may be regarded as the upshot of, or in some sense identical to, an utterly unassisted, unmotivated, originary deed on her part. I argue that Kant evades the question whether we really are permitted, without further ado, to regard this disposition (and with it an agent’s deeds) as so imputable. He simply affirms his commitment to the practice of imputing particular deeds to particular agents and, with this affirmation, affirms that he takes the warrant that it requires (the imputability of ‘Gesinnung’) to be secure. I argue, then, that the theoretical significance of imputation, as expressed in this extraordinary, evasive leap, supervenes on the urgency of the commitments that are expressed in Kant’s habitual glossing of ‘morality’ as ‘worthiness to be happy.’ The practice for which we would lack a warrant if the human being’s character were not imputable to her is the imputation of her deeds under a description (of imputation) that has immediate reference to this same ‘one’s’ punishment—specifically and only, however, to the extent that Kant takes punishments to be justifiable in none but strictly retributivist terms. These stakes and the constraining role of Kant’s habitual gloss are clearest, I argue, in his thinking about the practice of putting murderers to death—a practice, I argue, that has both a political and an eschatological significance for him.

Tully, Ian Martin.  On Greene’s Neuroscientific Challenge to Deontological Ethics.  Master’s thesis.  University of Colorado at Boulder, 2012. [62 p.]  Advisor: Christopher Heathwood. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper, I respond to the case against deontological moral theory that Joshua Greene develops in “The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul” and elsewhere. Using empirical data he and colleagues collected on peoples’ judgments in various moral dilemmas, Greene attempts to show that deontology rests on unsound foundations. In brief, he contends that the intuitions used to support deontological theory are undermined because they are responses to a morally irrelevant feature he calls “personalness.” I argue that deontologists can respond to Greene’s arguments by drawing a distinction between “practical” and “theoretical” intuitions. I contend that it is only the former sort of intuitions that are undermined by Greene’s evidence, and that deontological theory can be supported purely on the basis of theoretical intuitions.

Verweij, Jean Antonio Florance.  Kant-tekening van een Horrearius. De rol van het Magazijn voor critische wijsbegeerte en de geschiedenis van Dezelve in de Kantreceptie in Nederland. [Dutch]  Ph.D. diss.  Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam, 2012. [369 p.]  Advisor: W. van Bunge. [online] [M]

Villinger, Rahel.  Kant’s Theory of Intuition On Singularity and Unity.  Ph.D. diss.  Princeton University, 2012. [206 p.]  Advisor: Desmond Hogan. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The dissertation defends an interpretation of Kant’s critical philosophy on which singular and immediate representation of objects is independent of the kind of unity that is the characteristic contribution and function of discursive human understanding. It includes sustained critique of a widely accepted reading according to which Kant holds that the singularity of space and time, as the forms of reception and individuation of human sensible representation, is itself an achievement of understanding qua spontaneous capacity of cognition. The argument draws on a neglected critical doctrine according to which the attribution of perception and imagination to non-rational animals and not-yet-rational children cannot be excluded a priori. Kant embraces a view on which empirical intuitions and their associative-imaginative reproductions are indeterminate and not distinguished from their objects prior to the application of understanding. Further considerations establish that space and time, as singular forms of all human sensible intuitions, could not in principle depend on discursive understanding in Kant’s sense. The critical epistemology entails that humans sensibly represent an actual infinity of continuous filled space and time on the occasion of affection; further, that a discursive understanding cannot represent such infinity. It follows that the discursive, i.e. successively operating understanding Kant attributes to human beings cannot in principle determinately represent, at each moment of self-conscious perception, the singularity and continuity of spaces given in receptive intuition. An inherent limit of conceptual representation in Kant’s sense, one certainly absent from later logics allowing the representation of infinitary structures, thus constrains his account of the relation of sensibility and understanding. It is further argued that interpretations on which the singular form of spatiotemporal intuition depends constitutively upon understanding cannot explain the unity of human spontaneity itself as an irreducibly discursive (non-intuitive) self-consciousness. Finally, the dissertation offers a reading of the project of a Transcendental Deduction of the Categories as defensible on the assumption that intuition of objects is entirely independent of discursive understanding. The only possible role of such an understanding in cognition according to the tenets of critical philosophy is the combination of several intuitions in accordance with laws of unity.

Wakely-Mulroney, Aidan Gilbert.  Does Charity Begin — and End — at Home? Singer and Kant’s Views on Our Duties of Foreign Aid.  Master’s thesis.  Queen’s University, 2012. [iv, 78 p.]  Advisor: ??. [online] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In "Famine, Affluence, and Morality," Peter Singer urges citizens of wealthy countries to make immense personal sacrifices in order to assist the poor overseas. Though Singer has moderated his view in recent years and now supports widespread tithing, the motivation remains the same. By contrast, Immanuel Kant contends that the first right of humanity is freedom and that the purpose of a political order is to unite people into a rightful condition. As part of this, taxes should be imposed in order to support the domestic poor - an obligation that does not extend across borders. Although their underlying assumptions are quite different, Singer and Kant’s concerns can both be addressed by a common solution: the creation of a global tax to support the poor, implemented by a global state. Such an arrangement would permit substantial coordinated flows of aid to the needy (meeting Singer’s utilitarian concerns) while also ensuring that all people of the world are in a rightful condition with each other, thereby providing the justification for global social assistance (respecting Kantian deontology.) This solution requires expanding Singer’s proposals and a revisionist reading of Kant that dismisses his arguments against the creation of a global state. (Rawls’ support for a world of distinct states that support each other can also be dismissed, as his approach does not sufficiently connect political structures with personal duty, as Singer and Kant both do.) Though the final form of the solution is largely the same, Kant’s framework is superior: while Singer cannot eliminate the danger of becoming overwhelmed by duty, Kant’s focus on individual autonomy can guard against this.

Wenge, Mirjam.  “Man sieht das an den wilden Nationen...”: die Figur der “Wilden” bei Immanuel Kant und die Konstituierung von Differenz durch Geographie und Geschichte .  Master’s thesis.  Universität-Basel, 2012. [104 p.]  Advisor: Susanna Burghartz and Claudia Optiz-Belakhal. [WC]

West, Todd Harold.  Practical Ambiguities: A Kantian Guide to Charles Brockden Brown.  Ph.D. diss.  Northern Illinois University, 2012. [240 p.]  Advisor: William Baker. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This project examines the four major novels of Charles Brockden Brown (Wieland, Ormond, Edgar Huntly, and Arthur Mervyn) by viewing them alongside the major work of the German philosopher Immanuel Kant: Critique of Pure Reason, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, Critique of Practical Reason, and Critique of Judgement. In doing so, this project offers a new appraisal of Brown’s four novels by seeing them as a cohesive whole that develops from the first to the last in a meaningful way that is matched by the progression of Kant’s own work. Although a direct line of influence between Kant and Brown seems unlikely, this project argues that there was a late eighteenth-century intellectual atmosphere in America that inspired Brown much as Kant was inspired by a similar atmosphere in Germany. Through interest in, and reactions to, shared secondary sources, Brown and Kant arrived at similar conclusions. “Practical Ambiguities” pulls together competing critical approaches toward the principal Brown novels: those who view them as principally concerned with epistemological uncertainty, and those who view them as primarily concerned with practical matters of concern for the early republic. By viewing Brown’s novels in light of Kant’s major works, readers can better appreciate two major strains in Brown’s novels: a critique of the Enlightenment’s promise that reason and sense-based knowledge can provide true knowledge, and an insistence on the moral value of following what reason dictates it is one’s duty to do.

Winegar, Bradford Reed.  The Fate of Kant's Antinomies.  Ph.D. diss.  University of Pennsylvania, 2012. [315 p.]  Advisor: Paul Guyer. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This dissertation examines the development of Kant’s antinomy theory from the Critique of Pure Reason to Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. Although it would be a mistake to completely reduce Kant’s antinomy theory to a single topic, the dissertation illustrates that one major theme that reoccurs throughout Kant’s discussions of antinomies in the Critique of Pure Reason, Critique of Practical Reason, Critique of the Power of Judgment, and Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason is the theme of teleology or purposiveness. This theme comes to play an ever larger role in Kant’s philosophy during the 1780s and 1790s, as Kant attempts to articulate his final views on the relationship between his theoretical and moral philosophies. The primary aim of this dissertation is to illuminate the close relationship between Kant’s antinomy theory and his views concerning teleology and purposiveness. The dissertation examines the metaphysical and epistemological aspects of Kant’s antinomies in order to clarify the structure of Kant’s views concerning teleology and purposiveness, including Kant’s views on the ultimate unity of his theoretical and moral philosophies.

Zhu, Huihui.  The Reality of the Ideas of Freedom and Moral Law: Reconsidering the Groundwork of Kant’s Moral Philosophy.  Humboldt-Universität, 2012. [215 p.]  Advisor: ??. [WC]

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Citation Source Key

[ASP] — Academic Search Premier

[GVK] — Gemeinsamer Verbundkatalog

[JSTOR]

[M] — material copy of the book or journal

[MUSE] — Project Muse

[PDC] — Philosophy Documentation Center

[PI] — Philosopher’s Index

[PQ] — ProQuest

[PW] — publisher’s website

[RC] — Provided by Rodica Croitoru

[WC] — WorldCat

I thank Andrey Zilber for his kind assistance with the articles from the Russian journal Kantovskij Sbornik, and Rodica Croitoru for her help with many of the items from the Romanian literature.