[Info]  Kant Bibliography 2010  [2011]

Please send corrections or additions to: Steve Naragon.

[top]Kant    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Editions and translations of the writings of Immanuel Kant

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[See also the items listed under Collections]

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Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen (1764)

 ——.  Observaciones acerca del sentimiento de lo bello y de lo sublime. [Spanish] Edited and translated by Luis Jiménez Moreno. Madrid: Alianza, 2010. [119 p.]

 ——.  Güzellik ve yücelik duyguları üzerine gözlemler. [Turkish] Edited by Bahadir Vural; translated by Ahmet Fethi Yildirim. Istanbul: Hil Yayınları, 2010. [63 p.]

Versuch über die Krankheiten des Kopfes (1764)

 ——.  “Ensaio sobre as doenças da cabeça de 1764.” [Portuguese] Translated by Pedro Miguel Panarra. Revista Filosofica de Coimbra 19 (2010): 201-24.

Von den verschiedenen Racen der Menschen (1775)

 ——.  “Das Diferentes Raças Humanas.” [Portuguese] Translated with notes by Alexandre Hahn. Kant e-Prints (online journal) 5.5 (2010): 10-26. [online]

Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1781/87)

 ——.  Zut banakanut`yan k`nnadatut`yun. [Armenian] Translated by Varazdat Teroyan. Erevan: HH GAA "Gitut`yan" hratarakch`ut`yun, 2010. [951 p.]

 ——.  純粋理性批判 / Junsui risei hihan. [Japanese] 3 vols (of 5). Translated by Gen Nakayama. Tokyo: Kobunsha, 2010. [422, 423, 541 p.]

 ——.  De l’amphibologie des concepts de la réflexion. [French] Translated by Matthieu Haumesser. Paris: J. Vrin, 2010. [272 p.]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Translation and commentary of the “Amphiboly of Concepts of Reflection” section of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.

Prolegomena (1783)

 ——.  Prolegomena, do wszelkiej przyszlej metafizyki, która bedzie mogla wystapic jako nauka. [Polish] Translated by Benedykt Bornstein. Warsaw: Hachette Polska, 2010. [214 p.]

“Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?” (1784)

 ——.  ¿Qué es la ilustración? [Spanish] Translated by Eduardo García Belsunce and Sandra Giron. Buenos Aires: Prometio Libros, 2010. [75 p.]

Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (1785)

 ——.  Fundamentação da metafisica dos costumes. [Portguese] Translated with introduction and notes by Guido Antônio de Almeida. São Paulo: Editora Barcarolla, 2010. [501 p.]

 ——.  Fondements de la métaphysique des moeurs. [French]  Translated with notes and commentary by Pierrette Bonet. Paris: Nathan, 2010. [167 p.]

“Mutmasslicher Anfang der Menschengeschichte” (1786)

 ——.  “Início conjectural da história humana.” [Portuguese] Translated with notes by Joel Thiago Klein. Studia Kantiana (online) 8 (2010): 137-51. [online]

 ——.  Começo conjectural da história humana. [Portuguese] Translated with notes by Edmilson Menezes. São Paulo: Ed. UNESP, 2010. [131 p.]

Über eine Entdeckung, nach der alle neue Kritik der reinen Vernunft durch eine ältere entbehrlich gemacht werden soll (1790)

 ——.  Spór z Eberhardem. [Polish; Dispute with Eberhard] Translated by Artur Banaszkiewicz and Slawomir Stasikowski, edited by Banaszkiewicz. Gdansk: Wydawnictwo Slowo/Obraz Terytoria, 2010. [372 p.]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Includes a text by Johann August Eberhard as well as Kant's 1790 text.

Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft (1793)

 ——.  De religie binnen de grenzen van de rede. [Dutch] Translated by Geert Van Eekert. Amsterdam: Boom, 2010.  [265 p.]

 ——.  Sur le mal radical dans la nature humaine = Über das radicale Böse in der menschlichen Natur. [French] French/German, translated with introduction and commentary by Frédéric Gain. Paris: Edition Rue d’Ulm, 2010. [175 p.]

Zum ewigen Frieden (1795)

 ——.  Pour la paix perpétuelle. [French] Translated, with introduction and notes, by Joël Lefebvre. Lyon: Presses universitaires de Lyon, 2010. [188 p.]

“Von einem neuerdings erhobenen vornehmen Ton in der Philosophie” (1796)

 ——.  “Sobre um recentemente enaltecido tom de distinção na Filosofia.” [Portuguese] Translated with notes by Valerio Rohden. Studia Kantiana (online) 8 (2010): 152-70. [online]

Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht abgefaßt (1798)

 ——.  Antropología en sentido pragmático. [Spanish]  Translated by Mario Caimi. Buenos Aires: Losada, 2010. [352 p.]

 ——.  Antropología en sentido pragmático. [Spanish] Translated by José Gaos. Madrid: Alianza, 2010.  [287 p.]

 ——.  Antropologia dal punto di vista pragmatico. [Italian]  Translated by Mauro Bertani and Gianluca Garelli; introduction and notes by Michel Foucault. Torino: Einaudi, 2010. [ix, 365 p.]

 ——.  Antropologija pragmatiniu poziuriu. [Lithuanian] Translated by Romanas Pleckaitis. Vilnius: Margi Rastai, 2010. [305 p.]

 ——.  “Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (Excerpts).” [Lithuanian] Translated by Romanas Pleckaitis. Problemos: Mokslo darbai 77 (2010): 177-98.

Logik (1800)

 ——.  Lógica. [Spanish] Translated, and with an introduction, preface, and notes, by Carlos Correas. Buenos Aires: Corregidor, 2010. [205 p.]

Lecture Notes

 ——.  “Introdução ao Direito Natural Feyerabend” [Portuguese; Introduction to the Natural Law Feyerabend] Translated by Fernando Costa Mattos. Cadernos de Filosofia Alemã 15 (2010): 97-113.

Miscellaneous

 ——.  Opus postumum. [Polish; selection]   Translated by Tomasz Kupś. Studia z Historii Filozofii 1 (2010): 9-30.

 ——.  Kirjeenvaihtoa 1759-1799 [Finnish; Correspondence 1759-1799] Translated by Panu Turunen. Turku: Areopagus, 2010. [245 p.]

Collections

[Ingarden 2010] Krytyka czystego rozumu [Polish; Pre-Critical Writings]. Translated by Roman Ingarden. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 2010. [396 p.]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Vol. One of the six volume edition of Kant’s writings in Polish translation. In this volume:

[Kobe/Riha 2010] Predkritični spisi [Slovenian; Pre-Critical Writings]. Translated by Samo Tomšič and Zdravko Kobe, edited by Kobe and Rado Riha; introduction by Kobe. Ljubljana: Založba ZRC, 2010. [512 p.]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Translations of:
Poskus nekaterih razmišljanj o optimizmu (Samo Tomšič, tr.; 75-83) [Versuch einiger Betrachtungen über den Optimismus]
Lažno dlakocepstvo štirih silogističnih figur (Samo Tomšič, tr.; 85-101) [Die falsche Spitzfindigkeit der vier syllogistischen Figuren]
Edini možni argument za demonstracijo obstoja boga (Samo Tomšič, tr.; 103-96??) [Der einzig mögliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes]
Raziskava o razločnosti načel naravne teologije in morale. Odgovor na vprašanje, ki ga je za leto 1763 zastavila kraljeva akademija znanosti v berlinu (name, tr.; 197-224) [Untersuchung über die Deutlichkeit der Grundsätze der natürlichen Theologie und der Moral]
Poskus uvedbe pojma negativnih velikosti v filozofijo (name, tr.; 225-64??) [Versuch, den Begriff der negativen Grössen in die Weltweisheit einzuführen]
Razmišljanja o občutju lepega in vzvišenega (name, tr.; 265-314??) [Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen]
Poskus o boleznih glave (name, tr.; 315-28??) [Versuch über die Krankheiten des Kopfes]
Najava magistra immanuela kanta o poteku njegovih predavanj v zimskem semestru 1765–1766 (name, tr.; 329-40??) [M. Immanuel Kants Nachricht von der Einrichtung seiner Vorlesungen in dem Winterhalbjahre von 1765-1766]
Sanje duhovidca, pojasnjene s sanjami metafizike (name, tr.; 341-98??) [Träume eines Geistersehers erläutert durch Träume der Metaphysik]
O prvem temelju razlikovanja smeri v prostoru (name, tr.; 399-408??) [Von dem ersten Grunde des Unterschiedes der Gegenden im Raume]
O formi in temeljih inteligibilnega in senzibilnega sveta (name, tr.; 409-50??) [De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis].

[Kupś/Jankowski 2010] Pisma przedkrytyczne [Polish; Pre-Critical Writings]. Translated by Tomasz Kupś and Marek Jankowski. Torun: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Mikolaja Kopernika, 2010. [985 p.]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Vol. One of the six volume edition of Kant’s writings in Polish translation. In this volume:
1747
Myśli o prawdziwej mierze sił żywych oraz ocena dowodów, którymi w tej spornej kwestii posługiwał się Leibniz i inni mechaniści wraz z kilkoma wstępnymi uwagami dotyczącymi sił ciał w ogóle / 13
1754
Próba odpowiedzi na pytanie, czy ruch wirowy Ziemi wokół własnej osi, dzięki któremu zachodzi zmiana dnia i nocy, uległ jakimś zmianom od czasu jej powstania oraz dzięki czemu można się o tym przekonać, która w mijającym roku została poddana ocenie Królewskiej Akademii Nauk w Berlinie / 169
Pytanie, czy pod względem fizycznym Ziemia się starzeje / 177
1755
Powszechna historia naturalna i teoria nieba albo szkic o układzie oraz mechanicznym pochodzeniu całości świata opracowany zgodnie z prawami Newtona / 195
1756
O przyczynach trzęsień ziemi, w związku z nieszczęściem, które pod koniec ubiegłego roku nawiedziło kraje Europy Zachodniej / 387
Historia oraz opis natury najdziwniejszych przypadków trzęsienia ziemi,które pod koniec 1755 roku wstrząsnęło dużą częścią Ziemi /397
Dalsze rozważania dotyczące spostrzeganych od niedawna wstrząsów ziemi / 427
O zastosowaniu metafizyki, o ile połączona jest ona z geometrią, w filozofii przyrody, której pierwsza próba zawiera monadologię fizyczną / 437
Nowe uwagi do objaśnienia teorii wiatrów / 455
1757
Plan wykładów poświęconych geografii fizycznej i zawiadomienie o nich wraz z dołączonym krótkim rozważaniem na temat problemu: czy wiatry zachodnie w naszym regionie dlatego są wilgotne, bo wieją nad rozległym morzem /469
1758
Nowa teoria ruchu i spoczynku /481
1759
Esej o kilku spostrzeżeniach na temat optymizmu / 493
1760
Rozważania związane z przedwczesną śmiercią Jaśnie Wielmoznego Pana Johanna Friedricha von Funk /501
1762
Błędna drobiazgowość czterech figur sylogistycznych /509
1763
Jedyna możliwa podstawa dowodu na istnienie Boga / 527
1764
Rozważania o uczuciu piękna i wzniosłości / 651
Esej o schorzeniach głowy / 695
Recenzja pisma Silberschlaga: Teoria kuli ognia, która pojawiła się 23 sierpnia 1762 roku / 709
Rozprawa o wyraźności zasad naczelnych teologii naturalnej i filozofii moralnej / 713
1765
Zawiadomienie o urządzeniu wykładów w semestrze zimowym 1765-1766 / 741
1766
Marzenia jasnowidzącego objaśnione przez marzenia metafizyki / 751
1768
O pierwszej przyczynie rozróżnienia stron w przestrzeni / 801
1770
O formie i zasadach świata zmysłowego i intelligibilnego / 811
1771
Recenzja pisma Moscatiego: O istotnej różnicy w budowie ciała zwierząt i ludzi / 855
1775
O różnorodnych rasach ludzkich / 859
1776-1777
Rozprawy dotyczące Philantropinum / 877
Uwagi rzeczowe / 887

[Li 2010a] 邏輯學.自然地理學.教育學 / Luo ji xue. zi ran di li xue. jiao yu xue. [Chinese] Translated by Qiuling Li. Beijing: Renmin University Press, 2010. [510 p.]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: This appears to be a translation of volume 9 of the Academy edition, viz., of Logic (1800), Physical Geography (1802), and Pedagogy (1803).

[Li 2010b] 1781 年之后的论文 / 1781 nian zhi hou de lun wen. [Chinese; Papers after 1781] Translated by Qiuling Li. Beijing: Renmin University Press, 2010. [481 p.]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: This appears to be a translation of volume 8 of the Academy edition; see the individual texts on the Academy Edition page.

[Villacañas 2010] Obras Completas I: Crítica de la razón pura / Prolegómenos a toda metafísica futura / Relato de la vida y el carácter de Immanuel Kant por Ludwig Ernst Borowski. [Spanish] Translated, edited, and with an introduction by José Luis Villacañas. Madrid: Gredos, 2010. [cxxvii, 882 p.]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Translation of Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1781/87), Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysic (1783), and a selection from L. E. Borowski, Darstellung des Lebens und Charakters Immanuel Kants (1804).

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[top]A    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Abaci, Uygar.  “Artistic Sublime Revisited: Reply to Robert Clewis.”  Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 68 (2010): 170-73.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In my article “Kant’s Justified Dismissal of Artistic Sublimity” I argued that the absence of an account of artistic sublimity in the Critique of the Power of Judgment is not a trivial gap in the architectonic of the book, but rather a theoretically significant one. The way Kant constructs the concepts of sublimity and art leads to certain problems that leave no room for a coherent theory of artistic sublimity in Kant’s critical aesthetics, but perhaps only a set of impure cases. So anyone with a claim to a Kantian theory of artistic sublimity has to present us with a convincing explanation of the absence of an actual account in Kant’s text, address the problems I raised, and take on the burden of a positive account that is able to explain our aesthetic response to purportedly sublime artworks in terms of judgments of sublimity as Kant understands them. Robert Clewis’s response to my paper neither provides an explanation of this gap in the ‘Critique’ nor addresses the problems I raised.

Abbate, Giampaolo.  “La critica kantiana alla dottrina etica di Aristotele, tra esplicite accuse e tacite convergenze.” [Italian]  Was ist der Mensch? Que é o homem?  Eds. Ribeiro dos Santos, et al. (op cit.).  705-16.

Acerbi, Ariberto.  Rev. of Kant’s Theory of the Self, by Arthur Melnick (2009).  Acta Philosophica: Pontificia Universita della Santa Croce 19 (2010): 388-91.

Adams, Nicholas.  “Kant.”  The Blackwell Companion to Nineteenth-Century Theology.  Ed. David Fergusson.  Chichester, U.K./Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010.  3-30.

Adler, Hans.  “Metaschema und Aisthesis. Herders Gegenentwurf zu Kant.”  Zwischen Bild und Begriff. Kant und Herder zum Schema.  Eds. Ulrich Gaier and Ralf Simon (op cit.).  119-54.

Albers, Franz-Josef.  Praktische Philosophie zwischen Affirmation und Dissens: eine Gedankenreise.  Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2010.  [162 p.]

Allais, Lucy.  “Kant’s Argument for Transcendental Idealism in the Transcendental Aesthetic.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (2010): 47-75.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper gives an interpretation of Kant’s argument for transcendental idealism in the Transcendental Aesthetic. I argue against a common way of reading this argument, which sees Kant as arguing that substantive a priori claims about mind-independent reality would be unintelligible because we cannot explain the source of their justification. I argue that Kant’s concern with how synthetic a priori propositions are possible is not a concern with the source of their justification, but with how they can have objects. I argue that Kant’s notion of intuition needs to be understood as a kind of representation which involves the presence to consciousness of the object it represents, and that this means that a priori intuition cannot present us with a mind-independent feature of reality.

 ——.  “Transcendental Idealism and Metaphysics: Kant’s Commitment to Things as They are In Themselves.”  Kant Yearbook: Metaphysics 2 (2010): 1-32.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: One of Kant’s central claims in the Critique of Pure Reason is that we cannot have knowledge of things as they are in themselves.  This claim has been regarded as problematic in a number of ways: whether Kant is entitled to assert both that there are things in themselves and that we cannot have knowledge of them, and, more generally, what Kant’s commitment to things in themselves amounts to.  A number of commentators deny that Kant is committed to there actually being an aspect of reality which we cannot cognise; they argue that he is committed merely to the idea that we cannot avoid the concept of things as they are in themselves.  I will argue in this paper that while transcendental idealism is partly an epistemological position, it is also partly a metaphysical position, and in specific, that Kant is committed to the claim that the things we cognise have, in addition to the way they appear to us, a nature that is independent of us, which we cannot cognise.

Allison, Henry E.  Custom and Reason in Hume: a Kantian Reading of the First Book of the Treatise.  New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.  [xi, 412 p.]

Allouche-Pourcel, Béatrice.  Kant et la Schwärmerei: Histoire d’une Fascination.  Paris: Harmattan, 2010.  [285 p.]

[Note] [Hide Note] Based on the author’s doctoral thesis (Université Paris 12, 2008).
[From the publisher]: Omniprésente mais jamais réellement thématisée, la notion de Schwärmerei apparaît comme un fil directeur dans l’oeuvre kantienne. Confusion, insuppportable prétention mais aussi “raison négative” (antiparadigme), la Schwärmerei représente pour le philosophe le danger mortel d’une alternative possible à sa propre rationalité et il va se mettre en devoir de la dénoncer. Le dialogue entre la Schwärmerei et la raison sera un thème fondamental du système de la raison kantienne mais aussi dans l’histoire de la raison elle-même.

Almeida, Guido Antônio de.  “Kant et la bonne volonté.”  Was ist der Mensch? Que é o homem?  Eds. Ribeiro dos Santos, et al. (op cit.).  609-22.

Almond, Ian.  History of Islam in German Thought from Leibniz to Nietzsche.  New York: Routledge, 2010.  [vi, 208 p.]

[Note] [Hide Note] A volume in the Routledge Studies in Cultural History.  See especially ch. 2: “Kant, Islam, and the Preservation of Boundaries” (Islam as Sublime Threat; Kant, Anthropology and the Muslim World: Physical Geography as a Mere Appendix). [SN]

Altman, Matthew C.  “Kant on Sex and Marriage: The Implications for the Same-Sex Marriage Debate.”  Kant-Studien 101 (2010): 309-30.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: When examined critically, Kant’s views on sex and marriage give us the tools to defend same-sex marriage on moral grounds. The sexual objectification of one’s partner can only be overcome when two people take responsibility for one another’s overall well-being, and this commitment is enforced through legal coercion. Kant’s views on the unnaturalness of homosexuality do not stand up to scrutiny, and he cannot (as he often tries to) restrict the purpose of sex to procreation. Kant himself rules out marriage only when the partners cannot give themselves to one another equally – that is, if there is inequality of exchange. Because same-sex marriage would be between equals and would allow homosexuals to express their desire in a morally appropriate way, it ought to be legalized.

Altmann, Sílvia.  “Rational Foundation of Freedom in Kant’s Groundwork.”  Was ist der Mensch? Que é o homem?  Eds. Ribeiro dos Santos, et al. (op cit.).  649-61.

Alves, Julius.  “Vollkommene Tugendpflichten: Zur Systematik der Pflichten in Kants Metaphysik der Sitten.”  Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 64 (2010): 520–45.

Alves, Pedro M. S.  “The concept of a transcendental logic.”  Kant e-Prints 5.3 (2010): 132-44. [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper I try to show how transcendental logic can be interpreted in light of the distinction between apophantics and formal ontology. Despite the non-Kantian origin of these concepts, my contention is that they can reveal the scope of Kant’s argument regarding the distinction between formal and transcendental logic and the thesis that transcendental logic has a pure a priori content. While common approaches interpret this a priori content of transcendental logic as the content pure forms of aesthetics give, we stress that this content is the a priori concepts of object which are embedded in the logical form of judgments.

 ——.  “O Fenómeno-Vida. Kant e Darwin.” [Portuguese; "The Phenomenon of Life. Kant and Darwin"]  Was ist der Mensch? Que é o homem?  Eds. Ribeiro dos Santos, et al. (op cit.).  443-56.

Aly, Aysun. See: Frey, Michael, and Aysun Aly.

Ameriks, Karl.  “Reality, Reason, and Religion in the Development of Kant’s Ethics.”  Kant’s Moral Metaphysics: God, Freedom, and Immortality.  Eds. Lipscomb and Krueger (op cit.).  23-47.

Anderson, Abraham.  “The Objection of David Hume.”  Rethinking Kant, vol. 2.  Ed. Pablo Muchnik (op cit.). 81-120.

Anderson, Owen.  “Without Purpose: Modernity and the Loss of Final Causes.”  Heythrop Journal: A Bimonthly Review of Philosophy and Theology 51 (2010): 401-16.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Phenomenologically, boredom is described as a lack of interest that results in a lack of motivation. When questioned about this lack of interest, the bored person often asserts that the given activity or object of boredom has no purpose, it does not result in happiness, or contentment, or eudemonia. This is even true when the object of boredom is something that the bored person also maintains to be very important, such as religious observations, education, or discipline of various kinds. Boredom in this sense can be localized, and the person’s life more generally is not ‘boring’ because the person can divert their attention and activity to objects of interest. But what happens if life itself is perceived to be boring and without interest? Here I will argue that this will be the case when life is believed to be without any purpose. This lack of purpose filters down to the various activities of life, which are perceived to be meaningless.

Anderson, Pamela Sue.  “Pure Reason and Contemporary Philosophy of Religion: The Rational Striving in and for Truth.”  International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 68 (2010): 95-106.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This essay urges contemporary philosophers of religion to rethink the role that Kant’s critical philosophy has played both in establishing the analytic nature of modern philosophy and in developing a critique of reason’s drive for the unconditioned. In particular, the essay demonstrates the contribution that Kant and other modern rationalists such as Spinoza can still make today to our rational striving in and for truth. This demonstration focuses on a recent group of analytic philosophers of religion who have labelled their own work ‘analytic theology’ and have generated new debates, including new arguments about Kant bridging philosophy and theology. Cultivation of a reflective critical openness is encouraged here; this is a practice for checking reason’s overly ambitious claims about God.

 —— and Jordan Bell.  Kant and Theology.  London: T & T Clark International, 2010.  [x, 122 p.]

[Note] [Hide Note] A volume in the Philosophy and Theology series introducing the theological implications of various philosophers.  While an introductory overview of Kant’s arguments, this brief volume also polemically engages with the current literature.  The authors teach at Regent’s Park College, Oxford. [SN]

Anderson, R. Lanier.  “The Introduction to the Critique: Framing the Question.”  The Cambridge Companion to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.  Ed. Paul Guyer (op cit.).  75-92.

Anderson-Gold, Sharon.  “Kant, Radical Evil, and Crimes against Humanity.”  Kant’s Anatomy of Evil.  Eds. Anderson-Gold and Muchnik (op cit.).  195-214.

 ——.  “Kant’s Cosmopolitan Peace.”  Rethinking Kant, vol. 2.  Ed. Pablo Muchnik (op cit.). 205-21.

 ——.  “Privacy, Respect and the Virtues of Reticence in Kant.”  Kantian Review 15.2 (2010): 28-42.

 —— and Pablo Muchnik, eds.  Kant’s Anatomy of Evil.  New York/Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.  [xi, 251 p.] [review]

[Note] [Hide Note] Essays by: Phillip J. Rossi, Patrick Frierson, Gordon Michalson, Claudia Card, Robert Louden, Pablo Muchnik, Allen Wood, Jeanine Grenberg, Sharon Anderson-Gold, David Sussman.
[From the publisher]: Kant infamously claimed that all human beings, without exception, are evil by nature.  This collection of essays critically examines and elucidates what he must have meant by this indictment.  It shows the role which evil plays in his overall philosophical project and analyses its relation to individual autonomy.  Furthermore, it explores the relevance of Kant’s views for understanding contemporary questions such as crimes against humanity and moral reconstruction.  Leading scholars in the field engage a wide range of sources from which a distinctly Kantian theory of evil emerges, both subtle and robust, and capable of shedding light on the complex dynamics of human immorality.

Andrade M. Oliveira, Érico.  “A crítica de Nietzsche à moral kantiana: por um moral mínima.” [Portuguese]  Cadernos Nietzsche 27 (2010): 169-89.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: O presente artigo retoma a crítica de Nietzsche à moral kantiana por um duplo motivo. Primeiro, para mostrar a impossibilidade de se pensar uma moral como um 'dado', cuja fundamentação caberia à filosofia tecer. Segundo, tentamos estabelecer os primeiros passos para o projeto de uma moral minima que, sem recorrer à metafísica, preserva o caráter relacional da noção de perspectiva em Nietzsche e a diversidade de predicações de moralidade às nossas ações. Concluiremos que uma moral mínima se institui por um viés negativo, descrito pela seguinte regra: 'age de tal modo que tua ação nunca se torne um valor absoluto'. Essa regra se constitui, por seu turno, como o único imperativo moral legítimo porque passível de universalização.

Andrei, Petre.  Opera omnia, Bk. 5, vol. 1: Prelegeri de istoria filosofiei de la Kant la Schopenhauer. [Romanian; Lectures on the History of Philosophy, from Kant to Schopenhauer]  Iaşi, Romania: Tipo Moldova, 2010.  [371 p.]

Araujo Figueiredo de, Virginia.  “L’art comme promesse de liberté.”  Was ist der Mensch? Que é o homem?  Eds. Ribeiro dos Santos, et al. (op cit.).  495-504.

Arens, Patrick E.  “Kant and the Understanding’s Role in Imaginative Synthesis.”  Kant Yearbook: Metaphysics 2 (2010): 33-52.

Arnold, Denis G., Robert Audi, and Matt Zwolinski.  “Recent Work in Ethical Theory and Its Implications for Business Ethics.”  Business Ethics Quarterly 20 (2010): 559-81.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: We review recent developments in ethical pluralism, ethical particularism, Kantian intuitionism, rights theory, and climate change ethics, and show the relevance of these developments in ethical theory to contemporary business ethics. This paper explains why pluralists think that ethical decisions should be guided by multiple standards and why particularists emphasize the crucial role of context in determining sound moral judgments. We explain why Kantian intuitionism emphasizes the discerning power of intuitive reason and seek to integrate that with the comprehensiveness of Kant’s moral framework. And we show how human rights can be grounded in human agency, and explain the connections between human rights and climate change.

Askin, Zehragül.  “The Ontological Foundation of the Transcendental Deduction.” [Turkish]  Kaygi: Uludağ Universitesi Felsefe Dergisi (Bursa) 14 (2010): 11-26.

Atkins, Richard Kenneth.  “An ‘Entirely Different Series of Categories’: Peirce’s Material Categories.”  Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 46 (2010): 94-110.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article discusses what the author calls the “material categories” in the philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce. The author argues that although Peirce never developed an account of the “material categories,” his writings indicate that such a category exists. The author looks at Peirce’s conception of categoriality and its relationship to phaneroscopy (the description of the collective of all that is present in the mind). The author argues that Peirce’s 1903 model for the relationship between these two sets of categories is flawed. The article also discusses the model of universal categories developed by philosopher Immanuel Kant.

Audi, Robert.  See: Arnold, Denis G., Robert Audi, and Matt Zwolinski.

Auteri, Giuseppe.  “Fenomenologia della singolarità: Sulla filosofia de Pietro Piovani tra struttura kantiana, complessità platonica e antihegelismo consapevole.” [Italian]  Archivio di Storia della Cultura 23 (2010): 387-404.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The original Piovani’s criticism approaches the origin of the subject and the object, through the Socratic-Platonic course of reason which is defined within the historicity of action of the reasoning subjects, passing through both Kant’s ethical structure and the rethinking of the conscious anti-Hegelism critically revised by critical historicism. Piovani’s main theme is the restlessness of the contemporary man, faced by means of an original reflection which traces out a phenomenology of singularity in which history becomes privileged ground for the coexistence of individualities.

Axinn, Sidney.  Sacrifice and Value: A Kantian Interpretation.  Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2010.  [154 p.]

[Note] [Hide Note] [From the publisher]: Sacrifice and Value: A Kantian Interpretation argues that we create values by making sacrifices. Values don’t exist outside of us; they exist only when we give a gift without expecting a return. As Sidney Axinn demonstrates, we must have values in order to make decisions, to have friends or lovers, and to choose goals of any sort. Sacrifice is basic to almost everything of importance: care, love, religion, patriotism, loyalties, warfare, friendship, gift giving, morality. Axin uses Aristotle, Cicero, and Kant, and contemporary philosophers Oldenquest, Frankfurt, Friedman, Starobinski and others to analyze the role of sacrifice. A novel feature is the attention given to Kant’s use of sacrifice. Sacrifice and Value will interest advanced students and scholars of philosophy — particularly value theory and moral theory — as well as women’s studies, religion, political theory, and psychology.

Contents: Introduction — Sacrifice and the creation of inherent value — Care and sacrifice — Love — Religion and sacrifice — Patriotism — Business and other loyalties — Friendship — Gifts — Pluralism vs fanaticism: the need for more than one absolute value — Kant’s use of sacrifice — Relations to certain significant theories and issues — Conclusions.

[top]B    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Baccarini, Emilio.  “La ragione s-confinata: A partire da Kant.”  [Italian] Hermeneutica: Annuario di filosofia e teologia (2010): 135-49.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The essay starts from two different perspectives on the Enlightenment (Cassirer and Horkheimer-Adorno), which are also two different viewpoints that serve to introduce a train of thought that, when a preliminary comparison is made with the Kantian response to the question, “What is the Enlightenment?”, aims nevertheless to grasp a theory of reason that in its presentation already appears to be bivalent: ‘unconfined’. An attempt is made to show what being ‘confined-unconfined’ means for reason and especially what it means to be both things at the same time. In this brief work we will try to understand the polyvalence of the Kantian theory of reason, by making the sense of limit and that of the unconditioned interact in reason itself, but also by hinting at possible revivals of a more articulate theory of reason in the present day.

Bacin, Stefano.  “The Meaning of the Critique of Practical Reason for Moral Beings: the Doctrine of Method of Pure Practical Reason.”  Kant’s ‘Critique of Practical Reason’: A Critical Guide.  Eds. Andrews Reath and Jens Timmermann (op cit.). 197-215.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The essay addresses the philosophical role of the doctrine of method as part II of the second Critique. After discussing Kant’s general notion of a ‘doctrine of method’, the analysis shows that the final part of the second Critique aims at leading the individual agent to become aware of his own dignity as a moral being, through an understanding of the basic concepts of the doctrine of elements. The doctrine of method thereby confirms the conclusions of the ‘Analytic’ through the common use of pure practical reason and by connecting them with the experience of every moral agent.

 ——.  Rev. of The Form of Practical Knowledge: A Study of the Categorical Imperative, by Stephen P. Engstrom (2009). [Italian]  Studi Kantiani 23 (2010): 133-36. [online]

 ——.  Rev. of Kant’s Ethics of Virtue, by Monika Betzler (2008). [Italian]  Studi Kantiani 23 (2010): 151-54.

 —— and Dieter Schönecker.  “Zwei Konjekturvorschläge zur Tugendlehre, §9.”  Kant-Studien 101 (2010): 247–52.

Baiasu, Sorin.  Kant and Sartre: Re-Discovering Critical Ethics.  Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire/New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.  [320 p.]

[Note] [Hide Note] [From the publisher]: Starting from an original comparative methodology this first book-length comparative study challenges the standard view of the relationship between Kant’s and Sartre’s ethical theories. While their works in moral philosophy are usually contrasted, this book makes a case for regarding Kant as one of Sartre’s most important predecessors and for reading Sartre’s ethical writings as offering a practical philosophy which is closer to Kant than more recent Kantian moral theories are. On the basis of the similarities between their practical philosophies, the author argues that several aspects of Kant’s critical ethics, which have been overlooked or explicitly avoided by contemporary Kantians, can be retrieved and are essential for an appropriate approach to currently urgent normative problems, such as the problem of the justification of ethical and political norms in conditions of pluralism.

 ——.  “Kant’s Account of Motivation: A Sartrean Response to Some Hegelian Objections.”   Hegel Bulletin 31.1 (2010): 86-106.

Bailey, Tom.  “Analysing the Good Will: Kant’s Argument in the First Section of the Groundwork.”  British Journal for the History of Philosophy 18 (2010): 635-62. [abstract]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article contends that the first section of Kant’s ‘Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals’ provides a sophisticated and valid argument, and that commentators are therefore mistaken in dismissing this section as flawed. In particular, the article undertakes to show that in this section Kant argues from a conception of the goodness of a good will to two distinctive features of moral goodness, and from these features to his ‘formula of universal law’. The article reveals the sophistication and validity of this argument by considering it in the light of a number of criticisms that are commonly levelled at the section. In conclusion, the article proposes that this interpretation of the section also has significant implications for the understanding of Kant’s method, his formulas and his basic conception of the ‘moral’.

Bambauer, Christoph.  Rev. of Kant’s Ethics of Virtue, edited by Monika Betzler (2008).  Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 92 (2010): 203-9.

Banham, Gary.  “The Antimonies of Pure Practical Libertine Reason.”  Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities 15 (2010): 13-27.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article discusses the antimonies of pure practical libertine reason in association with sensibility assault described by Jacques Lacan. The assault’s nature can be summarized in terms of the enormous length of works and the descriptions given of a constant spectacle of erotic cruelty. It points out that the initial integration of Lacan’s account of the encounter between poet Marquis de Sade and philosopher Immanuel Kant is in the investigation of psychoanalysis ethics.

 ——.  “Perception, Justification, and Transcendental Philosophy.”  Deleuze and the Fold: A Critical Reader.  Eds. Sjoerd van Tuinen and Niamh McDonnell (London/New York: Palgrave Macmillan).  112-31.

 ——.  Rev. of Ethics Vindicated: Kant’s Transcendental Legitimation of Moral Discourse, by Ermanno Bencivenga (2007).  Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (2010): 111-12. [online]

 ——.  “Scepticism, Causation and Cognition.”  Rev. of Custom and Reason in Hume: A Kantian Reading of the First Book of the Treatise, by Henry E. Allison (2008).  British Journal for the History of Philosophy 18 (2010): 507-20.

Banton, Michael.  “Questions and Answers.”  Ethnicities 10 (2010): 148-49.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The author offers a reply to an article by Robert Bernasconi entitled “Defining Race Scientifically.” It was indicated by Bernasconi that the author misidentifies the problem that the misconception of race is being solved by philosopher Immanuel Kant. He points out that further investigation is needed for the historical influence of Kant’s ideas on race. He also explains why he regretted in contradicting the idea of race with the concept of racism. He cites that he doubt whether the word racism can help resolve any problems in scholarship.

Barata-Moura, José.  “Kant ou le sens pragmatique d’une Anthropologie.”  Was ist der Mensch? Que é o homem?  Eds. Ribeiro dos Santos, et al. (op cit.).  15-42.

Barbagallo, Santi.  Paraffi: la questione del parergon da Kant a Derrida. [Italian]  Rome: Aracne, 2010.  [258 p.]

Barboza, Jair.  “Kann der Krieg erhaben sein?”  War and Peace: the Role of Science and Art.  Eds. Soraya Nour and Olivier Remaud (op cit.).  237-46.

 ——. “A crítica de Schopenhauer às Críticas de Kant. Ou como reverenciar um mestre distanciando-se dele.” [Portuguese] Crítica da Razão Tradutora. Sobre a dificuldade de traduzir Kant. Eds. Alessandro Pinzani and Valério Rohden (op cit.). 75-85. [M]

Bardon, Adrian.  “Kant and the Conventionality of Simultaneity.”  British Journal for the History of Philosophy 18 (2010): 845-56.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In his Third Analogy of Experience, Kant argues that a universal system of mutual causal interaction-at-a-distance is presupposed in the very construction of experience, and thereby also can be assumed to hold of objects of experience qua appearances. This implies in turn a notion of objective simultaneity. I discuss whether Kant's project is rendered wholly obsolete by the relativity and conventionality of simultaneity as it is now understood under the theory of relativity. I conclude that, while major parts of his project are indeed obsolete, there may still be useful insights into time-awareness to be gleaned from his work.

 ——.  “Time-awareness and Projection in Mellor and Kant.”  Kant-Studien 101 (2010): 59–74.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The theorist who denies the objective reality of non-relational temporal properties, or ‘A-series’ determinations, must explain our experience of the passage of time.  D. H. Mellor, a prominent denier of the objective reality of temporal passage, draws, in part, on Kant in offering a theory according to which the experience of temporal passage is the result of the projection of change in belief.  But Mellor has missed some important points Kant has to make about time-awareness.  It turns out that Kant’s theory of time-awareness also involves projection – but for him, the projection of temporal passage is necessary to any coherent experience at all, and for this reason events in the world cannot be represented except as exhibiting real tensed change.  Consequently we cannot intelligibly suppose the world we know to be without the passage of time.  This fact would permit a modest transcendental argument the conclusion of which is that we are entitled to describe the world in terms of temporal passage.

Barth, Anna.  “Vom Ghetto nach Europa: Immanuel Kant und die Berliner Haskala.”  Kant der Europäer: Europäer über Kant.  Eds. Dietzsch, Grimoni, and Kozlowski (op cit.).  248-73.

Barth, Heinrich.  Philosophie der praktischen Vernunft.  Ed. and with an introduction by Armin Wildermuth.  Basel: Schwabe, 2010.  [xxxiv, 389 p.]

Basile, Pierfrancesco.  “Kant, Spinoza, and the Metaphysics of the Ontological Proof.”  Metaphysica: International Journal for Ontology and Metaphysics 11 (2010): 17-37.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper provides an interpretation and evaluation of Spinoza’s highly original version of the ontological proof in terms of the concept of substance instead of the concept of perfection in the first book of his Ethics. Taking the lead from Kant’s critique of ontological arguments in the Critique of Pure Reason, the paper explores the underlying ontological and epistemological presuppositions of Spinoza’s proof. The main topics of consideration are the nature of Spinoza’s definitions, the way he conceives of the relation between a substance and its essence, and his conception of existence. Once clarity is shed upon these fundamental issues, it becomes possible to address the proof in its own terms. It is then easy to see that Kant’s objections miss their target and that the same is true of those advanced by another of the ontological argument’s most famous critics, Bertrand Russell. Finally, several interpretations of Spinoza’s proof are proposed and critically evaluated; on all of them, the argument turns out to be either invalid or question-begging.

Bassoli, Selma Aparecida.  “O mal radical segundo Kant e Schopenhauer.” [Portuguese]  Was ist der Mensch? Que é o homem?  Eds. Ribeiro dos Santos, et al. (op cit.).  725-38.

Basta, Danilo.  “La imagen de Platón en la Crítica de la Razón Pura.” [Spanish]  Endoxa 25 (2010): 79-88.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The point of departure in this article is the claim raised by Paul Natorp in his famous book Plato’s Doctrine of Ideas (1903) that Plato’s philosophy includes many features that anticipate Kant while Kant’s thought points back to Plato. Indeed, one cannot doubt the fact that there are some characteristics in Plato’s thinking which by their intention and foresight point to Kant’s endeavour to critically examine the powers of the human mind, while some components of Kant’s critical stance refer to Plato’s philosophy. Nevertheless, Plato is not just a Kant in potentia, nor is Kant only an accomplished Plato. Even though Kant was well aware that ideas (forms) in Plato possess primarily an ontological function speculatively conceived, Kant, in keeping with his own philosophical strivings, hermeneutically shifted their import to ethics and politics, thus opening a new possibility of productively understanding the very core of Plato’s philosophy. With his Plato picture, Kant simultaneously draws some essential traits of his own portrait as a critical philosopher.

Battaglia, Fiorella.  Il sistema antropologico: la posizione dell'uomo nella filosofia critica di Kant. [Italian]  Pisa: Ed. Plus-Pisa University Press, 2010.  [171 p.]

Bauer, Nathan.  “Kant’s Subjective Deduction.”  British Journal for the History of Philosophy 18 (2010): 433-60.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article offers a reinterpretation of subjective deduction, a concept explored by 18th-century German philosopher Immanuel Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason. The author challenges the mainstream interpretation of subjective deduction as a broad analysis of human cognitive faculties. Kant’s discussion of the basic categories of thought in the “Transcendental Deduction” section of the Critique is reviewed, including its division into objective and subjective deduction. Flaws in the standard reading of subjective deduction are then pointed out, and a revised interpretation of it as coordinating the independent capacities for thinking and being is presented.

Baum, Manfred.  “Subjekt und Person bei Kant.”  Metaphysik und Kritik.  Eds. Chotaš, Karásek, and Stolzenberg (op cit.).  237-51.

Baumgarten, Alexander. Metaphysica = Metaphysik: historisch-kritische Ausgabe. Latin/German, translated, edited, and with an introduction by Günter Gawlick and Lothar Kreimendahl. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: frommann-holzboog, 2011. [lxxxvii, 634 p.] [data] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Forschungen und Materialien zur deutschen Aufklärung, Division I (Texte), vol. 2. General editors: Norbert Hinske, Lothar Kreimendahl, and Clemens Schwaiger.
Abstract (from the publisher): Die Philosophie Alexander Gottlieb Baumgartens (1714–1762) sowie ihre Bedeutung für die Philosophie- und Geistesgeschichte ist noch weitgehend unerforscht. Das gilt insbesondere für seine 1739 erstmals erschienene ›Metaphysica‹, die zwar sein erfolgreichstes Werk war, aber aufgrund des sperrigen Lateins, in dem sie verfasst wurde, heute nur schwer zugänglich ist. Ihre herausragende Stellung kommt nicht zuletzt darin zum Ausdruck, dass Kant sie während der vier Jahrzehnte seiner akademischen Lehrtätigkeit beinahe durchgängig seinen Vorlesungen über Metaphysik – und später auch denen über Anthropologie – zugrunde legte und seine eigene Transzendentalphilosophie in beständiger Auseinandersetzung mit ihr entwickelte. Der vorliegende Band bietet nun erstmals eine deutsche Gesamtübersetzung zusammen mit einem kritisch durchgesehenen lateinischen Text. Die ausführliche Einleitung schildert Baumgartens intellektuelle Biographie und beleuchtet einige der zentralen Themen des Werks.

Baxley, Anne Margaret.  Kant’s Theory of Virtue: The Value of Autocracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.  [xvi, 189 p.] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] [From the publisher]: Anne Margaret Baxley offers a systematic interpretation of Kant’s theory of virtue, whose most distinctive features have not been properly understood. She explores the rich moral psychology in Kant’s later and less widely read works on ethics, and argues that the key to understanding his account of virtue is the concept of autocracy, a form of moral self-government in which reason rules over sensibility. Although certain aspects of Kant’s theory bear comparison to more familiar Aristotelian claims about virtue, Baxley contends that its most important aspects combine to produce something different — a distinctively modern, egalitarian conception of virtue which is an important and overlooked alternative to the more traditional Greek views which have dominated contemporary virtue ethics.

 ——.  “The Aesthetics of Morality: Schiller’s Critique of Kantian Rationalism.”  Philosophy Compass 5 (2010): 1084-95.

Bayne, Tim.  The Unity of Consciousness.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.  [256 p.]

[Note] [Hide Note] [From the publisher] Tim Bayne examines the idea that a human being can have only a single stream of consciousness at any one point in time. He draws on philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience, weaving together detailed conceptual analysis with close attention to empirical findings, in defence of the unity of consciousness. In the first part of the volume Bayne develops an account of what it means to say that consciousness is unified. In the second part of the volume this account is applied to a variety of syndromes — drawn from both normal and pathological forms of experience — in which the unity of consciousness is said to breakdown. Bayne argues that the unity of consciousness remains intact in each of these syndromes. In the final section he explores the implications of the unity of consciousness for theories of consciousness, for the sense of embodiment, and for accounts of the self. In one of the most comprehensive examinations of the topic available, The Unity of Consciousness draws on a wide range of findings within philosophy, clinical psychology, and cognitive neuroscience in constructing an account of the unity of consciousness that is both conceptually sophisticated and scientifically informed.

Bazhanov, Valentin A. “О роли идей И. Канта в развитии логики и университетской философии в России.” [Russian; “On the role of Kant’s ideas in the development of logic and university philosophy in Russia”] Kantovskij Sbornik 32 (2010): 52-59. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article analyses the impact of Kant’s ideas on the development of logic and university philosophy in Russia. The integrity of philosophy, psychology (pedagogy), and logic until the early 20th century implied that Kant's ideas influenced logic via its philosophical foundations (empiricism versus the rationalistic aspects of Kant's philosophy). It was especially evident in the interpretations of logic in terms of psychologism and anthropologism ensuing from empiricism.

Bazzocchi, Luciano.  Rev. of On Scientific Representation: From Kant to a New Philosophy of Science, by Giovanni Boniolo (2007). [Italian]  Studi Kantiani 23 (2010): 143-46.

Beade, Ileana P.  “Acerca del carácter cosmológico-práctico de la ‘Tercera antinomia de la razón pura’.” [Spanish]  Anales del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofia 27 (2010): 189-216.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article offers an analysis of Kant’s “Third Antinomy of Pure Reason” (in which he examines the possibility of reconciling transcendental freedom with natural determinism), in order to show the lack of grounds of the interpretation that claims that the critical resolution of the antinomy implies a shift with respect to the cosmological terms in which the conflict was initially stated. Through a detailed analysis of the sources, we will suggest that the conflict analyzed in the “Third Antinomy of Pure Reason” is not exclusively cosmological, but rather that it also — and to the same degree — constitutes a practical conflict, and, secondly, that the critical solution is not developed in exclusively practical terms, but that it also involves certain aspects directly linked to the cosmological question initially formulated

Beaulieu, Alain.  “Towards a Liberal Utopia: The Connection between Foucault’s Reporting on the Iranian Revolution and the Ethical Turn.”  Philosophy & Social Criticism 36 (2010): 801-18. [abstract]

 ——.  Rev. of Emmanuel Kant: Anthropologie du point de vue pragmatique et Michel Foucault: Introduction à l’Anthropologie, edited by Daniel Defert, François Ewald, and François Gros (2008).  Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 41 (2010): 221-22.

Beckenkamp, Joãosinho.  “Kant e a hermenêutica moderna.” [Portuguese]  Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia 51 (2010): 275-92. [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: There are throughout Kant’s work many propositions concerning to what is today called hermeneutics, i.e., the art or the technique of interpretation. Notwithstanding the clear influence of these propositions on Fr. Schlegel and Schleiermacher, who should be recognized as the founders of modern hermeneutics, they aren’t duly taken in account by the historians of hermeneutics. The present paper proposes to recover the historical memory of these connections, in order to attain a fair picture of the development of modern hermeneutics.

Beckert, Cristina.  “A dívida infinita. Kant e Lévinas.” [Portuguese]  Was ist der Mensch? Que é o homem?  Eds. Ribeiro dos Santos, et al. (op cit.).  663-72.

Beckmann, Jan P.  “Die ‘ontologische Kantinterpretation’. Zum Beitrag Gottfried Martins (1901-1972).”  Kant als Bezugspunkt Philosophischen Denkens.  Eds. Hubertus Busche and Anton Schmitt (op cit.).  9-27.

Beiner, Ronald.  Civil Religion: A Dialogue in the History of Political Philosophy. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2010.  [448 p.]

[Note] [Hide Note] See esp. ch. 17: “‘The gods of the philosophers’ II: Rousseau and Kant”.

[From the publisher]: Civil Religion offers philosophical commentaries on more than twenty thinkers stretching from the sixteenth to the twentieth century. The book examines four important traditions within the history of modern political philosophy and delves into how each of them addresses the problem of religion. Two of these traditions pursue projects of domesticating religion. The civil religion tradition, principally defined by Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Rousseau, seeks to domesticate religion by putting it solidly in the service of politics. The liberal tradition pursues an alternative strategy of domestication by seeking to put as much distance as possible between religion and politics. Modern theocracy is a militant reaction against liberalism, and it reverses the relationship of subordination asserted by civil religion: it puts politics directly in the service of religion. Finally, a fourth tradition is defined by Nietzsche and Heidegger. Aspects of their thought are not just modern, but hyper-modern, yet they manifest an often-hysterical reaction against liberalism that is fundamentally shared with the theocratic tradition. Together, these four traditions compose a vital dialogue that carries us to the heart of political philosophy itself.

 ——.  “Paradoxes in Kant’s Account of Citizenship.”  Responsibility in Context: Perspectives.  Ed. Gorana Ognjenovic (op cit.).  19-34.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: What are we to make of Kant as a philosopher of citizenship? In order to begin answering this question, we need to determine how exalted a status Kant intends the status of citizen to be, especially in relation to the forms of moral experience that for Kant are decisive in conferring moral worth upon us as rational beings, and clarifying this turns out to be anything but a simple matter. In a very direct sense, our status as citizens constitutes a non-moral status, for the domain of politics per se refers to forms of civic behaviour that can be regulated by laws – i.e., state coercion – and therefore civic life doesn’t (and cannot) touch that which for Kant defines moral experience: the quality of our intentions or of our ultimate motivation. This is why Kant famously says that a race of intelligent devils could in principle devise a perfectly satisfactory political constitution: as long as we, for instance, pay our taxes, what is demanded of us in the political aspect of our life is fulfilled (even if the moral worth of these civic performances is precisely zero).

Beisbart, Claus.  “Kants ‘mathematische Antinomie’ (I): Anfang und räumliche Grenzen der Welt.”  Kants Grundlegung einer kritischen Metaphysik.  Ed. Norbert Fischer (op cit.).  243-63.

Beiser, Frederick C.  Diotima’s Children: German Aesthetic Rationalism from Leibniz to Lessing.  Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.  [x, 320 p.]

 ——.  “Mathematical Method in Kant, Schelling, and Hegel.”  Discourse on a New Method.  Eds. Mary Domski and Michael Dickson (op cit.).  243-58.

Belás, Ľubomír.  “Kant a dejiny filozofie.” [Slovakian; “Kant and the history of Philosophy”]  Dejiny filozofie ako filozofický problém [The History of Philosophy as a Philosophical Problem].  Eds. Vladimír Leško und Pavol Tholt (Košice: Univerzita Pavla Jozefa Šafárika, 2010).  139–151.

 —— and Adriana Krausova.  “Kant an der Philosophischen Fakultät der Universität Prešov.”  Kant-Studien 101 (2010): 101-04.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The paper deals with I. Kant’s work from the perspective of activities realized at the Faculty of Arts, University of Presov (Slovakia). Firstly, it describes Kant’s legacy to the courses in the field of study of philosophy (history of philosophy, philosophy of history) through activation forms of teaching process, e.g., discussion forums, presentations of students’ papers, etc. Secondly, the paper deals with scientific and research activities at the Faculty of Arts oriented towards Kant. The Faculty of Arts with the support of the grant project VEGA has organized six international scientific conferences and published six scientific compilations so far. The research outputs have been published in Slovakia and abroad: Czech Republic, Poland, Germany, and Russia. The Faculty of Arts also develops cooperation with relevant European scientific workplaces.

Bell, Jordan.  See: Anderson, Pamela Sue and Jordan Bell.

Bencivenga, Ermanno.  L’etica di Kant: La Razionalità del Bene. [Italian] Milano: B. Mondadori, 2010.  [243 p.]

 ——.  “An Infinite ‘Given’ Magnitude.”  History of Philosophy Quarterly 27 (2010): 95-100.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant says that space is represented as an infinite given magnitude, and this statement has been repeatedly criticized as, according to Kant, the representation of space would be an intuition and nothing infinite can be intuited. It is argued here that the representation of space, for Kant, is an idea of reason, and specifically the idea of an infinite magnitude which is taken to be involved in all empirical intuitions, given when they are given, though it is not itself ever intuited.

Berlendis de Figueiredo, Vinicius.  “Crítica e antropologia em Kant.”[Portuguese]  Was ist der Mensch? Que é o homem?  Eds. Ribeiro dos Santos, et al. (op cit.).  125-38.

Bernasconi, Robert, “Defining Race Scientifically.”  Ethnicities 10 (2010): 141-48.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The author offers a response to the article “The Vertical and Horizontal Dimensions of the Word Race,” by Michael Banton. He questions why Banton has singled out for criticism the author’s essay about philosopher Immanuel Kant entitled “Who Invented the Concept of Race.” The author argues that Banton regrets the time he contrasted the scientific concept of race with the popular views of race. He explains why he was confused when Banton accused him of committing presentism. He also comments on Banton’s adoption of Kenneth L. Pike’s etic-emic distinction.

 ——.  “Globalization and World Hunger: Kant and Levinas.”  Radicalizing Levinas.  Eds. Peter Atterton and Matthew Calarco.  Albany: State University of New York Press, 2010.  69-86.

 ——.  “The Place of Race in Kant’s Physical Geography and in the Writings of the 1790s.”  Rethinking Kant, vol. 2.  Ed. Pablo Muchnik (op cit.). 274-90.

Bernauer, Thomas and Patrick M. Kuhn.  “Is there an Environmental Version of the Kantian Peace? Insights from Water Pollution in Europe.”  European Journal of International Relations 16 (2010): 77-102. [abstract]

Bernecker, Sven.  “Kant on Spatial Orientation.”  European Journal of Philosophy (pre-print online, posted 6 Jul 2010). [abstract]

Bernstein, Alyssa R.  Rev. of Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy, by Arthur Ripstein (2009).  Journal of the History of Philosophy 48 (2010): 531-32.

Bertani, Corrado.  “Was ist Rechtens? La giustizia tra diritto privato e idea del diritto pubblico. Lettura di Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre, §§36-40.” [Italian]  Studi Kantiani 23 (2010): 23-55.

Bertani, Mauro, transl.  See: Immanuel Kant.  Antropologia dal punto di vista pragmatico.

Bertomeu, María Julia.  “Contra la teoría (de la Revolución Francesa).” [Spanish]  Res Publica: Revista de filosofía política 23 (2010): 57-79.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article provides a detailed analysis of Gentz’s critique and interpretation of the Kantian text “Über die Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht für die Praxis” (Berlinische Monatsschrift, 1793, 2). The article argues that an author’s ideas are best understood when tied to the social and political context in which they emerged and were propagated — as well as when the way in which they were appropriated by his contemporaries is understood. The article attempts to show that the then-Prussian war minister clearly captured the revolutionary component of the Kantian triad (liberty, equality, and independence), and cunningly struggled (with relative success) to misinterpret it, making an equivocal and discretionary use of the Kantian text, both a brave and deep one.

 ——.  “Issa se iactet in aula!” [Spanish]  Isegoria: Revista de Filosofia Moral y Politica 42 (2010): 73-90.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: More than a few of Kant’s contemporaries, including some of his disciples, were sharply critical of the systematic character of his philosophy, and markedly, of the philosophical prose in which this character was expressed. Others, on the contrary, found solace in the prospect of seeing the philosopher either isolated or trapped in the purely speculative realm of the academic room, in the good — or bad — company of all the metaphysical politicians of the time: ‘“illa se iactet in aula!”’ However, fearful that the walls or the metaphorical bars of the room were not enough to contain the “popular” propagation of Kant’s ideas, they completed — in line with Burke — Virgilio’s poem, distinctly alluding to surely less symbolic bars: ‘“Illa se iactet in aula Aeolus, et clauso ventorum carcere regnet”’. Kant replied in time, writing both to each group separately and to everyone at once. But he did it always from his fiercely held conviction about the importance of both a philosophical theory and a methodological discipline, which, even when “unpopular” in the beginning, he considered essential elements of a moral and political practice that was so hostile toward moral paternalism as it was to its counterpart, a (paternalistic) political despotism.

Besoli, Stefano, Claudio La Rocca, and Riccardo Martinelli, eds.  L’universo kantiano: filosofia, scienze, sapere. [Italian]  Macerata: Quodlibet, 2010.  [744 p.] [contents]

 ——.  “Fenomenologia.” [Italian]  L’universo kantiano: filosofia, scienze, sapere.  Eds. Stefano Besoli, Claudio La Rocca, and Riccardo Martinelli (op cit.).  571-646.

Bianco, Michele.  Etica e Storia in Kant. [Italian] Milano, Italy: FrancoAngeli, 2010.  [144 p.]

Bickmann, Claudia.  “Kant’s Critical Concept of a Person: The Noumenal Sphere Grounding the Principle of Spirituality.”  Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy.  Ed. Stephen R. Palmquist (op cit.).  194-204.

Bielskis, Andrius.  “A Philosophical Reflection on European Integration: Aristotelian Subsidiarity versus Kantian Universalism.”  Problemos: Mokslo darbai 77 (2010): 92-104.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper aims to show how contemporary Aristotelian political philosophy can be utilised in our reflections on European integration. It argues that changes in international relations after the end of the cold war and a growing cultural divide between Europe and the U.S. makes Europe’s Western identity untenable. Through a brief philosophical sketch of the history of ‘the West’ it argues that Europe needs to return to its European rather than Western roots. The philosophical emphasis on national cultures and local identities, which is also found at the heart of the European Union in the form of the notion of subsidiarity, links European cultural and political integration to Aristotelian philosophy. The paper argues that the principle of subsidiarity can be seen both as the political as well as ethical principle of European integration. Subsidiarity is understood in terms of Aristotle’s teleological ethics which emphasises the importance of culture and culturally embodied human ends and is juxtaposed to Kant’s deontology. The essay argues that the Kantian notion of the public and Kant’s understanding of morality gives rise to the modern one-sided account of the political.

Bird, Graham, ed.  A Companion to Kant.  Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010.  [xv, 530 p.]

[Note] [Hide Note] Paperback edition of: Bird, Graham, ed.  A Companion to Kant.  Oxford: Blackwell, 2006.  [xv, 530 p.]

 ——.  “Another Puzzle about Kant's Idealism.”  Studi Kantiani 23 (2010): 11-22.

Bishop, Paul.  Rev. of Wahn und Wahrheit: Kants Auseninandersetzung mit dem Irrationalien, by Constantin Rauer (2007).  Seminar: A Journal of Germanic Studies 46 (2010): 180-81.

Bjerre, Henrik Jøker.  Kantian Deeds.  London, New York: Continuum, 2010.  [199 p.]

Black, Carola.  Eigentumsfreiheit und Besteuerung aus liberaler Perspektive: Eine Untersuchung der Steuerpolitik auf Grundlage der Eigentumstheorien von Locke und Kant. Münster: LIT Verlag, 2010.  [288 p.]

[Note] [Hide Note] [From the publisher]: The author argues that taxation issues need to involve the normative values of personal freedom and universally acceptable principles of justice. For the study, the Locke’s private property theory is contrasted with Kant’s property theory. While Locke procedes from the inalienable right of every individual to the fruits of his labor, Kant’s remarks aim at a “well-ordered” society in which distribution rules are based on reason. These basic assumptions have a tangible impact on the tax system.

Blättler, Christine.  “Das Experiment im Spannungfeld von Freiheit und Zwang: Probierstein und Versuchkunst bei Kant.”  Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 58 (2010): 873-88.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In contrast to the common notion of experiments as a means for testing theories, science studies currently emphasize the explorative character of experiments, thus elevating their systematic epistemological relevance. Consequently, the experiment has become another challenge to Reichenbach’s distinction between discovery and justification, which has been valid in the philosophy of science for several decades. Repeatedly the experiment has served as an epistemological paradigm in philosophy. Engaging with recent positions in science studies the paper investigates Kant’s understanding of the use, meaning, and function of the experiment, focusing on its specifications with the catch words touchstone and the art of attempt. The historical and systematic approach shows to what extent the experiment is situated between freedom and coercion.

Bobko, Aleksander.  “The Unity of Human Personhood and the Problem of Evil.”  Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy.  Ed. Stephen R. Palmquist (op cit.).  493-500.

Bocca, Francisco Verardi.  “Civilização, Finalidade com Exaustão.” [Portuguese; Civilization, purpose with exhaustion]  Kant e-Prints 5.1 (2010): 89-117. [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article aims to contribute, seeking subvention in some aspects of the thoughts of Kant and Freud, to a reflection on the notion of the civilization progress, in a moral sense, withdrawing from it the possibilities of construction and maintenance of civilizing achievements. Therefore an investigation on its respective conceptions of human nature, of humanity civilization progress, of progressive demonstration of human spirit, in synthesis, its philosophies of history. It will be achieved by pointing approaches, as well as theoretical divergences of both, which option is justified by the fact that they present discerned perspectives in relation to the indications, developments and outcomes of the relationship between sensibility and reason, which is manifested in what we call society, or more broadly, civilization.

Boisclair, Annie.  “Mou Zongsan’s Interpretation of the Kantian Summum Bonum in Relation to Perfect Teaching (Yuanjiao).”  Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy.  Ed. Stephen R. Palmquist (op cit.).  603-14.

Bonaccini, Juan A.  “Antropologia, ciência da natureza humana ‘por analogia’.” [Portuguese]  Was ist der Mensch? Que é o homem?  Eds. Ribeiro dos Santos, et al. (op cit.).  273-88.

 ——.  “Antropologia, ciência da natureza humana ‘por analogia’.” [Portuguese; Anthropology, science of human nature “by analogy”]  Kant e-Prints 5.3 (2010): 145-61. [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The difficulty some interpreters find to place Kant ́s writings on Anthropology within his system is well known. There are those who understand the Anthropology as a transcendental science, those who think it is a mere non-systematic and empirical “science”, and even a rhapsodic chaos of information on diverse and disconnected subjects; finally, there are also those who consider the Anthropology as the applied moral philosophy Kant had promised, either in the preface of the Groundwork, or in the Metaphysics of Morals. On the one hand, Kant had already referred the question for human nature to the Anthropology in the Critique of Pure Reason. Nothing appears to be more natural, therefore, than considering the Anthropology as the science of human nature. On the other hand, the problem consists in determining whether and to what extent the critical philosophy can approach the concept of “human nature”. A good deal of difficulty comes from lack of clarity and unity with regard to its subject proper. For even if we accept that it must deal with human nature, it is not that clear in which sense human nature is to be understood from the point of view of “pragmatic anthropology”, nor how human being must be focused on in such an enquiry, whether empirically or not. My aim here is to explain in which sense pragmatic anthropology can be understood as science of human nature. I defend that this is possible out of a certain principle of analogy. Thus, in the first part I briefly mention some positions of the interpreters concerning the place and the status of the Anthropology in the critical system and identify a confusion sometimes is made between the place of the Anthropology within the system and its scientifically problematic status. In the second part, based upon Kant’s Lectures on Anthropology I argue that historically and conceptually Kant’s Anthropology endeavors to conciliate two different interests, namely, to criticize and reformulate the empirical psychology of the Wolfians and to observe and describe human being individually and collectivelly in order to offer a notion of human nature which the concepts and principles of its moral theory and its theory of the metaphysical knowledge can in concrete be applied to. In the third part, I defend that Anthropology considered as a cosmological knowledge reformulates the Humean project of an empirical science of human nature as a nearly–empirical science, since it involves as much observation and experience as well as application principles. My central thesis is here that the empirical scientific character of antropological knowledge is guaranteed by the application of the principle of analogy: what a human being knows intuitively from of himself as a set of first-order predicates functions as starting point for his reflection, out of which he is able to deduce consequences by analogy between himself and other human beings, as a set of second-order predicates he applies extensively to others. Thus, the Anthropology could appeal to observation and experience without being arbitrary: my knowledge of myself would be mediated by the knowledge of the others to the extent that I think myself in analogy with other beings that are given to me intuitively; conversely, my knowledge of the others would be mediated at the same time by the knowledge I have from myself, my body, as well as my mental and moral faculties. My knowledge of human being from the cosmopolitan point of view, as citizen of the world, then, would be thought and conceived of in analogy with my faculties and habits, with the moral, psychological structure and social politics of my world, with the uses and customs of my community. If this is not scientific knowledge in the strict sense (universal and necessary) as outlined in the first Critique, however, pragmatic antropological knowledge can be understood as a sound talk about humans, to the extent that on the basis of the principle of analogy a claim at universality and necessity is made which is pragmatically verifiable in action.

Bondeli, Martin.  “Idee als System, Idee des Verstandes, System der Ideen. Bemerkungen zu Kants Ideenlehre.”  Metaphysik und Kritik.  Eds. Chotaš, Karásek, and Stolzenberg (op cit.).  37-57.

Bonet, Pierrette, transl.  See: Kant, Immanuel.  Fondements de la métaphysique des moeurs.

Bonghi, Brigida.  Il Kant di Martinetti: la fiaccola sotto il moggio della metafisica kantiana. [Italian]  Milano: Mimesis, 2010.  [185 p.]

Borges, Maria de Lourdes.  “Williams e Kant sobre motivação moral.” [Portuguese]  Was ist der Mensch? Que é o homem?  Eds. Ribeiro dos Santos, et al. (op cit.).  673-80.

 ——.  “Kant on Woman and Morality.”  Kant e-Prints 5.3 (2010): 162-68. [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant has often been criticized for holding a very negative vision of women, according to which they are less rational and less morally valuable than men. I shall argue quite the opposite. I will show that, in spite of some minor pejorative comments, Kant held that women fit better the ideal of a moral person than men. This is due to some qualities of the female sex, mainly women’s capacity for self–control and the capacity for having moral emotions such as sympathy and compassion. Moreover, women show their master of emotions and passions when they are able to use their emotional sensitivity and self-control to master the feelings and passions of men.

Borges-Duarte, Irene.  “Realidade e senso comum em Kant.” [Portuguese]  Was ist der Mensch? Que é o homem?  Eds. Ribeiro dos Santos, et al. (op cit.).  231-43.

Borges Meneses, Ramiro Delio.  See: Pinto Serrão, Daniel and Ramiro Delio Borges Meneses.

Borsche, Tilman.  “Bildworte. Vom Ursprung unserer Begriffe.”  Zwischen Bild und Begriff. Kant und Herder zum Schema.  Eds. Ulrich Gaier and Ralf Simon (op cit.).  55-70.

Botez, Angela.  “Mihai Eminescu între Kant şi Schopenhauer.” [Romanian; “Mihai Eminescu between Kant and Schopenhauer”]  Revista de Filosofie 57 (2010): 341-49.

Böttigheimer, Christoph.  “Trinitätstheologische Ansätze in der Philosophie Kants.”  Die Gottesfrage in der Philosophie Immanuel Kants.  Eds. Norbert Fischer and Maximilian Forschner (op cit.). 180-98.

Boxill, Bernard R.  “The Duty to Seek Peace.”  Social Philosophy & Policy 27 (2010): 274-96.  Reprinted in: Moral Obligation.  Eds. Ellen Frankel Paul, et al. (op cit.).  274-96.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract (ProQuest): Kant claimed that we have a duty to seek peace, and encouraged a hope for peace to support that duty. To encourage that hope he argued that peace was reasonably likely. He thought that peace was reasonably likely because he believed that historical trends would create opportunities to implement his plan for peace. But authorities claim that globalization is undermining such opportunities. Consequently Kant’s arguments can no longer sustain our hope for peace. We can sustain that hope by devising a new plan for peace that globalization will give us opportunities to implement. But in order to devise such a plan we need to sustain our hope for peace. We can sustain such a hope by reflecting on the value of peace because hope is sustained not only by the belief that the object of hope is likely, but also by the conviction that it is valuable. In this way we can perhaps sustain a hope for peace that will support our duty to seek peace. But the fear of war and compassion for the victims of war may also support the duty to seek peace. Kant ignored these opportunities to support the duty to seek peace because they could support only the duty to avoid war. But Kant never showed that the duty to seek peace-as he saw it-outweighed the duty to avoid war. I conclude that Kant’s arguments lead us to endless war rather than to peace.

Bradley, Arthur, and Paul Fletcher, eds.  The Politics to Come: Power, Modernity and the Messianic.  London/New York: Continuum, 2010.  [xii, 225 p.]

[Note] [Hide Note] See chs. 5 (Paul Fletcher, “Towards Perpetual Revolution: Kant on Freedom and Authority”) and 11 (Joanna Hodge, “‘Something Unique is Moot in Europe’: Derrida Reading Kant”). [SN]

Brandt, Reinhard.  Immanuel Kant - Was Bleibt?  Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2010.  [269 p.]

 ——.  “Woran ich doch gar nicht zweifle. Eine Miszelle zu §14 von Kants Kritik der Urteilskraft.”  Kant als Bezugspunkt Philosophischen Denkens.  Eds. Hubertus Busche and Anton Schmitt (op cit.).  29-32.

 ——.  “Zwei Konjekturvorschläge zur Tugendlehre, §9.”  Kant-Studien 101 (2010): 377-79.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Against the proposal of two corrections to the Kantian text (Kant-Studien 101, 2010, 247-252) it is argued that §9 of the Tugendlehre is developed in a typically Kantian manner: (1) exposition of the problem of an obligation against oneself, (2) deduction of its possibility, (3) further observations. The "corrections" destroy this lucid structure.

Breazeale, Daniel.  “Doing Philosophy: Fichte vs. Kant on Transcendental Method.”  Fichte, German Idealism, and Early Romanticism.  Eds. Daniel Breazeale and Tom Rockmore (op cit.). 41-62.

 —— and Tom Rockmore, eds.  Fichte, German Idealism, and Early Romanticism.  [Fichte-Studien-Supplementa, 24] Atlanta: Editions Rodopi, 2010.  [396 p.]

[Note] [Hide Note] [From the Publisher]: This volume of 23 previously unpublished essays explores the relationship between the philosophy of J. G. Fichte and that of other leading thinkers associated with German idealism and the early romantic movement. Taken collectively, this set of essays provides Anglophone readers with a new and historically accurate understanding of the origin, development, and reception of Fichte’s philosophy in the context of its own era and in relationship to the most important intellectual movements of the time. This volume proposes a new interpretation of the history of German idealism in general and of the place therein of Fichte’s ‘Wissenschaftslehre’. It emphasizes the intimate connection between “transcendental idealism” and “German romanticism” and shows how developments within each of these intellectual movements reflected and in turn influenced developments within the other. Finally, it sheds new light on Fichte’s own philosophical development and does so by relating the various stages of his writings to other contemporary movements and authors.

Bredlow, Luis Andrés.  Kant esencial. [Spanish]  Mataró: Montesinos, 2010.  [192 p.]

Breidbach, Olaf.  “Erfahrungsprotokolle — Vom Problem der Sicherung des Objektiven in den Naturwissenschaften.”  Kant als Bezugspunkt Philosophischen Denkens.  Eds. Hubertus Busche and Anton Schmitt (op cit.).  33-51.

Breitenbach, Angela.  Rev. of Purposiveness. Teleology between Nature and Mind, edited by Luca Illetterati and Francesca Michelini (2008). [Italian]  Studi Kantiani 23 (2010): 159-63.

Brito, Adriano Naves de.  “Freedom and Value in Kant’s Practical Philosophy.”  Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy.  Ed. Stephen R. Palmquist (op cit.).  265-72.

Brjušinkin, Vladimir I., ed.  Klassičeskij razum i vyzovy sovremennoj civilizacii: 10. Kantovskie Čtenija; 22-24 aprelja 2009 g. Kaliningrad ; materily meždunarodnoj konferencii [Russian; “Classical Reason and the Challenges of Modern Civilization: Proceedings of the 10. International Kant Conference, 22-24 April 2009”].  2 vols. Kaliningrad: Izdat. Rossijskogo Gosudarst. Univ. im. Immanuila Kanta, 2010.

Brock, Stephen L.  “Metafisica ed etica: la riapertura della questione dell’ontologia del bene.” [Italian]  Acta Philosophica: Pontificia Universita della Santa Croce 19 (2010): 37-58.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Since Hume there has been broad consensus that if the notion of the good has any intelligible foundation, it is not “ontological”, in the natures of things. Today, however, this view is being challenged. After a sketch of the positions of Kant and Hume, and a glance at some of the recent challenges, the paper examines a key element in Thomas Aquinas’s ontology of the good: the notion of final causality. For Thomas final causality presupposes formal and efficient causality. Hume’s denial of the intelligibility of the good, it is suggested, presupposes his denial of that of these other causes.

Brodsky, Claudia.  “Doing without Knowing in Kant and Diderot: Experiments in Enlightenment.”  Formen des Nichtwissens der Aufklärung.  Eds. Hans Adler and Rainer Godel (München/Paderborn: Fink, 2010; 567 p.).  165-82.

 ——.  “‘Judgment’ and the Genesis of What We Lack: ‘Schema’, ‘Poetry’, and the ‘Monogram of the Imagination’ in Kant.”  Eighteenth Century: Theory & Interpretation 51 (2010): 317-40.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: While “the power of judgment” is the specific object of Kant’s final Third Critique, Kant first equates it with the actual origin of the “Age of Critique” itself. In the Preface to the first edition of the First Critique Kant names that origin the “phenomenon” of “indifference,” an appearance of mere disinterest in then contemporary philosophy that, as widespread as it seems only negative in effect, in fact indicates, according to Kant, a positive critical power to remain unpersuaded by falsifying accounts of the mind, those that would deny both the real limits and capabilities of the intellect. Just as “the power of judgment” is not a form of “reason,” but rather the “bridge” or “transition” between the impure (or “heterogeneous”) cognitions of “pure reason” and the pure (or “free”) actions of “practical reason,” so the “schema” is hypothesized by Kant in the First Critique to mediate between sensory perception and the a priori formal mechanism of the intellect. Enigmatically dubbed “a monogram of pure imagination,” the “schema” reappears in the Third Critique in Kant’s discussion of “poetry,” the “verbal form of expression” whose ability to “set imagination free” through its knowing inability to represent its object “adequately” makes it “first” among all the arts. That object is “the supersensible,” and the use “poetry” makes of “nature” as a “schema” for the “supersensible” even while itself “appear[ing]” an act of “mere play” links the “schema,” the “monogram of pure imagination,” to the “power of judgment” that pure as well as practical reason are inadequate to express. “Judgment,” the “power” to express that inadequacy, not only mediates but necessitates and produces the possibility of Critique in that it indicates the occurrence, neither strictly rational or irrational, of its own supersensible, the “freedom” “to think.”

Brook, Andrew.  “Kant’s Attack on Leibniz’s and Locke’s Amphibolies.”  Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy.  Ed. Stephen R. Palmquist (op cit.).  140-54.

Brown, Christopher A.  “Kantianism and Mere Means.”  Environmental Ethics 32 (2010): 267-84.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Few think that Kant’s moral theory can provide a defensible view in the area of environmental ethics because of Kant’s well-known insistence that all nonhumans are mere means. An examination of the relevant arguments, however, shows that they do not entitle Kant to his position. Moreover, Kant’s own ‘formula of universal law’ generates at least one important and basic duty which is owed both to human beings and to nonhuman animals. The resulting Kantian theory not only is sounder and more intuitive than the original, but also boasts some notable theoretical advantages over some of the most prominent views in environmental ethics.

Brown, Garrett W.  “The Laws of Hospitality, Asylum Seekers and Cosmopolitan Right: A Kantian Response to Jacques Derrida.”  European Journal of Political Theory 9 (2010): 308-27.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The purpose of this article is to respond to Jacques Derrida’s reading of Immanuel Kant’s laws of hospitality and to offer a deeper exploration into Kant’s separation of a cosmopolitan right to visit (Besuchsrecht) and the idea of a universal right to reside (Gastrecht). Through this discussion, the various laws of hospitality will be examined, extrapolated and outlined, particularly in response to the tensions articulated by Derrida. By doing so, this article will offer a reinterpretation of the laws of hospitality, arguing that hospitality is not meant to capture all the conditions necessary for cosmopolitan citizenship or for a thoroughgoing condition of cosmopolitan justice as Derrida assumes. This is because hospitality could be understood as the basic normative requirement necessary to establish an ethical condition for intersubjective communication at the global level, where discursive communication regarding the substance of a future condition of cosmopolitan justice is to be subjected to global public reason.

Brownlee, Timothy.  Rev. of German Idealism and the Concept of Punishment, by Jean-Christophe Merle, transl. by Joseph J. Kominkiewicz with Jean-Christophe Merle and Frances Brown (2009).  The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (February 2010, #18). [online]

Brum Torres, João Carlos.  “Kant et la notion de crime inexpiable.”  Raison pratique et normativité chez Kant: droit, politique et cosmopolitique.  Ed. Jean-François Kervégan (op cit.).  113-30.

Bruno, Paul W.  Kant’s Concept of Genius. Its Origin and Function in the Third Critique.  London: Continuum, 2010.  [ix, 162 p.] [review]

Brusa, Ana María. “Kant y el Neoconstitucionalismo.” [Spanish] Revista de la Facultad de Derecho 28 (2010): 33-43. [PW] [online]

Bruun, Hans Henrik.  “The Incompatibility of Values and the Importance of Consequences: Max Weber and the Kantian Legacy.”  Philosophical Forum 41 (2010): 51-67.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article focuses on the incompatibility of values and the importance of consequences of philosophers Max Weber and Immanuel Kant. It discusses the methodological crisis, ethical aspects and the political crisis in the case of Weber. It also reports the relationship of Weber with the field of philosophy of social sciences.

Buck-Morss, Susan.  “Reply to Bruun.”  Philosophical Forum 41 (2010): 69-72.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article focuses on the differences between the works of philosophers Immanuel Kant and Max Weber. It states the need to reassess the Neo-Kantian credentials and the difference in three realms including methodology, ethics and politics. It reports that Weber accepted the difference between the project of social science and the realm of moral values.

Budick, Sanford.  Kant and Milton.  Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2010.  [xiii, 330 p.] [review] [review]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents: Kant and Milton: Fundamentals and Foundations — Kant’s Journey in the Constellation of German Miltonism: Toward the Procedure of Succession — Kant’s Miltonic Transfer to Exemplarity: The Succession to Milton’s “On His Blindness” in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals — Kantian Tragic Form and Kantian “Storytelling” — The Critique of Practical Reason and Samson Agonistes — Kant’s Miltonic Procedure of Succession in a Key Moment of the Critique of Judgment — Conclusion: Constellation, Succession, and Kantian Poetry.

Bueno, Vera Cristina de Andrade.  “A razão humana e a fundamentação da concepção teleológica da natureza.” [Portuguese]  Was ist der Mensch? Que é o homem?  Eds. Ribeiro dos Santos, et al. (op cit.).  565-76.

Buhren, Frank.  Kant und die Diskursethik: Antinomien der Moral bei Kant und Habermas.  Berlin: WVB, 2010.  [113 p.] [contents]

Bunch, Aaron.  “‘Objective Validity’ and ‘Objective Reality’ in Kant’s B-Deduction of the Categories.” Kantian Review 14.2 (2010): 67-92.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This essay explains the goals of the two halves of the B-deduction of the categories (sections 15-21, and 22-26) in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. To do this, it defends Henry Allison’s claim that the two halves of the B-deduction aim to establish the ‘objective validity’ and the ‘objective reality’ of the categories, respectively. Contrary to Allison, however, this essay argues that ‘objective validity’ and ‘objective reality’ should be understood as the form and content of objects of possible experience, rather than in terms of the conditions for representing two different kinds of object.

 ——.  “The Resurrection of the Body as a ‘Practical Postulate’: Why Kant Is Committed to Belief in an Embodied Afterlife.”  Philosophia Christi 12 (2010): 46-60.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: I argue that Kant’s own views — his commitment to happiness as part of a transcendent highest good, his view of the afterlife as a place of moral striving, and his conception of the “absolute unity” of rational and animal natures in a human person — commit him to belief in an embodied afterlife. This belief is just as necessary for conceiving the possibility of the highest good as the beliefs in personal immortality, freedom, and God’s existence, and thus it too is a “practical postulate” in Kant’s sense.

 ——.  Rev. of The Kantian Sublime and the Revelation of Freedom, by Robert C. Clewis (2009).  Journal of the History of Philosophy 48 (2010): 532-33.

Busche, Hubertus.  “Der Äther als materiales Apriori der Erfahrung. Kants Vollendung der Transzendentalphilosophie im Opus postumum.”  Kant als Bezugspunkt Philosophischen Denkens.  Eds. Hubertus Busche and Anton Schmitt (op cit.).  53-83.

 —— and Anton Schmitt, eds.  Kant als Bezugspunkt Philosophischen Denkens. Festschrift für Peter Baumanns Zum 75. Geburtstag.  Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2010.  [389 p.] [contents]

Byrd, B. Sharon.  “Intelligible Possession of Objects of Choice.”  Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals: A Critical Guide.  Ed. Lara Denis (op cit.). 93-110.

 —— and Joachim Hruschka.  Kant’s Doctrine of Right: A Commentary.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.  [x, 336 p.] [review]

[top]C    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Caimi, Mario. “Lateinische Strukturen in Kants Stil. Mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Erklärung des Begriffes vom Gegenstand in KrV A 104.” [Portuguese] Crítica da Razão Tradutora. Sobre a dificuldade de traduzir Kant. Eds. Alessandro Pinzani and Valério Rohden (op cit.). 109-22. [M]

 ——, transl.  See: Kant, Immanuel, Antropología en sentido pragmático.

Calabrese, Alessio.  “A proposito del saggio di Giuliano Marini ‘La filosofia cosmopolitica di Kant’.”  [Italian] Archivio di Storia della Cultura 23 (2010): 249-70.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Giuliano Marini’s work on Kant’s cosmopolitical philosophy was published few months after his death. This essay debates some critical arguments concerning Kant's juridical-political perspective, including the idea of Weltrepublik and its moral foundation. This essay discusses also the role of politics in relation with Kant’s idea of right, in which “title to compel” and “idea of freedom” are joined together.

Calábria, Olavo. “Pela tradução mais literal que liberal e invariabilidade dos termos técnicos em Kant.” [Portuguese] Crítica da Razão Tradutora. Sobre a dificuldade de traduzir Kant. Eds. Alessandro Pinzani and Valério Rohden (op cit.). 123-40. [M]

Camera, Francesco.  “Ermeneutica.” [Italian]  L’universo kantiano: filosofia, scienze, sapere.  Eds. Stefano Besoli, Claudio La Rocca, and Riccardo Martinelli (op cit.).  529-70.

 ——.  Rev. of Virtù e felicità, by Daniela Tafani (2006). [Italian]  Studi Kantiani 23 (2010): 127-32.

Canals, Francisco.  “Criticismo trascendental.” [Spanish]  Anuario Filosófico 43.3 (2010): 477-503. [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this presentation, unpublished until now, Francisco Canals establishes a dialogue between Kantian trascendentalism and Aquinas’ thought. The question concerning the ontology of the knowing human subject, blocked by the presuppositions of Kant, can in turn be formulated and find response in the metaphysics of knowledge of Aquinas. In the face of the problems raised by the Cartesian postulation of a perfect intellectual intuition of the thinking self, and in the face of the separation of the pure ego and the empirical ego which is operative in Kant, Canals proposes an ontology of the subject based in the metaphysics of knowledge of Thomas Aquinas, where the finite, intellectual, sensible compound that is the human being is interpreted within the plane of his intellectual nature.

Candiotto, Maurizio.  Deduzione e critica: il trascendentale come necessità del possibile. [Italian]  Roma: Aracne, 2010.  [155 p.]

Capozzi, Mirella.  “Logica.” [Italian]  L’universo kantiano: filosofia, scienze, sapere.  Eds. Stefano Besoli, Claudio La Rocca, and Riccardo Martinelli (op cit.).  229-59.

Capps, Patrick, and Julian Rivers.  “Kant’s Concept of International Law.”  Legal Theory 16 (2010): 229-57.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract (ProQuest): Modern theorists often use Immanuel Kant’s work to defend the normative primacy of human rights and the necessity of institutionally autonomous forms of global governance. However, properly understood, his law of nations describes a loose and noncoercive confederation of republican states. In this way, Kant steers a course between earlier natural lawyers such as Grotius, who defended just-war theory, and visions of a global unitary or federal state. This substantively mundane claim should not obscure a more profound contribution to the science of international law. Kant demonstrates that his concept of law forms part of a logical framework by which to ascertain the necessary institutional characteristics of the international legal order. Specifically, his view is that the international legal order can only take a noncoercive confederated form as its subjects become republican states and that in these circumstances law can exist without a global state. Put another way, Kant argues that if we get state-building right, the law of nations follows.

Caranti, Luigi.  “Politica.” [Italian]  L’universo kantiano: filosofia, scienze, sapere.  Eds. Stefano Besoli, Claudio La Rocca, and Riccardo Martinelli (op cit.).  347-89.

Carbó, Mònica.  “Die Kantrezeption in Spanien.”  Kant der Europäer: Europäer über Kant.  Eds. Dietzsch, Grimoni, and Kozlowski (op cit.).  140-46.

Card, Claudia.  “Kant’s Moral Excluded Middle.”  Kant’s Anatomy of Evil.  Eds. Anderson-Gold and Muchnik (op cit.).  74-92.

Carl, Maria.  Rev. of Kant on Beauty and Biology: An Interpretation of the Critique of Judgment, by Rachel Zuckert (2007).  Comparative and Continental Philosophy 1 (2010): 275-76.

Carman, Taylor.  “Heidegger’s Anti-Neo-Kantianism.”  Philosophical Forum 41 (2010): 131-42.

Carson, Thomas L.  Lying and Deception: Theory and Practice.  Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.  [xix, 280 p.]

Carvalho, Jairo Dias.  “A Conformidade a Fins Como Princípio Transcendental da Faculdade de Julgar Reflexiva em Kant.” [Portuguese; The conformity according to finality as a transcendental principle of the reflexive power of the judgment on Kant]  Kant e-Prints 5.2 (2010): 66-80. [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article aims to discuss the notion of conformity according to finality as a transcendental principle of the reflexive power of the judgment on Kant’s first and second introductions of the Critique of the Power of Judgment, presenting it as a regulative and hypothetical principle for the systematization of the empiric laws.

Carvalho Chagas, Flávia. “A solução crítica do fato da razão na KpV.” [Portuguese] Studia Kantiana (online) 8 (2010): 51-72. [M][online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: For many commentators the doctrine of the fact of reason cannot be seriously defended because this would imply a dogmatic regression. However, we intend to defend in this article not only that the theory of the fact of reason is in accordance with the results of KrV and that it therefore can be incorporated in the critical-transcendental philosophy, but also that the Kantian answer is plausible, in consideration of the theoretical fragility of moral consciousness. Besides, we intend to show that the figure of moral consciousness, as Kant presents it in KpV, can be better explained, on the basis of an article by Dieter Henrich, through the notion of sittliche Einsicht.

Castillo, Monique.  “L’idée d’Europe chez Kant.”  Raison pratique et normativité chez Kant: droit, politique et cosmopolitique.  Ed. Jean-François Kervégan (op cit.).  183-98.

 ——.  “Kant’s Notion of Perfectibility: A Condition of World-Citizenship.”  Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy.  Ed. Stephen R. Palmquist (op cit.).  438-46.

Casullo, Albert.  “A Priori Knowledge.”  A Companion to Epistemology, 2nd ed.  Eds. Jonathan Dancy and Ernest Sosa (op cit.). 43-55.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The contemporary discussion of a priori knowledge is shaped by Kant. Central to his discussion is a conceptual framework that involves three distinctions: the epistemic distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge, the metaphysical distinction between necessary and contingent propositions, and the semantic distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions. Within this framework, Kant addresses four primary questions: What is a priori knowledge? Is there a priori knowledge? What is the relationship between the a priori and the necessary? Is there synthetic a priori knowledge? This paper presents the contemporary discussion of these questions and offers some responses to them.

Caygill, Howard. “Kant, Immanuel.” A Dictionary of Cultural and Critical Theory. 2nd ed. Eds. Michael Payne and Jessica Rae Barbera (Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010). 378-79.

Cavallar, Georg.  Rev. of Kant’s Doctrine of Right: A Commentary, by B. Sharon Byrd and Joachim Hruschka (2010).  The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (August 2010, #21). [online]

 ——.  Rev. of Embedded Cosmopolitanism. Duties to Strangers and Enemies in a World of ‘Dislocated Communities’, by Toni Erskine (2008).  Kantian Review 14.2 (2010): 153-55.

Cecchinato, Giorgia.  “Felicità come schema? Riflessioni sullo sviluppo della dottrina della felicità in Kant.” [Italian]  Was ist der Mensch? Que é o homem?  Eds. Ribeiro dos Santos, et al. (op cit.).  681-90.

 ——.  “Form and Colour in Kant’s and Fichte’s Theory of Beauty.”  Fichte, German Idealism, and Early Romanticism.  Eds. Daniel Breazeale and Tom Rockmore (op cit.). 63-81.

Černov, Sergey A.  “O transcendentaľnom mističizme.” [Russian; “On transcendental mysticism”]  Kantovskij Sbornik 34 (2010): 34-45. [pdf (English)]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Also available as Kantovskij Sbornik. Selected Articles 2010-2011, pp 40-49. [pdf (English)]
Abstract: This article offers a critical analysis of the general idea of “overcoming Kant”, presented by Ye. N. Trubetskoy in the book The metaphysical assumptions of knowledge (1917).

Cesa, Claudio.  “Tra filosofia e scienza. Gli Scritti su Kant di Silvestro Marcucci.” [Italian]  Studi Kantiani 23 (2010): 107-10.

Chalanouli, Christina.  Kant et Dworkin: de l'autonomie individuelle à l'autonomie privée et publique.  Paris: Harmattan, 2010.  [359 p.]

Cheetham, Mark A.  康德、艺术与艺术史: 学科的阶段 / Kang de, yi shu yu yi shu shi: Xue ke de jie duan.  Translation of Kant, Art, and Art History: Moments of Discipline into Chinese by Yadan Shen and Huifang Shuai.  Nanjing: Jiangsu mei shu chu ban she, 2010.  [257 p.]

Cheng, Chung-ying.  “Incorporating Kantian Good Will: On Confucian Ren as Perfect Duty.”  Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy.  Ed. Stephen R. Palmquist (op cit.).  74-96.

Chepurin, Kirill.  “Kant on the Soul’s Intensity.”  Kant Yearbook: Metaphysics 2 (2010): 75-94.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper I propose to consider a certain set of notions in Kant as subsumable under a single notion — that of the soul’s intensity — as well as the possibility of a transcendental grounding of this notion within Kant’s critical framework.  First, I discuss what it means for Kant to attribute intensive magnitude to the soul, starting with his response to Mendelssohn where Kant introduces the soul’s intensity as a metaphysical notion immanent to the principles of rational psychology.  I show, however, that in Kant’s counter-argument there occurs a subtle though crucial shift in perspective — from the soul’s substance to its powers.  Then I move on to consider three fundamental variants upon the soul’s intensity — intensities of representation, of life, and of cognition — each governed, I argue, by the implied notions of measure of intensity and its balance.  Also, I examine Kant’s accounts of the life of a species and the necessity of sickness; of intensity of “enlightenment” in a society and the benefit of ignorance; and of sermon as a practical exertion of cognition’s intensity.  Next, the aforementioned shift of emphasis allows me to demonstrate that the notion of the soul’s intensity can indeed be transcendentally justified by appealing to Kant’s principle of the Anticipation of Perception.  Finally, I conclude with an appendix on the possible connection of the soul’s intensity to Kant’s aesthetics.

Chignell, Andrew.  “Causal Refutations of Idealism.”  Philosophical Quarterly 60 (2010): 487-507.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the “Refutation of Idealism” chapter of the first Critique, Kant argues that the conditions required for having certain kinds of mental episodes are sufficient to guarantee that there are ‘objects in space’ outside us. A perennially influential way of reading this compressed argument is as a kind of causal inference: in order for us to make justified judgements about the order of our inner states, those states must be caused by the successive states of objects in space outside us. Here I consider the best recent versions of this reading, and argue that each suffers from apparently fatal flaws.

 ——.  “Kant between the Wars: A Reply to Hohendahl.”  Philosophical Forum 41 (2010): 41-49.

 ——.  “Real Repugnance and Belief about Things-in-Themselves: A Problem and Kant’s Three Solutions.”  Kant’s Moral Metaphysics: God, Freedom, and Immortality.  Eds. Lipscomb and Krueger (op cit.).  177-209.

 —— and Colin McLear.  “Three Skeptics and the Critique: Critical Notice of Michael Forster’s Kant and Skepticism.”  Philosophical Books 51 (2010): 228-44.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article discusses the philosophical insights of Michael Forster in his book Kant and Skepticism. Forster argues that Pyrrhonian skepticism was a central issue and the need to react on it played a more significant role in the critical philosophy’s genesis than is usually recognized. It says that the Forster criticizes philosopher Immanuel Kant for various insufficiencies, such as his inability to interpret Pyrrhonism rightly and his failure to overcome Pyrrhonism rightly interpreted.

 —— and Derk Pereboom.  “Kant’s Theory of Causation and its Eighteenth-Century German Background.”  Rev. of Kant and the Metaphysics of Causality and Kant’s ‘Critique of Pure Reason’: Background Source Materials, by Eric Watkins (2005 & 2009).  The Philosophical Review 119 (2010): 565-91. [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This critical notice highlights the important contributions that Eric Watkins’s writings have made to our understanding of theories about causation developed in eighteenth-century German philosophy and by Kant in particular. Watkins provides a convincing argument that central to Kant’s theory of causation is the notion of a real ground or causal power that is non-Humean (since it doesn’t reduce to regularities or counterfactual dependencies among events or states) and non-Leibnizean because it doesn’t reduce to logical or conceptual relations. However, we raise questions about Watkins’s more specific claims that Kant completely rejects a model on which the first relatum of a phenomenal causal relation is an event and that he maintains that real grounds are metaphysically and not just epistemically indeterminate.

Cholbi, Michael.  “A Kantian Defense of Prudential Suicide.”  Journal of Moral Philosophy 7 (2010): 489-515.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant’s claim that the rational will has absolute value or dignity appears to render any prudential suicide morally impermissible. Although the previous appeals of Kantians (e.g., David Velleman) to the notion that pain or mental anguish can compromise dignity and justify prudential suicide are unsuccessful, these appeals suggest three constraints that an adequate Kantian defense of prudential suicide must meet. Here I off er an account that meets these constraints. Central to this account is the contention that some suicidal agents, because they are unable to fashion a rational conception of their own happiness, are diminished with respect to their dignity of humanity, and as a result, lack the pricelessness that makes prudential suicide wrong on a Kantian view

Chong, Chaehyun.  “Confucianism and Things-in-themselves (Noumena): Reviewing the Interpretations by Mou Zongsan and Cheng Chung-ying.”  Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy.  Ed. Stephen R. Palmquist (op cit.).  615-24.

Chotaš, Jiří.  “Das Ich als transzendentales Subjekt. Eine Auseinandersetzung mit Rolf-Peter Horstmanns Interpretation von Kants Paralogismen.”  Metaphysik und Kritik.  Eds. Chotaš, Karásek, and Stolzenberg (op cit.).  117-39.

 ——.  “Bibliographie: Neuere Literatur zur ‘Transzendentalen Dialektik’ der Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1992-2009).”  Metaphysik und Kritik.  Eds. Chotaš, Karásek, and Stolzenberg (op cit.).  283-308.

 ——.  “Kant a filosofující dějiny filosofie.” [Slovakian; “Kant and the Philosophical History of Philosophy”]  Dejiny filozofie ako filozofický problém [The History of Philosophy as a Philosophical Problem].  Eds. Vladimír Leško und Pavol Tholt (Košice: Univerzita Pavla Jozefa Šafárika, 2010).  153-65.

 ——, Jindřich Karásek, and Jürgen Stolzenberg, eds.  Metaphysik und Kritik: Interpretationen zu der “Transzendentalen Dialektik” der Kritik der reinen Vernunft.  Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2010.  [318 p.] [contents]

Chrisman, Matthew.  “Constructivism, Expressivism and Ethical Knowledge.”  International Journal of Philosophical Studies 18 (2010): 331-53.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the contemporary metaethical debate, expressivist (Blackburn, Gibbard) and constructivist (Korsgaard, Street) views can be viewed as inspired by irrealist ideas from Hume and Kant respectively. One realist response to these contemporary irrealist views is to argue that they are inconsistent with obvious surface-level appearances of ordinary ethical thought and discourse, especially the fact that we talk and act as if there is ethical ‘knowledge’. In this paper, I explore some constructivist and expressivist options for responding to this objection. My conclusion is that, although both constructivists and expressivists can capture other surface-level features of ethical thought and discourse, the possibility of ethical knowledge causes special problems for these versions of irrealism. I end with some comments about where I think irrealists should begin to look for a response to these special problems, which points, somewhat surprisingly, towards an alternative inferentialist form of irrealism about epistemic and ethical thought and discourse, which is inspired by Sellars.

Cicovacki, Predrag.  “Respect for Persons as Respect for the Moral Law: Nicolai Hartmann’s Reinterpretation of Kant.”  Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy.  Ed. Stephen R. Palmquist (op cit.).  485-92.

Ciomoş, Virgil.  “A Réduction et donation: de Kant à Husserl.”  Studia Universitatis Babeş-Bolyai — Philosophia  2 (2010): 41-57.

Clark, David L.  “Unsocial Kant: The Philosopher and the Un-regarded War Dead.”  Wordsworth Circle 41 (2010): 60-68.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this article the author discusses Immanuel Kant’s “Toward Perpetual Peace” and its historical context. He notes that the circumstances surrounding the Treaty of Basle, signed in 1795 by the Prussian king Frederick William II with France, challenged the limits of peace for Kant. He examines Kant’s notion of peace and the ethics of the behavior of the victorious nation following a war.

Clarke, Jean, and Robin Holt.  “Reflective Judgement: Understanding Entrepreneurship as Ethical Practice.”  Journal of Business Ethics 94 (2010): 317-31.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Recently, the ethical rather than just the economic resonance of entrepreneurship has attracted attention with researchers highlighting entrepreneurship and ethics as interwoven processes of value creation and management. Recognising that traditional normative perspectives on ethics are limited in application in entrepreneurial contexts, this stream of research has theorised entrepreneurship and ethics as the pragmatic production of useful effects through the alignment of public/private values. In this article, we critique this view and use Kant’s concept of reflective judgement as discussed in his Critique of the Power of Judgement to theorise ethical entrepreneurial practice as the capacity to routinely break free from current conventions through the imaginative creation and use of self-legislating maxims. Through an analysis of the narratives of 12 entrepreneurs, we suggest there are three dimensions to reflective judgement in entrepreneurial contexts: (1) Social Performance; (2) Public Challenge and; (3) Personal Autonomy. Whilst the entrepreneurs were alive to the importance of commercial return, their narratives demonstrated further concern for, and commitment to, standards that they rationally and imaginatively felt as being appropriate. In our discussion, we integrate the findings into existing theoretical categories from entrepreneurship studies to better appreciate ethics within the context of value creation.

Clewis, Robert.  “A Case for Kantian Artistic Sublimity: A Response to Abaci.”  Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 68 (2010): 167-70.

[Note] [Hide Note] Author’s note: My discussion piece criticizes an article by Uygar Abaci, “Kant’s Justified Dismissal of Artistic Sublimity,” which denies the possibility of Kantian artistic sublimity. My piece concludes that genuine instances of an aesthetic judgment of sublimity can be elicited by art, not just nature. I emphasize the important role that rational and moral ideas play in the judgment of the sublime, introduce and defend the notion of impure sublimity, and discuss examples of artworks that evoke sublimity. I conclude that we should not assume that the phenomenology of the artistic sublime is qualitatively different from that of the natural sublime.

 ——.  “A Court Conversation.”  Tennis and Philosophy.  Ed. David Baggett.  Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2010.  142-163.

[Note] [Hide Note] Author’s note: This introductory and light piece is a dialogue between Kant, a tennis player, his coach, and a tennis fan.

 ——.  Rev. of Ideal Embodiment: Kant’s Theory of Sensibility, by Angelica Nuzzo (2008).  Review of Metaphysics 63 (2010): 715-17.

Cobben, Paul.  Institutions of Education, Then and Today: The Legacy of German Idealism.  Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2010.  [vi, 247 p.]

Cohen, Richard A.  “Franz Rosenzweig’s ‘Star of Redemption’ and Kant.”  Philosophical Forum 41 (2010): 73-98.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Rosenzweig favors Kant’s critical idealism, with its acknowledgment of a ‘beyond knowledge,’ over the absolute idealisms of Fichte, (early) Schelling and Hegel. The formal grounds for the three irreducible elements of the ‘Star of Redemption’ — God, man and world — derive specifically from overstepping the epistemological limits of the theological, psychological and cosmological ideas delineated in the Critique of Pure Reason. Rosenzweig’s later “common sense” defense of the ‘Star’ in “The New Thinking” exposed as an illegitimate effort to salvage its epistemological failures by a post facto appeal to Kant’s Enlightenment defense of Mendelssohn against Jacobi.

Cohnitz, Daniel.  “Orsteds ‘Gedankenexperiment’ und die kantianische Fundierung der Infinitesimalrechnung Ein Beitrag zur Begriffsgeschichte von ‘Gedankenexperiment’ und zur Mathematikgeschichte des frühen 19. Jahrhunderts.”  Kant der Europäer: Europäer über Kant.  Eds. Dietzsch, Grimoni, and Kozlowski (op cit.).  162-88.

Colombo, Chiara.  “La dottrina kantiana dei giudizi analitici a priori nella Critica della ragion pura.” [Italian]  Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica 102 (2010): 655-74.

Colombo, Enrico.  Rev. of Kants vergessener Rezensent. Die Kritik der theoretischen und praktischen Philosophie Kants in fünf frühen Rezensionen von Hermann Andreas Pistorius, ed. by Bernward Gesang (2007).  Rivista di Storia della Filosofia 65 (2010): 199-200.

Conceição, Jorge Vanderlei Costa da.  Rev. of Kant e o problema da significação, by Daniel Omar Perez (2008).  Kant e-Prints 5.1 (2010): 157-65. [online]

Cook Philip A.  Rev. of A Companion to Kant, ed. by Graham Bird (2006).  Kantian Review 15.1 (2010): 142-45.

Correia, Carlos João.  “Kant e o paralogismo da personalidade.” [Portuguese]  Was ist der Mensch? Que é o homem?  Eds. Ribeiro dos Santos, et al. (op cit.).  371-82.

Costa Rego, Pedro.  “Ceticismo estético e dedução da Crítica do Juízo.” [Portuguese]  Was ist der Mensch? Que é o homem?  Eds. Ribeiro dos Santos, et al. (op cit.).  485-94.

Cowling, Sam.  “Kantian Humility and Ontological Categories.”  Analysis 70 (2010): 659-65.

Cramer, Konrad.  “Ens necessarium.”  Metaphysik und Kritik.  Eds. Chotaš, Karásek, and Stolzenberg (op cit.).  203-33.

Cramer, Wolfgang.  Gottesbeweise und ihre Kritik: Prüfung ihrer Beweiskraft.  2nd ed.  Frankfurt/Main: Klostermann, 2010.  [161 p.] [data]

Creath, Richard.  “The Construction of Reason: Kant, Carnap, Kuhn, and Beyond.”  Discourse on a New Method.  Eds. Mary Domski and Michael Dickson (op cit.).  493-509.

Crelier, Andrés.  Rev. of La comprensión del lenguaje en la Crítica de la razón pura de I. Kant, by Daniel Leserre (2008). [German]  Kant e-Prints 5.1 (2010): 143-47. [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Welcher ist der wirkliche Status der Sprache in der Philosophie Kants? Hat Kant über die Sprache einfach geschwiegen oder sogar die Reflexion über sie unterdrückt? Warum scheint die Sprache keinen Platz in der kritischen Philosophie zu haben? Einige dieser Fragen sind während Kants Leben erstmals gestellt worden und andere waren schon Thema der Diskussion im 19. Jahrhundert. Wie bekannt ist, haben Hamann und Herder die Schwächen einer sprachlosen Vernunft betont, was zu einer Tradition geführt hat, in welcher das kantische Schweigen über die Sprache einen Konsens erreicht hat.

Croitoru, Rodica.  “Al IX-lea Congres Internaţional al Societăţii de Studii Kantiene de Limbă Franceză, Kant, ştiinţa şi ştiinţele.” [Romanian; “The IXth International Congress of the SKLF”].  Revista de Filosofie 57 (2010): 289-92.

 ——.  “Categoriile libertăţii la Kant.” [Romanian; “Kant’s Categories of Freedom”]  Studii de teoria categoriilor, vol. 2.  Ed. Sergiu Bălan (Bucureşti: Edit. Acad. Române, 2010). 115-23.

Crotti, Ornella.  La bellezza del bene: il debito di Hannah Arendt nei confronti di Immanuel Kant. [Italian]  Milano: Mimesis, 2010.  [189 p.]

Crowe, Benjamin D.  “Fichte’s Transcendental Theology.”  Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 92 (2010): 68-88.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The relationship between Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre and Kant’s philosophy is as important as it is ambiguous. The aim of this paper is to explore one significant and underexamined aspect of this relationship, i.e., the respective views of Fichte and Kant on the concept of God. Fichte’s noteworthy divergences from Kant’s discussions are described and analyzed. Fichte’s explication of the concept of God is considerably sparser than Kant’s. Furthermore, Fichte excludes from philosophy some of the subdisciplines of rational theology allowed by Kant. The deeper philosophical roots of these divergences are located in Fichte’s radical revision of the Kantian doctrine of the “primacy of practical reason”.

Crowther, Paul.  The Kantian Aesthetic. From Knowledge to the Avant-Garde. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.  [224 p.] [review] [review]

Cubo Ugarte, Óscar.  “Corporalidad y vida en la filosofía crítica de Kant.” [Spanish]  Ideas y Valores: Revista Colombiana de Filosofia 59 (2010): 109-22. [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to examine the paramount role played by the feeling of pleasure and the feeling of life (‘Lebensgefühl’) in the Critique of Judgement. It argues that dealing with these issues furthers the study conducted by Kant in his first two Critiques on the theoretical and the practical subject, and allows us to understand the vital background in which transcendental subjectivity exists factically. Finally, it shows that in the case of the human being, his subjectivity cannot be understood in isolation from its intimate connection to the body

 ——.  “Kant y Marx: el problema de las colonias.” [Spanish]  Daimon, Revista de Filosofia 3 (2010): 87-96. [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this work our aim is to analyse the relationship of the philosophy of right by I. Kant and the thought of K. Marx, mostly for what concerns the “doctrine of right”, elaborated by Kant in the Metaphysics of Morals. We want to show that the “doctrine of right”, as opposed to what some traditional Marxist spheres consider, is not the result of a bourgeois thought, but it is near to the central issues faced by K. Marx in his work Capital. In this way we individuate the common points of both the authors, aiming to the possibilities, that this philosophical conjunction can bring in the order of the philosophy of right to the present and the future of our societies. In particular we want to show how the questions faced in Capital introduce a sort of ‘empirical a priori’, that the transcendental principle of right has to take into account in order not to be assimilated or excluded in the real world.

 ——.  Rev. of Subjective Universality in Kant’s Aesthetics, by Ross Wilson (2007).  Kant-Studien 101 (2010): 253-56.

Cuffaro, Michael.  “The Kantian Framework of Complementarity.”  Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 41 (2010): 309-17.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: A growing number of commentators have, in recent years, noted the important affinities in the views of Immanuel Kant and Niels Bohr. While these commentators are correct, the picture they present of the connections between Bohr and Kant is painted in broad strokes. In this essay, I provide a closer, structural, analysis of both Bohr’s and Kant’s views that makes these connections more explicit. In particular, I demonstrate the similarities between Bohr’s argument that neither the wave nor the particle description of atomic phenomena pick out an object in the ordinary sense of the word, and Kant’s requirement that both ‘mathematical’ (having to do with magnitude) and ‘dynamical’ (having to do with an object’s interaction with other objects) principles must be applicable to appearances in order for us to determine them as objects of experience. I argue that Bohr’s ‘complementarity interpretation’ of quantum mechanics, which views atomic objects as idealizations, and which licenses the repeal of the principle of causality for the domain of atomic physics, is perfectly compatible with, and indeed follows naturally from a broadly Kantian epistemological framework.

Cummiskey, David.  “Competing Conceptions of the Self in Kantian and Buddhist Moral Theories.”  Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy.  Ed. Stephen R. Palmquist (op cit.).  664-77.

Cunico, Gerardo.  “Metafisica.” [Italian]  L’universo kantiano: filosofia, scienze, sapere.  Eds. Stefano Besoli, Claudio La Rocca, and Riccardo Martinelli (op cit.).  315-45.

[top]D    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Dahlstrom, Daniel.  “The Critique of Pure Reason and Continental Philosophy: Heidegger’s Interpretation of Transcendental Imagination.”  The Cambridge Companion to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.  Ed. Paul Guyer (op cit.).  380-400.

d’Allonnes, Myriam Revault.  “Kant, Arendt et la faculté de juger politique.”  Raison pratique et normativité chez Kant: droit, politique et cosmopolitique.  Ed. Jean-François Kervégan (op cit.).  169-80.

Dancy, Jonathan, and Ernest Sosa, eds.  A Companion to Epistemology, 2nd ed.  Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010.  [560 p.]

d’Anjou, Philippe.  “Beyond Duty and Virtue in Design Ethics.”  Design Issues 26 (2010): 95-105.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article discusses ethics for designers, in the context of various philosophical traditions. The categorical imperative theory of duty, promulgated by the philosopher Immanuel Kant, is contrasted with the classical conception of virtue set forth by the philosopher Aristotle. These are said to compose the foundational principles of most standard codes of business ethics. The existentialist ethics of the philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre, described in his book Being and Nothingness, are also described. These are said to be a more suitable touchstone for professional ethics in the field of design, since Sartre portrays ethical choice as a creative act.

Da Silva Wellausen, Saly.  “Foucault Leitor De Kant: Was Ist Aufklärung?” [Portuguese; Foucault’s reading of Kant: “Was ist Aufklärung?”]  Kant e-Prints 5.2 (2010): 15-30. [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This essay examines the question of Aufklärung, which opens the Course of 1983, called “The government of self and others,” given by Michel Foucault at the Collège de France. According to Foucault, the philosophical speech in the Occident has built a part of its identity in this issue of the government of self and others, which was in Kantian question about the Lights. For Foucault, the Aufklärung develops the following ideas: thinking about the “public” concept referred by Kant; defining modernity as the ethics of the present time; thinking also about the relations between government of self and government of others, going by an entire analysis of the relationship between obedience and absence of reasoning, private and public, until defining what is freedom of thinking.

De Boer, Karin.  Kants ‘Kritiek van de zuivere rede’: een leeswijzer. [Dutch]  Amsterdam: Boom, 2010.  [160 p.]

 ——.  “Hegel’s Account of Contradiction in the Science of Logic Reconsidered.”  Journal of the History of Philosophy 48 (2010): 345-73.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article challenges the prevailing interpretations of Hegel’s account of the concept “contradiction” in the Science of Logic by arguing that it is concerned with the principle of Hegel’s method rather than with the classical law of non-contradiction.  I first consider Hegel’s Doctrine of Essence in view of Kant’s discussion of the concepts of reflection in the first Critique.  On this basis, I examine Hegel’s account of the logical principles based on the concepts “identity,” “opposition,” and “contradiction.”  Finally, I point out how the principle Hegel derives from the concept of contradiction actually informs his own method.

 ——.  “Pure Reason’s Enlightenment: Transcendental Reflection in Kant’s first Critique.”  Kant Yearbook: Metaphysics 2 (2010): 53-74.

 ——.  “Kant, Reichenbach, and the Fate of A Priori Principles.”  European Journal of Philosophy (pre-print online, posted 18 Feb 2010). [abstract]

Debona, Vilmar.  “Tra Determinismo e Libertà: Aspetti del Concetto di “Carattere” in Kant e Schopenhauer.” [Portuguese]  Kant e-Prints 5.1 (2010): 49-59. [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The purpose of this study is to examine as the theory of acquired character of Schopenhauer, exposed especially in Aforismi, can offer an answer to the question of Kant and Schopenhauer about freedom and necessity. Analyzed the context of the gestation of the concept of “nature” in Kant, alongside the issue of freedom in the third antinomy. From this, take the concept of the acquired character in Schopenhauer as a middle way between the intelligible character and the empirical character, that can make the world of phenomenon less determinated.

 ——.  Rev. of Il giro fangoso dell’umana destinazione: Friedrich Schiller dall’illuminismo al criticismo, by Laura Anna Macor (2008). [Portuguese]  Kant e-Prints 5.1 (2010): 149-56. [online]

 ——.  Rev. of Kant e o problema da significação, by Daniel Omar Perez (2008). [German]  Kant e-Prints 5.1 (2010): 157-65. [online]

De Jong, Willem R.  “The Analytic-Synthetic Distinction and the Classical Model of Science: Kant, Bolzano and Frege.”  Synthese 174 (2010): 237-61. [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper concentrates on some aspects of the history of the analytic-synthetic distinction from Kant to Bolzano and Frege. This history evinces considerable continuity but also some important discontinuities. The analytic-synthetic distinction has to be seen in the first place in relation to a science, i.e., an ordered system of cognition. Looking especially to the place and role of logic it will be argued that Kant, Bolzano and Frege each developed the analytic-synthetic distinction within the same conception of scientific rationality, that is, within the Classical Model of Science: scientific knowledge as cognitio ex principiis . But as we will see, the way the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments or propositions functions within this model turns out to differ considerably between them

Dekens, Olivier.  Comprendre Kant.  Paris: A. Colin, 2010.  [191 p.]

Delaney, Neil.  “What Romance Could Not Be.”  American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 84 (2010): 589-98.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This essay makes a number of distinctions between the motives of love and of duty, and argues that ideally they act in concert so as to generate constancy in loving relations. The essay revolves around a case in which a husband or wife is tempted to infidelity. It is argued that resistance to the temptation is optimally grounded in love for the spouse rather than simply in a duty to resist initiated perhaps through promise or vow. This is not, however, to undermine altogether the significance of promises of this sort; it is rather to put a proper emphasis on the sentiment of love as an effective spring to action and to suggest that the sentiment itself ideally brings a past promise or vow of fidelity into present relief in a choice situation.

Delfosse, Heinrich, Norbert Hinske, and Gianluca Sadun Bordoni, eds.  Kant-Index. Section 2. Vol. 30.1: Stellenindex und Konkordanz zum “Naturrecht Feyerabend”. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: frommann-holzboog, 2010.

Deligiorgi, Katerina.  Rev. of The Founding Act of Modern Ethical Life. Hegel’s Critique of Kant’s Moral and Political Philosophy, by Ido Geiger (2007).  Hegel Bulletin 31.1 (2010): 137-41.

Den Uyl, Douglas J.  See: Rasmussen, Douglas B. and Douglas J. Den Uyl.

Denis, Lara, ed.  Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals: A Critical Guide.  Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010.  [xiii, 270 p.] [review]

[Note] [Hide Note] Essays by: Manfred Kuehn, Steven Engstrom, Katrin Flikschuh, Otfried Höffe, B. Sharon Byrd, Allen W. Wood, Paul Guyer, Jeanine Grenberg, Lara Denis, Robert N. Johnson, Patrick Kain, Thomas E. Hill, Jr.
[From the publisher: Immanuel Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals (1797), containing the Doctrine of Right and Doctrine of Virtue, is his final major work of practical philosophy. Its focus is not rational beings in general but human beings in particular, and it presupposes and deepens Kant’s earlier accounts of morality, freedom, and moral psychology. In this volume of newly-commissioned essays, a distinguished team of contributors explores the Metaphysics of Morals in relation to Kant’s earlier works, as well as examining themes which emerge from the text itself. Topics include the relation between right and virtue, property, punishment, and moral feeling. Their diversity of questions, perspectives and approaches will provide new insights into the work for scholars in Kant's moral and political theory.

 ——.  “Freedom, Primacy, and Perfect Duties to Oneself.”  Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals: A Critical Guide.  Ed. Lara Denis (op cit.). 170-91.

 ——.  “Humanity, Obligation, and the Good Will: An Argument against Dean’s Interpretation of Humanity.”  Kantian Review 15.1 (2010): 118-41.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: I argue against Richard Dean’s identification of humanity with a good will, understood as something that some human agents may have, but others may lack, depending on the priority they assign to morality. According to Immanuel Kant, ethical obligation is constraint by humanity in one’s own person. So Dean’s interpretation implies that only people with good wills are ethically obligated. This contradicts the position, shared by Kant and Dean, that people who lack good wills have ethical obligations — including the obligation to strive for a good will. Additional arguments reveal other conflicts between Dean’s interpretation of humanity and Kant’s positions.

 ——.  Rev. of Kant’s Theory of Action, by Richard McCarty (2009).  Journal of the History of Philosophy 48 (2010): 533-35.

De Pablos Escalante, Raúl E.  Rev. of Teoría y crítica de la razón: Kant y Ortega y Gasset, edited by Sergio Rábade Romeo, Antonio M. López Molina, Mariana Urquijo Reguera, et al. (2009).  Endoxa 25 (2010): 381-91.

De Rocha, Munira Gottardello.  “A filosofia política de Kant, segundo Heiner Klemme.” [Portuguese; The political philosophy of Kant, according to Heiner Klemme]  Kant e-Prints 5.4 (2010): 1-6. [online]

De Sá, Alexandre Franco.  “Kant, a imaginação e o futuro. Considerações a partir da confrontação de Heidegger com Kant.” [Portuguese]  Was ist der Mensch? Que é o homem?  Eds. Ribeiro dos Santos, et al. (op cit.).  577-86.

de Vleeschouwer, Gregory.  “Getekend door het lichaam: De rol van het lichaam bij de totstandkoming van persoonsidentiteit.” [Dutch]  Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 72 (2010): 273-307.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: According to Kant, experience is always characterised by a duality: on the one hand, there is the subjective pole of experiences, and on the other hand, an objective world of which the experiences are experience of. In section 1 I focus on the objective pole and go into the question (with Kant and Strawson) of what someone assumes about the objective world when he or she experiences it. In section 2 I shift the attention towards the subjective pole of this duality: to see itself as distinct from objective reality, the subjective side has to be able to consider itself as a unity — called by Kant “ich denke” or ‘transcendental I’. Kant (defended by Strawson) sees this ‘ich denke’ as the bodiless core of self-consciousness (or experience). This seems irreconcilable, though, with the current growing conviction that consciousness cannot be incorporeal: consciousness is always embodied — what I will call corporality. At the end of section 3, though, I show that sheer corporality in itself is not enough to form the subjective unity that is needed for experience: a further step is required. But unlike Strawson and Kant, I defend the argument that this second step is not to be considered as the transition of an incorporeal, abstract ‘ich denke’ towards an empirical, embodied consciousness, but as the crossing towards a different way of living through the same corporality. Together with the insights of section 1, this will bring us to a model that can account as well for Strawson’s sensitivity to the fact that our consciousness goes through a crucial turn, as well as for the concern that our body should not be seen as secondary and instrumental.

deVries, Willem.  “Kant, Rosenberg, and the Mirror of Philosophy.”  Self, Language, and World.  Eds. James R. O'Shea and Eric M. Rubenstein (op cit.).  17-27.

Dewalque, Arnaud.  “La critique néokantienne de Kant et l’instauration d’une théorie conceptualiste de la perception.”  Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review/Revue canadienne de philosophie 49 (2010): 413-33.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper contributes to explore the historical background of contemporary conceptualism. It suggests that a step forward toward a more promising understanding of this historical background can be made if we focus, not on the much-discussed, controversial position of Kant, but rather on the straightforward position of some main representatives of classical neo-Kantianism. My main hypothesis is that criticisms of Kant’s transcendantal aesthetics coming from Paul Natorp (1854–1924) and Bruno Bauch (1877–1942) may be regarded as a significant historical source for the so-called “content” conceptualism (especially in McDowell’s version), insofar as they imply that the contents of perception are conceptual contents.

Dicker, George.  Rev. of Kant and Skepticism, by Michael N. Forster (2010).  European Journal of Philosophy 18 (2010): 609-15.

Dickson, Michael, ed.  See: Domski, Mary and Michael Dickson, eds.

Dietzsch, Steffen.  “Immanuel Kant im Europa der Aufklärung.”  Kant der Europäer: Europäer über Kant.  Eds. Dietzsch, Grimoni, and Kozlowski (op cit.).  32-48.

 ——, Lorenz Grimoni, and David Kozlowski, eds., in collaboration with David Kozlowski.  Kant der Europäer: Europäer über Kant.  Husum: Husum, 2010.  [309 p.]

[Note] [Hide Note] Companion book to the exhibit: Kant der Europäer of the Museums Stadt Königsberg in Duisburg, 2010.
Contents: Norbert Lammert, “Kant und Europa Vorbemerkungen zu einer Ausstellung” — Lorenz Grimoni, “Immanuel Kant und die europäische Metropole Königsberg” — Steffen Dietzsch, “Immanuel Kant im Europa der Aufklärung” — Endre Kiss, “Das Kant’sche Europa” — Ernst-Otto Onnasch, “Immanuel Kants Philosophie in den Niederlanden zwischen 1785 und 1804” — René-Marc Pille, “‘Einfach nicht zu inkantieren!’ Wilhelm von Humboldt als erfolgloser Vermittler der kritischen Philosophie bei den Franzosen” — Vesa Oittinen, “Zur frühen nordischen Kant-Rezeption” — Mònica Carbó, “Die Kantrezeption in Spanien” — Mirosław Żelazny, “Kant und Polen” — Daniel Cohnitz, “Orsteds ‘Gedankenexperiment’ und die kantianische Fundierung der Infinitesimalrechnung Ein Beitrag zur Begriffsgeschichte von ‘Gedankenexperiment’ und zur Mathematikgeschichte des frühen 19. Jahrhunderts” — Gianluca Garelli, “Teleologie als Autonomie: Die Bedeutung der Kritik der teleologischen Urteilskraft für die italienische Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts” — Alexei N. Krouglov, “Kant und die kantische Philosophie in Russland zu den Lebzeiten des Königsberger Philosophen” — David Kozlowski, “Swedenborg bei Kant und in Europa. Auf den Spuren riskanter Interpretationen der Träume eines Geistersehers im 19. Jahrhundert” — Anna Barth, “Vom Ghetto nach Europa: Immanuel Kant und die Berliner Haskala” — Susan A. J. Stuart und Chris Dobbyn, “A Kantian Prescription for Artificial Conscious Experience” — Klaus Weigelt, “Immanuel Kant in Kaliningrad nach 1945”

di Giovanni, George.  Rev. of K. L. Reinhold’s Briefe über die Kantische Philosophie, ed. by Martin Bondeli (2007).  Journal of the History of Philosophy 48 (2010): 251-52.

Dimitrov, Stefan.  “The Heteronomy of Conscience and Reason in Man.” [Bulgarian]  Philosophical Alternative (Bulgarian Academy of Sciences) 19 (2010): 15-24.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper studies the relation between conscience and reason as two autonomous sources of the sense in man. Reason is considered here as based on the principle of a reflective logico-ontological self-sufficiency. The conscience, respectively, is viewed as based on the principle of the spontaneous and free affiliation to a transcendent source of regulative sense. These two higher faculties, being founded on different principles, in some circumstances fall into heteronomy. The thesis proposed is that the ascertaining of a subordinative accordance between the reason and the conscience can be considered as the way out from this heteronomy.

DiSalle, Robert.  “Synthesis, the Synthetic a priori, and the Origins of Modern Space-time Theory.”  Discourse on a New Method.  Eds. Mary Domski and Michael Dickson (op cit.).  523-51.

Dlugach, Tamara Borisovna.  От Канта к Фихте: сравнительно-исторический анализ / Ot Kanta k Fikhte: sravnitel’no-istoricheskii analiz. [Russian]  Moscow: Kanon+, 2010.  [367 p.]

Dobbyn, Chris.  See: Stuart, Susan A. J., and Chris Dobbyn.

Dobe, Jennifer Kirchmyer.  “Kant’s Common Sense and the Strategy for a Deduction.”  Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 68 (2010): 47-60.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article discusses how philosopher Immanuel Kant’s conceptions of common sense relate to his conception of the Fourth Moment regarding aesthetic judgment and deductions of aesthetic taste. The author comments on the reflective nature of aesthetic judgments and their relationship to understanding and imagination. Kant’s views on the role of necessity and pleasure in those judgments are noted. Kant suggested that although they are subjective, judgments of taste should have universal validity with common sense forming the subjective principle of the Fourth Moment. Kant’s views regarding the ability to communicate cognitive concepts universally are discussed.

Dobko, Taras.  “Happiness and Moral Autonomy of the Human Person: A Critical Reflection on Kant and von Hildebrand.”  Topos: Journal for Philosophical and Cultural Studies 2 (2010): 108-21.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article seeks to analyze the relation between happiness and moral autonomy drawing upon the moral experience of the human person with special focus upon the treatment of the issue within the framework of Immanuel Kant’s and Dietrich von Hildebrand’s philosophy of the person. Thus, our aim is to find what we can learn about the human person through the appreciation of the experience of his/her true happiness. We take the phenomenon of happiness, with special reference to von Hildebrand’s thought, as a clue which could help us to understand better the important and truly personal phenomena in human life such as the human person’s ordination to the objective reality, his/her vocation to build his/her life in response to and in dialogue with the world of values, his/her task to live a meaningful and dignified life. In particular, we attempt to show that the experience of happiness, far from being heteronymous in its character and origin, is rather a distinctive experience of personal autonomy. Thus, we try to substantiate our conviction that the true vision of happiness is an important tool for the real understanding and solution of certain apparently paradoxical situations related to the problem of the person’s moral autonomy and moral freedom.

Dolins, Francine L.  See: Mitchell, Robert W. and Francine L. Dolins.

Domingo Moratalla, Tomás.  Rev. of Teoría y crítica de la razón: Kant y Ortega y Gasset, edited by Sergio Rábade Romeo, Antonio M. López Molina, Mariana Urquijo Reguera, et al. (2009).  Revista de Estudios Orteguianos 20 (2010): 223-27.

Domski, Mary.  “Kant on the Imagination and Geometrical Certainty.”  Perspectives on Science 18 (2010): 409-31.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In what follows, I aim to develop our understanding of the role the imagination plays in Kant’s critical account of geometry and suggest, in particular, that the peculiar interpretation of the imagination that Kant forwards in the first ‘Critique’ helps secure the certainty of geometrical knowledge. To make my case, I first consider the account of geometrical reasoning Kant presents in his 1764 prize essay, a text in which geometrical certainty is tied to the power that the mind (or understanding) has to perceive the geometrical objects presented before it. I highlight the problems that emerge from this precritical account of geometrical certainty in order to make better sense of why Kant, in 1787, fashions the imagination as he does and specifically, why he dissolves any connection between the imagination’s power of perception — what he terms our “degree of sensibility” — and the certainty of geometrical knowledge. In general, as I hope my treatment brings to light, paying attention to the transition in Kant’s thinking about geometrical reasoning grants us added perspective on the role the imagination is intended to serve in the critical account of geometrical cognition.

 ——.  Rev. of Kant and the Early Moderns, edited by Daniel Garber and Béatrice Longuenesse (2008).  Mind 119 (2010): 478-81.

  —— and Michael Dickson, eds.  Discourse on a New Method: Reinvigorating the Marriage of History and Philosophy of Science.  Chicago: Open Court, 2010.  [x, 852 p.] [review]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents: Mary Domski and Michael Dickson, “Discourse on a new method, or a manifesto for a synthetic approach to history and philosophy of science” — Pt. 1. The Newtonian era — Domenico Bertoloni Meli, “The axiomatic tradition in 17th century mechanics” — William R. Newman, “The reduction to the pristine state in Robert Boyle’s corpuscular philosophy” — Mary Domski, “Newton as historically-minded philosopher” — Andrew Janiak, “Newton’s forces in Kant’s critique” — Pt. 2. Kant — Alison Laywine, “Kant and Lambert on geometrical postulates in the reform of metaphysics” — Charles Parsons, “Two studies in the reception of Kant’s philosophy of arithmetic” — Daniel Sutherland, “Philosophy, geometry, and logic in Leibniz, Wolff, and the early Kant” — Daniel Warren, “Kant on attractive and repulsive force: the balancing argument” — Frederick C. Beiser, “Mathematical method in Kant, Schelling, and Hegel” — Pt. 3. Logical positivism and neo-Kantianism — John Michael Krois, “Validity in the cultural sciences?” — Alan Richardson, “Ernst Cassirer and Michael Friedman: Kantian or Hegelian dynamics of reason?” — Paul Pojman, “From Mach to Carnap: a tale of confusion” — Thomas Ricketts, “Quine’s objection and Carnap’s Aufbau” — Don Howard, “‘Let me briefly indicate why I do not find this standpoint natural’: Einstein, general relativity, and the contingent a priori” — Pt. 4. History and philosophy of physics — John Norton, “How Hume and Mach helped Einstein find special relativity” — James Mattingly, “The paracletes of quantum gravity” — Michael Dickson, “Dirac and mathematical beauty” — Scott Tanona, “Theory, coordination, and empirical meaning in modern physics” — Thomas Ryckman, “The ‘relativized a priori’: an appreciation and a critique” — Pt. 5. Post-Kuhnian philosophy of science — William Demopoulos, “The role of the foundations of mathematics in the development of Carnap’s theory of theories” — Richard Creath, “The construction of reason: Kant, Carnap, Kuhn, and beyond” — Noretta Koertge, “How should we describe scientific change? or: a neo-Popperian reads Friedman” — Robert DiSalle, “Synthesis, the synthetic a priori, and the origins of modern space-time theory” — Mark Wilson, “Back to ‘back to Kant’” — Pt. 6. Michael Friedman responds — Michael Friedman, “Synthetic history reconsidered”.

Dörflinger, Bernd.  “A via teleológica e a via ética para a ideia de Deus.” [Portuguese]  Was ist der Mensch? Que é o homem?  Eds. Ribeiro dos Santos, et al. (op cit.).  291-302.

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: This is a translation into Portuguese of “Kant über das Defizit der Physikotheologie und die Notwendigkeit der Idee einer Ethikotheologie,” below.

 ——.  “Kant über das Defizit der Physikotheologie und die Notwendigkeit der Idee einer Ethikotheologie.”  Die Gottesfrage in der Philosophie Immanuel Kants.  Eds. Norbert Fischer and Maximilian Forschner (op cit.).  72-84.

 ——.  “Kants Jesus.”  Klassičeskij razum i vyzovy sovremennoj civilizacii.  Ed. V. I. Brjušinkin (op cit.).  I, 34-45.

 ——.  “Zum Begriff des Raums in Kants Vernunftkritik. Von der Form der Anschauung zur formalen Anschauung.”  Kants Grundlegung einer kritischen Metaphysik.  Ed. Norbert Fischer (op cit.).  65-78.

 ——. “Иисус в трактовке Канта.” Translated from the German by A. N. Salikov. [Russian; “Kant’s Jesus”] Kantovskij Sbornik 31 (2010): 15-23. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article considers the correlation between the historical Christianity and the pure religion of reason, the figure of the biblical Christ of Nazareth and Kant's interpretation of his personality. The author focuses on the question, whether the Biblical Christ, as a real historical person, is the personification of the idea of the absolute good and moral perfection.

Dorussen, Han.  “Trade Networks and the Kantian Peace.”  Journal of Peace Research 47 (2010): 29-42. [abstract]

Dowling, Christopher.  “The Aesthetics of Daily Life.”  British Journal of Aesthetics 50 (2010): 225-42. [abstract]

 ——.  “Zangwill, Moderate Formalism, and Another Look at Kant’s Aesthetic.”  Kantian Review 15.2 (2010): 90-117.

Doyle, Thomas E. “Kantian Nonideal Theory and Nuclear Proliferation.” International Theory 2.1 (2010): 87-112. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Recent revelations of Iran’s hitherto undisclosed uranium enrichment programs have once again incited western fears that Tehran seeks nuclear weapons’ capability. Their fears seem motivated by more than the concern for compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Rather, they seem strongly connected to the western moral assumptions about what kind of government or people can be trusted with a nuclear arsenal. In this paper, I critically examine the western assumptions of the immorality of contemporary nuclear proliferation from an international ethical stance that otherwise might be expected to give it unequivocal support – the stance of Kantian nonideal theory. In contrast to the uses of Kant that were prominent during the Cold War, I advance and apply a sketch of a Kantian nonideal theory that specifies the conditions (although strict conditions) under which nuclear proliferation for states like Iran is morally permissible even though the NPT forbids it.

Drăghici, Marius Augustin.  Experimentul raţiunii pure. Deducţia kantiană a categoriilor. [Romanian; “The Experiment of Pure Reason. The Kantian Deduction of Categories”]  Cluj-Napoca: Editura Grinta, 2010.  [275 p.]

 ——.  “Aspecte privind distincţia ştiinţă-ştiinţe în Critica raţiunii pure.” [Romanian; “Aspects concerning the distinction science-sciences in the Critique of Pure Reason”]  Filosofie şi cultură.  Eds. Ana Bazac and Vasile Morar (Bucharest: Edit. Universitară, 2010).  158-67.

 ——.  “Despre firul conducător transcendental în Critica raţiunii pure.” [Romanian; “On the Guide of the Transcendental Deduction in the Critique of Pure Reason”]  Studii de teoria categoriilor, vol. 2.  Ed. Sergiu Bălan (Bucureşti: Edit. Acad. Române, 2010). 143-62.

 ——.  “Eul kantian şi conştiinţa artificială.” [Romanian; “The Kantian I and the Artificial Consciousness”]  Metafizică şi hermeneutică.  Ed. Gheorghe Vladutescu (Craiova: Edit AIUS, 2010).  308-13.

Duran, Xavier, and Patrick McNutt.  “Kantian Ethics within Transaction Cost Economics.”  International Journal of Social Economics 37 (2010): 755-63.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The purpose of this paper is twofold: first to add to the debate on trust and opportunism within transaction cost economics (TCE) and second to describe a partial solution, a code of ethical practice (CoEP) originating in Kant’s moral philosophy. The methodology has centred on ethical values of right and wrong within an organisation in terms of fulfilling one’s duty. The contracting or exchange objective in any transaction is to arrive at a mutually satisfactory outcome, an equilibrium point. With opportunism, a free rider problem may well arise; if so, a partial solution emerges. This has to be avoided. In this paper, the authors focus on simple contracts as a solution, that is, an agreement-as-bargain in a CoEP not made in deed but made in reason, so that each party to the arrangement, has “dignity”. The avoidance of an ethical dilemma in not fulfilling one’s duty is linked to the role of trust in TCE. Practical implications - It is argued that the decision not to engage in opportunistic behaviour, for example, by any one individual, may be rooted in a personal sense of duty or influenced by the ethical values and beliefs embedded within the culture of the organisation or the firm. Management may therefore decide not to abuse their discretionary power; workers may opt not to shirk. The paper builds on a new approach to understand governance and ethics insofar as a firm teaches people morality. This CoEP supports the role of trust in modern companies and links across to the literature on TCE. The paper should be of value to shareholders, workers and management, trade unions and commentators on the theory of the firm.

Durão, Aylton Barbieri.  “O direito real de Kant.” [Portuguese; “Kant’s Real Right”]  Trans/Form/Acao: Revista de Filosofia 33.1 (2010): 77-93. [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In real right, Kant investigates the private property of a substance (the soil and the objects on it). In the state of nature the physical or empirical possession of an external object only occurs based on the juridical postulate of the practical reason as a permissive law; otherwise, usable things would be in themselves, or res nullius, but the juridical or intelligible possession depends on the common possession which originates from the soil (and cannot be confounded with primitive communism), to avoid the property to be a relation among people and things, such as what happens in the work theory, because all rights demand a correlated duty, but things cannot have duties towards people, followed by the first occupant's unilateral will to want the object and the advent of an a priori unified will of the people, which only becomes effective in the civil state, the one that is able to generate a reciprocal obligation among all; that is why the intelligible possession is only possible in the civil state, even though the empirical possession of the state of nature has the presumption to become juridical when the entrance in the juridical state occurs and serves by comparison in the wait and preparation of that state.

Duro, Paul.  “‘Great and Noble Ideas of the Moral Kind’: Wright of Derby and the Scientific Sublime.”  Art History 33 (2010): 660-79.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the 1760s Joseph Wright of Derby produced two important paintings – the Orrery, and the Air Pump – that show lecturers demonstrating the laws of science to a small audience of men, women, and children. While Wright’s paintings have been widely and variously discussed in terms of their representation of science, as images of the Industrial Revolution, their use of artificial light, and what they tell us about gender relations, they have hitherto not been specifically considered from the point of view of the eighteenth century’s interest in the aesthetic category of the sublime. This article seeks to redress the balance through exploration of the paintings’ relationship to the sublime, particularly as it is represented in the writings of Edmund Burke and Immanuel Kant, and to further consider Wright’s paintings as a commentary on contemporary society’s fascination with art, science, and the Enlightenment ideal of human perfectibility.

Düsing, Klaus.  “Apperzeption und Selbstaffektion in Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Das Kernstück der ‘transzendentalen Deduktion’ der Kategorien.”  Kants Grundlegung einer kritischen Metaphysik.  Ed. Norbert Fischer (op cit.).  139-53.

 ——.  “Kritik der Theologie und Gottespostulat bei Kant.”  Die Gottesfrage in der Philosophie Immanuel Kants.  Eds. Norbert Fischer and Maximilian Forschner (op cit.). 57-71.

Dutra, Delamar José Volpato. “Um novo Kant: homenagem a Valério Rohden.” [Portuguese] ethic@ 9.2 (2010): 157-62. [M] [online]

Dwyer, Philip.  Rev. of Necessity and Possibility: The Logical Strategy of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, by Kurt Mosser (2008).  Journal of the History of Philosophy 48 (2010): 402-3.

Dyck, Corey W.  “The Aeneas Argument: Personality and Immortality in Kant’s Third Paralogism.”  Kant Yearbook: Metaphysics 2 (2010): 95-122.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper, I challenge the assumption that Kant’s Third Paralogism has to do, first and foremost, with the question of personal identity.
Revised version appears as chapter five of Dyck (2014).

[top]E    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Ebert, Theodor.  “Michael Wolff über Beweise für vollkommene Syllogismen bei Aristoteles.”  Journal for the General Philosophy of Science 41 (2010): 215-31.

 ——.  “Michael Wolff über Kant als Logiker. Eine Stellungnahme zu Wolffs Metakritik.”  Journal for the General Philosophy of Science 41 (2010): 373-82.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In an earlier article (see J Gen Philos Sci (2009) 40: 357–372) I have discussed the arguments brought forward by Michael Wolff against the interpretation given in the commentary by Ebert and Nortmann on Aristotle’s syllogistic theory (Aristoteles Analytica Priora Buch I, übersetzt und erläutert von Theodor Ebert und Ulrich Nortmann. Berlin 2007) and against the critique of Kant’s adaption of the syllogistic logic. I have dealt with Wolff’s arguments concerning (Ebert/Nortmann’s interpretation of) Aristotle in the paper mentioned and with his attempts to defend his critique in this subsequent article (part 1; see J Gen Phils Sci (2010) 41: 215–231). Part 2 (the paper below) is concerned with Wolff’s renewed attempts to defend Kant as a logician. In particular I point out that if, as Wolff claims, the nota notae relation in Kant is restricted to subordinated concepts, then it can hardly serve as a principle for syllogistic logic, as Kant claims. Against Wolff’s attempts to defend Kant’s claim that o-propositions are simpliciter convertible, I point out two arguments: (1) Even if Kant, following the Vernunftlehre by Meier, has assumed that an o-proposition can be turned into an i-proposition, this conversion is useless for the reduction to first figure syllogisms since we are no longer dealing with three syllogistic terms but with four. (2) It is quite unlikely that Kant has a conversion of this type in mind since the texts of his students always talk of the group of either the particular propositions or else of the negative propositions. Given Kant’s mistakes concerning the convertibility simpliciter of o-propositions, it is no wonder that he overlooks the special status of the moods Baroco and Bocardo. Wolff’s attempts to provide Kant with what he claims are direct proofs for these moods can be shown to rely on a reductio ad impossibile. Kant mistook what are parts of the proofs for the validity of moods in figures two to four as parts of these moods themselves. Wolff — who tries to defend Kant on this point — is forced to an artificial and unconvincing reading of the Kantian texts.

Edel, Geert.  Von der Vernunftkritik zur Erkenntnislogik die Entwicklung der theoretischen Philosophie Hermann Cohens. 2nd fully revised ed.  Waldkirch: Ed. Gorz, 2010.  [422 p.] [contents]

[Note] [Hide Note] Doctoral dissertation (Bonn, 2008)
[from the publisher]: In diesem Buch rekonstruiert der Autor die wichtigsten Stationen des Weges, der Hermann Cohen, den eigentlichen Begründer und Kopf der Marburger Schule des Neukantianismus, von seiner ersten Interpretation der „Kritik der reinen Vernunft“ zu seinem systematischen Hauptwerk, der „Logik der reinen Erkenntnis“, geführt hat. Während jene seinen wissenschaftlichen Ruf begründet und ihn als entschiedenen Verfechter der Kantischen Philosophie gezeigt hatte, legte er mit dieser eine Theorie vor, die — bis heute nur unzureichend rezipiert — auch schulintern nicht unumstritten blieb und bald den Vorwurf eines uneingestandenen Hegelianismus auf sich zog.
Die systematische Analyse der verschiedenen von Cohen vorgelegten Darstellungen der Kantischen Erkenntnistheorie, aber auch seiner Platon-Rezeption sowie der zentralen Schrift „Das Prinzip der Infinitesimal-Methode“ (Leibniz) erbringt den Nachweis, dass die Keime der Theoriekonzeption der Cohenschen „Erkenntnislogik“ bereits in seinem ersten Kant-Buch angelegt und alle wesentlichen Schlüsselbegriffe und -theoreme der „Erkenntnislogik“ in den ihr voraufgehenden Schriften vorformuliert sind. So überbrückt die Analyse die zwischen den beiden grundverschiedenen Theorien Kants und Cohens bestehende Kluft und gewinnt zugleich die begrifflichen und theoretischen Grundlagen für ein angemessenes Verständnis der Cohenschen „Erkenntnislogik“ selbst.

Edgar, Scott.  “The Explanatory Structure of the Transcendental Deduction and a Cognitive Interpretation of the First Critique.”  Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (2010): 285-314.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article discusses the two interpretations of the first Critique of Pure Reason, by Immanuel Kant to understand its explanatory structures. It states that epistemic interpretation evaluates the perception in psychology while cognitive interpretation evaluates the human cognitive faculties of the person for the understanding of Kant’s writing. It mentions the use of transcendental deduction in explaining the cognitive interpretation for the solution on the problem of understanding.

Edlin, Douglas E.  “Kant and the Common Law: Intersubjectivity in Aesthetic and Legal Judgment.”  Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 23 (2010): 429-60.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Considering Kantian aesthetic judgment and common law legal judgment together, we find that Kant and the common law do not seek judgments that are objective either in the sense that the judge must disengage or suppress his subjective responses or that the judgment must state or seek the truth. Instead, the Kantian and common law process of judging requires that judges combine their own subjective response with a reflective judgment that is claimed as valid by virtue of the form of its reasoning and expression according the methods and sources of the community in which and to which the judgment is rendered. Provided that the judge can perform the adjudicatory function impartially and independently, without any improper interest or influence tainting the decision making process, the judge remains free to decide for herself. That is the sort of judgment that is recognized by the community as intersubjectively valid and which best contributes to the ongoing process of understanding art and law.

Edmundson, William A.  Rev. of Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy, by Arthur Ripstein (2009).  Ethics 120 (2010): 869-73. [online]

Elsenhans, Theodor.  Fries und Kant: ein Beitrag zur Geschichte und zur systematischen Grundlegung der Erkenntnistheorie.  Hamburg: Severus-Verlag, 2010.  [xxviii, 347 p.] [contents]

[Note] [Hide Note] A reprint of the original edition (Giessen, 1906).

Emundts, Dina.  “The Refutation of Idealism and the Distinction between Phenomena and Noumena.”  The Cambridge Companion to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.  Ed. Paul Guyer (op cit.).  168-89.

Enchev, Kristiyan.  “Capacity for Metaphysics?” [Bulgarian]  Philosophical Alternative (Bulgarian Academy of Sciences) 19 (2010): 73-79.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: As far as the topic of the present paper is capability (Vermögen) for metaphysics I take into account a twofold meaning — the terms ‘facultas’ and ‘vir’. The aim of such a choice is to follow a possible dynamizing of Kant’s mathematical categories as an act of spontaneity preceding any further process of devirtualization. Indeed, this step is quite risky in order with the pure nonobjectivity of the defended here modification of critical metaphysics but it is possible to make a thematical shift toward regulative attitude of our thinking in “as if” modality. According to that modus I try to throw a light on the possibility to be construed supplementary categorial correlations so that to cope successfully with the experience content keeping in mind the critical-metaphysical requirement to avoid the loop of direct category ontologization.

Engelhardt, Jr., H. Tristam.  “Kant, Hegel, and Habermas: Reflections on ‘Glauben und Wissen’.”  Review of Metaphysics 63 (2010): 871-903.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This essay examines Immanuel Kant’s (1724-1804), Georg Friedrich Wilhelm Hegel’s (1770-1831), and Jürgen Habermas’s (1929-) accounts of God and of the interplay of belief about God and philosophically justified knowledge. Hegel’s account is central, because he responds to Kant’s critical position that sets the stage for much of subsequent thought, including the context for Hegel’s essay and Habermas’s lecture “Glauben und Wissen.” The reflection on the death of God in Hegel’s 1802 essay “Glauben und Wissen” lies at the turning point in the Western intellectual appreciation of God. This text is addressed both in its own right and as essential for appreciating Habermas’s recent engagement with the idea of God. That Habermas names his lecture after Hegel’s essay provokes the question of how to compare the authors’ views concerning God, especially in their accounts of the relation between theological and philosophical claims, that is, between 'Glauben’ and ‘Wissen’. After all, Habermas engages the idea of God, even though he admits the impossibility of a “renewal of a philosophical theology in the aftermath of Hegel.” Although his assumptions regarding the possibilities for "communicative action" are more Kantian than Hegelian, yet his understanding of the role of God in philosophy depends on the major shift in Western philosophical understandings of God appreciated by Hegel in “Glauben und Wissen.”

 ——.  “Moral Obligation After the Death of God: Critical Reflections on Concerns From Immanuel Kant, G. W. F. Hegel, and Elizabeth Anscombe.”  Social Philosophy & Policy 27 (2010): 317-40.  Reprinted in: Moral Obligation.  Eds. Ellen Frankel Paul, et al. (op cit.).  317-40.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Once God is no longer recognized as the ground and the enforcer of morality, the character and force of morality undergoes a significant change, a point made by G.E.M. Anscombe in her observation that without God the significance of morality is changed, as the word criminal would be changed if there were no criminal law and criminal courts. There is no longer in principle a God’s-eye perspective from which one can envisage setting moral pluralism aside. In addition, it becomes impossible to show that morality should always trump concerns of prudence, concerns for one’s own non-moral interests and the interests of those to whom one is close. Immanuel Kant’s attempt to maintain the unity of morality and the force of moral obligation by invoking the idea of God and the postulates of pure practical reason (i.e., God and immortality) are explored and assessed. Hegel’s reconstruction of the status of moral obligation is also examined, given his attempt to eschew Kant’s thing-in-itself, as well as Kant’s at least possible transcendent God. Severed from any metaphysical anchor, morality gains a contingent content from socio-historical context and its enforcement from the state. Hegel’s disengagement from a transcendent God marks a watershed in the place of God in philosophical reflections regarding the status of moral obligations on the European continent. Anscombe is vindicated. Absent the presence of God, there is an important change in the force of moral obligation.

Engelland, Chad.  “The Phenomenological Kant: Heidegger’s Interest in Transcendental Philosophy.”  Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 41 (2010): 150-69.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper provides a comprehensive overview of Martin Heidegger’s interpretations of Immanuel Kant. It identifies Heidegger’s motive in interpreting Kant and distinguishes, for the first time, the four phases of Heidegger’s reading of Kant. The promise of the phenomenological Kant motivated Heidegger to engage Kant repeatedly. In four phases and with reference to Husserl, Heidegger interpreted Kant as first falling short of phenomenology (1919-1925), then approaching phenomenology (1925-1927), then advancing phenomenology (1927-1929), and finally again approaching phenomenology (1930 and after). In the last phase, Heidegger does not reject the phenomenological Kant. Rather, he retracts the “over-interpretation” of the third phase.

Engstrom, Stephen.  “Reason, Desire, and the Will.”  Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals: A Critical Guide.  Ed. Lara Denis (op cit.). 28-50.

 ——.  “The Triebfeder of Pure Practical Reason.”  Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason.  Eds. Reath and Timmermann (op cit.).  90-118.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article explores Kant’s determination of how the moral law becomes a “spring” (‘Triebfeder’) of action in human beings. Special attention is given to his account of self-love and self-conceit as natural propensities to claim oneself worthy, respectively, of others’ love and of their esteem and deference. The moral law is interpreted as reason’s standard of validity for such claims, and it is argued that this standard, by exposing the inherent invalidity of self-conceit’s claim, generates a feeling of humiliation and thereby a complementary feeling of respect for the moral law, through which that law moves human beings to act.

Enns, Phil.  “Kant and the Possibility of the Religious Citizen.”  Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy.  Ed. Stephen R. Palmquist (op cit.).  455-62.

Enskat, Rainer.  “The Cognitive Dimension of Freedom as Autonomy.”  Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy.  Ed. Stephen R. Palmquist (op cit.).  233-46.

Erlewine, Robert.  Monotheism and Tolerance: Recovering a Religion of Reason.  Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010.  [x, 246 p.]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents: Overcoming the current crisis — Monotheism, tolerance, and pluralism: the current impasse — Learning from the past: introducing the thinkers of the religion of reason — Mendelssohn: idolatry and indiscernability — Mendelssohn and the repudiation of divine tyranny — Monotheism and the indiscernible other — Kant: religious tolerance — Radical evil and the mire of unsocial sociability — Kant and the religion of tolerance — Cohen: ethical intolerance — Cohen and the monotheism of correlation — Rational supererogation, and the suffering servant — Conclusion: Revelation, reason, and the legacy of the Enlightenment.

Ertl, Wolfgang.  “Persons as Causes in Kant.”  Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy.  Ed. Stephen R. Palmquist (op cit.).  217-30.

Escamilla-Castillo, Manuel.  “The Purposes of Legal Punishment.”  Ratio Juris 23 (2010): 460-78.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: There is a vast literature on the meanings of legal penalties. However, we lack a theory that explains them according to the formation of the modern state. Oakeshott’s theory can help explain this phenomenon, leading to an attempt of the individual to take over as many powers of the state as possible. Thus, Kant’s and Smith’s retributivism is the most consistent of all those theories. Nevertheless, the preventive and resocializing theory of Bentham succeeded eventually. But is this a liberal theory? We contrast the explanations of H.L.A. Hart and Frederick Rosen in order to lay the groundwork for a liberal theory of the meaning of legal sanctions.

Escudero Pérez, Alejandro.  “Darwin y el posthumanismo.” [Spanish]  Eikasia: Revista de Filosofía 30 (2010): 171-201.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Darwin brought to light a dangerous idea: human beings are not the center nor the top of the world. With this statement he situated himself against centuries of humanism. Because of this, when philosophy turns to a posthumanist position — trying to leave offside the illusions of modern idealism — can find in Darwin an essential support.

Esposito, Costantino. “Un pensiero al lavoro: tradurre (in italiano) la Critica della ragion pura di Kant.” [Portuguese] Crítica da Razão Tradutora. Sobre a dificuldade de traduzir Kant. Eds. Alessandro Pinzani and Valério Rohden (op cit.). 35-51. [M]

Essen, Georg, and Magnus Striet.  Kant e a teologia. [Portuguese]  São Paulo: Ediçoes Loyola, 2010.  [352 p.]

Esser, Andrea.  “Schwerpunkt: Kants kritische Metaphysik –— Substanz, Freiheit und System.”  Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 58 (2010): 576-78.

Estes, Yolanda.  “Intellectual Intuition: Reconsidering Continuity in Kant, Fichte, and Schelling.”  Fichte, German Idealism, and Early Romanticism.  Eds. Daniel Breazeale and Tom Rockmore (op cit.). 165-77.

Esteves, Julio.  “Uma análise semântica da Boa Vontade.” [Portuguese]  Was ist der Mensch? Que é o homem?  Eds. Ribeiro dos Santos, et al. (op cit.).  691-704.

 ——, and Candice Glenday.  “Kant, Chomsky e Rawls: sobre o método de A Theory of Justice.” [Portuguese; Kant, Chomsky and Rawls: on the method of A Theory of Justice]  Kant e-Prints 5.3 (2010): 66-92. [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The aim of this paper is to critically examine Rawls’ discussions of the method of a moral theory spread through his book Theory of Justice. First, Kant’s reasons for rejecting the attempt to employ in A philosophy a method inspired in mathematics, respectively, in geometry are considered. This provides a basis for rejecting the interpretation given by Maria Carolina and Zeljko Loparic, according to which Rawls would have allegedly followed Kant’s indications, and applied methodological developments of the Greek geometry to the solution of philosophical problems. Second, a brief analysis of some passages in Rawls’ book is given from which it becomes clear that despite his references to several methodological guidelines his real inspiration comes from Chomsky’s linguistics. The aims and method of Chomsky’s linguistics is then discussed to show the parallelism between them and Rawls’ own statements on the aims and method of his moral theory. Finally, it is argued that the purported parallelism collapses because, among other things, the data of a philosophical moral theory are completely different in nature from the data in linguistics.

Etxeberria, Arantza.  See: Nuño de la Rosa, Laura, and Arantza Etxeberria.

[top]F    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Faggion, Andrea.  “Apontamentos sobre a necessidade de um princípio teleológico para o conhecimento humana da causalidade.” [Portuguese]  Was ist der Mensch? Que é o homem?  Eds. Ribeiro dos Santos, et al. (op cit.).  395-406.

Fahmy, Melissa Seymour.  “Kantian Practical Love.”  Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (2010): 313-31.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the Doctrine of Virtue Kant stipulates that “Love is a matter of feeling, not of willing...so a duty to love is an absurdity.” Nonetheless, in the same work Kant claims that we have duties of love to other human beings. According to Kant, the kind of love which is commanded by duty is practical love. This paper defends the view that the duty of practical love articulated in the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’ is distinct from the duty of beneficence and best understood as a duty of self-transformation, which agents observe by cultivating a benevolent disposition and practical beneficent desires.

Falkenburg, Brigitte.  “Kants ‘mathematische Antinomie’ (II): Teilbarkeit der Materie als Elementarsubstanzen.”  Kants Grundlegung einer kritischen Metaphysik.  Ed. Norbert Fischer (op cit.).  265-84.

Federicis, Nico de.  Rev. of La pace e la ragione. Kant e le relazioni internazionali: diritto, politica, storia, by Massimo Mori (2008). [Italian]  Studi Kantiani 23 (2010): 137-42.

Feger, Hans.  “Kant’s Idea of Autonomy as the Basis for Schelling’s Theology of Freedom.”  Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy.  Ed. Stephen R. Palmquist (op cit.).  511-22.

Feldmeijer, F. R.  In de ban van noodzakelijkheid: Kants ethiek als weerspiegeling van zijn tijd. [Dutch]  Leiderdorp: [Feldmeijer], 2010.  [305 p.]

Fenves, Peter D.  Der späte Kant für ein anderes Gesetz der Erde.  Göttingen: Wallstein-Verlag, 2010.  [355 p.] [contents]

Fernandes, Paulo Cezar.  “Direito penal e justiça social em Kant. O problema da pena de morte.” [Portuguese]  Was ist der Mensch? Que é o homem?  Eds. Ribeiro dos Santos, et al. (op cit.).  777-94.

Fernández Agis, Domingo.  “Juicio político, juicio moral y poder.” [Spanish]  Areté: revista de filosofía 22 (2010): 289-300. [online]

Fernández-Labastida, Francisco.  Rev. of Kants Vorsehungskonzept auf dem Hintergrund der deutschen Schulphilosophie und -theologie, by Ulrich L. Lehner (2007).  Acta Philosophica: Pontificia Universita della Santa Croce 19 (2010): 226-29.

Ferrari, Massimo.  “Filosofia analitica.” [Italian]  L’universo kantiano: filosofia, scienze, sapere.  Eds. Stefano Besoli, Claudio La Rocca, and Riccardo Martinelli (op cit.).  647-707.

Ferrer, Diogo.  “Sobre o significado antinómico do prazer em Kant.” [Portuguese]  Was ist der Mensch? Que é o homem?  Eds. Ribeiro dos Santos, et al. (op cit.).  505-14.

Ferron, Isabella.  “La determinazione dell’uomo nell’Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht di Kant.” [Italian]  Was ist der Mensch? Que é o homem?  Eds. Ribeiro dos Santos, et al. (op cit.).  165-78.

Ferry, Jean-Marc.  La religion réflexive.  Paris: Cerf, 2010.  [296 p.]

Fetscher, Justus.  “Vielleicht.  Über eine Minimalfigur kosmologischer Imagination zwischen Milton und Kant.”  MLN 125 (2010): 511-35.

Ficarrotta, J. Carl.  Kantian Thinking about Military Ethics.  Farnham, Surrey/Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate Publishing, 2010.  [ix, 135 p.]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents: Are military professionals bound by a higher moral standard?: Functionalism and its limits — Women in combat: discrimination by generality — Careerism in the military services: an analysis of its nature, why it is wrong and what might be done about it — Homosexuality and military service: a case for abandoning “don't ask, don't tell” — How to teach a bad military ethics course — Should members of the military fight in immoral wars?: A case for selective conscientious objection — Does the doctrine of double effect justify collateral damage?: A case for more restrictive targeting policies — Just war theory: triumphant ... and doing more harm than good.

Figal, Günter.  “At the Limit: A Commentary on John Sallis, ‘Transfigurements’.”  Research in Phenomenology 40 (2010): 97-103.

Filho, Sílvio Rosa.  O eclipse da moral. Kant, Hegel e o nascimento do cinismo contemporâneo. [Portuguese; “Eclipse of Morals. Kant, Hegel and the birth of modern cynicism”]  São Paulo: Barcarolla, 2010.  [682 p.]

Fincham, Richard.  “Kant’s Early Critics: Jacobi, Reinhold, Maimon.”  Kant, Kantianism, and Idealism.  Ed. Thomas Nenon (op cit.).  49-82.

Finke, Ståle.  “Political Autonomy and Moral Self-understanding: Kant’s Justification of ‘Substantive Freedom’.”  Responsibility in Context: Perspectives.  Ed. Gorana Ognjenovic (op cit.).  35-52.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant’s political philosophy has been widely accepted as providing a moral basis for political autonomy and citizenship. However, as recent commentators have found, there seems to be no neat way of deriving a conception of Recht constitutional democracy or even political autonomy exclusively from within the framework of Kant’s moral philosophy.

Fioraso, Nazzareno.  “Il Kant di Miguel de Unamuno.” [Italian; "The Kant of Miguel de Unamuno"]  Was ist der Mensch? Que é o homem?  Eds. Ribeiro dos Santos, et al. (op cit.).  555-64.

Fisch, Menachem.  “Toward a History and Philosophy of Scientific Agency.”  Monist 93 (2010): 518-44.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article discusses the philosophy and history of scientific agency. It focuses on the biases of the major themes of philosopher Immanuel Kant: the strong commitment to framework-dependency of all scientific knowledge and the commitment to self-critical stance to free-willed and reflective self-governance. Kant notes that both ideas are not associated since the framework made explicit and analyzed in the First Critique cannot be regarded as a normative system.

Fischer, Norbert, ed.  Kants Grundlegung einer kritischen Metaphysik. Einführung in die Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Hamburg: Meiner, 2010.  [xv, 431 p.]

 ——.  “Die Zeit als Thema der Kritik der reinen Vernunft und der kritischen Metaphysik. Ihre Bedeutung als Anschauungsform des inneren Sinnes und als metaphysisches Problem.”  Kants Grundlegung einer kritischen Metaphysik.  Ed. Norbert Fischer (op cit.).  79-100.

 ——.  “Zur Aufgabe der ‘transzendentalen Analytik’ der Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Mit einem Blick auf die ‘metaphysische’ und die ‘transzendentale Deduktion’ der Kategorien.”  Kants Grundlegung einer kritischen Metaphysik.  Ed. Norbert Fischer (op cit.).  121-38.

 ——.  “Kants Reflexion der Vernunfterkenntnis im ‘Anhang zur transzendentalen Dialektik’.”  Kants Grundlegung einer kritischen Metaphysik.  Ed. Norbert Fischer (op cit.).  323-40.

 ——.  “Vom Rang und vom Sinn der Gottesfrage in der Philosophie Kants.”  Die Gottesfrage in der Philosophie Immanuel Kants.  Eds. Norbert Fischer and Maximilian Forschner (op cit.). 1-16.

 ——.  “Kants Philosophie und der Gottesglaube der biblischen Offenbarung. Vorüberlegungen zu einem gründlichen Bedenken des Themas.”  Die Gottesfrage in der Philosophie Immanuel Kants.  Eds. Norbert Fischer and Maximilian Forschner (op cit.). 131-54.

 ——.  Rev. of Kants System der transzendentalen Ideen, by Nikolai F. Klimmek (2005).  Kant-Studien 101 (2010): 131-34.

 —— and Maximilian Forschner, eds.  Die Gottesfrage in der Philosophie Immanuel Kants.  Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 2010.  [xi, 216 p.] [data]

Fistioc, Mihaela C.  “Mou Zongsan and Kant on Intellectual Intuition: A Reconciliation.”  Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy.  Ed. Stephen R. Palmquist (op cit.).  585-91.

Flannery, Kelly.  “Theoretical Byplay: Arendt’s Use of Kant in Political Judgment.”  Dialogue: Journal of Phi Sigma Tau 52 (2010): 110-24.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper I will attempt to explain Arendt’s initially confounding move to Kant’s account of judgment of taste as a basis for political judgment by first exploring why Arendt finds practical judgment distasteful, then turning to explicate Kant’s theory of the judgment of taste. Finally, I will draw out four themes that Arendt found distinctive in Kant’s account of the judgment of taste that justify its role as a foundation for Arendt’s political judgment.

Fletcher, Paul.  “Towards Perpetual Revolution: Kant on Freedom and Authority.”  The Politics to Come: Power, Modernity and the Messianic.  Eds. Arthur Bradley and Paul Fletcher (op cit.).  57-77.

——, ed.  See: Bradley, Arthur and Paul Fletcher, eds.

Flikschuh, Katrin.  “Justice without Virtue.”  Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals: A Critical Guide.  Ed. Lara Denis (op cit.). 51-70.

 ——.  “Kant’s Sovereignty Dilemma: A Contemporary Analysis.”  Journal of Political Philosophy 18 (2010): 469-93.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this article the author examines aspects of state sovereignty as expressed by Immanuel Kant, a German philosopher of the 18th and early 19th centuries. Kant’s position on sovereignty is contrasted with that of Thomas Pogge and is in agreement with Thomas Nagel, political philosophers. A number of Kant’s works are addressed including The Doctrine of Right, “Toward Perpetual Peace,” and Critique of Pure Reason. Kant’s views stand in opposition to those who regard state sovereignty as an obstacle to cosmopolitanism.

Foessel, Michaël.  Le scandale de la raison: Kant et le problème du mal.  Paris: Champion, 2010.  [192 p.]

 —— and Fabien Lamouche, eds.  Kant.  Paris: Éditions Points, 2010.  [295 p.]

 —— and Pierre Osmo, eds.  Kant.  Paris: Ellipses, 2010.  [299 p.]

Fonnesu, Luca.  Per una moralità concreta: studi sulla filosofia classica tedesca. [Italian]  Bologna: Il Mulino, 2010.  [274 p.] [content]

 ——.  “Etica.” [Italian]  L’universo kantiano: filosofia, scienze, sapere.  Eds. Stefano Besoli, Claudio La Rocca, and Riccardo Martinelli (op cit.).  147-87.

Foreman, Elizabeth.  Rev. of Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: A Critical Guide, ed. by Jens Timmerman (2010).  The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (August 2010, #23).

Formosa, Paul.  “Kant on the Highest Moral-Physical Good: The Social Aspect of Kant’s Moral Philosophy.”  Kantian Review 15.1 (2010): 1-36.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant identifies the “highest moral-physical good” as that combination of “good living” and “true humanity” which best harmonizes in a “good meal in good company”. Why does Kant privilege the dinner party in this way? By examining Kant’s accounts of enlightenment, cosmopolitanism, love and respect, and gratitude and friendship, the answer to this question becomes clear. Kant’s moral ideal is that of an enlightened and just cosmopolitan human being who feels and acts with respect and love for all persons and such an ideal is temporary manifested in the sort of social interaction achievable at a good dinner party.

Forrester, Stefan.  Rev. of The Problem of Free Harmony in Kant’s Aesthetics, by Kenneth F. Rogerson (2008).  Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 68 (2010): 425-27.

Forschner, Maximilian.  “Homo naturaliter metaphysicus. Zu Kants ‘Einleitung’ in die Kritik der reinen Vernunft.”  Kants Grundlegung einer kritischen Metaphysik.  Ed. Norbert Fischer (op cit.).  33-48.

 ——.  “Das Wesen der Erfahrungserkenntnis. Anmerkungen zu Kants Grundsätzen des Verstandes.”  Kants Grundlegung einer kritischen Metaphysik.  Ed. Norbert Fischer (op cit.).  167-83.

 ——.  “Zur Antinomie der dynamischen Ideen.”  Kants Grundlegung einer kritischen Metaphysik.  Ed. Norbert Fischer (op cit.).  285-311.

 ——.  “Die Stufen des Fürwahrhaltens: ‘Vom Meinen, Wissen und Glauben’. Mit einem Blick auf Kants Auslegung des Verhältnisses von Glaube und Kirche.”  Kants Grundlegung einer kritischen Metaphysik.  Ed. Norbert Fischer (op cit.).  391-407.

 ——.  “Kants Gottesbild in der Religionsschrift.”  Die Gottesfrage in der Philosophie Immanuel Kants.  Eds. Norbert Fischer and Maximilian Forschner (op cit.). 109-30.

 ——, ed.  See: Fischer, Norbert and Maximilian Forschner, eds.

Forster, Michael N.  Kant and Skepticism.  Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010.  [x, 154 p.]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Originally published in 2008.

Contents: Preface — pt. 1. Exposition — ch. 1. Varieties of skepticism — ch. 2. “Veil of perception” skepticism — ch. 3. Skepticism and metaphysics (a puzzle) — ch. 4. Kant’s pyrrhonian crisis — ch. 5. Humean skepticism — ch. 6. Kant’s reformed metaphysics — ch. 7. Defenses against humean skepticism — ch. 8. Defenses against pyrrhonian skepticism — pt. 2. Critical assessment — ch. 9. Some relatively easy problems — ch 10. A metaphysics of morals? — ch. 11. Failures of self-reflection — ch. 12. The pyrrhonist’s revenge — Notes — Index.

Förster, Eckart.  “What is the ‘Highest Point’ of Transcendental Philosophy?”  Rethinking Kant, vol. 2.  Ed. Pablo Muchnik (op cit.). 257-71.

 ——.  “The Significance of §§76 and 77 of the Critique of Judgment for the Development of Post-Kantian Philosophy.” (part two)  Translated from the German by Karen Ng and Matthew Congdon.  Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 31 (2010): 323-47.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Part One appeared in the previous volume: Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 30 (2009): 197-217.  The essay was originally published in German: Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 56 (2002): 321-45.

Foucault, Michel.  Einführung in Kants Anthropologie.  Translation of Introduction à l’Anthropologie into German by Ute Frietsch, afterword by Andrea Hemminger.  Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2010.  [141 p.]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: See this review of the original French edition.

 ——.  カントの人間学 / Kanto no ningengaku.  Translation of Introduction à l’Anthropologie into Japanese by Kenta Oji.  Tokyo: Shinchōsha, 2010.  [225 p.]

 ——.  See: Immanuel Kant.  Antropologia dal punto di vista pragmatico.

Fraisopi, Fausto.  Theoria: il soggetto kantiano e la complessità del suo esperire. [Italian]  Macerata: EUM, 2010.  [254 p.]

Franceschet, Antonio.  “Kant, International Law, and the Problem of Humanitarian Intervention.”  Journal of International Political Theory 6 (2010): 1-22.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract (ProQuest): International law has one principal mechanism for settling the legality of humanitarian interventions, the United Nations Security Council’s power to authorize coercion. However, this is hardly satisfactory in practice and has failed to provide a more secure juridical basis for determining significant conflicts among states over when humanitarian force is justified. This article argues that, in spite of Immanuel Kant’s limited analysis of intervention, and his silence on humanitarian intervention, his political theory provides the elements of a compelling analysis on this topic. Five components of Kant’s roadmap towards perpetual peace and an eventual world republic give conditional support for humanitarian intervention even in imperfect juridical conditions. This support is conditional on the achievement of juridical progress within and among states and has implications for the development of cosmopolitan citizenship. From Kant we learn that, ultimately, humanitarian intervention should become a matter of coercive law enforcement rather than an ethical question of ‘saving strangers’.

Frank, Martin.  “Kant und das Recht nach dem Krieg.”  Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 64 (2010): 498-519.

Frey, Michael, and Aysun Aly. “Kant auf Arabisch: Übersetzungsprobleme und deren Lösungen durch die Übersetzer der Schriften ‘Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?’ und Kritik der reinen Vernunft.” Asiatische Studien: Zeitschrift der Schweizerischen Asiengesellschaft 64.3 (2010): 535-79. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Translating the works of German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) into Arabic is difficult for two reasons. Firstly, Kant's language is so complex that some Kant researchers and linguists go so far as to deny the translatability of his works into any other language. Secondly, the special lexical and grammatical characteristics of the Arabic language lead some Arabic intellectuals to doubt the ability of Arabic to express ideas of modern philosophy in general. Notwithstanding these difficulties, Kant's works have been translated into Arabic. This article examines how the translators of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason and "An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?", Aḥmad aš-Šībānī, Mūsā Wahba, Ismāʿīl al-Muṣaddaq and ʿAbd al-Ġaffār Mikkāwī, coped with the above-mentioned difficulties and how they solved lexical and syntactic problems. It will be argued that the way the translators coped with these problems depended on their personal target cultures and the goals they pursued with their translations, and that therefore, the translations have to be considered as facts of a translator's personal target culture.

Frey, R. G.  “Goals, Luck, and Moral Obligation.”  Social Philosophy & Policy 27 (2010): 297-316.  Reprinted in: Moral Obligation.  Eds. Ellen Frankel Paul, et al. (op cit.).  297-316.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract (ProQuest): In Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, Bernard Williams is rather severe on what he thinks of as an ethics of obligation. He has in mind by this Kant and W. D. Ross. For many, obligation seems the very core of ethics and the moral realm, and lives more generally are seen through the prism of this notion. This, according to Williams, flattens out our lives and moral experience and fails to take into account things which are obviously important to our lives. Once we take these things into account, what do we do if they come into conflict with some of our moral obligations, as Williams, in his earlier writings on moral luck, thought to be the case. I want here to explore some of these ideas, in a way that I think harmonious with Williams’s general bent though not one that I intend as in any way detailed exegesis of Williams’s work.

Friedman, Michael.  “A Post-Kuhnian Approach to the History and Philosophy of Science.”  Monist 93 (2010): 497-517.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: An essay is presented on post-Kuhnian approach to the philosophy and history of science. It discusses the complex interactions among physics, technology, mathematics, politics, philosophy, and religion. It explains the modification of the original philosophical synthesis of philosopher Immanuel Kant by scientist philosophers. It also deals with mutual interactions among the quasi-autonomous cultural processes resulting to unpredictable novelty.

 ——.  “Synthetic History Reconsidered.”  Discourse on a New Method.  Eds. Mary Domski and Michael Dickson (op cit.).  571-813.

Frierson, Patrick.  “Kantian Moral Pessimism.”  Kant’s Anatomy of Evil.  Eds. Anderson-Gold and Muchnik (op cit.).  33-56.

 ——.  “Two Standpoints and the Problem of Moral Anthropology.”  Kant’s Moral Metaphysics: God, Freedom, and Immortality.  Eds. Lipscomb and Krueger (op cit.).  84-110.

 ——.  Rev. of Kant’s Theory of Action, by Richard McCarty (2009).  The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (June 2010, #27). [online]

 —— and Ido Geiger.  Rev. of Immanuel Kant: Anthropology, History, and Education, edited and translated by Zöller and Louden, et al. (2007).  American Philosophical Association Newsletters: Teaching and Philosophy 9 (2010): 9-20.

Fues, Wolfram Malte.  “The Foe: The Radical Evil: Political Theology in Immanuel Kant and Carl Schmitt.”  Philosophical Forum 41 (2010): 181-204.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article discusses the views of philosophers Immanuel Kant and Carl Schmitt on the foe, radical evil and political theology. It focuses on the evil that is behind the reason having the basic principle of self-determination. It states the principle that reflects the power of judgment that relates to the faculties of human cognition.

Fugate, Courtney David.  “Moral Individuality and Moral Subjectivity in Leibniz, Crusius, and Kant.”  Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy.  Ed. Stephen R. Palmquist (op cit.).  273-84.

Fujimoto, Kazushi.  カントの義務思想 / Kanto no gimu shiso. [Japanese]  Tokyo: Hokujushuppan, 2010.  [202 p.]

Fulda, Hans Friedrich.  “Nécessité du droit sous présupposition de l'impératif catégorique de l’éthique.”  Raison pratique et normativité chez Kant: droit, politique et cosmopolitique.  Ed. Jean-François Kervégan (op cit.).  13-54.

Fulkerson-Smith, Brett A.  “On the Apodictic Proof and Validation of Kant’s Revolutionary Hypothesis.”  Kantian Review 15.1 (2010): 37-56.

Fullinwider, Robert K.  “Philosophy, Casuistry, and Moral Development.”  Theory and Research in Education 8 (2010): 173-85.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Moral educators have little to learn from the moral theories in which philosophers routinely trade. These theories — including those by Slote, Hume, and Kant — leave behind the concrete world in which the moral educator labors. As interesting as they may be, they merely devise alternative routes to the same destination — to the main general features of morality as we know it. It is not so much these general features but the particular forms of moral life under which children and their tutors live that give specificity to duties and rights, content to virtues, and shape to purpose. To navigate successfully through this stuff of moral life, the developing youth needs not only a good heart but a casuistical temper.

[top]G    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Gable, Justin C.  Rev. of Metaphor and Continental Philosophy: From Kant to Derrida, by Clive Cazeaux (2007).  Review of Metaphysics 63 (2010): 911-13.

Gabriel, Markus.  “O mal radical como problema epistemológico.” [Portuguese]  Was ist der Mensch? Que é o homem?  Eds. Ribeiro dos Santos, et al. (op cit.).  347-56.

Gaier, Ulrich, and Ralf Simon, eds.  Zwischen Bild und Begriff. Kant und Herder zum Schema.  München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2010.  [254 p.] [contents]

 ——.  “Metaschematisieren? Hieroglyphe und Periodus.”  Zwischen Bild und Begriff. Kant und Herder zum Schema.  Eds. Ulrich Gaier and Ralf Simon (op cit.).  55-69.

Gain, Frédéric, transl.  See: Immanuel Kant. Sur le mal radical dans la nature humaine = Über das radicale Böse in der menschlichen Natur

Gallois, Laurent.  “L’esprit de la philosophie transcendantale chez Kant. Vers une philosophie de l’esprit?”  Archives de Philosophie 73 (2010): 229-248.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In order to bring his philosophical system to completion, Kant goes back to the transcendental question in his Opus Postumum. He reconsiders the problem of the junction of sense and intelligible. Kant comes up with the autoposition of the self, grounded by and on a notion unheard of in his transcendental philosophy: the spirit (‘Geist’). This article examines its meaning and in what way the Opus Postumum is historically a bridge towards a philosophy of the spirit.

Gambriani, Sourénto.  La place de Jean-Jacques Rousseau dans la philosophie kantienne de l'éducation.  Paris: Éditions de l'Onde, 2011.  [102 p.]

Gao, Guoxi.  “Kant’s Virtue Theory.”  Frontiers of Philosophy in China 5 (2010): 266-79.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: By focusing on human virtues rather than the general morality of rational beings, Kant’s virtue theory presents systematic arguments from the perspectives of reason and experiential emotion, norms and disposition, spirituality and humanity, etc., which is of great significance to an overall understanding of Kantian ethics, thus clarifying misunderstandings from the past decades.

Garcia-Borreguero, Diego.  See: Miranda, Marcelo, Andrea Slachevsky, and Diego Garcia-Borreguero.

Gardner, Sebastian.  Rev. of Freedom and Religion in Kant and His Immediate Successors: The Vocation of Humankind, 1774-1800, by George di Giovanni (2005).  Hegel Bulletin 31.1 (2010): 132-37.

Garelli, Gianluca.  “Teleologie als Autonomie: Die Bedeutung der Kritik der teleologischen Urteilskraft für die italienische Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts.”  Kant der Europäer: Europäer über Kant.  Eds. Dietzsch, Grimoni, and Kozlowski (op cit.).  190-210.

 ——, transl.  See: Immanuel Kant.  Antropologia dal punto di vista pragmatico.

Garthoff, Jon.  “Mimicking Korsgaard.”  Rethinking Kant, vol. 2.  Ed. Pablo Muchnik (op cit.). 122-55.

 ——.  “Structuring Ends.”  Philosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israel 38 (2010): 691-713.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: There is disagreement among contemporary theorists regarding human well-being. On one hand there are “substantive good” views, according to which the most important elements of a person’s well-being result from her nature as a human, rational, and/or sentient being. On the other hand there are “agent-constituted” views, which contend that a person’s well-being is constituted by her particular aims, desires, and/or preferences. Each approach captures important features of human well-being, but neither can provide a complete account: agent-constituted theories have difficulty accounting for the normativity of their claims, and substantive good theories have difficulty accounting for how a person’s actually adopted aims shape what is good for her and, hence, what she has reason to do. I articulate and defend a hybrid view that equals these approaches in systematicity and completeness of explanation yet seeks to surpass them in coherence with our ordinary judgments about what human well-being consists in. This hybrid view maintains, with agent-constituted theories, that a person’s well-being is (1) significantly constituted by her actually adopted aims; (2) deeply contingent; (3) agent-relative; (4) significantly dependent on spatially and temporally remote events; and (5) significantly independent of her experiences. The hybrid view also maintains, with substantive good theories, that a person’s well-being is (6) in part determined by facts independent of her aims, desires, and preferences; (7) such that all her aims are subject to critical evaluation and revision; and (8) constituted by her aims only if these aims are choiceworthy.

Gasché, Rodolphe.  “A Material ‘a priori’? On Max Scheler’s Critique of Kant’s Formal Ethics.”  Philosophical Forum 41 (2010): 113-26.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article focuses on the critique of formal ethics of philosopher Immanuel Kant by Max Scheler. It states that formalism in ethics by Kant took form of non-formal ethics. It reports the rejection of the formal ethics by Scheler lead to looking for material values. It discusses the accuse of the formal ethics that lead to rigid metaphysical opposition of form and matter.

Gauthier, Yvon.  “L’observateur local, ‘sa’ perspective et le point à l’infini.”  Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review/Revue canadienne de philosophie 49 (2010): 287-94.

Gebharter, Alexander, and Alexander G. Mirnig. “From a Mereotopological Point of View: Putting the Scienti􏰀fic Magnifying Glass on Kant’s First Antinomy.” Kriterion 23.1 (2010): 78-90. [PW] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In his Critique of Pure Reason Immanuel Kant presents four antinomies. In his attempt to solve the 􏰀rest of these antinomies he examines and analyzes 􏰁thesis􏰂 and 􏰁antithesis􏰂 more thoroughly and employs the terms ‘part’, ‘whole’ and `boundary' in his argumentation for their validity. According to Kant, the whole problem surrounding the antinomy was caused by applying the concept of the world to nature and then using both terms interchangeably. While interesting, this solution is still not that much more than a well thought out idea if it does not also include an adequate formal explication. Since the aforementioned terms all have counterparts in modern mereotopology, a discipline that has seen signi􏰀cant progress in recent times, we will apply these concepts to Kant's analysis in an attempt to evaluate Kant's solution in light of modern analytic philosophy.

Geiger, Ido.  “What is the Use of the Universal Law Formula of the Categorical Imperative?”  British Journal for the History of Philosophy 18 (2010): 271-95.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The paper argues that if the FUL presupposes no moral knowledge and puts forward a purely formal universalization test then it cannot determine whether maxims are morally permissible or impermissible. It suggests that Kant takes agents to know well what duties bind them without employing any test. The discussion of the FUL presents the ‘formal’ aspect of Kant’s principal metaphysical claim: ‘Universal’ laws determine the will of moral agents. It is not the formal moral law from which a substantive conception of morality is derived. Rather, a substantive conception of morality is given and the FUL makes explicit the ‘form’ of common moral reason.

 ——.  See: Frierson, Patrick and Ido Geiger.

Geismann, Georg.  Kant und kein Ende, vol 2: Studien zur Rechtsphilosophie.  Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2010.  [327 p.] [data]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Volume One — Studien zur Moral-, Religions- und Geschichtsphilosophie — was published in 2009.

 ——.  Rev. of La pace e la ragione: Kant e le relazioni internazionali: diritto, politica, storia, by Massimo Mori (2008).  Kant-Studien 101 (2010): 397-401.

Gelfert, Axel.  “Kant and the Enlightenment’s Contribution to Social Epistemology.”  Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology 7 (2010): 79-99.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The present paper argues for the relevance of Immanuel Kant and the German Enlightenment to contemporary social epistemology. Rather than distancing themselves from the alleged ‘individualism’ of Enlightenment philosophers, social epistemologists would be well-advised to look at the substantive discussion of social-epistemological questions in the works of Kant and other Enlightenment figures. After a brief rebuttal of the received view of the Enlightenment as an intrinsically individualist enterprise, this paper charts the historical trajectory of philosophical discussions of testimony as a source of knowledge, via such philosophers as C. Thomasius, C. A. Crusius, J. M. Chladenius, G. F. Meier, and finally Kant. Building on recent work on Kant’s epistemology of testimony, the paper considers Kant’s broader contributions to social epistemology. This includes an analysis of Kant’s comments on the social basis of contingent epistemic standards, e.g., in the sciences, as well as on problems arising from the management of what Kant calls the growing ‘volume of knowledge’. Special attention is paid to the relation between Kant’s views and contemporary problems arising both in the context of education and from our increased reliance on scientific experts.

Gentile, Andrea.  Rev. of Modalität und Existenz: Von der Kritik der reinen Vernunft zur Kritik der hermeneutischen Vernunft: Kant, Husserl, Heidegger, by Gaetano Chiurazzi (2006).  Kant-Studien 101 (2010): 277-80.

Gentili, Carlo.  “Kants ‘kindischer’ Anthropomorphismus. Nietzsches Kritik der ‘objektiven’ Teleologie.”  Nietzsche-Studien 39 (2010): 100-19.

Gerardi, Giovanni.  Rev. of La pace e la ragione: Kant e le relazioni internazionali: diritto, politica, storia, by Massimo Mori (2008).  Filosofia Politica 24 (2010): 161-65.

Gerlach, Hans-Martin.  “Kant u berlinskoe prosveščenie.” [Russian; “Kant and the Berlin enlightenment”]  Translated from the German by A. Ju. Šačina und S. V. Šačin.  Kantovskij Sbornik 34 (2010): 13-20.

Gerlach, Stefan.  Wie ist Freiheit möglich?: eine Untersuchung über das Lösungspotential zum Determinismusproblem in Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft.  Tübingen: Francke, 2010.  [368 p.] [content]

[Note] [Hide Note] [WorldCat]: Originally a dissertation submitted to Universität Tübingen, 2008.

Gheller, Frantz.  “The Sociopolitical Context of Emmanuel Kant’s Project of Perpetual Peace.”  Études internationales 41 (2010): 341-59.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: To understand that the socio-political context in which Kant developed his “Perpetual Peace” was marked by the existence a plurality of forms of sovereignty & social property regimes can lead to a more rigorous understanding of the nature of his republicanism. In turn, it allows us to identify certain blind spots in Kant’s theorization of nascent modernity. After having pointed to the chrono-fetishism of contemporary democratic peace theory, this article proposes a reinterpretation of the Kantian project based on the examination of the sociopolitical of the late 18th century. The conclusion outlines a tentative theorization of an alternative conceptualization of the democratic peace that takes into account the uneven & combined development of capitalism during the 19th century. Adapted from the source document.

Giesen, Klaus-Gerd.  “Asian Hospitality in Kant’s Cosmopolitan Law.”  Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy.  Ed. Stephen R. Palmquist (op cit.).  753-63.

Gigliotti, Gianna.  “Neokantismo.” [Italian]  L’universo kantiano: filosofia, scienze, sapere.  Eds. Stefano Besoli, Claudio La Rocca, and Riccardo Martinelli (op cit.).  709-44.

Gilabert, Pablo.  “Kant and the Claims of the Poor.”  Philosophy & Phenomenological Research 81 (2010): 382-418.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article focuses on the perspective of Immanuel Kant regarding positive duties as duties of justice. It states that the practical philosophy of Kant provides sufficient resources in developing a powerful account of basic positive duties. It states that Kant was concerned with criticizing the monarchic despotism and feudalism during his time. Meanwhile, it discusses left-libertarian argument and the liberal egalitarian or liberal socialist argument.

Gilgen, Peter.  “Introduction: On Going Back to Kant, Again.”  Philosophical Forum 41 (2010): 1-15.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article focuses on the philosophical turning-point and maps the philosophical scene between the world wars in relation to philosopher Immanuel Kant. It also discusses the enforcement of new form of philosophy “new thinking” that replaced neo-Kantianism. It reports that the period between the World Wars was marked by economic and political changes that required philosophical analysis.

 ——.  “Rosenzweig’s Thinking after Kant: A Reply to Richard A. Cohen.”  Philosophical Forum 41 (2010): 99-111.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: An essay is presented that examines the arguments by philosopher Richard Cohen. It states that views of Franz Rosenzweig continues the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. According to Cohen, the three irreducible elements of the system of Rosenzweig included God, Man and the World. Some concepts were only mentioned by Kant which were considered “positive elements” by Rosenzweig.

Gilmanov, Vladimir H. “Кант в дискурсе «технологий надежды». Посвящается 5-й годовщине присвоения Калининградскому университету имени Канта.” [Russian; “Kant in the discourse of the ‘technique of hope’. On the occasion of the 5th anniversary of naming the Kaliningrad University after Kant”] Kantovskij Sbornik 32 (2010): 80-87. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant's ‘Technique of hope’ appears to be the 'most genuine hope of the Enlightenment' for the moral intersubjectivity of being. Its immense significance becomes obvious against the background of Kant's 'Copernican Revolution', which resulted in the new subject-oriented ontology. The viability of this ontology depends on the possibility of freedom, i. e. on whether the human being is capable of the practical implementation of the free causality of moral law. Due to its history, Kaliningrad is meant to become a window to Kant's ontology of hope.

Giovanelli, Marco.  “Urbild und Abbild. Leibniz, Kant und Hausdorff über das Raumproblem.”  Journal for General Philosophy of Science 41 (2010): 283-313. [abstract]

Giuspoli, Paolo.  “Sviluppi del concetto kantiano di idealità in Hegel.” [Italian]  Was ist der Mensch? Que é o homem?  Eds. Ribeiro dos Santos, et al. (op cit.).  431-42.

Glenday, Candice.  See: Esteves, Julio and Candice Glenday.

Glouberman, Mark.  “Transcendental Idealism: What Jerusalem Has To Say to Königsberg.”  Dialogue 49 (2010): 25-51.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The Bible illuminates Kant’s distinction between appearances and things-in-themselves. The two biblical creation stories, in Genesis 1 and in Genesis 2, offer different ontological parsings, only the second of which, like Kant’s appearances, is relativized to the human case. But while Kant’s other region remains undercharacterized (it is either understood negatively, as differing from the realm of appearances, or else uninformatively, as the object of supra-human cognition), the Bible articulates quite fully the world as it is before the advent of men and women. The Bible treats this realm from the sub-human standpoint. This broadly anthropological approach to the idea of appearances clarifies transcendental idealism.

Gluchman, Vasil.  “Kant and Virtuous Action: A Case of Humanity.”  Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy.  Ed. Stephen R. Palmquist (op cit.).  256-64.

Goldman, Avery.  “An Antinomy of Political Judgment: Kant, Arendt, and the Role of Purposiveness in Reflective Judgment.”  Continental Philosophy Review 43 (2010): 331-52.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article builds on Arendt’s development of a Kantian politics from out of the conception of reflective judgment in the Critique of Judgment. Arendt looks to Kant’s analysis of the beautiful to explain how political thought can be conceived. And yet Arendt describes such Kantian reflection as an empirical undertaking that justifies itself only in relation to the abstract principle of the moral law. The problem for such an account is that the autonomy of the moral law appears to be at odds with the social cohesion of Kantian political life. The ensuing contradiction can be deemed the antinomy of political judgment. Kant’s conception of reflective judgment offers such an inquiry considerably more to work with than Arendt uncovers. In particular, the regulative principle of the purposiveness of nature that is shown to direct all reflection can be seen to offer the solution to this antinomy.

 ——.  “Kant, Heidegger, and the Circularity of Transcendental Inquiry.”  Epoche: A Journal for the History of Philosophy 15 (2010): 107-20.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: While in Being and Time Heidegger criticizes Kant for presupposing the very objects that he then goes on to examine, in his 1935-1936 lecture course What Is a Thing? he argues that the differentiation of subject and object with which Kant begins enables him to point to the temporal nature of thought. In following Kant’s own description of his project, Heidegger deems the presupposition of the objects of experience not detrimental to the inquiry, but determinative of its circular method. In this paper I investigate whether such circularity offers an entrance to Heidegger’s own hermeneutic circle.

Goldstein, Jürgen.  “Die Höllenfahrt der Selbsterkenntnis und der Weg zur Vergötterung bei Hamann und Kant.”  Kant-Studien 101 (2010): 189–216.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the Metaphysics of Morals Kant repeats Hamann’s remark that “only the descent into the hell of self-cognition can pave the way to godliness”.  This article pursues the question what Kant and Hamann meant by a “descent into the hell of self-cognition” and a “way to godliness”.  It will be shown that they share an affinity in their assessment that evil is rooted in humanity and that moral improvement is necessary, but that their views nevertheless differ significantly.  For this reason Kant later distances himself from Hamann.  Whereas Hamann’s view is that the recognition of one’s own depravity leads to an experience of one’s dependence on God, with the consequence that the concept of godliness is understood as salvation through grace, Kant emphasizes the inscrutability of evil within us and calls for moral improvement through our own effort.  In this way the divergent moral conceptions of the age of Enlightenment with their theological and philosophical aspects are reflected in the respective views of these two authors.

Gomes, Anil.  “Is Kant’s Transcendental Deduction of the Categories Fit of Purpose?”  Kantian Review 15.2 (2010): 118−37.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: James Van Cleve has argued that Kant’s Transcendental Deduction of the categories shows, at most, that we must apply the categories to experience. And this falls short of Kant’s aim, which is to show that they must so apply. In this discussion I argue that once we have noted the differences between the first and second editions of the Deduction, this objection is less telling. But Van Cleve’s objection can help illuminate the structure of the B Deduction, and it suggests an interesting reason why the rewriting might have been thought necessary.

Gómez Caffarena, José.  Diez lecciones sobre Kant. [Spanish]  Madrid: Universidad Pontificia Comillas, 2010.  [124 p.]

Gómez Haro, Enrique.  Kant y Hegel: ¿Principio o fin de la ciencia? Con apuntes de Friedrich Nietzsche. [Spanish]  Mexico City: Siglo XXI, 2010.  [192 p.]

Goodwin, William Mark.  “Coffa's Kant and the Evolution of Accounts of Mathematical Necessity.”  Synthese 172 (2010): 361-79.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: According to Alberto Coffa in The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap, Kant’s account of mathematical judgment is built on a ‘semantic swamp’. Kant’s primitive semantics led him to appeal to pure intuition in an attempt to explain mathematical necessity. The appeal to pure intuition was, on Coffa’s line, a blunder from which philosophy was forced to spend the next 150 years trying to recover. This dismal assessment of Kant’s contributions to the evolution of accounts of mathematical necessity is fundamentally backward-looking. Coffa’s account of how semantic theories of the a priori evolved out of Kant’s doctrine of pure intuition rightly emphasizes those developments, both scientific and philosophical, that collectively served to undermine the plausibility of Kant’s account. What is missing from Coffa’s story, apart from any recognition of Kant’s semantic innovations, is an attempt to appreciate Kant’s philosophical context and the distinctive perspective from which Kant viewed issues in the philosophy of mathematics. When Kant’s perspective and context are brought out, he can not only be seen to have made a genuinely progressive contribution to the development of accounts of mathematical necessity, but also to be relevant to contemporary issues in the philosophy of mathematics in underappreciated ways.

Gorodeisky, Keren.  “A New Look at Kant’s View of Aesthetic Testimony.”  British Journal of Aesthetics 50.1 (2010): 53-70.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper I explore the following threefold question: first, is there a genuine problem of grounding aesthetic judgement in testimony? Second, if there is such a problem, what exactly is its nature? And lastly, can Kant help us get clearer on the problem? Following Kant, I argue that the problem with aesthetic testimony is explained by norms that govern what it takes to judge a beautiful object aesthetically, rather than theoretically or practically, not by norms that govern what it takes to judge aesthetically with a sufficient epistemic basis rather than without it. I thus propose a normative and aesthetic approach to testimony.

 ——.  Rev. of Kant’s Aesthetic Theory: The Beautiful and Agreeable, by David Berger (2009).  British Journal of Aesthetics 50.3 (2010): 317-20.

Gowans, Christopher W.  Rev. of An Introduction to Kant’s Moral Philosophy, by Jennifer K. Uleman (2010).  International Philosophical Quarterly 50 (2010): 513-18.

Goy, Ina.  “Immanuel Kant on the Moral Feeling of Respect.”  Rethinking Kant, vol. 2.  Ed. Pablo Muchnik (op cit.). 156-79.

Grandjean, Antoine.  “Téléologie juridique et téléologie historique chez Kant.”  Kant-Studien 101 (2010): 40–58.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This essay shows that according to Kant the philosophy of history is a division of physical teleology, which only meaning is to be a confirmation of the moral (juridical) teleology which grounds and seeks in the physical world a natural grounding for the standpoint of ends (peace) which nature itself is always powerless to bring about.  The teleology of freedom seeks in the teleology of nature grounds for hope and its actual achievement, yet without ever filling the void of the separation that prohibits all natural accomplishment of right.  That explains the effects of rupture one can find in the Kantian texts, and which are only a problem for the continuist reading which is here refused.  Finally, it is shown that genuine historical events consist rather in that which within history cannot knowingly be deduced from history, because they precisely escape from the natural world that is their invariable context.

Granja, Dulce María.  Lecciones de Kant para hoy. [Spanish]  Rubí: Anthropos, 2010.  [336 p.]

Grapotte, Sophie.  Rev. of Kant et le problème du transcendantalisme, by Pascal Gaudet (2006).  Revue Philosophique de la France et de l’Etranger 200 (2010): 271-73.

 ——.  Rev. of Le problème de l’architectonique dans la philosophie critique de Kant, by Pascal Gaudet (2009).  Revue Philosophique de la France et de l’Etranger 200 (2010): 271-73.

Green, Garth.  The Aporia of Inner Sense: The Self-Knowledge of Reason and the Critique of Metaphysics in Kant.  Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2010.  [vi, 352 p.]

Green, Leslie.  “Two Worries about Respect for Persons.”  Ethics 120 (2010): 212-31.

Green, Ronald M.  “Is There a Kantian Perspective on Human Embryonic Stem Cells?”  Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy.  Ed. Stephen R. Palmquist (op cit.).  349-57.

Greenberg, Robert.  “A Neglected Proposition of Identity.”  Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy.  Ed. Stephen R. Palmquist (op cit.).  109-17.

Greenspan, Patricia.  “Making Room for Options: Moral Reasons, Imperfect Duties, and Choice.”  Social Philosophy & Policy 27 (2010): 181-205.  Reprinted in: Moral Obligation.  Eds. Ellen Frankel Paul, et al. (op cit.).  181-205.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: An imperfect duty such as the duty to aid those in need is supposed to leave leeway for choice as to how to satisfy it, but if our reason for a certain way of satisfying it is our strongest, that leeway would seem to be eliminated. This paper defends a conception of practical reasons designed to preserve it, without slighting the binding force of moral requirements, though it allows us to discount certain moral reasons. Only reasons that offer criticism of alternatives can yield requirements, but our reasons for particular ways of satisfying imperfect duties merely count in favor of the acts in question.
When the state is authorized to take over charitable obligations, it should not be seen as enforcing fulfillment of our imperfect duties, but rather as forcing us to help fulfill collective duties that may be substantially modified by transfer to the state, replacing imperfect duties with perfect. Besides the cost to us in freedom of choice there is a moral cost to replacing the virtuous motives of charity with those that tend to accompany paying taxes. However, a compensating feature of state involvement is the fact that its more precise demands come with limits.

Grenberg, Jeanine.  Kant and the Ethics of Humility: A Story of Dependence, Corruption and Virtue.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. [xi, 269 p.]

[Note] [Hide Note] Paperback edition of Grenberg, Jeanine.  Kant and the Ethics of Humility: A Story of Dependence, Corruption and Virtue.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. [xi, 269 p.]

 ——.  “In Search of the Phenomenal Face of Freedom.”  Kant’s Moral Metaphysics: God, Freedom, and Immortality.  Eds. Lipscomb and Krueger (op cit.).  111-30.

 ——.  “Social Dimensions of Kant’s Conception of Radical Evil.”  Kant’s Anatomy of Evil.  Eds. Anderson-Gold and Muchnik (op cit.).  173-94.

 ——.  “What is the Enemy of Virtue?”  Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals: A Critical Guide.  Ed. Lara Denis (op cit.). 152-69.

 ——.  Rev. of Kant’s Theory of Action, by Richard McCarty (2009).  Mind 119 (2010): 1198-1205.

Gressis, Rob.  “How To Be a Good Person Who Does Bad Things.”  Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy.  Ed. Stephen R. Palmquist (op cit.).  501-08.

 ——.  “Recent Work on Kantian Maxims I: Established Approaches.”  Philosophy Compass 5 (2010): 216-27.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Maxims play a crucial role in Kant’s ethical philosophy, but there is significant disagreement about what maxims are. In this two-part essay, I survey eight different views of Kantian maxims, presenting their strengths, and their weaknesses. Part I: Established Approaches, begins with Rüdiger Bubner’s view that Kant took maxims to be what ordinary people of today take them to be, namely pithily expressed precepts of morality or prudence. Next comes the position, most associated with Rüdiger Bittner and Otfried Höffe, that maxims are Lebensregeln, or ‘life rules’ — quite general rules for how to conduct oneself based on equally general outlooks on how the world is. These first two interpretations make sense of Kant’s claim, made in his anthropological and pedagogical writings, that we have to learn how to act on maxims, but they become less plausible in light of Kant’s probable view that people always act on maxims — after all, how can people learn how to act on something they always act on anyway? The next two views, each advanced, at different times, by Onora O’Neill, make better sense of the fact that people always act on maxims, for they hold that maxims are intentions — either specific intentions, such as “to open the door”, or general intentions, such as “to make guests feel welcome” — and it is perfectly sensible to claim that people always act on intentions. However, they face the same problem as the two previous views, which is that if people always act on maxims, what sense does it make to say they also have to learn how to act on them? Henry Allison, the main representative of the fifth view, claims, on the basis of Kant’s doctrine of the ‘highest maxim’, that maxims are principles organized hierarchically, such that an agent endorses one maxim because she endorses a more general maxim. Unfortunately for Allison, there is little direct textual support for his claim that maxims are organized hierarchically.

 ——.  “Recent Work on Kantian Maxims II.”  Philosophy Compass 5 (2010): 228-39.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Maxims play a crucial role in Kant’s ethical philosophy, but there is significant disagreement about what maxims are. In this two-part essay, I survey eight different views of Kantian maxims, presenting their strengths and their weaknesses. In part II: “New Approaches”, I look at three more recent views in somewhat greater detail than I do the five treatments canvassed in “Recent Works on Kantian Maxims I: Established Approaches”. First, there is Richard McCarty’s interpretation, which holds that Kant’s understanding of maxims can be illuminated by placing them in the context of the Wolffian tradition, according to which maxims are the major premises of practical syllogisms. The next subject Maria Schwartz holds that careful attention to Kant’s distinction between rules and maxims, as well as Kant’s concept of happiness, allows us to make sense of almost all of Kant’s remarks on maxims. It may be, however, that on Schwartz’s view agents turn out to perform actions as opposed to thoughtlessly habitual behaviors much less often than is plausible. This leads to the final approach, exemplified by Jens Timmermann, which is that Kant understands maxims equivocally. I claim that something like Timmermann’s approach is the only way to make sense of all of what Kant has to say on maxims.

 ——.  Rev. of Kant’s Anatomy of Evil, ed. by Sharon Anderson-Gold and Pablo Muchnik (2010).  The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (July 2010, #15). [online]

Grier, Michelle.  “The Ideal of Pure Reason.”  The Cambridge Companion to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.  Ed. Paul Guyer (op cit.).  266-89.

Griffith, Aaron M.  “Perception and the Categories: A Conceptualist Reading of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.”  European Journal of Philosophy (pre-print online, posted 4 Apr 2010). [abstract]

Griftsovoi, I. N., and N. A. Dmitrievoi, eds.  Неокантианство немецкое и русское: между теорией познания и критикой культуры / Neokantianstvo nemetskoe i russkoe: mezhdu teoriei poznaniia i kritikoi kul’tury. [Russian]  Moscow: Rosspen, 2010.  [567 p.]

Grimoni, Lorenz.  “Immanuel Kant und die europäische Metropole Königsberg.”  Kant der Europäer: Europäer über Kant.  Eds. Dietzsch, Grimoni, and Kozlowski (op cit.).  18-30.

 ——, ed.  See: Dietzsch, Steffen, Lorenz Grimoni, and David Kozlowski, eds.

Gruber, Natascha.  “When Is a Person a Person – When Does the “Person” Begin?”  Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy.  Ed. Stephen R. Palmquist (op cit.).  358-69.

Gruenwald, Oskar.  “Progress in Science: A Copernican Revolution in Evolution?”  Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies 22 (2010): 1-31. [abstract]

Grünewald, Bernward.  “Gesinnung oder Verantwortung? Über den Widersinn der Entgegensetzung von Gesinnungs- und Verantwortungsethik.”  Kant als Bezugspunkt Philosophischen Denkens.  Eds. Hubertus Busche and Anton Schmitt (op cit.).  85-100.

 ——. “Kant e os fundamentos das ciências humanas.” [Portuguese] Studia Kantiana (online) 8 (2010): 113-24. [M][online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The conditions of the possibility of experience apply to the empirical human sciences not less than for the natural sciences. Yet Kant is convinced, that though there is a doctrine, there is no science of the ‘thinking nature’ possible, because the thinking nature, as the object of inner sense is structured by nothing than the one-dimensional time, which does not permit a mathematical construction of the conception of the thinking nature. But the human will, as a “natural cause in the world” according to Kant is a “faculty of desire according to concepts”. And thinking is to be experienced only, insofar it is by nature a ‘speaking to and of oneself’ and it is to be received by comprehension. Why should not there be a mathematics of thoughts and then Metaphysical Foundations of a Science of the Thinking Nature?

Grupillo, Arthur.  “O problema fundamental do solipsismo metodólogico.” [Portuguese]  Was ist der Mensch? Que é o homem?  Eds. Ribeiro dos Santos, et al. (op cit.).  421−30.

Guenova, Ludmila L.  Rev. of Kant’s Aesthetic Epistemology: Form and World, by Fiona Hughes (2007).  Kantian Review 14.2 (2010): 155-58.

Guilherme, Alexandre.  “Fichte: Kantian or Spinozian? Three Interpretations of the Absolute I.”  South African Journal of Philosophy 29 (2010): 1-16.

Guyer, Paul.  “The Deduction of the Categories: The Metaphysical and Transcendental Deductions.”  The Cambridge Companion to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.  Ed. Paul Guyer (op cit.).  118-50.

 ——.  “Moral Feelings in the Metaphysics of Morals.”  Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals: A Critical Guide.  Ed. Lara Denis (op cit.). 130-51.

 ——.  “The Obligation to be Virtuous: Kant’s Conception of the Tugendverpflichtung.”  Social Philosophy & Policy 27 (2010): 206-32.  Reprinted in: Moral Obligation.  Eds. Ellen Frankel Paul, et al. (op cit.).  206-32.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant makes a distinction between duties of virtue and the obligation to be virtuous. For a number of reasons, it may seem as if the latter does not actually require any actions of us not already required by the former. This essay argues that Kant does succeed in describing obligations that we have to prepare for virtuous conduct that are different from simply fulfilling specific duties of virtue, and that in so doing he describes an important element of the moral life.

 ——, ed.  The Cambridge Companion to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.  Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010.  [xiv, 461 p.] [review]

 ——.  Rev. of Kant and the Limits of Autonomy, by Susan Meld Shell (2009).  Kantian Review 15.2 (2010): 138-47.

 ——.  Rev. of Kant’s Moral and Legal Philosophy, edited by Karl Ameriks and Otfried Höffe, transl. by Nicholas Walker (2009).  Ethics 120 (2010): 820-26.

Guzzardi, Luca.  Lo sguardo muto delle cose: oggettività e scienza nell'età della crisi. [Italian]  Milano: R. Cortina, 2010.  [xix, 164 p.]

[top]H    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Haas, Bruno.  “Les catégories de la liberté selon Kant.”  Raison pratique et normativité chez Kant: droit, politique et cosmopolitique.  Ed. Jean-François Kervégan (op cit.).  55-87.

Habermas, Jürgen.  “The Concept of Human Dignity and the Realistic Utopia of Human Rights.”  Metaphilosophy 41 (2010): 464-80.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Human rights developed in response to specific violations of human dignity, and can therefore be conceived as specifications of human dignity, their moral source. This internal relationship explains the moral content and moreover the distinguishing feature of human rights: they are designed for an effective implementation of the core moral values of an egalitarian universalism in terms of coercive law. This essay is an attempt to explain this moral-legal Janus face of human rights through the mediating role of the concept of human dignity. This concept is due to a remarkable generalization of the particularistic meanings of those “dignities” that once were attached to specific honorific functions and memberships. In spite of its abstract meaning, “human dignity” still retains from its particularistic precursor concepts the connotation of depending on the social recognition of a status — in this case, the status of democratic citizenship. Only membership in a constitutional political community can protect, by granting equal rights, the equal human dignity of everybody.

Hache, Émilie, and Bruno Latour.  “Morality or Moralism?”  Common Knowledge 16 (2010): 311-20.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: An essay is presented on several articles related to moralism including Sur les droits des animaux, by Andrew Comte-Sponville, The Critique of Judgement, by Immanuel Kant, and Statues, by Michel Serres. It says that Comte-Sponville’s article clearly belongs to the genre of moral reflection and has been chosen to help define the relation between moralism and morality. Meanwhile, it states that the parts played by the clouds in Kant’s article are fully fledged characters in their own right.

Hahmann, Andree.  “Kant und die Dinge an sich — Was leistet die ontologische Version der Zwei-Aspekte-Theorie?”  Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie 35 (2010): 123-44.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The problem of the thing-in-itself surely belongs to the oldest and most fiercely discussed questions among Kant scholars. In the last years, one interpretation has become widely accepted according to which the Kantian expression of thing-in-itself must be understood as a short version of thing in itself considered. Thus, Kant only introduced an epistemological distinction that says nothing more than that the same things are considered with neglect of the transcendental forms of intuition: space and time. However, important exegetical and systematic reasons contradict this interpretation. Therefore, this paper argues for a revised form of this approach, which, on the one hand, claims to furnish a consistent interpretation of all Kantian statements and on the other hand, is supported by crucial systematic reasons.

 ——.  “Wozu braucht Kant die Kategorie der Substanz? Dingheit und Einheit der Zeitvorstellung”  Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 58 (2010): 579-94.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant is well known for his criticism of knowledge claims of traditional metaphysics. The concept of substance must be considered one of the most important notions in ontology. Kant transforms traditional ontology into an analytic of pure understanding. Accordingly, the concept of substance has become a category of pure understanding. The application of this category in the "First Analogy of Experience" faces some particular problems, which are highlighted in the current debate. This paper seeks to furnish a coherent reading of the "First Analogy" by considering which purpose the category of substance is meant to serve in transcendental idealism.

 ——.  Rev. of Kants Theorie der Freiheit: Rekonstruktion und Rehabilitierung, by Jochen Bojanowski (2006).  Kant-Studien 101 (2010): 124-27.

Hahn, Alexandre.  “Acerca da solução crítica do problema da possibilidade da ideia transcendental de liberdade em Kan.” [Portuguese; On Kant’s critical solution for the possibility problem of the transcendental idea of freedom]  Kant e-Prints 5.3 (2010): 93-108. [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The present paper aims to discuss Kant’s critical solution for the possibility problem of the transcendental idea of freedom. The problem consists in the supposed incompatibility between that idea and the natural causality. Despite the impossibility of a dogmatic solution for the conflict, the philosopher proposes a critical solution. This critical solution frequently is interpreted as a attempt to make freedom compatible with natural causation. There are, however, some divergences about the form and the implications of that compatibility. I intend to defend that the compatibilism that result from Kant’s critical solution doesn’t assure the real possibility of freedom, but only its logical possibility.

 ——.  “Estudo e Tradução: Immanuel Kant, Das Diferentes Raças Humanas.” [Portuguese]  Kant e-Prints 5.5 (2010): 4-9. [online]

 ——, transl.  See: Kant, Immanuel.  “Das Diferentes Raças Humanas.”

Hall, Bryan.  “Appearances and the Problem of Affection in Kant.”  Kantian Review 14.2 (2010): 38-66.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Hans Vaihinger, in the late 19th century, posed a trilemma for Immanuel Kant’s theory of affection requiring affecting objects to be either (1) things-in-themselves, (2) appearances, or (3) both things-in-themselves and appearances (so-called double affection). Vaihinger argues that all three alternatives fail and with them Kant’s theory of affection. Both Vaihinger as well as most commentators responding to Vaihinger assume that appearances are particulars. I develop an alternative interpretation, one that views appearances as ‘intrinsic relations’ where neither affecting objects nor cognitive subjects are possible outside of the appearance relation. I argue that my view on appearances dispels Vaihinger’s trilemma.

Hamilton, Andy.  Rev. of Knowledge, Reason and Taste: Kant’s Response to Hume, by Paul Guyer (2008).  Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (2010): 737-39.

Hamm, Christian.  “Ideias estéticas e o jogo das faculdades do ânimo.” [Portuguese]  Was ist der Mensch? Que é o homem?  Eds. Ribeiro dos Santos, et al. (op cit.).  477-84.

 ——. “A fusão de campos semânticos: o exemplo de einsehen - verstehen - begreifen.” [Portuguese] Crítica da Razão Tradutora. Sobre a dificuldade de traduzir Kant. Eds. Alessandro Pinzani and Valério Rohden (op cit.). 53-74. [M]

Han, Suh-Reen.  “When Theory Meets the World: Kant’s Post-Revolutionary Renegotiation of the Cosmopolitan Ideal.”  European Romantic Review 21 (2010): 673-92. [abstract]

Hanly, Peter.  “Strange Lands: Hölderlin, Kant, and the Language of the Beautiful.”  Epoche: A Journal for the History of Philosophy 14 (2010): 321-34. [abstract]

Hanna, Robert.  “Kantian Minds and Humean Minds: How to Read the Analogies of Experience in Reverse.”  Kant e-Prints 5.1 (2010): 27-48. [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: It is nowadays a commonplace of Kant-interpretation that Kant’s response to Hume in the Analogies of Experience is not strictly speaking a refutation of Hume but in fact only an extended critical response to Hume’s skeptical accounts of object-identity and causation, that also accepts many of Hume's working assumptions. But this approach can significantly underestimate the extent to which Kant's conception of the representational mind is radically distinct from Hume’s. In particular, Kant’s conception of the human mind’s innately-specified spontaneous actions as ultimate sources of the veridical representation of both logical and metaphysical necessity in the world of objective experience, if correct, entails a flat-out rejection of Hume's conception of the human mind’s merely projectivist abilities and activities. This in turn entails that, to this extent, the Analogies contain not only a critical response to Hume, but also a flat-out refutation of Hume.

Hansen, Ejvind.  “Kantian Antinomies in Digital Communications Media.”  Telos: A Quarterly Journal of Critical Thought 150 (2010): 137-42.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this statement I contemplate the relationship between the Kantian antinomies and modern digital communicative media. The antinomies demonstrate that knowledge is decisively indeterminate. The indeterminate character of our knowledge is an important source for critical reflection. Since we are inevitably bound up in a dialectics between finitude and infinitude, we are never allowed to fall back into a self-assured conviction of the infallibility of our understanding. I do, however, demonstrate that digital media are characterized by a fundamental finitude. This poses a potential bias in digitally mediated communication of which it is important to be aware. Kantian transcendental dialectics thus proves to be relevant in framing our communication within the digital systems – and in the creation of new media. The point is not that there is never room for critical reflection in digital media, but rather that digital media in certain respects diminishes our awareness of the need for critical reflection.

Hardy, Lee.  “Kant’s Reidianism: The Role of Common Sense in Kant’s Epistemology of Religious Belief.”  Kant’s Moral Metaphysics: God, Freedom, and Immortality.  Eds. Lipscomb and Krueger (op cit.).  233-54.

Harrelson, Kevin J.  Rev. of Kant and the Early Moderns, ed. by Daniel Garber and Béatrice Longuenesse (2008).  Journal of the History of Philosophy 48 (2010): 111-12.

Harries, Karsten.  “‘Let No One Ignorant of Geometry Enter Here’: Ontology and Mathematics in the Thought of Martin Heidegger.”  International Journal of Philosophical Studies 18 (2010): 269-79.

Harrington, Katie.  Rev. of Kant and the Scandal of Philosophy, by Luigi Caranti (2007).  British Journal for the History of Philosophy 18 (2010): 168-71.

Harrison, Ewan.  “The Democratic Peace Research Program and System-level Analysis.”  Journal of Peace Research 47 (2010): 155-65. [abstract]

Hart, Keith.  “Kant, ‘Anthropology’ and the New Human Universal.”  Social Anthropology 18 (2010): 441-47.

Hasker, William.  “Persons and the Unity of Consciousness.”  The Waning of Materialism.  Eds. Robert C. Koons and George Bealer (Oxford: Oxford Univ Press, 2010).  175-90.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: We have a conception of human beings as persons understood as constituted in part by a self, a unified, coherent center of consciousness which is a rational agent, capable of being responsive, and responsible, to other agents. The phenomena of commissurotomy and multiple personality seem to threaten this unity. The unity-of-consciousness argument, deriving from Leibniz and Kant, appears to conflict with the empirical evidence of disunity, but I maintain that there is no inconsistency. The combination of the two both places a barrier in the way of a materialist account of mind and consciousness, and also points out a difficulty for standard varieties of dualism. I close by sketching out my own preferred view of the metaphysics of persons, emergent dualism.

Hattrup, Dieter.  “Das Schicksal des babylonischen Turms. Zur ‘Disziplin der reinen Vernunft’.”  Kants Grundlegung einer kritischen Metaphysik.  Ed. Norbert Fischer (op cit.).  355-74.

Haumesser, Matthieu.  “Que signifie pour Kant l’erreur de Leibniz? Autour de l’«Amphibologie des concepts de la réflexion».”  Kant-Studien 101 (2010): 1–21.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: For Kant, «reflection», the logical action that consists in elaborating concepts, also means, when it is «transcendental», the action of distinguishing within our knowing what belongs to each of the two sources of our representations – sensibility and understanding.  In that respect, reflection is a central notion in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.  But it is also essential to the understanding of Kant’s relation to classical philosophy.  Indeed, in the chapter of the Critique of Pure Reason entitled «Amphiboly of concepts of reflection», Kant takes a simultaneous stand on Leibniz and Locke, as he assignes them two symmetrical errors: according to Kant, Leibniz «intellectualized phenomena», while Locke «sensualised the concepts of the understanding».  The present paper proposes to demonstrate how the reproach adressed to Leibniz might constitute an original approach for the interpretation of the problematic relation established in the Critique of Pure Reason between sensibility and understanding.

 ——, transl.  See: Kant, Immanuel.  De l’amphibologie des concepts de la réflexion.

Hauswald, Rico.  “Umfangslogik und analytisches Urteil bei Kant.”  Kant-Studien 101 (2010): 238-308.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: According to Kant’s most important definition an analytic judgement obtains when the predicate of a judgement is already contained intensionally in the subject. It has been objected (most recently by Robert Hanna) that whereas this containment is a sufficient criterion, nevertheless there are analytic judgements that do not have a corresponding conceptual content. In these cases one needs to add an extensional criterion. The chief goal of this essay is to examine this argument critically and to reject it on the grounds that although an analytic judgement can be defined extensionally, this does not achieve anything more than a conventional intensional definition. To this end Kant’s argumentation on intension and extension will be reconstructed and this distinction will then be set in relation to the distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions. This discussion requires especially a clarification of the role of modality.

Heck, José N.  “Responsabilidade, Irresponsabilidade ou Autoconsciência moral.” [Portuguese; Responsibility, irresponsibility, or moral self-consciousness]  Kant e-Prints 5.2 (2010): 31-43. [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The idea of responsibility is overshadowed in Kant’s practical philosophy by the concept of duty. The idea of responsibility is overshadowed in Kant’s practical philosophy by the concept of duty. Throughout the post-modern period, it has been yielding up its place to responsibility. This study emphasizes the character relative to the context, place and the philosophical concept of the term responsibility in Kant’s later works. It does so in order to rehabilitate, on the one hand, its statute as a normative principle of reflection on morality, and on the other, as personal action, normatively open to the multiple alternatives for action in the sphere of human freedom.

Heidemann, Dietmar H., ed.  Kant Yearbook: Metaphysics.  Berlin / New York: De Gruyter, 2010. [198 p.]

[Note] [Hide Note] Content: Lucy Allais, “Transcendental idealism and metaphysics: Kant’s commitment to things as they are in themselves” — Patrick E. Arens, “Kant and the understanding’s role in imaginative synthesis” — Karin de Boer, “Pure reason’s enlightenment: transcendental reflection in Kant’s first critique” — Kirill Chepurin, “Kant on the soul’s intensity” — Corey W. Dyck, “The Aeneas argument: personality and immortality in Kant’s Third Paralogism” — Chong-Fuk Lau, “Kant’s epistemological reorientation of ontology” — Christian Onof, “Kant’s conception of self as subject and its embodiment” — Matthew Rukgaber, “Time and metaphysics: Kant and McTaggart on the reality of time”

Heinrichs, Bert.  “Single-Principle versus Multi-Principles Approaches in Bioethics.”  Journal of Applied Philosophy 27 (2010): 72-83.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The so-called principlism of Beauchamp and Childress is one of the most prominent approaches in bioethics. It has, nevertheless, given rise to an ongoing debate on methodology in bioethics. At the bottom of this debate lies the question whether a multiprinciples approach or a single-principle approach is more convincing in bioethics. In this paper I shall propose a ‘third way’ of bioethical reasoning that is committed neither to a multiprinciples nor to a single-principle approach. In contrast, I will take up the Kantian differentiation of formal and material principles. This differentiation permits combining the strengths of multiprinciples as well as of single-principle approaches.

Helfrich, E. Regina.  Rev. of Provisional Politics: Kantian Arguments in Policy Context, by Elisabeth Ellis (2008).  Journal of the History of Philosophy 48 (2010): 249-50.

Hengstermann, Christian.  Rev. of Kants Lösung des Theodizeeproblems: Eine Rekonstruktion, by Volker Dieringer (2009).  European Journal for Philosophy of Religion: Journal of the Central European Society for Philosophy of Religion 2 (2010):209-14.

Henning, Tim.  “Kant und die Logik des ‘Ich denke’.”  Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 64 (2010): 331-56.

Hernandez, Jill.  “Impermissibility and Kantian Moral Worth.”  Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (2010): 403-19. [abstract]

Herrera, Hugo Eduardo.  “Salomon Maimon’s Commentary on the Subject of the Given in Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.”  Review of Metaphysics 63 (2010): 593-613.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article discusses the criticism by German philosopher Salomon Maimon of Immanuel Kant’s philosophy on the causal effect of material principle on sensibility, as discussed in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. It explains the contribution of Maimon’s position to the development of critical philosophy. The issue of “the thing in itself” or “the given” is explained. In addition, the article discusses the interpretation of Critique of Pure Reason by philosophers Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, Gottlob Ernst Schulze and Karl Leonhard Reinhold.

 ——.  “La discusión de Salomon Maimon con el intento de vinculación de sensibilidad y entendimiento en la Critica de la Razón Pura de Immanuel Kant.” [Spanish]  Anuario Filosofico 43 (2010): 561-87.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper analyses Salomon Maimon’s commentary on Kant’s attempt to link sensibility and understanding. In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant marks out two faculties of knowledge, which must be united in order to make objective knowledge possible. Maimon doubts that the connection is feasible. After discussing Kant’s starting point, the paper analyzes Maimon’s arguments, laying out the systematic difficulties which would affect the intent of Kantian unification.

Herrera Noguera, Mónica. “El arte ejemplar kantiano: uma filosofia del arte más allá de reglas.” [Spanish] Studia Kantiana (online) 8 (2010): 125-36. [M][online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The paragraphs on fine art in Critique of the power of Judgment of Immanuel Kant develop the main paradox about this issue, which deserves, as all his paradoxes, serious attention. Contrary to the belief of most of nineteen century German philosophers, not to resolve it, but to locate some outcomes about fundamental philosophical issues in which we are still involved. In this paper, we are going to defend that the paradox between fine arts and taste can be seen through the concept of the “exemplarity”, and so, rethink Kant’s philosophy of art. This concept and the strategies linked to it could not be the core of Kant’s aesthetics, but we intend to argue that they allow us to think – or avoid thinking if we dismiss it – art and art critique even nowadays.

Herrmann, Friedrich-Wilhelm von.  “Kants ‘Vorreden’ zur Kritik der reinen Vernunft als Wegweisung zu einer neuen Wesensbestimmung der Metaphysik.”  Kants Grundlegung einer kritischen Metaphysik.  Ed. Norbert Fischer (op cit.).  23-32.

 ——.  “Kants ‘transzendentaler Schematismus der reinen Verstandesbegriffe’.”  Kants Grundlegung einer kritischen Metaphysik.  Ed. Norbert Fischer (op cit.).  155-65.

Hill, Jr., Thomas E.  “Kant.”  The Routledge Companion to Ethics.  Ed. John Skorupski.  Abingdon, Oxon/New York: Routledge, 2010.  156-67.

 ——.  “Kant’s Tugendlehre as Normative Ethics.”  Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals: A Critical Guide.  Ed. Lara Denis (op cit.). 234-55.

 ——.  “Moral Responsibilities of Bystanders.”  Journal of Social Philosophy 41.1 (2010): 28-39.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Three second-order responsibilities are especially pertinent to “by-standers” to oppression: exercising due care in deliberation, scrutinizing one’s motives (e.g., for remaining passive), and developing virtue conceived as strength of will to do what is right despite obstacles. Neglect of these broadly applicable, second-order duties, described by Kant, partially explains why even good-willed by-standers can contribute to the on-going oppression of others. Arguably the neglect is a failure of respect for oneself as well as others.

Hilmer, Brigitte.  “Form und Schema der Vernunft. Zu Herders Metakritik an Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft.”  Zwischen Bild und Begriff. Kant und Herder zum Schema.  Eds. Ulrich Gaier and Ralf Simon (op cit.).  191-206.

 ——.  “Kunst als reflexive Form und als reflektierende Bewegung.”  Zeitschrift für Aesthetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft 55 (2010): 235-46.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Reflexivity does not presuppose linguistic articulation or even propositional content. If it did, art could not be called reflexive. Reflexivity can be found in the self-contact of the living, in mental reflection or in symbolic self-reference. Art is a medium which claims these different modes of reflexivity and intertwines them. Aesthetic reflexivity as such has been established by Kant and his epigones, following the model of transcendental reflection. Thus, it could be specified as the reflexive structure of aesthetic judgement, or as an emphasis on a work’s being created, or as a reference to perception itself in the process of perceiving, or as a way of reflecting concepts. Aesthetic reflexivity can only be detached from the model of transcendental reflection, if it is seen as oriented towards the interaction among the three modes of reflection mentioned above, leaving aside the difference, interplay or competition between perception and conceptual capacities.

Hiltscher, Reinhard.  Rev. of Kants Neutralismus, by Lydia Mechtenberg (2006).  Kant-Studien 101 (2010): 264-68.

 ——.  Rev. of Kant, Science, and Human Nature, by Robert Hanna (2006).  Kant-Studien 101 (2010): 269-74.

Himi, Kiyoshi.  “Kant’s Philosophy of Religion as the Basis for Albert Schweitzer’s Humanitarian Awareness.”  Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy.  Ed. Stephen R. Palmquist (op cit.).  550-62.

Hinske, Norbert.  “Die Rolle des Methodenproblems im Denken Kants. Zum Zusammenhang von dogmatischer, polemischer, skeptischer und kritischer Methode.”  Kants Grundlegung einer kritischen Metaphysik.  Ed. Norbert Fischer (op cit.).  343-54.

 ——, ed.  See: Delfosse, Heinrich, Norbert Hinske, and Gianluca Sadun Bordoni, eds.

Ho, Anita.  “Personhood and Assisted Death.”  Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy.  Ed. Stephen R. Palmquist (op cit.).  370-81.

Hoche, Hans-Ulrich, and Michael Knoop.  “Logical Relations between Kant’s Categorical Imperative and the Two Golden Rules.”  Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik / Annual Review of Law and Ethics 18 (2010): 483-518.

Hodge, Joanna.  “‘Something Unique is Moot in Europe’: Derrida Reading Kant.”  The Politics to Come: Power, Modernity and the Messianic.  Eds. Arthur Bradley and Paul Fletcher (op cit.).  161-73.

Hodgson, Louis‐Philippe.  “Kant on the Right to Freedom: A Defense.” Ethics 120 (2010): 791-819.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article offers the author’s views on Immanuel Kant’s general approach to political philosophy and idea on the right to freedom. He argues that having a right to freedom follows from considerations similar to the Formula of Humanity in Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. He cites that if one thinks that freedom should be central to political philosophy, as one will if one accepts that there is right to freedom, then adopting conception of freedom like Kant’s is possible.

 ——.  “Kant on Property Rights and the State.”  Kantian Review 15.1 (2010): 57-87.

Höffe, Otfried.  Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason: The Foundation of Modern Philosophy.  Dordrecht/New York: Springer, 2010.  [xviii, 449 p.]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents: Four reasons for engaging with Kant's first Critique — The full critical programme. Innovation and tradition; Objectivity through subjectivity; A philosophical theory of science; First assessment: Kant's programme — Only human beings pursue mathematics. A philosophy of intuition; A transcendental geometry; Second assessment: sensibility and world — A transcendental grammar. Categories; The problem of justification; The incomplete deduction; Third assessment: understanding and world — Transcendental laws of nature. Mathematisation; physicalisation; Fourth assessment: understanding and world (2) — A post-metaphysical metaphysics. Constructive deconstruction; A critical philosophy of mind; Cosmological contradictions; Transcendental theology; Fifth assessment: reason and world — Epistemic universalism. From theoretical to practical reason; System and history; The Kantian metaphors; Conclusion and prospect.

 ——, ed.  Kants Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten: Ein Kooperativer Kommentar.  4th, expanded edition.  Frankfurt/Main: Klostermann, 2010.  [339 p.] [data]

 ——.  “Kant’s Innate Right as a Rational Criterion for Human Rights.”  Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals: A Critical Guide.  Ed. Lara Denis (op cit.). 71-92.

 ——.  Rev. of Immanuel Kant – Was bleibt?, by Reinhard Brandt (2010).  Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 64 (2010): 604-608.

Hoffmann, Thomas Sören.  “‘Darstellung des Begriffs’. Zu einem Grundmotiv neueren Philosophierens im Ausgang von Kant.”  Kant als Bezugspunkt Philosophischen Denkens.  Eds. Hubertus Busche and Anton Schmitt (op cit.).  101-18.

Hogan, Desmond.  “Kant’s Copernican Turn and the Rationalist Tradition.”  The Cambridge Companion to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.  Ed. Paul Guyer (op cit.).  21-40.

Hohendahl, Peter Uwe.  “The Crisis of Neo-Kantianism and the Reassessment of Kant after World War I: Preliminary Remark.”  Philosophical Forum 41 (2010): 17-39.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article focuses on the turning point in understanding philosopher Immanuel Kant before and after World War I. It discusses the crisis of Neo-Kantianism and interpretating the attitude towards Critical Philosophy. It mentions the thinkers that were involved in the challenge to and the break with Kant including Rudolf Carnap, Martin Heidegger and Edmund Husserl.

Holt, Robin.  See: Clarke, Jean and Robin Holt.

Holzhey, Helmut, and Vilem Mudroch.  The A to Z of Kant and Kantianism.  Lanham. Md.: Scarecrow Press, 2010.  [xv, 374 p.]

Hongladarom, Soraj.  “Kant and Vasubandhu on the ‘Transcendent Self’.”  Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy.  Ed. Stephen R. Palmquist (op cit.).  709-14.

Horneffer, Ernst, and Klaus Horneffer.  Kant und der Gottesgedanke: eine Interpretation.  2 vols.  Hildesheim/New York: Olms, 2010.

Horneffer, Klaus.  See: Horneffer, Ernst, and Klaus Horneffer.

Horstmann, Rolf-Peter.  “The Reception of the Critique of Pure Reason in German Idealism.”  The Cambridge Companion to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.  Ed. Paul Guyer (op cit.).  329-45.

Hruschka, Joachim.  See: Byrd, B. Sharon, and Joachim Hruschka.

Hsüeh-chu, Maria Chang.  “Concept and Being — Kant and Hegel on Unknowability or Knowability of God.” [Chinese]  Philosophical Review (Taiwan) 39 (2010): 51-94.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The epistemological positions of Kant and Hegel are greatly different, and the meanings they give to the idea of God play a clear indication to it. Both of them have the same idea of God as “ens realissimum,” but they understand it differently. The reasons why there is a great difference between the two philosophers could be seen in the fact that the purport of their dealing with the problems of God is different and their theological views of the world are not the same. In this article I propose to contrast Kant’s statement on the idea of God with Hegel’s on the basis of their respective metaphysical ideas and methods.

Huggler, Jorgen.  “Cosmopolitanism and Peace in Kant’s Essay on ‘Perpetual Peace’.” Studies in Philosophy and Education 29 (2010): 129-40.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Immanuel Kant’s essay on Perpetual Peace (1795/96) contains a rejection of the idea of a world government (earlier advocated by Kant himself).  In connexion with a substantial argument for cosmopolitan rights based on the human body and its need for a space on the surface of the Earth, Kant presents the most rigorous philosophical formulation ever given of the limitations of the cosmopolitan law.  In this contribution, Kant’s essay is analysed and the reasons he gives for these restrictions discussed in relation to his main focus: to project a realistic path to perpetual peace.

Hughes, Fiona.  Kant’s Critique of Aesthetic Judgement: A Reader’s Guide.  London/New York: Continuum, 2010.  [viii, 196 p.]

Hughes, Joe.  Rev. of Immanence and the Vertigo of Philosophy: From Kant to Deleuze, by Christian Kerslake (2009).  Radical Philosophy: A Journal of Socialist and Feminist Philosophy 162 (2010): 61-62.

Hunt, Gayle.  See: Rice, Stephen, David Trafimow, Gayle Hunt, and Joshua Sandry.

Hunter, Ian.  “Kant’s Regional Cosmopolitanism.”  Journal of the History of International Law 12 (2010): 165-88.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article discusses the philosophical cosmopolitanism of 18th-century German philosopher Immanuel Kant, especially as articulated in his 1795 essay “Toward Perpetual Peace,” and the opinion of later Kantians that his views constitute a universal normative principle of justice that can be used as the basis for international law and order. The author argues, however, that Kant’s metaphysical anthropology and cosmology are in fact particular to his European cultural and academic context and are thus useful only as one regional perspective among many in the world. Kant’s views on international law in relation to those of his predecessors Samuel von Pufendorf and Emer de Vattel are discussed in particular.

Hutchens, Benjamin.  Rev. of Enthusiasm: The Kantian Critique of History, by Jean François Lyotard (2009).  Philosophy in Review 30 (2010): 408-11. [online]

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Ifergan, Pini.  “Kant on the Political.” [Hebrew]  Iyyun: The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly 59 (2010): 52-70.

Ihne, Hartmut.  “Moralische Vernunft und ökonomische Rationalität.”  Kant als Bezugspunkt Philosophischen Denkens.  Eds. Hubertus Busche and Anton Schmitt (op cit.).  119-31.

Illetterati, Luca.  “Biologia.” [Italian]  L’universo kantiano: filosofia, scienze, sapere.  Eds. Stefano Besoli, Claudio La Rocca, and Riccardo Martinelli (op cit.).  53-96.

 ——.  “Conoscenza del limite e struttura dell’umano.” [Italian]  Was ist der Mensch? Que é o homem?  Eds. Ribeiro dos Santos, et al. (op cit.).  315-30.

Irit, Samet.  “The Form of Evil.”  Kantian Review 14.2 (2010): 93-117.

Irrlitz, Gerd.  Kant-Handbuch: Leben und Werk.  2nd rev. and expanded ed. Stuttgart: Weimar Metzler, 2010.  [xxxiii, 540 p.] [contents]

Iwasaki, Takeo.  カント「純粋理性批判」の研究 / Kanto junsui risei hihan no kenkyu. [Japanese]  Tokyo: Keisoshobo, 2010.  [513 p.]

[top]J    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Jablonski, Pawel, and Anna Jablonski-Musial (transl).  “The Relation Between Kant’s Theoretical and Practical Philosophy in the Light of the First Two Critiques.” [Polish]  Kwartalnik Filozoficzny 38 (2010): 133-54.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The analysis of the problem designated in the title consists of two parts. The first, which is preparatory, presents Kant’s essential notions in theoretical and practical philosophy. The second part is an attempt to disclose the subtlety of his construction. The considerations concentrate on the following issues: (1) The key distinction for practical and theoretical cognition is the contradiction between two types of mindset rather than between two objective domains. (2) Theoretical and practical reason strictly cooperate with each other. Theoretical philosophy not only prepares the field for practical considerations, but also enriches its own activity by incorporating the latter’s achievements. (3) Since practical reason represents its own object, which turns out to be the subject, practical cognition is an effort of being the best possible version of ourselves. (4) Kant does not require that theoretical reason disclaim its eligibility to speculate about God, freedom, and the immortality of the soul, but he only notes that it is necessary to be aware of the inability of theoretical cognition in resolving these matter.

Jackson, W. T.  Seneca and Kant; or, an exposition of stoic and rationalistic ethics, with a comparison and criticism of the two systems.  LaVergne, Tenn.: Kessinger, 2010.  [vi, 109 p.]

Jacob, Jan.  Ausschliesslichkeitsrechte an immateriellen Gütern: eine kantische Rechtfertigung des Urheberrecht.  Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010.  [xiv, 232 p.] [data]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Doctoral dissertation, Hamburg, 2010.
Abstract: Kant gilt als Begründer der persönlichkeitsrechtlichen Theorie des Urheberrechts. In seiner 1797 veröffentlichten Rechtslehre legte er zudem die Grundlage für eine Eigentumstheorie, die auch um die Rechte der "Nicht-Eigentümer" bemüht ist. Jan Jacob versucht, auf der Grundlage beider Schriften das Urheberrecht zu rechtfertigen, aber auch Normkritik zu üben. Das immaterielle Gut wird dabei als ontisch vom Urheber getrennter, abstrakter Gegenstand begriffen. Es kann durch Geheimhaltung physisch beherrscht werden. Erst die Veröffentlichung macht aus dem Werk ein öffentliches Gut. Das Urheberrecht ist einintelligiblesRecht an dem Immaterialgut, weil es den Verlust physischer Herrschaft für irrelevant erklärt. Es schützt aber auch das Recht des Urhebers aufkommunikative Selbstbestimmung. Exkurse zum Patentrecht schärfen den Blick für die Besonderheiten des Urheberrechts.

Jacob, Thomas.  Das Individuum im Spannungsverhaltnis von staatlicher Souveränität und Internationalisierung: Uberstaatliche Zwangsgewalt in der Rechtsphilosophie Immanuel Kants.  Bonn: Bonn University Press, 2010.  [259 p.]

[Note] [Hide Note] [WorldCat]: Originally a dissertation submitted to Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn, 2009.

Jacobs, Wilhelm G.  Rev. of Karl Leonhard Reinhold, Briefe über die Kantische Philosophie, ed. by Martin Bondeli (2007).  Philosophisches Jahrbuch 117 (2010): 366-67.

Jahromi, Mohammad Raayat.  “Moral Theology or Theological Morality?”  Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy.  Ed. Stephen R. Palmquist (op cit.).  523-35.

Jakl, Bernhard.  “Human Dignity and the Innate Right to Freedom in National and International Law.”  Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy.  Ed. Stephen R. Palmquist (op cit.).  382-90.

James, David.  “Fichte’s Reappraisal of Kant’s Theory of Cosmopolitan Right.”  History of European Ideas 36 (2010): 61-70.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: I argue that although in the ‘Foundations of Natural Right’ Fichte adopts a theory of cosmopolitan right that is in a number of important respects formally identical to the one developed by Kant. He later came in ‘The Closed Commercial State’ to reassess his earlier Kantian cosmopolitanism. This work can in fact be seen to identify a problem with Kant’s cosmopolitanism, namely, Kant’s failure to recognize the possibility of an indirect form of coercion based on unequal relations of economic dependence. I argue that Kant’s failure to acknowledge such a possibility stems from his uncritical acceptance of this type of relation. Whereas Fichte’s awareness of the possibility of one-sided forms of economic dependence leads him to offer a solution to the problems it raises: the severing of all commercial relations with other states.

 ——.  Rev. of Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Addresses to the German Nation, edited and translated by Gregory Moore (2008).  Kantian Review 15.1 (2010): 148-50.

Jamme, Christoph.  “‘Wahrheit für die Phantasie’. Der junge Hegel und Herder.”  Zwischen Bild und Begriff. Kant und Herder zum Schema.  Eds. Ulrich Gaier and Ralf Simon (op cit.).  237-50.

Jaran, François.  “Heidegger’s Kantian Reading of Aristotle’s Theologike Episteme.”  Review of Metaphysics 63 (2010): 567-91.

Javadi, Mohsen.  “The Idea of Moral Autonomy in Kant’s Ethics and its Rejection in Islamic Literature.”  Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy.  Ed. Stephen R. Palmquist (op cit.).  732-38.

Jenkins, Scott.  “Hegel on Space: A Critique of Kant’s Transcendental Philosophy.”  Inquiry 53 (2010): 326-55.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper considers Hegel’s views on space and his account of Kant’s theory of space. I show that Hegel’s discussions of space exhibit a deep understanding of Kant’s apriority argument in the first Critique, commit him to the central premise of that argument, and separate his concerns from the familiar problem of the neglected alternative. Nevertheless, Hegel makes two objections to Kant’s theory of space. First, he argues that the theory is internally inconsistent insofar as Kant’s identification of space with an a priori intuition is incompatible with the doctrine of productive imagination in the transcendental deduction of the categories. Second, Hegel argues that the apriority argument is insufficiently critical insofar as it relies upon an unexamined theory of subjectivity as a set of representational capacities. I conclude by outlining Hegel’s strategy for undermining the assumptions concerning subjectivity that give form to Kant’s transcendental philosophy. Because Hegel’s positive views on space depend upon his articulation of an alternate notion of subjectivity, the account of Hegel’s position on space offered here remains incomplete. On the other hand, considering Hegel’s discussions of space demonstrates both the nature and the importance of his examination of subjectivity in the phenomenology.

Jesus, Paulo.  “Le Je pense comme facteur de vérité: adéquation, cohérence et communauté sémantique.”  Kant-Studien 101 (2010): 167–88.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article proposes a reading of the Kantian transcendental apperception that attempts both to reinforce the cognitive efficacy of its spontaneity (described as poetics of the self) and to determine the modus operandi of its unifying function (described as self-regulated cognition).  Thus, being irreducible to a pure logical form (or form of representation in general), the I think is meant to constitute the qualitative unity of all possible representational system, insofar as it performs an infinite process of semantic or narrative unification.  From this standpoint, the I think denotes the key operation that produces meaning, and thereby the very possibility of truth.  It follows, from such a framework of a procedural and constructivist theory of truth, the absolute primacy of the establishment of a semantic community by and under the Self.  This community lays the foundation of coherence or organic cohesion of contents, and coherence provides the ground where correspondence emerges, which, in the last analysis, expresses nothing but the ever unfinished agreement of donation and action, agreement of Self with Itself.

 ——.  “Moralization and humanization. Man as an epigenetic process in Kant.”  Was ist der Mensch? Que é o homem?  Eds. Ribeiro dos Santos, et al. (op cit.).  739-50.

Johnson, Robert N.  “Duties to and Regarding Others.”  Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals: A Critical Guide.  Ed. Lara Denis (op cit.). 192-209.

Jurkowitz, Edward.  “Helmholtz’s Early Empiricism and the Erhaltung der Kraft.”  Annals of Science 67 (2010): 39-78. [abstract]

Jütten, Timo.  “Adorno on Kant, Freedom and Determinism.”  European Journal of Philosophy (pre-print online, posted 22 Aug 2010). [abstract]

[top]K    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Kain, Patrick.  “Duties Regarding Animals.”  Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals: A Critical Guide.  Ed. Lara Denis (op cit.). 210-33.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: A better appreciation of Kant’s commitments in a variety of disciplines reveals Kant had a deeper understanding of human and non-human animals than generally recognized, and this sheds new light on Kant’s claims about the nature and scope of moral status and helps to address, at least from Kant’s perspective, many of the familiar objections to his notorious account of “duties regarding animals.” Kant’s core principles about the nature of moral obligation structure his thoughts about the moral status of human beings and non-human animals. Kant’s commitments in biology, psychology, anthropology and physical geography support his account of the nature of and distinction between humans and non-human animals. This account supports Kant’s judgment that we have duties to every human being and significant duties regarding non-human animals, duties which involve direct concern for animals because of their nature. A comparison of Kant’s account with some recently proposed Kantian alternatives provides additional perspective on some of the distinctive features, and strengths and weaknesses, of Kant’s approach.

 ——.  “Practical Cognition, Intuition, and the Fact of Reason.”  Kant’s Moral Metaphysics: God, Freedom, and Immortality.  Eds. Lipscomb and Krueger (op cit.).  211-30.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant’s claims about supersensible objects, and his account of the epistemic status of such claims, remain poorly understood, to the detriment of our understanding of Kant’s metaphysical and epistemological system. In the Critique of Practical Reason, and again in the Critique of Judgment, Kant claims that we have practical cognition (Erkenntnis) and knowledge (Wissen) of the moral law and of our supersensible freedom; that this cognition and knowledge cohere with, yet go beyond the limits of, our theoretical cognition; and that this knowledge grounds rational belief (Vernunftglaube) in the existence of God, the immortality of our soul, and the real possibility of the “highest good.” This essay untangles some of these claims about practical cognition, practical knowledge, and practical belief and their relation to Kant’s account of theoretical cognition and theoretical knowledge. There is a core conception of cognition and knowledge underlying the accounts of theoretical cognition and practical cognition, which allows for a principled distinction between cases of practical knowledge and practical belief. Kant’s doctrine of the “fact of reason” turns out to be crucial to his claims about legitimacy of and distinction between the two forms of practical cognition, one which constitutes knowledge and another which cannot.

 ——.  Rev. of Kantian Ethics, by Allen W. Wood (2008).  The Philosophical Review 119 (2010): 104-8.

 ——.  Rev. of The Form of Practical Knowledge: A Study of the Categorical Imperative, by Stephen Engstrom (2009).  The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (November 2010, #11). [online]

Kaiser, Volker.  Rev. of Passions of the Sign. Revolution and Language in Kant, Goethe, and Kleist, by Andreas Gailus (2006).  Goethe Yearbook 17 (2010): 387-89.

Kalinnikov, Leonard A. “О предшественнике пуделя Понто, а заодно и кота Мурра, или О кантианстве естественном и сверхъестественном.” [Russian; “On the predecessor of the poodle Ponto, along with the tomcat Murr, or on natural and supernatural Kantianism”] Kantovskij Sbornik 31 (2010): 24-40. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article analyses the works of E. T. A. Hoffmann through the example of the novel A Report on the Latest Adventures of the Dog Berganza. The author shows the influence of Kant's epistemological and ethical ideas on the Weltanschauung of E. T. A. Hoffmann for whom the human nature and the essence of humanity became one of the central problems. Following Kant, Hoffmann considered morals the measure of humanity.

 ——. “Кантианские мотивы в «Медном всаднике» А. С. Пушкина. Посвящается 75-летию Б. В. Емельянова, историка русской философии.” [Russian; “Kantian Themes in "The Bronze Horseman" by A. S. Pushkin. In celebration of the 75th birthday of the historian of Russian philosophy, B. W. Emeljanow”] Kantovskij Sbornik 32 (2010): 17-38. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article attempts to demonstrate the influence of Kant's philosophy of law and politics and philosophy of history alongside his aesthetic ideas on “The Bronze Horseman” by A. Pushkin.

 ——.  “Kantiancu Vladimiru Aleksandroviču Žučkovu – 70.” [Russian; “The Kantian Valadimir Zhuchkov is 70”]  Kantovskij Sbornik 34 (2010): 7-9.

 ——.  “O nravocentričnosti transcendentaľ noj antropologii Kanta, nan o roli morali b prirode čeloveka.” [Russian; “On the morals-centrism of Kant’s transcendental anthropology and on the role of morals in human nature”]  Kantovskij Sbornik 34 (2010): 21-33. [pdf (English)]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Also available in Kantovskij Sbornik. Selected Articles 2010-2011, pp. 16-27. [pdf (English)]
Abstract: This article proves that Kant’s philosophical system is a system of transcendental anthropology, which acts as a method in Kant’s pragmatic anthropology. The essence of transcendental anthropology is the metaphysics of morals. This role of morals manifests itself in the primacy of practical reason over theoretical reason. The humanity owes its development and existence to practical reason. In Kant’s system, morality is the essence of humanity.

 ——.  “Voprosy poëta A. S. Kušnera k filosofu I. Kantu o problemach potustoronnich.” [Russian; “The questions of the poet A. S. Kushner to the philosopher I. Kant regarding the otherworldly”]  Kantovskij Sbornik 33 (2010): 33-51. [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article proves that when addressing the problem persistent in his oeuvre — whether the humanity exists independently in space or it is a transcendental project — the Saint Petersburg poet A. S. Kushner always consults with I. Kant.

Kalyniuk, Gregory.  Rev. of Immanuel Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, translated by Robert B. Louden (2006).  Philosophy in Review 30 (2010): 98-100. [online]

Kannisto, Toni.  “Three Problems in Westphal’s Transcendental Proof of Realism.”  Kant-Studien 101 (2010): 227–46.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The debate on how to interpret Kant’s transcendental idealism has been prominent for several decades now.  In his book Kant’s Transcendental Proof of Realism (2004) Kenneth R. Westphal introduces and defends his version of the metaphysical dual-aspect reading.  But his real aim lies deeper: to provide a sound transcendental proof for (unqualified) realism, based on Kant’s work, without resorting to transcendental idealism.  In this sense his aim is similar to that of Peter F. Strawson – although Westphal’s approach is far more sophisticated.  First he attempts to show that noumenal causation – on the reality of which his argument partly rests – is coherent in and necessary for Kant’s transcendental idealism.  Westphal then aims to undermine transcendental idealism by two major claims: Kant can neither account for transcendental affinity nor satisfactorily counter Hume’s causal scepticism.  Finally Westphal defends his alternative for transcendental idealism by showing that it solves these problems and thus offers a genuine transcendental proof for realism.  In this paper I will show that all the three steps outlined above suffer from decisive shortcomings, and that consequently, regardless of its merits, Westphal’s transcendental argument for realism remains undemonstrated.

Kanzian, Christian.  “The Immateriality of the Human Soul — An Argument of Ayatullah Misbah, Its Roots in Mulla Sadra, and Its Correspondence in Western Philosophy.”  Soul: A Comparative Approach.  Eds. Christian Kanzian and Muhammad Legenhausen (Heusenstamm bei Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, 2010). 85-95.

Kaplow, Ian.  “Nursi’s Compassion and Kant’s Categorical Imperative: Justice and Ethics in Building a Better World.”  Theodicy and Justice in Modern Islamic Thought: The Case of Said Nursi.  Ed. Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi (Farnham, Surrey/Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2010; xiii, 282 p.).  241-55.

Karásek, Jindřich.  “Der Selbstbezug der Vernunft. Zur Logik der Kantischen Ideendeduktion.”  Metaphysik und Kritik.  Eds. Chotaš, Karásek, and Stolzenberg (op cit.).  59-71.

 ——, ed.  See: Chotaš, Jirí, Jindřich Karásek, and Jürgen Stolzenberg, eds.

Karatani, Kojin.  トランスクリティーク: カントとマルクス / Toransu kuritiku: Kanto to Marukusu. [Japanese]  Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2010.  [vi, 511 p.]

Kaufmann, Matthias.  “Le droit à la guerre et l’ennemi injuste dans la Métaphysique des mœurs de Kant.”  War and Peace: the Role of Science and Art.  Eds. Soraya Nour and Olivier Remaud (op cit.).  55-70.

Kawamura, Katsutoshi.  “Die Person als gesetzgebendes Wesen.”  Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy.  Ed. Stephen R. Palmquist (op cit.).  415-23.

 ——.  “Bericht über «Japanische Kant-Studien».”  Studi Kantiani 23 (2010): 117-23.

Keller, Pierre.  “Two Conceptions of Compatibilism in the Critical Elucidation.”  Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason.  Eds. Reath and Timmermann (op cit.).  119-44.

Kersting, Wolfgang.  “‘Ein beharrliches Ganzes unter wiedersinnischen Köpfen’: Kants Gemeinschaftsphilosophie.”  Zeitschrift für Kulturphilosophie 4 (2010): 79-93.

Kerszberg, Pierre.  “Fisica.” [Italian]  L’universo kantiano: filosofia, scienze, sapere.  Eds. Stefano Besoli, Claudio La Rocca, and Riccardo Martinelli (op cit.).  189-228.

Kervégan, Jean-François, ed., with the collaboration of Caroline Guibet-Lafaye.  Raison pratique et normativité chez Kant: droit, politique et cosmopolitique.  Lyon: ENS, 2010.  [250 p.]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note [WorldCat]: Actes du colloque international sur le thème “Kant, droit et politique” organisé par la Société française pour la philosophie et la théorie politiques et juridiques (SFPJ), tenu en Sorbonne les 22 et 23 octobre 2004.

 ——.  “La théorie kantienne de la normativité.”  Raison pratique et normativité chez Kant: droit, politique et cosmopolitique.  Ed. Jean-François Kervégan (op cit.).  89-109.

Kim, Alan.  Plato in Germany: Kant - Natorp - Heidegger.  Sankt Augustin: Academia, 2010.  [312 p.] [review]

[Note] [Hide Note] [From the publisher]: This study explores Plato in the work of Kant, Natorp, and Heidegger. The author aims sympathetically to present their important if unfamiliar Plato interpretations, and to grasp how these are related to their philosophical projects. He argues that Natorp’s interpretation of the Platonic forms as laws and not “things” grows out of the Marburg School’s struggle against psychologism: his reading is thus not simply foisted upon the text, but reveals an important dimension of Plato’s thought. Yet, Natorp’s insight is blind to the key aspects of form and vision — a flaw that Heidegger and such archaist interpreters as Friedländer and Reinhardt try in turn to remedy. The merit of their contributions to our understanding of Plato only emerges when considered against the neo-Kantian and Husserlian background. Tracing the continuities and ruptures of these readings, the author demonstrates the significance of Plato’s theory of forms in post-Kantian German thought, not merely as an object of interpretation, but also as a model of philosophical understanding.

Kim, Soo Bae.  “Menschliche Autonomie als Aufgabe – der Autonomiebegriff in der Geschichtsphilosophie Kants.”  Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy.  Ed. Stephen R. Palmquist (op cit.).  791-98.

Kisaka, Takayuki.  “Human Personhood at the Interface between Moral Law and Cultural Values.”  Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy.  Ed. Stephen R. Palmquist (op cit.).  724-31.

Kiss, Endre.  “Das Kant’sche Europa.”  Kant der Europäer: Europäer über Kant.  Eds. Dietzsch, Grimoni, and Kozlowski (op cit.).  50-68.

Kitcher, Patricia.  Kant’s Thinker.  New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.  [xiv, 312 p.]

 ——.  “Kant’s Spontaneous Thinker and (More) Spontaneous Agent.”  Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy.  Ed. Stephen R. Palmquist (op cit.).  36-52.

Klaudat, André. “‘Necessary Sentiment’ and Moral Sensibility in Kant.” Studia Kantiana (online) 8 (2010): 7-26. [M][online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The aim of this paper is to bring to a sharper focus the relation between morality and human sensibility in Kant’s thought. Given that, on the one hand, the human will is a “faculty of desire” which is necessarily linked to pleasure and displeasure, and that, on the other side, the philosophical task concerning the subject-matter is conceived as of metaphysics, that is, to be dealt with in a priori terms, we find therewith the makings of a difficult problem. Kant’s theory of respect – the “necessary” sentiment – as the incentive of pure practical reason is the locus classicus for the search of a solution. The moral law has a necessary effect on the sensibilities of beings like us. Our agency is, at first, naturally orientated by self-love, and, then, inevitably succumbs to arrogance as a conception of value when it harbours that love so as to become the source of absolute value. The moral law causes irretrievable loss to arrogance, thereby necessarily producing the pain present in the respect for this law. This model of the relation in question seems to be present as well in Kant’s theory of the “moral predispositions”, without in this case the central issue being moral motivation, but rather a broader vision concerning the phenomenology of the moral experience of agents like us.

 —— “Os princípios de aplicação da Metafísica dos costumes de Kant.” [Portuguese; The principles of application of Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals] ethic@ 9.1 (2010): 77-87. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: That Kant’s moral law is based in the a priori is well-known and the object of much discussion. That the subject of a Metaphysics of Morals is Kant’s articulation of a system of duties in his practical philosophy is also well-known and much contested. What is not so well-known is that the “principles of application” of the Metaphysics of Morals pertain to itself, thus being in consequence themselves a priori. I try to show what this means and how this still allows Kant to speak of an application of the Metaphysics of Morals, generating duties to beings like us. The solution seems depend on Kant’s understanding of volitions and maxims of human beings in terms that make them intrinsically amenable to assessment on the part of a practical pure reason. This understanding of them allows Kant a presentation of duties (including duties of virtue), of which the nature is being rational moral requirements that are strict, for beings like us, which have sensibility and are imperfect, and who live in a world like ours.

Klein, Joel Thiago. “Consideracões em torno da traducão de Bedürfnis na obra kantiana.” [Portuguese] Crítica da Razão Tradutora. Sobre a dificuldade de traduzir Kant. Eds. Alessandro Pinzani and Valério Rohden (op cit.). 87-108. [M]

Klein, Tillmann.  Rev. of Das Spiel in der Ästhetik: Systematische Überlegungen zu Kants ‘Kritik der Urteilskraft’, by Alexander Wachter (2006).  Kant-Studien 101 (2010): 263-64.

Kleingeld, Pauline.  “Moral Consciousness and the ‘Fact of Reason’.”  Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason.  Eds. Reath and Timmermann (op cit.).  55-72.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: At the heart of the argument of the Critique of Practical Reason, one finds Kant’s puzzling and much-criticized claim that the consciousness of the moral law can be called a ‘fact of reason’. In this essay, I clarify the meaning and the importance of this claim. I correct misunderstandings of the term ‘Factum’, situate the relevant passages within their argumentative context, and argue that Kant’s argument can be given a consistent reading on the basis of which the main questions and criticisms can be answered. This amounts to a novel reconstruction of Kant’s justification of freedom and morality.

Klemme, Heiner F.  “The Origin and Aim of Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason.”  Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason.  Eds. Reath and Timmermann (op cit.).  11-30.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The essay addresses the question why Kant decided to write a self-standing ‘Critique of Practical Reason’ by turning to developments in his critical philosophy in 1786-1787. Two main reasons are given: (1) With the discovery of the a priori character of the judgment of taste, and the plan to write a “Critique of Taste”, Kant modifies his overall critical plan: The one critique of pure reason is now presented in three different ‘Critiques’. (2) With the ‘antinomy of practical reason’ and the ‘dialectic of pure practical reason’, it becomes clear that the main reason for Kant to write the second ‘Critique’ is to disprove critical arguments against the moral law.

 ——.  “Filosofia política de Kant - Moral e Direito na perspectiva histórica e futura.” [Portuguese; Political philosophy of Kant - morality and law in the historical and the future perspective]  Transl. from the German by Clélia Aparecida Martins.  Kant e-Prints 5.4 (2010): 7-61. [online]

 ——.  “Ponjatie antropologii v filosofii I. Kanta.” [Russian; “The notion of anthropology in Kant’s philosophy”]  Transl. from the German by A. Ju. Šačina und S. V. Šačin.  Kantovskij Sbornik 33 (2010): 24-32.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article analyses different definitions, types and tasks of Kant's anthropology: Is "moral" or "practical" anthropology identical to "pragmatic" anthropology? Does anthropology aim to answer the question about the vocation of a human being? To what extent is metaphilosophy present in the Anthropology? What is the 'fundamental' transcendental anthropology? The idea of an anthroponomy remains an unsolved puzzle.

 ——.  “Die rationalistische Interpretation von Kants ‘Paralogismen der reinen Vernunft’. Eine Kritik.”  Metaphysik und Kritik.  Eds. Chotaš, Karásek, and Stolzenberg (op cit.).  141-61.

 ——.  See: Kuehn, Manfred and Heiner Klemme, eds.

Konhardt, Klaus.  “‘...was man sein muss, um ein Mensch zu sein’. Kant und dieneuerlich wiederentdeckte Frage nach dem ‘guten Leben’.”  Kant als Bezugspunkt Philosophischen Denkens.  Eds. Hubertus Busche and Anton Schmitt (op cit.).  133-54.

Koptsev, Ivan D. “К субъектно-речевой структуре аксиологического дискурса И. Канта.” [Russian; “On the author’s speech structure of Kant’s axiological discourse”] Kantovskij Sbornik 32 (2010): 60-68. [M][pdf (English)]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Also available in Kantovskij Sbornik. Selected Articles 2010-2011, pp. 50-57. [pdf (English)]
Abstract: The major difference between Kant's axiological and cognitive discourse is that the former contains a greater number of persona pronouns that signify different speech roles of the author. This text is characterised by a more direct expression of the addressee factor, which explains the emergence of the speech acts that are absent in Kant's cognitive texts. Another substantial difference is the explicit imperative modality of this type of Kant's texts.

Kosch, Michelle.  Freedom and Reason in Kant, Schelling, and Kierkegaard.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.  [x, 236 p.]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents: Kant’s account of freedom — Kant on autonomy and moral evil — Idealism and autonomy in Schelling's early systems — Freedom against reason: Schelling's Freiheitsschrift and later work — ‘Despair’ in the pseudonymous works, and Kierkegaard's double incompatibilism — Religiousness B and agency.

 ——.  “Gasché on Scheler.”  Philosophical Forum 41 (2010): 127-30.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article focuses on the criticism of philosopher Immanuel Kant. It discusses the objection by Max Scheler against the Kantian ethics. It states that according to the views of Scheler, his commands used to come directly from the God. It reports that Scheler was worried for Kant’s connection of agency with practical rationality.

Kozlowski, David.  “Swedenborg bei Kant und in Europa. Auf den Spuren riskanter Interpretationen der Träume eines Geistersehers im 19. Jahrhundert.”  Kant der Europäer: Europäer über Kant.  Eds. Dietzsch, Grimoni, and Kozlowski (op cit.).  228-46.

 ——, ed.  See: Dietzsch, Steffen, Lorenz Grimoni, and David Kozlowski, eds.

Krause, Julia.  “The Doctrine of Subjective Space as a Precondition for the Distinction between Sensibility and Understanding.”  Rethinking Kant, vol. 2.  Ed. Pablo Muchnik (op cit.). 26-53.

Krausova, Adriana.  See: Belás, Ľubomír and Adriana Krausova.

Krkút, Ján.  “Lonergan’s Transcendental Thomism.” [Slovak]  Filozofia 65 (2010): 600-608.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The paper introduces the work of B. F. Lonergan, a Canadian philosopher and theologian, who is almost unknown in Slovak philosophical context. The paper covers basic elements and sources, which are necessary for the research on Lonergan’s work. Since Lonergan’s texts are new for our philosophical community, we are facing the problem of how to translate some of the key terms of his philosophy (e.g., ‘insight’). In its second part, the paper shows basic principles of the transcendental method in philosophy. There is a specific tradition that Lonergan is part of — transcendental Thomism (its representatives are among others Marechal, Muck, Coreth), which, accepting the classical principles of Thomistic philosophy, responses to Kantian philosophy. The analysis of the success of the transcendental method in philosophy is valuable and helps us to understand the developments in modern philosophy.

Krouglov, Alexei N.  “Kant und die kantische Philosophie in Russland zu den Lebzeiten des Königsberger Philosophen.”  Kant der Europäer: Europäer über Kant.  Eds. Dietzsch, Grimoni, and Kozlowski (op cit.).  212-26.

 ——.  “Das Problem des Friedens bei I. Kant und L. N. Tolstoj.”  War and Peace: the Role of Science and Art.  Eds. Soraya Nour and Olivier Remaud (op cit.).  257-64.

 ——. “Раннее кантианство в России: И. В. Л. Мельман и И. Г. Буле.” [Russian; “Early Kantianism in Russia: J. W. L. Melmann and J. G. Buhle”] Kantovskij Sbornik 32 (2010): 39-51. [M] [pdf (English)]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Also available in Kantovskij Sbornik. Selected Articles 2010-2011, pp. 28-39. [pdf (English)]
Abstract: The early reception of Kantianism in Russia took place at Moscow University at the turn of the 18th century and was connected with the endeavours of two graduates of Göttingen University. J. W. L. Mellmann was the first adherent of Kant’s critical philosophy in Russia and thus provoked a philosophical-theologicaladministrative conflict, which led to his untimely death. J. G. Buhle taught one of the first courses on Kant's philosophy of the critical period and safely returned to Germany after a 20 year residency in Russia.

 ——. “Nemeckaja dokantovskaja filosofija: beloe, seroe nan raznocvetnoe pjatno?” [Russian; “German pre-Kantian philosophy: a blank, grey, or multicolored spot?”]  Kantovskij Sbornik 34 (2010): 10-12.

Krueger, James.  “Duties, Ends and the Divine Corporation.”  Kant’s Moral Metaphysics: God, Freedom, and Immortality.  Eds. Lipscomb and Krueger (op cit.).  149-73.

 ——, ed.  See: Lipscomb, Benjamin J. Bruxvoort and James Krueger, eds.

Kubalica, Tomasz “Относительная истинность теории отражения в интерпретации Генриха Риккерта.” Translated by W. Prochorow and W. Below. [Russian; “The relative truth of the theory of reflection in the interpretation of H. Rickert”] Kantovskij Sbornik 32 (2010): 69-79. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article analyses, first of all, the epistemological theory of reflection (Abbildtheorie) of Heinrich Rickert, the main representative of the Baden Neo-Kantianism School. The author analyses the key arguments put forward by Rickert against the understanding of cognition as a reflection of reality. Rickert’s standpoint is neutral. He criticises the transcendental theory of reflection, but does not reject the idea of reflection as a model of cognition and acknowledges the immanent theory of reflection as relatively justified. The article also addresses the standpoint of another representative of the Baden School, Emil Lask, who rejected the theory of reflection in favour of the aftervision theory (Nachbildtheorie).

Kuehn, Manfred.  “Interpreting Kant Correctly: On the Kant of the Neo-Kantians.”  Neo-Kantianism in Contemporary Philosophy.  Eds. Makkreel and Luft (op cit.).  113-31.

 ——.  “Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals: The History and Significance of its Deferral.”  Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals: A Critical Guide.  Ed. Lara Denis (op cit.). 9-27.

 ——.  “Kant, Immanuel.”  The Dictionary of Eighteenth-Century German Philosophers.  Eds. Manfred Kuehn and Heiner Klemme (op cit.).  611-17 (v2).

 —— and Heiner Klemme, eds.  The Dictionary of Eighteenth-Century German Philosophers.  3 vols.  London/New York: Continuum, 2010.  [xxx, 1344 p.]

Kuhn, Patrick M.  See: Bernauer, Thomas and Patrick M. Kuhn.

Kumamoto, Yasuhiro.  Philosophische Pädagogik bei Kant und Fichte Erziehung im Dienst der Freiheit.  Saldenburg: Verlag Senging, 2010.  [164 p.] [contents]

Kumano, Sumihiko.  埴谷雄高-- 夢みるカント / Haniya Yutaka yumemiru Kanto. [Japanese]  Tokyo: Kodansha, 2010.  [298 p.]

Kumar, Apaar.  Rev. of Kant’s Theory of Self, by Arthur Melnick (2009).  Journal of the History of Philosophy 48 (2010): 535-36.

Kuneš, Jan.  “Kants Kritik der rationalen Psychologie.”  Metaphysik und Kritik.  Eds. Chotaš, Karásek, and Stolzenberg (op cit.).  75-98.

Kuperus, Gerard.  “The Development of the Role of the Spectator in Kant’s Thinking: The Evolution of the Copernican Revolution.”  Idealistic Studies 40 (2010): 65-82. [abstract]

Küpper, Joachim.  “Kants Kritik der Urteilskraft und die Philosophie der Aufklärung.”  Zeitschrift für Aesthetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft 55 (2010): 9-23.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper seeks to examine the relation between Kant’s aesthetic theory and the philosophy of Enlightenment. My study will focus on two central aspects from the Critique of Judgment: In connection with the ‘Analytic of the Sublime’, I will argue that Kant’s discussion of the concept enabled the development of the opinion that experiencing the specifically modern artistic beauty works as a means to equip us with an awareness of ourselves as beings equipped with reason. The second aspect I want to discuss is that of the ‘aesthetic ideas’. I will show that in the Third Critique, the idea of experiencing artistic beauty functions as a compensation for the pressure of rationality that sets in together with modernity in the 18th century.

Kuzin, Ivan V.  “I. Kant: Svoboda, grech, proščenie.” [Russian; “I. Kant: freedom, sin, forgiveness”]  Kantovskij Sbornik 33 (2010): 96-110. [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article offers a comparative analysis of Kant’s moral philosophy and the philosophy of Sade revealing the paradoxes of the categorical imperative. The satisfaction of the requirement of the categorical imperative is, on the one hand, a single and unique act and, on the other hand, a permanent and universal one. Although the familiarity with the categorical imperative does not always result in a moral action, the familiarity itself alongside the idea of forgiveness may be considered as a manifestation of morality and freedom.

[top]L    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

LaCapra, Dominick.  “Kant, Benjamin, Pensky and the Historical Sublime.”  Philosophical Forum 41 (2010): 175-79.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article focuses on the views of philosophers Walter Benjamin, Max Pensky and Immanuel Kant on the historical sublime. It discusses the facts of empirical history collected from series of events. It also states that philosophical history by Kant has a different relationship with the body of empirical data that has traces of history.

Lacour, Claudia Brodsky.  “‘Judgement’ and the Genesis of What we Lack: ‘Schema’, ‘Poetry’, and the ‘Monogram of the Imagination’ in Kant.”  The Eighteenth Century 51 (2010): 317-40.

 ——.  “Doing Without Knowing in Kant and Diderot: Experiments in Enlightenment.”  Formen des Nichtwissens der Aufklärung.  Eds. Hans adler and Rainer Godel (München: Fink, 2010; 567 p.).  165-82.

Lammert, Norbert.  “Kant und Europa Vorbemerkungen zu einer Ausstellung.”  Kant der Europäer: Europäer über Kant.  Eds. Dietzsch, Grimoni, and Kozlowski (op cit.).  11-16.

Landucci, Sergio.  La Critica della ragion pratica di Kant: introduzione alla lettura. [Italian]  Rome: Carocci, 2010.  [191p.]

Lang, Anthony F.  “Kant and the Supreme Propietor: A Response.”  Kantian Review 15.2 (2010): 78-89.

Lange, Berthold, ed.  Menschenrechte und ihre Grundlagen im 21. Jahrhundert — auf dem Wege zu Kants Weltbürgerrecht.  Beiträge anlässlich der Verleihung des Kant-Weltbürger-Preises an Bischof Dom Luiz Cappio (Brasilien) und Prof. Jeff Halper (Israel).  Würzburg: Ergon-Verlag, 2010.  [212 p.] [data]

Lange-Bertalot, Nils.  Weltbürgerliches Völkerrecht. Kantianische Brücke zwischen konstitutioneller Souveränität und humanitärer Intervention.  Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2010.  [606 p.]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Originally submitted as a doctoral dissertation (Universität Speyer, 2004).
Abstract: Der Autor wagt eine Adaption der Werke Kants zur Sittenlehre und Urteilskritik. Statt akademisch zu rekapitulieren, erarbeitet er praktikable Vorschläge gegen übermäßig partikular ausgerichtetes Recht und Politik. Entwicklungen der sog. Globalisierung bergen Hindernisse für den geschichtsapologetisch postulierten Fortschritt. Diese gipfeln im Kampf gegen Terroristen. Das Weltbürgerrecht soll vor solchen nicht durch Grenzziehung auszumerzenden Friedensbrüchen schützen. Darunter ist ein universelles Kriterium der Konfliktbewältigung zu verstehen. Es weist einen Kanon individuell und kollektiv erzwingbarer Prinzipien und Regeln aus. Sie gelten wegen ihrer gedanklichen Plausibilität willensbildend aber nicht -abhängig als ius cogens und wirken erga omnes. Daher durchdringt diese Teilschnittmenge alle Kulturen. Aus ihr kann man anschauliche Direktiven gewinnen: gegen Tötung, Folter, Sklaverei und für Notwehr, Unschuldsvermutung, Asylnahme etc.Die Basis zur Herleitung bilden der kategorische Imperativ sowie juridische und politische Imperative. Der völkerrechtliche Vollzug des Weltbürgerrechts bedarf einer UNO mit Gremien freier Willensbildung und notfalls humanitärer Einmischung.

Langston, Richard.  “Toward an Ethics of Fantasy: The Kantian Dialogues of Oskar Negt and Alexander Kluge.”  The Germanic Review 85 (2010): 271-93. [abstract]

Langthaler, Rudolf.  “Zur Gottesthematik in der Preisschrift über die wirklichen Fortschritte in der Metaphysik. Das Gefüge der Ideen des ‘Übersinnlichen in uns, über uns und nach uns’.”  Die Gottesfrage in der Philosophie Immanuel Kants.  Eds. Norbert Fischer and Maximilian Forschner (op cit.). 155-79.

La Rocca, Claudio.  “Prospettive su Kant e la psicologia.” [Italian]  Was ist der Mensch? Que é o homem?  Eds. Ribeiro dos Santos, et al. (op cit.).  43-59.

 ——.  “Psicologia.” [Italian]  L’universo kantiano: filosofia, scienze, sapere.  Eds. Stefano Besoli, Claudio La Rocca, and Riccardo Martinelli (op cit.).  391-435.

 ——, ed.  See: Besoli, Stefano, Claudio La Rocca, and Riccardo Martinelli, eds.

LaRock, Eric.  “Cognition and Consciousness: Kantian Affinities with Contemporary Vision Research.”  Kant-Studien 101 (2010): 445-64.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: After providing a critique of Andreas Engel's neural mechanistic approach to object feature binding (OFB), I develop a Kantian approach to OFB that bears affinity with recent findings in cognitive psychology. I also address the diachronic object unity (DOU) problem and discuss the shortcomings of a purely neural mechanistic approach to this problem. Finally, I motivate a Kantian approach to DOU which suggests that DOU requires the persisting character of the cognizing subject. If plausible, the cognizing subject could make an explanatory contribution to our theory of unified consciousness and thus could not be eliminated on parsimonious grounds alone.

Laßwitz, Kurd.  Die Lehre Kants von der Idealität des Raumes und der Zeit, im Zusammenhange mit seiner Kritik des Erkennens allgemeinverständlich dargestellt.  Lüneburg: von Reeken, 2010.  [235 p.]

[Note] [Hide Note] Reprint of the 1883 1st edition.

Latour, Bruno.  See: Hache, Émilie and Bruno Latour.

Lau, Chong-Fuk.  “Kant’s Epistemological Reorientation of Ontology.”  Kant Yearbook: Metaphysics 2 (2010): 123-146.

 ——.  “Self-Cognition in Transcendental Philosophy.”  Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy.  Ed. Stephen R. Palmquist (op cit.).  99-108.

Lauer, Christopher.  The Suspension of Reason in Hegel and Schelling.  London/New York: Continuum, 2010.  [viii, 206 p.]

Lauer, David.  Rev. of Having the World in View: Essays on Kant, Hegel, and Sellars, by John McDowell (2009).  Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 58 (2010): 492-98.

Lawler, James.  “The Spiritualist Trend in Modern Western Philosophy: From Descartes to Sartre.”  Philosophia: International Journal of Philosophy 39 (2010): 82-102.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The contemporary debate between religion and science has its roots in seventeenth-century debates on the implications of the new sciences. While Hobbes’s materialism rests on the implications of the new physics, Descartes’s spiritualism focuses on the radically new character of scientific thinking itself. Two opposed conceptions of God, externalist and internalist, correspond to these trends. Kant reconciles Descartes focus on free subjectivity with materialist determinism by regarding the latter as a pragmatically useful construction of subjectivity itself. For Descartes, Kant, and Sartre, science itself rests on human cooperation in an endless pursuit of an ideal of divine perfection.

Laywine, Alison.  “Kant and Lambert on Geometrical Postulates in the Reform of Metaphysics.”  Discourse on a New Method.  Eds. Mary Domski and Michael Dickson (op cit.).  113-33.

Lazos, Efraín.  “Devils with Understanding: Tensions in Kant’s Idea of Society.”  Rethinking Kant, vol. 2.  Ed. Pablo Muchnik (op cit.). 182-204.

Leach, Jessica.  “Kant’s Modalities of Judgment.”  European Journal of Philosophy (pre-print online, posted 4 Apr 2010). [abstract]

Lee, Kyoo.  Rev. of The Body Problematic: Political Imagination in Kant and Foucault, by Laura Hangehold (2007).  Hypatia 25 (2010): 480-84.

Lefebvre, Joël, transl.  See: Kant, Immanuel.  Pour la paix perpétuelle.

Lehman, Robert S.  “Between the Science of the Sensible and the Philosophy of Art.”  Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities 15 (2010): 171-85.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article offers the author’s insights on Alain Badiou’s philosophies on finitude, elaborating its relation to Alexander Baumgarten’s science of sensible and the implication of truth in arts. The author discusses the Badiou’s philosophies on inaesthetics which focus on the development of modern aesthetics that occurred in Germany in 1735. He also relates his approach with Immanuel Kant’s philosophies on aesthetics and finitism.

Lennon, K.  “Re-enchanting the World: The Role of Imagination in Perception.”  Philosophy 85 (2010): 375-89.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article invokes a concept of the imagination to defend the phrase “imaginary texture of the real” coined by the philosopher Merleau Ponty. It explores the role of imagination in perception and the explanation of philosopher Immanuel Kant of how it works by unifying a manifold of intuitions. In addition, how concepts of accuracy and inaccuracy can still be considered despite the imagination’s creative aspects in perception is explained.

Levin, Yakir.  “Idealism and Relativism: Locke, Berkeley, Kant, and Wittgenstein.” [Hebrew]  Iyyun: The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly 59 (2010): 128-42.

Levine, Joseph.  “Habermas, Kantian Pragmatism, and Truth.”  Philosophy & Social Criticism 36 (2010): 677-95.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In his book ‘Truth and Justification’ Habermas replaces his long-held discourse-theoretic conception of truth with what he calls a pragmatic theory of truth. Instead of taking truth to originate in the communicative interactions between subjects, this new theory ties truth to the action contexts of the lifeworld, contexts where the existence of the world is ratified in practice. This, Habermas argues, overcomes the relativism and contextualism endemic to the linguistic turn. This article has two goals: (1) to chart in detail how Habermas’ new theory of truth overcomes relativism and contextualism; and (2) to argue for the thesis that Habermas’s specific way of meeting this objective is flawed insofar as he resists relativism and contextualism by yoking truth to a concept of objectivity that is not consistent with the larger pragmatic transformation of his thought.

Licht dos Santos, Paulo R.  “A unidade essencial e originária da intuição e o §26 da Dedução Transcendental.” [Portuguese]  Was ist der Mensch? Que é o homem?  Eds. Ribeiro dos Santos, et al. (op cit.).  407-20.

Linhares, Orlando Bruno.  “O silêncio de Kant: o esboço da analítica transcendental na década de 1770.” [Portuguese; Kant’s silence: the sketch Of transcendental analytics in the decade of 1770]  Kant e-Prints 5.3 (2010): 14-35. [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this article I reconstruct the transcendental analytics in the first half of the decade of 1770, and I interprete it as transcendental semantics. In a letter to Herz from 1772, Kant elaborates the critical project, while revising the Dissertation of 1770 and he hopes to write the Critique of Pure Reason in approximately three months. The solution of the problem that he has in mind by this time, is limited to the objectivity of

Lipscomb, Benjamin J. Bruxvoort.  “Moral Imperfection and Moral Phenomenology in Kant.”  Kant’s Moral Metaphysics: God, Freedom, and Immortality.  Eds. Lipscomb and Krueger (op cit.).  49-79.

 —— and James Krueger, eds.  Kant’s Moral Metaphysics: God, Freedom, and Immortality.  New York/Berlin: De Gruyter, 2010.  [vii, 334 p.] [review]

[Note 1] [Hide Note 1] [From the publisher]: Morality has traditionally been understood to be tied to certain metaphysical beliefs: notably, in the freedom of human persons (to choose right or wrong courses of action), in a god (or gods) who serve(s) as judge(s) of moral character, and in an afterlife as the locus of a “final judgment” on individual behavior.  Some scholars read the history of moral philosophy as a gradual disentangling of our moral commitments from such beliefs.  Kant is often given an important place in their narratives, despite the fact that Kant himself asserts that some of such beliefs are necessary (necessary, at least, from the practical point of view).  Many contemporary neo-Kantian moral philosophers have embraced these “disentangling” narratives or, at any rate, have minimized the connection of Kant’s practical philosophy with controversial metaphysical commitments — even with Kant’s transcendental idealism.  This volume re-evaluates those interpretations.  It is arguably the first collection to systematically explore the metaphysical commitments central to Kant’s practical philosophy, and thus the connections between Kantian ethics, his philosophy of religion, and his epistemological claims concerning our knowledge of the supersensible.  [Note 2] [Hide Note 2] [From the editors]: Recent interpreters of Kant’s philosophy and contemporary advocates of broadly neo-Kantian views generally minimize the importance of Kant’s metaphysical beliefs.  The essays in this volume attempt to challenge such understandings of Kant in two ways.  First, they seek to re-engage with the substantive metaphysical claims made by Kant in the development of his practical philosophy.  Second, in so doing, they seek to defend a more holistic understanding of the Kantian corpus.  The topics explored include the feeling of respect, the role God might play in ethics, the metaphysics of human freedom, and the possibility of knowledge of supersensibles.  By examining these topics in the context of the full range of Critical texts, the collected essays seek to lay the foundation for a holistic understanding of Kant’s mature philosophical views, one that emphasizes the connections between positions he defends in his practical and theoretical works.  Contributors to the volume include: Karl Ameriks, Patrick Frierson, Jeanine Grenberg, David Sussman, Andrew Chignell, Patrick Kain, Lee Hardy, Eric Watkins and Rachel Zuckert.

Longo, Mario.  “La varietà delle razze umane e la finalità della natura in Kant.” [Italian]  Was ist der Mensch? Que é o homem?  Eds. Ribeiro dos Santos, et al. (op cit.).  101-14.

Loparic, Zeljko.  “Os Juízos de Gosto sobre a Arte na Terceira Crítica.” [Portuguese; Judgments of taste regarding art in the third critique]  Kant e-Prints 5.1 (2010): 119-41. [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The present paper begins by attempting to show what predicate “beautiful” means when used in synthetic a priori judgements of taste regarding the objets of nature, and lays out how Kant justifies the claims conveyed by those judgments. It then examines the meaning and the claims of the judgments of taste regarding beauty in objets of art, and finishes by focusing attention on judgments of the beauty of musical compositions.

 ——.  “Os problemas da razão pura e a semântica transcendental.” [Portuguese]  Was ist der Mensch? Que é o homem?  Eds. Ribeiro dos Santos, et al. (op cit.).  303-14.

Lopes, Christine.  “Truth, Falsehood and Dialectical Illusion: Kant’s Imagination.”  Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy.  Ed. Stephen R. Palmquist (op cit.).  205-16.

Lord, Beth.  Kant and Spinozism: Transcendental Idealism and Immanence from Jacobi to Deleuze.  Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.

Loriaux, Sylvie.  Rev. of Agency and Autonomy in Kant’s Moral Theory: Selected Essays, by Andrews Reath (2006).  Kantian Review 14.2 (2010): 149-51.

Lotfi, Shidan.  “The ‘Purposiveness’ of Life: Kant’s Critique of Natural Teleology.”  Monist 93 (2010): 123-34.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article offers information on natural teleology. It deals with questions about the ends or purpose of nature which fill much of philosopher Immanuel Kant’s attention in his critical philosophy. It notes the critique of Kant in natural teleology that is contained for the most part in the third of his three major critiques.

Louden, Robert B.  “Evil Everywhere: The Ordinariness of Kantian Radical Evil.”  Kant’s Anatomy of Evil.  Eds. Anderson-Gold and Muchnik (op cit.).  93-115.

Love, Brandon.  “Kant’s Religious Perspective on the Human Person.”  Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy.  Ed. Stephen R. Palmquist (op cit.).  563-72.

Lozano, Valerio Rocco.  “La figura del guerriero in Kant e in Hegel.” [Italian]  Was ist der Mensch? Que é o homem?  Eds. Ribeiro dos Santos, et al. (op cit.).  751-62.

Lu, Xuekun.  物自身與智思物: 康德的形而上學 / Wu zi shen yu zhi si wu: Kangde de xing er shang xue. [Chinese]  Taibei Shi: Li ren shu ju, 2010.  [537 p.]

Ludwig, Bernd.  “Die ‘consequente Denkungsart der speculativen Kritik’: Kants radikale Umgestaltung seiner Freiheitslehre im Jahre 1786 und die Folgen für die Kritische Philosophie als Ganze.”  Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 58 (2010): 595-628.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In his critical writings before 1786 (First Critique, Prolegomena, Groundwork) Kant argues that transcendental freedom is a problem for speculative philosophy — and that this problem was solved satisfyingly in 1781 by his own transcendental idealism. In the Groundwork, 1785, after having linked the moral law inseparably to transcendental freedom by his discovery of autonomy, Kant claimed that the moral law can be deduced (“erkannt”) from freedom thus established. But in May 1786 he was persuaded by a review article that his 1781/85 deduction of freedom was incompatible with his critical philosophy. Hence, Kant had to shift the epistemic priority from freedom to the moral law. He thus replaced the deduction of freedom and morality given in the third part of the Groundwork by his Doctrine of the “fact of pure practical reason” in the Second Critique. By this move Kant established an entirely new and dominant role (“Primat”) for practical reason in metaphysics, a role which already shows up in the second edition of the First Critique — and which leads to Kant’s unprecedented conception of a “praktisch-dogmatische Metaphyik” in the 1790s.

Luft, Sebastian, ed.  See: Makkreel, Rudolf A., and Sebastian Luft, ed.

Lutskanov, Rosen.  “Hilbert’s Program: The Transcendental Roots of Mathematical Knowledge.”  Balkan Journal of Philosophy 2 (2010): 121-26.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The design of the following paper is to establish an interpretive link between Kant’s transcendental philosophy and Hilbert’s foundational program. Through a regressive reading of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (1781), we can see the motivation of his philosophical project as bound with the task to expose the a priori presuppositions which are the grounds for the possibility of actual knowledge claims. Moreover, according to him the sole justification for such procedure is the (informal) proof of consistency and (architectonical) completeness. Hilbert tried to strip Kant’s philosophy of its last anthropomorphic vestiges which led to the formulation of his “finite standpoint” and the proof-theoretical methods for axiomatic reconstruction of classical mathematics. Therefore, contrary to the received view, the proofs of consistency and completeness which were envisaged as part of his metamathematical program were not conceived as a means to secure to epistemic basis of mathematical knowledge. Accordingly, the program itself was not confuted by Gödel’s theorems and remains as viable as ever.

Lynch, Gary.  See: Palmer, Linda and Gary Lynch.

Lyubenova, Vera.  “Transcendental Deduction in the First Edition of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.” [Bulgarian]  Philosophical Alternative (Bulgarian Academy of Sciences) 19 (2010): 64-72.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The aim of this paper is to consider Kant’s “Transcendental Deduction” in the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason as an answer given directly to Hume. For that purpose I examine the sources from which Kant has had the possibility of drawing a knowledge of the theses of Hume’s Treatise. Among them are periodicals such as Göttingische Zeitungen von gelehrten Sachen and Königsberger Zeitung. My claim here is that the first edition of the “Deduction” follows the logic of the Treatise. In this sense I consider (1) Kant’s synthesis of apprehension as an answer to Hume’s theory of perception, (2) the synthesis of reproduction — as an answer to the thesis of the continued existence of the object and (3) the synthesis of recognition — as an answer concerning the identity of the subject. Hume’s empiricism ultimately leads to contradictions which find their resolve in Kant’s concept of transcendental apperception.

[top]M    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

MacDougall, Margaret.  “Poincaréan Intuition Revisited: What Can We Learn from Kant and Parsons?”  Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 41 (2010): 138-47.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper provides a comprehensive critique of Poincaré’s usage of the term ‘intuition’ in his defence of the foundations of pure mathematics and science. Kant’s notions of ‘sensibility’ and ‘a priori’ form and Parsons’s theory of quasi-concrete objects are used to impute rigour into Poincaré’s interpretation of intuition. In turn, Poincaré’s portrayal of sensible intuition as a special kind of intuition that tolerates the senses and imagination is rejected. In its place, a more harmonized account of how we perceive concrete objects is offered whereby intuitive knowledge is consistently a priori whatever the domain of application.

Machuca, Diego E.  Rev. of Kant and Skepticism, by Michael Forster (2008).  Philosophy in Review 30 (2010): 186-88. [online]

Macor, Laura Anna.  Der morastige Zirkel der menschlichen Bestimmung. Friedrich Schillers Weg von der Aufklärung zu Kant.  Translation from Italian, by the author, and expanded.  Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2010.  [192 p.] [contents]

 ——.  “Spalding e Kant. Illuminismo e criticismo a confronto.” [Italian]  Was ist der Mensch? Que é o homem?  Eds. Ribeiro dos Santos, et al. (op cit.).  537-54.

Mäser, O.  “Medical Diagnoses and Psychiatric Diagnoses — The Difference and the Ensuing Consequences in the Light of Immanuel Kant’s Philosophy.”  European Psychiatry 25 (2010): 605. [abstract]

 ——.  “Probability in Medicine and in Psychiatry — in the Light of Immanuel Kant’s Philosophy.”  European Psychiatry 25 (2010): 606. [abstract]

Magee, Glenn Alexander.  “Quietism in German Mysticism and Philosophy.”  Common Knowledge 16 (2010): 457-73.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The author reflects on the rise of strong strain of quietism in the German intellectual history, from medieval mystics such as Meister D. Eckhart to modern philosophers like Immanuel Kant, Arthur Schopenhauer, and Martin Heidegger. He explores the relation of the individual to the universe as the central issue of German thought in the quietist thinking philosophy. He further focuses on the necessity of detachment and surrender of ego as basic principles to the German mystical tradition.

Maimon, Salomon.  Essay on Transcendental Philosophy [German: Versuch über die Transzendentalphilosophie].  Transl. by Nick Midgley.  London/New York: Continuum, 2010.  [lxvii, 282 p.]

Majumdar, Ruchira.  “Kant’s Moral Philosophy in Relation to Indian Moral Philosophy as Depicted in Srimad-Bhagavad-Gita 23.”  Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy.  Ed. Stephen R. Palmquist (op cit.).  715-??.

Makkai, Katalin.  “Kant on Recognizing Beauty.”  European Journal of Philosophy 18 (2010): 385-413.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant declares the judgment of beauty to be neither ‘objective’ nor ‘merely subjective’. This essay takes up the question of what this might mean and whether it can be taken seriously. It is often supposed that Kant’s denials of ‘objectivity’ to the judgment of beauty express a rejection of realism about beauty. I suggest that Kant’s thought is not to be understood in these terms—that it does not properly belong in the arena of debates about the constituents of ‘reality’—motivating the suggestion by first considering a pair of opposing views on the question of whether Kant can be understood to develop a real alternative to realism about beauty at all.

Makkreel, Rudolf A. and Sebastian Luft, eds.  Neo-Kantianism in Contemporary Philosophy.  Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010.  [vi, 331 p.] [review]

[Note] [Hide Note] A volume in the series Studies in Continental Thought, ed. by John Sallis.

Mallgrave, Harry Francis.  The Architect’s Brain: Neuroscience, Creativity, and Architecture.  Chichester, West Sussex/Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010.  [viii, 273 p.]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents: Introduction — Historical essays — The humanist brain: Alberti, Vitruvius, and Leonardo — The enlightened brain: Perrault, Laugier, and Le Roy — The sensational brain: Burke, Price, and Knight — The transcendental brain: Kant and Schopenhauer — The animate brain: Schinkel, Bötticher, and Semper — The empathetic brain: Vischer, Wölfflin, and Göller — The gestalt brain: the dynamics of the sensory field — The neurological brain: Hayek, Hebb, and Neutra — The phenomenal brain: Merleau-Ponty, Rasmussen, and Pallasmaa — Neuroscience and architecture — Anatomy: architecture of the brain — Ambiguity: architecture of vision — Metaphor: architecture of embodiment — Hapticity: architecture of the senses — Epilogue: The architect’s brain.

Manchong, José M. Petterson.  Der Gottesbegriff in Kants theoretischer Philosophie.  Berlin: Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, 2010.  [275 p.]

Mandle, Jon.  “Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy.”  Dialogue 49 (2010): 479-87.

Mansur Garda, Juan Carlos.  Kant: ontología y belleza. [Spanish]  Tehuantepec, Mexico: Herder, 2010.  [272 p.]

[Note] [Hide Note] From the publisher: El pensamiento de Kant gira en torno a la Ontología en un interés por acercarse a la comprensión no dogmática del ser. Kant, el autoconfeso enamorado de la metafísica ve en ella la inevitable formadora de ilusiones que nos incitan a creer que conocemos el ser en sí, y calman, de esta forma, los anhelos por llegar a los principios incondicionados del ser. La belleza no escapa a esta ilusión y es abordada por Kant en la Crítica del Juicio. En esta tercera obra del periódo crítico Kant responde a la pregunta perenne de la Estética de Occidente: la relación entre el ser y la belleza, que ve en la contemplación un camino de ascenso por llegar a los principios incondicionados del ser y en la belleza el principio que confiere unidad y armonía a la naturaleza. Desde este planteamiento, la reflexión kantiana sobre la belleza y gusto traspasan los temas de la filosofía del arte y se dirigen a un tema eminentemente metafísico: la ontología de la belleza. La presente obra aborda la profundidad de estos temas y los expone de forma clara e interesante, por lo cual constituye un libro útil no sólo para los especialistas en el tema, sino para todo lector interesado en tener un acercamiento a la filosofía de la belleza en Kant.

Maraguat, Edgar.  “Actuar bajo la idea de la libertad: Kant y la tesis de la incorporación.” [Spanish]  Anales del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofia 27 (2010): 217-42.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper examines a fundamental supposition of Kant’s moral philosophy, namely, that, without transcendental freedom, understood as the quality of the will by which it determines itself to act without being affected by sensible motives, we could not impute to any putative agent immoral acts. I argue theoretically against the logical sense of the supposition (showing its aporetic consequence), and I also demonstrate how superfluous it is from a practical point of view. Nevertheless, I acknowledge to Kant, in spite of some well known Nietzschean reasons, the merit of having grasped the insurmountable human attachment to the idea that we are arbitrary or transcendentally free beings. Finally, some instances of the echo of this merit in contemporary authors (Nagel, Strawson, Dennett) are reviewed.

Marcolungo, Ferdinando Luigi.  “L’uomo e la storia dal punto di vista cosmopolitico in I. Kant.” [Italian]  Was ist der Mensch? Que é o homem?  Eds. Ribeiro dos Santos, et al. (op cit.).  61-75.

Marcucci, Silvestro.  Scritti su Kant: scienza, teleologia, mondo. [Italian]  Ed. by Claudio La Rocca.  Pisa: ETS, 2010.  [255 p.]

Marey, Macarena.  “Humanidad como fin, justificación de principios kantianos de justicia y diferen- cia deontológica: una teoría kantiana de la acción para los fundamentos del argumento contractualista-constructivista político.” [Spanish]  Revista de Filosofía y Teoría Política 41 (2010): 99-128. [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The aim of this paper is to develop a step within the justificatory argumentation that bases the juridical-political application of the principle of humanity in a way that makes it fully compatible with the thesis of the deontological distinction between ethics and law. This step belongs to the metaethical level that serves to justify Kant’s principles of justice within the original contract. Specifically, my interpretative thesis holds that this level begins with a theory of action by which the description of the agents or persons that participate in the contract is fully compatible with the fact of pluralism.

 ——. “La ética kantiana como “sistema de los fines”: Algunas objeciones a las lecturas formalistas e procedimentalistas de la ética de Kant.” [Spanish] Studia Kantiana (online) 8 (2010): 73-112. [M][online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The aim of this article is to expound some of the consequences of Kant’s definition of Ethics (“doctrine of virtue”) as “the system of the ends of pure practical reason” in MS has for a systematic understanding of Kant’s Ethics. Specially, we focus on the way this definition affects those renderings of Kant’s Ethics that consider it to be an eminently formal and procedural theory of morality and moral worth.

Margolis, Joseph.  “The Point of Hegel’s Dissatisfaction with Kant.”  Hegel and the Analytic Tradition.  Ed. Angelica Nuzzo.  London/New York: Continuum, 2010.  12-39.

Markovits, Julia.  “Acting for the Right Reasons.”  The Philosophical Review 119 (2010): 201-42.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This essay examines the thought that our right actions have moral worth only if we perform them for the right reasons. It argues against the view, often ascribed to Kant, that morally worthy actions must be performed because they are right and argues that Kantians and others ought instead to accept the view that morally worthy actions are those performed for the reasons why they are right. In other words, morally worthy actions are those for which the reasons why they were performed (the reasons motivating them) and the reasons why they morally ought to have been performed (the reasons morally justifying them) coincide. The essay calls this the Coincident Reasons Thesis and argues that it provides plausible necessary and sufficient conditions for morally worthy action, defending the claim against proposed counterexamples. It ends by showing that the plausibility of the thesis, which it argues is largely independent of any particular ethical standpoint, gives us some reason to doubt a class of ethical theories that includes utilitarianism.

Marques, António.  “A primeira pessoa na Ética e na Filosofia do Direito de Kant.” [Portuguese]  Was ist der Mensch? Que é o homem?  Eds. Ribeiro dos Santos, et al. (op cit.).  623-34.

Marques, José Oscar de Almeida.  “Harmony and melody in Kant’s second analogy of experience.”  Kant e-Prints 5.3 (2010): 57-65. [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: My aim in this paper is to examine how, from a Kantian perspective, the model of the Second Analogy of Experience could be applied to the perception of objective successions and coexistences of musical sounds, that is to say, to the hearing of chords and melodic lines. I begin by showing how the reasoning of the Second Analogy can reasonably be transferred to this new realm of experience; I examine, then, some difficulties related to this proposed transference of the Kantian argument; and I conclude by raising and answering some objections that could be made against my proposal.

Marshall, Colin.  “Kant’s Metaphysics of the Self.”  Philosophers’ Imprint 10.8 (2010): 1-21. [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] I argue that Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason offers a positive metaphysical account of the thinking self. Previous interpreters have overlooked this account, I believe, because they have held that any metaphysical view of the self would be incompatible with both Kant’s insistence on the limitations of cognition and with his project in the Paralogisms. Closer examination, however, shows that neither of those aspects of the Critique precludes a metaphysical account of the self, and that other aspects (namely, the structure of Kant’s overall project and the commitments of his claims in the Transcendental Deduction) require such an account. Drawing on a principle of 'effect-relative composition,' I argue that Kant’s self is neither an activity, a form, nor a representation, but instead an individual constituted by the thing or things that bring about the unity of a course of experience.

 ——.  Rev. of Kant’s Theory of the Self, by Arthur Melnick (2008).  British Journal for the History of Philosophy 18 (2010): 950-52.

Marshall, David L.  “The Origin and Character of Hannah Arendt’s Theory of Judgment.”  Political Theory 38 (2010): 367-93.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Hannah Arendt’s theory of judgment has been the object of considerable interest in the last three decades. Political theorists in particular have hoped to find in her theory of judgment a viable account of how diverse modern societies can sustain a commitment to dialogue in the absence of shared basic principles. A number of scholars, however, have critiqued Arendt’s account of judgment in various ways. This article examines criticisms from Richard Bernstein, Ronald Beiner, George Kateb, Jürgen Habermas, and Linda Zerilli. On the basis of early sources from Arendt’s manuscripts and ‘Denktagebuch’ that have not been used in these debates, this article contends that Arendt’s position on judgment can be defended against these critics and that her account warrants further exploration.

Martín Jorge, Miguel Luis.  “Implicaciones epistemológicas de la noción de forma en la psicologa de la Gestalt.” [Spanish]  Revista de Historia de la Psicología 31 (2010): 37-50.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Gestaltism appears in European Universities along the early decades of the 20th century. It turns up as a scientific psychology, which bases its conclusions on psychophysics’ finds and on its own experimental research. At the same time, it is closely linked to German thinking and, specifically, to some of its most representative epistemological theories. These two influences coincide in the gestalt notion of form. Kant’s knowledge theory and Husserl’s phenomenology are part of the philosophical background of this notion. These authors are identified with an epistemological approach known as phenomenism, usually set against typical realism of scientific methodology. Although Gestalt psychologists assumed the basis of phenomenism about perception, they tackled its study in an experimental fashion. This work deals with the contradictions arisen from this fact. [PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA]

Martindale, Charles.  “Performance, Reception, Aesthetics: Or Why Reception Studies Need Kant.”  Theorising Performance: Greek Drama, Cultural History and Critical Practice.  Eds. Edith Hall and Stephe Harrop.  London: Duckworth, 2010.  71-84

Martinelli, Riccardo.  “Antropologia.” [Italian]  L’universo kantiano: filosofia, scienze, sapere.  Eds. Stefano Besoli, Claudio La Rocca, and Riccardo Martinelli (op cit.).  13-52.

 ——, ed.  See: Besoli, Stefano, Claudio La Rocca, and Riccardo Martinelli, eds.

Martins, Clelia Aparecida.  “O que é o homem? Um paralelismo entre a Anthropologie e a filosofia teórica de Kant.” [Portuguese]  Was ist der Mensch? Que é o homem?  Eds. Ribeiro dos Santos, et al. (op cit.).  77-100.

Marzolf, Hedwig.  “Entre guerre et paix, l’humanité comme communauté esthétique. Réflexions à partir de Kant et Bourdieu.”  War and Peace: the Role of Science and Art.  Eds. Soraya Nour and Olivier Remaud (op cit.).  247-54.

Massimi, Michela.  “Galileo’s Mathematization of Nature at the Crossroad between the Empiricist and the Kantian Tradition.”  Perspectives on Science 18 (2010): 152-88.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The aim of this paper is to take Galileo’s mathematization of nature as a springboard for contrasting the time-honoured empiricist conception of phenomena, exemplified by Pierre Duhem’s analysis in To Save the Phenomena (1908), with Immanuel Kant’s.  Hence the purpose of this paper is twofold.  I) On the philosophical side, I want to draw attention to Kant’s more robust conception of phenomena compared to the one we have inherited from Duhem and contemporary empiricism.  II) On the historical side, I want to show what particular aspects of Galileo’s mathematization of nature find a counterpart in Kant’s conception of phenomena.

Matthis, Michael J.  The Beautiful, the Sublime the Grotesque: The Subjective Turn in Aesthetics from the Enlightenment to the Present.  Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publ., 2010.  [x, 148 p.]

Mattos, Fernando Costa.  See: Kant, Immanuel. “Direito Natural Feyerabend”

Mazziotti, Arnaldo.  Immanuel Kant. [Italian]  Arezzo: Helicon, 2010.  [39 p.]

Mazzoni, Augusto.  Il gioco delle forme sonore: studi su Kant, Hanslick, Nietzsche e Stravinskij. [Italian]  Milano: Mimesis, 2010.  [117 p.]

McCall, Corey.  “The Art of Life: Foucault’s Reading of Baudelaire’s The Painter of Modern Life.”  Journal of Speculative Philosophy 24 (2010): 138-57.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In his essay “What Is Enlightenment?” Foucault compares the role of modernity in the work of the decadent Parisian poet Charles Baudelaire with that of the austere Prussian philosopher Immanuel Kant. He claims that the relationship between these two strange bedfellows can be found in the value each writer accords to the present in contrast to the past and future. Each writer claims, in his own style, that each individual must render his or her existence meaningful by cultivating what Foucault calls in this essay a philosophical ethos. This conception of the philosophical form of life forms the conceptual basis of Foucault’s later work. I briefly interpret Foucault’s discussion of Kant and Baudelaire in “What Is Enlightenment?” in order to begin to reconsider this idea of a philosophical ethos through a reading of Baudelaire’s seminal essay in art criticism, “The Painter of Modern Life.”

McCarty, Richard.  “Kant’s Derivation of the Formula of Universal Law.”  Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review/Revue canadienne de philosophie 49 (2010): 113-33.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Critics have charged that there are gaps in the logic of Kant’s derivation of the formula of universal law. Here I defend that derivation against these charges, partly by emphasizing a neglected teleological principle that Kant alluded to in his argument, and partly by clarifying what he meant by actions’ “conformity to universal law.” He meant that actions conform to universal law just when their maxims can belong to a unified system of principles. An analogy with objects’ conformity to universal law in nature helps show how Kant was correct in deriving the formula of universal law from the premises of his argument.

McDonald, Fritz J.  “Agency and Responsibility.”  Journal of Value Inquiry 44 (2010): 199-207.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: According to Christine Korsgaard, Kantian hypothetical and categorical imperative principles are constitutive principles of agency. By acting in a way that is guided by such imperatives, an individual makes herself into an agent. On her theory, there is an inextricable link between the nature of agency and the practical issue of why we should be rational and moral. I argue that Korsgaard does not present a coherent account of irrational or immoral agency, and the inability to offer an account of such agency implies an inability to offer a proper account of responsibility. Korsgaard’s view shares a fundamental flaw with Immanuel Kant’s account of morality in the ‘Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals’. Korsgaard cannot give a full, adequate account of individual responsibility. In light of the failure of Kant’s and Korsgaard’s accounts, Kantians need to provide a better, more comprehensive characterization of agency. Drawing on the literature on free will compatibilism, I present an alternative conception of agency that avoids the problems with Korsgaard’s account. Presenting a proper account of agency requires a rejection of a central tenet of traditional Kantian metaethics, but rejection of the central tenet does not require a full rejection of Kantianism.

McKenna, Tony.  “Thoughts on Kant and Hegel.”  Critique: Journal of Socialist Theory 38 (2010): 321-25.

McLear, Colin.  See: Chignell, Andrew and Colin McLear.

McMahon, Jenny.  “The Classical Trinity and Kant’s Aesthetic Formalism.”  Critical Horizons 11 (2010): 419-41.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: I identify two mutually exclusive notions of formalism in Kant’s Critique of Aesthetic Judgement: a thin concept of aesthetic formalism and a thick concept of aesthetic formalism. Arguably there is textual support for both concepts in Kant’s third critique. I offer interpretations of three key elements in the Critique of Aesthetic Judgement which support a thick formalism. The three key elements are: Harmony of the Faculties, Aesthetic Ideas and Sensus Communis. I interpret these concepts in relation to the conditions for theoretical Reason, the conditions for moral motivation and the conditions for intersubjectivity, respectively. I conclude that there is no support for a thin concept of aesthetic formalism when the key elements of Kant’s Critique of Aesthetic Judgement are understood in the context of his broader critical aims.

McNutt, Patrick.  See: Duran, Xavier and Patrick McNutt.

McQuillan, Colin.  Rev. of Kant and the Human Sciences: Biology, Anthropology, and History, by Alix Cohen (2009).  The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (August 2010, #19). [online]

Melich, Julja B.  “Il superamento di Kant in Russia.” [Italian]  Studi Kantiani 23 (2010): 91-106.

Mello, Cláudio Ari.  Kant e a dignidade da legislação. [Portuguese]  Porto Alegre: Livr. do Advodgado, 2010.  [183 p.]

Mendieta, Eduardo.  “Interspecies Cosmopolitanism.”  Philosophy Today 54 (2010): 208-16.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The author discusses the fundamental contradiction at the core of the notion of cosmopolitanism. He explains that Immanuel Kant’s philosophical anthropology and his cosmopolitan project are based in the Stoic notion that it is precisely as creatures of nature that humans belong to the same nomos. Several philosophers who made contributions to the clarification of cosmopolitanism as a desirable and possible ideal in the 21st century include Martha Nussbaum, Kwame Anthony Appiah and Walter Mignolo.

Menges, Karl.  See: Zammito, John H., Karl Menges, and Ernest A. Menze.

Menze, Ernest A.  See: Zammito, John H., Karl Menges, and Ernest A. Menze.

Merle, Jean-Christophe.  “Kooperation, Krieg und Frieden bei Kant und Rawls.”  War and Peace: the Role of Science and Art.  Eds. Soraya Nour and Olivier Remaud (op cit.).  109-16.

Merritt, Melissa McBay.  “Kant on the Transcendental Deduction of Space and Time: An Essay on the Philosophical Resources of the Transcendental Aesthetic.”  Kantian Review 14.2 (2010): 1-37.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: I take up Kant’s remarks about a “transcendental deduction” of the “concepts of space and time” (A87/B119-120). I argue for the need to make a clearer assessment of the philosophical resources of the Aesthetic in order to account for this transcendental deduction. Special attention needs to be given to the fact that the central task of the Aesthetic is simply the “exposition” of these concepts. The Metaphysical Exposition reflects upon facts about our usage to reveal our commitment to the idea that these concepts refer to pure intuitions. But the legitimacy of these concepts still hangs in the balance: these concepts may turn out to refer to nothing real at all. The subsequent Transcendental Exposition addresses this issue. The objective validity of the concepts of space and time, and hence their transcendental deduction, hinges on careful treatment of this last point.

 ——.  Rev. of The Kantian Sublime and the Revelation of Freedom, by Robert R. Clewis (2009).  British Journal for the History of Philosophy 18 (2010): 528-31.

Metz, Thaddeus.  “Human Dignity, Capital Punishment, and an African Moral Theory: Toward a New Philosophy of Human Rights.”  Journal of Human Rights 9 (2010): 81-99. [abstract]

Meyer, Linda.  The Justice of Mercy.  Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 2010.  [x, 254 p.]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents: Introduction — Beyond Kanticism to being-with — Before reason: being-in-the-world-with-others — The failure of retribution — A new approach: the mercy of punishment — The ethics of mercy: the pardon cases — Miscarriages of mercy? — Conclusion: Fallen angels.

Meyer, Thomas.  “Immanuel Kant und Leo Strauss.”  Zeitschrift für Kulturphilosophie 4 (2010): 111-29.

Michalson, Gordon E., Jr.  “Kant, the Bible, and the Recovery from Radical Evil.”  Kant’s Anatomy of Evil.  Eds. Anderson-Gold and Muchnik (op cit.).  57-73.

Mikalsen, Kjartan Koch.  “Testimony and Kant’s Idea of Public Reason.”  Res Publica: A Journal of Moral, Legal and Social Philosophy 16 (2010): 23-40. [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: It is common to interpret Kant’s idea of public reason and the Enlightenment motto to ‘think for oneself’ as incompatible with the view that testimony and judgement of credibility is essential to rational public deliberation. Such interpretations have led to criticism of contemporary Kantian approaches to deliberative democracy for being intellectualistic, and for not considering our epistemic dependence on other people adequately. In this article, I argue that such criticism is insufficiently substantiated, and that Kant’s idea of public reason is neither at odds with deference to a certain kind of authority, nor with making judgements of character in rational deliberation. This view is corroborated by recent work on Kant’s epistemology of testimony.

Miller, Fred Dycus, ed.  See: Paul, Ellen Frankel, Fred Dycus Miller, and Jeffrey Paul, eds.

Millstein, Brian.  “Kantian Cosmopolitanism beyond ‘Perpetual Peace’: Commercium, Critique, and the Cosmopolitan Problematic”  European Journal of Philosophy (pre-print online, posted 11 Nov 2010). [abstract]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Most contemporary attempts to draw inspiration from Kant's cosmopolitan project focus exclusively on the prescriptive recommendations he makes in his article, ‘On Perpetual Peace’. In this essay, I argue that there is more to his cosmopolitan point of view than his normative agenda. Kant has a unique and interesting way of problematizing the way individuals and peoples relate to one another on the stage of world history, based on a notion that human beings who share the earth in common ‘originally’ constitute a ‘commercium’ of thoroughgoing interaction. By unpacking this concept of ‘commercium’, we can uncover in Kant a more critical perspective on world history that sets up the cosmopolitan as a specific kind of historical-political challenge. I will show that we can distinguish this level of problematization from the prescriptive level at which Kant formulates his familiar recommendations in ‘Perpetual Peace’. I will further show how his particular way of framing the cosmopolitan problematic can be expanded and expatiated upon to develop a more critical, reflexive, and open-ended conception of cosmopolitan thinking.

Miranda, Marcelo, Andrea Slachevsky, and Diego Garcia-Borreguero.  “Did Immanuel Kant have Dementia with Lewy Bodies and REM Behavior Disorder?”  Sleep Medicine 11 (2010): 586-88.

Mirnig, Alexander, G. See: Gebharter, Alexander, and Alexander G. Mirnig.

Mitchell, Robert W. and Francine L. Dolins.  “Psychology and the Philosophy of Spatial Perception: A History, or How the Idea of Spatial Cognition in Animals Developed.”  Spatial Cognition, Spatial Perception: Mapping the Self and Space.  Eds. Francine L. Dolins and Robert W. Mitchell (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge Univesity Press, 2010).  35-53.

Mohamed, Feisal G.  “Poignancy as Human Rights Aesthetic.”  Journal of Human Rights 9 (2010): 143-60. [abstract]

Mohr, Georg.  “Publicité de la raison, droit et cosmopolitisme chez Kant.”  Raison pratique et normativité chez Kant: droit, politique et cosmopolitique.  Ed. Jean-François Kervégan (op cit.).  213-41.

Molder, Maria Filomena.  “Variações sobre a metamorfose da crítica em doutrina.” [Portuguese]  Was ist der Mensch? Que é o homem?  Eds. Ribeiro dos Santos, et al. (op cit.).  587-606.

Molina Cantó, Eduardo. “Kant and the Concept of Life.” CR: The New Centennial Review 10.3 (2010): 21-36.

Mongin, Jean-Paul, and Laurent Moreau.  La folle journée du professeur Kant: (d’après la vie et l’oeuvre d’Emmanuel Kant).  Paris: Les petits Platons, 2010.  [63 p.]

Moore, A. W.  “The Transcendental Doctrine of Method.”  The Cambridge Companion to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.  Ed. Paul Guyer (op cit.).  310-26.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The author surveys all but chapter II of the second of the two main parts into which Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason is divided, namely “Transcendental Doctrine of Method”. There is a discussion of Kant’s most sustained and most reflective account of what is generally recognized to be the distinctive style of argument initiated in the Critique, namely transcendental argument. The article finishes with a more general discussion of the character of transcendental idealism, which Kant himself believes to be that which explains the possibility of a sound transcendental argument.

Moors, Martin.  “Religious Fictionalism in Kant’s Ethics of Autonomy.”  Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy.  Ed. Stephen R. Palmquist (op cit.).  475-84.

Morais, Marceline.  Le souverain bien et la fin dernière de la philosophie: vers une interprétation téléologique de la philosophie kantienne.  Québec, Canada: Presses de l'Université Laval, 2010.  [x, 270 p.]

Moreau, Laurent.  See: Mongin, Jean-Paul and Laurent Moreau.

Moreno, Luis Jiménez, transl.  See: Kant, Immanuel.  Observaciones acerca del sentimiento de lo bello y de lo sublime.

Moretto, Antonio.  “Matematica.” [Italian]  L’universo kantiano: filosofia, scienze, sapere.  Eds. Stefano Besoli, Claudio La Rocca, and Riccardo Martinelli (op cit.).  261-313.

Mori, Massimo.  “Storia.” [Italian]  L’universo kantiano: filosofia, scienze, sapere.  Eds. Stefano Besoli, Claudio La Rocca, and Riccardo Martinelli (op cit.).  465-92.

Morujão, Carlos.  “Kant e a Ideia de Europa: uma Interpretação do Opúsculo para a Paz Perpétua.” [Portuguese]  A ideia de Europa de Kant a Hegel [Portuguese; The Idea of Europe from Kant to Hegel].  Ed. Carlos Morujão and Claudia Oliveira (Lisbon: Universidade Catolica Portuguesa, 2010).  11-32[??]. [WC]

Motta, Giuseppe.  Rev. of Die neue Seinsbestimmung in der reinen theoretischen Philosophie Kants: Das Sein als Position, by Hardy Neumann (2006).  Kant-Studien 101 (2010): 274-77.

Moyer, Dean. “The Political Theory of Kant, Fichte and Hegel.” The Routledge Companion to Nineteenth Century Philosophy. Ed. Dean Moyer (New York: Routledge, 2010). pages??. [WC]

Muchnik, Pablo, ed.  Rethinking Kant, vol. 2.  Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishers, 2010. [xiii, 293 p.]

 ——.  “Introduction.”  Rethinking Kant.  Ed. Pablo Muchnik (op cit.). 1-23.

 ——.  “An Alternative Proof of the Universal Propensity to Evil.”  Kant’s Anatomy of Evil.  Eds. Anderson-Gold and Muchnik (op cit.).  116-43.

 ——, ed.  See: Anderson-Gold, Sharon, and Pablo Muchnik, eds.

Mücke, Dorothea von.  “Authority, Authorship, and Audience: Enlightenment Models for a Critical Public.”  Representations 111 (2010): 60-87.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This essay analyzes programmatic texts by Lessing and Kant in terms of how they influence the public sphere of the Enlightenment. Sharing a programmatic commitment to enlightenment as “the exit from our self-imposed tutelage,” Lessing and Kant understood the enlightenment process as one that cannot be taught or imposed by some authority from above, nor can it ever be fully accomplished. For both philosophers, enlightenment calls for specific framing conditions that have to do with the abolishment of censorship, on the one hand, and with the recruitment of an active, critical audience, on the other.

Mudroch, Vilem.  See: Holzhey, Helmut and Vilem Mudroch.

Muenzer, Clark S.  “Forms of Figuration in Goethe’s Faust.”  Goethe Yearbook 17 (2010): 133-52.

Muller, F. A.  See: Teunis, Thekla and F. A. Muller.

Mumburu Mora, Alex.  Rev. of Kant und das Problem der Sprache: Die historischen und systematischen Gründe für die Sprachlosigkeit der Transzendentalphilosophie, by Jürgen Villers (1997).  Pensamiento: Revista de Investigación e Información Filosofíca 66 (2010): 365-68.

Muñoz Fonnegra, Sergio.  “La elección ética: Sobre la crítica de Kierkegaard a la filosofía moral de Kant.” [Spanish]  Estudios de Filosofia 41 (2010): 81-109.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This piece offers a thorough approach to the existential ethics of Kierkegaard, and at the same time shows in what moment there comes about a separation from the moral philosophy of Kant and operates as a corrective to the latter. From both conceptions of ethics is presented the problem of moral acting, both in its purely practical dimension (Kant and Kierkegaard) and in its constitutive existential dimension (Kierkegaard), stressing the importance of the election of the self in connection to the principles of morality.

Mussenbrock, Andreas.  Termin mit Kant: philosophische Lebensberatung.  Munich: Deutsche-Taschenbuch-Verlag, 2010.  [220 p.]

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Nakajima, Yoshimichi.  「純粋理性批判」を嚙み砕く / Junsui risei hihan o kamikudaku. [Japanese]  Tokyo: Kodansha, 2010.  [345 p.]

Nakano, Hirotaka.  La teoría de la autoafección de Kant: un estudio sobre la intuición sensible en la crítica de la razón pura. [Spanish]  Mexico City: Universidad Iberoamericana, 2010.  [223 p.]

Nakayama, Gen, transl.  See: Kant, Immanuel.  純粋理性批判 / Junsui risei hihan.

Naragon, Steve.  “‘A Good, Honest Watchmaker’: J. C. F. Schulz’s Portrait of Kant from 1791.”  Kant-Studien 101 (2010): 217–26.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant’s body offered a constant target for his own remarks, both in correspondence and during his lunchtime conversations.  Several good descriptions of Kant’s body have come down to us over the centuries, as well as a number of visual representations, but these are remarkably limited, given his stature in the world of ideas.  A new description of Kant, written by a novelist who visited Kant while passing through Königsberg, has recently come to light.  It is reproduced here – in English translation as well as the original German – and earlier descriptions of Kant are briefly recounted.

Nawrath, Thomas.  “Kant und die Sprachphilosophie. Eine systematologische Rekonstruktion der Möglichkeit von Sprache im kritischen Idealismus.”  Zwischen Bild und Begriff. Kant und Herder zum Schema.  Eds. Ulrich Gaier and Ralf Simon (op cit.).  207-35.

 ——.  “The Moral Laboratory: On Kant’s Notion of Pedagogy as a Science.”  Studies in Philosophy and Education 29 (2010): 365-77.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abtstract: Following Kant, it is clear “that,” but probably not completely “how” we are morally obligated.  I will point out that there are three possible ways to struggle for an understanding of how we can be obligated as rational beings and also as “ordinary human beings.”  There is (a) the argument from rational feeling ("Achtung"), (b) the argument from language, and finally (c) the argument from systematization.  Reading the later passages of the Critique of Pure Reason and following its instructions, we will understand why education has to be founded by the same kind of argumentation as the natural sciences.  The systematical analysis of Kant’s “analogy between the physical body and the moral obligation” will explain the suspected gap between our just rational and our whole selves.  The most important part of the demanded bridge will be Kant’s “Moral Laboratory."

Negt, Oskar.  Kant und Marx: ein Epochengespräch.  Göttingen: Steidl Taschenbuch, 2010.  [96 p.]

Nehring, Robert.  Kritik des Common Sense: Gesunder Menschenverstand, reflektierende Urteilskraft und Gemeinsinn — der Sensus communis bei Kant.  Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2010.  [294 p.]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note (WorldCat): Originally a dissertation submitted to Humboldt-Universität Berlin (2008), and is here published as vol. 100 of Erfahrung und Denken.

Nelson, Eric S.  “China, Nature, and the Sublime in Kant.”  Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy.  Ed. Stephen R. Palmquist (op cit.).  333-46.

Nelson, Scott G.  Sovereignty and the Limits of the Liberal Imagination.  London/New York: Routledge, 2010.  [xi, 191 p.]

[Note] [Hide Note] See ch. 4: “Critical Enlightenment: the liberalism of Immanuel Kant."

Nenon, Thomas.  “Immanuel Kant’s Turn to Transcendental Philosophy.”  Kant, Kantianism, and Idealism.  Ed. Thomas Nenon (op cit.).  15-47.

 ——, ed.  Kant, Kantianism, and Idealism: The Origins of Continental Philosophy.  Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2010.  [xv, 343 p.] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Volume 1 of The History of Continental Philosophy, 8 vols., Alan D. Schrift, general editor.
See esp. Chapter 1: Thomas Nenon, “Immanuel Kant’s Turn to Transcendental Philosophy.”

Neumann Soto, Hardy.  “Heidegger y la tesis de Kant sobre el ser: A propósito de la conferencia de 1961.” [Spanish]  Praxis Filosófica 30 (2010): 65-84.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The present article intends to identify the main interpretative proposals that are in the base of the ideas developed by Heidegger in the conference of 1961 “the thesis Kant’s on Being” (‘Kants These über das Sein’). The core of that thesis is the idea of position. After the determination of the hermeneutical situation to access to the thesis and the specification of the extent that some expressions in the enunciation of the thesis have, the work discusses the subjective character that obtain the thesis in virtue of the interpretation of the position as representation (‘Vorstellung’). This circumstance allows Heidegger, in a new step, determine more accurately the thesis understanding the Being as a transcendental predicate, although one last determination concerning the same is gained in a “reflection over the reflection”. The main purpose of the article is to show how these steps in the dense Heideggerian interpretation are carried out.

Nicholson, Peter.  Rev. of International Library of Essays in the History of Social and Political Thought: Immanuel Kant, edited by Arthur Ripstein (2008).  Kantian Review 14.2 (2010): 151-52.

Nisbet, H. B., transl.  See: Immanuel Kant.  Political Writings.

Nitzan, Lior.  “The Thought of an Object and the Object of Thought: A Critique of Henry E. Allison’s ‘Two Aspect’ View.”  Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie. 92 (2010): 175-98.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper I take issue with Allison’s ‘two aspect’ view of Kant’s transcendental distinction between appearances and things-in-themselves. Unlike those of Allison’s critics, who criticize him, and by implication Kant, based on some form of the ‘two world’ view, I argue that, even Allison’s methodological, more moderate interpretation, nevertheless includes an excessive commitment to the role of things-in-themselves in Kant’s theoretical philosophy, a commitment which is both unnecessary and incompatible with Kant’s text. I offer an alternative interpretation which, in my view, is at once more accurate, and more defensible against the familiar claim that Kant’s philosophy is either incompatible with itself or it inevitably leads to idealism.

Nocentini, Lucia.  Prismi di identità. Alla ricerca dell’unità dell'esperienza tra analogia e analisi trascendentale. Saggio su Kant. [Italian]  Pisa: Edizioni ETS, 2010.  [178 p.] [contents]

Nour, Soraya, and Olivier Remaud, eds.  War and Peace: the Role of Science and Art.  Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2010.  [290 p.]

[Note] [Hide Note] Vol. 159 of Beiträge zur Politischen Wissenschaft (BPW).
See especially the essays by Sardinha, Kaufmann, Raulet, Merle, Barboza, Marzolf and Grouglov.
Abstract: The essays gathered in this volume investigate the role of science and art in issues of war and peace through various disciplines and theoretical traditions. How does philosophical anthropology explain why humans can be so violent? How do psychoanalysis and neuroscience regard the fact that, rather than pursuing happiness and freedom, humans seem to prefer the destruction of others and themselves? How is violence incorporated into language? How do the social sciences construct a depreciative view of the enemy and the myth of a national, superior identity? How have the natural sciences been involved in domination or cooperation between countries? How does art defame or value the other? How can one shield science and art from the logic of war, making them a common good for humanity and a foundation for peace? Many reflections are discussed here with regard to Kant, Hegel, Alexander von Humboldt, Novalis, Schlegel, Schopenhauer, Tolstoy, Freud, Einstein, Ortega y Gasset, Clausewitz, Canetti, Bourdieu, Rawls etc. This volume stands alone in clarifying the role of science and art in war and peace analytically and historically while also linking it to a number of contemporary implications.

Contents: I. Violence: D. Sardinha, L'humanité dans l'animalité: Kant et l'anthropologie du bien et du mal - S. Nour, Alexander von Humboldt's cosmopolitanism - O. Remaud, La violence dans les mots - II. Political Philosophy: N. Quy Dao, Nguyên Trai. Correspondances de guerre et la Grande Proclamation de la Pacification des Ngô - M. Kaufmann, Le droit à la guerre et l'ennemi injuste dans la Métaphysique des mœurs de Kant - G. Raulet, Die Rezeption von Kants Traktat "Zum ewigen Frieden" in der deutschen Romantik - H. Bentouhami, "La révolte des masses" d'Ortega y Gasset: de la guerre dans les sociétés pacifiées - J.-C. Merle, Kooperation, Krieg und Frieden bei Kant und Rawls - III. Critical Theory: A. E. Ferraro, Science, politics and administration. The political critique of science, from romanticism to the state of exception - C. Cronin, Globalization as Process and Ideology: The Neoliberal Dispensation and the Critique of Ideology - IV. Science and Arts in International Relations: J. Terrier, The impact of war on the French human sciences and the image of Germany: 1914-1916 - D. Ehrhardt, La guerre franco-prussienne, la fondation de la Société nationale de Musique et l'appropriation de la musique allemande - E. Suraud, Les grandes collaborations en "Physique Lourde" et le renforcement des relations internationales - V. Psyche: C. Pollmann, Luttes pour les ressources et détermination émotionnelle de l'existence humaine - N. M. Proença, Pourquoi donc la guerre? Lecture de Freud et Einstein - E. Glon, Fictions morales et architecture cognitive - VI. Aesthetics: A. P. Olivier, L'art comme savoir de l'art - J. Barboza, Kann der Krieg erhaben sein? - H. Marzolf, Entre guerre et paix, l'humanité comme communauté esthétique - VII. Tolstoi's "War and Peace": A. N. Krouglov, Das Problem des Friedens bei I. Kant und L. N. Tolstoj - E. Balibar, Sur "Guerre et Paix" de Tolstoi.

Novac, Mihai.  “Kant şi fenomenologia captivă din Critica raţiunii pure.” [Romanian; “Kant and the Captive Phenomenology of the Critique of Pure Reason”]  Revista de Filosofie 57 (2010): 341-49.

Novakovic, Tomislav.  Cisto Ja i Atomika Kantove Kritike cistog uma: nacela prakticne logike. [Serbian]  Belgrade: Desire, 2010.  [997 p.]

Nuño de la Rosa, Laura, and Arantza Etxeberria.  “¿Fue Darwin el ‘Newton de la brizna de hierba’? La herencia de Kant en la teoría darwinista de la evolución.” [Spanish]  Endoxa 24 (2010): 185-216.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kantian criticism left a double legacy to the biology of the 19th century: his notion of science based on Newtonian mechanism motivates and shapes epistemologically Darwin's theory of evolution, whereas his understanding of organisms as natural purposes gave rise to a teleological morphology. In this paper we pose two questions about the relation between Kant’s and Darwin’s ideas: (1) whether Kant would have considered Darwin to be the Newton of biology, to which our answer is affirmative; (2) whether Newtonian physics is today enough to naturalize biology. Our negative answer, based on self-organization and evo-devo, allows to set out the naturalization of the Kantian approach to organisms.

Nuyen, A. T.  “The Kantian Good Will and the Confucian Sincere Will: The Centrality of Cheng (‘Sincerity’) in Chinese Thought.”  Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy.  Ed. Stephen R. Palmquist (op cit.).  627-38.

Nuzzo, Angelica.  “Analisi filosofica e coscienza storica: Kant e Hegel oggi.” [Italian]  Studi Kantiani 23 (2010): 77-87.

 ——.  “Fichte’s Transcendental Logic of 1812 — Between Kant and Hegel.”  Fichte, German Idealism, and Early Romanticism.  Eds. Daniel Breazeale and Tom Rockmore (op cit.). 189-206.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This essay contrasts Fichte’s idea of transcendental logic in his 1812 lectures on logic to Kant’s transcendental logic. The claim is that Fichte’s logic arises out of a particular interpretation of the charge of “empiricism” often invoked against Kant at the beginning of the 1800s. in the second part of the argument, the opposition between Being (Sein) and image (Bild) whereby Fichte institutes the properly transcendental character of his logic leads to a discussion that parallels the opening of Fichte’s 1812 logic to the opening of Hegel’s ‘Science of Logic’ published in the same year.

 ——.  Rev. of Kant and the Limits of Autonomy, by Susan Meld Shell (2009).  Review of Metaphysics 63 (2010): 949-50.

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Oberer, Hariolf.  “Noch einmal zu Kants Rechtsbegründung.”  Kant-Studien 101 (2010): 380-93.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The thesis that Kant’s “Rechtslehre” is entirely independent of his transcendental idealism is simply not correct. In fact: the material contents of the “Rechtslehre” follow analytically from the logical explication of the empirical concept of external freedom, whereas the absolute practical validity (“Verbindlichkeit”) of the imperative and of the imperatives of right is based exclusively on the categorical imperative and therefore ultimately on transcendental idealism.

Ognjenovic, Gorana, ed.  Responsibility in Context: Perspectives.  Dordrecht/New York: Springer, 2010.  [xvii, 147 p.]

O’Hagan, Emer.  “Kant and the Buddha on Self-Knowledge.”  Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy.  Ed. Stephen R. Palmquist (op cit.).  695-708.

Oittinen, Vesa.  “Zur frühen nordischen Kant-Rezeption.”  Kant der Europäer: Europäer über Kant.  Eds. Dietzsch, Grimoni, and Kozlowski (op cit.).  106-38.

Oliveira, Jelson Roberto De.  “Kant Para Nietzsche, Um Emblema da Modernidade: em Torno da Questão da Natureza.” [Portuguese; Kant to Nietzsche, an emblem of modernity: around the matter of nature.]  Kant e-Prints 5.2 (2010): 101-17. [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article summarizes the main reasons for Nietzsche’s critique of Kant in relation to the notion of nature and morality as anti-nature. To this end, the Nietzschean critique is headed by the attempt to reveal the Kantian strategy that reserved a place untouched for metaphysics and, thus, led to the consolidation of the old foundations of morality. Against Kant, Nietzsche presents a notion of nature as guided by a kind of illogical necessity that, being respected, would lead to the affirmation of the vital nature. The debate between the authors, therefore, leads to one of the central questions of the modern era and shows how Nietzsche sees Kant as a true emblem of modernity.

Olson, Michael J.  “The Intuition of Simultaneity: Zugleichsein and the Constitution of Extensive Magnitudes.”  Kant-Studien 101 (2010): 429-44.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant's response to ‘Hume's problem’ in his analysis of the a priori structure of causality as law-governed succession in the Second Analogy of Experience has unquestionably overshadowed the account of simultaneity (Zugleichsein), which follows in the Third Analogy. The analysis of simultaneity in the first Critique relies entirely upon that of succession and is ultimately no more than a more complicated variant of the causal dependence of substances: two objects are experienced as simultaneous only when each of those objects grounds some determination of the other, that is when they are reciprocally determined in dynamic community. By investigating Kant's remark in the third Critique that the experience of the sublime “makes simultaneity intuitable” this paper develops a Kantian analysis of simultaneity that is irreducible to the more prominent analysis of causal succession. This more robust account of simultaneity is then seen to play an essential role in the constitution of the objects of perception (and not only the regulation of their relations) as thematized in the Axioms of Intuition in the Critique of Pure Reason.

O’Neill, Onora.  “Rights, Obligations, Priorities.”  Studies in Christian Ethics 23 (2010): 163-71. [abstract]

Onnasch, Ernst-Otto.  “Immanuel Kants Philosophie in den Niederlanden zwischen 1785 und 1804.”  Kant der Europäer: Europäer über Kant.  Eds. Dietzsch, Grimoni, and Kozlowski (op cit.).  70-96.

Onof, Christian.  “Kant’s Conception of Self as Subject and its Embodiment.”  Kant Yearbook: Metaphysics 2 (2010): 147-74.

Osborne, Gregg.  “The Active Role of the Self in Kant’s First Analogy.”  Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy.  Ed. Stephen R. Palmquist (op cit.).  129-39.

O’Shea, James R.  Rev. of Having the World in View: Essays on Kant, Hegel, and Sellars, by John McDowell (2009).  Philosophical Books 51 (2010): 63-82.

 —— and Eric M. Rubenstein, eds.  Self, Language, and World: Problems from Kant, Sellars, and Rosenberg.  Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing Company, 2010.  [288 p.]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This volume contains articles from fifteen philosophers on central themes in the philosophies of Jay F. Rosenberg and Wilfrid Sellars, including: Willem deVries, “Kant, Rosenberg, and the Mirror of Philosophy”; David Landy, “The Premise That Even Hume Must Accept”; William Lycan, “Rosenberg on Proper Names”; Douglas Long, “Why Life is Necessary for Mind: The Significance of Animate Behavior”; Dorit Bar-On and Mitchell Green, “Lionspeak: Communication, Expression, and Meaning”; David Rosenthal, “The Mind and Its Expression”; Jeffrey Sicha, “The Manifest Image: the Sensory and the Mental”; Bruce Aune’s “Rosenberg on Knowing”; Matthew Chrisman, “The Aim of Belief and the Goal of Truth: Reflections on Rosenberg”; Joseph Pitt, “Sellarsian Anti-Foundationalism and Scientific Realism”; James O’Shea, “Conceptual Thinking and Nonconceptual Content: A Sellarsian Divide”; Anton Koch, “Persons as Mirroring the World”; Eric Rubenstein, “Form and Content, Substance and Stuff”; and Ralf Stoecker, “On Being a Realist About Death”.

Osmo, Pierre.  See: Foessel, Michaël and Pierre Osmo.

Ospald, Peter.  “Michael Friedmans Behandlung des Unterschiedes zwischen Arithmetik und Algebra bei Kant in Kant and the Exact Sciences.”  Kant-Studien 101 (2010): 75–88.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the second chapter of his book Kant and the Exact Sciences Michael Friedman deals with two different interpretations of the relation or the difference between algebra and arithmetic in Kant’s thought.  According to the first interpretation algebra can be described as general arithmetic because it generalizes over all numbers by the use of variables, whereas arithmetic only deals with particular numbers.  The alternative suggestion is that algebra is more general than arithmetic because it considers a more general class of magnitudes.  This means that arithmetic is concerned only with rational magnitudes, whereas algebra is also concerned with irrational magnitudes.  In this article, I will discuss which of the two aforementioned approaches is to be considered the most plausible interpretation of Kant’s theory of algebra and arithmetic.  According to Friedman, the first interpretation cannot be reconciled with certain statements made by Kant on various occasions.  The second interpretation is developed by Friedman himself.  It is meant to be an attempt to avoid such inconsistencies.  By a detailed analysis of the texts Friedman himself cites I shall examine the soundness of his arguments against the first interpretation and the compatibility of his own interpretation of the difference between algebra and arithmetic with the relevant passages in Kant’s texts.  It will turn out that the reasons that make Friedman reject the first interpretation are invalid as they are based on misunderstandings and that his own interpretation does not expound Kant’s notions on that subject correctly, whereas the first interpretation is compatible with these passages.  Thus, I conclude that the interpretation rejected by Friedman, unlike his own approach, is actually the more adequate interpretation of Kant.

Ostaric, Lara.  “Works of Genius as Sensible Exhibitions of the Idea of the Highest Good.”  Kant-Studien 101 (2010): 22–39.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper I argue that, on Kant’s view, the work of genius serves as a sensible exhibition of the Idea of the highest good.  In other words, the work of genius serves as a special sign that the world is hospitable to our moral ends and that the realization of our moral vocation in such a world may indeed be possible.  In the first part of the paper, I demonstrate that the purpose of the highest good is not to strengthen our motivation to accept the moral law as binding for us but, rather, to strengthen our motivation to persist in our already existent moral dispositions.  In the second part, I show that the works of genius exhibit the Idea of the highest good and, consequently, strengthen our hope in its realization.  Drawing on the results of the second part, the third part of the paper demonstrates that beauty, of both art and nature, symbolizes morality in a more substantive sense than that suggested by Henry Allison’s “formalistic” interpretation.  Since, on my view, fine art in Kant serves as a sensible representation of an undetermined conceptual content, or the Idea of the highest good, the fourth part of the paper addresses the vexed question of whether Kant’s account of fine art already anticipates the cognitive role later attributed to it by the German Idealists.

Oultram, Stuart.  “Does the Baby Selling Objection to Commercial Surrogacy Misuse Immanuel Kant?”  Arguments and Analysis in Bioethics.  Eds. Matti Häyry, et al. (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2010). 177-84.

Ozturk, Saniye, and Burkay Ozturk.  Rev. of Embodied Minds in Action, by Robert Hanna and Michelle Maiese (2010).  Kantian Review 15.2 (2010): 147-50.

[top]P    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Padial, Juan José.  “Tiempo de la presencia y presencia en el tiempo.” [Spanish]  Studia Poliana: Revista sobre el pensamiento de Leonardo Polo 12 (2010): 85-103.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper focused on the time of intellectual presence. In doing so: (i) It distinguishes the time of mind from that of the world, (ii) It distinguishes the mind linking of time from the Kantian idea of synthesis, and (iii) It begins to study the distinction between the “before-after” vast and the Husserlian conception of phases.

Padui, Raoni.  “Homo Kantius: Sovereign Subject and Bare Thing.”  Philosophy Today 54 (2010): 121-31.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article discusses Giorgio Agamben’s description of the paradoxes of sovereignty to Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, for an understanding of the sovereignty of the transcendental subject. It indicates that the sovereign subject and the bare thing as limits of understanding arise from the same paradox of inclusion and exclusion and are therefore inextricably bound to each other. It suggests that Kant’s dualism results from his refusal to accept that the subject is sovereign and that the bare thing must submit without question to its laws.

Pakalski, Dariusz.  Rev. of Immanuel Kant, Rozprawa filozoficzna o religii i moralnosci [German: Philosophische Abhandlung über Religion und Moral, translated into Polish by Krzysztof Celestyn Mrongowiusz], edited by Mirosław Żelazny (2006).  Kant-Studien 101 (2010): 113-15.

Palermo, Sandra.  “La sintesi a priori nella lettura hegeliana di Kant.” [Italian]  Giornale Critico della Filosofia Italiana 89 (2010): 260-74.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Since Faith and Knowledge, Hegel claims that in Kant’s philosophy a dual concept of synthesis is at stake, which is understood as a true original synthesis of the heterogeneous and at the same time as a simple aggregate of original manifolds, which precede the synthesis. The first conception, in Hegel’s opinion, would belong to a speculative position, because it exhibits the originality of the thought, while the second would be an expression of the reflexive character of this philosophy. The attempt of the text is to show that reading Hegel takes a swing in our opinion present in Kant’s concept of synthesis — and thus in the relationship of unity and manifolds — and to show the way in which he intends to develop it, following only on the threads that keeps the Kantian synthesis.

Palkoska, Jan.  “Quasiantinomische Behauptungen und die dogmatische Metaphysik. Zur Gültigkeit der Beweise in der ersten Antinomie.”  Metaphysik und Kritik.  Eds. Chotaš, Karásek, and Stolzenberg (op cit.).  185-99.

Pallikkathayil, Japa.  “Deriving Morality from Politics: Rethinking the Formula of Humanity.”  Ethics 121 (2010): 116-47.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant’s Formula of Humanity famously forbids treating others merely as a means. It is unclear, however, what exactly treating someone merely as a means comes to. This essay argues against an interpretation of this idea advanced by Christine Korsgaard and Onora O’Neill. The essay then develops a new interpretation that suggests an important connection between the Formula of Humanity and Kant’s political philosophy: the content of many of our moral duties depends on the results of political philosophy and, indeed, on the results of actual political decision making.

Palmer, Linda, and Gary Lynch.  “A Kantian View of Space.”  Science 328 (2010): 1487-88.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: How does the brain represent space? Is this representation entirely the result of learning from experience? In his Critique of Pure Reason, Immanuel Kant argued that there must be certain “a priori conditions” of cognition, which could not be derived from experience but must instead be given prior to it. His theory includes two “a priori pure forms” of space and of time, regarded as constraints of thought rather than results of investigation or experience (1, 2). On pages 1576 and 1573 of this issue, Langston et al. and Wills et al. both refer to Kant’s theory and report that critical components of the brain’s spatial representation systems are already in place when an animal first encounters an extended environment. This supports the view that spatial representation indeed includes an innate component prior to experience.

Palmquist, Stephen, ed.  Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy.  Berlin / New York: De Gruyter, 2010.  [xvii, 845 p.] [data]

[Note] [Hide Note] Proceedings of a conference held in May 2009 in Hong Kong. [From the publisher] Authors from all over the world unite in an effort to cultivate dialogue between Asian and Western philosophy. The papers forge a new, East-West comparative path on the whole range of issues in Kant studies. The concept of personhood, crucial for both traditions, serves as a springboard to address issues such as knowledge acquisition and education, ethics and self-identity, religious/political community building, and cross-cultural understanding. Edited by Stephen Palmquist, founder of the Hong Kong Philosophy Café and well known for both his Kant expertise and his devotion to fostering philosophical dialogue, the book presents selected and reworked papers from the first ever Kant Congress in Hong Kong, held in May 2009. Among others the contributors are Patricia Kitcher (New York City, USA), Günther Wohlfart (Wuppertal, Germany), Cheng Chung-ying (Hawaii, USA), Sammy Xie Xia-ling (Shanghai, China), Lau Chong-fuk (Hong Kong), Anita Ho (Vancouver/Kelowna, Canada), Ellen Zhang (Hong Kong), Pong Wen-berng (Taipei, Taiwan), Simon Xie Shengjian (Melbourne, Australia), Makoto Suzuki (Aichi, Japan), Kiyoshi Himi (Mie, Japan), Park Chan-Goo (Seoul, South Korea), Chong Chaeh-yun (Seoul, South Korea), Mohammad Raayat Jahromi (Tehran, Iran), Mohsen Abhari Javadi (Qom, Iran), Soraj Hongladarom (Bangkok, Thailand), Ruchira Majumdar (Kolkata, India), A.T. Nuyen (Singapore), Stephen Palmquist (Hong Kong), Christian Wenzel (Taipei, Taiwan), Mario Wenning (Macau).

 ——.  “The Unity of Architectonic Reasoning in Kant and I Ching.”  Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy.  Ed. Stephen R. Palmquist (op cit.).  811-21.

 ——.  “Kant’s Ethics of Grace: Perspectival Solutions to the Moral Difficulties with Divine Assistance.”  The Journal of Religion 90 (2010): 530-53.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article presents an examination into the theological implications of the philosophy of the 18th-century philosopher Immanuel Kant, focusing on his ethical investigations on Divine assistance or intervention. The legitimacy of a Kantian understanding of Grace within the philosopher’s ethical system is then addressed.

 ——.  “The Kantian Grounding of Einstein’s Worldview: (I) The Early Influence of Kant’s System of Perspectives.”  Polish Journal of Philosophy 4.1 (2010): 45-64.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Recent perspectival interpretations of Kant suggest a way of relating his epistemology to empirical science that makes it plausible to regard Einstein’s theory of relativity as having a Kantian grounding. This first of two articles exploring this topic focuses on how the foregoing hypothesis accounts for various resonances between Kant’s philosophy and Einstein’s science. The great attention young Einstein paid to Kant in his early intellectual development demonstrates the plausibility of this hypothesis, while certain features of Einstein’s cultural-political context account for his reluctance to acknowledge Kant’s influence, even though contemporary philosophers who regarded themselves as Kantians urged him to do so. The sequel argues that this Kantian grounding probability had a formative influence not only on Einstein’s discovery of the theory of relativity and his view of the nature of science, but also on his quasi-mystical, religious disposition.

 ——.  Rev. of In Defense of Kant’s Religion, by Chris L. Firestone and Nathan Jacobs (2008).  The Journal of Religion 90 (2010): 267-69.

 ——.  Rev. of The Social Authority of Reason: Kant’s Critique, Radical Evil, and The Destiny of Humankind, by Philip J. Rossi (2005).  Kant-Studien 101 (2010): 127-31.

Palovicová, Zuzana.  “The Nature of Strong Evaluation.” (in Slovak) Filozofia 65 (2010): 564-73.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Strong evaluation as a model of practical reasoning is an attractive alternative to the utilitaristic as well as Kantian proceduralism. It makes the legitimization of specific moral claims possible. Furthermore, in their justification the motivation of agency is taken into account. This enables us to show the meaning of values and evaluation in human life. The paper tries to answer the questions such as: What does strong evaluation refer to? What is its nature? What is its role in human life? What is its relevance for ethics? The author draws upon Tylor’s conception of strong evaluation, comparing it with Laitinen’s reinterpretation of the latter.

Panarra, Pedro Miguel, transl.  See: Kant, Immanuel.  “Ensaio sobre as doenças da cabeça de 1764.”

Papadaki, Lina.  “Kantian Marriage and Beyond: Why It Is Worth Thinking About Kant on Marriage.”  Hypatia 25 (2010): 276-94.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant has famously argued that monogamous marriage is the only relationship where sexual use can take place “without degrading humanity and breaking the moral laws.” Kantian marriage, however, has been the target of fierce criticisms by contemporary thinkers: it has been regarded as flawed and paradoxical, as being deeply at odds with feminism, and, at best, as plainly uninteresting. In this paper, I argue that Kantian marriage can indeed survive these criticisms. Finally, the paper advances the discussion beyond marriage. Drawing on Kant’s conception of friendship, I suggest that he might have overlooked the possibility of sex being morally permissible in yet another context.

 ——.  “What is Objectification?”  Journal of Moral Philosophy 7 (2010): 16-36. [abstract]

Papastephanou, Marianna.  “The Conflict of the Faculties: Educational Research, Inclusion, Philosophy and Boundary Discourses.”  Ethics and Education 5 (2010): 99-116.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The aim of this article is to examine ways in which localized research runs the risk of becoming a boundary discourse in a negative sense. The exaggerated emphasis on immanent critique, contextualization and incommensurability may lead discourse and disciplines to an isolationist self-understanding that leaves unchallenged or even entrenches existing discursive hegemonies. Or, it may side with the kind of facile and hasty fusion of discourses and disciplines that ignores epistemic demands and concerns for validity and semantic accuracy. That is, it may overlook the necessity for positively understood discursive boundaries. Clearly demarcated, a-porous boundaries block osmosis and fruitful exchange and facilitate what is called here ‘stronghold fortification’. And they make common cause with a disregard for all boundaries, i.e. with what is called here ‘frame demolition’. Discourses of educational research, and particularly of ‘special’ versus ‘inclusive’ education, supply examples that are all the more telling since the very possibility of pedagogy reminds us that relativism is not an option here. To discuss interdisciplinarity and discursivity with an eye to such risks, I refer to Habermas’ outlook on the position of philosophy after Kant alongside Derrida’s rethinking of the right to philosophy—a rethinking that is grounded in a reading of Kant’s cosmopolitical point of view.

Parellada, Ricardo.  “Ilustración, publicidad y capacidades humanas.” [Spanish]  Daimon, Revista de Filosofia 3 (2010): 339-46. [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: I examine the connection established by Kant between Enlightenment and publicity, and Amartya Sen’s conception of human capabilities, which is taken to be an enlightened approach. I argue that Sen’s enlightened appeal to public discussion is a flaw of his theory, because formal capabilities should be complemented by notions that go beyond that narrow notion of enlightenment, such as well-being, value and social justice.

Park, Chan-Goo.  “Self-Knowledge and God in the Philosophy of Kant and Wittgenstein.”  Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy.  Ed. Stephen R. Palmquist (op cit.).  536-49.

Park, Peter K. J.  “The Exclusion of Asia and Africa from the History of Philosophy: Is Kant Responsible?”  Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy.  Ed. Stephen R. Palmquist (op cit.).  777-90.

Parrini, Paolo.  “Epistemologia.” [Italian]  L’universo kantiano: filosofia, scienze, sapere.  Eds. Stefano Besoli, Claudio La Rocca, and Riccardo Martinelli (op cit.).  493-528.

Parsons, Charles.  “Gödel and Philosophical Idealism.”  Philosophia Mathematica 18 (2010): 166-92.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kurt Gödel made many affirmations of robust realism but also showed serious engagement with the idealist tradition, especially with Leibniz, Kant, and Husserl. The root of this apparently paradoxical attitude is his conviction of the power of reason. The paper explores the question of how Gödel read Kant. His argument that relativity theory supports the idea of the ideality of time is discussed critically, in particular attempting to explain the assertion that science can go beyond the appearances and ‘approach the things’. Leibniz and post-Kantian idealism are discussed more briefly, the latter as documented in the correspondence with Gotthard Günther.

 ——.  “Two Studies in the Reception of Kant’s Philosophy of Arithmetic.”  Discourse on a New Method.  Eds. Mary Domski and Michael Dickson (op cit.).  135-53.

Pascale, Carla De.  “Le droit cosmopolitique comme synthèse du droit.”  Raison pratique et normativité chez Kant: droit, politique et cosmopolitique.  Ed. Jean-François Kervégan (op cit.).  199-211.

Pasternack, Lawrence.  Rev. of Kant’s Theory of Evil: An Essay on the Dangers of Self-Love and the Aprioricity of History, by Pablo Muchnik (2009).  Kantian Review 15.2 (2010): 150-55.

Patton, Lydia.  Rev. of The Determinate World: Kant and Helmholtz on the Physical Meaning of Geometry, by David Hyder (2009).  The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (July 2010, #22). [online]

 ——.  Rev. of Neo-Kantianism in Contemporary Philosophy, edited by Rudolf A. Makkreel and Sebastian Luft (2010).  Philosophy in Review 30 (2010): 280-82. [online]

Paul, Ellen Frankel, Fred Dycus Miller, and Jeffrey Paul, eds.  Moral Obligation.  New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010.  [xv, 345 p.]  Reprint, with an introduction and index, of volume 27.2 of the journal Social Philosophy & Policy.

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents: Charles Larmore, “Reflection and morality” — Mark Timmons, “Terry Horgan and untying a knot from the inside out — Reflections on the ‘paradox’ of supererogation” — Holly M. Smith, “Subjective rightness” — Thomas Hurka, “Underivative duty: Prichard on moral obligation” — Stephen Darwall, “’But it would be wrong’” — John Skorupski, “Moral obligation, blame, and self-governance” — Patricia Greenspan, “Making room for options: moral reasons, imperfect duties, and choice” — Paul Guyer, “The obligation to be virtuous: Kant’s conception of the Tugendverpflichtung” — Andrew Jason Cohen, “A conceptual and (preliminary) normative exploration of waste” — Bernard R. Boxill, “The duty to seek peace” — R.G. Frey, “Goals, luck, and moral obligation” — H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., “Moral obligation after the death of God: critical reflections on concerns from Immanuel Kant, G.W.F. Hegel, and Elizabeth Anscombe”

Paul, Jeffrey, ed.  See: Paul, Ellen Frankel, Fred Dycus Miller, and Jeffrey Paul, eds.

Pavão, Aguinaldo.  “O moralmente bom e o moralmente mau em Kant: uma discussão com Zeljko Loparic.” [Portuguese; The morally good and the morally bad in Kant: a discussion with Zeljko Loparic]  Kant e-Prints 5.3 (2010): 109-31. [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In Zeljko Loparic´s article "Kantian solution of the fundamental problem of religion" (2008), he connect the originality of the doctrine of radical evil to the anthropological inflection of practice Kantian philosophy, whose culminating reflection would be presented in the Doctrine of Virtue and Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. However, the discussion that I intend to do, with the interpretation offered by Loparic on Kantian doctrine of radical evil, has a more restricted purpose. I intend to focus on the following problem: in Kant’s moral philosophy, the question of whether moral evil refers essentially to the particular maxims or to man’s character involves the difficulty on the relationship among Gesinnung, fundamental maxim and particular maxims. This difficulty can give rise to the claim that the fundamental maxim can not be the focus to assert the moral quality of actions, since it indicates a general plan of the particular maxim, while the moral quality of actions seems to depend more on particular maxim rather than fundamental maxim. According to Loparic, Kant argues in Religion the thesis that predicates morally good and morally bad should be applied primarily to man, ie the person's character. Thus, the question arises: what exactly is the target of ascription our moral judgements? Now, we can’t judge directly the man’s character, that is to say, we do not say that a man is good or evil because of an isolated action. So, what is the base to state that a man is evil? It will also be necessary to discuss if what the Religion offers, or suggests to offer, represents an alternative view, or is consistent with what we have learned about the moral evaluation in the Groundwork and Critique of Practical Reason. I defend that Religion represents an alternative view.

Pavón, Cecilia.  Swedenborg vs Kant. [Spanish]  Nuevo París, Uruguay: La Propria Cartonera, 2010.  [20 p.]

Paya, Ali, and Malakeh Shahi.  “The Reception of Kant and His Philosophy in Iran.”  Journal of Shi’a Islamic Studies 3 (2010): 25-40.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The story of the introduction of Kant’s ideas to Iran’s intellectual milieu can be regarded as part of a larger scenario, the one in which ‘modernity’ in its various forms gradually penetrated different quarters of the Iranian society from the mid-nineteenth century onward. In the present paper, following a brief historical overview of the earliest examples of the attempts on the part of Iranian intellectuals and scholars to come to grips with the ideas of the German philosopher, we cast a critical eye on the activities of Iranian scholars both inside and outside academia to introduce Kant’s views to a wider audience. The paper’s main conclusion is that while there has been a manyfold increase in the number of books and articles on Kant since the Islamic Revolution of 1978-1979 in comparison with the decades before it, Kant’s philosophy and his style of philosophising have not yet become as widely popular among the learned as the views of other writers such as Marx, Heidegger, or Popper.

Pekurovskaia, Asia.  Герметический мир Иммануила Канта: по ту сторону зрения и слуха / Germeticheskii mir Immanuila Kanta: po tu storonu zreniia i slukha. [Russian]  St Petersburg: Aleteiia, 2010.  [566 p.]

Penner, James.  “The State Duty to Support the Poor in Kant’s Doctrine of Right.”  British Journal of Politics & International Relations 12 (2010): 88-110. [abstract]

Pensky, Max.  “Contributions toward a Theory of Storms: Historical Knowing and Historical Progress in Kant and Benjamin.”  Philosophical Forum 41 (2010): 149-74.

Pereboom, Derk.  See: Chignell, Andrew and Derk Pereboom.

Perez, Daniel Omar.  “O Significado de Natureza Humana em Kant.” [Portuguese; The meaning of human nature in Kant]  Kant e-Prints 5.1 (2010): 75-87. [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper shows the meaning of concept of human nature according to the nominal definitions and the characteristic elements of Kant’s work. The research gives some elements to decide the place and the status of the anthropology in Kantian sense.

 ——.  “O significado de natureza humana em Kant.” [Portuguese]  Was ist der Mensch? Que é o homem?  Eds. Ribeiro dos Santos, et al. (op cit.).  207-17.

Perin, Adriano.  “A verdade como um problema fundamental em Kant.” [Portuguese; “Kant on Truth as a Fundamental Problem”]  Trans/Form/Ação: Revista de Filosofia 33.1 (2010): 97-124. [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The main point of disagreement about Kant’s approach to the problem of truth is whether it can be understood within the apparatus of contemporary philosophy as a coherence or a correspondence theory. By favoring a systematic consideration of Kant’s argumentation in light of the available literature on the problem, this paper argues toward the latter alternative. It is sustained that the definition of truth as “the agreement of cognition with its object” is cogent throughout Kant’s thought and that it is finally approached not from an established theory, but as a problem to which a solution cannot be given within the boundaries of the critical-transcendental philosophy. Initially, the literature which locates Kant either as coherentist or correspondentist is taken into account. The latter is systematized into four groups: the ontological reading; the isomorphic reading; the “consequentialist” reading; the regulative reading. Secondly, the argumentation in the precritical period is approached. It is argued that a coherence theory lacks its confirmation already within it and that in the decade of 1750 Kant disposes of the isomorphic correspondence reading. Finally, the critical argumentation is considered. It is sustained that the critical approach takes truth as a fundamental problem which cannot be held by a “consequentialist” or regulative correspondence theory.

 ——.  “Por que Kant escreve duas introduções para a Crítica da Faculdade do Juízo?” [Portuguese; “Why did Kant write two introductions to the Critique of the Faculty of Judgment?”]  Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia 51 (2010): 129-47.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In face of the self-sufficiency of the theoretical and practical domains of reason, which is the outcome reached by the critical philosophy at the end of the 1780s in the second Critique’s argumentation, the search for a systematic function for the Critique of the Power of Judgment calls for an enterprise accomplishing the connection (‘Verknüpfung’) or the means for combining (‘Verbindungsmittel’) these domains. Nature and freedom are guaranteed by the first two critiques as determining legalities only within their own domains. The third Critique is therefore able to attest to a “great gulf” between the theoretical and practical domains of reason. By reconstructing the argumentation of both introductions to the Critique of the Power of Judgment, the paper defends that the systemic weight given to the consideration of the problem of the possibility of a transition (‘Übergang’) between the theoretical and the practical domains is the main reason behind the necessity of a new text for the introduction to the work.

 ——. “Sobre a gênese da distinção crítica entre Schein e Erscheinung.” [Portuguese] Crítica da Razão Tradutora. Sobre a dificuldade de traduzir Kant. Eds. Alessandro Pinzani and Valério Rohden (op cit.). 11-34. [M]

Perovich, Anthony N. Rev. of Immanuel Kant, Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason, transl. by Werner S. Pluhar (2009).  The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (January 2010, #24). [online]

Perreau-Saussine, Amanda.  “Immanuel Kant on International Law.”  The Philosophy of International Law.  Eds. Samantha Besson and John Tasioulas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). 53-75.

Peruzzi, Alberto.  Dialoghi della ragione impura. [Italian] Vol. 2.  Roma: Aracne, 2010.  [583 p.]

Petterson Manchong, José Manuel.  Der Gottesbegriff in Kants theoretischer Philosophie.  Berlin: Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, 2010.  [275 p.] [data]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Dissertation, Technische Universität Berlin, 2008.

Pettoello, Renato.  “La geometria eterna: Nelson e le geometrie non-euclidee.” [Italian]  Rivista di Storia della Filosofia 65 (2010): 483-506.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The “discovery” of non-Euclidean geometries had profound repercussions on the sciences and philosophy alike and opened a heated debate on the nature of space and on the origin of geometry and its axioms. At the heart of the discussion lay Kant’s doctrine of space. Nelson took part in this debate, rejecting the three main theories of time: the logical, the empirical and the conventionalist. Referring to J. F. Fries’s philosophy, he tried to demonstrate the a priori, synthetic nature of Euclidean axioms and the merely logical character of non-Euclidean geometries. His attempt, though interesting, ended according to the author of this essay in failure.

Philonenko, Alexis.  Commentaire de la critique de la faculté de juger.  Paris: Vrin, 2010.  [202 p.]

Piaia, Gregorio.  “Né con Nietzsche né con Kant. La critica di Alfred Fouillée al ‘moralismo’ kantiano.” [Italian]  Was ist der Mensch? Que é o homem?  Eds. Ribeiro dos Santos, et al. (op cit.).  635-48.

 ——, ed.  See: Ribeiro dos Santos, Leonel, Ubirajara Rancan de Azevedo Marques, Gregorio Piaia, Marco Sgarbi, und Riccardo Pozzo, eds.

Pieper, Hans-Joachim.  “Das Problem der Todesstrafe in der Philosophie des Deutschen Idealismus.”  Kant als Bezugspunkt Philosophischen Denkens.  Eds. Hubertus Busche and Anton Schmitt (op cit.).  155-78.

Pietsch, Lutz-Henning.  Topik der Kritik: die Auseinandersetzung um die Kantische Philosophie (1781-1788) und ihre Metaphern.  Berlin: De Gruyter, 2010.  [vi, 351 p.] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Doctoral dissertation (Tübingen, 2008).

Pihlström, Sami.  “Pragmatic Aspects of Kantian Theism.”  The Pluralist 5 (2010): 110-39.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper proposes a re-evaluation of the theism vs. atheism controversy, and of the related metalevel dispute between evidentialism and fideism, from a Kantian transcendental perspective, connected with Jamesian pragmatism. If there is a morally vital human need to postulate the reality of God, and if this theistic postulation can be regarded as rational or legitimate from the perspective of “practical reason”, then metaphysical and ethical aspects of the theism issue turn out to be deeply entangled with each other. A Kantian-cum-pragmatist philosophy of religion will inevitably approach the question of God’s existence from a standpoint that thoroughly synthesizes ethics and metaphysics — just as Kant’s defense of theism as a postulate of practical reason did. A serious engagement with the theism vs. atheism issue thus requires a plurality of philosophical standpoints, including the Jamesian pragmatic one and the Kantian transcendental one, and cannot be reductively accounted for in terms of a single overarching framework.

Pille, René-Marc.  “‘Einfach nicht zu inkantieren!’ Wilhelm von Humboldt als erfolgloser Vermittler der kritischen Philosophie bei den Franzosen.”  Kant der Europäer: Europäer über Kant.  Eds. Dietzsch, Grimoni, and Kozlowski (op cit.).  98-104.

Pimenta, Pedro.  “A ‘gramática saudával’ de Kant.” [Portuguese]  Cadernos de Filosofia Alemã 15 (2010): 11-26.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The paper discusses the famous comparison made by Kant in his courses on logic between logic and grammar so as to show that the recurrence of this topic is central to Kant's discussion of the relationship between spontaneity of reason and philosophy as a system.

Pinheiro, Letícia Machado.  “O Conceito Kantiano de Estado de Natureza Ético.” [Portuguese; Kant’s concept of the ethical state of nature]  Kant e-Prints 5.2 (2010): 1-14. [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article aims to examine the concept of Kantian ethical state of nature focusing on the following points: 1) the characteristics inherent in human nature that provide or promote such condition, 2) the peculiarities of the Kantian concept of an ethical state of nature before the classical concept of the state of nature, and 3) the Kantian proposal to overcome such a state under an ethical community, which shows a moral collective labor.

Pinkard, Terry.  “How to Move from Romanticism to Post-Romanticism: Schelling, Hegel, and Heine.”  European Romantic Review 21 (2010): 391-407. [abstract]

Pinto Serrão, Daniel, and Ramiro Delio Borges Meneses.  “Autonomia em Kant: pela crítica científica.” [Portuguese]  Revista de Filosofía (Spain) 35 (2010): 7-19.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper tries to synthesize the a priori foundations of Kant’s autonomy principle, deciphering its sense and epistemic value, from the Critique of Practical Reason to the Foundations of Metaphysics of Morals.

Pinzani, Alessandro.  “L’animale che ha bisogno di un padrone. Antropologia e politica nel Kant degli anni Ottanta e degli anni Novanta.” [Italian; “The animal that needs a master. Kant’s anthropology and politics in the eighties and nineties.”]  Was ist der Mensch? Que é o homem?  Eds. Ribeiro dos Santos, et al. (op cit.).  115-24.

 ——.  “Il II Colloquio Kantiano italo-luso-brasiliano (Lisbona, 15-; settembre 2009).” [Italian]  Studi Kantiani 23 (2010): 111-15.

 ——, and Valério Rohden, eds. Crítica da Razão Tradutora. Sobre a dificuldade de traduzir Kant. Florianópolis: Nefiponline, 2010. [173 p.] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents:
Adriano Perin (Sobre a gênese da distinção crítica entre Schein e Erscheinung)
Costantino Esposito (Un pensiero al lavoro: tradurre (in italiano) la Critica della ragion pura di Kant)
Christian Hamm (A fusão de campos semânticos: o exemplo de einsehen - verstehen - begreifen)
Jair Barboza (A crítica de Schopenhauer às Críticas de Kant. Ou como reverenciar um mestre distanciando-se dele)
Joel Thiago Klein (Consideracões em torno da traducão de Bedürfnis na obra kantiana)
Mario Caimi (Lateinische Strukturen in Kants Stil. Mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Erklärung des Begriffes vom Gegenstand in KrV A 104)
Olavo Calábria (Pela tradução mais literal que liberal e invariabilidade dos termos técnicos em Kant)
Robinson dos Santos (O Conceito de Klugheit em Kant)
Valerio Rohden (Jusificação das Ilusões da Metafísica consideraçóes sobre KrV B 294-95).

Pippin, Robert B.  “Le mien et le tien? L’État kantien.”  Raison pratique et normativité chez Kant: droit, politique et cosmopolitique.  Ed. Jean-François Kervégan (op cit.).  131-53.

Pizer, John.  “Skewering the Enlightenment: Alexander von Humboldt and Immanuel Kant as Fictional Characters.”  Atlantic Studies: Literary, Cultural and Historical Perspectives 7 (2010): 127-42.

Plant, Daniel.  Rev. of In Defense of Kant’s Religion, by Chris L. Firestone and Nathan Jacobs (2008).  Modern Theology 26 (2010): 303-05.

Plata Pineda, Oswaldo.  “La antropología de la religión dentro de los límites de la mera razón.” [Spanish]  Areté: revista de filosofía 22 (2010): 259-85. [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: “The Anthropology of the Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason”. The aim of this study is to present in detail the anthropological framework introduced by Kant in his Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason. This paper intends to show the way in which Kant reinterprets the essential elements of its ethical system and begins to understand wrongdoing (moral transgression) from a theological perspective.

Pleckaitis, Romanas.  “The Last Book Published by I. Kant.” [Lithuanian]  Problemos: Mokslo darbai 77 (2010): 174-76.

Plischka, Heinz.  Das transzendentale Gehirn: Ansichten von sich durch sich.  Münster: Verl.-Haus Monsenstein und Vannerdat, 2010.  [239 p.]

Poggi, Davide.  “Locke and Kant. From ‘internal sense I’ to Transcendental Apperception.”  Was ist der Mensch? Que é o homem?  Eds. Ribeiro dos Santos, et al. (op cit.).  383-94.

 ——.  Rev. of Philosophia transcendentalis. La questione antepredicativa e l’analogia tra la Scolastica e Kant, by Francesco Valerio Tommasi (2008).  Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica 102 (2010): 201-04.

Pollok, Konstantin.  “The ‘Transcendental Method’: On the Reception of the Critique of Pure Reason in Neo-Kantianism.”  The Cambridge Companion to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.  Ed. Paul Guyer (op cit.).  346-79.

 ——.  Rev. of Kant and Philosophy of Science Today, ed. by Michela Massimi (2008).  The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (August 2010, #14). [online]

Položencev, Andrei N.  “Osnovnaja ideja Kanta.” [Russian; “Kant’s basic idea”]  Kantovskij Sbornik 33 (2010): 83-95. [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article puts forward the idea that the basis of Kant’s philosophy is moral ontology dominated by things in themselves, which provide the basis for the moral world order: God, soul, and freedom. Kant's epistemology, teleology and anthropology are determined by the attempt to prove the possibility of such world order. The ultimate end of this order is a human as a moral being, the thinking, experience, and knowledge of which are consistent with this end.

Ponchio, Alice.  Rev. of Etica e mondo in Kant, edited by Luca Fonnesu (2008). [Italian]  Studi Kantiani 23 (2010): 155-58.

Pong, Wen-Berng.  “On Allison’s Interpretation of Kant’s Theory of Freedom.” [Chinese]  Philosophical Review (Taiwan) 39 (2010): 149-208.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The main concern of this paper is Henry Allison’s interpretation of Kant’s theory of freedom which received heavy criticism. Basically he divides Kant’s theory of freedom into two different periods, namely the period of semicritical moral theory around 1781 and the period of mature theory of freedom in second Critique. In the first part of Kant’s Theory of Freedom by Allison, he tries to develop the first period of Kant’s theory of freedom based on the texts of the first Critique. His main thesis is the following: In the semicritical period, Kant tries to construct a theory of rational agency based on the concept of practical freedom. In the third part of Kant’s Theory of Freedom, Allison argues further that Kant develops a new theory of freedom in order to justify the use of practical freedom, and in the center of this justification lies the concept of transcendental freedom. The main objective of this paper attempts to reconstruct Allison’s arguments, and on some crucial points, add some comments.

Porta, Mario Ariel González.  “De Newton a Maxwell. Un Aporte A La Comprensión Del Proyecto Cassireriano De Una Filosofía De Las Formas Simbólicas.” [Portuguese; From Newton to Maxwell. An approach to the understanding of the Cassirerian project of a philosophy of symbolic forms]  Kant e-Prints 5.2 (2010): 44-65. [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the Cassirerian bibliography, it is usual to understand his philosophy of symbolic forms as a “broadening” of the critical (Kant or Neokantian) philosophy to a “philosophy of culture”. This understanding, however, is inadequate. The “philosophy of symbolic forms” has its historical and systematic origin in a reflection upon the situation of science in the second half of the 19th century. It is the new Faktum of science that which makes transcendental philosophy, from Cassirer’s point of view, adopt a new approach to the problem of objectivity.

Post, Werner.  “Mou Zongsan’s Critique of Kant’s Theory of Self-Consciousness in the First Critique.”  Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy.  Ed. Stephen R. Palmquist (op cit.).  575-84.

 ——.  “Über das Naturschöne.”  Kant als Bezugspunkt Philosophischen Denkens.  Eds. Hubertus Busche and Anton Schmitt (op cit.).  179-91.

Posy, Carl.  “Man Is the Measure: Kantian Thoughts on the Unities of Self and World.”  Iyyun: The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly 59 (2010): 115-41.

Pozzo, Riccardo.  “Tempo dei fenomeni e tempo delle opinioni in Kant.” [Italian]  Was ist der Mensch? Que é o homem?  Eds. Ribeiro dos Santos, et al. (op cit.).  331-36.

 ——, ed.  See: Ribeiro dos Santos, Leonel, Ubirajara Rancan de Azevedo Marques, Gregorio Piaia, Marco Sgarbi, und Riccardo Pozzo, eds.

Praeg, Leonhard.  “Of Evil and Other Figures of the Liminal.”  Theory, Culture and Society 27 (2010): 107-34.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Inspired by research on the Rwanda genocide and the decapitation, in July 2008, of a passenger on a Canadian Greyhound bus, this occasional paper explores the shared agitation with which we may respond to two seemingly disparate instances of evil such as these. Arguing against discontinuous claims that distinguish between pre- and postmetaphysical conceptions of evil pivoting around the figure of Kant, the article identifies three logics suggestive of continuity in Western thought on evil: negativity, functionalism and the Messianic. Focusing on the theme of negativity, the article argues that the essentially apophatic doctrine of the privation of evil is reconstituted in postmodern thinking as the liminal nature of evil. While acts of evil relate to what is both/either mathematically or qualitatively sublime (Kant), and while this experience may account for our agitation, we nonetheless employ figures like ‘hubris’, the ‘uncanny’ (Freud) and the ‘state of exception’ (Agamben) to traverse the liminal in order to interpret instances of human praxis which, given their liminal nature, will always remain brute fact. The article argues that these figures, in particular the temporal structure implicit in Freud’s account of the uncanny, can usefully be explored to account for the agitation with which we respond to instances of evil as diverse as the two that inspired this article.

Prauss, Gerold.  “Wilhelm von Humboldt als Kantianer über Sprache.”  Kant als Bezugspunkt Philosophischen Denkens.  Eds. Hubertus Busche and Anton Schmitt (op cit.).  193-205.

Prieto López, Leopoldo José.  “La persona en Kant.” [Spanish]  Espiritu: Cuadernos del Instituto Filosofico de Balmesiana 59 (2010): 117-42.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In contrast with the classical notion of “person” that emphasizes the ‘metaphysical subject’ as the ground of ‘rational activity’, Kant, as indeed the greater part of modern philosophers, swaps the terms of this relation giving pride of place to the operative dimension of the person, in detriment to the indispensable metaphysical ground. This swap gives origin to a double tendency: one, of resolution of the subject into his acts; and another, subsequently, of the substantialization of the acts into fragmentary and disconnected entities. Of the distinct levels of the I in Kant’s philosophy (the empiric I, the logical I, the metaphysical I and the moral I), it is only to the moral I that the title of ‘person’ belongs.

Proops, Ian.  “Kant’s First Paralogism.”  The Philosophical Review 119 (2010): 449-95. [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: An essay is presented on the philosophy of transcendental criticism or idealism. The author analyzes the German philosopher Emmanuel Kant’s principles of the Critique of Pure Reason which involves pure systematic detection, correction, and explanation of excesses. Moreover, Kant’s principle accounts the diagnosis of dogmatic error which acknowledges the importance of distinction originally drawn from Michelle Grier’s phenomenon of transcendental illusion.

Puls, Heiko.  Rev. of Knowledge, Reason and Taste: Kant’s Response to Hume, by Paul Guyer (2008).  Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 92 (2010): 210-14.

[top]Q    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Quinn, Timothy Sean.  Rev. of Kant’s Critique of Aesthetic Judgment, by Fiona Hughes (2010).  The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (July 2010, #12). [online]

[top]R    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Rademacher, Torsten.  Kants Antwort auf die Globalisierung: das kantsche Weltbürgerrecht als Prinzip einer normativen politischen Theorie des weltpolitischen Systems zur Steuerung der Globalisierung.  Berlin: Logos-Verlag, 2010.  [329 p.] [contents]

Raffoul, François.  The Origins of Responsibility.  Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010.  [xiv, 341 p.]

Rancan de Azevedo Marques, Ubirajara.  “Kant e ‘aquisição originária’ em sentido especulativo. Ensaio de analogia musical.” [Portuguese]  Was ist der Mensch? Que é o homem?  Eds. Ribeiro dos Santos, et al. (op cit.).  357-70.

 ——, ed.  See: Ribeiro dos Santos, Leonel, Ubirajara Rancan de Azevedo Marques, Gregorio Piaia, Marco Sgarbi, und Riccardo Pozzo, eds.

Raseev, Daniil N. “Телеологический принцип познания в контексте «Критики способности суждения» Канта.” [Russian; “The teleological principle of cognition in the context of Kant’s Critique of Judgment”] Kantovskij Sbornik 31 (2010): 7-14. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Through the difference between the first and the second variants of «The Introduction» to The Critique of Judgment, the author shows the epistemological meaning of teleological principle revealed by Kant in the cognition of nature.

Rasmussen, Douglas B., and Douglas J. Den Uyl.  “In Search of Universal Political Principles: Avoiding Some of Modernity’s Pitfalls and Discovering the Importance of Liberal Political Order.”  The Good Society 19 (2010): 79-86.

Rasmussen, James.  “Language and the Most Sublime in Kant’s Third Critique.”  Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 68 (2010): 155-66.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article discusses the work of philosopher Immanuel Kant and his aesthetic theory about sublimity as laid out in his book Critique of the Power of Judgment. The author argues that language is important to Kant’s notion of the sublime. To strengthen his argument, the author turns to Kant’s use of a quotation from the Bible about graven images and another quotation in the Critique about the power of nature. That Kant does not provide an apparatus in his text for ranking sublimity is a problem for the author who considers that Kant’s definition for “the sublime” may be different.

Rauer, Constantin.  “Kant e a Loucura.” [Portuguese; Kant and madness]  Kant e-Prints 5.1 (2010): 61-74. [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The essay describes the relationship between Kant’s Critique of Madness written in the 1760s and his Critique of Reason dating from the 1780s. It attempts to reconstruct the systematics of Kant’s so-called Critical Turn, starting with his Essay on the diseases of the head (1764) and his Dreams of a Spirit-Seer (1766), through the First grounds of the difference of the regions in space (1768) and the Inaugural-Dissertation (1770) up to his Critique of Pure Reason (1781/87). The essay points out the way in which Kant applies his psychological insights to philosophy. Via his theory of hallucination, he arrives at the insight that all knowledge is based on projections. Starting with this premise, he examines the objective and subjective basis of rational projection, i.e. apriori reason. Again, he relates the knowledge of projection to philosophy in his examination of projections in logical judgements based on Leibniz’ axioms. This leads him to the detection of three types of logical errors in logical judgement: amphibolia, paralogism, and antinomia. With the latter, his early theory of madness was integrated in philosophy. This essay points out some of the central ideas of my book, Wahn und Wahrheit. Kants Auseinandersetzung mit dem Irrationalen (Akademieverlag, Berlin 2007).

Raulet, Gérard.  “Die Rezeption von Kants Traktat Zum ewigen Frieden in der deutschen Romantik.”  War and Peace: the Role of Science and Art.  Eds. Soraya Nour and Olivier Remaud (op cit.).  71-86.

Rauscher, Frederick.  “The Appendix to the Dialectic and the Canon of Pure Reason: The Positive Role of Reason.”  The Cambridge Companion to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.  Ed. Paul Guyer (op cit.).  290-309.

Raymaekers, Bart.  Rev. of Kants Kritiek van de zuivere rede: Een leeswijzer, by Karin de Boer (2010).  Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 72 (2010): 589-90.

 ——.  Rev. of Immanuel Kant: Kritiek van het oordeelsvermogen, edited and transl. by Jabik Veenbaas and Willem Visser (2009).  Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 72 (2010): 335-37.

Rayman, Joshua.  Kant on Sublimity and Morality.  Cardiff: University Of Wales Press, 2010.  [160 p.]

Raymond, Claire.  Francesca Woodman and the Kantian Sublime.  Farnham, Surrey; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2010.  [viii, 156 p.]

Raynaud.  “Kant et le droit révolutionnaire.”  Raison pratique et normativité chez Kant: droit, politique et cosmopolitique.  Ed. Jean-François Kervégan (op cit.).  155-68.

Razeev, D. N.  Телеология Иммануила Канта / Teleologii︠a︡ Immanuila Kanta. [Russian; “Immanuel Kant’s Teleology”]  Saint-Petersburg: Nauka, 2010.  [307 p.]

Reath, Andrews.  “Contemporary Kantian Ethics.”  The Routledge Companion to Ethics.  Ed. John Skorupski.  Abingdon, Oxon/New York 2010.  456-66.

 ——.  “Formal Principles and the Form of a Law.”  Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason.  Eds. Reath and Timmermann (op cit.).  31-54.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant claims that fundamental normative principle must be formal in some sense. Though he shows that principles that determine choice through their ‘matter’ cannot apply with necessity, he does not explain why only formal principles provide true laws. This essay argues that a formal principle does not simply abstract from content, but rather is a principle that is constitutive of some domain of cognition. Understanding formal principles as constitutive principles establishes the connection between form and normative necessity: a constitutive principle necessarily governs the relevant domain of cognitive activity and is not coherently rejected by anyone engaged in that activity.

Reath, Andrews, and Jens Timmermann, eds.  Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason. A Critical Guide. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.  [xi, 226 p.] [review]

Recki, Birgit.  “Zwischen Kantischem Kompatibilismus und Naturalismus: Ernst Cassirers Begriff der Freiheit.”  Zeitschrift für Kulturphilosophie 4 (2010): 95-110.

Redding, Paul.  “Two Directions for Analytic Kantianism: Naturalism and Idealism.”  Naturalism and Normativity.  Eds. Mario de Caro and David Macarthur (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010).  263-85. [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Usually, analytic philosophy is thought of as standing firmly within the tradition of empiricism, but recently attention has been drawn to the strongly Kantian features that have characterized this philosophical movement throughout a considerable part of its history. 1 Those charting the history of early analytic philosophy sometimes point to a more Kantian stream of thought feeding it from both Frege and Wittgenstein, and as countering a quite different stream flowing from the early Russell and Moore. 2 In line with this general assessment, Michael Friedman has pointed to the specifically Kantian features of the approach of Carnap and other members of the Vienna Circle. 3 For Friedman, the positivists should be seen as having emerged from the tradition of late nineteenth-century neo-Kantianism. Although they had explicitly rejected Kant’s analysis of geometric truth and his key concept of the “synthetic a priori” because of dramatic changes within science itself, this move should not be seen as any simple abandonment of Kantianism.4 Rather, the positivists had redefined the nature of the Kantian a priori, by axiomatizing, relativizing and historicizing it, so as to fit with the results of the contemporary sciences.

Reed, T. J.  “Kant and his German Literary Culture: Coincidences and Consequences.”  British Journal of Aesthetics 50.4 (2010): 343-56.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The literary scene of Kant’s day goes unmentioned by philosophical commentators. Yet some of its salient features have a clear relation to his problems and positions, not demonstrably causal in every detail, but too close overall to be coincidence in the random sense (which is only number 5 in the OED!). Kant’s critical view of society and his establishing of an independent aesthetic realm parallel the themes, and the arguments in self-defence, of contemporaneous radical writing; his discussion of how to exemplify ethical arguments bears on the general Enlightenment problem of how to embody abstractions persuasively, while his theoretical and practical difficulties over written style have consequences for the reception of his own work, and were responsible for divisions among writers of the day who might otherwise have made common cause. All this adds a valuable dimension to our understanding of both Kant’s aesthetics and his time.

Rehbock, Theda.  “Moral und Sprache: Ist das Verbot der Lüge sprachphilosophisch begründbar?”  Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 58 (2010): 105-25.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The paper tries to defend the Augustinian and Kantian position on the moral problem of lying against the popular opinion that this position must be rejected as an inhuman rigorism. The first part argues that Augustine and Kant do not intend to condemn entirely any kind of lying in any single case, which would be the task of (the power of) judgment (‘Urteilskraft’). Rather, they strive for a clarification of lying as a fundamental moral concept of language. Those concepts are not morally neutral, as consequentialist positions hold, but function rather as a kind of conceptual measure or compass for moral judgment. That means that single lies can be excusable or an inevitable evil. But under no circumstance do we have a right or even an obligation to lie. The second part shows how the moral prohibition against lying as a linguistic act can be argued for — as Augustine and Kant do — by reflection on the anthropological meaning of language for human existence. For this purpose, following the phenomenological tradition three meanings of language are distinguished: (1) language as object, (2) language as practice, (3) language as ‘Sinnhorizont’ (conceptual structured horizon of sense).

Reiss, Hans Siegbert, ed.  See: Immanuel Kant.  Political Writings.

Remaud, Olivier, ed.  See: Nour, Soraya, and Olivier Remaud, eds.

Rentmeester, Casey. “A Kantian Look at Climate Change.” Essays in Philosophy 10.1 (2010): 76-86. [M]

Rheindorf, Johann.  Kants Opus Postumum und das Ganze der Philosophie: Gesellschaft, Wissenschaft, Menschenbild.  Tübingen: Francke, 2010.  [viii, 175 p.]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note (WorldCat): Originally presented as the author’s doctoral thesis (Basel) under the title: Die Einheit der Erfahrung: Gott, Welt, Mensch. Kants Hauptwerk im Opus postumum.  Vol. 16 of the Basler Studien zur Philosophie.
[From the publisher]: Kant wollte, wie angekuendigt, seine Philosophie mit einem systematischen Hauptwerk abschliessen. Diese vielfaeltig vorbereitete Synthese und Summe wird aus den Fragmenten des Opus postumum herausgearbeitet und als folgerichtige, hoechste Stufe seines Gesamtwerkes sowie als zusammenfassende Antwort auf die Frage nach dem Menschen nachgewiesen: Der Wissenschaftler Kant zeigt, dass Gott, Welt und Mensch aufeinander verweisen und nur so zu begreifen sind. Dieses klassische, zeitwidrige Denkergebnis entspricht nicht dem herkoemmlichen Kant-Bild, es deutet auf den Revolutionaer und Gesellschaftskritiker Kant und seine Gegner.

Ribeiro dos Santos, Leonel.  “A antropocosmologia do jovem Kant.” [Portuguese]  Was ist der Mensch? Que é o homem?  Eds. Ribeiro dos Santos, et al. (op cit.).  219-30.

 ——.  “A concepção kantiana da experiência estética: novidades, tensões e equilíbrios.” [Portuguese; “Kant’s Conception of Aesthetic Experience: Novelties, Tensions and Balances”]  Trans/Form/Acao: Revista de Filosofia 33.1 (2010): 35-75. [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The aim of this essay is to identify some peculiar aspects of Kant's treatment of aesthetic sentiment, showing his tensions and balances and also his fecundity to the actual philosophical debate concerning aesthetic problems. I try to demonstrate that Kant's meditation represents a singular moment of instable equilibrium between two different paradigms of aesthetic thought: one, that turns on the category of taste (Geschmack), understood as an aesthetic common sense that invokes a social and communitarian preoccupation, the other, that turns on the category of genius (Genie) and assumes the presupposition of the absolute character of the individual subjectivity as source of creativity; one, that rehabilitate the human sensibility (Sinnlichkeit) and the sensible qualities of objects as contemplated or appreciated by the subject, the other, based on the idea of inner sentiment (Gefühl), considered as something inalienable and as the absolutely subjective dimension of individual experience.

 ——. “Kant: da reinvenção do Republicanismo à ideia de uma ‘República Mundial’.” [Portuguese] Cadernos de Filosofia Alemã: Crítica e Modernidade 16 (2010): 13-54. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper means to show the significant contribution of Kant to the modern idea of the republic and republicanism. Even nowadays not usualy associated with the philosopher, but always identified either with the liberal tradition or with the comunitary tradition (or yet with a certain “liberal republicanism”), this notion of republicanism is, however, central within the Kantianism. It is therefore important to show how this idea is linked to Kantian philosophy, explaining its essential aspects and finally to place these in the Kantian project of perpetual peace, taking into account the creation of political institutions founded on the principles of law and respect for human dignity

 ——, Ubirajara Rancan de Azevedo Marques, Gregorio Piaia, Marco Sgarbi, und Riccardo Pozzo, eds.  Was ist der Mensch? Que é o homem? Antropologia, Estética e Teleologia em Kant.  Lisbon: Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisbo, 2010.  [793 p.]

Riccardi, Mattia.  “Nietzsche’s Critique of Kant’s Thing in Itself.”  Nietzsche-Studien 39 (2010): 333-51.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper investigates the argument that substantiates Nietzsche’s refusal of the Kantian concept of thing in itself. As Maudemarie Clark points out, Nietzsche dismisses this notion because he views it as self-contradictory. The main concern of the paper will be to account for this position. In particular, the two main theses defended here are (a) that the argument underlying Nietzsche’s claim is that the concept of thing in itself amounts to the inconsistent idea of a propertyless thing and (b) that this argument is a sound one. Finally, I will show that the reading proposed allows a deflationary response to the objection that Nietzsche’s will to power is simply a new version of the post-Kantian thing in itself.

Rice, Stephen, David Trafimow, Gayle Hunt, and Joshua Sandry.  “Generalizing Kant’s Distinction between Perfect and Imperfect Duties to Trust in Different Situations.”  Journal of General Psychology 137 (2010): 20-36. [abstract]

Richter, Gerhard.  “The Work of Art and Its Formal and Genealogical Determinations: Benjamin’s “Cool Place” between Kant and Nietzsche.”  Grey Room 39 (2010): 95-113.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article discusses the views of German Jewish philosopher Walter Benjamin on the formal and genealogical determinations of a work of art, which separates the perceptions of German philosophers Immanuel Kant and Friedrich Nietzsche. It mentions that some of the writings of Benjamin depict internal tensions as well as consistencies. It states that his literary works require readers to learn how to follow his thoughts on logic. The author says that his sentences imply a self-reflexive and at the same time textual model of cognition wherein language becomes an element of obliteration and insight.

Ricken, Friedo.  Warum moralisch sein? Beiträge zur gegenwärtigen Moralphilosophie.  Stuttgart: Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 2010.  [160 p.]

 ——.  “Von der Unentbehrlichkeit der transzendentalen Theologie. Zum ‘Ideal der reinen Vernunft’.”  Kants Grundlegung einer kritischen Metaphysik.  Ed. Norbert Fischer (op cit.).  313-22.

 ——.  Rev. of Kant on God, by Peter Byrne (2007).  Theologie und Philosophie 85 (2010): 95-96.

Rieu, Alain-Marc.  “The Kantian Model: Confucianism and the Modern Divide.”  Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy.  Ed. Stephen R. Palmquist (op cit.).  741-52.

Rind, Miles.  Rev. of The Kantian Aesthetic: From Knoweldge to the Avant-Garde, by Paul Crowther (2010).  The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (December 2010, #10). [online]

Rinofner-Kreidl, Sonja.  “Husserl’s Categorical Imperative and His Related Critique of Kant.”  Epistemology, Archaeology, Ethics: Current Investigations of Husserl’s Corpus.  Eds. Pol Vandevelde and Sebastian Luft (London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2010). 188-210.

Ripstein, Arthur.  “Kantian Legal Philosophy.”  A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory, 2nd ed.  Ed. Dennis Patterson (Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010).  392-405.

Risser, James.  “Introduction to Transfigurements: On the True Sense of Art by John Sallis.”  Research in Phenomenology 40 (2010): 95-96.

Rivers, Julian.  See: Capps, Patrick and Julian Rivers.

Rjabov, Pyotr V.  “Rossijskoe kantianstvo I neokantianstvo načala XX veka v neopublikovannych memuarach A. A. Borovogo.” [Russian; “Russian Kantianism and Neo-Kantianism at the beginning of the 20th century in the unpublished memoirs of A. A. Borovoi”]  Kantovskij Sbornik 34 (2010): 97-103.

Roberts-Cady, Sarah.  “Against Retributive Justifications of the Death Penalty.”  Journal of Social Philosophy 41 (2010): 185-93.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Theories of retributive justice are not sufficient to establish whether or not the death penalty is a morally acceptable form of punishment. One cannot justify the death penalty simply by establishing the claim that wrongdoers deserve punishment which fits the crime. It is reasonable to believe that there are some punishments which, even if they are deserved, one ought not to inflict. To sort out whether or not the death penalty is a punishment of that sort, one must discuss broader ethical issues than a fit between crime and punishment.

Robinson, Daniel N.  “Kant’s (Seamless) Refutation of Idealism.”  Review of Metaphysics 64 (2010): 291-301.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article discusses the refutation of idealism by Immanuel Kant in his book Critique of Pure Reason. Jonathan Vogel states that the refutation fails if the self can be known to persist through change and Kant does not seem to address such a possibility. Furthermore, it says that actual knowledge requires inner intuition, rendering sensibility possible and that the self cannot have direct knowledge of persistence through change and therefore cannot have direct knowledge of any substance.

Robinson, Henry Crabb.  Essays on Kant, Schelling, and German aesthetics.  Edited by James Vigus.  London: Modern Humanities Research Association, 2010.  [ix, 151 p.]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: This is a critical edition of texts written by Robinson (1775–1867) during his first stay in Germany (1800-1805). [SN]

Robinson, Hoke. “Kant on Empirical Concept- and Intuition-Formation: A Discussion with Hannah Ginsborg.” Southwest Philosophy Journal 26.1 (2010): 131-40. [PDC]

Roche, Andrew.  “Kant’s Principle of Sense.”  British Journal for the History of Philosophy 18 (2010): 663-91.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article explores the use the term sense in the writings on the theory of knowledge by Enlightenment philosophers Immanuel Kant, especially in his book Critique of Pure Reason; in the book A Treatise of Human Nature, by David Hume; and in the publication An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, by John Locke, to consider how they use, define, and view the term. Some of the subjects considered include Kant’s Transcendental Deduction, experience, substance, the philosophical nature of the soul, epistemology, and teleology.

Rockmore, Tom.  “Dewey, Hegel, and Knowledge after Kant.”  John Dewey and Continental Philosophy.  Ed. Paul Fairfield (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2010). 26-43.

 ——.  “Fichte, German Idealism, and the Thing in Itself.”  Fichte, German Idealism, and Early Romanticism.  Eds. Daniel Breazeale and Tom Rockmore (op cit.). 9-20.

 ——.  在康德的唤醒下: 20世纪西方哲学 / Zai Kangde de huan xing xia: 20 shi ji xi fang zhe xue.  Translation into Chinese by Xiangdong Xu of In Kant’s Wake: Philosophy in the Twentieth Century (2006).  Beijing: Beijing da xue chu ban she, 2010.  [233 p.]

 ——, ed.  See: Breazeale, Daniel and Tom Rockmore, eds.

Roff, Heather M.  “Kantian Provisional Duties.”  Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik / Annual Review of Law and Ethics 18 (2010): 533-62.

Rohden, Valerio.  “As ideias como formas de vida da Razão.” [Portuguese]  Was ist der Mensch? Que é o homem?  Eds. Ribeiro dos Santos, et al. (op cit.).  337-46.

 ——. “Jusificação das Ilusões da Metafísica consideraçóes sobre KrV B 294-95.” [Portuguese] Crítica da Razão Tradutora. Sobre a dificuldade de traduzir Kant. Eds. Alessandro Pinzani and Valério Rohden (op cit.). 161-75. [M]

 ——, ed. See: Pinzani, Alessandro, and Valério Rohden, eds.

Rohlf, Michael.  “The Ideas of Pure Reason.”  The Cambridge Companion to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.  Ed. Paul Guyer (op cit.).  190-209.

Röller, Nils.  “Thinking with Instruments: The Example of Kant’s Compass.”  Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy.  Ed. Stephen R. Palmquist (op cit.).  300-307.

Rölli, Marc.  “Person and Character in Kant’s Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View.”  Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy.  Ed. Stephen R. Palmquist (op cit.).  447-54.

Romero Romeral, Pablo.  Rev. of Teoría y crítica de la razón: Kant y Ortega y Gasset, edited by Sergio Rábade Romeo, Antonio M. López Molina, Mariana Urquijo Reguera, et al. (2009).  Educación y futuro: Revista de investigación aplicada y experiencias educativas 22 (2010): 257-60.

Ronzoni, Miriam.  “Constructivism and Practical Reason: On Intersubjectivity, Abstraction, and Judgment.”  Journal of Moral Philosophy 7 (2010): 74-104.

Rosen-Carole, Adam.  “The Possibility of the New: Adornoian Lessons for Psychoanalysis.”  Pli: The Warwick Journal of Philosophy 21 (2010): 62-87.

Rosenkoetter, Timothy.  “Absolute Positing, the Frege Anticipation Thesis, and Kant’s Definitions of Judgment.”  European Journal of Philosophy 18 (2010): 539-66. [abstract]

 ——.  Rev. of Kant’s Moral and Legal Philosophy, ed. by Karl Ameriks and Otfried Höffe (2009).  The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (November 2010, #6). [online]

Rosillo Pelayo, María de las Viñas.  Rev. of Teoría y crítica de la razón: Kant y Ortega y Gasset, edited by Sergio Rábade Romeo, Antonio M. López Molina, Mariana Urquijo Reguera, et al. (2009).  Estudios Filosoficos 59 (2010): 191-93.

Ross, Alison.  “The Modern Concept of Aesthetic Experience: from Ascetic Pleasure to Social Criticism.”  Critical Horizons 11 (2010): 333-39.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article discusses various reports published within the issue including one by Jenny McMahon on the relation between aesthetics and morals based on the view of philosopher Immanuel Kant, one by Alison Ross on the critical review of aesthetics and morals, and one by James Phillips and Krzystof Ziarek on the materiality of language in poetry.

 ——.  “The Moral Efficacy of Aesthetic Experience: Figures of Meaning in the Moral Field.”  Critical Horizons 11 (2010): 397-417.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract #1: The author discusses a process that provides meaning to the paths of action called figuration, and analyzes the aesthetic theory of philosopher Immanuel Kant. She asserts that moral action is different from the sphere of daily habit because it is a product of a reflective process. She offers a hypothesis about the role of aesthetic experience of meaning in showing that some circumstances reflect moral relevance. Also explained are the contexts of the path of moral action.

Abstract #2: This paper proposes to analyse the process that makes paths of action meaningful. It argues that this process is one of ‘figuration’. The term ‘figuration’ intends to outline how the experience of moral meaning is one that already positively marks out a field and to identify and analyse the mechanisms used for such marking and selection. It is my contention that these mechanisms predate the persuasion to a moral path; they are the process through which this path is constructed as meaningful. This thesis is elucidated through an analysis of the tactics of meaning in Kant’s moral theory. Kant turns to aesthetics as a means of corroboration for his moral theory, but he also attempts to limit the scope of the interactions between his aesthetic and moral theory. For instance, when he writes on the topic of form in aesthetic taste or outlines the technical specifications of aesthetic judgment, it is arguably the arcane peculiarities of his system that are met. For this reason, Kant insists on the merely analogical relations between beauty and morality. However, it is also possible to see how certain aspects of Kant’s aesthetic theory execute wider, and potentially more important, functions for his practical philosophy, such as providing meaningful orientation for the ascetic moral attitude of his duty-ethics. In this respect, certain figures of Kant’s aesthetic theory may well be viewed as complementing the dependence in his moral philosophy, in the important sections on moral pedagogy and methodology, on appeals to heroic models and stories as ways of shaping and inculcating the moral disposition. This paper considers these aspects of interaction between Kant’s aesthetic and moral philosophies as both 1) a problem for the consistency of his philosophy given his avowed exclusion of aesthetic and religious elements of meaning in his duty-ethics; and 2) as a case study for the new, schematic analysis of ‘moral figuration’ outlined in the paper.

Rossi, Philip J.  “Kant’s ‘Metaphysics of Permanent Rupture’.”  Kant’s Anatomy of Evil.  Eds. Anderson-Gold and Muchnik (op cit.).  13-32.

 ——.  “Reading Kant from a Catholic Horizon: Ethics and the Anthropology of Grace.”  Theological Studies 71 (2010): 79-100. [abstract]

Rouanet, Luiz Paulo.  “A Filosofia da Natureza de Kant.” [Portuguese; Kant’s philosophy of nature]  Kant e-Prints 5.1 (2010): 1-13. [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper has as central objective to scrutinize the work Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, by Immanuel Kant. It is part of a broader project which investigates the conception of Nature of many philosophers along the history. This work should be related with the critical philosophy in general, specially the Prolegomena to any future metaphysics that will be able to come forward as science and the Critique of Pure Reason.

Rovira, Rogelio.  “¿Es una ‘falsa sutileza’ la división lógica de las figuras del silogismo? Sobre la crítica de Kant a la doctrina aristotélica del silogismo categórico.” [Spanish]  Teorema 29 (2010): 5-21.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The aim of this paper is to show the unsoundness of Kant’s thesis, according to which Aristotle’s logic division of the four syllogistic figures is a false subtlety. As a matter of fact, Kant’s criticism of Aristotle’s doctrine of categorical syllogism is in last analysis based on a misinterpretation of the Aristotelian procedure of the reduction of syllogisms.

Roy, Manuel.  Rev. of Est Deus in nobis: Die Identität von Gott und reiner praktischer Vernunft in Immanuel Kants ‘Kritik der praktischen Vernunft’, by Gerhard Schwarz (2004).  Philosophiques 37 (2010): 546-51.

Rubenstein, Eric M., ed.  See: O’Shea, James R. and Eric M. Rubenstein, eds.

Rüdiger, Axel.  “Produktive Nagativität: Die Rolle des Perfektionismus im deutschen Aufklärungsdenken zwischen Pufendorf und Kant.”  Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 58 (2010): 721-40.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: On the basis of the finding that perfectibility for Pufendorf had a cultural as well as an antiessentialist meaning, the perfectibility debate of the early German Enlightenment will be discussed. Central to this debate is the principle of “generative absence”, one that has heretofore received little attention, but proves to be constitutive of both Pufendorf’s and Pietism’s argumentation in opposition to mechanical materialism and religious orthodoxy. My account of this context will go over the positions of Christian Thomasius’s empirical eclecticism and Christian Wolff’s rationalist metaphysics and end with Georg Forster’s and Immanuel Kant’s reception of the Rousseauian concept of perfectibility. In so doing, I will advance the thesis that, much more extensively than most have assumed, the German Enlightenment prepared German idealism’s dialectical constitution of the modern concept of progress.

Ruffing, Margit.  “Sentiment moral et sentiment religieux chez Kant.”  Was ist der Mensch? Que é o homem?  Eds. Ribeiro dos Santos, et al. (op cit.).  527-36.

 ——.  “Worauf Vernunft hinaussieht.  Kants regulative Ideen im Kontext von Teleologie und praktischer Philosophie.  Bericht zur Tagung am 4. und 5. September 2009 in Frankfurt am Main.”  Kant-Studien 101 (2010): 105–09.

Rufinoni, Priscila Rossinetti.  “Julgar sem preceptivas, julgar pelo universal: glosas modernistas a Kant” [Portuguese; “To judge without preceptive, to judge by universal: modernist comments about Kant”]  Trans/Form/Acao: Revista de Filosofia 33.1 (2010): 95-111. [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article aims to show the aesthetic judgments of the Third critique of Kant in relation to the discourses on modern art. In didactic manner, we propose to show the relationship between the Kantians judgments and the artistic modernity, its development and its contemporary criticism. We do not propose, however, a detailed analysis of Kant's philosophy, but expose the various interpretations which this philosophy received when it opened another space for Aesthetic. This article does not show art as "free play" or as "beautiful" and as "finality without end", but investigates the autoreflexivity of the aesthetic judgments. The interpretation of the modern art could be, ultimately, an exercise of communal judgments?

Rühl, Ulli F. H.  Kants Deduktion des Rechts als intelligibler Besitz Kants “Privatrecht” zwischen vernunftrechtlicher Notwendigkeit und juristischer Kontingenz.  Paderborn: Mentis, 2010.  [135 p.] [contents]

 ——.  “Der intellegible Besitz – und nicht Eigentum – als rechtsmetaphysischer Fundamentalbegriff in Kants ‘Privatrecht’.”  Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik / Annual Review of Law and Ethics 18 (2010): 563-80.

Ruiz Sanjuán, César.  “La articulación de lo abstracto y lo concreto en el proceso de conocimiento teórico.” [Spanish]  Endoxa 25 (2010): 129-64.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper deals with the way in which the abstract and the concrete are articulated in the correct scientific method as it is defined by Marx in his fundamental methodological text, as well as the relation of this articulation with the respective theoretical positions of Hegel and Kant. In order to do this we examine the conceptual coordinates in which Marx raises the question of the method and analyze his description of it as a process that consist in ascending from the abstract to the concrete. Then we discuss the implications of Marx’s approach in his position toward Hegel’s philosophy and Kant’s philosophy.

Rukgaber, Matthew.  “Time and Metaphysics: Kant and McTaggart on the Reality of Time.”  Kant Yearbook: Metaphysics 2 (2010): 175-94.

Rumjantsewa, Tatyana G. “М. Мендельсон в эпистолярном наследии И. Канта.” [Russian; “M. Mendelssohn in the epistolary remains of I. Kant”] Kantovskij Sbornik 31 (2010): 41-47. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The author shows the importance of the analysis of Kant's epistolary heritage in the reconstruction of the evolution process of German Classic philosophy. This article defines the role of Moses Mendelsohn, Kant's letters to whom became a turning point in the works of the great German philosopher, in the context of this heritage.

Ruthenberg, Klaus.  “Das Kant’sche Echo in Paneths Philosophie der Chemie.”  Kant-Studien 101 (2010): 465-79.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The eminent radiochemist Friedrich Paneth (1887–1958) tried to come to terms with the following epistemological problem: On the one hand chemical elements are characterized empirically as indestructible material species, on the other hand they are characterized theoretically as having the same number of protons in the nuclei of their atoms. Paneth used the dualistic Kantian epistemology (using Eduard von Hartmann’s interpretation) in order to describe the combination of these two aspects, applying the terms “Grundstoff”, fundamental matter, to the latter and “einfacher Stoff”, simple matter, to the former. The present paper discusses the applicability of Kant’s philosophy – in the interpretation of Paneth – to the (modern) philosophy of chemistry.

[top]S    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Saastamoinen, Kari.  “Pufendorf on Natural Equality, Human Dignity, and Self-Esteem.”  Journal of the History of Ideas 71 (2010): 39-62.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: It is often maintained that Samuel Pufendorf founded natural equality on human dignity.  This article partly questions this interpretation, maintaining that the dignity Pufendorf attributed to human nature did not indicate the Kantian idea of absolute and incomparable worth but only superiority in relation to other animals.  This comparative dignity of humanity implied that all humans are equally obliged to obey natural law, but it did not offer a foundation for the similarity of their innate duties.  The latter followed from the fundamental principle of natural law, the duty to maintain sociality, and from observations concerning human self-esteem.

Sabolius, Kristupas.  “Space and Imagination.” [Lithuanian]  Problemos: Mokslo darbai 77 (2010): 60-69.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The problem of pure space, presented in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, is a controversial issue which should be reconsidered in the light of the polemics over the status of imagination. It is exactly the analysis of the principle of individuation, identifying a particular and concrete interconnection between time and space that it becomes the criterion which supposedly could reveal the original and constitutional differences between the two ideals and à priori conditions of our internal intuition. The phenomenological approach to imagination unfolds the relation of space to the sense of specific experiences and elucidates the original function of spatial imagination. It constantly structures the coordination of consciousness and accomplishes the organization of space.

Sadun Bordoni, Gianluca, ed.  See: Delfosse, Heinrich, Norbert Hinske, and Gianluca Sadun Bordoni, eds.

Sala, Giovanni.  Rev. of Kants Lösung des Theodizeeproblems. Eine Rekonstruktion, by Volker Dieringer (2009).  Philosophisches Jahrbuch 117 (2010): 362-66.

Salikov, Alexei N.  “Russkie v Kant-Študien.” [Russian; “Russians in Kant-Studien”]  Kantovskij Sbornik 34 (2010): 87-96.

Sallis, John.  “On Shining Forth: Response to Günter Figal and Dennis Schmidt.”  Research in Phenomenology 40 (2010): 115-19.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article presents a reply of the author to the commentaries written by Gunter Figal and Dennis Schmidt on the book Transfigurements. It gives an overview of the nature of both commentaries and provides answers to the questions posed by Figal and Schmidt. It concludes with a passage from Critique of Judgement by Immanuel Kant. The book centers on the analysis of aesthetic ideas and sketches the entire Kantian motif in the first section of the introductory piece.

Salzani, Carlo.  “Purity (Benjamin with Kant).”  History of European Ideas 36 (2010): 438-47.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The essay analyses the notion of ‘purity’ in the early writings of Walter Benjamin, focusing more specifically on three essays written around the crucial year 1921: ‘Critique of Violence’, ‘The Task of the Translator’, and ‘Goethe’s Elective Affinities’. In these essays, ‘purity’ appears in the notions of ‘pure means’, ‘pure violence’, ‘pure language’, and, indirectly, the ‘expressionless’. The essay argues, on the one hand, that the ‘purity’ of these concepts is one and the same notion, and, on the other, that it is strongly indebted to, if not a by-product of, Kant’s theorisation of the moral act. In order to make this claim, the essay analyses Benjamin’s intense engagement with Kant’s writings in the 1910s and early 1920s: ‘purity’ is a category strongly connoted within the philosophical tradition in which the young Benjamin moved his first steps, namely Kantian transcendental criticism. The essay argues that the notion of ‘purity’ in Benjamin, though deployed outside and often against Kant’s theorisation and that of his followers, and moreover influenced by different and diverse philosophical suggestions, retains a strong Kantian tone, especially in reference to its moral and ethical aspects. Whereas Benjamin rejects Kant’s model of cognition based on the ‘purity’ of the universal laws of reason, and thus also Kant’s theorisation of purity as simply non empirical and a priori, he models nonetheless his politics and aesthetics around suggestions that arise directly from Kant’s theorisation of the moral act and of the sublime, and uses a very Kantian vocabulary of negative determinations construed with the privatives-los and -frei (motiv-frei, zweck-los, gewalt-los, ausdrucks-los, intention-frei, etc). The essay explores thus the connections that link ‘pure means’, ‘pure language’ and ‘pure violence’ to one another and to the Kantian tradition.

Samet, Irit.  “The Form of Evil.”  Kantian Review 14.2 (2010): 93-117.

Sánchez Madrid, Nuria.  “Dos Obstáculos da Natureza aos Obstáculos da Razão. Uma Leitura das Preleções de Pedagogia de Kant em Seis Passos.” [Portuguese; From the obstacles of nature to the obstacles of reason. A reading of Kant’s Lectures of pedagogy in six steps]  Kant e-Prints 5.2 (2010): 81-100. [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This text aims to set out Kantian pedagogical thought as a supplementary piece of his conception of reason. The process of appropriation of reason needs to involve as an essential means the discipline, i.e., that part of education which gets children fit to use their freedom in a communitarian context. With this approach, it analyzes the educational progress as a path which has to be carried out in six steps. Going through this path, the rational human being quits its animal features, getting used to obey rules of universal reach, in order to achieve finally a moral character, which is required to be able to act in a human community regulated by courtesy and right.

Sánchez Rodríguez, Manuel.  Sentimiento y reflexión en la filosofía de Kant: estudio histórico sobre el problema estético. [Spanish]  Hildesheim: Olms, 2010.  [xxviii, 319 p.] [data]

 ——.  “Prolegómenos a una edición crítica de los ‘Fragmentos sobre estética’ de Kant.” [Spanish]  Daimon, Revista de Filosofia 3 (2010): 75-84. [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In dem vorliegenden Aufsatz wird das Projekt der Übersetzung und Edition der Fragmentos sobre estética. Una selección crítica a partir de los Apuntes de Lecciones sobre Antropología von Kant dargestellt. Aus einer entwicklungsgeschichtlichen Untersuchung über die Bildung seines ästhetischen Projekts von 1770 bis zum 1790, werden die Fragmente über Ästhetik ausgewählt und übersetzt, die im Band 25. der Akademie-Ausgabe beinhalten sind. Man vertretet hier die Relevanz solcher Materialien zum historischen Verständnis der Entstehung und Bildung der Kritik der Urteilskraft im Kontext der Überlegungen Kants über sytematische Probleme und Themen, die in der kritischen Begründung der Rationalität impliziert sind.

 ——.  Rev. of Der Begriff der Welt bei Wolff, Baumgarten, Crusius und Kant: Eine Untersuchung zur Vorgeschichte von Kants Weltbegriff, by Chang Won Kim (2004).  Kant-Studien 101 (2010): 134-37.

Sandry, Joshua.  See: Rice, Stephen, David Trafimow, Gayle Hunt, and Joshua Sandry.

Sans, Georg.  “Gerold Prauss über Moral und Recht im Staat nach Kant und Hegel.”  Theologie und Philosophie 85 (2010): 185-202.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The categorical imperative, in the formula of humanity as end in itself, demands to use every person always at the same time as end, never merely as a means. According to Gerold Prauss, Kant should have distinguished more carefully between “not merely as a means, but at the same time as end” and “not as means at all, but only as end”. Whereas the first formula describes a legal relationship between two self-determining subjects who mutually recognize one another, the second formula applies to situations in which I face a rational being that depends on my help. For Prauss, only in the second case the ethical duty deserves to be called moral. The paper traces Prauss' considerations regarding right and morals as well as regarding the role played by the secular state in their realization. These considerations are discussed as an extremely stimulating attempt to make sense of the Kantian thesis that reason is practical of itself.

 ——.  Rev. of Kritische Metaphysik der Substanz: Kant im Widerspruch zu Leibniz, by Andree Hahmann (2009).  Theologie und Philosophie 85 (2010): 416-19.

Santos, José Henrique.  “De Kant a Schelling.” [Spanish]  Rev. of Nouvelles études sur l'idéalisme allemand, by Miklos Vetö (2009).  Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia 51 (2010): 328-35. [online]

Santos, Robinson dos. “O Conceito de Klugheit em Kant.” [Portuguese] Crítica da Razão Tradutora. Sobre a dificuldade de traduzir Kant. Eds. Alessandro Pinzani and Valério Rohden (op cit.). 141-59. [M]

Sá Pereira, Roberto Horácio de. “Consciência e Autoconsciência em Kant.” [Portuguese; "Consciousness and Self-Consciousness in Kant"] Revista Índice 2.2 (2010): 1-22. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper, I defend three different readings for capital notions of empirical consciousness, empirical apperception and for transcendental apperception in Kant’s theoretical philosophy. In empirical sense, consciousness is understood by Kant as a form of conscious of objects, the product of a representation, resulting from the so-called synthesis of apprehension. When the act of apprehension is direct to outside things (in the empirical sense of the term), empirical consciousness takes the form of a simple perception [Wahrnehmung], but when the act is internally direct (also in the empirical sense of the term), empirical consciousness takes the form of an introspection or internal perception [innere Wahrnehmung]. While consciousness in empirical sense is percipire, in the propositional sense is rather the knowledge, or more specifically, the recognition [erkennen] that the object perceived belongs to the sphere of such and such concept. Furthermore, if propositional consciousness is the acknowledgment of what appears as belonging a concept, self-consciousness or consciousness of oneself qua subject is the acknowledge erkennen that one is self-concerned or self-involved whenever one entertains a given content in the assertoric mode as a proposition [Satz], i.e. as a fact or an objective reality independently from the subject himself.

Sardinha, Diogo.  “L’humanité dans l’animalité: Kant et l’anthropologie du bien et du mal.”  War and Peace: the Role of Science and Art.  Eds. Soraya Nour and Olivier Remaud (op cit.).  11-23.

 ——.  “O paradoxo da antropologia.” [Portuguese]  Was ist der Mensch? Que é o homem?  Eds. Ribeiro dos Santos, et al. (op cit.).  179-91.

Sautter, Frank Thomas.  “As Regras Supremas dos Silogismos.” [Portuguese; The supreme rules of the syllogism]  Kant e-Prints 5.1 (2010): 15-26. [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: I give two interpretations of the supreme rules of all syllogisms provided by Kant in his pre-critical essay “The False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures”. One interpretation understands literally, i.e., grammatically, the expressions ‘positive syllogism’ and ‘negative syllogism’; the other interprets them non-literally, i.e., it interprets them logically.

Schachina, Anna Ju. “Актуальность философско-педагогического наследия И. Канта.” [Russian; “The enduring relevance of the philosophical-pedagogical heritage of Kant”] Kantovskij Sbornik 32 (2010): 88-96. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article is meant for teachers and everyone interested in the problems of upbringing and selfupbringing. The major incentive for all works of the great scientists was the desire to reveal the extent of possibility and necessity of dignity for a person pursuing their vocation. Kant showed the world as the world should be in accordance to the sensible disposition of the human being. The author analyses the main concepts of Kant's rational ethics and attempts to classify his pedagogical ideas, which can be traced through all his works. The article also addresses the influence of Immanuel Kant's philosophical and pedagogical ideas on the development of pedagogy in Germany in the 19th century as well as on the modern theory and practice of education.

Schalowski, Stefan.  Erziehung, Selbstbestimmung und Zwang bei Immanuel Kant und Jean-Jacques Rousseau.  Zwei Philosophen mit identischen Ideen?  Munich: GRIN Verlag, 2010.  [18 p.]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Wenn heute ältere Leute nach Erziehung und ihrem Stellenwert in der Gesellschaft gefragt werden, bekommt man häufig als Antwort, dass früher ganz anders erzogen wurde. Damals gehörten z. B. Schläge zur Züchtigung zu einer gängigen Erziehungsmethode. Gerade der jüngere Teil der Gesellschaft wird von dieser Generation häufig als „schlecht erzogen“, „rüpelhaft“ oder sogar als „ungezogen“ beschrieben. Das Interesse an Erziehung spiegelt sich gerade in der heutigen Medienlandschaft in diversen TV-Formaten wieder. In diesen wird dann häufig versucht, vermeidliche Erziehungsfehler der Eltern mit pädagogischen Erziehungsmethoden wieder rückgängig zu machen. Die Frage die sich dabei stellt ist jedoch, ob Erziehung erst durch die mediale Ausschlachtung ein gesellschaftsfähiges oder zumindest gesellschaftsrelevantes Thema wurde. Es liegt jedoch auf der Hand, dass Erziehung längst nicht nur ein Thema der modernen Industriegesellschaft ist. Bereits viel früher wurde sich eingehend mit dieser Thematik beschäftigt. Hier besonders hervorzuheben sind die Philosophen Immanuel Kant (* 1724; † 1804) und Jean-Jacques Rousseau (* 1712; † 1778) die sich intensiv mit dem Erziehungsbegriff auseinandersetzten. Daher beschäftigt sich diese Ausarbeitung im Schwerpunkt mit dem Erziehungsbegriff bei Kant und Rousseau. Ein besonderes Augenmerk wird dabei auf die Relevanz der Erziehung sowie dem Zusammenhang von Selbstbestimmung und Zwang gelegt. Bei Rousseau werden des Weiteren noch Ausführungen über die Rolle der Gesellschaft ergänzt. Abschließen wird die Frage geklärt, ob beide Philosophen identische Ideen hatten oder worin sie sich vielleicht auch unterscheiden. Haben sie sich möglicherweise sogar gegenseitig beeinflusst? Im ersten Schritt werden daher die Ideen von Kant, im zweiten Schritt die von Rousseau dargestellt. Gerade dabei ist es wichtig, meist auf längere Zitate der Primärtexte zurückzugreifen, um die Gedanken des jeweiligen Philosophen authentisch zu transportieren. Dies wäre durch Sekundärwerke meist nicht mehr möglich. Anschließend werden dann beide Philosophen in Beziehung zueinander gesetzt. Diese Ausarbeitung erhebt dabei keinerlei Anspruch auf Vollständigkeit. Vielmehr ist es das Ziel, zentrale Elemente beider Theorien herauszugreifen und diese miteinander zu verknüpfen. An geeigneter Stelle wird darauf noch einmal explizit hingewiesen.

Scherer, Fábio César.  “Teoria Kantiana dos Juízos a priori do Direito dos Estados Segundo o Método de Análise e Síntese.” [Portuguese; Kantian theory of the a priori judgments of the right of states according to the analytic and synthetic method]  Kant e-Prints 5.2 (2010): 118-34. [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the horizon of the Kantian theory of the reasoning problems and his auxiliary theory (transcendental philosophy), can the States law fundamental juridical problem in Rechtslehre be synthesized by the question: how are the States law a priori synthetic judgments possible? On the other hand, in the matter of logical-analytical problems resolution, it is possible to operate through the analysis and synthesis method. The objective of this article is to reconstruct the possibility problem and the applicability of the States law theory according to this procedure of discovery and exposition. In a wide context, the aim is to connect the Kantian Rechtslehre to the solubility theory of reasoning in general to make explicit the critical character of this late

 ——.  “Teoria dos juízos a priori do Direito do Estado conforme o método de análise e síntese.” [Portuguese; Theory of a priori judgments of the right of states according to the analytic and synthetic method]  Kant e-Prints 5.3 (2010): 36-56. [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The aim of this article is to reconstruct the State law Kantian theory exposed in Rechtslehre (1797), through an analytical-logical reading key, which contains as proof proceeding the analysis and synthesis method. This investigation corroborates with the interpretation that defends the criticality this late juridical text to an extent that the State law is connected to the critical plan of the a priori synthetic judgments in general enunciation.

Scherer, Günter Richard.  Kant, die Handschrift und das Bild: Roman über ein rätselhaftes Porträt des Königsberger Philosophen Immanuel Kant.  Husum: Husum, 2010.  [232 p.]

Schick, Friedrike.  Rev. of Moral und Recht im Staat nach Kant und Hegel, by Gerold Prauss (2009).  Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 64 (2010): 264-67.

Schilling, Christof.  Rev. of Von der Freiheit und ihrer Verkehrung: Eine Studie zu Kant und den Bedingungen der Möglichkeit einer kritischen Theorie der Gesellschaft, by Till Streichert (2003).  Kant-Studien 101 (2010): 110-13.

Schliemann, Oliver.  Die Axiome der Anschauung in Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft.  Berlin / New York: De Gruyter, 2010.  [154 p.]

[Note] [Hide Note] Kantstudien Ergänzungshefte, vol. 162; originally presented as the author’s thesis (Universität Bielefeld, 2009).

Schmidt, Claudia M.  Rev. of Kant and the Early Moderns, edited by Daniel Garber and Béatrice Longuenesse (2008).  Philosophy in Review 30 (2010): 263-65. [online]

Schmidt, Dennis J.  “In Kant’s Wake: On John Sallis’ Transfigurements.”  Research in Phenomenology 40 (2010): 104-14.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Discusses the question of the relation of art and truth in Kant and his successors. Argues for the idea that this is the defining question of Continental philosophy. Sallis’s book ‘Transfigurements’ is presented as on the cutting edge of answering this question. Three special concerns are: the notion of truth, the sense of nature, the scope of language.

Schmitt, Anton.  “Kuno Fischers Clavis Kantiana — Einführung und Übersetzung.”  Kant als Bezugspunkt Philosophischen Denkens.  Eds. Hubertus Busche and Anton Schmitt (op cit.).  207-33.

 ——, ed.  See: Busche, Hubertus, and Anton Schmitt, ed.

Schneewind, J. B.  Essays on the History of Moral Philosophy.  Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.  [xvii, 447 p.]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: J.B. Schneewind presents a selection of his published essays on ethics, the history of ethics and moral psychology, together with a new piece offering an intellectual autobiography. The essays range across the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries, with a particular focus on Kant and his relation to earlier thinkers.

Schönecker, Dieter.  “Kant über Menschenliebe als moralische Gemütsanlage.”  Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie. 92 (2010): 133-75.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the Introduction of the Tugendlehre, Kant identifies love of human beings as one of the four moral predispositions that make us receptive to the moral law. We claim that this love is neither benevolence nor the aptitude of the inclination to beneficence in general (both are also called love of human beings); rather it is amor complacentiae, which Kant understands as the delight in moral striving for perfection. We also provide a detailed analysis of Kant’s almost completely neglected theory of moral predispositions. They are necessary conditions to be aware of the moral law and to be motivated by it.

 ——.  “Kant über die Möglichkeit von Pflichten gegen sich selbst (Tugendlehre, §§ 1-3). Eine Skizze.”  Kant als Bezugspunkt Philosophischen Denkens.  Eds. Hubertus Busche and Anton Schmitt (op cit.).  235-60.

 ——. “Kant, sobre a possibilidade de deveres para consigo mesmo (Tugendlehre §§ 1 – 3).” [Portuguese] Studia Kantiana (online) 8 (2010): 27-50. [M][online]

 ——.  See: Bacin, Stefano and Dieter Schönecker.

Schönfeld, Martin. “Wolffs Chinarede und ihre Bedeutung für Kant.” Christian Wolff und die europäische Aufklärung, Pt. 5 of the Akten des 1. Internationalen Christian-Wolff-Kongresses, Halle (Saale), 4.-8. April 2004. Eds. Jürgen Stolzenberg und Oliver-Pierre Rudolph (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York: Georg Olms, 2010). 377-95. [M]

Schönwälder-Kuntze, Tatjana.  Freiheit als Norm?: Moderne Theoriebildung und der Effekt Kantischer Moralphilosophie.  Bielefeld: Transcript, 2010.  [311 p.]

[Note] [Hide Note] The author’s Habilitationschrift (Universität München, 2007).
Wie wirkmächtig ist die kritische Moralphilosophie Kants heute? Im Foucault'schen Sinne einer kritischen Ontologie fragt Tatjana Schönwälder-Kuntze nach dem für unsere Gegenwart so bedeutenden Konstrukt und zeigt, dass in der modernen Bestimmung von Freiheit und Subjektivität der Denkraum aufgespannt worden ist, innerhalb dessen nicht nur die Praktische Philosophie bis heute gedacht wird (und gedacht werden darf). Zudem bietet die Studie eine umfassende Konstruktionsanalyse der Kant’schen Moralphilosophie, die den Fokus auf deren durch die Problemstellung bedingte Genese sowie auf die so entstandene Architektur legt.

Schrag, Francis.  “Moral Education in the ‘Badlands’.”  Journal of Curriculum Studies 42 (2010): 149-63.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The author’s initial argument concludes that parents should refrain from inculcating norms and dispositions suitable for peacetime when ruthless enemies seek to kill or imprison their children.  Drawing on recent interpreters of Kant, this paper argues that teaching children to deceive pursuers is consistent with Kantian arguments against lying.  This paper modifies the initial argument to take account of the need to also inculcate peacetime norms, even in wartime.  It shows that the amended argument has applicability to a variety of real-world contexts and explores its implications for schools.  A final section responds to purported objections.  (Contains 8 notes.)

Schramm, Michael.  “Hermann und Kant: Philologie als (Kantische) Wissenschaft.”  Gottfried Hermann (1772-1848): Internationales Symposium in Leipzig 11.-13. Oktober 2007.  Eds. Kurt Sier and Eva Wöckener-Gade (Tübingen: Narr, 2010).  83-121. [data (anthology)]

Schröder, Peter.  “‘Irgend ein Vertrauen … muss … übrig bleiben’: The Idea of Trust in Kant’s Moral and Political Philosophy.”  Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy.  Ed. Stephen R. Palmquist (op cit.).  391-98.

Schröder, Wolfgang M.  Rev. of Kants Vorsehungskonzept auf dem Hintergrund der deutschen Schulphilosophie und -theologie, by Ulrich L. Lehner (2007).  Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 64 (2010): 280-81.

Schüling, Hermann.  Kritik der Erkenntnislehre des transzendentalen Idealismus Immanuel Kants.  Hildesheim: Olms, 2010.  [195 p.]

Schulting, Dennis.  “Kant, non-conceptuele inhoud en synthese.” [Dutch]  Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 72 (2010): 679-715.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Inspired by Kant’s account of intuition and concepts, John McDowell has forcefully argued that the relation between sensible content and concepts is such that sensible content does not severally contribute to cognition but always only in conjunction with concepts. This view is known as conceptualism. Recently, Robert Hanna and Lucy Allais, among others, have brought against this view the charge that it neglects the possibility of the existence of essentially non-conceptual content that is not conceptualized or subject to conceptualization. Their defense against McDowell amounts to non-conceptualism. Both views believe that intuition is synthesized content in Kant’s sense. In this article, I am particularly interested in how their views are true to Kant. I argue that although McDowell is right that intuition is only epistemically relevant in conjunction with concepts, I also believe that Hanna and Allais are right with regard to the existence of essentially non-conceptual content, but that they are wrong with regard to intuition being synthesized content in Kant’s sense. I also point out the common failure to take account of the modal nature of Kant’s argument for the relation between intuition and concept. [the article is written in Dutch]

Schwaiger, Clemens.  “Kants Apologie der Sinne. Die Erfindung der ‘transzendentalen Ästhetik’ im Kontext ihrer Zeit.”  Kants Grundlegung einer kritischen Metaphysik.  Ed. Norbert Fischer (op cit.).  51-64.

 ——.  Rev. of Il senso dell’etica: Kant e la costruzione di una teoria morale, by Stefano Bacin (2006).  Kant-Studien 101 (2010): 141-43.

 ——.  Rev. of L’ordine delle idee: La genesi del concetto di rappresentazione in Kant attraverso le sue fonti wolffiane, by Paola Rumore (2007).  Kant-Studien 101 (2010): 394-96.

Schwartz, Jeremy.  “Do Hypothetical Imperatives Require Categorical Imperatives?”  European Journal of Philosophy 18 (2010): 84-107.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Recently, the idea that every hypothetical imperative must somehow be ‘backed up’ by a prior categorical imperative has gained a certain influence among Kant interpreters and ethicists influenced by Kant. Since instrumentalism is the position that holds that hypothetical imperatives can by themselves and without the aid of categorical imperatives explain all valid forms of practical reasoning, the influential idea amounts to a rejection of instrumentalism as internally incoherent. This paper argues against this prevailing view both as an interpretation of Kant and as philosophical understanding of practical reason. In particular, it will be argued that many of the arguments that claim to show that hypothetical imperatives must be backed up by categorical imperatives mistakenly assume that the form of practical reasoning must itself occur as a premise within the reasoning. An alternative to this assumption will be offered. I will conclude that while instrumentalism may well be false, there is no reason to believe it is incoherent.

Schwarz, Anette.  “Reply to Taylor Carman: Heidegger’s Anti-Neo-Kantianism.”  Philosophical Forum 41 (2010): 143-47.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: First, I would like to thank Professor Taylor Carman for his complex and thought-provoking presentation. I have selected a certain number of claims and arguments from Professor Carman’s paper to which I want to respond by offering both counterclaims and suggestions for further discussion. Because of the time constraints, my observations, unfortunately, remain somewhat superficial and I apologize for that. The topics of my response include: the Davos debate between Heidegger and Cassirer, the status of its language, Heidegger’s focus on the status of transcendental imagination, and last but not least, Heidegger’s definitions of fundamental moods and thrownness.

Schwarz, Gerhard, and Matthias Wunsch.  “Limitation als Erkenntnisfunktion der Einbildungskraft. Eine Strukturverwandtschaft zwischen reiner Vernunfterkenntnis und reiner sinnlicher Erkenntnis bei Kant.”  Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte 52 (2010): 93-112.

Scraire, Mathieu.  Amour, utilité et dignité humaine: la distinction entre “jouir” et “user” chez Augustin, lue à travers l’impératif catégorique.  Saarbrucken, Germany: Éditions universitaires européennes, 2010.  [vii, 108 p.]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Originally presented as a Masters thesis (University of Montreal, 2007), with the title Amour, utilité et dignité de la personne: le schéma uti/frui chez Augustin lu à travers l'impératif catégorique.

Scruton, Roger.  Kant: A Brief Insight.  New York: Sterling Pub., 2010.  [163 p.]

Scutt, Marie Zermatt.  “Kant’s Moral Theology.”  British Journal for the History of Philosophy 18 (2010): 611-33.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article explores English criticisms of the “moral theology” forwarded by 18th-century German philosopher Immanuel Kant, especially in his books Critique of Pure Reason, Critique of Practical Reason, and Critique of the Power of Judgement. The philosophical interpretations regarding Kant’s proofs of God are defined as traditionalist, modernist and deductionist. Some of the subjects considered include Kant’s summum bonum or highest good, empiricism, the union of morality and happiness, and the nature and characteristics of God.

Sedová, Tatiana.  Rev. of Kant v kontextoch Husserlovej a Heideggerovej filozofie, edited by V. Lesko and Z. Plasienková (2009).  Filozofia 65 (2010): 504-06.

Seeberg, Ulrich.  “Aesthetic Judgment and the Unity of Reason.”  Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy.  Ed. Stephen R. Palmquist (op cit.).  287-99.

Segatto, Antonio Ianni.  “Transformação pragmatica da filosofia kantiana: Habermas, leitor de Humboldt.” [Portuguese]  Cadernos de filosofia alemã 15 (2010): 59-79.

Seidel, Roman. “Reading Kant in Teheran: Towards a Reception of the Iranian Reception of European Philosophy.” Asiatische Studien: Zeitschrift der Schweizerischen Asiengesellschaft 64.3 (2010): 681-705. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The purpose of this article is to furnish insights into the variety of ways in which European philosophy has been, and is being, received in Iran. The reception of Kantian thought in Iran exemplifies in significant ways the transmission of European philosophy into a non-European context, since the philosophy of Kant is discussed by a variety of intellectuals and scholars and in many different ways. The article first briefly discusses the motives of this study along with some methodological questions concerning comparative philosophy. It also gives some information about the issue of philosophy in Iran. It then focuses on two specific approaches to Kant provided by two different Iranian thinkers: on Mehdi Ha’eri Yazdi’s critique of Kant’s critique of the ontological proof of God’s existence, and on Mohammad Mogtahed Šabestari’s references to Kant’s idea of freedom and autonomy.

Seidler, Victor J.  Kant, Respect and Injustice: The Limits of Liberal Moral Theory.  London: Routledge, 2010.  [xii, 244 p.]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents: Introduction: respect, equality and the autonomy of morality — Respect and human nature. Learning to respect human nature; The sensible world and the intelligible world — Respect and dignity. Dignity and natural inclinations; Dignity and self-esteem — Respect, impartiality and the moral law. Respect and the moral law; Individuality, impartiality and equality — Respect, independence and self-sufficiency. Respect and non-interference; Independence and self-sufficiency — Obligation and inequality. An obligation to help a poor person; For the rich beneficence is not meritorious; The sources of wealth — Liberalism, inequality and social dependence. The institutionalisation of dependence; Liberalism, citizenship and social dependence — Liberalism and the autonomy of morality. Autonomy and dependence; Means and ends; Respect and injustice.

Seif, Seyyed Masoud.  “The Possibility of Wrong Ethical Judgment in Kant’s Ethical Theory.” [Farsi]  Hekmat va Falsafeh 5 (2010): 7-15.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The main question of this article is whether it is possible in Kant’s ethical theory that an ethical agent commits mistakes in recognizing a right ethical judgment or not. In order to reply to this question, first, the place of wrong ethical judgment in Kant’s ethical theory is considered. Then, by referring to the two main ethical principles in Kant’s theory, i.e., universality and autonomy, it is tried to show that these principles are united in Kant’s view and this unity constitutes the basis of his theory and makes him not to accept the possibility of wrong ethical judgment in his ethical theory.

Semenov, Valery E.  “Čto takoe transcendentaľnaja logika?” [Russian; “What is transcendental logic?”]  Kantovskij Sbornik 33 (2010): 7-23. [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article deals with Kant's justification of transcendental logic. The author shows how Kant draws the distinction between general and transcendental logic. The article analyses the essence of the new logic and its place in transcendental philosophy and considers the structural logical elements and their functions.

Senderowicz, Yaron M.  Controversies and the Metaphysics of Mind.  Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publ., 2010.  [235 p.] [review]

[Note] [Hide Note] [Publisher Note]: Since ancient times, metaphysical theories have been shaped by the dialectical relations between metaphysical positions. The present book offers a new account of the role of controversies in the evolution of ideas in current metaphysics of mind. Part one develops a pragmatic theory of metaphysical controversies that combines Kantian themes and themes from current argumentation theory. The theory developed in this book underscores the role of a unique type of dialectical arguments which establish metaphysical positions as ‘controversial relevant alternatives’ in the evolution of ‘chains of debates’ in metaphysics. In part two and part three, this theory is applied to chains of debates in present day metaphysics of mind which address the problems of consciousness and personal identity. One of the contentions defended in this book is that the intellectual history of metaphysics is not a process in which positions are replaced by opposite positions, but rather, a ‘history of their status as relevant alternatives’. The book analyzes in detail and demonstrates how ‘progress’ in contemporary metaphysics of mind consists in a dialectical process through which challenges to extant positions lead to innovative alternatives that are intrinsically relevant to advancing the understanding of the issues under discussion.

Sezeman, V. E.  “Teoretičeskaja filosofija Marburgskoj Školy.” [Russian; “The theoretical philosophy of the Marburg school”]  Kantovskij Sbornik 34 (2010): 60-79.

Sgarbi, Marco.  La Kritik der reinen Vernunft nel contesto della tradizione logica aristotelica. [Italian]  Hildesheim: Olms, 2010.  [282 p.] [contents]

[Note] [Hide Note] Volume 80 in the series Studien und Materialien zur Geschichte der Philosophie.

 ——.  Logica e metafisica nel Kant precritico: l’ambiente intellettuale di Königsberg e la formazione della filosofia kantiana. [Italian]  Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 2010.  [252 p.]

 ——.  La logica dell'irrazionale: studio sul significato e sui problemi della Kritik der Urteilskraft. [Italian]  Milano: Mimesis, 2010.  [226 p.]

 ——.  “La genesi della fondazione della morale in Kant. Nota in margine a un recente commento alla Kritik der praktischen Vernunft.” [Italian]  Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica 102 (2010): 179-93.

 ——.  “Metaphysics in Königsberg Prior to Kant (1703-1770).”  Trans/Form/Acao: Revista de Filosofia 33.1 (2010): 31-64. [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The present contribution aims to reconstruct, using the methodology of intellectual history, the broad spectrum of metaphysical doctrines that Kant could know during the years of the formation of his philosophy. The first part deals with the teaching of metaphysics in Königsberg from 1703 to 1770. The second part examines the main characteristics of the metaphysics in the various handbooks, which were taught at the ‘Albertina’, in order to have an exhaustive overview of all metaphysical positions.

 ——.  “L’origine della connessione fra antropologia, estetica e morale in Kant (1763−1766).” [Italian]  Was ist der Mensch? Que é o homem?  Eds. Ribeiro dos Santos, et al. (op cit.).  515-26.

 ——, ed.  The Kant-Weymann Controversy: Two Polemical Writings on Optimism, with an introduction by Marco Sgarbi.  Verona: Aemme, 2010.  [xii, 33 p.]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: This is a reprint of Daniel Weymann, Dissertatio philosophica de mundo non optimo and Beantwortung des Versuchs einiger Betrachtungen über den Optimismus, with an introduction in English by Sgarbi. The relevant Kant text is Versuch einiger Betrachtungen über den Optimismus (1759).

 ——, ed.  See: Ribeiro dos Santos, Leonel, Ubirajara Rancan de Azevedo Marques, Gregorio Piaia, Marco Sgarbi, und Riccardo Pozzo, eds.

Shabel, Lisa.  “The Transcendental Aesthetic.”  The Cambridge Companion to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.  Ed. Paul Guyer (op cit.).  93-117.

Shahi, Malakeh.  See: Paya, Ali and Malakeh Shahi.

Shell, Susan.  “Autonomy and the Unity of the Person.”  Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy.  Ed. Stephen R. Palmquist (op cit.).  465-74.

 ——.  “‘Nachschrift eines Freundes’: Kant on Language, Friendship and the Concept of a People.”  Kantian Review 15.1 (2010): 88-117.

[Note] [Hide Note] Extract: Kant's brief ‘Postscript of a Friend’ serves as a peculiar coda to his life work. The last of Kant's writing to be published during his lifetime, it is both a friendly endorsement of Christian Gottlieb Mielcke's newly competed Lithuanian–German and German–Lithuanian Dictionary and a plea in Kant's own name for the preservation of minority languages, Lithuanian in particular. This support for minority languages has no visible precedent in his earlier writings, in which national, civic and linguistic identities and associated loyalties tend to overlap. Indeed, Kant's understanding of the commonwealth as nation-state seems predicated on the fact or myth of ethnic and linguistic unity and homogeneity. The same apparent lack of precedent also applies to the Nachschrift's singling out as a people of peculiar civic merit of the Lithuanians, who are not otherwise mentioned in any of Kant's published or unpublished writings. The work thus raises an obvious question: why does Kant devote his last published work (and declining powers) to a topic and cause in which he does not seem to have taken much earlier interest?

Sherwin, Michael S.  “Happiness and Its Discontents.”  Logos: A Journal of Catholic Thought & Culture 13 (2010): 35-59.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article discusses on the relationship between the desire for happiness and the moral life. According to, German philosopher, Immanuel Kant morally good person often suffers during his allegiance to the good, while the immoral person is often content in his unrighteousness. It is stated that pursuing happiness ultimately makes us neither happy nor good.

Shieber, Joseph.  “Between Autonomy and Authority: Kant on the Epistemic Status of Testimony.”  Philosophy & Phenomenological Research 80 (2010): 327-48.

Shim, Michael K.  Rev. of Ideal Embodiment: Kant’s Theory of Sensibility, by Angelica Nuzzo (2008).  Journal of the History of Philosophy 48 (2010): 248-49.

Showler, Ryan L.  Rev. of Kant and the Role of Pleasure in Moral Action, by Iain P. D. Morrisson (2008).  Philosophy in Review 30 (2010): 286-88. [online]

 ——.  See: Wike, Victoria S. and Ryan L. Showler.

Siani, Alberto L.  “I limiti dell’umano. Osservazioni su Kant e l’intuizione intellettuale.” [Italian]  Studi Kantiani 23 (2010): 57-75.

Siemens, Stephan.  “Nichts — Negation — Anderes. Eine Kritik an Henrichs Formen der Negation in Hegels Logik.”  Kant als Bezugspunkt Philosophischen Denkens.  Eds. Hubertus Busche and Anton Schmitt (op cit.).  261-79.

Simão, Jean Leison.  “Heidegger e a Doutrina da Personalidade em Kant.” [Portuguese]  Cadernos de Filosofia Alemã 15 (2010): 41-58.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article is about the development of the concept of personality in Kant according to Heidegger and under three determinations: transcendental personality, psychological personality and moral personality. Specifically, the objective is to define the strict and authentic concept of personality. In the most general concepts the ontology is not possible. In determining the transcendental personality the subject entity is not manifested. However, what makes the ontology not feasible is the fact that this entity (the soul) is not taken in itself, that is, it is not independent from the body. The most strict and authentic concept in Kant according to Heidegger is what makes possible one ontology once it is the only one to, from the peculiarity of the moral auto-consciousness compared to the empirical auto-consciousness, manifest ontologically and promptly the person in what he is: his dignity.

Simon, Josef.  “Ad melius esse. Zur Differenz im Verstehen.”  Kant als Bezugspunkt Philosophischen Denkens.  Eds. Hubertus Busche and Anton Schmitt (op cit.).  281-94.

 ——.  “Der transzendentale Grund der ‘Unterscheidung aller Gegenstände überhaupt in Phaenomena und Noumena’.”  Kants Grundlegung einer kritischen Metaphysik.  Ed. Norbert Fischer (op cit.).  185-96.

Simon, Ralf.  “Von den Kategorien zum Schematismus oder vom Bild zur Sprache? Versuch, einen Konflikt zwischen Kant und Herder zu verstehen.”  Zwischen Bild und Begriff. Kant und Herder zum Schema.  Eds. Ulrich Gaier and Ralf Simon (op cit.).  93-118.

 ——, ed.  See: Gaier, Ulrich and Ralf Simon, eds.

Sirovátka, Jakub.  “Kants langer Weg zur kritischen Metaphysik und zur Gottesfrage.”  Die Gottesfrage in der Philosophie Immanuel Kants.  Eds. Norbert Fischer and Maximilian Forschner (op cit.).  43-56.

 ——.  “Die moralische ‘Endabsicht’ der Vernunft. Zum ‘Kanon der reinen Vernunft’.”  Kants Grundlegung einer kritischen Metaphysik.  Ed. Norbert Fischer (op cit.).  375-90.

Siskind, Mariano.  “The Globalization of the Novel and the Novelization of the Global. A Critique of World Literature.”  Comparative Literature 62 (2010): 336-60.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article focuses on Immanuel Kant’s essay “Idea for a Universal History With a Cosmopolitan Purpose,” wherein the author underscored the importance of novel towards the discourses of globalization. According to him, it is striking how Kant attempts to determine which one is more adequate to tell the story of a modern world that march towards global rational freedom. It also mentions the author’s proposal of two models about the relation between the novel and the discourses of globalization.

Skorupski, John.  “Moral Obligation, Blame, and Self-Governance.”  Social Philosophy & Policy 27 (2010): 158-80.  Reprinted in: Moral Obligation.  Eds. Ellen Frankel Paul, et al. (op cit.).  158-80.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract (ProQuest): This paper shows how moral concepts are definable in terms of reasons for the blame sentiment. It then shows how, given that definition, the categoricity of moral obligation follows from some plausible principles about reasons for blame. The nature of moral agency is further considered in this light. In particular, in what sense is it self-governing agency? Self-governing actors must be at least self-determining: that is, they must be able to think about what reasons they have, in order in order to assess what they have sufficient reason to believe, feel, or do. Thus any moral assessment implies that the person assessed is capable of self-governance in that sense. Furthermore, this notion of self-governance implies that an agent’s moral obligations are relative to the agent’s warranted beliefs. However it does not entail that moral agents must be autonomous, in the strong sense intended by Kant. Some consequences for modern conceptions of morality are considered.

Slachevsky, Andrea.  See: Miranda, Marcelo, Andrea Slachevsky, and Diego Garcia-Borreguero.

Slote, Michael.  Essays on the History of Ethics.  Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.  [165 p.]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Ch. 7: “Kant for Anti-Kantians,” pp. 101ff.
Contents: The opposite of reductionism — The end of teleological ethics — Ancient ethics and modern moral philosophy — Comments on Bryan Van Norden’s Virtue ethics and consequentialism in early Chinese philosophy — Hume on approval — Hume on the artificial virtues — Kant for Anti-Kantians — Reconfiguring utilitarianism — Under the influence: a very personal brief history of late-twentieth-century ethics — Carol Gilligan and history of ethics.

Smith, M. B. E.  “Does Humanity Share a Common Moral Faculty?”  Journal of Moral Philosophy 7 (2010): 37-53.

Smith, M. Campbell, transl.  See: Kant, Immanuel.  Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay.

Smith, Nick.  “Kantian Restorative Justice?”  Criminal Justice Ethics 39 (2010): 54-69.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Linda Radzik’s Making Amends: Atonement in Morality, Law, and Politics and Christopher Bennett’s The Apology Ritual: A Philosophical Theory of Punishment use different strategies in their efforts to reconcile Kant and restorative justice. I will focus this essay primarily on Radzik’s Making Amends, emphasizing the most salient aspects of that work for the Criminal Justice Ethics readership. Especially when read in conjunction with Bennett, Radzik has made considerable progress refining the moral principles that often seem undertheorized in the restorative justice literature. [...] Radzik understands “atonement as the reconciliation of a relationship” [21].

Smyth, Bryan.  “Merleau-Ponty and the ‘Naturalization’ of Phenomenology.”  Philosophy Today 54 (2010): 153-62.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The author examines Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s reinterpretation of Husserlian phenomenology. He explains that the phenomenology in the Husserlian tradition is essentially a project of transcendental philosophy. The author introduces key features of the larger context concerning Edmund Husserl, Immanuel Kant and cognitive science. He concludes that Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology is an exemplary kind of transcendental practice.

Sng, Zachary.  The Rhetoric of Error from Locke to Kleist.  Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2010.  [x, 202 p.]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents: Corrupting the fountains of knowledge — Linguistic turns: Leibniz, Tooke, and Coleridge — Kant and the error of subreption — The madness of the middle — “Inaccurate, as lady linguists often are”: Herodotus and Kleist on the language of the Amazons — Conclusion: a dirty word.

Sobotka, Milan.  “Kants zweifache Überwindung der traditionellen Metaphysik.”  Metaphysik und Kritik.  Eds. Chotaš, Karásek, and Stolzenberg (op cit.).  271-81.

Sosa, Ernest, ed.  See: Dancy, Jonathan and Ernest Sosa, eds.

Soromenho-Marques, Viriato.  “Pensar a Vida. Notas para um diálogo entre Kant e Darwin.” [Portuguese]  Was ist der Mensch? Que é o homem?  Eds. Ribeiro dos Santos, et al. (op cit.).  245-58.

Stabel, Jürgen.  “Die Kritik der reinen Vernunft im Lichte der modernen Physik. Einsteins Relativitätstheorie als empirisches Analogon zu Kants Raum- und Zeitverständnis.”  Kants Grundlegung einer kritischen Metaphysik.  Ed. Norbert Fischer (op cit.).  101-17.

Städtler, Michael.  “Selbstbestimmung zwischen Natur und Technik.”  Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 58 (2010): 257-71.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The relation between human beings and nature is basically technical. Humans are compelled to transform the natural conditions of life through their labor, using technical equipment. Thus — and this is a specifically human characteristic — they set themselves apart from their natural surroundings. As a result of the same process, untouched nature exists no more. Therefore, it is not a matter of how to absolutely preserve parts of nature from technical alteration, but rather a question of what the dominant ends are in the technical development of modern society and whether these ends are reasonable or not. The ideas of Karl, Hegel and Marx concerning the connection between society and its ends will be discussed. The resulting combination of technical and moral moments, rather than an external ethical view, includes the proposal to revisit the concept of education and research.

 ——.  Rev. of Moral und Recht im Staat nach Kant und Hegel, by Gerold Prauss (2008).  Philosophisches Jahrbuch 117 (2010): 143-46.

Stang, Nicholas F.  “Kant’s Possibility Proof.”  History of Philosophy Quarterly 27 (2010): 275-99.

Stanguennec, André.  Rev. of Kant et les Lumières de l’Europe, by Lorenzo Bianchi and Jean Ferrari (2009).  Revue Philosophique de la France et de l’Etranger 200 (2010): 270-71.

Stapleford, Scott.  “A Refutation of Idealism from 1777.”  Idealistic Studies 40 (2010): 139-46. [abstract]

Stark, Werner.  “Was wußte Kant über Asien? Hinweise und Überlegungen zu Kant’s Interesse an Fragen der Geographie.”  Klassičeskij razum i vyzovy sovremennoj civilizacii.  Ed. V. I. Brjušinkin (op cit.).  I, 101-21.

 ——.  “Herder’s Kant-Papiere. Eine kurze Klarstellung.”  Herder Jahrbuch/Herder Yearbook, vol 10.  Eds. Karl Menges und Wulf Koepke (Heidelberg: Synchron, 2010).  13-24.

Stegmaier, Werner.  “Fröhliche Wissenschaft als Kunst der Philosophie.”  Kant als Bezugspunkt Philosophischen Denkens.  Eds. Hubertus Busche and Anton Schmitt (op cit.).  295-312.

Steigerwald, Joan.  “Natural Purposes and the Reflecting Power of Judgment: The Problem of the Organism in Kant’s Critical Philosophy.”  European Romantic Review 21 (2010): 291-308. [abstract]

Stepanenko, Pedro.  Rev. of Sentido interno y subjetividad: Un análisis del problema del auto-conocimiento en la filosofía trascendental de I. Kant, by Claudia Jáuregui (2008).  Kantian Review 15.1 (2010): 150-52.

Stern, Robert.  “Moral Scepticism and Agency: Kant and Korsgaard.”  Ratio 23 (2010): 453-74.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: One argument put forward by Christine Korsgaard in favour of her constructivist appeal to the nature of agency, is that it does better than moral realism in answering moral scepticism. However, realists have replied by pressing on her the worry raised by H. A. Prichard that any attempt to answer the moral sceptic only succeeds in basing moral actions in nonmoral ends and so is self-defeating. I spell out these issues in more detail, and suggest that both sides can learn something by seeing how the sceptical problematic arises in Kant. Doing so, I argue, shows how Korsgaard might raise the issue of scepticism against the realist whilst avoiding the Prichardian response.

Stetter, Christian.  “Herder und Kant. Anmerkungen zu Herders Abhandlung Über Bild, Dichtung und Fabel.”  Zwischen Bild und Begriff. Kant und Herder zum Schema.  Eds. Ulrich Gaier and Ralf Simon (op cit.).  71-91.

Stingl, Alexander.  Between Discursivity and sensus communis: Kant, Kantianism and the Social Media Theory of Talcott Parsons.  Erlangen-Nürnberg, Univ. Diss., 2010.  [485 p.] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Author’s dissertation (Erlangen-Nürnberg, 2008).

Stoev, Hristo.  “The Meta-Concepts in Critique of Pure Reason.” [Bulgarian]  Philosophical Alternative (Bulgarian Academy of Sciences) 19 (2010): 44-63.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The main subject of present article is to analyze some basic concepts in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, here referred as metanotions, in purpose to designate their transcendental and reflexive functions. They all appear in opposite couples, which indicate the nature of reason as situated in the tension of opposite attributes. These concepts are a priori — a posteriori, pure — empiric, synthetic — analytic, transcendent — immanent, transcendental — empirical, mathematical — dynamical, constitutive — regulative, intuitive — discursive and receptivity — spontaneity.

Stolz, Violetta.  Geschichtsphilosophie bei Kant und Reinhold.  Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2010.  [336 p.]

Stolzenberg, Jürgen.  “Subjektivität und Freiheit. Zu Kants Theorie praktischer Selbstbestimmung.”  Metaphysik und Kritik.  Eds. Chotaš, Karásek, and Stolzenberg (op cit.).  253-70.

 ——. “Кант и право на ложь.” Translated from the German by I.D. Koptsev and A. S. Silber. [Russian; “Kant and the right to lie”] Kantovskij Sbornik 32 (2010): 7-16. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The author analyses the Enlightenment's principle of justifying lie from altruistic motives, which was criticised by Kant in the article "On a supposed right..." The article considers the advantages and disadvantages of arguments drawn in Kant's work. The author proves and specifies the admissibility of lie due to ethical and legal principles put forward by Kant in other publications and lectures, namely: need for self-defence and internal legal duty to humanity (categorical imperative).

 ——, ed.  See: Chotaš, Jirí, Jindřich Karásek, and Jürgen Stolzenberg, eds.

Strawson, Galen.  “Fundamental Singleness: How to Turn the 2nd Paralogism into a Valid Argument.”  The Metaphysics of Consciousness.  Eds. Pierfrancesco Basile, Julian Kiverstein, Pauline Phemister [Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 67] (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 61-92.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: (1) Experience (i.e., conscious experience) is a real concrete phenomenon. The existence of experience entails the existence of a subject of experience. Therefore, subjects of experience are concretely real (or at least one is). (2) The existence of a subject of experience in the lived present or living moment of experience, e.g., the period of time in which the grasping of a thought occurs, provably involves the existence of singleness or unity of an unsurpassably strong kind. The singleness or unity in question is a metaphysically real, concrete entity. So if thoughts, or any experiences at all, really do occur or exist — and they do — then there exist entities that are genuine, concrete, metaphysical unities of an unsurpassable sort. (3) There is a metaphysically irreproachable sense in which we may — must — take these unsurpassable metaphysical unities to be themselves (a) subjects of experience, although we may also take them to be (b) thoughts or experiences. If so, there is a sound argument (using Kantian materials) to the conclusion of the second paralogism. (4) Perhaps (a) and (b) are not in the final analysis distinct. Perhaps Kant is right, in his 1772 letter to Herz, that ‘the thinking or the existence of the thought and the existence of my own self are one and the same’.

Striet, Magnus.  See: Essen, Georg and Magnus Striet.

Stroud, Scott R.  “Desire and the Project of Moral Cultivation: Kant and Xunzi on the Inclinations.”  Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy.  Ed. Stephen R. Palmquist (op cit.).  639-52.

Stuart, Susan A. J., and Chris Dobbyn.  “A Kantian Prescription for Artificial Conscious Experience.”  Kant der Europäer: Europäer über Kant.  Eds. Dietzsch, Grimoni, and Kozlowski (op cit.).  276-84.

Stuhlmann-Laeisz, Rainer.  “Beweisbare Wahrheiten.”  Kant als Bezugspunkt Philosophischen Denkens.  Eds. Hubertus Busche and Anton Schmitt (op cit.).  313-24.

Sturm, Thomas, and Falk Wunderlich.  “Kant and the Scientific Study of Consciousness.”  History of the Human Sciences 23 (2010): 48-71.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: We argue that Kant’s views about consciousness, the mind-body problem and the status of psychology as a science all differ drastically from the way in which these topics are conjoined in present debates about the prominent idea of a science of consciousness. Kant never used the concept of consciousness in the now dominant sense of phenomenal qualia; his discussions of the mind-body problem center not on the reducibility of mental properties but of substances; and his views about the possibility of psychology as a science did not employ the requirement of a mechanistic explanation, but of a quantification of phenomena. This shows strikingly how deeply philosophical problems and conceptions can change even if they look similar on the surface.

Sudan, Meghant. “Remarks on Tri-partition and the Structure of Kant’s Kritik der Urteilskraft: Comment on Sam Stoner’s ‘Critical Philosophy as Artistic Endeavor: On the Form of Kant’s ‘Critique of Aesthetic Judgment’ and its Implications’.” Southwest Philosophy Review 26.2 (2010): 55-59. [PDC]

Surprenant, Chris W.  “Kant’s Contribution to Moral Education: The Relevance of Catechistics.” Journal of Moral Education 39 (2010): 165-74.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant’s deontological ethics, along with Aristotle’s virtue ethics and Mill’s utilitarian ethics, is often identified as one of the three primary moral options between which individuals can choose.  Given the importance of Kant’s moral philosophy, it is surprising and disappointing how little has been written on his important contributions to moral education.  Kant argues for a catechistic approach to moral education.  By memorising a series of moral questions and answers, an individual learns the basic principles of morality in the same way that Martin Luther believed an individual should learn the tenets of Christianity.  The difficulty, however, is that this approach appears to violate a central tenet of Kantian morality: virtuous acts must be performed out of respect for the moral law itself, not due to habituation.  This paper demonstrates Kant’s significant contribution to moral education by showing how a catechistic moral education establishes the foundation necessary for autonomous action.

 ——.  “Liberty, Autonomy, and Kant's Civil Society.”  History of Philosophy Quarterly 27 (2010): 79-94.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Morality, as Immanuel Kant understands it, depends on the capacity of a person to be the agent and owner of his own actions, not merely a conduit for social and psychological forces and influences over which he has little or no control. As a result, Kant’s moral philosophy focuses primarily on the topic of individual freedom and the necessary preconditions of the possibility of that freedom. In the Groundwork and second Critique, Kant’s discussion of the connection between morality and freedom centers on autonomy of the will. He identifies autonomy as the supreme principle of morality and defines it as “choos[ing] only in such a way that the maxims of your choice are also included as universal law in the same volition” (Gr 4:440). In this paper I argue that according to Kant the possibility of autonomous action requires that certain preconditions be met. Satisfying these preconditions requires an individual to be a member of civil society (status civilis), and, specifically, a civil society maintained by a strong, sovereign power. This connection between freedom and civil society exists on two levels. First, one precondition of autonomy (i.e., internal freedom) is liberty (i.e., external freedom), and an individual can secure his liberty only once he is a member of civil society. Second, an individual is free only when others recognize him as a being with the capacity for autonomous action, and joining civil society is the process by which this recognition takes place.

 ——.  “Minority Oppression and Justified Revolution.”  Journal of Social Philosophy 41 (2010):442-53.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article offers the author’s insights on the oppression of minority groups and their right of revolution, and on the views of philosophers including John Locke, Immanuel Kant, and Christine Korsgaard on oppression and revolution. The author explores the assumption of considering revolution as a legitimate tool for oppressed members of minority groups to protect their rights. He says that the political theory of Locke presents more strict criteria for justified revolution of minorities.

Sussman, David.  “Something to Love: Kant and the Faith of Reason.”  Kant’s Moral Metaphysics: God, Freedom, and Immortality.  Eds. Lipscomb and Krueger (op cit.).  133-48.

 ——.  “Unforgivable Sins?  Revolution and Reconciliation in Kant.”  Kant’s Anatomy of Evil.  Eds. Anderson-Gold and Muchnik (op cit.).  215-35.

 ——.  Rev. of Kant’s Theory of Evil: An Essay on the Dangers of Self-Love and the Aprioricity of History, by Pablo Muchnik (2009).  The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (July 2010, #19). [online]

Sutherland, Daniel.  “Philosophy, Geometry, and Logic in Leibniz, Wolff, and the Early Kant.”  Discourse on a New Method.  Eds. Mary Domski and Michael Dickson (op cit.).  155-92.

Suzuki, Makoto.  “Respect for Persons as the Unifying Moral Ideal.”  Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy.  Ed. Stephen R. Palmquist (op cit.).  247-55.

Svendsen, Lars Fr. H.  A Philosophy of Evil. [Norwegian: Ondskapens filosofi]  Transl. by Kerri A. Peirce.  Champaign, Ill.: Dalkey Archive Press, 2010.  [306 p.]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents: Introduction: What is evil and how can we understand it? — The theology of evil — Theodicies — The privation theodicy — The free will theodicy — The Iraenean theodicy — The totality theodicy — History as secular theodicy — Job’s insight-the theodicy of the hereafter — Anthropology of evil — Are people good or evil? — The typologies of evil — Demonic evil — Evil for evil’s sake — Evil’s aesthetic seduction — Sadism — Schadenfreude — Subjective and objective evil — Kant and instrumental evil — The impossibility of a “devilish” will — The paradox of evil — Moral rebirth — The evil is the other-idealistic evil — “Us” vs. “them” — Violent individuals — Arendt and stupid evil — The evil and the stupid — Radical and banal evil — Eichmann, Hoss, and Stangl — Normal people and extreme evil — Thinking as opposition — Evil people — The problem of evil — Theory and praxis — Ethics of conviction and ethics of responsibility — Politics and violence — Evil as a concrete problem.

Sweet, Kristi.  “Kant and the Culture of Discipline: Rethinking the Nature of Nature.”  Epoche: A Journal for the History of Philosophy 15 (2010): 121-38.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant’s notion of culture is typically treated in the context of his philosophy of history. In this paper, however, I explore the importance of culture for Kant’s doctrine of virtue, and argue that culture affords a new way — contra immortality — to think the possibility of attaining virtue. As I show, Kant identifies culture as a site of the self-effacement of nature in its influence on the will. Because of this, we see that for Kant the task of virtue encounters nature not only as obstacle, but also as something that serves, promotes, and advances virtue.

 ——.  “The Moral Import of the Critique of Judgment.”  Rethinking Kant, vol. 2.  Ed. Pablo Muchnik (op cit.). 222-36.

Swindler, J. K.  “Autonomy and Accountability.”  Appraisal: A Journal of Constructive and Post-Critical Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Studies 8 (2010): 14-18.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: By attributing accountability, we constitute the moral significance of persons, actions and attitudes. Holding oneself accountable constitutes one’s autonomy. Thus, moral persons are a kind of artifact. The impossibility of a private language proves that one can reliably follow rules by which one has bound oneself, and grounds the sociality of accountability. Autonomy is real only because it is the product of the attribution of accountability, rather than some mysterious quasi-empirical feature of minds.

Szendy, Peter.  Kant chez les extraterrestres: philosofictions cosmopolitiques.  Paris: Minuit, 2010.  [156 p.]

[top]T    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Tafani, Daniela.  “Stato e chiesa in Kant.” [Italian]  Filosofia Politica 24 (2010): 197-219.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The essay analyzes Kant’s definition of the church as an ethical community. This definition coincides with the liberal — and subversive, as Kant’s contemporaries understood — view concerning the merely private character of religion. The secularization of law and the denial of any ius in sacra of the state, however, do not mean that the citizens are concerned only with the statutory ecclesiastic prescriptions. Rather, according to Kant the state ought to conceive as socially dangerous every church which does not aim at its own dissolution in favor of pure morality.

Takeda, Seiji.  完全解読カント「純粋理性批判」/ Kanzen kaidoku kanto junsui risei hihan. [Japanese]  Tokyo: Kodansha, 2010.  [412 p.]

Taylor, Robert S.  “Kant’s Political Religion: The Transparency of Perpetual Peace and the Highest Good.”  Review of Politics 72 (2010): 1-24. [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Scholars have long debated the relationship between Kant’s doctrine of right and his doctrine of virtue (including his moral religion or ethico-theology), which are the two branches of his moral philosophy. This article will examine the intimate connection in his practical philosophy between perpetual peace and the highest good, between political and ethico-religious communities, and between the types of transparency peculiar to each. It will show how domestic and international right provides a framework for the development of ethical communities, including a kingdom of ends and even the noumenal ethical community of an afterlife, and how the transparency and trust achieved in these communities are anticipated in rightful political society by publicity and the mutual confidence among citizens that it engenders. Finally, it will explore the implications of this synthesis of Kant’s political and religious philosophies for contemporary Kantian political theories, especially those of Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls.

 ——.  Rev. of Kant and the Limits of Autonomy, by Susan Meld Shell (2009).  Review of Politics 72 (2010): 740-42.

Teroyan, Varazdat, transl.  See: Kant, Immanuel.  Zut banakanut`yan k`nnadatut`yun.

Terra, Ricardo.  “Les observations de Kant sur les races affectent-elles l’universalisme de sa philosophie?”  Was ist der Mensch? Que é o homem?  Eds. Ribeiro dos Santos, et al. (op cit.).  139-49.

Teruel, Pedro Jesús.  “Das ‘Ich denke’ als der ‘alleinige Text der rationalen Psychologie’. Zur Destruktion der Seelenmetaphysik und zur Grundlegung der Postulatenlehre in der Kritik der reinen Vernunft.”  Kants Grundlegung einer kritischen Metaphysik.  Ed. Norbert Fischer (op cit.).  215-41.

Teunis, Thekla, and F. A. Muller.  “Kant en Keus, Antinomie en axioma: een ontogenese van de paradox van Banach & Tarski.” [Dutch]  Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 102 (2010): 81-104.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: We provide an account of the ontogenesis of the Banach-Tarski paradox within Kant’s view on metaphysics, rather than within his view on mathematics, when the axiom of choice in set-theory is seen as giving rise to a fifth antinomy. The key insight is that the axiom of choice (as well as its negation) when applied to infinite sets transcends all possible experience.

Thacker, Eugene.  After Life.  Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010.  [xvi, 295 p.] [contents]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: See ch. 5: “Logic and Life (On Kantian Teratology)”.
From the publisher: Life is one of our most basic concepts, yet when examined directly it proves remarkably contradictory and elusive, encompassing both the broadest and the most specific phenomena. We can see this uncertainty about life in our habit of approaching it as something at once scientific and mystical, in the return of vitalisms of all types, and in the pervasive politicization of life. In short, life seems everywhere at stake and yet is nowhere the same. In After Life, Eugene Thacker clears the ground for a new philosophy of life by recovering the twists and turns in its philosophical history. Beginning with Aristotle’s originary formulation of a philosophy of life, Thacker examines the influence of Aristotle’s ideas in medieval and early modern thought, leading him to the work of Immanuel Kant, who notes the inherently contradictory nature of ‘life in itself’. Along the way, Thacker shows how early modern philosophy’s engagement with the problem of life affects thinkers such as Gilles Deleuze, Georges Bataille, and Alain Badiou, as well as contemporary developments in the ‘speculative turn’ in philosophy. At a time when life is categorized, measured, and exploited in a variety of ways, After Life invites us to delve deeper into the contours and contradictions of the age-old question, ‘what is life?’

Theis, Robert.  “Kants Ideenmetaphysik. Zur Einleitung und dem ersten Buch der transzendentalen Dialektik.”  Kants Grundlegung einer kritischen Metaphysik.  Ed. Norbert Fischer (op cit.).  199-214.

 ——.  “Du savoir, de la foi et de l’opinion de Wolff à Kant.”  Archives de Philosophie 73 (2010): 211-28.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The study reconstructs the constellation Wolff-Baumgarten-Meier-Kant concerning the epistemic triad “knowing-believing opining”. It is shown in what manner the Kantian discourse in his Lessons of Logic is articulated according to these references, but also how Kant develops in an autonomous way new aspects, namely that of moral faith.

 ——.  “Kants frühe Theologie und ihre Beziehungen zur Wolffschen Philosophie.”  Die Gottesfrage in der Philosophie Immanuel Kants.  Eds. Norbert Fischer and Maximilian Forschner (op cit.).  17-42.

Thielke, Peter Graham.  “Who’s Who from Kant to Hegel I: In the Kantian Wake.”  Philosophy Compass 5 (2010): 385-97.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: While almost all of Kant’s contemporaries agreed that the Critique of Pure Reason effected a philosophically epochal change, there was far less consensus about what precisely Kant’s new critical philosophy had brought about. In large part, this uncertainty was a result of a methodological crisis that Kant’s work had sparked: the Critique had shown that traditional dogmatic metaphysics was suspect at best, but what new methods needed to be adopted in the wake of Kant’s ‘Copernican revolution’? The Critique stood as the lighting rod at the center of a complicated and especially lively set of debates and disputes that erupted in Germany in the late 1780s and early 1790s: empiricists and rationalists, threatened by the ‘all-destroying Kant’, leapt to challenge the new critical system; skeptics attacked Kant’s claims to have secured a sure footing for empirical knowledge; a few ambitious thinkers sought to complete the critical system by revealing a foundational first principle on which Kant’s system could rest. All of these elements conspired to make the early stages in post-Kantian thought one of the richest, most vibrant — and most fascinating — periods in the history of philosophy. The present essay looks at the various figures of the move from Kant to Fichte, and presents some of the excellent new research on the era that has appeared in the last decade or so. The sequel takes up the period from Fichte to Hegel, with an eye toward understanding how Kantian critical philosophy gave way to Hegelian absolute idealism.

 ——.  “Who’s Who from Kant to Hegel II: Art and the Absolute.”  Philosophy Compass 5 (2010): 398-411.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant’s ‘Copernican revolution’, which began in the Critique of Pure Reason (1781/1787), had, by the early 1790s, fundamentally altered the terrain of German philosophy – but not entirely in the way that Kant had foreseen. Skeptical challenges to Kant’s discursive account of cognition, in which experience arises from the separate faculties of sensibility and understanding, had led thinkers such as K. L. Reinhold and J. G. Fichte to attempt to provide a first, foundational principle for the critical philosophy. These efforts were enormously influential, but by the middle of the 1790s, they too were facing a great deal of critical scrutiny. The central challenge to the Fichtean project came from an unlikely quarter: a group of young thinkers and poets who are collectively known as the early romantics. For the romantics, Fichte’s project remains too ‘subjectivist’, for it tries to provide an account of the world by beginning with the conditions that govern subjectivity alone. Rather, the romantics argue that the world must be understood in terms of a monistic absolute, akin to Spinoza’s substance, in which all dualisms are overcome. It is with this step that absolute idealism comes on the scene, and sets the stage for the development of Hegel’s system in the early 1800s. This essay, which continues the story of “Who’s Who from Kant to Hegel I”, examines the ways in which early romanticism reacted to the Fichtean project, looks at a variety of antifoundationalist idealisms that the romantics — in particular Hölderlin, Novalis, Schlegel, and Schleiermacher — developed, and traces the role that Friedrich Schelling plays in offering the first systematic account of absolute idealism.

Thöle, Bernhard.  “Kants Diagnose der Illusionen der rationalen Psychologie.”  Metaphysik und Kritik.  Eds. Chotaš, Karásek, and Stolzenberg (op cit.).  99-116.

Thomas, Patrick.  Rev. of Early Notions of Global Governance: Selected Eighteenth-Century Proposals for ‘Perpetual Peace’: With Rousseau, Bentham and Kant Unabridged, edited by Esref Aksu (2008).  Kantian Review 15.1 (2010): 152-53.

Thompson, Michael.  “Antinomy of Identity.”  Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy.  Ed. Stephen R. Palmquist (op cit.).  181-93.

Thorpe, Lucas.  The Kant Dictionary.  London: Continuum Pub. Co., 2010.  [240 p.]

 ——.  “Is Kant’s Realm of Ends a unum per se? Aquinas, Suárez, Leibniz and Kant on Composition.”  British Journal for the History of Philosophy 18 (2010): 461-85.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant and Leibniz are interested in explaining how a number of individuals can come together and form a single unified composite substance. Leibniz does not have a convincing account of how this is possible. In his precritical writings and in his later metaphysics lectures, Kant is committed to the claim that the idea of a world is the idea of a real whole and, hence, is the idea of a composite substance. This metaphysical idea is taken over into his ethical writings and becomes the idea of a realm of ends. I explain why a realm of ends, should be thought of as both a ‘unum per se’ and as a real whole. A realm of ends is a whole of individuals unified by laws they have given themselves, that is, it is a community of autonomous individuals. Only such a community can be thought of as a composite individual. Such a whole will be real rather than ideal because the source of the unity of the whole is intrinsic to the whole, for what gives unity to the realm are laws and the sources of the laws are the individual members of the whole. It will be a ‘unum per se’ because both the laws and the individuals constituting the realm are incomplete without one another. If this reading is correct, this requires a fundamental re-evaluation of Kant’s notion of autonomy. To be autonomous is not, primarily, to be understood in terms of ruling oneself, but instead must be thought of primarily in terms of being a generative source of laws for an ideal community.

Timmermann, Jens.  Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: A Commentary. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.  [234 p.] [review]

 ——.  “Reversal or Retreat? Kant’s Deductions of Freedom and Morality.”  Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason.  Eds. Reath and Timmermann (op cit.).  73-89.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the ‘Critique of Practical Reason’, Kant rejects his previous conception of a ‘critique of pure practical reason’. Criticizing the practical faculty as a whole now reveals that the moral law is given as a ‘fact of reason’. It is argued that the Critique marks not just a strategic reversal, but also a retreat. Although many of the familiar doctrines and arguments of ‘Groundwork III’ reappear in the later work — the reciprocity thesis, the notion of ‘transferal’, the idea that we conceive of ourselves as members of a normative realm — Kant is no longer willing to employ them in a formal deduction. Common moral consciousness, used in the Groundwork merely to confirm the deduction, now stands alone as the foundation of morality.

 ——, ed.  See: Reath, Andrews and Jens Timmermann, eds.

Tirado Navarro, Jorge.  “La pena en Kant: ¿Retribucionista en lo moral pero no en lo legal?” [Spanish]  Estudios de Derecho (Medellin) 67 (2010): 85-112.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: En este artículo el autor sostiene que los planteamientos de Kant en relación con la pena pueden encuadrarse en una teoría retributiva "débil" del castigo legal. En esta versión del retributivismo, la pena se justifica en la necesidad de prevenir y disuadir a la ciudadanía de cometer actos criminales, pero en el momento de imponer el castigo, el Estado sólo puede tener en cuenta para su individualización el que se haya (i) cometido un delito, y el (ii) grado de afectación de la libertad exterior que con él se genere. Para argumentar esta posición, se exponen los conceptos de libertad, Estado y derecho en Kant, mostrando cómo leídos en su integridad hacen poco plausible atribuirle a Kant un retributivismo "fuerte", y las razones por las cuales dichos conceptos permitirían atribuirle una teoría retributiva en su versión débil. De igual forma, se presentan las diferencias en el ámbito de la moral y el derecho en Kant, para señalar las implicaciones que éstas tienen para su concepción de la pena, y se explica porqué un retributivismo "débil" no afecta la autonomía y la dignidad del individuo.

Tokunaga, Kazuo.  自由論: 思想の結語へ / Jiyūron: shisō no ketsugo e. [Japanese]  Nagoya: Buitsūsoryūshon, 2010.  [243 p.]

Tomasi, Gabriele.  Un bicchiere con Hume e Kant: divertissement estetico-metafisico. [Italian]  Pisa: ETS, 2010.  [158 p.]

 ——.  “Estetica.” [Italian]  L’universo kantiano: filosofia, scienze, sapere.  Eds. Stefano Besoli, Claudio La Rocca, and Riccardo Martinelli (op cit.).  97-146.

 ——.  “Kant, la bellezza e l’autonomia del gusto.” [Italian]  Was ist der Mensch? Que é o homem?  Eds. Ribeiro dos Santos, et al. (op cit.).  459-76.

Tommasi, Claudio.  “Civiltà delle armi: Guerra e tecnica nella Germania di primo Novecento.” [Italian]  Filosofia Politica 24 (2010): 111-42.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The essay considers the crucial role played by technique into the different conceptions of war at the beginning of XXth century. Moving from the point of view of the history of ideas, it assumes a fundamental change from an extrinsic and instrumental relationship between war and technique, to an intrinsic and symbiotic one. The ideological and conceptual premises of this alliance are analyzed referring to the historical development and opposition between the ideas of ‘Kultur’ and ‘Zivilization’ from Kant to Rathenau.

Tommasi, Francesco Valerio.  “Ein ‘Missing Link’ in der Geschichte der Transzendentalphilosophie: die ‘Longue Durée’ des akademischen Aristotelismus bei Kant.”  Der Aristotelismus an den europäischen Universitäten der frühen Neuzeit.  Ed. Rolf Darge (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2010).  315-31.

Tonetto, Milene Consenso. Direitos Humanos em Kant e Habermas. [Portuguese] Florianópolis: Insular, 2010. [248 p.] [WC]

Torra-Mattenklott, Caroline.  “Kreisfigur und Metaschematismus bei Karl Philipp Moritz.”  Zwischen Bild und Begriff. Kant und Herder zum Schema.  Eds. Ulrich Gaier and Ralf Simon (op cit.).  155-90.

Torriani, Tristan.  “From Transcendental to Practical Intersubjectivity: A Social Psychological Approach to Kant’s Musical Aesthetics.”  Trans/Form/Acao: Revista de Filosofia 33.1 (2010): 125-54. [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: It is well known that Kant’s aesthetics is framed intersubjectively because he upholds the claim of taste to universality. However, the transcendental foundation of this shared universality is a supersensible ground which is taken for granted but which cannot be brought directly into communicative experience. Kant’s reliance on the synthetic ‘a priori’ structure of aesthetic judgment also removes it from the sphere of observable personal interaction. This argumentative strategy exposes it to skeptical challenge and generates inaccessible references to inner representations (be they intuitions, categories of the understanding or rational ideas). It is not sufficient, as Kant did, to propose a description of aesthetic experience that is subjectively plausible and thereby claim its intersubjective validity. It is indispensable to embody intersubjectivity in behavior and language. In practical intersubjectivity, aesthetic attitudes are dealt with in a concrete and accessible manner without relying on mentalistic assumptions as a foundation. Conceptual terms such as ‘agreeable’, ‘beauty’, ‘sublime’, ‘ugly’, ‘universality’ acquire new meaning in a conversational context and aesthetic claims are tested in a dialogical game semantics model.

Tourinho Peres, Daniel.  “Kant, a natureza humana e os limites da ação.” [Portuguese]  Was ist der Mensch? Que é o homem?  Eds. Ribeiro dos Santos, et al. (op cit.).  717-24.

Trafimow, David.  See: Rice, Stephen, David Trafimow, Gayle Hunt, and Joshua Sandry.

Treppiedi, Fabio.  Rev. of Metamorfosi del trascendentale: Percorsi filosofici tra Kant e Deleuze, edited by Gaetano Rametta (2008).  History and Philosophy of Logic 31 (2010): 388-92.

Trisokkas, Ioannis.  Rev. of Kant and the Early Moderns, edited by Daniel Garber and Béatrice Longuenesse (2008).  British Journal for the History of Philosophy 18 (2010): 348-51.

Tunhas, Paulo.  “Kant e a política. Continuidade e dinâmica.” [Portuguese]  Was ist der Mensch? Que é o homem?  Eds. Ribeiro dos Santos, et al. (op cit.).  763-76.

Tuppini, Tommaso.  “Critica o antropologia? Alcune considerazioni intorno all’Introduzione all’antropologia di Kant (1961) di Michel Foucault.” [Italian]  Was ist der Mensch? Que é o homem?  Eds. Ribeiro dos Santos, et al. (op cit.).  259-72.

Turunen, Panu, transl.  See: Kant, Immanuel.  Kirjeenvaihtoa 1759 - 1799.

Twellmann, Marcus.  “Schwören nach Kant.”  The Germanic Review 85 (2010): 125-41. [abstract]

Tyler, Colin.  “The Liberal Hegelianism of Edward Caird: Or, How to Transcend the Social Economics of Kant and the Romantics.”  International Journal of Social Economics 37 (2010): 852-66.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The paper establishes that Edward Caird developed a distinctive form of liberal Hegelianism out of his critical responses to Kant, the romantic tradition of Rousseau, Goethe and Wordsworth and indeed Hegel himself. The paper presents a philosophical reconstruction of Caird’s social economics that is based on a close reading of a very wide range of Caird’s writings including his recently published lectures on social ethics and political economy. Caird’s theory of historical development underpinned his writings on social economics. One of his greatest debts in this regard was to his interpretation of the romantics, which introduced a rich conception of higher human capacities into his critical analysis of capitalism. When combined with his critique of Kantian formalism, this led Caird towards Hegel. Yet, Caird’s concerns regarding corporatism’s stultifying tendencies led him to develop a dynamic form of liberal Hegelianism, which placed far greater trust than had Hegel in the ability of free conscientious citizens to restructure and enrich established social categories (classes, professions, gender roles and so on) and the system of nations which those categories helped to constitute. If Caird’s liberal Hegelianism were to be adopted today, we could live in much freer, fairer and enriching communities than we do at present. Edward Caird has been wrongly neglected in intellectual histories of Anglo-American political theory, and while his writings on Kant’s critical philosophy have received some scholarly attention, his critique of romanticism has never received the attention it deserves. This also draws on manuscripts that have been published only within the past five years, having been edited for the first time by the author of this paper.

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Uleman, Jennifer K.  An Introduction to Kant’s Moral Philosophy.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.  [ix, 189 p.] [review]

[Note] [Hide Note] [From the publisher]: Immanuel Kant’s moral philosophy is one of the most distinctive achievements of the European Enlightenment. At its heart lies what Kant called the ‘strange thing’: the free, rational, human will. This introduction explores the basis of Kant’s antinaturalist, secular, moral vision of the human good. Moving from a sketch of the Kantian will, with all its component parts and attributes, to Kant’s canonical arguments for his categorical imperative, it shows why Kant thought his moral law the best summary expression of both his own philosophical work on morality and his readers’ deepest shared convictions about the good. Kant’s central tenets, key arguments, and core values are presented in an accessible and engaging way, making this book ideal for anyone eager to explore the fundamentals of Kant’s moral philosophy.

Uyl, Douglas J. Den.  See: Rasmussen, Douglas B. and Douglas J. Den Uyl.

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Vandenabeele, Bart.  “Common Sense and Community in Kant’s Theory of Taste.”  Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy.  Ed. Stephen R. Palmquist (op cit.).  308-20.

 ——.  “Kant on the Universal Communicability of Judgments of Beauty.”  Rethinking Kant, vol. 2.  Ed. Pablo Muchnik (op cit.). 238-56.

 —— and Stijn Van Impe.  “Kant after Habermas and Searle. Towards a Pragmatics of Aesthetic Judgements.”  Beyond Universal Pragmatics: Studies in the Philosophy of Communication.  Ed. Colin B. Grant.  Bern/New York: Peter Lang, 2010.  59-82.

Vanden Auweele, Dennis.  “Atheism, Radical Evil, and Kant.”  Philosophy & Theology 22 (2010): 155-76.

Van Eekert, Geert, transl.  See: Kant, Immanuel.  De religie binnen de grenzen van de rede.

Van Gorkom, Joris.  “Kant, Kafka, Josef K.”  [Dutch] Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 72 (2010): 41-78.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper tries to read ‘Kant with Kafka’. We begin with the question of how the law can be given. This question is addressed by way of another question, namely whether Immanuel Kant’s practical philosophy can protect us from corrupting motives. What if Kant’s thoughts on the law are merely based on illusions? Central to this discussion is the theme of respect. Respect is first of all respect for the moral law, but Kant adds that this respect is mediated by a respect for the person. Will respect, then, guard us against all corrupting impulses, as Kant assured us? Here, Franz Kafka’s ‘The Trial’ becomes relevant, insofar as Kafka presents in this novel what can be called a ‘Talmudic’ discussion between the protagonist Josef K. and a priest, which precisely deals with the question of illusions and lies regarding the law.

Van Impe, Stijn.  “Kant’s Realm of Ends: A Communal Moral Practice as Locus for the Unity of Moral Personhood.”  Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy.  Ed. Stephen R. Palmquist (op cit.).  424-37.

 ——.  Rev. of Kants Kritiek van de zuivere rede: Een leeswijzer, by Karin de Boer (2010).  Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 102 (2010): 268-70.

 ——.  See: Vandenabeele, Bart and Stijn Van Impe.

Vanzo, Alberto.  “Kant on the Nominal Definition of Truth.”  Kant-Studien 101 (2010): 147–66. [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant claims that the nominal definition of truth is: “Truth is the agreement of cognition with its object”.  In this paper, I analyse the relevant features of Kant’s theory of definition in order to explain the meaning of that claim and its consequences for the vexed question of whether Kant endorses or rejects a correspondence theory of truth.  I conclude that Kant’s claim implies neither that he holds, nor that he rejects, a correspondence theory of truth.  Kant’s claim is not a generic way of setting aside a correspondence definition of truth, or of considering it uninformative.  Being the nominal definition of truth, the formula “truth is the agreement of cognition with its object” illustrates the meaning of the predicate “is true” and people’s ordinary conception of truth.  True judgements correspond to the objects they are about.  However, there could be more to the property of truth than correspondence.

 ——.  “Kant, Skepticism, and the Comparison Argument.”  Rethinking Kant, vol. 2.  Ed. Pablo Muchnik (op cit.). 54-80. [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Kant's writings on logic illustrate the comparison argument about truth, which goes as follows. A truth-bearer p is true if and only if it corresponds, or it agrees, with a portion of reality: the object(s), state(s) of affairs, or event(s) p is about. In order to know whether p agrees with that portion of reality, one must check if that portion of reality is as p states. Using the terms of the comparison argument, one must compare p with that portion of reality. This is impossible, because the only knowledge of reality we can have is in the form propositions, beliefs, or judgments, whose agreement with reality is as much in need of justification as the agreement of p with reality. Therefore, it is impossible to know which truth-bearers are true. This paper reconstructs Kant’s version of the comparison argument. It is argued that, according to Kant, the argument is sound only under the assumption of transcendental realism. Transcendental idealism avoids the sceptical consequences of the comparison argument.

Varden, Helga.  “Kant and Lying to the Murderer at the Door ... One More Time: Kant’s Legal Philosophy and Lies to Murderers and Nazis.”  Journal of Social Philosophy 41 (2010): 403-21.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article offers the author’s views on the idea of Immanuel Kant about the concept of lying to the murderer to save the victim from being killed. He notes that Kant rejects the idea claiming that justice is an enforcement of ethical duties or a subset of ethical duties. He cites that Kant sees justice as concerned with the exercise of external freedom and virtue deals with the exercise of internal freedom. He adds that Kant rejects the view that truth telling is an enforceable duty of justice.

 ——.  “Kant’s Non-Absolutist Conception of Political Legitimacy – How Public Right ‘Concludes’ Private Right in the Doctrine of Right.”  Kant-Studien 101 (2010): 331-51.

[Note] [Hide Note] Contrary to the received view, I argue that Kant, in the “Doctrine of Right”, outlines a third, republican alternative to absolutist and voluntarist conceptions of political legitimacy. According to this republican alternative, a state must meet certain institutional requirements before political obligations arise. An important result of this interpretation is not only that there are institutional restraints on a legitimate state's use of coercion, but also that the rights of the state (‘public right’) are not in principle reducible to the rights of individuals (‘private right’). Thus, for Kant, political obligations are intimately linked to the existence of a certain kind of republican institutional framework.

 ——.  Rev. of The Blackwell Guide to Kant’s Ethics, edited by Thomas E. Hill (2009).  Ethics 120 (2010): 860-64.

Vaysse, Jean-Marie.  Le Vocabulaire de Kant.  Paris: Ellipses, 2010.  [120 p.]

Vázquez Lobeiras, María Jesús.  “Fines y razones. Elementos para una antropología filosófica en el pensiamento de Kant.” [Spanish]  Was ist der Mensch? Que é o homem?  Eds. Ribeiro dos Santos, et al. (op cit.).  193-205.

 ——.  Rev. of Immanuel Kant: Crítica de la razón pura, translated and edited by Mario Caimi (2009).  Kant-Studien 101 (2010): 405-8.

Veillette, Claude.  Entre bonheur et liberté: commentaire sur l’éthique de Bentham, Mill et Kant.  Anjou, Québec: Éditions CEC: publisher, 2010.  [xvi, 207 p.]

Verhaegh, Marcus.  Critical Libertarianism: Kant, Austrian Economics, and the Night-Watchman State.  Dialectical Press, 2010.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This work develops the Critical philosophy while considering how Kant’s thought might support classical liberal, libertarian, and republican policy proposals.  It focuses extensively on the application of the Categorical Imperative.  The issue of deontic conflict among Kantian duties is explored at length, with a special focus on conflicts between duties of virtue and the duty to respect property claims.  The Categorical Imperative is not seen as requiring libertarianism, but it is suggested that the libertarian still receives some measure of support from the Categorical Imperative as applied together with Kant’s views of property and communism.  It is argued that ethical and policy prescriptions more in line with libertarian views favoring anarchism or the night-watchman state can be arrived at by conjoining to a polished version of Kant’s philosophy, reasons in support of his rejection of paternalism, and a focus on certain laws of economics.  The nature of economics laws is considered relative to Kant’s accounts of reflective judgment and of culture.  The work further suggests that either abandoning Kant’s views of communism or accepting paternalist coercion within a revised Critical system can allow one to support the welfare state or related political arrangements, even while embracing economic law.

Veríssimo Serrão, Adriana.  “‘Uma única família’. Género e raça na Antropologia de Kant.” [Portuguese]  Was ist der Mensch? Que é o homem?  Eds. Ribeiro dos Santos, et al. (op cit.).  151-63.

Verrucci, Gianluca.  Ragion pratica e normatività: il costruttivismo kantiano di Rawls, Korsgaard e O’Neill. [Italian]  Milano: Mimesis, 2010.  [294 p.] [contents]

 ——.  Rev. of L’autorità della morale, by Carla Bagnoli (2007). [Italian]  Studi Kantiani 23 (2010): 147-50.

Vigo, Alejandro G.  “Libertad como causa: Heidegger, Kant y el problema metafísico de la libertad.” [Spanish]  Anuario Filosofico 43 (2010): 161-81.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper discusses Heidegger’s criticism of Kant’s conception of freedom as a peculiar kind of cause. With his view of freedom Kant consummates the central tendencies of traditional ontology, ultimately arising from the Greek understanding of Being in terms of “constant presence”. But the causal view does not do justice to the deeper roots of freedom in the transcendence of Dasein.

Vilhauer, Benjamin.  “The Scope of Responsibility in Kant’s Theory of Free Will.”  British Journal for the History of Philosophy 18 (2010): 45-71.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article discusses the role of moral responsibility in the concept of free will as demonstrated by philosopher Immanuel Kant. The author reflects on the difference between personal responsibility for events and responsibility for causal laws in relation to the problem of determinism. Emphasis is given to locating limited-instantiation-scope laws in an empirical causal series in the context of the Kantian analysis of author Ralph Walker. It is suggested that Kant’s theory of free will can simultaneously account for determinism and moral responsibility.

Viliunas, Dalius.  “‘Res Admirabilae’: Lithuanian Reception of the Pre-Critical Philosophy of I. Kant (Part III).” [Lithuanian]  Logos: Religijos, filosofijos, komparatyvistikos ir meno zurnalas 62 (2010): 6-14.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article attempts to give an argument for the hypothesis that Lithuanian priest of Piars Kazimieras Narbutas (1738-1807) has been the philosopher, who had an honour to be the first in East, and maybe the whole Europe, to receive and criticise the precritical thinking of Immanuel Kant. In 1765, in his course of philosophy at the Collegium of Piars in Dabrowicy, Narbutas criticises the concept of substance suggested by “metaphysician Cantzius”. A person named as “Cantzius” could have been either Immanuel Kant, or theologian Gottlieb Israel Canz. Objecting to the position of Steponas Tunaitis, two arguments have been developed in this article: the person, who was referred to by Narbutas, couldn’t have been Canz, since the latter was a representative of the theologian Wolffianism. This philosophical position is close to that of Narbutas himself, his concept of the essence of the substance is the same as that of the school of Wolff. Canz couldn’t have delivered the concept of substance which were opposite to that of School of Wolff. The second argument states, that the principal propositions (and their consequentials) of Kant provided in his work of 1755 Principorum primorum cognitionis metaphysicae nova dilucidatio could be attributed to the position of “metaphysician Cantzius” on the substance, its attributes and the goals of God, which had been questioned by Narbutas. This parallel provides us with an opportunity to state, that Narbutas directly or indirectly has been acquainted with the above mentioned work of Kant and that the person, referred to in the text of Narbutas, is nobody but Kant, who has been dealing with metaphysical matters at that time.

Virvidakis, Stelios.  “The Allure of Hegelian Quietism.”  Teorema 29 (2010): 163-74.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper provides a critical discussion of John McDowell’s recent collection of articles Having the World in View, trying to trace the evolution of his philosophical approach since the publication of Mind and World. It focuses on McDowell’s interpretation of Hegel’s elaboration and development of Kant’s central epistemological positions in the light of the Sellarsian attack on the ‘myth’ of the ‘given’. It highlights the main points of his quietist construal of Hegelian idealism and questions his positive assessment of a supposedly satisfactory equipoise between subjective and objective.

 ——.  Rev. of Having the World in View: Essays on Kant, Hegel, and Sellars, by John McDowell (2009).  Teorema 29 (2010): 163-74.

Vollmann, Morris.  Freud gegen Kant? Moralkritik der Psychoanalyse und praktische Vernunft.  Bielefeld: Transcript, 2010.  [259 p.]

Vos, Rein.  “Doing Good or Right? Kant’s Critique on Confucius.”  Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy.  Ed. Stephen R. Palmquist (op cit.).  764-76.

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Waibel, Violetta L.  “With Respect to the Antinomies, Fichte Has a Remarkable Idea: Three Answers to Kant and Fichte — Hardenberg, Hölderlin, Hegel.”  Fichte, German Idealism, and Early Romanticism.  Eds. Daniel Breazeale and Tom Rockmore (op cit.). 301-26.

Waite, Geoffrey.  “Kant, Schmitt or Fues on Political Theology, Radical Evil and the Foe.”  Philosophical Forum 41 (2010): 205-27.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article discusses the views of philosophers Wolfram Malte Fues, Immanuel Kant and Carl Schmitt on political theology, radical evil and the foe. According to Kant the identity of concepts in analytic judgments can be both explicit and implicit. It also focuses on the radical evil that is a theological concept that represents the political and military enemies.

Walker, Ralph C. S.  “Kant on the Number of Worlds.”  British Journal for the History of Philosophy 18 (2010): 821-43.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: It has long been disputed whether Kant's transcendental idealism requires two worlds — one of appearances and one of things in themselves — or only one. The one-world view must be wrong if it claims that individual spatio-temporal things can be identified with particular things in themselves, and if it fails to take seriously the doctrine of double affection; versions that insist on one world, without making claims about the identity of individual things, cannot say in what way the world as we know it and the world of things in themselves can be ‘the same’. The two-world view must be wrong if it denies Kant's empirical realism, or offers a phenomenalist interpretation of it. On moral grounds Kant ‘identifies’ each human person with a particular thing in itself, but the relationship here cannot be strict identity; instead its closeness may warrant regarding the two distinct entities as part of a composite whole. Perhaps up to the first edition of the Critique, Kant thought that empirical knowledge required a particular kind of close correspondence between appearances and things in themselves, one that would make it appropriate to speak of composite wholes here also. By the time of the second edition, he saw that there could be no good grounds for thinking that. In this respect something a bit like the one-world theory might make more sense for the first edition than for the second; but in both cases there is room to speak of two worlds as well. Talk of the number of worlds is metaphorical, and both metaphors have their dangers.

Walsh, Kate Padgett.  “Reasons Internalism, Hegelian Resources.”  Journal of Value Inquiry 44 (2010): 225-40.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The significant point of difference between Kantian and Humean versions of reasons internalism lies in how they understand the powers of the faculty of reason in relation to desires. What the resulting versions of internalism ignore is the fundamentally social character of our reasons. I propose a distinctively Hegelian version of reasons internalism which, rather than focusing on the relative powers of inner faculties, is concerned with fundamental self-conceptions that structure our deliberation. These self-conceptions are neither universal nor particular to individuals, but rather reflect how we understand ourselves in relation to others within a complex social space.

Wandschneider, Dieter. “The Philosophy of Nature in Kant, Schelling and Hegel.” The Routledge Companion to Nineteenth Century Philosophy. Ed. Dean Moyer (New York: Routledge, 2010). pages??. [WC]

Warren, Daniel.  “Kant on Attractive and Repulsive Force: The Balancing Argument.”  Discourse on a New Method.  Eds. Mary Domski and Michael Dickson (op cit.).  193-241.

Watkins, Brian.  Rev. of Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason: A Critical Guide, ed. by Andrews Reath and Jens Timmerman (2010).  The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (September 2010, #2). [online]

Watkins, Eric.  “The Antinomy of Practical Reason: Reason, the Unconditioned and the Highest Good.”  Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason.  Eds. Reath and Timmermann (op cit.).  145-67.

 ——.  “Kant.”  A Companion to the Philosophy of Action.  Eds. Timothy O’Connor and Constantine Sandis (Chichester: Wiley Blackwell, 2010). 521-27.

 ——.  “Kant on the Hiddenness of God.”  Kant’s Moral Metaphysics: God, Freedom, and Immortality.  Eds. Lipscomb and Krueger (op cit.).  255-90.

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: This essay first appeared in Kantian Review 14 (2009): 81-122.

 ——.  “The System of Principles.”  The Cambridge Companion to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.  Ed. Paul Guyer (op cit.).  151-67.

Waxman, Wayne.  Rev. of Custom and Reason in Hume: A Kantian Reading of the First Book of the Treatise, by Henry Allison (2008).  Mind 119 (2010): 1135-38.

Weidemann, Christian.  “Von ‘bisweilen unvermeidlicher Geringschätzung’: Kant über Glaubensfreiheit, Toleranz und Religionskritik.”  Aufgeklärtes Christentum: Beiträge zur Kirchen- und Theologiegeschichte des 18. Jahrhunderts.  Eds. Albrecht Beutel, Volker Leppin, Udo Sträter, and Markus Wriedt (Leipzig: Evang. Verl.-Anst., 2010).  233-56. [online]

Weigelt, Klaus.  “Immanuel Kant in Kaliningrad nach 1945.”  Kant der Europäer: Europäer über Kant.  Eds. Dietzsch, Grimoni, and Kozlowski (op cit.).  286-305.

Weinrib, Jacob.  “What Can Kant Teach Us about Legal Classification?”  Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence: An International Journal of Legal Thought 23 (2010): 203-31.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This essay considers how three great legal theorists — Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel — answer three fundamental classificatory questions about private law. First, what is the unity that underlies the seemingly chaotic array of legal instances? Second, what is the principle of differentiation that applies to this unity? Third, how are legal instances subsumed under this differentiated unity? The focus of this essay is the enduring significance of Kant’s conception of legal classification, which offers a set of coherent answers to the fundamental classificatory questions. In contrast, both Aristotle and Hegel respond to the fundamental classificatory questions by providing a conception of the unity of private law that fails to cohere with their ensuing accounts of its differentiation.

Weiper, Susanne.  “Die Suche nach dem ‘Stein der Weisen’. Zum Problem der sittlichen Triebfeder bei Kant.”  Kant als Bezugspunkt Philosophischen Denkens.  Eds. Hubertus Busche and Anton Schmitt (op cit.).  325-49.

Wellmon, Chad.  Becoming Human: Romantic Anthropology and the Embodiment of Freedom.  University Park, Pa: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010.  [viii, 336 p.] [review]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents: Pt. 1. The historical problem — Proto-anthropology and the discovery of reflexivity — Pt. 2. A provisional (Kantian) solution — Cultivating freedom: Kant’s affective ethics — Freedom, between nature and reason: Kant’s pragmatic anthropology — Testing the human: Kant and Forster on the differences of race and the possibilities of culture — Pt. 3. — Three responses to Kant — Poesie as anthropology: Schleiermacher, colonial history, and the ethics of ethnography — Lyrical feeling: Novalis’s anthropology of the senses — The body of language: Goethe, Humboldt, and the “lively gaze”.

Welter, Nelsi Kistemacher. “Vida, liberdade e propriedade: Rawls e Kant a partir da perspectiva de Paul Guyer.” [Portuguese; Life, Liberty and Property: Rawls and Kant from the Perspective of Paul Guyer] ethic@ 9.3 (2010): 155-68. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article aims to present some elements of the relation between Kant and Rawls from the perspective of Paul Guyer. According to Guyer, before Rawls, Kantian thought had influenced very little American political thought. But from Rawls, this reality changes significantly precisely because according to Guyer, the theory of justice as fairness is derived from an essentially Kantian conception. More than that, Rawls’s principles of justice corresponds, today, to the appropriate reconstruction of Kant’s right conception.

Wenning, Mario.  “Kant and Daoism on Nothingness.”  Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy.  Ed. Stephen R. Palmquist (op cit.).  653-63.

Wenzel, Christian Helmut.  “On Wittgenstein’s Notion of Meaning-Blindness: Its Subjective, Objective and Aesthetic Aspects.”  Philosophical Investigations 33 (2010): 201-19.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Wittgenstein in his later years thought about experiences of meaning and aspect change. Do such experiences matter? Or would a meaning — or aspect-blind person not lose much? Moreover, is this a matter of aesthetics or epistemology? To get a better perspective on these matters, I will introduce distinctions between certain subjective and objective aspects, namely feelings of our inner psychological states versus fine-tuned objective experiences of the outer world. It seems to me that in his discussion of meaning-blindness, Wittgenstein unhappily floats between these two extremes, the subjective and the objective. I will also introduce some notions from Kant’s aesthetics, to get a better understanding of the interplay between feeling and meaning. This will shed some new light on Wittgenstein’s enquiry into meaning- and aspect-blindness.

 ——.  “Aesthetics and Morality in Kant and Confucius: A Second Step.”  Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy.  Ed. Stephen R. Palmquist (op cit.).  321-32.

 ——.  Rev. of The Kantian Sublime and the Revelation of Freedom, by Robert R. Clewis (2009).  Review of Metaphysics 64 (2010): 135-37.

Westphal, Kenneth R.  “From ‘Convention’ to ‘Ethical Life’: Hume’s Theory of Justice in Post-Kantian Perspective.”  Journal of Moral Philosophy 7 (2010): 105-32.

 ——.  “Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and Analytic Philosophy.”  The Cambridge Companion to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.  Ed. Paul Guyer (op cit.).  401-30.

Wheeler, Samuel.  Rev. of Having the World in View: Essays on Kant, Hegel, and Sellars, by John McDowell (2009).  Review of Metaphysics 64 (2010): 155-57.

White, Mark D.  “Adam Smith and Immanuel Kant: On Markets, Duties, and Moral Sentiments.”  Forum for Social Economics 39 (2010): 53-60.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This note points out a neglected parallel between the philosophies of Adam Smith and Immanuel Kant related to their views on self-interest, morality, and society. First, I explain the distinction between Kant’s perfect and imperfect duties, and how they result from his moral philosophy. Next, I summarize Smith’s two major perspectives on human behavior, as presented in The Theory of Moral Sentiments and The Wealth of Nations, and discuss the apparent conflict between them. Finally, I use Kant’s two types of duties, along with his concept of the kingdom of ends, to explicate my interpretation of the relationship between Smith’s two strains of thought. By explaining these dual aspects of Kant’s ethical system in relation to Smith, I hope to give a new perspective on the apparent duality in Smith’s thought, as well as help bring out the oft-neglected social aspects of Kant’s.

 ——.  “Behavioral Law and Economics: The Assault on Consent, Will, and Dignity.”  Essays on Philosophy, Politics & Economics: Integration & Common Research Projects.  Eds. Christi Favor, Gerald F. Gaus, and Julian Lamont (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010).  201-24.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In “Behavioral Law and Economics: The Assault on Consent, Will, and Dignity,” Mark D. White uses the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant to examine the intersection of economics, psychology, and law known as “behavioral law and economics.” Scholars in this relatively new field claim that, because of various cognitive biases and failures, people often make choices that are not in their own interests. The policy implications of this are that public and private organizations, such as the state and employers, can and should design the presentation of options and default choices in order to “steer” people to the decision they would make, were they able to make choices in the absence of their cognitive biases and failures. Such policies are promoted under the name “libertarian paternalism,” because choice is not blocked or co-opted, but simply “nudged.” White argues that such manipulation of choice is impossible to conduct in people's true interests, and any other goal pursed by policymakers substitutes their own ends, however benevolent they may be, for people’s true ends. Normatively, such manipulation should not be conducted because it fails to respect the dignity and autonomy of persons, what some hold to be the central idea in Kant’s ethical system, and which serves to protect the individual from coercion, however subtle, from other persons or the state.

 ——.  “Resisting Procrastination: Kantian Autonomy and the Role of the Will.”  The Thief of Time: Philosophical Essays on Procrastination.  Ed. Chrisoula Andreou (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). 216-32.

Wiegerling, Klaus.  Rev. of Kants Realismus und der Außenweltskeptizismus, by Vanderlei de Oliveira Farias (2006).  Kant-Studien 101 (2010): 258-60.

Wike, Victoria S., and Ryan L. Showler.  “Kant’s Concept of the Highest Good and the Archetype-Ectype Distinction.”  The Journal of Value Inquiry 44 (2010): 521-33.

 ——.  Rev. of Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: An Introduction, by Sally Sedgwick (2008).  Philosophy in Review 30 (2010): 227-29. [online]

Wilkerson, William.  “The Paradox of Time and the Will in Kant, Existentialism, and Derrida.”  Philosophy Today 54 (2010): 222-26.

Willaschek, Marcus.  “The Primacy of Practical Reason and the Idea of a Practical Postulate.”  Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason.  Eds. Reath and Timmermann (op cit.).  168-96.

 ——.  “Die ‘Spontaneität des Erkenntnisses’. Über die Abhängigkeit der ‘Transzendentalen Analytik’ von der Auflösung der Dritten Antinomie.”  Metaphysik und Kritik.  Eds. Chotaš, Karásek, and Stolzenberg (op cit.).  165-83.

Willat, Edward.  Kant, Deleuze, and Architectonics.  London/New York: Continuum, 2010.  [xi, 174 p.] [review]

 ——.  Rev. of Immanence and the Vertigo of Philosophy: From Kant to Deleuze, by Christian Kerslake (2009).  Philosophy in Review 30 (2010): 101-04. [online]

Williams, Howard.  “The Torture Convention, Rendition and Kant’s Critique of ‘Pseudo-Politics’.”  Review of International Studies 36 (2010): 195-214. [abstract]

 ——.  “Towards a Kantian Theory of International Distributive Justice.”  Kantian Review 15.2 (2010): 43-77.

Wilson, Catherine.  “Leibniz’s Reputation in the Eighteenth Century: Kant and Herder.”  Insiders and Outsiders in Seventeenth-Century Philosophy.  Eds. G. A. J. Rogers, Tom Sorell, and Jill Kraye.  New York: Routledge, 2010.  294-308.

Wilson, Eric.  “The Ontological Argument Revisited: A Reply to Rowe.”  Forum Philosophicum: International Journal of Philosophy 15 (2010): 37-44. [abstract]

 ——.  “On the Nature of Judgment in Kant’s Transcendental Logic.”  Idealistic Studies 40 (2010): 43-63.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This essay explores Kant’s account of judging. In it, I argue for two central claims. First, Kant defines the act of judgment as the exercise of a particular type of authority (Befugnis). When a person makes a judgment, she makes a claim to speak for everyone, and not just herself. She puts something forward as true. Kant’s term for this discursive authority is “objectivity validity”, and he identifies this as the essential feature of judging. Second, the categories and the principles are what authorize a person to put something forward as true. This means that the objective validity of a judgment is supplied by the rules of the understanding rather than by something outside the mind.

Wilson, Mark.  “Back to ‘Back to Kant’.”  Discourse on a New Method.  Eds. Mary Domski and Michael Dickson (op cit.).  553-68.

Winkler, Kenneth P.  “Kant, the Empiricists, and the Enterprise of Deduction.”  The Cambridge Companion to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.  Ed. Paul Guyer (op cit.).  41-72.

Winkler, Tanja.  Die Freiheit im und vom Staate bei Immanuel Kant.  Munich: C. H. Beck, 2010.  [288 p.]

Winter, Aloysius.  “‘Es ist ein Gott denn es ist ein categorische Imperativ’. Versteckte Ansätze zur Gottesfrage in der Kritik der praktischen Vernunft.”  Die Gottesfrage in der Philosophie Immanuel Kants.  Eds. Norbert Fischer and Maximilian Forschner (op cit.).  85-108.

 ——.  “Die sittliche Pflicht und das biblische Liebesgebot.”  Die Gottesfrage in der Philosophie Immanuel Kants.  Eds. Norbert Fischer and Maximilian Forschner (op cit.).  199-202.

Witte, Egbert.  Zur Geschichte der Bildung. Eine philosophische Kritik.  Freiburg im Breisgau: Karl Alber Verlag, 2010.  [176 p.] [review]

Wodarzik, Ulrich Fritz.  “Kants Logik des Menschen – Duplizität der Subjektivität.”  Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy.  Ed. Stephen R. Palmquist (op cit.).  167-80.

Wohlfart, Günter.  “Kantianism Versus Confucianism: From Kant’s Universalized Egocentrism to Kongzi’s Moral Reciprocity and Mengzi’s Compassion.”  Comparative and Continental Philosophy 2 (2010): 105-16.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This is a “metacritical” engagement from a Confucian perspective with the legacy of Kantian ethics. The first and longest part of this essay deals with the European West and Kant, especially the categorical imperative. The second part hearkens back to East Asian antiquity, especially Ancient China, as it briefly explores Kongzi’s Golden Rule and Mengzi’s compassion.

 ——.  “Metacritique of Practical Reason: Back from Kant’s Universalized Egocentrism via Kongzi’s Moral Recprocity and Mengzi’s Compassion to Huainanzi’s Receprocal Resonance and Zhuangzi’s Ethos without Ego.”  Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy.  Ed. Stephen R. Palmquist (op cit.).  53-73.

Wolff, Michael.  Der Begriff des Widerspruchs. Eine Studie zur Dialektik Kants und Hegels.  Expanded new ed.  Frankfurt/Main: Frankfurt Univ. Press, 2010.  [198 p.] [contents]

 ——.  “Logische und grammatische Form in der Prädikatenlogik – Anmerkungen zu einem ‘Gedanken’ Axel Bühlers.”  Kant-Studien 101 (2010): 352-76.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article defends the view that the logical vocabulary of syllogistic is sufficient for representing the logical form of rules and laws of non-syllogistic (classical or non-classical) predicate logic. This representation requires replacement only of the descriptive vocabulary of syllogistic (i.e., of variables for terms) by non-syllogistic descriptive signs. The validity of rules and laws of modern (classical or non-classical) predicate logic rests on the validity of rules and laws which can without exception be represented in the formal language of syllogistic. Expressions of this language are representations of logical form. Frege’s view that relationships between logical subjects and logical predicates can be “reduced” to relationships between functions and arguments confuses logical and grammatical subjects as well as logical and grammatical predicates.

 ——.  “Vollkommene Syllogismen und reine Vernunftschlüsse: Aristoteles und Kant. Eine Stellungnahme zu Theodor Eberts Gegeneinwänden. Teil 1.”  Journal for the General Philosophy of Science 41 (2010): 199-213.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In an earlier article (s. J Gen Philos Sci 40:341–355, 2009), I have rejected an interpretation of Aristotle’s syllogistic which (since Patzig) is predominant in the literature on Aristotle, but wrong in my view. According to this interpretation, the distinguishing feature of perfect syllogisms is their being evident. Theodor Ebert has attempted to defend this interpretation by means of objections (s. J Gen Philos Sci 40:357–365, 2009) which I will try to refute in part [1] of the following article. I want to show that (1) according to Aristotle’s Prior Analytics perfect and imperfect syllogisms do not differ by their being evident, but by the reason for their being evident, (2) Aristotle uses the same words to denote proofs of the validity of perfect and imperfect syllogisms („apodeixis“, “deiknusthai” etc.), (3) accordingly, Aristotle defines perfect syllogisms not as being evident, but as “requiring nothing beyond the things taken in order to make the necessity evident“, i.e. as not “requiring one or more things that are necessary because of the terms assumed, but that have not been taken among the propositions” (APr. I. 1), (4) the proofs by which the validity of perfect assertoric syllogisms can be shown according to APr. I. 4 are based on the Dictum de omni et nullo, (5) the fact that Aristotle describes these proofs only in rough outlines corresponds to the fact that his proofs of the validity of other fundamental rules are likewise produced in rough outlines, e.g. his proof of the validity of conversio simplex in APr. I. 2, which usually has been misunderstood (also by Ebert): (6) Aristotle does not prove the convertibility of E-sentences by presupposing the convertibility of I-sentences; only the reverse is true.

 ——.  “Vollkommene Syllogismen und reine Vernunftschlüsse: Aristoteles und Kant. Eine Stellungnahme zu Theodor Eberts Gegeneinwänden. Teil 2.”  Journal for the General Philosophy of Science 41 (2010): 359-71.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In an earlier article (see J Gen Philos Sci (2010) 41: 341–355) I have compared Aristotle’s syllogistic with Kant’s theory of “pure ratiocination”. “Ratiocinia pura” („reine Vernunftschlüsse“) is Kant’s designation for assertoric syllogisms Aristotle has called ‘perfect’. In Kant’s view they differ from non-pure ratiocinia precisely in that their validity rests only on the validity of the Dictum de omni et nullo (which, however, in Kant’s view can be further reduced to more fundamental principles) whereas the validity of non-pure ratiocinia additionally presupposes the validity of inferences which Kant calls consequentiae immediatae. I have argued that Kant’s view is in some (not in all) essential features in accordance with Aristotle’s view concerning perfect syllogisms and certainly leading to a tenable and interesting logical theory. As a result I have rejected not only the interpretation of Aristotle adopted by Theodor Ebert, but also the objections he has raised against Kant’s logical theory. As far as Aristotle is concerned, Ebert has attempted to defend his position in the first part of his reply to my article published in J Gen Philos Sci (2009) 40: 357–365, and I have argued against this defence in issue 1 of the J Gen Philos Sci (2010) 41: 199–213 (cf. Ebert’s answer in the same issue pp. 215–231). In the following discussion I deal with Eberts defence of his criticism of Kant published in the second part of his reply to my article (see J Gen Philos Sci (2009) 40: 365–372). I shall argue, that Kant’s principle ‘nota notae est nota rei ipsius’ and his use of technical vocabulary stand up to the objections raised by Ebert. His attempts to prove that Kant’s logical theory is defective are based on several misinterpretations.

Wolin, Richard.  “The Idea of Cosmopolitanism: From Kant to the Iraq War and Beyond.”  Ethics and Global Politics 3 (2010): 143-53.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: With the end of the Cold War the world approached the prospect of realizing what one might call the ‘Kantian moment’ in international relations. Auspiciously, 1995 marked both the 50th anniversary of the establishment of UN Charter, in which human rights guarantees prominently figured, as well as the 200th anniversary of Kant’s celebrated text on ‘Perpetual Peace.’ During the era of the EastWest political stalemate, the idea of effective world governance remained a chimera, as both political camps willfully exploited international governmental organizations (IGOs), such as the UN and UNESCO, for the self-serving ends of Realpolitik. Human rights claims were brazenly politicized. The Soviets lambasted American racism and the inadequacy of social rights. The USA and its allies, conversely, pilloried their opponent’s failure to minimally respect basic, first-generation civil and political liberties.

Wong, Kwok Kui.  “Schelling’s Criticism of Kant’s Theory of Time.”  Idealistic Studies 40 (2010): 83-102.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper aims at engaging Kant’s and Schelling’s theories of time in dialogue. It begins with Schelling’s famous criticism of Kant’s theory of time in his Weltalter (Ages of the World). It will examine this question from four main perspectives, namely, the unity of time; time and a unitary object of experience; subjectivity of time; and the problem of infinity of time. It will show that Schelling’s criticism may instigate some fundamental reflections on Kant’s theory of time, the relation between objective and subjective time, and the possibilities of connecting Kant’s different meanings of time in his first Critique. Further, it will show that despite the fundamental differences between Kant’s and Schelling’s philosophical systems, some of Schelling’s ideas about time may have their earlier expressions in Kant. While Schelling has gone further and radicalized some insights from Kant in his own version of idealism, his criticism of Kant may find possible responses from the latter’s first Critique.

 ——.  “Kant and the Reality of Time.”  Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy.  Ed. Stephen R. Palmquist (op cit.).  118-28.

Wood, Allen W.  “The Antinomies of Pure Reason.”  The Cambridge Companion to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.  Ed. Paul Guyer (op cit.).  245-65.

 ——.  “Punishment, Retribution, and the Coercive Enforcement of Right.”  Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals: A Critical Guide.  Ed. Lara Denis (op cit.). 111-29.

Wright, Patrick.  “A Timeless Sublime?”  Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities 15 (2010): 85-100.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article discusses the concept of feminine sublime which is argued as a means for non-periodising sublime approach. Philosopher Immanuel Kant believes that too much nature overpower a subject in dynamical sublime while statesman Edmund Burke appears to fear lack of nature. It says that sublime is a specific historical phenomenon. It mentions the works on sublime experience’s psychology including “An Essay on the Sublime,” “Critique of Judgement,” and “Reflections on the Revolution in France.”

Wuerth, Julian.  “The Paralogisms of Pure Reason.”  The Cambridge Companion to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.  Ed. Paul Guyer (op cit.).  210-44.

 ——.  “The First Paralogism, its Origin, and its Evolution: Kant on How the Soul Both Is and Is Not a Substance.”  Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy.  Ed. Stephen R. Palmquist (op cit.).  157-66.

 ——.  “Sense and Sensibility in Kant’s Practical Agent: Against the Intellectualism of Korsgaard and Sidgwick.”  European Journal of Philosophy (pre-print online, posted 26 Sep 2010). [abstract]

 ——.  Rev. of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason: Background Source Materials, ed. and tr. by Eric Watkins (2009).  The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (August 2010, #26). [online]

Wunderlich, Falk.  See: Sturm, Thomas and Falk Wunderlich.

 ——.  Rev. of Die Seele und ihre Vermögen: Kants Metaphysik des Mentalen in der ‘Kritik der reinen Vernunft’, by Stefan Heßbrüggen (2004).  Kant-Studien 101 (2010): 256-58.

Wunsch, Matthias.  See: Schwarz, Gerhard and Matthias Wunsch.

Wyrebska, Ewa.  “The Idea of Metaphysics in the Philosophy of Immanuel Kant.” (in Polish) Diametros: An Online Journal of Philosophy 23 (2010): 162-81. [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article investigates the notion of “metaphysics” in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, with emphasis on the idea and significance of metaphysics in the theoretical and practical use of reason. The author presents the Kantian interpretation of the term “metaphysics”, which determines the way Kant understood the task of the science of metaphysics. Metaphysics is also treated as the unavoidable outcome of the use of reason, which pursues completeness in knowledge. Nevertheless, the outcome of metaphysical speculation can never satisfy reason in its theoretical aspirations. The article also presents the consequences of the Kantian transposition of the objects of metaphysics to the terrain of practical reason, where their reality is postulated in view of moral perfection, which is the goal of mankind.

[top]X    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Xie, Sammy Xia-ling.  “On Kant’s Duality of Human Beings.”  Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy.  Ed. Stephen R. Palmquist (op cit.).  592-602.

Xie, Simon Shengjian.  “Is Kant a Western Philosopher?”  Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy.  Ed. Stephen R. Palmquist (op cit.).  799-807.

Xu, Xiangdong, transl.  See: Rockmore, Tom.  在康德的唤醒下: 20世纪西方哲学 / Zai Kangde de huan xing xia: 20 shi ji xi fang zhe xue.

[top]Y    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Yamamoto, Michio.  カントとその時代: ドイツ啓蒙思想の一潮流 / Kanto to sono jidai: doitsu keimo shiso no ichi choryu. [Japanese]  Kyoto: Koyo Shobo, 2010.  [420 p.]

Yamane, Yuichiro.  “Eine Studie zum kritischen Begriff a priori als ein Sachverhalt, der ursprünglich erworben wird.”  Kant-Studien 101 (2010): 413-28.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In his later polemical work against Eberhard, Kant uses the concept of “original acquisition” to defend the critical meaning of his own concept of the “a priori”. It is well known that the former has been borrowed from the modern idea of natural law. In this paper, I try to clarify how the former characterizes the latter in Kant’s critical epistemology, referring to a certain Kantian transformation of the traditional concept of “innate”. Drawing on the dualism of human cognitive faculties, i.e. of sensibility and understanding, the conception of “original acquisition” can distinguish the apriority of the transcendental imagination from the rest of the a priori apparatus. Thus the concept of “original acquisition” points to one of the central theses in the first Critique.

Yazdi, Mahdi Husseinzadeh.  “A New Approach to Comparing Kantian Categories with Secondary Intelligibles in Islamic Philosophy.” [Farsi]   Kheradname-ye Sadra Journal 15 (2010): 12-27.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: According to Kant, the faculty of understanding possesses a priori concepts. These concepts or categories are the basis of universal and necessary judgments. In his view, the knowledge of facts is possible for humans through these concepts. On the other hand, in Islamic philosophy true and universal concepts are divided into primary intelligibles or quiddative concepts indicating the quiddities of objects, logical secondary intelligibles, and philosophical secondary intelligibles. This paper compares the Kantian categories with the secondary intelligibles in Islamic philosophy. The writer believes that paying attention to various viewpoints of concepts makes this paper distinct from similar ones. Here, he has first explained the various viewpoints of concepts, and then, after a brief explanation of Kantian categories and secondary intelligibles in Islamic philosophy, compared them with each other.

Yazicioglu, Sanem.  “Arendt’s Hermeneutic Interpretation of Kantian reflective Judgment.”  Philosophy Today 54 (2010): 321-32.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: An essay on the hermeneutic interpretation of the reflective judgment of Immanuel Kant is presented. It examines the common critical attitude of Kant and Hannah Arendt toward the traditions in which their respective reflections were rooted. It examines the qualities of aesthetical reflective judgments in the Critique of Judgement, by Kant. An analysis showing the influence of Kant’s notion of common sense upon Arendt’s understanding of judgment is offered.

Yermolaev, Vladimir K.  “Argumentacija Kanta v scholii v teoreme VI v Nova Dilucidatio: tradicionnaja interpretacija i svjazannye s neju problem.” [Russian; “Kant’s argumentation in the scholia to theorem VI in Nova Dilucidatio: the traditional interpretation and related problems”]  Kantovskij Sbornik 33 (2010): 52-63. [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This offers an introduction to the analysis of Kant’s refutation of the ontological argument in his dissertation A New Elucidation of the First Principles of Metaphysical Cognition (Nova dilucidatio). The author explains the importance of the pre-critical argument analysis for the understanding of argumentation presented in the Critique of Pure Reason. The traditional interpretation of the arguments in Nova dilucidatio and related problems are discussed in detail.

 ——.  “Argumentacija Kanta v scholii v teoreme VI v Nova Dilucidatio: interpretacii T. Pindera i J. Šmukera.” [Russian; “Kant’s argumentation in the scholia to theorem VI in Nova Dilucidatio: T. Pinder and J. Schmucker’s interpretations”]  Kantovskij Sbornik 34 (2010): 46-59.

Yi, Xiaobo.  论康德的知性与理性 / Lun Kangde de zhi xing yu li xing. [Chinese]  Changsha Shi: Hu nan jiao yu chu ban she, 2010.  [193 p.]

Yildirim, Ahmet Fethi, transl.  See: Kant, Immanuel.  Güzellik ve yücelik duyguları üzerine gözlemler.

Yoshida, Hiroshi.  “The Status of Hearing in the Modern Philosophical Thought: In the Cases of Herder, Kant and Hegel.” [Japanese]  Bigaku: The Japanese Journal of Aesthetics 61 (2010): 25-36.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: For Herder, the ear is the most nearest sense to the soul, and the audition stands in the middle of our five senses, dominating the others. But, at the same time, he also attaches great importance to touch, inheriting the tradition of Molyneux’s question and, therefore, presupposes a kinship between hearing and touch. Kant exiles the ear from his conception of the critique of judgment, preferring the eye as a normative sense for disinterested and formal judgment. But he emphasizes a moral function of the ear in his critique of practical reason, as an organ hearing the voice of reason, i.e., the divine voice. The ear, finally, gains a definitive advantage over the eye with Hegel. He describes the progress of romantic art from painting to music as a process of the “negation of dimension.” In his view, time is negation (or sublation) form of space, and equally the audition is that of vision. We can say, therefore, that the hypothetical “hegemony of vision” was never stable, and the status of seeing has always been challenged and undermined by the hearing in the course of modern philosophy.

Yost, Benjamin S.  “Kant’s Justification of the Death Penalty Reconsidered.”  Kantian Review 15.2 (2010): 1-27.

Ypi, Lea.  “Natura Daedala Rerum? On the Justification of Historical Progress in Kant’s Guarantee of Perpetual Peace.”  Kantian Review 14.2 (2010): 118-48.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article analyses the teleological argument justifying historical progress in Kant’s “Guarantee of Perpetual Peace”. It starts by examining the controversies produced by Kant’s claim that the teleology of nature supports the idea of a providential development of humanity towards moral progress and the possibility of achieving a cosmopolitan political constitution. It further illustrates how Kant’s teleological argument in “Perpetual Peace” needs to be assessed with reference to two systematically relevant issues: first, the problem of coordination linked to the necessity of realizing the ‘highest good’ as a historical end of practical reason, and secondly, the problem of continuity posed by the temporal limitation of all individual efforts to cultivate moral dispositions. To illustrate the implications of both issues for the teleological argument in “Perpetual Peace”, the article draws attention to some important developments in Kant’s analysis of teleology following the ‘Critique of Judgment’. More specifically, it identifies in the combination of the ‘culture of discipline’ with the ‘culture of skill’ a new interpretative key for understanding Kant’s conception of historical progress in the “Guarantee”. Contrary to a number of critiques of Kant’s would-be providential understanding of teleology, the article defends an agent-oriented conception of the guarantee where nature is judged reflectively as rational collective agency promoting reason’s moral ends through social and political institutions.

[top]Z    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Zacchini, Simone.  La collana di Armonia: Kant, Poincaré, Feyerabend e la Crisi dell’episteme. [Italian]  Milano, Italy: FrancoAngeli, 2010.  [191 p.]

Zahonero, Luis Alegre.  “La libertad civil como condición de posibilidad de la autonomía moral: Sobre la aportación de Freud al planteamiento práctico de Kant.” [Spanish]  Trans/Form/Acao: Revista de Filosofia 33.1 (2010): 155-82. [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: It is usual to read Freud as a critic of Enlightenment, specially of the Kantian way of thinking moral autonomy. However, all Freud did was discover in human nature a great difficulty that enlightened philosophy just cannot ignore. This difficulty, which directly affects conceptions about the age of majority, refers to certain heteronomy mechanisms which main characteristic is the skill to supplant the voice of moral autonomy: exactly the same as moral law in Kant, ‘superego’ — once internalized during childhood and once culture imperatives have been assumed as one’s own (regardless of their rationality) — orders without promising anything (external) or threatening anything (external). So, the political project of enthroning reason as the top authority (project shared by both, Kant and Freud) depends on the existence of a republican organization that guarantees a pedagogical program for which “age of majority” does not mean any more naming “ego” to ancient customs internalized but the capacity of being ruled by one’s own reason (which becomes, once psychoanalysis developed, not only a moral imperative but also a therapeutic imperative).

Zammito, John H., Karl Menges, and Ernest A. Menze.  “Johann Gottfried Herder Revisited: The Revolution in Scholarship in the Last Quarter Century.”  Journal of the History of Ideas 71 (2010): 661-84.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: An essay is presented on philosopher Johann Gottfried Herder and his influence on both the natural and social sciences. It describes Herder’s belief that it was integral to combine the study of humans and nature because of their interconnectedness, which was the opposite of the Enlightenment thinking of philosopher Immanuel Kant. It focuses on research regarding Herder’s literary works and explores his thoughts on anthropology, modern language philosophy, and natural history.

Zehetner, Cornelius.  “Das a priori kritischer Anthropologie. Zum Intelligiblen in Kants vierfachem Ansatz und seiner Weiterführung bei Benedikt.”  Transformationen der kritischen Anthropologie.  Eds. Cornelius Zehetner, Hermann Rauchenschwandtner, and Birgit Zehetmayer (Vienna: Löcker Verlag, 2010).  62-77.

[Note] [Hide Note] From the Publisher on the anthology: Kritische Anthropologie stellt in der Tradition der aufzuklärenden Aufklärung die Theorie und Praxis der Einzelwissenschaften, der Künste, der Politik, Religion, Wirtschaft und Lebenswelt insgesamt und im gegenseitigen Verhältnis zur Debatte, um den Erfahrungsbezug der Philosophie umfassend in differenzierten Dimensionen auszuleuchten. Angeregt von Kants pragmatischer und transzendentaler Anthropologie und veranlasst durch ein Symposion zum 80. Geburtstags von Michael Benedikt, versammelt der vorliegende Band Beiträge aus acht Ländern, von Europa über Amerika bis Japan, zur philosophischen Fundierung, Infragestellung und Entschlüsselung der gesellschaftlichen und kulturellen Welt in ihren Entwicklungen und Krisen. Bei aller Unterschiedlichkeit der Zugänge, der Gegenstände möglicher Erfahrung und der geistesgeschichtlichen Vorgaben, die hier in kritischer Verwerfung oder aber Fortführung und Transformation thematisiert werden, geht es um die Möglichkeit einer Vereinbarung der einzelwissenschaftlichen Forschungen mit dem wohl fundierten Anspruch der kritischen Anthropologie. Jenseits allen dogmatischen Schlummers steht dabei mit der Frage nach dem Menschen nicht zuletzt Philosophie als solche auf dem Prüfstand. Michael Benedikt hat in seinem Werk, seiner Ausdeutung der philosophischen Tradition, seinen gesellschaftspragmatischen Analysen und Anstößen, seinen Perspektiven auf Gegenwart und Zukunft ein solches Prozedere immer wieder in Gang gesetzt. Zu ausgewählten Themenkreisen aus seinem Oeuvre - Philosophischer Empirismus, Anthropodizee und die Verengung distinkter Halbwelten, Wissen und Glauben, Kunst, religiöser Sozialismus, philosophische Politik - tragen u.a. folgende AutorInnen bei: John Blackmore, Walter Gartler, Wolfgang Kaempfer, Endre Kiss, Helmut Kohlenberger, Wolfgang Pircher, Jacques Poulain, János Rathmann, Elisabeth von Samsonow, Daisuke Shimizu, Wolfdietrich Schmied-Kowarzik, Hans Rainer Sepp, Reiner Wiehl, Katherina Zakravsky.

Żelazny, Mirosław.  “Kant und Polen.”  Kant der Europäer: Europäer über Kant.  Eds. Dietzsch, Grimoni, and Kozlowski (op cit.).  148-60.

Zeuske, Michael.  “Alexander von Humboldt — ein Kantianer? Sein Verhältnis zu Sklaverei, Kolonialismus und Menschenrechten in Spanisch-Amerika.”  Menschenrechte und ihre Grundlagen im 21. Jahrhundert — auf dem Wege zu Kants Weltbürgerrecht.  Ed. Berthold Lange (op cit.).  85-92.

Zeyer, Kirstin.  “Wiederentdeckung eines vergessenen Kantianers Friedlaender/Mynona: Gesammelte Schriften.”  Kant-Studien 101 (2010): 89–100.

Zhang, Ellen Y.  “What Is Personhood? Kant and Huayan Buddhism.”  Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy.  Ed. Stephen R. Palmquist (op cit.).  678-91.

Zhang, Wei.  What Is Enlightenment: Can China Answer Kant’s Question?  Albany: State University of New York Press, 2010.  [x, 121 p.]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents: Two unrelated questions — What is enlightenment?: a Kant-Foucault-Habermas sequence — What is Chinese enlightenment?: can China answer Kant's question? — Hermeneutics as politics: a May Fourth appropriation of a Confucian model — History and the present: a May Fourth's critiques of spurious history — Afterthought: so, what is enlightenment?

 ——.  “Kantische und phänomenologische Auffassungen des ‘Apriori’ in Bezug auf materiales ‘Apriori’ und formales ‘Apriori’.”  Topos: Journal for Philosophical and Cultural Studies 2 (2010): 122-35.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: On one hand, the concept of the ‘a priori’ is one of the principal themes in Kant’s philosophy. And we can say that Kant basically comprehended the ‘a priori’ as the form of ‘a priori’. Husserl, however, claimed that there was absent of the genuine concept of the ‘a priori’ in Kant’s philosophy. On the other hand, Husserl suggested that Hume’s “the relation of ideas” is the only important concept of the ‘a priori’ in epistemology. It was by the way of reflecting on Hume and Kant’s concept of the ‘a priori’ that Husserl found his own concept named as “essence — ‘Apriori’”. We can regard the critique of Scheler on the concept of the ‘a priori’ of Kant as the supplement and deepening of Husserl’s critique on Kant. In contrast with Kant, the phenomenologists hold that there is the nonformal ‘a priori’, and the grounding relationship between the nonformal ‘a priori’ and the formal one. By Scheler’s theory of the functionalization of the eidetic intuition, it is confirmed that the nonformal ‘a priori’ given as the essence in phenomenological intuition functions as the foundation. It is by its functionalization that the formal ‘a priori’ plays a role as the formal laws of function. In this sense, the comprehension of ‘a priori’ in the way of phenomenology is not only the comprehension of Kant’s ‘a priori’, but also the transform of the mode of philosophical thinking.

Ziegler, Rafael.  Rev. of Kant and the Culture of Enlightenment, by Katerina Deligiorgi (2005).  Kant-Studien 101 (2010): 115-19.

Zimmermann, Stephan.  “In Sachen Willensfreiheit: Kant und die Grenzstreitigkeiten zwischen Philosophie und Neurowissenschaft.”  Philosophische Rundschau 57 (2010): 272-90.

Zöller, Günter.  “Autocracy: Kant on the Psycho-Politics of Self-Rule.”  Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy.  Ed. Stephen R. Palmquist (op cit.).  401-14.

 ——.  “Autokratie. Die Psycho-Politik der Selbstherrschaft bei Platon und Kant.”  Kant als Bezugspunkt Philosophischen Denkens.  Eds. Hubertus Busche and Anton Schmitt (op cit.).  351-77.

 ——.  “Fichte und das Problem der Metaphysik.”  Fichte-Studien 35 (2010): 13-41.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The essay investigates the relation of the post-Kantian philosophy of J. G. Fichte (1762-1814) to the metaphysical tradition. The focus is on the attempts undertaken throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to recuperate Fichte for classical metaphysics. Based primarily on Fichte’s late work (1807-1814), which only recently has been made available in its entirety, I argue for Fichte’s continued critical stance toward an onto-theological conception of metaphysics. The persistent character of Fichte’s brand of first philosophy (“Wissenschaftslehre”) is shown to be a transcendental account of knowledge in terms of its absolute ground (“life”), subjective conditions (“I”) and objective domain (“appearances”).

 ——.  “In der Begrenzung zeigt sich der Meister. Der metaphysische Minimalismus der Kritik der reinen Vernunft.”  Metaphysik und Kritik.  Eds. Chotaš, Karásek, and Stolzenberg (op cit.).  19-33.

 ——.  “Of Empty Thoughts and Blind Intuitions Kant’s Answer to McDowell.”  Trans/Form/Acao: Revista de Filosofia 33.1 (2010): 65-96. [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper examines the relation between intuition and concept in Kant in light of John McDowell’s neo-Kantian position that intuitions are concept-laden. The focus is on Kant’s twofold pronouncement that thoughts without content are empty and that intuitions without concepts are blind. I show that intuitions as singular representations are not instances of passive data intake but the result of synthetic unification of the given manifold of the senses by the power of the imagination under the guidance of the understanding. Against McDowell I argue that the amenability of intuitions to conceptual determination is not due some pre-existing, absolute conceptuality of the real but to the “work of the subject.” On a more programmatic level, this paper seeks to demonstrate the limitations of a selective appropriation of Kant and the philosophical potential of a more comprehensive and thorough consideration of his work. Section 1 addresses the unique balance in Kant’s philosophy between the work on particular problems and the orientation toward a systematic whole. Section 2 outlines McDowell’s take on the Kantian distinction between intuition and concept in the context of the Kant readings by Sellars and Strawson. Section 3 exposes McDowell’s relapse into the ‘myth of the given’. Section 4 proposes a reading of Kant’s theoretical philosophy as an epistemology of metaphysical cognition. Section 5 details Kant’s original account of sensible intuition in the Inaugural Dissertation of 1770. Section 6 presents the transition from the manifold of the senses to the synthesis in the imagination and the unification through the categories in the Critique of Pure Reason (1781 and 1787). Section 7 addresses Kant’s formalism in epistemology and metaphysics.

Zovko, Marie-Élise.  “Der systematische Zusammenhang der Philosophie in Kants Kritik der Urteilskraft: ‘Zweite Aufmerksamkeit’ und Analogie der ästhetischen und teleologischen Urteilskraft.”  Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 58 (2010): 629-45.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The unity of aesthetic and teleological judgment, the third and earlier Critiques, is based on Kant’s discovery of a “heuristic method” for applying judgments regarding sense phenomena to abstract thought, a “second attention” which enables an “idea of the whole”. Synthetic judgment, basis for cognition and human action, depends on efficacy of nonempirical insights: the transcendental standpoint, “regulative” ideas, consciousness of “ought” and the reality of freedom, universality of natural mechanism, the principle of “fortuitous” purposiveness. The activity of reflective judgment in the encounter with the beautiful, sublime, living, and two paradigmatic types of explanation, inspired by Spinoza’s distinction of extensio and cogitatio, permit Kant to bridge the gap between freedom and necessity, theoretical knowledge and morality.

Zuckert, Catherine, H.  Rev. of Plato in Germany: Kant — Natorp — Heidegger, by Alan Kim (2010).  The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (August 2010, #28). [online]

Zuckert, Rachel.  Kant on Beauty and Biology: An Interpretation of the 'Critique of Judgment'.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

 ——.  “Kant’s Account of Practical Fanaticism.”  Kant’s Moral Metaphysics: God, Freedom, and Immortality.  Eds. Lipscomb and Krueger (op cit.).  291-318.

Zwolinski, Matt.  See: Arnold, Denis G., Robert Audi, and Matt Zwolinski.

[top]Dissertations    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Atkin, Parasceve (Vivi).  Applying Kant’s Universality Test for the Morality of Actions.  Ph.D. diss.  University of Wisconsin/Madison, 2010.  [168 p.]  Advisor: Claudia Card.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: John Stuart Mill ( Utilitarianism ) and G.W.F. Hegel ( Elements of the Philosophy of Right ) claim that Kant’s Categorical Imperative test expressed in its first major formulation “Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law” is not usable as a moral test of maxims. According to their view Kant’s test is too abstract and requires further principles for its application. The claims of Mill and Hegel have given rise to the problem of relevant act-descriptions. The problem consists in how to identify morally significant features that are to be included in the focus of the Categorical Imperative test.
The same problem arises in the application of conditional logic. It is not a problem that can be solved by formal logic alone. I tap into the powers of a logical theory of conditionals to interpret the Categorical Imperative test. My interpretation solves the problem of relevant act-descriptions by opening the door to appealing to features that add moral import on a case by case basis. In contrast to scholars like Barbara Herman (2008) who claim that Kant’s test can only be used as a general guide to generating moral rules, my interpretation shows that the Categorical Imperative test is sensitive to the moral nuances and complexities of human action and interaction. My interpretation also shows that Kant’s Categorical Imperative test can decide moral dilemmas and deal with cases of omissions that have no maxims. My argument brings Kant’s Categorical Imperative test back to life as a practical guide to specific moral decisions.

Ballard, Leslie Roy.  Synthesis and Selfhood: A Comparative Study of Kierkegaard and Kant.  Ph.D. diss.  Boston College, 2010.  [480 p.]  Advisor: Vanessa P. Rumble.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Many commentators on Kierkegaard’s philosophy acknowledge that his writings draw from Kant’s philosophy; but few essays trace the origin of specific categories in Kierkegaard’s thought to their Kantian roots. While young scholars are especially prone to see in the philosophy of the previous century numerous links to Kierkegaard’s writings, few question their ultimate source. The question of Kierkegaard’s indebtedness to Kant recommends itself, then, to serious explorers of the sources of Kierkegaard’s notion of selfhood, the role of Kant’s ontology and moral philosophy in the latter, and the differences in their understandings of the relation between religious faith and moral obligation.
Ronald M. Green and Ulrich Knappe examine Kierkegaard’s familiarity with Immanuel Kant’s philosophy. Green consults lecture notes, journal entries, and university documents to determine the nature and extent of Kierkegaard’s engagement with Kant; he reviews public auction records to discover the books by Kant that Kierkegaard owned at the time of his death. Knappe bypasses such investigations to analyze the Kantian ideas apparent in Kierkegaard’s texts — often a more substantive reflection than Green’s, albeit sometimes speculative.
This dissertation identifies and addresses interpretive problems like the ultimate unity of Kant’s critical and ethical philosophies, and the autonomy of Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms. Conclusions concerning Kierkegaard’s use of Kant are drawn within these parameters. The early Climacus alludes to Kant’s pure intuitions of space and time and the origin of consciousness in reflection. In spite of similarities in their depictions of the synthesis implied in human consciousness and knowledge, Climacus later criticizes Kant’s presumed neglect of ethics for theory. Climacus’ criticism, I argue, is based on a conflation of non-religious and religious ethics. The dissertation takes as its point of departure Kant’s and Kierkegaard’s non-religious formulations of identity in order to learn how each thinker understands human being and to allow each to present a conception of Christian selfhood.
Three different, sometimes overlapping, stages emerge in the pseudonymous writings: the esthetic, the ethical, and the religious. In Either/Or, the first two are analogous to Kant’s hypothetical and categorical motivation in terms of the universality and necessity of the law. A cogent analogy between their ethics, however, requires the pseudonyms to describe the law as a priori. William twice refers to a priority and mentions his familiarity with Kantian ethics. It is argued that William’s ethical stage is a Kantian a priori ethics that other pseudonyms — namely, Silentio — overcome in the religious.
The corpora understand sin differently, but agree that it hinders moral progress and causes the breakdown of the non-religious person. Anti-Climacus writes that revelation imparts knowledge of sin, and Haufniensis asserts that the convert needs dogmatics to guide the new self-understanding. Religious passion rather than reason primarily motivates the theological self. Kant thinks theology and its self-conception are good only insofar as they help pure practical reason to attain perfection; passion remains mostly suspect, and pure practical reason maintains its authority in moral deliberation.
Silentio and Kant disagree whether the faith of religious life can be justified in violating universal ethical principles. Silentio claims that Abraham’s sacrifice of Isaac presupposes the teleological suspension of universal ethics. Kant asserts that the laws of pure practical reason admit no exception. Abraham must comprehend the apparition’s command as a temptation to commit murder, and not heed it. Silentio envisions extraordinary acts of faith apart from moral justification, but Kant argues the ethical is inviolate. Silentio welcomes the passionate and the miraculous; Kant leaves open the question whether his ethical rigorism is compatible with true biblical faith.

Batra, Anupa.  Experience, Time, and the Subject: Deleuze’s Transformation of Kant’s Critical Philosophy.  Ph.D. diss.  Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, 2010.  [205 p.]  Advisor: Sara G. Beardsworth.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The aim of this thesis is to show that Deleuze develops a new conception of experience. I do so by showing the roots of this new conception in a transformation of Kant’s transcendental philosophy. Kant is central to Deleuze’s project because Deleuze finds in Kant the idea that the justification for truth is internal to the relation of subject and object. Since the internal relation is vital to Deleuze’s notion of experience, his project is formed as the problem of transcendental conditioning, as was Kant’s. However, Deleuze argues that Kant did not take the critique far enough since he was able to examine claims to truth but not the idea of truth itself. Deleuze’s notion of experience is developed in and through his attempt to overcome this problem.
I show that Deleuze transforms Kant by rethinking four key notions. First, Deleuze reconceives the notion of the system of experience. He argues that Kant’s notion of the system of experience closes off experience so that nothing genuinely new could occur. For Deleuze, experience does not form a single system but, instead, there are multiple systems of experience and they arise from within experience. In addition, new systems of experience can occur for Deleuze. Second, he rethinks the notion of the transcendental conditions of experience such that they condition experience but arise from within experience. Experience can always be opened up in a new way. Moreover, since experience can occur in a genuinely new way, the subject must be able to be transformed as well. Third, then, he also rethinks the notion of the subject. For Deleuze, we cannot begin with a subject that is self-identical. He provides an account for the production of the subject. The transcendental conditions of experience belong to experience itself, not the subject. The subject and the object of knowledge are produced together when a system of experience opens up. As a result, the subject and object are necessarily in relation and, for this reason, the object can always in principle be known by the subject. Fourth, although Deleuze relies on Kant’s conception of time to explain the subject’s relation to itself, he transforms both the subject’s self-relation and the conception of time. In Kant the subject simply cannot know itself as it is, but only as it is given to itself. Deleuze’s subject, which also cannot know itself, can nonetheless genuinely be transformed and become different from itself. The transformation of the subject occurs at the moment that a new field of experience is opened up. In conclusion, Deleuze shows that new experience can always occur.

Benson, Carolyn Jane.  Autonomy and Purity in Kant’s Moral Theory.  Ph.D. diss.  St. Andrews University, 2010.  [203 p.]  Advisors: Jens Timmerman and Sarah Broadie. [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant believed that the moral law is a law that the rational will legislates. This thesis examines this claim and its broader implications for Kant’s moral theory. Many are drawn to Kantian ethics because of its emphasis on the dignity and legislative authority of the rational being. The attractiveness of this emphasis on the special standing and capacities of the self grounds a recent tendency to interpret Kantian autonomy as a doctrine according to which individual agents create binding moral norms. Where this line is taken, however, its advocates face deep questions concerning the compatibility of autonomy and the conception of moral requirement to which Kant is also certainly committed — one which conceives of the moral law as a strictly universal and necessary imperative. This thesis has two main aims. In the first half, I offer an interpretation of Kantian autonomy that both accommodates the universality and necessity of moral constraint and takes seriously the notion that the rational will is a legislator of moral law. As a means of developing and securing my preferred view, I argue that recent popular interpretations of Kantian autonomy fail to resolve the tensions that seem at first glance to plague the concept of self-legislation, where what is at stake is the legislation of a categorical imperative. In the second half of this thesis, I examine the connections between my preferred interpretation of self-legislation and Kant’s dichotomisation of reason and our sensuous nature. I argue that some of the more harsh and seemingly unreasonable aspects of Kant’s moral philosophy can be defended by bringing to light the ways in which they are connected to his commitment both to the autonomy of the will and to developing a genuinely normative ethics.

Brown, Gary Ronald.  The 1929 Davos Disputation Revisited.  Ph.D. diss.  The University of Texas at Dallas, 2010.  [380 p.]  Advisor: Charles Bambach.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The 1929 disputation at Davos, Switzerland, pitting Martin Heidegger’s version of phenomenology against Cassirer’s extension of neo-Kantianism, initiated a shift in Western philosophy from epistemology to ontology. Although most agree that Heidegger won, few agree about what was at issue. My dissertation seeks to clarify the protocol with references to related topics in the published works of both philosophers. It also attempts to bring out differences that the insufficient sharpness of the disputation, which Heidegger attributed to Cassirer’s politeness, served to conceal. By following phenomenological clues within the disputation, I trace the underlying conflict to Cassirer’s and Heidegger’s differing interpretations of Kant. At the core of the Critique of Pure Reason Kant describes the transcendental structure, consisting of sense, imagination, and apperception, by which human beings relate to objects on both the a priori and a posteriori levels. Cassirer appropriates the empirical, conscious level of this Kantian structure as the backbone of his Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, yielding a three-stage historical unfolding toward timeless objectivity of the various cultural spheres: language, myth, religion, and science. Heidegger, in contrast, beginning with Phenomenology of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (1927/8), appropriates this same Kantian structure (along with others) ontologically on the a priori level as a transcendental description of Dasein’s transcendence as being-in-the-world. I show the consequences at Davos of Heidegger’s ontologically different reading of Kant, which undermines the conscious orientation not only of Cassirer, neo-Kantianism, and Husserlian phenomenology, but the tradition back to Plato. My dissertation shows how Heidegger’s entire middle period, between the collapse of Being and Time through Beiträge, is shaped by his ontological appropriation of Kant. After Davos, Heidegger continues this project of reinterpreting Kant not only in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (1927) and What is a Thing? (1936), but in his lectures on Leibniz, human freedom, truth, Hegel, and Schelling, By reclaiming through this effort the directly grasped being and temporality of truth from neo-Kantian subjective constructions, Heidegger lays the ground for his “so-called turn” later in the 1930s.

Butterman, Ralf.  Die Fiktion eines Faktums: Kants Suche nach einer Rechtswissenschaft: Erwägungen zu Begründung und Reichweite der kantischen Rechtsphilosophie.  Ph.D. diss.  Universität-Potsdam, 2010.  [311 p.]  Advisor: Francesca Yardenit Albertini.

Choi, Andrew N.  On Kant, Arpaly and Practical Rationality.  Ph.D. diss.  Ohio State University, 2010.  [174 p.]  Advisor: Timothy Schroeder.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In my dissertation, I develop and defend a new version of the Kantian theory of action and practical rationality. According to the Kantian theory of action, action is behavior that is genuinely guided by a series of representations which reflect the agent's understanding of what he is doing – namely, judgments about reasons for action, best judgments and choices. Moreover, one significant claim of the Kantian theory of practical rationality is the claim that rational action is action that accords with one's best judgment, and irrational action is action that goes against one's best judgment - where acting in accordance with one's best judgment is taken to be a necessary (and not sufficient) condition of rational action, whereas acting against one's best judgment is taken to be a sufficient condition of irrational action. While these claims are taken for granted by Kantians, they have recently come under significant fire. In a well-known paper, Nomy Arpaly presents a character named “Sam”, an agent who allegedly acts rationally even though he acts against his best judgment. In light of Sam, Arpaly concludes that we should reject the aforementioned claim of the Kantian theory of practical rationality. Now, while Arpaly’s main target is the Kantian theory of practical rationality, the argument has repercussions for the Kantian theory of action as well. As it happens, the Kantian theory of action makes a further claim that makes accommodating the case of Sam quite difficult - it claims that the agency in action is manifested in the role that conscious representations play in action. In light of the problems associated with this claim, Arpaly suggests that we dispense with the Kantian project in its entirety. In contrast with Arpaly, I am less pessimistic about the Kantian enterprise. I develop a theory of action and practical rationality that coopts much of the Kantian framework, but revises the Kantian claim about agency in action. Specifically, I claim that unconscious representations can be manifestations of agency in action, albeit in a limited set of cases. In light of the revision, the new theory easily accommodates the case of Sam. In fact, it shows that Sam is an agent who acts rationally and acts in accordance with his best judgment. The result is a theory that gives the Kantian a new alternative, one that resists Arpaly’s push to dispense with the Kantian framework. Furthermore, it preserves a central tenet that Kantians and many others hold dear – that rational action is action that accords with one’s best judgment, and irrational action is action that goes against one’s best judgment.

Cebolla Sanahuja, Lorena. El cosmopolitismo moral en Kant. Entre los límites del saber y la creencia. [Spanish] Ph.D. diss. Universitat de Valencia (philosophy of law, ethics and policy), 2010. [418 p.] Advisor: Adela Cortina Orts. [PQ]

Doherty, Megan Elizabeth.  Living with Understanding: Subjectivity and Metaphysics in Kant, Apel, and the Neoclassical Alternative.  Ph.D. diss.  University of Chicago, 2010.  [279 p.]  Advisor: Franklin Gamwell.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The overwhelming concern of this project to ask and answer the metaphysical question through the question of human subjectivity, which whatever else it may be, can be characterized as life with understanding. This entails an account not only of a proper conception of the metaphysical enterprise, but also of the necessary features entailed in being a human subject. This dissertation will argue not only that human subjectivity has certain necessary, normative conditions, but also that these universal conditions of subjectivity as such include the universal conditions of reality as such — including, finally, a divine reality. I will pursue this discussion with the help of a few primary interlocutors: Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), Karl-Otto Apel (1922-), Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947) and Charles Hartshorne (1897-2000). The neoclassical account, as formulated by Whitehead and Hartshorne, has systematically offered an alternative to Kant’s conception of subjectivity and metaphysics as well as to the twentieth century’s more “postmetaphysical” orientation. This latter development, which I will argue is at best an unnecessary and at worst a detrimental result of some important insights of the linguistic turn and hermeneutic turns, is in parts both criticized and upheld by Apel, who is this project’s primary dialogue partner. Despite my immense appreciation for Apel’s achievements, I will also offer some criticisms of what I take to be the central incoherencies of an otherwise commendable project. Ultimately, I will argue that neoclassical metaphysics provides a viable, alternative account of both subjectivity and metaphysics that not only fails to succumb to Kant’s and Apel’s due criticisms of inadequate, previous formulations thereof, but also resolves the difficulties evident in Apel’s own project.

Elizondo, Epifanio Sonny. Happiness, Pleasure, and the Rational Will: An Essay on Kantian Moral Psychology. Ph.D. diss. University of California, Los Angeles, 2010. [125 p.] Advisor: Barbara Herman. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Few philosophers have done more to illuminate the nature of rational agency than Kant. Yet despite centuries of scrutiny, the Kantian account of rational agency has not been well-understood. One important reason for this is that interpreters too often bring to their reading of Kant psychological views that are empiricist in origin and so foreign to Kant's more rationalist orientation. The ambition of my dissertation is to articulate a more fully rationalist account of Kantian psychology, through reflection on Kant's identification of the rational will as a rational faculty of desire. Taking this identification seriously, I believe, requires attending to the consequences both of including desire as an aspect of the rational mind and including reason as a source of desire. The result will be a more accurate and more attractive account of what it is to possess a rational will and, especially, what is involved in exercising that will well.
In Chapters One and Two, I reflect on the consequences of including desire as an aspect of the rational mind. Given the deep connection Kant sees between desire and states such as happiness and pleasure, this inclusion may seem uneasy. After all, happiness and pleasure seem paradigmatically non-rational states that are, as such, foreign to reason. Drawing significantly on Kant's discussions of divine psychology, which provide an invaluable and underutilized resource for understanding Kant's view of the rational mind, I argue that while happiness and pleasure are often non-rational, they are not always and essentially so. Kant admits forms of happiness and pleasure that are themselves rational because constitutively connected to the good exercise of the rational will.
In Chapter Three, I turn to the consequences of including reason among the sources of desire. According to Kant, what distinguishes the rational will, as a rational faculty of desire, is the role of practical judgment in determining the will. Thus, the will is not merely a faculty of desire, a faculty to bring things about. It is also a faculty of (practical) cognition, a faculty to cognize objects as to brought about, or, more simply, as good. It follows from this, I argue, that the success conditions of the will are more complicated than they may at first appear. The will is successful when it brings things about, but it is also successful when it sets itself to bring things about as a consequence of correct judgment about what is good. It is this latter, more cognitive success in which the good exercise of the rational will properly consists.
If all this is right, then Kant's account of rational agency is more thoroughly rationalist than is usually supposed. It includes rational forms of contentment and pleasure; and the will itself truly is, with respect to its determining ground, nothing other than practical reason itself While a proper defense of this revised Kantian psychology is beyond the scope of this dissertation, I hope the elaboration I offer casts it in a plausible light. Even if some particulars of Kant's account do not withstand critical scrutiny, the introduction of his true position should prove a salutary development, expanding the conceptual space in which philosophers may profitably work.

Ercolini, Gina L.  Kant’s Enlightenment Legacy: Rhetoric through Ethics, Aesthetics, and Style.    Ph.D. diss.  Penn State University, 2010.  [262 p.]  Advisor: Stephen H. Browne. [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The relationship between Enlightenment and rhetoric is complicated, involving the simultaneous movements towards style’s eradication and exaggerated effusion. Immanuel Kant, thinker of the Enlightenment par excellence, is widely considered no enthusiast of rhetoric. In Critique of Judgment Kant claims that oratory deserves no respect whatsoever. However, he immediately retracts that dramatic pronouncement in a footnote that distinguishes bad rhetoric (manipulative oratory that evacuates the listener’s ability to use his or her own judgment) from good rhetoric (defined as the combination of eloquence and well-spokenness), where sufficient influence on the mind can be effected without the machinery of persuasion. Without such a distinction, a curious enigma emerges: how can a thinker reject rhetoric while defining enlightenment as the public exercise of reason, at every point? Examining Kant’s complicated and conflicted attitudes towards rhetoric requires looking beyond the curt dismissal in the third Critique and to his extensive commentary on not only rhetoric but several related themes that cut across his popular and critical philosophy more broadly. This project does just that in examining Kant’s comments, across a broad swath of his works, on a constellation of topics related to rhetoric such as eloquence, the persuasion/conviction distinction, rhetoric’s relation to poetry and philosophy, and his sustained interest in the notion of popularity in philosophy. Furthermore, rhetoric plays a role in Kantian ethics, particularly the emphasis in his anthropological ethics on conversation and sociable exchange to better the mind through the body. In Kantian aesthetics, the crucial role of reflective judgment and the orientation of “critique” — especially the important turn it takes in the Critique of Judgment — was in no small part actually influenced by British rhetorical and aesthetic theory. Kant also wrote extensively on style, fashioning his own stylistic orientation that emphasizes balancing both the logical and aesthetic, producing a natural style that effaces itself, and that is suitable to the writer, audience, and occasion (rather than merely following fashion). In examining Kant’s “What is Enlightenment” in the context of these themes, an important if not central role for rhetoric in enlightenment, and Kantian philosophy more broadly, emerges.

Erdelack, Wesley Lyons.  “A law unto themselves”: Religion and Autonomy in Modern Moral Thought.  Ph.D. diss.  Harvard University, 2010.  [242 p.]  Advisor: David Lamberth.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This study inquires into the interrelation of philosophical and religious matters in modern European moral thought, examining the work of Ralph Cudworth, Shaftesbury, Immanuel Kant, and GWF Hegel. Its primary conclusion is that the ideal of moral autonomy, or moral self-government, is best understood as an “internalization” of an originally political model of sovereignty. The idea of moral self-government, as articulated by these thinkers, represents transposition of political relations among rulers and subjects within the moral subject, recasting them as relationships among parts of the soul — reason, will, and desire. Further, it argues that specifically religious concerns, including the character of moral relationships between humans and God and the fallenness of human nature, played a central role in the development of autonomy as a moral ideal. This study maintains that the distinctive ideal of moral-self-government in modern moral philosophy can be understood as a response to the conflicting commitments to free will and divine sovereignty within the Christian tradition. On this account, the distinctive commitments of secular ethics — an emphasis on self-determination, freedom of conscience, and individual liberty of choice — emerge from an attempt to reconcile reason with religion.

Eriksson, Jens. The Eloquence of Speechlessness: Hybridity, Sexed Bodies, and Astonishment in Kant’s Theory of Epigenesis. Master’s thesis. Uppsala Universitet, 2010. [# p.] Advisor: ??. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper interrogates why epigenesis has been eradicated from the historical consciousness of today’s scholarship on gender politics. By honing in on the weirdness, a term borrowed from Lorraine Daston, in and of Immanuel Kant’s (1724-1804) theory on animal generation I show how an alertness it requires a re-evaluation of views on "political anatomy" taken-for-granted in scholarship, but also of Kant’s philosophy itself. The endeavour is divided into three main sections.In the first, I situate the failure of Kant-scholars to, in the words of John H. Zammito, "stabilize" epigenesis by exploring the hitherto unacknowledged peculiarity of Kant’s use racial hybridity to ‘prove’ the theory. In the second, the analysis departs from the notion ‘modern sex difference’ and show that a reading of epigenesis requires a re-thinking of sexed bodily identity in terms of conflict and contradiction. The third section reads this strife in light of Kant’s experience of "astonishment", a cognitive mode, I argue, designed to resolve both physiological and ideological inconsistencies. The antinomy of sex differentiation is in a concluding section juxtaposed with Kant’s phrase "eloquent speechlessness" in which the gender practice activated in the writing of, about, and on epigenesis is compared to the structure informing moral philosophy’s definition of lies.

Farzam-Kia, Arash.  Moral Responsibility and Preconditions of Moral Criticism.  Ph.D. diss.  Queen’s University (Kingston, Ontario), 2010.  [172 p.]  Advisor: Rahul Kumar. [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Traditionally, the central threat to the defensibility of the range of practices and attitudes constitutive of moral criticism has been seen to be posed by the Causal Thesis, the view that all actions have antecedent causes to which they are linked by causal laws of the kind that govern other events in the universe. In such a world, agents lack the sort of underived origination and agency required for the appropriateness of moral criticism. However, Peter Strawson’s “Freedom and Resentment” marks a move away from a metaphysical conception of agency and conditions of the appropriateness of moral criticism. On Strawson’s account, the problem of moral responsibility is centrally a normative problem, a problem about the moral norms that govern interpersonal relationships, and the conditions of appropriateness of the range of attitudes and sentiments occasioned by the agents’ fulfillment or non-fulfillment of these norms. In this dissertation I argue that the success of normative conceptions of conditions of appropriateness of moral criticism is contingent of the amelioration of the tension between two strategies in “Freedom and Resentment.” Naturalist interpretations hold that sentiments and practices constitutive of moral criticism are natural features of human psychological constitution, and therefore neither allow nor require justification. Rationalist interpretation, by contrast, are based on an analysis of conditions under which moral criticism can be justifiably modified or suspended. Both of these strategies, I argue, are false. The naturalistic interpretation is false not because of its inability to offer a plausible account of the conditions of justifiability of reactive attitudes, but rather because of its inability to offer a principled account of the way moral norms are grounded. The rationalistic interpretation, in turn, not only relies on an implausible psychological account of conditions of responsible agency, but puts an unacceptable emphasis on the agent’s intention. A plausible interpretation of the normative strategy requires emphasizing not only the significance of attitudes and feelings, but also the role reasons play in constituting moral norms and justifying moral criticism.

Fremstedal, Roe.  Kierkegaard and Kant on Anthropology and Religion: Evil, Faith, and Hope.  Ph.D. diss.  Trondheim, Norges teknisk-naturvitenskapelige universitet, 2010.  [224 p.]  Advisor: ??.

Frydrych, David Gershon. Taking Rights Way Too Seriously: Kant, Hohfeld, and Evaluating Conceptual Theories of Rights. Master’s thesis. University of Toronto (law), 2010. [66 p.] Advisor: ??. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper concerns the dominant conceptual or formal accounts of legal rights: the Interest and Will Theories. Section II clarifies the minimal necessary conditions for a rights model to count as a Will Theory. It also explores Kant's Will Theory of rights and the difficulties posed to it by Hohfeld's schema of jural relations. Kant has three alternatives: reject the schema's utility or demonstrate his theory's compatibility with it via molecularist or basic models of Hohfeldian rights. Although his best option is to disavow Hohfeld, Kant's theory is ultimately undesirable on other grounds. Section III shall analyze the modern Will and Interest Theories' biggest weaknesses according to a test proposed in Section I, which should generate bases for preferring one theory to another. It will offer a counterargument to the Inalienability charge levied against the Will Theory, and demonstrate why Interest Theory responses to the Third Party Beneficiary argument are inadequate.

Garcia, John J.  Humanity in the Balance: The Relationship of the Moral Law to the Promotion of the Moral World in Kant’s Ethics.  Ph.D. diss.  Loyola University/Chicago, 2010.  [214 p.]  Advisor: Victoria Wike.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This dissertation deals with the tension between two seemingly divergent approaches to morality. On the one hand, there are those who take the view that morality concerns itself with the promotion of certain ends. This is a teleological or consequentialist view of ethics. On the other hand, we see thinkers who take the view that rationality or some other criteria provide us certain moral imperatives that may not be violated, regardless of our desire to bring about a particular end. Kant is usually depicted not only as a member of the latter camp, but indeed as the father of this approach. Occasionally these approaches to morality seem to be put into direct conflict with one another by cases in which one seems to face a choice between the promotion of ends and the adherence to certain moral rules. One example of the supposed conflict between teleological concerns and formal requirements is famously depicted in the case of the murderer at the door. Many see Kant’s approach to this case as one that causes us to act in a way that jars against our deep moral intuitions, and they take this to be a sign of a weakness in Kant’s approach. As a result, thinkers such as Christine Korsgaard have attempted to read Kant in a way that sidesteps this conflict between teleology and form, arguing that the categorical imperative can be read in a way that allows us to lie to the murderer at the door. A view such as Korsgaard’s is intriguing because it indicates a belief that we go wrong when we value a formal requirement such as the adherence to the dictates of rationality above the desire to prevent a great injustice from occurring. This view is powerful, and it seems correct to me that, if our only reason to adhere to a conception of the moral law was to cling to a view of rationality, that this goal seems to pale in comparison to the desire to prevent great harms from occurring or to promote moral ends. Ultimately though, I think Korsgaard’s approach fails.
I argue instead that Kant’s ethical thought shows a deep concern for both teleological and formal considerations, and that a consideration of the relationship between these two aspects of his thought will help us make sense of his approach to cases such as the murderer at the door. It is the goal of my dissertation to present such an analysis. In my proposed dissertation I take the view that, far from interfering with the promotion of moral ends, Kant sees the formal requirements of morality as providing the only possible path to the highest end, a moral world. On my view, Kant’s formal ethics and his teleology do not then represent stages in his thinking, or pieces of his thinking that stand at odds with one another; they are instead to be seen as two inseparable pieces of the same puzzle. A full understanding of each of these pieces of Kant’s thought will show us that neither piece can make sense without the other.
Human beings have two sorts of ends: moral ends, which we set for ourselves, and natural ends, which aim at our happiness. Kant realized that obedience to the moral law was not important simply because it allowed us to be rationally consistent. He also saw such adherence to the moral law as the only sure path to the full realization of our humanity. It is important to remember that for Kant the realization of our humanity involves a realization of the natural ends and rational ends for all human beings. So, Kant’s project is much more ‘cosmopolitan’ than we often understand it to be.

Goldman, Loren.  The Sources of Political Hope: Will, World and Democracy.  Ph.D. diss.  University of Chicago, 2010.  [252 p.]  Advisor: Patchen Markell.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This dissertation concerns the nature of hope for political progress in the contemporary world. Indeed, what is hope, and what role does it play in political thought? Despite the concept’s recent prevalence in popular politics and democratic theory alike, the problematic it presents remains hardly recognized. Hope is a paradoxical phenomenon: constitutively uncertain, demanding often improbable or even irrational belief in the possibility of a future not yet realized, yet at the same time a necessary condition for intentional action, a phenomenological human constant. Political hope presents a similar problem: engaged citizens enter the fray with at least the tacit hope that their participation will contribute to a more desirable world, albeit often without much ground. While it used to be that theorists could predicate their political hopes on eschatological philosophies of history — Catholicism, Absolute Idealism, Historical Materialism, etc. — the loss of conviction in teleological metanarratives leaves post-Enlightenment thinkers with the question of how to comprehend hope without a metaphysical ground for progress. This dissertation investigates the problem posed by hope in social action, political theory and democracy by tracing an ongoing yet overlooked discussion in modern political thought.
I argue that two schematic perspectives have informed traditional approaches to hope, in line with the phenomenon’s presence in a state of dynamic uncertainty between subjective aspiration and objective possibility. On the one hand, hope has been justified by reference to an agent’s practical cognitive needs, and I call this conception “hope as will”; on the other hand, hope has been justified by reference to the objective constitution of reality itself, and I call this conception “hope as world.” The first chapter explicates Immanuel Kant’s arguments for the regulative assumption of historical progress as reflecting the former approach, drawing on his writings in practical philosophy, politics, anthropology and pedagogy. The second chapter takes up the work of Ernst Bloch as representative of the latter approach, arguing that despite introducing a materialist criterion for distinguishing sound from false political hopes, Bloch’s inability to countenance non-Marxist hopes effectively makes his revision of the Kantian problematic evade the central question of the subject’s potential as an agent of hope’s realization. The third chapter turns to the work of Charles S. Peirce and William James, showing how this dynamic between will and world is recapitulated in the political philosophy of early American Pragmatism, with equally unsatisfactory results. The fourth and final chapter argues that John Dewey’s democratic theory offers a way of navigating between the subjectivist tendency in hope as will and the objectivist tendency in hope as world. In contrast to Kant’s and James’s voluntarism and Bloch’s and Peirce’s absolutism, Dewey vests his political hope in democracy as a social formation attuned to bringing about the mutual reconstruction of a public and the institutions that mold it. As such, Dewey’s democratic hope offers a profound redescription of the Kantian problematic, shifting - as Kant himself intended in his later lectures on anthropology and pedagogy - away from hope’s justificatory ground and towards the soil in which an intelligent public grows. Democratic hope is not simply a matter of belief as a cognitive experience or of faith in the workings of History; instead, the bridge between subjective aspiration and objective possibility is built on experimentation with the institutions of public life.

Golob, S. Y. J. Intentionality, Freedom, Method: Theoretical and Practical Philosophy in Kant and Heidegger. Ph.D. diss. University of Cambridge, 2010. [# p.] Advisor: ??. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Between 1927 and 1936, Martin Heidegger devoted more than one thousand pages of close textual commentary to the work of Immanuel Kant. The purpose of this thesis is to use that material as the basis for a sustained comparison between the two philosophies. Specifically, I aim to juxtapose and to analyse their positions on a range of foundational issues within metaphysics, within ethics – both broadly construed – and at the interface between those two fields. In doing so, I hope to contribute to three areas of research: the history of philosophy, contemporary analytic philosophy and an understanding of the methodological connections between philosophy and other disciplines. The thesis comprises five chapters and is divided into three parts, parts marked by the Kantian texts on which they are based: Part I concentrates on issues arising from the ‘theoretical’ philosophy of the Critique of Pure Reason; Part II addressed the ‘practical’ sphere of the second Critique and the Groundwork; Part III takes its orientation from the Critique of Judgement. Part I, Ch. 1: Heidegger’s Critique: The A Priori in Kant and Heidegger. Part I, Ch. 2: Language and Dasein: Intentionality and Methodology in Kant and Heidegger. Part II, Ch. 3: Anxiety in Eden: Rational Choice and Public Reason in Kant and Heidegger. Part II, Ch. 4: The Reality of Freedom: The Interaction of ‘Theoretical’ and ‘Practical’ in Kant and Heidegger. Part III, Ch.5: System, Organism, Origin: Methodology and Unresolved Problems in Kant and the ‘Early Heidegger’.

Gomes e Silva, Sérgio.  As noções de Deus, moral e religião e sua função em a religião nos limites da simples razão de Immanuel Kant. [Portuguese]  Master’s thesis.  Universidade de Brasília, Brasília, 2010.  [116 p.]  Advisor: Estevão Chaves de Rezende Martins. [online] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The thesis starts with the criticism present in the Critique of Pure Reason and it goes through the possibility of having metaphysics as a science. Thus, it demonstrates Kantian issues about the conception of God as an object of rational theology. The research also problematizes the Kantian criticism on the possibility of a conception of God as a metaphysical object. In addition, it discusses the boundaries imposed by criticism on metaphysics and, consequently, the a priori notions of God. Immediately, it is possible to conclude that the concept of God heads for the practical scope. However, the problem that the Kantian system presents is the deduction of the moral law, since, only from such deduction, it is possible to identify the role of God in the practical dimension. The thesis emphasizes that in the first Critique, the deduction of the moral law is impossible. On the other hand, in Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, this deduction is still metaphysical, in other words, the deduction is made from the negative concept of freedom. Only in the second Critique, through the fact of the reason, the deduction of the moral law becomes possible. Having the morality scope established, there is a place for religion. Furthermore, it highlights that Kant intends to analyze God and religion from simple reason. Therefore, both the notions of God as well as of religion are reintegrated into the perspective of Critique of Practical Reason. From this context, having demonstrated the frailty of the arguments that supported the rational theology, the philosopher questions the revealed theology. Finally, the philosopher proposes the possibility of notions of God and religion under the perspective of the moral theology.

Gursoy, A. Ozgur.  Experience without Subject: Rule-governed Practices and the Possibility of Critical Historiography in Foucault.  Ph.D. diss.  Emory University, 2010.  [300 p.]  Advisor: Thomas R. Flynn.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this study I propose to articulate a concept of experience according to which it is already limit — experience, where “limit” and “experience” are understood in terms of rule-governed and spatio-temporally indexed practices criterial for both cognitive and practical interactions with ourselves and with the world. Moreover, I propose to locate this concept in the historiography of Foucault and construct its dimensions using Foucauldian conceptual tools. Finally, I discuss Foucault’s division of his “methodologies” over the course of his trajectory, avoiding their strict separation — as archaeology, genealogy, and problematization — in favor of their articulation in terms of discursive and nondiscursive practices, where “articulation” stands for neither a purely linguistic, nor logical, nor even causal relation, but traces the contours of an ensemble of historically constitutive and therefore criterial practices. I want to call that “genealogy”. I then situate this Foucauldian conception with respect to a number of powerful objections I reconstruct on the basis of texts by Habermas, Derrida, Merleau-Ponty and Adorno. I claim that the objections gain their motivation and strength from the constitutive divide between the transcendental and the empirical. Against this position, and at times against the grain of some of Foucault’s own formulations, a more faithful characterization of Foucault’s trajectory is not so much the conversion into the domain of contingency and particularity of what would otherwise be necessary and universal conditions — historicizing the transcendental — as it is giving up the transcendental in the forms it has taken since Kant, and pressing the consequences of this abandonment for a reflection on history, and by extension subjectivity. The result is a problematic and problematizing notion of critique: Foucault’s giving up of the transcendental standpoint is not a repudiation of reflection; it is rather motivated by the conviction that the moment of self-relation entailed by reflection cannot be anchored in any unreflected given. It therefore has more critical force than an argument which would transcendentally secure the legitimacy of cognitive and normative exclusion by "demonstrating" the irrationality of those who are so excluded, without accounting for the constitutive role our social sanctions play in their very creation.

Hanson, Erik.  Kant and Kierkegaard: Radical Evil and the Ethics of Love.  Ph.D. diss.  Purdue University, 2010.  [148 p.]  Advisors: William McBride and Martin Matustik.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This dissertation addresses the problem of “radical evil” as first articulated by Immanuel Kant, and in light of the treatment Kant’s analysis given by Friedrich Schelling, Søren Kierkegaard’s own treatment of the issue in a manner that sought to retain a commitment to transcendental human freedom and the possibility of moral alternatives. In light of September 11, 2001, it is no less a problem for this century than it was in the nineteenth. For Kant, radical evil presented a genuine challenge to his ethics of autonomy, which as a propensity to subvert the moral law, results in a corruption of our moral disposition, and can be resolved only through a “natural religion” of pure reason. Yet for Schelling, a Kantian account of evil as a propensity to subvert the moral law lacks a motivational justification for its choice. Schelling offers an alternative account as a deliberate propensity to subvert not the moral law, but the natural order of the world, so that self-will is no longer subordinate to the divine and universal will. In light of Schelling’s critique of Kant, I argue that Kierkegaard presents an existential ethic that retains a commitment to transcendental freedom through an ethics of authenticity in practicing commanded neighbor love, while avoiding the difficulties that Kant faced.

Heide, David C.  Kant’s Idealism: On the Character and Limits of Spatial Representation.  Ph.D. diss.  Ohio State University, 2010.  [208 p.]  Advisor: Lisa Shabel.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: I offer a new interpretation of Kant’s argument for transcendental idealism according to which Kant rejects the metaphysical possibility that things in themselves are spatial (the so-called “neglected alternative”) by arguing that all possible spaces are mere parts of the actual, subjective space given in a priori intuition. I claim that Kant establishes this by denying that it is possible to employ spatiotemporal predicates to conceive of any space that is wholly discrete from intuitive space. I argue that Kant develops a version of this argument as early as the Inaugural Dissertation and I go on to show how the doctrines he adduces in defending this argument help to resolve two longstanding criticisms of his critical philosophy. First, I argue that Kant can consistently uphold the intelligibility of noumenal causation because causal predicates are not subject to the representational limitations he upholds for spatiotemporal predicates. I close by arguing that Kant has available to him a considerably stronger argument against the possibility of non-Euclidean geometries than he is often taken to have and that this argument depends upon claims about the representational and referential capacity of spatial predicates that he defends in arguing for transcendental idealism.

Herbert, Daniel Richard. Kant, Peirce and the Transcendental Deduction. Ph.D. diss. University of Sheffield, 2010. [# p.] Advisor: ??. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The present thesis examines and compares the philosophies of Immanuel Kant and Charles Sanders Peirce in terms of their differing positions on the justificatory grounds of the classification of sensible phenomena according to a list of irreducibly general concepts, or ‘categories’. Here it is argued that, contrary to ‘transcendentalist’ interpretations of his position (the most compelling of which is advocated by Karl-Otto Apel), Peirce does not attempt to ground the reality of his categories in a counterpart to Kant’s Transcendental Deduction. Instead, Peirce is shown to maintain that the objective validity of the categories can only possibly be justified a posteriori, by appeal to the results of our efforts at achieving lasting consensus by means of scientific inquiry.
As such, Peirce is held to depart from Kant by refusing to endorse the use of transcendental arguments to explain our entitlement to assert the reality of the categories. However, the Kantian ancestry of his philosophical outlook is nonetheless claimed to be evident in Peirce’s aspiration to construct an architectonic system of philosophy organised in terms of a set of categories originally identified by means of logical analysis. Further Kantian influences in his position are also remarked upon in discussion of Peirce’s appropriation and development of ideas concerning ‘schemata’ and ‘regulative norms’.
Throughout the thesis it is argued that Peirce makes a number of departures from the critical philosophy which relieve him of any demand to give a counterpart to Kant’s Transcendental Deduction. By denying that there is any cognitively significant function for those representations which Kant describes as ‘sensible intuitions’, Peirce is able to circumvent any requirement to explain the possibility of co-operative interaction between sensible and conceptual form.

Hilgers, Thomas.  On Aesthetic Disinterestedness.  Ph.D. diss.  University of Pennsylvania, 2010.  [363 p.]  Advisor: Paul Guyer.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Schopenhauer famously claims that a person typically relates to the world according to her own interests. He further claims that the aesthetic experience temporarily disengages a person from her interests, and thereby makes her temporarily lose her sense of self. When claiming the latter, Schopenhauer introduces a notion of disinterestedness that has been criticized by many aestheticians of our time. In my dissertation, I explicate, specify, and defend this notion. More precisely, I defend the claim that our aesthetic experiences tend to make us temporarily lose our sense of self.?
In my investigation, I proceed by interpreting, criticizing, and elaborating upon the work of some prominent philosophers, such as Kant and Schopenhauer. I further test the claims that I arrive at through my discussion of these philosophers against a description of the general conditions under which we experience works of art, where this description is informed not only by our ordinary ways of talking about art, but also by the findings of other humanities and related disciplines.?
In order to support my claim, I proceed in four steps. First, I introduce my notion of disinterestedness by means of discussing Kant, Schopenhauer, and Bullough. Second, I specify this notion by means of defending it against nine objections. Third, I prepare the grounds for an argument that shows why we must typically lose our sense of self when having an aesthetic experience. In preparation for this argument, I explicate what it means to have a sense of one’s own specific self. Then, I show that the conditions under which we experience works of art typically conflict with the conditions of having a sense of one’s own specific self. Thus, I conclude that we typically lose our sense of self when aesthetically engaging with works of art. However, I also show that this temporary loss happens to different degrees with respect to different forms of art, different artistic periods, and different artistic movements. Moreover, I show that due to its disinterestedness, an aesthetic experience typically has a cognitive and an ethical value.

Jirtle, James Vernon. Understanding Music’s Theological Significance: A Kantian Approach. Ph.D. diss. University of Durham (theology and religion), 2010. [210 p.] Advisor: ??. [PQ] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Jeremy Begbie speaks of music as ‘theologically loaded’: as conveying a sense of intrinsic theological significance. This thesis explores the possibility that music is theologically loaded in an epistemological sense: that music is dependent on knowledge of God. Modern epistemologies, in which knowledge is constructed by the individual human mind, pose a challenge to such a conclusion, since even if divine knowledge is possible it would appear irrelevant for our understanding of objects, such as music, that can be known directly through experience. Because Immanuel Kant presents a particularly stringent theory of human-mind-dependent knowledge, we can use his aesthetic theory as an analytical tool both to assess the epistemological content of our aesthetic judgements as they relate to musical beauty, and to consider whether theological knowledge can be relevant to these judgements. Applying Kant’s aesthetic theory to musical beauty, we find that from within, music seems sublime — defying our ability to understand its form or predict its structure — while from without it remains clearly intelligible. This unique construction makes our judgements of musical beauty particularly dependent on what Kant calls a ‘common sense’: a principle that, although outside our cognition, nevertheless plays a constitutive role in our aesthetic judgements by ensuring their universal validity. The dependence of our aesthetic judgements on this common sense allows for the possibility that musical beauty is dependent on knowledge of God — even when considered within a human-mind-dependent epistemology — and thus enables us to give an account of music’s theological significance that is consistent with modern theories of knowledge. Considered within a Christian perspective, this common sense forms the basis for a grammatical understanding of beauty, in which beauty represents the distance between our awareness of divine providence and our limited knowledge of God’s purposes.

Kent, Tayler.  The Problem of Privilege: Temperament and Diversity in Kant’s “Beobachtungen ueber das Gefuehl des Schoenen und Erhabenen”.  Master’s thesis.  The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2010.  [54 p.]  Advisor: Jonathan Hess.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This thesis explores Kant’s theory of the temperaments as outlined in his 1764 precritical essay on the aesthetic categories of the beautiful and the sublime. While this text is often singled out for its prejudicial remarks, the chapter on temperament provides a useful framework for understanding Kant’s thinking on diversity at this stage in his philosophy, and is critical for any attempt to reconcile the tensions in this work between its advocacy of cosmopolitan universalism and its troubling observations on gender and race. The first chapter explores Kant’s awareness of the problem of privileging the melancholic above all others as the only temperament capable of achieving true moral virtue. The second and third chapters investigate how Kant engages in a struggle to redefine what constitutes the morally feeling subject in order to exclude women and non-Europeans from his ideal community of rational and moral human subjects.

King, Martin.  Speculative Philosophy and the Grounding of Metaphysics.  Master’s thesis.  Concordia University (Canada), 2010.  [79 p.]  Advisor: ??.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: German idealism is in part characterized by its attempt to provide a justification for our knowledge of the world in response to David Hume’s problem of induction. In looking at three major philosophers of this time period - Kant, Fichte, and Hegel- a pattern emerges among their respective treatments of metaphysical propositions and their methods of grounding metaphysics. Kant’s method was to demonstrate the possibility of synthetic a priori propositions so as to divide objects epistemologically according to the possibility of their being known or not. This left human psychology uncomfortably split and so Fichte attempted a revision of Kant’s system beginning with the assumption of unity in an immediately certain analytic proposition in order to rectify this. However, this limited the scope of his philosophy to a narrow subjectivism based on an ungrounded presupposition of the subject. Hegel’s speculative proposition allowed his dialectics to be absolute and objective. It granted his philosophy the power not only to ground metaphysics, but to explain the entire history of human consciousness. As such, it is the culmination of Kant’s response to Hume’s attack working out its contradictions.

Koch, William H.  From Husserl and the Neo-Kantians to Art: Heidegger’s Realist Historicist Answer to the Problem of the Origin of Meaning.  Ph.D. diss.  University of South Florida, 2010.  [247 p.]  Advisor: Charles Guignon. [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: I offer a new interpretation of Kant’s argument for transcendental idealism according to which Kant rejects the metaphysical possibility that things in themselves are spatial (the so-called “neglected alternative”) by arguing that all possible spaces are mere parts of the actual, subjective space given in a priori intuition. I claim that Kant establishes this by denying that it is possible to employ spatiotemporal predicates to conceive of any space that is wholly discrete from intuitive space. I argue that Kant develops a version of this argument as early as the Inaugural Dissertation and I go on to show how the doctrines he adduces in defending this argument help to resolve two longstanding criticisms of his critical philosophy. First, I argue that Kant can consistently uphold the intelligibility of noumenal causation because causal predicates are not subject to the representational limitations he upholds for spatiotemporal predicates. I close by arguing that Kant has available to him a considerably stronger argument against the possibility of non-Euclidean geometries than he is often taken to have and that this argument depends upon claims about the representational and referential capacity of spatial predicates that he defends in arguing for transcendental idealism.

Kong, Camillia E.H. Beyond the Sub-Humean Model: Instrumental Reason in Aristotle, Hume and Kant. Ph.D. diss. London School of Economics and Political Science (government), 2010. [234 p.] Advisor: Katrin Flikschuh. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The thesis illustrates the importance of philosophical frameworks to our conception of instrumental reason through the comparative exegetical analysis of Aristotle, Hume, and Kant. Interpretations of each thinker reveal the significance of their respective philosophical frameworks in helping them avoid the subjectivist and freestanding connotations of the standard model. Specifically, since Aristotle, Hume, and Kant incorporate a notion of ethical normative objectivity within their frameworks, I show that these three thinkers represent a rich if divergent historical tradition according to which an adequate understanding of the normative significance of instrumental practical reasoning depends on situating it within a broader moral, social, or metaphysical framework. I establish how Aristotle's, Hume's, and Kant's thinking about practical reason is integrated within a more general frame of moral and political theorising that in each case reflects a degree of philosophical unease with the allure of a freestanding conception of instrumental rationality. Thus, a sympathetic examination of these historical thinkers' metaphysical commitments are important to illustrate the need for contemporary philosophers to directly confront, examine and articulate the comparative moral framework situating our current conception of instrumental reason.

Land, Thomas Christian.  Kant’s Theory of Synthesis.  Ph.D. diss.  University of Chicago, 2010.  [327 p.]  Advisor: James Conant.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: How Kant conceives of the relation between thinking and perceiving has remained far from clear. On the one hand, he claims that thinking and perceiving (or understanding and sensibility) require distinct and indeed heterogeneous capacities. This claim is crucial to Kant’s entire project, since his critique of his Empiricist and Rationalist predecessors depends on it. On the other hand, Kant is equally concerned to show that intuitions, the acts of sensibility, themselves involve the understanding. And this claim is no less crucial: Kant’s justification of the possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge demands it. How are these two claims to be reconciled? In my dissertation, I first bring out the force of this question and then address it by proposing a new interpretation of Kant’s conception of the understanding.
‘Synthesis’ is Kant’s term for that exercise of the understanding which accounts for the unity of intuition. Most commentators simply assume that, because synthesis is an act of the understanding, and the understanding appears to be defined as a capacity for judgment, synthesis is identical to judgment. But this, I argue, distorts Kant’s conception of the understanding. This distortion is reinforced by a complementary distortion in received interpretations of Kant’s notion of intuition. Bringing one of these interpretative distortions clearly into view therefore requires addressing the other as well.
I begin, in the dissertation, by discussing the distorted view of intuition. This is the view, widespread among commentators, that an intuition is a part of a judgment in the same way in which a singular term is a part of a sentence. I argue that this view is mistaken for two reasons. First, it anachronistically ascribes to Kant a Fregean conception of judgment, according to which the structure of an atomic judgment is Fa (whereas on Kant’s conception a judgment is essentially a compound of concepts, that is, general representations). Secondly, and more importantly, it misconstrues the cognitive function of intuition in Kant’s philosophy: An intuition for Kant is the sensory presentation of an object, and this means that an intuition is not a part of a judgment, but rather a distinct mental act.
Since intuitions are not parts of judgments, synthesis ought not to be construed as a kind of judgment. The reason is as follows: According to Kant, synthesis accounts for the unity of intuition. The only plausible way in which judgment could account for the unity of intuition is for intuition to be a part of judgment. But since intuition is not a part of judgment, synthesis must be distinct in character from judgment. This brings to the fore the real challenge of Kant’s doctrine: How can the understanding, which appears to be defined as a capacity for judgment, be responsible not only for judgment but also for synthesis, given that synthesis is distinct from judgment?
After making clear how central this problem is to Kant’s overall project in the Critique, I offer an account of the understanding that solves it. I argue that the understanding is fundamentally a capacity for the representation of a certain kind of unity (which Kant calls the unity of apperception). This capacity, so characterized, can be distinguished from two different ways in which it can be exercised: (1) in judgment apperceptive unity is represented discursively, that is, by means of relations of subordination among concepts; (2) in sensible synthesis apperceptive unity is represented intuitively, that is, by means of spatio-temporal relations. Thus, on my view, Kant has a more expansive conception of the understanding than is commonly thought.
My argument breaks down into the following steps. In the first part of the dissertation, I discuss the relation between judgment and intuition. After rejecting, in Chapter One, the view that intuitions are parts of judgments, I go on in Chapter Two to present my own positive account, according to which an intuition is the immediate perceptual presentation of an object. In Chapters Three and Four, I argue that Kant’s fundamental characterization of the understanding is as a capacity for the spontaneous representation of apperceptive unity and show that judgment must be construed as one of two distinct ways in which this capacity can be exercised. Finally, in Chapter Five, I show that Kant’s theory of geometrical construction provides the model for a distinct kind of exercise of the understanding, and I argue that this is the sensible synthesis that is responsible for the unity of intuition. It thus emerges that Kant holds a distinctive view of how human perception is informed by rational capacities — a view that constitutes a genuine alternative to both conceptualist and nonconceptualist positions in contemporary philosophy of perception.

Licht, Melissa Vera.  Warring Opinions: An Investigation into the Sublime Aesthetic Narratives of Contemporary Warfare.  Ph.D. diss.  University of Minnesota, 2010.  [296 p.]  Advisor: Thomas A. Pepper.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This project uses aesthetic concepts of the sublime as critical categories for exploring opinions and subjective responses to war as they are presented in selected soldiers’ memoirs, literary theory, films, and public affairs-from World War I to the (ongoing) Gulf War. Representations of sublime force as well as sublime sacrifice and idealism permeate even “objective” journalistic accounts of warfare and inform the perspectives through which we engage with war in thought and feeling. The project argues that “opinion” is not merely a rationally measurable statistical phenomenon but an aesthetic problematic through which we experience ourselves in relation to the world. Soldiers’ memoirs and public discourses narrate the trauma of war and express opinions that swing between and simultaneously uphold radically different positions: war as a sublime communal endeavor versus war as the destruction of social meaning. These opposing opinions reflect different aesthetic and narrative strategies: different ways of representing one’s position in the world and of managing overpowering forces and emotions. Opinion itself is built and supported through our emotional narratives of sublime antagonism and/or sublime interest in the social world.
The critical thought of Hannah Arendt, J. Glenn Gray, Paul de Man, Walter Benjamin, Sigmund Freud, and Immanuel Kant are central to the analysis of sources throughout the project.

Lima, Márcio José Silveira.  Perspectivísmo e verdade em Nietzsche. Da apropriação de Kant ao confronto com o relativismo. [Portuguese]  Ph.D. diss.  University of São Paulo, 2010.  [# p.]  Advisor: Scarlett Zerbetto Marton.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This Doctoral Thesis studies perspectivism on the work of Nietzsche, as well as the confrontation with the truth it represents. In order to do so, we try to show that this confrontation pervades Nietzsche’s work, as his former writings investigate the conditions for the emergence of the belief in the truth, beyond the interests to which it served. By expounding that Nietzsche, borrowing Kant’s critical legacy in his early works, starts out a complete destruction of truth, we intend to demonstrate that he fails in his objectives. This occurs because the radicalism of his arguments would destroy the very foundations which they are based upon, that is, Kantian transcendental idealism. At the moment we circumscribe our analysis to the early writings, we intend to demonstrate that Nietzsche limits himself to refuting the notion of truth as an adequacy to the thing-in-itself, but fails to widen this refutation beyond these limits. Therefore, we analyze the means of the fight against the truth, as presented in his writings from the 80’s. We defend that, in these writings, perspectivism becomes decisive in relation to the problems formerly faced by Nietzsche. By interpreting perspectivism as a phenomenalism of the conscience and interpretationism, we investigate the means by which Nietzsche re-elaborates the critique of truth in his late writings. Through the understanding of this critique as an appropriation of Kant’s ideas, we try to demonstrate that it reaches the goals set by Nietzsche. Therefore it bypasses the impasses of his early work. This is to show that Nietzsche declines not only the notion of truth as adequacy to the thing-in-itself, but also the modern concept of truth as certainty and foundation of knowledge. That is why Nietzsche aims at the Cartesian notion of “I think” as the first truth, as well as the Kantian conception of truth as expressed in logical judgments. Therefore, we sustain that phenomenalism of the conscience refutes the notion of unity, fundamental presupposition to Cartesian and Kantian philosophies. Additionally, we analyze the way Nietzsche, appropriating the Kantian idea of regulative principles, asserts that every vision we take to evaluate the world is fiction, a mistake, a perspectives-optic of life with a regulative value to existence. We defend, finally, that, even perspectivism radically stands against the truth - understood as strife of interpretations. It does not become relativism, since it is connected to the Theory of the Will to Power, which is the criterion to evaluate perspectives and which is itself presented as interpretation.

Marshall, Colin.  Keeping our Selves Together: Kant’s Metaphysics of Selves and Objects.  Ph.D. diss.  New York University, 2010.  [160 p.]  Advisor: Béatrice Longuenesse.

McGuire, Steven Francis.  Freedom and the Moral Condition in F. W. J. Schelling’s Freiheitsschrift.  Ph.D. diss.  Catholic University of America, 2010.  [272 p.]  Advisor: David J. Walsh.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This dissertation is a study of F. W. J. Schelling’s Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom. It focuses in particular on the Kantian themes of autonomy and the primacy of the practical as they are developed by Schelling. It is argued that Schelling, following Kant, gives primacy to the practical and thereby attempts to demonstrate that human existence unfolds within a metaphysical order of the whole. He does this by means of an analysis of human freedom (the ability to choose between good and evil by Schelling’s definition), which he sees as the conduit through which we gain awareness of our moral and ontological role within the process of reality. In other words, Schelling recognizes that, through our practical existence as free beings, human beings are self-consciously aware of participating in (if not fully grasping) an overarching reality that precedes any individual’s existence. Schelling thus develops Kant’s argument for the primacy of practical reason into an argument for the primacy of existence, or freedom, and, from that perspective, he shows that human freedom, or autonomy, articulates our awareness of our participation with full personal responsibility in a universal moral order that transcends the self and demands our assent as moral agents. In other words, Schelling offers a new and profound analysis of what it means to be free that captures a balance between the modern emphasis on individual freedom and the need to recognize that we are always already subject to inescapable moral obligations.

McKean, Benjamin Laing.  Political Dispositions and Global Justice: Understanding the Duties of Individuals in an Unjust World.  Ph.D. diss.  Princeton University, 2010.  [407 p.]  Advisor: Charles Beitz.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This dissertation places the dispositions, attitudes, and perspectives of individuals at the heart of political obligation rather than at its margins, where they are found in the prevalent views that understand such obligation essentially as compliance with institutional rules. Chapter One traces this family of views to its origin in Kant’s political philosophy, which influentially argues that justice and political duties are intrinsically tied to the state and coercion, suggesting that international social justice is fundamentally an oxymoron. Kant’s account founders on internal contradictions and has unappealingly inegalitarian consequences in the domestic realm, so the dissertation turns in Chapter Two to contemporary arguments that try to fix these problems by adopting egalitarian liberal premises while remaining within Kant’s framework. These arguments also falter because the premises that they adopt to guarantee domestic egalitarianism also require greater openness to both international and non-coercive domestic forces than they can allow if they wish to restrict fully political duties to the state alone. By demonstrating the surprising extent to which John Rawls’s theory of justice relies on elements of Hegel at key junctures, I develop in Chapter Three a dispositional approach to political duty that show how citizens must shape their own attitudes and perspective in order for political society to function fairly. Chapter Four extends this dispositional approach to show how the interdependence of individuals and institutions facilitates reciprocity in a well-ordered society and to consider the implications for the non-ideal case of societies like ours, which are not well-ordered. Chapter Five then develops a conception of solidarity to help individuals understand their political obligations in a non-ideal social world that forces them to cooperate internationally with others whom shared institutions and practices fail to treat as free and equal. The dissertation defends this conception against charges of its being ideological with a consideration in Chapter Six of how political theory itself shapes the dispositions of individuals and the materials which it may reasonably draw upon in doing so. In doing so, the project concludes by advancing a methodology for better linking ideal and non-ideal theory.

McQuillan, Colin.  Critical Philosophy: Immanuel Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason.  Ph.D. diss.  Emory University, 2010.  [288 p.]  Advisor: Rudolf A. Makkreel.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Critical Philosophy: Immanuel Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason examines the concept of “critique,” as it is employed by Immanuel Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason (1781/1787). While many readers assume that Kant intended the Critique of Pure Reason to establish the limits of reason, my dissertation shows that the work attempts to determine the possibility of a science of metaphysics through a critique of the faculty of human reason. The critical approach to metaphysics that Kant develops in the Critique of Pure Reason is novel, because critique had been a primarily philological concept in the eighteenth century, when it was associated with the authentication of ancient texts and the determination of their sources. Kant appropriated the term in the early 1770’s, applying it to a problem with which he had been concerned since the time of his earliest, “pre-critical” works. This is the problem of the proper method of metaphysics. The discussions of a critique of pure reason that are to be found in Kant’s notes, lectures, and correspondence, as well as the Critique of Pure Reason itself, afford us a unique insight into the development of Kant’s “critical” philosophy, when we realize that they are the direct result of Kant’s application of the concept of critique to problem of the proper method of metaphysics. By examining these texts, my dissertation helps scholars to understand the reasons why Kant thought the possibility of a science of metaphysics depended upon the determination and authentication of the sources of metaphysics in the faculties of human reason. It provides a historical and contextual account of the development of Kant’s critical philosophy which is unique in the scholarly literature.

McTavish, Christopher Henry.  An Experiential Approach to Kant’s Moral Philosophy: A Reply to Dogmatism, Formalism and Rigorism.  Ph.D. diss.  Loyola University/Chicago, 2010.  [195 p.]  Advisor: Victoria Wike.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Many of Kant’s commentators and critics interpret his moral philosophy solely in terms of the cognitive dimension of his categorical imperative. Such a predominant manner of reading Kant gives rise to the criticism that his moral philosophy is too far removed from the actual way in which human beings orient themselves as moral persons in the world. In response to this general tendency in Kant interpretation, my dissertation proposes to offer an experiential approach to Kant’s ethics. By the expression experiential I mean an approach to Kant’s thinking that attends to the living sense in which we experience the phenomena and realities that his moral philosophy presents. In this dissertation I consider three common criticisms of Kant’s moral philosophy (dogmatism, formalism and rigorism), and I show how an experiential approach to Kant’s ethics can help us to respond to these three charges. In chapter one I explain the central arguments that Kant’s foundational works in moral philosophy proposed, and I outline the three criticisms of Kant’s ethics. In chapters two and three I present my experiential approach to Kant’s practical philosophy by exploring the experiential character of happiness [Glückseligkeit], moral feeling [moralisches Gefühl] and the ethical duties that Kant derives in his doctrine of virtue [Tugendlehre]. In the fourth chapter I show how my experiential approach to Kant can help us to address these three criticisms that are commonly leveled against his ethics, and in the fifth and final chapter I consider how this experiential approach can be fruitfully applied. For instance, I show how an experiential approach to Kant can help instructors to better introduce Kant to first time Kant readers, and I demonstrate how an experiential approach to Kant allows us to bring Kant’s insights into an interesting and revealing conversation with Emmanuel Levinas. With respect to this latter conversation, I show how a critical comparison between these two thinkers can lead us to investigate the rather intriguing notion of an elevated form of happiness.

Meckstroth, Christopher Stephen.  Democracy in Progress: History, Paradox, and Constitutional Struggle.  Ph.D. diss.  University of Chicago, 2010.  [501 p.]  Advisor: Patchen Markell.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This dissertation explores the relationship between democracy and historical change. Democracy is often treated as an ideal end-point toward which history ought to progress. But the idea of progress as the march of reason in history sits uneasily with the democratic demand that the people freely make the laws for themselves. And yet if we abandon altogether the possibility of evaluating historical change, then citizens are left with no defensible basis for judging which social or political reforms would make their societies more or less democratic. This dissertation thus argues for radically reconceiving the notion of “progress” in a critical and Socratic way that severs its dependence on historical teleology.
I argue that progress can be understood as a contingent and contextual process of comparative evaluation: we need not know what a perfect democracy looks like, or the final end toward which history must lead, in order to compare two different visions of democracy here and now to determine which of them is more defensible than the other. As in a court of law, we do not need access to ultimate truth ex ante to decide on which side a stronger case has been made. In part one I argue that this view does better than contemporary deliberative or agonistic theories in addressing the issue of historical change. I also offer a case study of nineteenth-century France, based on a year of archival research at the Bibliothèque Nationale, which highlights the dangers of teleology for democracy. In part two, I closely examine Plato's Socratic dialogues and Kant’s moral works to argue for a rigorously antifoundationalist defense of democratic principles. In part three I develop my positive alternative in detail. I provide a way of thinking about how disputes over what ought to count as “progress” may themselves be democratically adjudicated, by adapting the idea of Socratic method to the conditions of democratic politics. And I present a comparative study of fifty democratic constitutions to argue that an attention to social and historical factors is deeply embedded in contemporary democratic practice.

Miller, Joshua A.  Hannah Arendt’s Theory of Deliberative Judgment.  Ph.D. diss.  Pennsylvania State University, 2010.  [207 p.]  Advisor: John Cristman.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this dissertation, I investigate the role of judgment in the work of Hannah Arendt, focusing on her reading of Kant and Augustine and her account of deliberation in democratic theory. In an attempt to fill the lacuna left by her unfinished work, The Life of the Mind, I argue that Arendt’s appropriation of the Kantian sensus communis entails a theory of ethical and political judgment centered in the community rather than the subject. Taking my cue from her comment that the goal of philosophy is to teach us how to “think without banisters,” I defend Arendt's view that the faculty of thinking cannot practically constrain the faculty of willing, and that the categorical imperative is inadequate to challenge of the explosive unforeseeability that Arendt attributes to action. Thus Arendt’s account of judging cannot be equated with reasoning over consequences or intentions.
Because Arendt rejects Kant’s attempts to circumscribe action under a moral law and his nascent account of historical progress developed under the rubric of teleological judgment, her account of aesthetic judgments also departs significantly from that of Kant. To spell out this departure, I analyze Arendt’s dissertation on Augustine, in which I show that Arendt sought a theory of judging as amor mundi that depends on the phenomenological circumscription of communities of interpretation and response. I expand this account with a reading of Augustine’s struggle to negotiate with the Donatist schismatics, which I use to develop the parallels between Arendt’s account of judgment and contemporary democratic theories of deliberation and public reason.

Moser, Anna Aloisia.  Performative Intentionality: On Performativity of Thought and Language in Kant and Wittgenstein.  Ph.D. diss.  New School University, 2010.  [173 p.]  Advisor: Alice M. Crary.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The problem of intentionality is usually treated in a way that falls short of circumscribing its full spectrum. Theories of intentionality often do not go beyond the intentions of the thinker or speaker on the one hand or the intentional object or object intended on the other. A sound theory of intentionality must find the right kind of connection between mind or language and the thing thought or spoken about. In my dissertation I make the claim that there is no gap between mind or language and the things spoken or thought about in the first place, and that we therefore need a radically new take on intentionality, one that explains how in speaking or thinking thought and thing are always already connected. In order to prepare the ground for such an account I present the working together of receptivity and spontaneity in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and the way the proposition’s form makes its structure possible in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. I reveal these moments in Kant and Wittgenstein’s work as forerunners to theories of use or performativity that will make possible a new theory of intentionality that I call performative. The basic thesis of the dissertation is that the connection between thought or language and what it is about is made in the use or performativity of thought and language. However, Kant and Wittgenstein give theoretical accounts in which the relationship of thought or language to that which it is about is spelled out and thus produce metaphysics: transcendental illusions in Kant and propositions that are nonsensical in Wittgenstein. Something important must nevertheless be gleaned from Kant’s and Wittgenstein’s metaphysical attempts, which is that the fact that something is thought or that language is used offers us an explanation of how our thought and language can be about things. This I call Performative Intentionality.

Muravnik, Constantine F.  Nabokov’s Philosophy of Art.  Ph.D. diss.  Yale University, 2010.  [505 p.]  Advisor: Vladimir Alexandrov.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This dissertation examines Nabokov’s philosophy of art. Contrary to the two dominant trends in Nabokov studies — the metafictional, which presents Nabokov merely as an ironic manipulator of various literary devices, and the metaphysical, which associates him with no less than a transcendent realm — I put forth a different interpretive paradigm. I attempt to understand Nabokov’s art through the lens of Kantian aesthetics, which carefully differentiates between the transcendental and the transcendent. This differentiation provides my interpretation of Nabokov with hermeneutic guidance and makes it possible to avoid either of the above extremes. Following Kant, but also Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and, in some respects, Heidegger — in other words, following the entire phenomenological and markedly anti-Hegelian tradition that associates the transcendental with aesthetic experience — I, too, relate the ontological ground of Nabokov’s art with the aesthetic experience of the author and believe this experience to be at the source of all his writings. Since the author’s aesthetic experience is not conceptual, it reveals itself to the reader only in art and simultaneously becomes, as Kant put it, “the symbol of morality” without, however, prescribing any specific ethical rules. I also connect Nabokov’s aesthetic experience with his thematic interest in the inner workings of an artist who, as Khodasevich rightly states, is Nabokov’s only hero whether he appears in his fiction as a real poet/artist by profession or in any other more or less mundane disguise.
In my “Theoretical Introduction,” I explain how the philosophical reorientation of the literary study of Nabokov’s oeuvre in the direction of the author’s aesthetic experience reveals the fundamental ontology of his art and how the latter becomes instrumental in specific readings of his individual works. I argue the relevance of Kant, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche to Nabokov and trace various theoretical as well as factual and textual connections between Nabokov and the philosophers. In the body of the dissertation, I follow the development of Nabokov’s poet/artist through various narrative permutations and conclude that Nabokov’s poet successfully functions in life and in art only in the tense but harmonious metaphoric space between reality and imagination. More often than not, I chose to characterize this aesthetic “habitat” of Nabokov’s poet using Kant’s vocabulary from his Critique of Judgment and call it the space of free and harmonious interplay between the manifold of intuitions gathered by imagination and the concepts of understanding. Kant assigned this free and harmonious interplay to the aesthetic judgments of beauty. This space is tense because imagination and understanding counteract each other: the powers of understanding prevent the poet from taking leave of reality while the powers of imagination allow him to see more than has already been seen and known in the world and thus create truly original works of art. This interplay is harmonious because, while acting as a cognitive stimulant, it produces a feeling of pleasure and thus reconciles man with the world, even if only subjectively and for a time. Nabokov invariably presupposes this conception of aesthetics even when he deliberately distorts the above balance in favor of the poet’s imagination and presents his poet in an exaggerated or even caricatured form. This usually initiates a dynamic interpretive process of its own: the reader is provoked to pass a judgment on a character in accordance with the hidden measure provided by the implied author but against this author’s explicit albeit superficial defense.
I start my exposition of the aesthetic drama of Nabokov’s poet in the world with the unequivocally negative example of the pseudo-poet Smurov in The Eye. In Chapter II, I discuss the next, intermediate step that Nabokov prepares for his poet before he grants him full realization in narrative and in life; I refer to this step by the term “hermetic art.” In Chapter III, I study Nabokov’s positive narrative solution of the ontological problem of imagination and art — Fyodor’s productive, harmonious, and happy existence in The Gift. And in Chapter IV, in the conclusion of my study of Nabokov’s aesthetic metaphysics, I focus on the ethical implications and consequences of the kind of metaphysics that has little to do with the transcendent but remains transcendentally aesthetic. The ethical aspect of aesthetics comes into play every time when aesthetics starts to develop toward purity, timelessness, and perfection — in other words, every time when aesthetics intends to uproot itself from ontology. Throughout this dissertation, I assert the essential triangular connection among aesthetics, metaphysics, and ethics in Nabokov and associate this essential connection with Nietzsche’s aesthetic cosmodicy relevant to much of Nabokov’s philosophy and art.

Murphy, Jonathan William David.  Hawthorne’s Transcendental Turn.  Ph.D. diss.  State University of New York at Buffalo, 2010.  [309 p.]  Advisor: Rodolphe Gasche.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This dissertation charts the trajectory of the “transcendental turn” that occurred in Nathaniel Hawthorne’s thought between the years 1833 and 1846. I focus especially on the first stage of the author's philosophical conversion, which began in 1833 with his borrowing of Coleridge’s Aids to Reflection, and only came to be surpassed in 1837 as a result of his increasing familiarity with the brand of idealism native to New England. In Chapter One, “Bridging the Ontological Gap in ‘The Celestial Railroad,’” I argue that this tale — which is often cited as definitive evidence for the author’s antipathy towards idealist philosophy — is instead demonstrative of a decided shift in his thinking away from both metaphysical dogmatism as well as dogmatic unbelief, and towards an aesthetically charged and ontologically attuned expression of transcendental idealism. My second chapter, “Kantian Reflections on the Metaphysics of Mysticism,” follows the evolution the concept of reflection underwent over the course of Kant’s career. In Chapter Three, “Coleridge’s Rational Vindication of Religion in Aids to Reflection,” I read Coleridge’s mystical defense of philosophy as part and parcel with his rational affirmation of the spiritual mysteries of religion. In Chapter Four, “Critical Encounters of the Mystical Kind in ‘Young Goodman Brown,’” I bring all the threads of the preceding chapters together in a concentrated analysis of Hawthorne’s first metaphysical fiction. I assemble some contextual and textual evidence to document my thesis that Coleridge’s transcendentalist contribution to the debate between philosophy and religion determined the terms of this discussion for Hawthorne even before the advent of New England idealism in 1836. More specifically, I argue that “Young Goodman Brown” constitutes Hawthorne’s own transcendentalist exploration of the difference between faith and knowledge, precisely with respect to the radical aporia evil represents for any speculative system or moral religion that would seek to have done with the problem of finitude once and for all.
The second half of my dissertation, “Hawthorne among the Historians,” engages some of the secondary literature and takes issue with the predominant trend to distance Hawthorne from transcendental idealism if not philosophical rationalism in its entirety. In Chapter Five, “Nathaniel Hawthorne, Artist of the Real,” I take Millicent Bell’s portrait of the author to task, and reveal that the connection between philosophical skepticism, religious dogmatism, historical positivism, and social pragmatism is not an accident of fate in the Hawthorne scholarship, but is instead expressive of the total picture wrought by negative romanticism. In Chapter Six, “The Metaphysical Provenance of Hawthorne’s Provincial Histories,” I examine Michael Colacurcio’s seminal contributions to the field. I argue that his depiction of the author as a neo-positivist historical scientist is ultimately misleading, but that his renewed emphasis upon the artist as “moral historian” is an important contribution to the annals of Hawthorne criticism. In my seventh chapter, “The Hawthorne Question: Dating the Composition of ‘Young Goodman Brown,’” I provide further evidence to support my thesis that Hawthorne composed this tale sometime after he read Aids to Reflection in 1833. In the process, I expand beyond the dimensions of the transcendentalist framework, in order to draw a larger picture of the enlightenment context within which this story was articulated. My background argument is that although Coleridge helped Hawthorne to mediate between the respective claims of empiricism and dogmatism on the contentious subjects of witch ointments, spectral evidences, demoniac possessions, mystical revelations, and other related instances where spirit and matter collide, he did not read him alone or in a vacuum. In the concluding chapter of my dissertation, “Hawthorne’s Delusive Garment of Visibility in ‘Monsieur du Miroir,’” I examine the various Anglo-German and French tributaries of thought reflected in the author’s physiognomy as mirrored in this sketch. In this much maligned little meditation upon body and soul and the mysterious power of reflection that sutures the breach between them, Hawthorne stages a debate between skepticism and idealism specifically on the alleged “divinity” of the power of reason. Although he brings his tale to a close on an ambiguous note, this ambiguity is one that is irreducible to the philosophy of transcendental idealism as Hawthorne understood it, and thus should not be read as condemnatory on the author's part. In the years to follow, Hawthorne would adopt a decidedly more affirmative position on the philosophy of idealism, thereby overcoming the stalemate between dogmatism and skepticism in favor of the aesthetic bridge afforded by transcendentalism, thus completing the full circuit of his metaphysical conversion in thought.

Newton, Alexandra Mary.  Kant on Logical Form.  Ph.D. diss.  University of Pittsburgh, 2010.  [196 p.]  Advisors: Stephen Engstrom and John McDowell.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Most philosophers today assume what Kant might have called a ‘material’ conception of logic. According to the material conception, the laws of logic obtain independently of our consciousness of them, because they are either objective ‘laws of truth’, laws governing linguistic practices, or laws innate to our cognitive capacities. But it is often overlooked that this view of logic faces intractable difficulties in providing an adequate explanation of how these laws govern the mind. (Both rationalist and empiricist attempts to offer an explanation have been made.) The material conception immunizes logic from these problems, since it assumes that they do not concern logic , but merely concern epistemological views about what it is to have knowledge of logic.
In this dissertation I argue that Kant avoids the epistemological difficulties because he has a ‘formal’ conception of general logic, according to which logical operations and rules articulate self-consciousness in any exercise of the understanding. That is, they are not rules or procedures for generating intellectual acts (such as judgments), nor are they products of intellectual acts. Instead, they bring to (self-) consciousness the necessity (or ‘necessary synthetic unity’) in the activity of the understanding itself. Logical cognition thus is not material cognition of that which is distinct from our cognition of it, but instead is formal cognition, or cognition that any act of cognition has of itself. I argue that we cannot fully appreciate these points if we assume an ‘analytic approach’ to Kant’s logic, according to which logical operations consist in mere acts of comparison (or analysis) of representations. General logic must primarily concern itself with the understanding’s acts of synthesis in cognition, acts that are directed at an inner telos or purpose (namely, systematic unity in the whole of cognitions). Kant’s conception of logical form thus invokes an organic notion of ‘form’ that is linked to the teleological structure of our cognitive capacities.

Njoya, Wairimu R.  Dignity amidst Devastation: Politics, Aesthetics and the Slave Sublime.  Ph.D. diss.  Rutgers University, 2010.  [287 p.]  Advisors: Drucilla Cornell and Cynthia Daniels.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Burke, Kant, and Schiller used aesthetic categories to connect politics with ethical ideals of sympathy, dignity, and freedom. Although they extended these ideals to all human beings regardless of sex, color, or nation, this dissertation argues that representations of human difference in the realm of the aesthetic undermined the universal intent of their political philosophies. A new approach to aesthetics is needed in order to re-imagine difference from an ethical standpoint. This project identifies one such approach in selected works of art and literature by women from different parts of the African diaspora. In representing the dignity of women who were enslaved or colonized, these creative works revise our conceptions of political community, humanity, and the meaning of freedom.

Paccacerqua, Cynthia Maria.  The Doctrine of Self-positing and Receptivity in Kant’s Late Philosophy.  Ph.D. diss.  State University of New York at Stony Brook, 2010.  [199 p.]  Advisor: Edward S. Casey.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: I argue that in the Opus postumum — specifically in what is known as his “doctrine of self-positing” — Kant provides both a logical structure and a genetic account of the subject’s insertion into a natural world that is of its own making. In addition, I show how the doctrine contains an expanded role of the faculty of sensibility, an account of embodiment and the opening of an epistemological field proper to philosophical anthropology, both physiological and pragmatic. By identifying two levels of the doctrine of self-positing, I develop what appears as a new account of the function of the faculty of receptivity that always already entails a form of activity through which the subject makes it possible for data to be capable of being given to it. The dissertation is composed of four sections. The first provides an analysis of the concept of positing in Kant’s earlier theoretical philosophy. The second contextualizes the doctrine of self-positing within the Opus postumum as a whole, introduces the systematic location of the doctrine and situates its problematic historically. The third part examines the “analytic level” of the doctrine. And the fourth brings the former sections to bear upon the reconstruction of Kant’s doctrine of self-positing, especially with regards to receptivity.

Pathak, Krishna Mani.  The Universalizability of the Categorial Imperative: Re-examining Kant’s Maxim of Duty.  Ph.D. diss.  Heidelberg University, 2010.  [187 p.]  Advisor: Peter McLaughlin. [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this dissertation, I defend Kantian ethics in terms of the universalizability of moral duties as moral laws against relativistic ethics like traditionalism and communitarianism. The problem I deal with, in special reference to Kant, is whether our actions are or should be judged by local moral determinants like individuality, community, religion or society, or by universal determinants of Kantian spirit. Those who follow local moral determinants, criticize Kantian universalizability. But I consider universality to be a strong moral determinant and therefore I defend it, and Kant.
My argument, which I develop comprehensively in this dissertation, is twofold: Firstly, local determinants are based on historicism and therefore limited in scope; they leave room for partiality and discrimination among individuals. They are also dually-standardized – one for the first person (I use the term agent) and another for the second and third agents, all of whom differ from each other. Secondly, local determinants considered to be moral criteria are challenging to justify: Their projection of what a person is is not the only or real picture of a person as a moral agent. In other words, local determinants don't affect — or their proponents like MacIntyre and Taylor overlook — our deep sense of moral orientation, which deems every human being as the same. Our deep sense of morality has a need for a common standard of morality. With these arguments, I claim that the Kantian model of morality, in contrast, presents a real picture of a person and his sense of morality, though it is quite hard to find a person in the real world who acts in accordance with this moral sense. But our failure in following our deep moral sense does not mean that morality is a matter of individual choice or is merely locally-determined. The universal moral law is, after all, supreme and something to be achieved in the realization of what we are as moral and autonomous beings. The concept of local moral determinants is in fact weak in the sense that one can justify a wrong and irresponsible action as a right action, whereas, universal determinants prohibit us from following such a justification of a wrong action as right.
In brief, this dissertation aims to critically evaluate the two kinds of determinants and their link to our practical life from a moral point of view. Another crucial dimension does remain in the debate at hand — the epistemic dimension — but due to the specificity of the project shall remain untouched in this dissertation

Perold, Martin Ludwig.  Does Immanuel Kant’s Categorical Imperative Commit Him to the View that Lying is Always Morally Wrong?  Master’s thesis.  University of the Witwatersrand, 2010.  [vi, 80 p.]  Advisor: Lucy Allais. [online][WC]

Poe, Andrew.  The Sources and Limits of Political Enthusiasm.  Ph.D. diss.  University of California, San Diego, 2010.  [327 p.]  Advisor: Tracy Strong.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Political affect has historically been viewed as a fundamental impairment to the functioning of democracy. Indeed, democratic politics is often seen as particularly susceptible to dangerous provocation through inflamed sentiments. Yet still, a continuing worry for contemporary democracies is the problem of developing and maintaining political allegiances that encourage civic engagement without those allegiances becoming the basis for political exclusion or the infringement of human rights.
My dissertation investigates democratic allegiances through the lens of political enthusiasm. I argue that political enthusiasm — the feeling, as Kant puts it, that accompanies “the idea of the good,” commingling inspiration and conviction — is a necessary feature in the functioning of salutary allegiances to an open political system.
Due to its historical association with religious and political fanaticism, enthusiasm remains a relatively unexplored analytic concept within democratic theory. Many view the use of political emotions generally — and enthusiasm in particular — as perilous to democracy, preferring instead to encourage the rationalization of interests because of its predictability. Such concern for emotions that motivate political closure seems salient, especially in the context of new and developing democracies, where allegiance formations have proved vulnerable to hyper-nationalism.
But, as my dissertation shows, not all political emotions need motivate closure. I elaborate an analytic and behavioral distinction between enthusiasm (which, I argue, leads to open allegiances) and fanaticism (which results in closure). I illustrate this distinction through a reappraisal of historical developments in late 18 th century German thought, where enthusiasm is discussed alternatively as Schwärmerei and Enthusiasmus. Through analysis of the works of diverse German thinkers — from Wieland and Kant, to the “popular philosophy” movement (including Mendelssohn, Gentz, and Garve), and romantics such as Fichte and Novalis, amongst others — I present a developing portrait of this dual conceptualization of enthusiasm.
My analysis discloses these historical efforts to disentangle enthusiasm from fanaticism, ultimately illustrating how contemporary failure to distinguish between the two leaves a void in understating affective motivations in democratic politics. I use the concept of enthusiasm to develop a new framework by which to evaluate successful patterns of democratic allegiances.

Ponchio, Alice.  Il rapporto tra etica e diritto. Per un’interpretazione comprensiva della morale di Kant [Italian].  Ph.D. diss.  Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, Munich, 2010.  [379 p.]  Advisors: Julian Nida-Rümelin and Antonio Da Re. [online]

Robinson, Robert.  A Critical Ontology of Ourselves: The Kantian Foundations of Michel Foucault’s Philosophy.  Ph.D. diss.  Purdue University, 2010.  [208 p.]  Advisor: Daniel Smith.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In his final writings Michel Foucault surprises in saying that his “critical ontology of ourselves” extends the tradition of critical philosophy inaugurated by Immanuel Kant. He had previously described his project as a “critique of the subject,” which purports to demolish the Kantian conception of the human being as capable of autonomous thought and conduct. Despite the obvious tensions between these descriptions, the scholarship continually interprets Foucault’s later turn to Kant according to his critique of the subject. The three essays of this dissertation challenge the efficacy of this interpretative strategy on textual and philosophical grounds. My thesis is that Foucault’s turn to Kant is indicative of a break in the former’s philosophical views, and therefore his earlier views must be proportioned to his more mature, and distinctively Kantian, philosophy. Chapter One opens with the argument that Foucault’s critique of the subject is incompatible his later self-inscription in the critical tradition, as it cannot accommodate a conception of autonomy. I then provide significant evidence that Foucault renounces his critique of the subject in order to accommodate autonomy. Not coincidentally, this renunciation occurs when Foucault begins to investigate Kant’s reflections on enlightenment. Drawing on Foucault’s investigations of Kant and the former’s late work on truth-telling, I defend a moderate account of Foucaultian critique that satisfactorily avoids the weaknesses and problems often attributed to his critical project by critics. Chapter Two argues that Béatrice Han’s and Amy Allen’s recent interpretations of Foucault’s alleged critique of Kant are fundamentally misguided. After elucidating the Kantian character of Foucault’s analysis of modern philosophy in The Order of Things, I argue that Han and Allen confuse Foucault’s critique of modern philosophical anthropology for a critique of Kant. They fail to notice his distinction between the formal (transcendental) subject from the subject conceived as the essential self. This leads to their failure to notice that Foucault uses Kant’s critique of metaphysics, notably the paralogisms of reason, to isolate the mistake of modern “anthropologism”. Finally, I contend that these facts show that Foucault’s critique of the subject is best understood as furthering a Kantian skepticism about possible knowledge of human nature, which fits nicely with the account of critique defended in Chapter One. Chapter Three focuses on the philosophy that informs Foucault’s historical methodologies. Following Colin Koopman I argue that phenomenological interpretations fail to capture Foucault’s mature articulations of his views. However, I challenge Koopman’s interpretation on the grounds that it fails to account for the transcendental language in which Foucault casts his methods. I resolve this impasse by showing that Foucault draws significantly on the conceptual architecture of Kant’s transcendental inquiry. Like Kant, Foucault sees a condition of experience as a rule that both enables and constrains, but uniquely accounts for these rules as social norms. Insofar as an analytic accounts for the rules that comprise the conditions of experience, Foucault’s methods comprise an historical analytic of experience or “historical ontology”.

Roff Perkins, Heather M.  Provisional to Perfect: A Kantian Theory of Humanitarian Intervention.  Ph.D. diss.  University of Colorado at Boulder, 2010.  [260 p.]  Advisor: David R. Mapel.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Several scholars claim that Kant’s ethical and political theories are inconsistent. These “inconsistencies” become apparent when scholars attempt to apply Kant’s ethical and political framework to problems in international relations, such as humanitarian intervention (HI). Kok-Chor Tan argues that HI is an imperfect duty of benevolence (ethics), for example, while Carla Bagnoli argues that HI a perfect duty of right (justice). I argue the parties in this debate are misguided, though much of the disagreement is owing to a failure on Kant’s part to provide a robust conception of justice in the state of nature. First, I argue that to make Kant’s account fully consistent, a “provisional” duty must be included in his taxonomy. Next, I argue that HI ought to be considered a provisional duty of justice. I then consider whether HI can be a perfect duty of justice, that is, a duty that all actors are capable of fulfilling. This would require the institutionalization of a duty of HI. I argue that Kant’s permissive law authorizes the coercion of states into such an institution but that the United Nations Security Council should be the only agent to undertake the task of such coercion. Moreover, existing juridical institutions such as the International Criminal Court ought to be reformed and a United Nations led Rapid Reaction Force should be established to carry out interventions.

Ruta, Marcello.  La deuxième voie du post-kantisme temporalité et éternité dans la philosophie de Schopenhauer et Schelling.  Ph.D. diss.  Université de Strasbourg, 2010.  [xiv, 377 p.]  Advisor: Gérard Bensussan. [online][WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The thesis is divided into four chapters: a first chapter, which attempts to reconstruct a bibliography on Schopenhauer and Schelling. As it will be shown, these authors have always been linked almost instinctively, because of a common terminology (e.g., by using the concept of Will) and the irrationalism that labelled their thoughts, at least since Windelband. In spite of all that, there is not a rich bibliography where the relation between the two authors is deeply analysed. The situation changed only in recent years, a change that has found in the congress held in Freiburg under the direction of L. Hühn in 2005 its full expression. A second chapter, which explores the relationship between temporality and eternity in the thoughts of Kant and Hegel: this chapter is decisive in relation to the historical-philosophical thesis of the work, because it is here that the hypothesis of a second (non-hegelian) way of post-kantianism is founded. The last two chapters discuss the relationship between temporality and eternity in the thoughts of Schopenhauer and Schelling. In the latter case, we took into account the median production of Schelling (from 1809-1821). The work ends with a conclusion which summarizes the content of work.

Saman, Michael Joseph.  Goethe as a Reader of Kant, 1788-1832: Judgment, Grace, and the Most Desirable Calling.  Ph.D. diss.  Harvard University, 2010.  [288 p.]  Advisor: Peter Burgard.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This thesis seeks to account for a set of suggestive yet problematic elements in Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre that, I argue, are modeled on Kantian notions such as the sublime, the categorical imperative, intuitive understanding, and the critique of teleological judgment. In addition to interpreting these elements of the novel, I address the development of Goethe’s engagement with Kantian philosophy from the 1780s until his death, and, in the appendix of the thesis, I compile as completely as possible the textual documentation demonstrating it. This material, spanning four decades, is drawn from a range of primary documents, including scientific writings, letters, journal entries, and conversations. The dissertation thus aims to demonstrate the broader trajectory of which the Wanderjahre passages form the closure, and the underappreciated level of complexity and significance in Goethe’s reception of Kant.

Sanchez, Melvin Alexander.  A Defense of Kant’s Transcendental Idealism.  Ph.D. diss.  University of California, Irvine, 2010.  [171 p.]  Advisor: Ermanno Bencivenga.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant’s transcendental idealism has come under attack after Peter Strawson’s publication of The Bounds of Sense. Kant scholars have gone as far as claiming that Kant is not a transcendental idealist at all despite the fact that Kant labels himself a transcendental idealist. At the same time, defenders of transcendental idealism have given reasons why this type of idealism is still valuable. In my dissertation, I present some of the problems with transcendental idealism and also give an exposition of the commentators who argue against Kant’s idealism. I end the dissertation by summarizing the most well known defense of transcendental idealism (Henry Allison’s defense). I argue that Allison’s defense is not satisfactory enough because it is a defense that focuses only on epistemology. Transcendental idealism is not just an epistemological thesis, it also has implications for ontology and even ethics and as such it needs an ontological defense. That transcendental idealism needs an ontological defense is made evident by the fact that the conceptual problems involved with it are ontological in nature. I make an attempt at such an ontological defense by showing the presuppositions involved in Kant’s notion of objective validity.

Schulz, Joshua W.  Friendship and Fidelity: An Historical and Critical Examination.  Ph.D. diss.  Marquette University, 2010.  [288 p.]  Advisors: Michael Wreen and Richard Taylor.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Aristotle considers friendship the greatest external good, one integral to the attainment of happiness. However, while Aristotle limits distrust to what he calls imperfect forms of friendship, subsequent philosophers have stressed our uncertainty regarding the benevolence, beneficence and loyalty we may expect of friends. They do so in part because overcoming this uncertainty requires the exercise of the virtues of trust and loyalty if our friendships are to survive intact. For example, insofar as Aquinas holds that we cannot scrutinize the wills of others — thus inviting uncertainty regarding their present and future conduct — he argues that friendship requires the virtue of hope as a cause of friendly love, a hope which helps us to make virtuous presumptions about others' wills. Likewise, Kant argues that all de facto friendships are plagued by epistemic uncertainty regarding the wills of others. In consequence, he treats loyalty as an unenforceable ideal of virtue (rather than as an enforceable and determinable right). Kierkegaard goes further, framing his treatment of nonagapic love — in which he argues that friendship cannot be ethically justified — with a discussion of deception in Works of Love.
If Aristotle is correct in thinking that friendship ‘is a virtue, or involves virtue’ (1155a1), and that ‘loving is the virtue of friends’ (1159a35), then addressing the epistemological, conceptual, and normative concerns these philosophers have regarding trust and loyalty between friends is needed to understand a central goal of the ethical life: the perfection of love. After a historical survey of the thought of these four thinkers regarding the relationship between friendship and loyalty, this study suggests that contemporary problems about the origins, nature, and limits of loyalty can be fruitfully resolved using insights derived from the historical survey.

Shuster, Arthur.  Ancient and Modern Approaches to the Question of Punishment: Hobbes, Kant and Plato.  Ph.D. diss.  University of Texas at Austin, 2010.  [vii, 179 p.]  Advisor: Thomas Pangle. [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The modern criminal justice system is experiencing what may be called a moral crisis brought about by a fundamental disagreement regarding the just and humane treatment of criminals and the purpose of punishment. This crisis has been addressed by contemporary scholarship without much success. The most serious defect of these scholarly attempts has been a failure to grasp how the apparently clashing aims of punishment — deterrence, retribution, and rehabilitation — relate to the fundamental principles of modern politics. Without this knowledge, it is impossible to begin to understand how these different penal aims may today be compatible and how incompatible, or even to appreciate what is at stake in each of them. In order to gain a firmer grip on the problem, this dissertation returns to the original arguments for modern punishment by examining crucial moments in its theoretical development. In Hobbes, modern punishment theory attains its first and most consistent articulation. Hobbes shows that the principles of modern politics limit the scope of justice to the protection of private freedom and property, and thus necessitate that deterrence should be the dominant aim of punishment. In his reaction against Hobbes, Kant affirms the importance of human dignity and argues that a penal system of pure deterrence would threaten the humanity of the criminal. Kant presents retribution as a more noble aim of punishment and tries to defend it on modern grounds, although he ultimately fails in this task. In light of the aporetic conclusion of the examination of modern punishment theory, this dissertation turns to investigate the classical approach to the question of punishment as it is expressed in the proposal for humane penal reform in Plato’s Laws. In the Laws, the highest aim of punishment, as the city understands it, is shown to be moral rehabilitation, although retribution and deterrence are also incorporated into the city’s actual penal code as a concession to necessity and to the limitations of the thumotic civic outlook. The most humanizing feature of the penal reform proposal in the Laws is, however, its philosophical analysis of the nature of crime.

Siyar, Jamsheed Alam.  Kant’s Conception of Practical Reason.  Ph.D. diss.  University of Pittsburgh, 2010.  [190 p.]  Advisor: Stephen Engstrom.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: My dissertation develops a novel account of Kant’s moral philosophy by focusing on his conception of pure reason. As is well known, Kant contends that morality has its source in pure reason, and that the authority of moral considerations derives from this source. Yet recent commentators have shied away from Kant’s account of reason, emphasizing instead aspects of his view that seem to make it more accessible. In particular, influential constructivist readings have stressed the role of rational agents as autonomous subjects that “construct” the principles or values they commit themselves to. I argue that to properly grasp Kant’s distinctive conception of moral constraints, and his conception of rational agency, we must look to his underlying account of reason.
My dissertation divides into two parts. In the first part, I reconstruct Kant’s account of the practicality of pure reason, i.e. reason’s capacity to determine the will a priori, and show how all norms of practical reason are systematically derived from this capacity. In particular, I show: (1) that all possible moral constraints derive from pure reason’s determination of the will and that each such constraint must be systematically related to all the others; and (2) that the norms of instrumental rationality equally depend on reason’s capacity to determine the will a priori. In the second part, I broaden the focus to consider the relations between the theoretical and practical exercises of reason. I develop the formal parallels between the two exercises of reason and show how each exercise is governed by a corresponding rational interest. I then elaborate Kant’s notion of a rational interest to show that for Kant reason is fundamentally practical--in the sense that reason’s theoretical exercise is in important respects shaped by its practical concerns. A key upshot of this argument is that we cannot fully grasp Kant’s account of practical reason unless we consider the relation between theoretical and practical reason. Once we consider this relation, however, we see that Kant takes morality, i.e. reason’s legislation of the moral law, to be the grounding principle of all rational activity.

Southgate, Henry Michael.  Individuation and Opposition in Hegel’s “Doctrine of Essence”: The Importance of Kant’s “Amphiboly” to Hegel’s Metaphysics.  Ph.D. diss.  Northwestern University, 2010.  [268 p.]  Advisor: Rachel Zuckert.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: My dissertation is about two traditional metaphysical problems and how these shape the philosophies of Leibniz, Kant, and Hegel. The problems concern the nature of individuals and individuation, and the nature and ontological status of opposition. The question of individuation asks, “What makes some thing, A, the very thing that it is, and no other?” The related topic of opposition is about whether or not a combination of positive qualities can produce a negation of qualities. I argue that these two problems are central to the subject matter of the second book of Hegel’s Science of Logic, the “Doctrine of Essence,” and that Hegel’s response to these problems illustrates more generally his relationship to Leibniz and Kant, for whom the problems are also central. Specifically, I claim that Hegel’s reflection on these topics guides the dialectic of the first division of the “Doctrine of Essence,” “Essence as Reflection in Itself,” towards its conclusion in Hegel’s holism about the relation between substance and property, on the one hand, and between properties generally on the other. I claim that Hegel’s holism on these two points, and the dynamic ontology of particulars they support, results from his criticisms of two key Leibnizian doctrines — the principle of the identity of indiscernibles and the principle that all reality is in agreement — but that these criticisms do not lead Hegel to abandon metaphysics as a philosophical program. Hegel’s assessment of Leibnizian rationalism is thus quite distinct from Kant’s critical evaluation of it in the “Amphiboly of the concepts of reflection through the confusion of the empirical use of the understanding with the transcendental.” Hegel accepts Kant’s criticism that Leibniz confounds the comparison of concepts with the comparison of objects thought under those concepts, but he distances himself from Kant’s thesis that this criticism presupposes a radical distinction between sensibility and understanding. Against Kant, Hegel demonstrates that Leibniz’s metaphysics fails on conceptual grounds alone, i.e. before it is submitted to “transcendental reflection.” Hegel thus shows another way forward in post-Kantian philosophy, one that remains thoroughly metaphysical in its orientation and conclusions.

Stockwell, Cory.  Open Secrets: Violence, Secrecy, Community.  Ph.D. diss.  University of Minnesota, 2010.  [281 p.]  Advisor: Thomas Pepper.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The dissertation is a consideration of the workings of secrecy in texts by five writers Kant, Sade, Duras, Lispector and Bolaño. The first chapter, through a reading of Kant’s Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, and his Critique of Judgment, argues that the secret is that element of Kant’s philosophy that allows us to conceive of a Kantian theory of community, one that is marked by an essential openness to the outside. The second chapter turns to Sade, and to a select group of his twentieth century readers, and posits the secret as an essentially political element in his work. If, as many observers have noted, the condition of violence in Sade is that it take place in secret, I argue that the very essence of this secret violence is to overflow the borders of its containment, but that this violence remains secret in its very openness, in its very becoming-public. My third chapter investigates what I refer to as the essential femininity of the secret, through a reading of Duras’s The Ravishing of Lol V. Stein and Lispector’s The Hour of the Star. Examining the workings of the veil in these novels, I argue that the veil opens onto a certain temporality, one that lies on the limit between present and future, a time of the “not yet.” It is within this sliver of time, I contend, that a link between femininity and secrecy is established. The last chapter turns to the names of the dead (and specifically the names of dead women) in the work of Roberto Bolaño. I argue that proper names in Bolaño’s work function essentially as divine names: rather than revealing any hidden meanings to us, they tell us absolutely nothing, and in so doing, open us up to what we are - open us, in other words, to our common being.

Sudan, Meghant.  Matter and Motion in Kant’s Philosophy of Science.  Ph.D. diss.  State University of New York at Stony Brook, 2010.  [261 p.]  Advisors: Edward Casey and Jeffrey Edwards.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This dissertation examines Kant’s project in his Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science to present a ‘critically’ approved account of physical entities, purportedly necessary for all scientific investigation. It develops an original interpretation of its key programmatic premises, which revolve around the attribution of motion to matter as a way of making further a priori claims about outer things in general. It clarifies the connections these premises have to central doctrines of the Critique of Pure Reason such as Kant’s theories about mathematical cognition and the constitution of perception according to sensation. Fatal flaws in Kant’s project, however, compel revisions that affect those very doctrines that were supposed to provide a prior basis for it. The dissertation outlines these problems and the corresponding revisions with the help of Hegel’s surprisingly sympathetic and detailed criticisms of Kant’s Metaphysical Foundations. This has the added benefit of showing how Hegel’s own philosophical approach is much more intimately informed by Kant’s said project than it initially appears. In sum, Kant is asked to relinquish his transcendental-psychological framework in favor of an account of perception which is immanently reflective and which rests on rational-physical bases instead of providing an allegedly subjectivist basis for the latter. This result issues a challenge for us to think such revisions without helping oneself either to a blatant Hegelian rationalism or an anachronistic naturalism foreign to Kant.

Tagma, Halit Mustafa Emin.  That Dangerous Discipline: The Function and Place of the International Relations Discipline in the Modern University.  Ph.D. diss.  Arizona State University, 2010.  [312 p.]  Advisor: Roxanne L. Doty.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This dissertation aims to locate the place and function of the international relations discipline within the modern university. In order to do so, I engage with the writings of Immanuel Kant, whose ideal of the modern university was behind the founding of the University of Berlin and was later imported into the United States to become a widely-replicated model. Kant argues that modern universities ought to have several faculties, along with a philosophical faculty, whose claim to universal reason put it at the core of this model. Building on Kant, I argue that the discourse of International Relations (IR) is, along with philosophy, at the core of the project of the modern university. This is so because IR theoretical discourse has important implications for the Kantian architectonics of the university with philosophy at its core. What IR theoretical discourse does is actively repudiate the universality of reason, and Kantian philosophy, by pointing to the international as the sphere beyond the applicability of reason and progress. That IR does so, however, does not mean for Kant that reason in the hands of philosophy is bankrupt. Instead, and in line with Kant’s work in The Critique of Pure Reason, reason requires limits for it to be able to function. Kantian philosophy needs limits for the applicability of reason and IR provides those limits. IR discourse does so by casting the inside of the state as the only realizable domain for progress and order against an opposing violent international arena.
An analysis of the disciplinary history of IR shows the core theme of the discipline to be the multiplicity of “sovereign reasons” in an anarchic order, which problematizes the universality of reason. My conclusion is that the IR discipline is the “dangerous yet necessary supplement” to philosophy’s centrality in the Kantian architectonics of the modern university. The spatio-temporal limits and boundaries that IR discourse imposes on philosophy, makes the latter dependent on the former in order to be able to appear complete. What this means is that the IR discipline is inseparable from philosophy, and philosophy’s apparent centrality is dependent on repudiating IR.

Tarantino, Giancarlo.  Reorientation through Interruption: On the Relation of Immanuel Kant’s Modes of Egoism to his Critical Philosophy.  Master’s thesis.  Loyola University/Chicago, 2010.  [117 p.]  Advisor: Andrew Cutrofello.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The relationship between Immanuel Kant’s anthropology, and his Critical philosophy has proven to be a notoriously difficult problem, both for specifically Kantian scholarship as well as for philosophy in general. This thesis attempts to investigate this relationship by showing the importance of Kant’s modes of egoism at work in his three Critiques. In doing so this thesis will highlight the phenomena of interruption, and orientation as playing crucial interpretive roles for parsing out the aforementioned relationship. I will try to show that anthropology and Critique mutually interrupt, and re-orient one another’s specific contributions to the major themes of Kant’s thinking.

Tonetto, Milene Consenso. O direito humano à liberdade e a fundamentação do direito em Kant. [Portuguese] Ph.D. diss. Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, 2010. [227 p.] Advisor: Delamar José Volpato Dutra. [WC] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The aim of this work is to show that Kant's theory of right is based on the unique and original right that pertains to man, namely the innate right to freedom. Kant derives the analytical principle of right from morality, but not directly from the Categorical Imperative, which is an a priori synthetic principle. Instead, he justifies the universal principle of right from an innate human right the right to freedom. The universal principle of right states that an action is right if it can coexist with everyone's freedom in accordance with a universal law. Moreover, this work will argue that the whole Kantian system of rights is derived from the innate right to freedom. From this right it can be analytically derived other "innate" rights, for example, the "innate" right to equality, the "innate" right to the quality of being your own master, and the acquired rights such as the right to property and the political ones. Finally, the work will defend that the establishment of state is based on the innate right to freedom. It will sustain that the three principles that justify the state, that is, lawful freedom, equality and independence follow from the innate right to freedom.

Trullinger, Joseph.  The Hidden Life of God: Kant and the German Idealists on Ethical Purity.  Ph.D. diss.  University of Kentucky, 2010.  [417 p.]  Advisor: Daniel Breazeale.

Tuna, Emine Hande.  Location, Location, Location: An Alternative View Concerning the Location of the Deduction in Kant’s Third Critique.  Master’s thesis.  University of Alberta, 2010.  [113 p.]  Advisor: Alex Rueger. [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The project of the Critique of the Aesthetic Power of Judgment consists in providing a ground for judgments of taste so that we are justified in claiming that everybody else can agree with our judgment (‘subjective universality’) and that all others ought to agree with us (‘subjective necessity,’ normativity). This justification is supposed to be accomplished in the “Deduction of judgments of taste.” The section that carries this title (§38) is surprisingly short and for this and various other reasons (some of them textual) commentators have often wondered about the precise location where Kant provides the deduction, whether it is really contained in that short paragraph or whether the argument might actually extend beyond §38. In my thesis, I want to reinvigorate the discussion about the location of the deduction and its interpretation by arguing that it takes place between §30-42.

Uzawa, Kazuhiko.  Einbildungskraft: philosophische Bildtheorie bei Leibniz, Hume und Kant.  Ph.D. diss.  Universität Münster (Westfalen), 2010 [viii, 243 p.]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: One source indicates 2007 as the degree date.

Villaran Contavalli, Alonso Manuel.  An Overarching Defense of Kant’s Idea of the Highest Good.  Ph.D. diss.  Loyola University/Chicago, 2010.  [177 p.]  Advisor: Victoria Wike.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The main goal of this dissertation is to develop an overarching defense of Kant’s idea of the highest good, against the criticisms pointed out in the English-speaking world, within the framework of the so-called “Beck-Silber controversy.” As it is known, since the second half of the last century, when the “Beck-Silber controversy” started, Kant’s idea of the highest good has been subject to a massive attack. These attacks motivated, in turn, the emergence of a counterforce of defenders, a group that I attempt to join through this work. Particularly, I have identified six criticisms against Kant’s idea of the highest good, which I have labeled as the problems of heteronomy, unsuitability, impossibility, injustice, irrelevance, and abandonment. Thanks to this, we know what a complete defense of Kant’s idea of the highest good requires. Now, once with all these criticisms identified, I develop a response to each of them. In that way, I show how Kant’s idea of the highest good does not undermines the principle of autonomy; how the highest good has not only a place, but a privileged one in his moral philosophy; how it is possible to promote a world in which happiness is distributed in accordance to virtue; how the problem of injustice is both ungrounded and overestimated; how the highest good is actually relevant for morality; and finally, that Kant did not abandon his idea of the highest good at the end of his life. In this way, I hope having saved the highest good as part of Kant’s ethics.

Ware, Owen.  Kant, Skepticism and Moral Sensibility.  Ph.D. diss.  University of Toronto, 2010.  [132 p.]  Advisor: Paul Franks. [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In his early writings, Kant says that the solution to the puzzle of how morality can serve as a motivating force in human life is nothing less than the “philosophers’ stone.” In this dissertation I show that for years Kant searched for the philosophers’ stone in the concept of “respect” (Achtung), which he understood as the complex effect practical reason has on feeling. I sketch the history of that search in Chapters 1-2. In Chapter 3 I show that Kant’s analysis in Groundwork I is incomplete because it does not explain how respect functions as a feeling in motivating choice. In Chapter 4 I argue that Kant’s subsequent attempt to sidestep this explanation in Groundwork III is unsuccessful, and that his position remains open to a skeptical threat. The argument in the second Critique, which I reconstruct in Chapters 5-6, overcomes this threat, and in doing so explains how the feeling of respect is both painful and pleasurable. -/- In the course of defending these claims, I provide an alternative reading of the shift in Kant’s ethical project from the Groundwork of 1785 to the second Critique of 1788 Against a common view in the literature, I argue that the shift does not concern the direction of Kant’s deduction (from freedom to morality, or morality to freedom); rather, it concerns his view of human sensibility and the resources he thinks we have to make our practical self-understanding intelligible. In the second Critique, I argue, Kant develops a novel approach to moral feeling from the perspective of the human agent; and this in turn clears room in his ethics for a new kind of a priori knowledge—namely, knowledge of what the activity of practical reason must feel like. By way of conclusion, I offer a few reasons for why the form of Kant’s argument in the second Critique is still relevant today, as it shows why we can only address moral skepticism from a first-personal perspective.

Wasser, Audrey Catherine.  The Work of Difference: Form and Formation in Twentieth-century Literature and Theory.  Ph.D. diss.  Cornell University, 2010.  [218 p.]  Advisor: Jonathan Culler.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: My dissertation argues for a non-romantic conception of the literary work, one that can account for a certain integrity of the work without reducing it to a form of identity based on closure, completion, or self-reflection. It begins by taking issue with a persistently romantic problematic in contemporary criticism and theory. Deriving from the work of Immanuel Kant, this problematic leads critics to pose the question of a work's organization in terms of two alternatives: on the one hand, a totalizing form or system, and on the other a disruptive break or freedom. Neither alternative is deemed adequate to a notion of literature; rather, literature becomes the privileged locus and paradoxical presentation of the tension between them. I proceed with an analysis of the fragment in early German romanticism as instantiating a new model of the literary work, one in which the conflict between freedom and system is preserved in an opposition between literary form and the activity of reflection. I discuss the self-perpetuating mechanism of this conflict as it pervades major critical statements of the twentieth-century, focusing on the works of Cleanth Brooks, Maurice Blanchot, and Gilles Deleuze. The second half of the dissertation analyzes a series of twentieth-century literary texts in order to argue that something else is being thought by these texts than what can be apprehended either by the terms of a renewed romanticism, or by literary histories that understand modernism as a reaction to romanticism. Each of these texts presents a distinct challenge to a different aspect of the romantic paradigm. Beckett’s trilogy complicates the self-reflection at the heart of the romantic model of art; and in the disjunction it introduces between its figures and its actual functioning, it produces an image of the necessity of writing as a wholly external and unassailable demand. Proust’s novel likewise traces a disjunction between the self, its sense impressions, and their conversion into a work of art, representing its own hyperbolic organization in the form of its protagonist’s vocation to write. Stein’s work, finally, replaces romantic forms of organic development with an open, generative repetition.

Watkins, J. Brian.  Good Taste: Pleasure and Practice in Kant’s Critique of Aesthetic Judgment.  Ph.D. diss.  University of Notre Dame, 2010.  [266 p.]  Advisors: Karl Ameriks and Anja Jauernig. [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: What does it mean to have good taste? I provide a commentary on Immanuel Kant’s “Critique of Aesthetic Judgment,” part 1 of the Critique of Judgment, that aims to describe how he might answer this question. I show that, for Kant, taste, our capacity for feeling pleasure and displeasure on the basis of which we can judge whether an object is beautiful, begins as a crude talent that must be sharpened if we are to judge the beautiful correctly. When we have good taste, according to Kant, we become the kind of person who takes pleasure in those objects that are truly worth contemplating. I argue that this activity of contemplation, which Kant calls the free play of the understanding and the imagination, is best understood as practice reflecting on an object for the sake of better understanding what it offers. For Kant, I claim, a beautiful object provides us with an excellent example for how we might make sense of something that lies beyond the boundaries of possible experience, for example, the perfect expression of love, the majesty of God’s creative power, or what it’s like to feel at home in the world. It is an excellent example because through continued practice, we can always learn more about how it strives to show us what it does. In other words, a beautiful object offers an inexhaustible wealth of material that sustains our contemplation indefinitely, and taste, then, is our capacity to like those objects that are excellent in this sense and dislike those that are not. I argue that, for Kant, it is important to develop one’s taste because it plays an orientational role in human life. To have good taste is to become mature enough to determine for oneself which objects of art or nature offer an excellent example for how we might strive toward making sense of some of our deepest concerns as humans, that is, an example which always remains worth contemplating, an example from which we can always learn more.

Wolever, Matthew L.  A Metaphysical Exploration.  Master’s thesis.  Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, 2010.  [97 p.]  Advisor: Thomas Alexander.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The first chapter explores an anachronistic Kantian critique of Plotinus wherein Plotinus’ notion of the One and the soul’s ascent to the One is discussed. In the second part of the chapter it will be argued that despite Plotinus’ via negativa approach to the One, he commits what Kant calls a transcendental illusion. At this time, Kant’s conditions of experience and knowledge are discussed, to show what constitutes as experience. Then, Kant’s notion of transcendental illusion is discussed, specifically in its paralogistic and ideal forms. From this discussion, it is evident that Plotinus’ idea of the soul is a paralogistic error and his idea of the One becomes the Ideal of pure reason, thereby mistaking the Ideal of the One as constituting ultimate existence.
Following this Kantian critique, the second chapter discusses Sankara’s view of Atman. The exposition demonstrates that Sankara’s approach is essentially via negativa, that while it is the most humble approach to Brahman, yet it is unable to account for the absolute reality that is essentially ineffable. This discussion focuses on Sankara’s belief that people falsely attribute or superimpose qualities to the true Self, because of Avidya and that only true knowledge transforms Avidya into vidya or discriminating knowledge. After this discussion, some criticisms are discussed to show some apparent problems with Sankara’s view. At which time, it will be argued that despite Sankara’s use of via negativa he commits what Kant calls a “transcendental illusion.” We do not have an empirical intuition of the concept of Brahman; therefore, we have neither access to the mystical reality of Brahman as a thing in itself, nor to true knowledge about ultimate reality. Thus, Sankara’s view engenders transcendental illusion.
The final chapter addresses Schelling’s idealism and in particular the view of the potencies at work in God, before God was God. Due to creation, an inversion of the potencies occurs and the outer gains control over the inner. Next, elements of Habermas’ view are discussed, wherein he holds a materialistic-interactive-idealist position, as indicated in his ideal speech situation. At this time, it will be argued that Habermas’ “ideal speech situation” is idealistic like Schelling’s position. Consequently, both Schelling and Habermas’ reaction respectively make the Primordial Will and the Ideal Speech Situation into an Ideal and in so doing commits a transcendental illusion.

Worsnip, Alexander Liam. Kant, Constructivism, and 'Kantian Constructivism'. Master’s thesis. University of Oxford, 2010. [# p.] Advisor: Terence Irwin. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In recent years a ‘constructivist’ interpretation of Kant’s views on the foundations of morality has become very popular. This thesis argues that Kant did not hold a constructivist view, and that constructivism is not in a broader sense ‘Kantian’ nor a sympathetic revision of Kant’s views. I begin by clarifying what makes a moral theory distinctively ‘constructivist’. Then I argue that the textual evidence does not support a constructivist reading of Kant, and explain some of the passages which suggest constructivism. Finally, I offer a critique of constructivism as a substantive meta-ethical view.

Wretzel, Joshua.  Speaking with the Dead: The Philosophical Implications of Brandom’s Interpretive Oversights.  Ph.D. diss.  State University of New York at Binghamton, 2010.  [148 p.]  Advisor: Robert Guay.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: I contend that oversights in Brandom’s historical works leave his inferentialist project vulnerable to philosophical critique in four ways. Drawing upon Gadamer, I argue first that Brandom’s hermeneutics cannot provide the dialogical relation it promises at the outset. I then show how Kant’s self-legislative account of knowledge counters the empiricism that underlies Brandom’s account of discursive practice. Third, I propose a new reading of Hegel that critiques the inherent subject-object dualism at the root of Brandom’s inferentialism. Finally, I show how Hegel provides a critique of the “Givenness” of Brandom’s deontic scorekeeping model of discursive practice. I show both how Brandom’s model is “abstract” in the Hegelian sense, bearing no grounding in the actual, historical discursive practices of sapient beings; and how Hegel’s account of discursive practice in the Jena Phenomenology provides the “concrete,” developmental account that Brandom’s version lacks.

Yoshikuni, Hiroki.  Kant with Melville: Freedom, Enthusiasm, and the Novel.  Ph.D. diss.  State University of New York at Buffalo, 2010.  [167 p.]  Advisor: Kenneth Dauber.

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This dissertation explores the relationship between Kant and Melville, paying close attention to the former’s idea of freedom and the latter’s effort to exhibit freedom without transforming it into individualism. It is also an attempt to read Melville’s novels as responses to Kant’s ethical critique of the novel in general. In Critique of Practical Reason, grounding his ethics on the idea of freedom, Kant denounces the novel because it causes moral enthusiasm by transforming freedom into a fantasy, which becomes a core of individualism by inducing great pleasure in the subject. The novel appears to be able to exhibit freedom since at a critical moment the hero or heroine decides to act independently of the laws of nature and culture, but, pointing out the moral enthusiast’s inclinations pathologically motivating his actions, Kant’s critique of the novel amounts to alleging that the freedom exhibited by the heroic action in the novel lacks the idea’s radical otherness to phenomena, causing pleasure to the reader instead. The novel is able to exhibit freedom, which in principle could not be accounted for, because it describes the moment of freedom as something “unaccountable,” rather than giving a substantial account of it. Freedom in the novel is thus to be comprehended by the absence of explanation, an absence that is indeed charged with a meaning. Individualism is precisely an ideology that utilizes this structure of accountable unaccountableness: each individual enjoys freedom, which has an appearance of an exception from society but indeed belongs to it as something exceptional. According to individualism, everyone has freedom with unaccountable secrets and mysteries, but this individuality is as such presupposed and in reality demanded in order to be a member of the society.
Kant’s critique of the novel is in this sense his defense of freedom against individualism because the individual is not free at all. In the wake of recent critique of individualism, numerous interpreters of Melville have started focusing on the communal aspects of his works. I argue, however, that Melville’s response to the domination of individualism is not the embrace of communality but the defense of freedom in distinction from individualism. But Melville’s problem is that he writes the novel, which is, as Kant maintains, exactly the cause of individualism. Hence Melville’s task as a novelist is double: on the one hand he must write freedom, which the previous novels did not succeed in exhibiting without losing its radical otherness to phenomena, and on the other hand he must separate freedom from the fantasy of freedom, which eventually would form individualism. As a result, the heroes in Melville’s novels, such as Pierre, Bartleby and the confidence man, are lacking in what we usually consider freedom. They are unheroic heroes, as it were, because in his novels the fantasy of freedom, which has formed our image of “freedom,” collapses, as we see typically in Bartleby’s immobility and mechanical repetition of his formula. At the same time, however, these heroes are not mere products of nature; their destruction of the fantasy itself causes a surprise to the characters around them and also to the reader.