Please send corrections or additions to: Steve Naragon.
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[See also the items listed under Collections]
Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels (1755)
——. Istoria generală a naturii şi teoria cerului. [Romanian] Translated, with notes and appendices, by Alexandru Boboc. Cluj-Napoca: Edit. Grinta, 2014. [192 p.] [RC]
Versuch den Begriff der negativen Größen in die Weltweisheit einzuführen (1763)
——. Dokímio gia ten eisagoge tes énnoias tou arnetikoú megéthous ste philosophía. [Greek] Translated by Haris Tasakos. Athena: Printa, 2014. [71 p.] [RC]
Inaugural Dissertation (1770)
——. La “Dissertatio” de 1770: sobre la forma y los principios del mundo sensible y del inteligible. [Spanish] Translated and edited by Ramón Ceñal. Madrid: Encuentro, 2014. [140 p.] [WC]
“Concerning Sensory Illusion and Poetic Fiction” (1777)
——. “Sobre a ilusão poética e a poética da ilusão.” [Portuguese] Translated, with introduction and notes, by Leonel Ribeiro dos Santos. Estudos Kantianos 2.2 (2014): 291-313. [M]
Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1781)
——. Critica della ragione pura. [Italian] Translated, with introduction and notes, by Giorgio Colli. Milan: Adelphi, 2014. [xxiv, 910 p.] [WC]
——. 純粋理性批判 / Junsui risei hihan. [Japanese] Translated by Fumiyasu Ishikawa. Tokyo: Chikumashobō, 2014. [373 p.] [WC]
——. Phan phan ly tinh tuan tuy (Tap mot / Ta hai) [Vietnamese] Two volumes. Translated, with introduction and notes, by Bui Van Nam Son. Ho Chi Minh City: NXB Van hoc, 2014. [584 p.] [WC]
——. Crítica de la razón pura [Spanish] Translated and with notes by Pedro Ribas; introduction by José Luis Villacañas. Madrid: Gredos, 2014. [cxxvii, 623 p.] [WC]
Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysic, die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können (1783)
——. Prolegomene la orice metafizică viitoare care se va putea înfăţişa drept ştiinţă. [Romanian] Translated by Mircea Flonta and Thomas Kleininger. Bucureşti: Humanitas. [263 p.] [WC]
——. Prolêgomenos a qualquer metafísica futura que possa apresentarse como ciência. [Portuguese] Translated by José Oscar de Almeida Marques. São Paulo: Estação Liberdade, 2014. [176 p.] [WC]
——. Prolegomeni ad ogni metafisica futura. [Italian] Translated, with commentary, by Piero Partinetti; edited by Francesco Saverio Festa. Rome: Castelvecchi, 2014. [302 p.] [WC]
Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (1785)
——. Întemeierea metafizicii moravurilor. [Romanian] Translated by Valentin Mureşan. Bucureşti: Edit. All, 2014. [112 p.] [RC]
——. Moraalin metafysiikan perustus. [Finnish] Translated by Markus Nikkarla. Turku: Areopagus, 2014. [108 p.] [RC]
——. 道德形而上学基础 / Dao de xing er shang xue ji chu. [Chinese] Translated by Shaowei Sun. Nan chang: Jiangxi jiao yu chu ban she. [79 p.] [WC]
“Rezension von Gottlieb Hufeland, Versuch über den Grundsatz des Naturrechts” (1786)
Marey, Macarena. “Sobre las Críticas de Kant a Gottlieb Hufeland, con una Traducción de Recensión del Ensayo Sobre el Principio del Derecho Natural, de Gottlieb Hufeland.” [Spanish] Estudos Kantianos 2.1 (2014): 107-4. [M]
“Was heißt: sich im Denken orientieren?" (1786)
——. Che cosa significa orientarsi nel pensare. [Italian] Translated and with an introduction by Michele Giorgiantonio. Lanciano: Carabba, 2014. [185 p.] [WC]
Kritik der praktischen Vernunft (1788)
——. 实践理性批判 / Shi jian li xing pi pan. [Chinese] Translated by Yongqi Zhang. Nan chang: Jiangxi jiao yu chu ban she, 2014. [130 p.] [WC]
“Erste Fassung der Einleitung in die Kritik der Urteilskraft” (1789)
——. “Prima introduzione alla Critica del Giudizio.” [Italian] Translated by ??. il cannocchiale 39.1 (2014): 15-81.
Kritik der Urteilskraft (1790)
——. Krytyka wladzy sadzenia. [Polish] Edited by Marta Agata Chojnacka, Milena Marciniak, and Kinga Kaskiewicz; translated by Mirosław Żelazny. Torun: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Mikolaja Kopernika, 2014. [403 p.] [WC]
“Über das radikale Böse in der menschlichen Natur.” (1793)
——. Il male radicale. [Italian] Translated by Roberto Celada Ballanti. Milan: Garzanti, 2014. [277 p.] [WC]
“Ausgleichung eines auf Mißverstand beruhenden mathematischen Streits” (1796)
——. “Disolución de una disputa matemática que se funda en un equívoco.” [Spanish] Translated by Rogelio Rovira. Con-Textos Kantianos 2014.1 (2014): 125-26. [M] [online]
Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre (1797)
——. Princípios metafísicos da doutrina do direito. [Portuguese] Translated and with an introduction by Joãosinho Beckenkamp. São Paulo: WMF Martins Fontes, 2014. [lxxv, 198 p.] [WC]
——. “Metafyzika mravov.” [Slovak] Introduction (pp. 47-53) and translation (pp. 54-69) by Eva Zelizňaková. Studia Philosophica Kantiana 2014.1 (2014): 47-69. [M] [online]
Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht abgefaßt (1798)
——. Antropología en sentido pragmático. [German/Spanish] Translated by Dulce María Granja, Gustavo Leyva, and Peter Storandt; prologue by Reinhard Brandt. Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2014. [ccliii, 248 p.] [WC]
——. Pragmatische antropologie. [Dutch] Translated, with annotations and introduction, by Willem Visser. Amsterdam: Boom, 2014. [287 p.] [WC]
Logik, ein Handbuch zu Vorlesungen (1800)
——. Logiké. [Greek] Edited and translated by Haris Tasakos. Athens: Ekdóseis Printa, 2014. [247 p.] [WC]
——. “Kästner’in Makaleleri Üstüne.” [Turkish] Translated by Çağlar Koç. Felsefi Düşün 3 (2014): pages??. [PW]
——. “On Kästner’s Treatises.” [English] Translated by Christian Onof and Dennis Schulting. Kantian Review 19.2 (2014): 305-13. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Translation of a portion (Ak. 20: 410-23) of Kant’s notes for the “Review of Eberhard’s Magazin” (Ak. 20: 381-423) written by his Königsberg colleague and professor of mathematics, Johann Schultz, and published in 1790.
——. Réflexions sur la philosophie morale. [French] Translated by Luc Langlois, in collaboration with Mathieu Robitaille and Émilie Jade-Poliquin; introduction by Luc Langlois. Also includes a translation into French of A. G. Baumgarten, Initia philosophiae practicae primae acroamatice. Paris: J. Vrin, 2014. [419 p.] [WC]
——. Stellenindex und Konkordanz zum ›Naturrecht Feyerabend‹. Teilband 2: Abhandlung des ›Naturrechts Feyerabend‹ (Text und Hauptindex). Edited by Heinrich P. Delfosse, Norbert Hinske and Gianluca Sadun Bordoni. Stuttgart-Bad Canstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 2014. [cxxxv, 174 p.] [WC]
——. Stellenindex und Konkordanz zum ›Naturrecht Feyerabend‹. Teilband 3: Abhandlung des ›Naturrechts Feyerabend‹ (Konkordanz und Sonderindices). Edited by Heinrich P. Delfosse, Norbert Hinske and Gianluca Sadun Bordoni. Stuttgart-Bad Canstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 2014. [viii, 177-618] [WC]
——. 칸트의 형이상학 강의. [Korean; Kant’s metaphysics lectures (translation of Pölitz 1821)] Translated by ??. Place: publisher, 2014. [318 p.] [WC]
[Agostini 2014] Dissertazioni latine. [Italian] Translated by Igor Agostini, introduction and notes by Agostini and Gualtiero Lorini. Milan: Bompiani 2014. [cvi, 556 p.] [WC]
[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Translation from the Latin into Italian of: Meditationum quarundam de igne succincta delineatio, Principiorum primorum cognitionis metaphysicae nova dilucidatio, Metaphysicae cum geometria junctae usus in philosophia naturali, cuius specimen I. continet monadologiam physicam, and De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis.
[Aramayo 2014a] Fundamentación para una metafísica de las costumbres; Crítica de la razón práctica; En torno al tópico: “Eso vale para la teoría pero no sirve de nada en la práctica”; Hacia la paz perpetua; Sobre un presunto derecho de mentir por filantropía. [Spanish] Translated and edited by Roberto Rodríguez Aramayo, Jacobo Muñoz, and Juan Miguel Palacios, with an introduction by Maximiliano Hernández. Madrid: Gredos, 2014. [cv, 363 p.] [WC]
[Aramayo 2014b] Crítica del juicio; Contestación a la pregunta: ¿Qué es la Ilustración?; Idea para una historia universal en clave cosmopolita; Probable inicio de la historia humana; El fin de todas las cosas; El Conflicto de las facultades en tres partes. [Spanish] Translated and edited by Roberto Rodríguez Aramayo, Manuel García Morent, Antonio Lastra, and Javier Alcoriza. Madrid: Gredos, 2014. [494 p.] [WC]
[Serrano Escallón 2014] La deducción trascendental y sus inéditos (1772‒78). [Spanish] Edited and translated by Gonzalo Serrano Escallón. Bogotá: Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 2014. [321 p.] [WC]
[Note] [Hide Note] Note: A translation into Spanish of various texts related to the transcendental deduction, including correspondence with Herz, various reflections (incl. Duisburg), passages from the Critique of Pure Reason, the Prolegomena, the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, and the Volckmann notes from Kant's metaphysics lectures.
Abaci, Uygar. “Kant’s Only Possible Argument and Chignell’s Real Harmony.” Kantian Review 19.1 (2014): 1-25. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Andrew Chignell recently proposed an original reconstruction of Kant’s Only Possible Argument for the existence of God. Chignell claims that what motivates the ‘Grounding Premise’ of Kant’s proof, ‘real possibility must be grounded in actuality’, is the requirement that the predicates of a really possible thing must be ‘really harmonious’, i.e. compatible in an extra-logical or metaphysical sense. I take issue with Chignell’s reconstruction. First, the pre-Critical Kant does not present ‘real harmony’ as a general condition of real possibility. Second, the real harmony requirement is not what motivates the ‘Grounding Premise’ of the proof. Instead, this premise is sufficiently motivated by what Chignell labels the ‘content’ requirement. Finally, Kant’s downgrading of the proof in his Critical period is not based on a concern regarding the real harmony of the predicates of God, but on his Critical restrictions on cognition in general and modal cognition in particular.
——. Rev. of Kant’s Elliptical Path, by Karl Ameriks (2012). The Philosophical Quarterly 64 (2014): 316-18. [PW]
Abadi, Florencia. “From Kant to Romanticism: Towards a Justification of Aesthetic Knowledge in the Young Benjamin.” Critical Horizons 15.1 (2014): 82-94. [ASP]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The specialist literature has investigated extensively the link between Benjamin and German Romanticism and, less frequently, his relation to Kant. However, these contributions tend to take up these links separately, and therefore do not analyse in detail the process which begins with the theoretical sketches on Kant and concludes with the writing of the doctoral thesis on the Frühromantik. This paper argues that there is a marked continuity between the objectives which led Benjamin to plan, in the first place, his doctoral investigation on Kant and those which were finally realized. I try to demonstrate that such continuity consists in a displacement of the problem of the justification of knowledge, from the field of the criticism of knowledge in general to a particular sphere: that of art criticism. In this shift the purpose of linking the justification of knowledge with a messianic philosophy of time and history is also preserved.
Ajei, Martin, and Katrin Flikschuh. “Colonial Mentality: Kant’s Hospitality Right Then and Now.” Kant and Colonialism: Historical and Critical Perspectives. Eds. Katrin Flikschuh and Lea Ypi (op cit.). 221-50. [M]
Akbarian, Reza. See: Asadi, Siavash, and Reza Akbarian.
Allison, Henry E. “Revisiting Judgments of Perception.” Philosophie nach Kant. Neue Wege zum Verständnis von Kants Transzendental- und Moralphilosophie. Ed. Mario Egger (op cit.). 71-86. [M]
Al Tamamy, Saud M. S. Averroes, Kant and the Origins of the Enlightenment: Reason and Revelation in Arab Thought. London: I.B. Tauris, 2014. [280 p.] [WC]
Altman, Matthew C., ed. The Palgrave Handbook of German Idealism. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. [xxiv, 801 p.] [M]
Contents: See especially the essays by
Alix Cohen (Kant’s Anthropology and its Method: The Epistemic Uses of Teleology in the Natural World and Beyond),
Benjamin D. Crowe (Jacobi on Kant, or Moral Naturalism vs. Idealism),
Lara Denis (Moral Goodness and Human Equality in Kant’s Ethical Theory),
Paul Guyer (Kant’s Legacy for German Idealism: Versons of Autonomy),
Steve Naragon (Kant’s Career in German Idealism),
Stephen R. Palmquist (Transcendental Idealism as the Backdrop for Kant’s Theory of Religion),
Timothy Rosenkoetter (Kant’s Three Transcendentals, Explanation, and the Hypothesis of Pure Apperception),
Benjamin Vilhauer (Kant and the Possibility of Transcendental Freedom),
Brian Watkins (Why Should We Cultivate Taste? Answers from Kant’s Early and Late Aeshetic Theory),
Allen Wood (Kant’s Political Philosophy).
——. “Introduction: What is German Idealism?” The Palgrave Handbook of German Idealism. Ed. Matthew C. Altman (op cit.). 1-11. [M]
Alvarez Manninen, Bertha. “A Kantian Defense of Abortion Rights with Respect for Intrauterine Life.” [English] Diametros 39 (2014): 70-92. [PW] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper, I appeal to two aspects of Immanuel Kant’s philosophy – his metaphysics and ethics – in defense of abortion rights. Many Kantian pro-life philosophers argue that Kant’s second principle formulation of the categorical imperative, which proscribes treating persons as mere means, applies to human embryos and fetuses. Kant is clear, however, that he means his imperatives to apply to persons, individuals of a rational nature. It is important to determine, therefore, whether there is anything in Kant’s philosophy that permits regarding embryos and fetuses as persons, since they lack the capacity for sentience (at least until mid-gestation), let alone rational thought. In the first part of the paper, I will illustrate why there are difficulties maintaining, from a Kantian perspective, that conception marks the genesis of a new person. Even granting that embryos and fetuses are persons, however, this alone would not entail the moral impermissibility of abortion rights, mainly because prohibiting abortion, and compelling women to gestate, violates the formula of humanity against them. Developing this thesis encompasses the second part of my essay. Finally, although I argue that Kant’s philosophy lends strong support to abortion rights, this does not thereby entail that it allows for the complete dehumanization of the human fetus. By appealing to the writings of Kantian scholar Allen Wood, I will argue that a fetus’ status as a potential person does render it worthy of some degree of respect and moral value.
Alweiss, Lilian. “Kant’s Not so ‘Logical’ Subject.” The Harvard Review of Philosophy 21 (2014): 87-105. [PW]
Alznauer, Mark. Rev. of Understanding Moral Obligation: Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard, by Robert Stern (2012). Mind 123.492 (2014): 1246-49. [PW]
Ameriks, Karl. “Kant, Miracles, and Religion, Parts One and Two.” Kant’s Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason: A Critical Guide. Ed. Gordon E. Michalson (op cit.). 137-55. [M]
Anderson-Gold, Sharon. “The Political Foundations of Prophetic History.” Politics and Teleology in Kant. Eds. Paul Formosa, Avery Goldman, and Tatiana Patrone (op cit.). 180-93. [M]
Andreicut, Dana. “Kant and Rand on Rationality and Reality.” Philosophy Now 101 (2014): 25-27. [PW]
Ang, Nobel. “Positive Freedom as Exercise of Rational Ability: A Kantian Defense of Positive Liberty.” Journal of Value Inquiry 48.1 (2014): 1-16. [PW]
Aportone, Anselmo. Kant et le pouvoir réceptif recherches sur la conception kantienne de la sensibilité. Translated from the Italian by E. Alfano and P. Quintilli. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014. [260 p.] [WC]
Aramayo, Roberto R. “Crises and Revolutions: Philosophical approaches to their interdependence in the classic work of Rousseau, Kant, Tocqueville, Cassirer and Arendt.” ethic@ 13.2 (2014): 303-14. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: It is the sole topic of conversation throughout Europe. An economic crisis with an underlying crisis of values is devastating everything, while politics has nothing to say. An attempt was made to base the European Unión on a single currency, and the resulting traders’ Europe prevented the desired political project from bearing fruit. Instead of comparing different legal systems before creating a constitution for citizens, we have seen the birth of a new “idolatry” that is connected with a perverse fatalism. Only macroeconomic figures are considered to be important, while citizens have to suffer because of the actions of a few unscrupulous people who worship profit as well as having legalised usury. Given this situation it is necessary to take all types of precaution, and that is why it is a good idea to see what classical authors have to say. The Enlightenment seems to be a failed project that urgently needs to be restarted. It may be enormously useful to re-read Rousseau, as Cassirer did during the rise of Nazism so that it could be fought on the basis of the history of ideas. His discourse on inequality could not be more relevant now. And the same consideration applies to the genealogical study of the French revolution by Tocqueville. That was the revolution par excellence which Kant described as a symbol of the moral progress of mankind.
——. “La recherche du bonheur et le rôle de l’espérance chez Kant, en dialogue avec Spinoza et Rousseau.” Revista Filosófica de Coimbra 23.46 (2014): 429-48. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant’s theory of the Highest Good causes great perplexity among the readers of his Critique of Practical Reason, and, in order to better understand it, it should be interpreted within the Kantian philosophy of history. According to Kant, our teleological structure is unable to give up hope, and we can speak about an elpidological imperative that complements ethical formalism without being detrimental to it. This is its possible formulation: “Act as if everything depended on your acting (or letting act), while at the same time trusting that another power, more capable than you (the nature, the providence or the destiny), will consequently manage your well-intentioned efforts and will culminate your moral aims.” If it is true that Kant’s real moral hero would be the atheist Spinoza (following the paragraph 87 of the Critique of Judgement) who acts exclusively for moral motivations and should thus renounce the Highest Good, it is also true that the influence of Rousseau’s Savoyard Vicar plays a decisive role in the intersection built by the second and the third of the famous Kantian questions. In short, the imperative of hope allows for a less contra- dictory reading of one major question of Kantian thought: the Highest Good.
Arias Albisu, Martín. “On Two Different Lines of Argumentation in Kant’s Theory of Schematism of Empirical and Mathematical Concepts.” Kant Studies Online (2014): 1-42; posted January 15, 2014. [M] [online]
——. “Los esquemas de los conceptos empíricos y matemáticos como procedimientos de síntesis gobernados por reglas conceptuales.” [Spanish; The schemata of empirical and mathematical concepts as procedures of synthesis governed by conceptual rules] Studia Kantiana 12.17 (2014): 74-103. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The aim of this paper is to offer an interpretation of the doctrine of schematism of empirical and mathematical concepts presented by Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason. We show that the schemata of empirical and mathematical concepts are procedures of synthesis governed by conceptual rules. Although we do not consider that this Kantian doctrine is unproblematic, our paper shows that: 1) those schemata can be thoroughly distinguished from their corresponding concepts; 2) those schemata are not superfluous entities. These conclusions are reached by showing that the content of a concept (that is, a set of discursive marks) determines the unity of sensible elements that must be effectuated by a schema as a procedure of synthesis.
Armstrong, Chloe. See: Lapointe, Sandra, and Chloe Armstrong.
Arrese Igor, Héctor Oscar. “La pureza de la voluntad en la filosofía moral de Hermann Cohén.” [Spanish] Temas kantianos. Ed. Mario Caimi (op cit.). 355-72. [WC]
Artis, Aderemi. Rev. of Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy, edited by Stephen R. Palmquist (2010). Journal of Chinese Philosophy 41.3-4 (2014): 530-34. [PW]
Asadi, Siavash, and Reza Akbarian. “Kant and Tabatabaei on Thing in Itself and Phenomena.” [Farsi] Falsafe va Kalam-e Eslami [Philosophy and Kalam] 46.2 (2014): 1-19. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper intends to find an answer to the problematic description of the "thing in itself", "phenomena" and the relation between the two in Kant and Allameh Tabatabaei's philosophy and to consider how Allameh can solve the existing challenges in Kant's philosophy. This research shows that since Kant accepts some necessary relation between "intelligible essences" and phenomena, he considers the existence of intelligible essences as a certain fact. In spite of accepting the intelligible essences, he believes noumena remain always unknown, because they cannot be known by experience. On the other hand, Allameh argues that the appearances in mind (quiddity) are representations of the reality of the things (existence). Therefore, he makes a meaningful relation between 'the thing in itself' and the phenomena; similarly, the related challenges in Kant's philosophy can be answered through Allameh's philosophy.
Assumpção, Gabriel Almeida. “A sensibilização das ideias estéticas: o belo como símbolo do bem moral.” [Portuguese; Sensitization of aesthetic ideas: beauty as a symbol of the moral good] Studia Kantiana 12.17 (2014): 144-60. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: We will examine how the discussion on beauty as a symbol of the moral good arises within the Critique of Judgment, more specifically on the Dialectic of aesthetic judgment. We intend to draw a parallel between the antinomy of taste, as well as its resolution, and the practical antinomy, as presented on the Critique of Practical Reason. We intend to show how both of them make use of the distinction between phenomena and things in themselves as a source of its resolution. Afterwards, we intend to discuss how Kant presents the necessity of sensitization of aesthetic ideas, and how symbolization permits such deed. Besides, we shall connect such steps of Kant’s argumentation to his defense of the idealism of finality.
Bagnoli, Carla. “Starting Points: Kantian Constructivism Reassessed.” Ratio Juris 27.3 (2014): 311-29. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: G. A. Cohen and J. Raz object that Constructivism is incoherent because it crucially deploys unconstructed elements in the structure of justification. This paper offers a response on behalf of constructivism, by reassessing the role of such unconstructed elements. First, it argues that a shared conception of rational agency works as a starting point for the justification, but it does not play a foundational role. Second, it accounts for the unconstructed norms that constrains the activity of construction as constitutive norms. Finally, on this basis, it draws a contrast between constructivist and foundational methods of ethics, such as deontology and teleology.
Baiasu, Sorin. “Kant’s Justification of Welfare.” [English] Diametros 39 (2014): 1-28. [PW] [online]
Abstract: For several decades, theorists interested in Kant’s discussion of welfare have puzzled over Kant’s position on the issue of the redistribution of goods in society. They have done this both in order to clarify his position and as a source of inspiration for current conceptual problems faced by contemporary political philosophers who attempt to reconcile the ideal of equal freedom with the asymmetric interference necessary for redistribution and social provision.
In this paper, I start with Kant’s brief discussion of welfare in Rechtslehre and I identify four claims that Kant clearly asserts as characteristic for his view. I then outline five main interpretative directions in the literature, I evaluate and rank them. The most accurate view of Kant’s justification of welfare, which I call the “genuinely Kantian” position is, however, unable to explain the nature of the duty of welfare that it asserts. By going back to Kant’s text, I suggest one solution. This solution, together with some further questions, can be seen as initiating a new interpretative direction in the literature.
Bardout, Jean-Christophe. “Kant et la tradition française du sens intime.” De la sensibilité: les esthétiques de Kant. Eds. François Calori, Michaël Foessel, and Dominique Pradelle (op cit.). 93-109. [M]
Baron, Marcia. “Kantian Moral Maturity and the Cultivation of Character.” Kant on Emotion and Value. Ed. Alix Cohen (op cit.). 69-87. [PW]
Barrasús, Juan Carlos. Rev. of Temas Kantianos, edited by Mario Caimi (2014). Con-Textos Kantianos 2014.1 (2014): 158-61. [M] [online]
Bass, Alan. “The Signature of the Transcendental Imagination.” The Undecidable Unconscious: A Journal of Deconstruction and Psychoanalysis 1 (2014): 31-51. [MUSE]
Baum, Manfred. “Sittengesetz und Freiheit. Kant 1785 und 1788.” Kants Rechtfertigung des Sittengesetzes in Grundlegung III. Ed. Heiko Puls (op cit.). 209-26. [PW]
——. “Kant über die Empfänglichkeit des Gemüts für Pflichtbegriffe überhaupt.” Affektivität und Ethik bei Kant und in der Phänomenologie. Ed. Inga Römer (op cit.). 101-16. [M]
Baumann, Lutz. “Joachim Kopper (1925-2013).” Kant-Studien 105.1 (2014): 1-4. [M]
Beade, Ileana P. “La Posición Kantiana en el Debate Acerca del Alcance y los Límites de la Ilustración del Pueblo.” [Spanish; Kant’s Position in the Debate on the Scope and Limits of the Enlightenment of the People] Estudos Kantianos 2.1 (2014): 79-105. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper we consider the position adopted by Kant in the debate on the scope and limits of the Enlightenment of the people, through a comparative study of the different positions defended by important authors of the German and the French Enlightenment. Our main purpose is to show that certain aspects of Kant’s philosophy that could be interpreted, at first glance, as conservative, can be interpreted in a different way as long as we consider them in contrast with the position assumed by other authors. The moderate and cautious attitude reflected in Kant’s distinction between the public and the private use of reason is shared by many other thinkers of the period.
——. “La impugnación del derecho de resistencia en el marco de la filosofía kantiana del derecho.” [Spanish] Temas kantianos. Ed. Mario Caimi (op cit.). 259-94. [WC]
——. “Acerca del Carácter Regulativo de las "Ideas de la Razón" en el Marco de la Doctrina Jurídico-Política Kantiana.” [Portuguese] Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 70.2-3 (2014): 473-91. [PW]
——. Rev. of Immanuel Kant, ¿Qué es la Ilustración? Y otros escritos de ética, política y filosofía de la historia, edited and translated by Roberto R. Aramayo (2013). Con-Textos Kantianos 2014.1 (2014): 141-45. [M] [online]
——. Rev. of Immanuel Kant, Crítica de la razón práctica, 2nd ed., edited and translated into Spanish by Roberto R. Aramayo (2013). Con-Textos Kantianos 2014.1 (2014): 150-52. [M] [online]
——. Rev. of Suplemento Kant: la filosofía práctica. De la política a la moral, publicado en Ideas y valores, edited by Catalina González and Lisímaco Parra (2013). Studia Kantiana 12.16 (2014): 160-65. [M]
Beiser, Frederick C. The Genesis of Neo-Kantianism, 1796-1880. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. [xiv, 610 p.] [WC]
Belás, Ľubomír. “Kant a problém nového zaciatku dejín.” [Slovak; Kant and the Problem of the New Beginning of History] Studia Philosophica Kantiana 2014.2 (2014): 49-56. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The paper focuses on the issue of the beginning of history which is primarily a topic from philosophy of history as a systematic philosophical discipline. Within this framework, the author examines socio-political consequences of ground- breaking changes from 1989 which are designated as the end of history or a new beginning of history and which are in his view of triumphantly ideological nature.
Berciano, Modesto. Rev. of Las armonías de la razón en Kant. Libertad, Sentimiento de lo bello y Teleología de la naturaleza, by Ana María Andaluz Romanillos (2013). Studia Kantiana 12.16 (2014): 166-76. [M]
Berg, Hein van den. Kant on Proper Science: Biology in the Critical Philosophy and the Opus Postumum. Dordrecht: Springer Verlag, 2014. [xii, 283 p.] [WC]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This book provides a novel treatment of Immanuel Kant’s views on proper natural science and biology. The status of biology in Kant’s system of science is often taken to be problematic. By analyzing Kant’s philosophy of biology in relation to his conception of proper science, the present book determines Kant’s views on the scientific status of biology. Combining a broad ideengeschichtlich approach with a detailed historical reconstruction of philosophical and scientific texts, the book establishes important interconnections between Kant’s philosophy of science, his views on biology, and his reception of late 18th century biological theories. It discusses Kant’s views on science and biology as articulated in his published writings and in the Opus postumum. The book shows that although biology is a non-mathematical science and the relation between biology and other natural sciences is not specified, Kant did allow for the possibility of providing scientific explanations in biology and assigned biology a specific domain of investigation.
——. “On Jennifer Mensch’s Kant’s Organicism.” Critique (blog posted: 4 Feb 2014) n.p. [PW] [online]
Berg, Jan. Die theoretische Philosophie Kants: Unter Berücksichtigung der Grundbegriffe seiner Ethik.. Stuttgart: Frommann-holzboog, 2014. [264 p.] [WC]
Berman, Robert. “Reason, Idealism, and the Category: Kantian Language in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit.” The Linguistic Dimension of Kant’s Thought. Eds. Frank Schalow and Richard L. Velkley (op cit.). 205-36. [M]
Bernasconi, Robert. “Kant and the Distinction between Nature and Culture: Its Role in Recent Defenses of His Cosmopolitanism.” Eco-ethica 3 (2014): 23-38. [PW]
——. “Silencing the Hottentots: Kolb’s Pre-Racial Encounter with the Hottentots And Its Impact on Buffon, Kant, and Rousseau.” Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 35.1-2 (2014): 101-24. [PW]
Bernstein, Alyssa R. “The Rights of States, the Rule of Law, and Coercion: Reflections on Pauline Kleingeld’s Kant and Cosmopolitanism.” Kantian Review 19.2 (2014): 233-49. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Pauline Kleingeld argues that according to Kant it would be wrong to coerce a state into an international federation, due to the wrongness of paternalism. Although I agree that Kant opposes the waging of war as a means to peace, I disagree with Kleingeld's account of the reasons why he would oppose coercing a state into a federation. Since she does not address the broader question of the permissibility of interstate coercion, she does not properly address the narrower question of whether coercion to compel a state to join a federation can be permissible. I revise and supplement her arguments.
Bilgiç, Meriç. “Kant ve Hegel Diyalektiklerinde Rol Değişimi.” [Turkish; Role Reversal of Kant and Hegel in Dialectic] FLSF: Journal of Philosophy and Social Science 17 (2014): 231-44. [PW] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article supports just the opposite of the idea that Plato and Hegel defends dialectic as a scientific method, and Aristotle and Kant refuse it; and gives an account of a comparison between Kant-Hegel in a parallel with Marx, Russell, Kojéve, Adorno and Desmond. The basic idea of the paper is that there can be a room for dialectic in some decision processes when dialectic is refused as a scientific method. In this context, Aristotle is a dialectician since he doesn’t include Proairesis in the list of Dianoethikes aretes, and Kant is a dialectician too since the relations of his three faculties are vogue and paradoxical.
Billier, Jean-Cassien. “L’agent moral kantien est-il insensible?” De la sensibilité: les esthétiques de Kant. Eds. François Calori, Michaël Foessel, and Dominique Pradelle (op cit.). 353-59. [M]
Bird, Graham. Rev. of Late German Idealism: Trendelenburg and Lotze, by Frederick C. Beiser (2013). Kantian Review 19.3 (2014): 500-4. [M]
——. Rev. of Kant’s Construction of Nature: A Reading of the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, by Michael Friedman (2013). Philosophical Investations 37.2 (2014): 173-78. [PW]
Biscuso, Massimilano, and Hansmichael Hohenegger. “Rolf Hohenemser e la Prima introduzione alla Critica del Giudizio.” [Italian; Rolf Hohenemser and the first introduction to the Critique of Judgment] il cannocchiale 39.1 (2014): 83-103. [PW]
Blomme, Henny. “L’être de l’ombre.” Philosophie nach Kant. Neue Wege zum Verständnis von Kants Transzendental- und Moralphilosophie. Ed. Mario Egger (op cit.). 107-26. [M]
Blöser, Claudia. Zurechnung bei Kant: Zum Zusammenhang von Person und Handlung in Kants praktischer Philosophie. Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2014. [xii, 326 p.] [WC]
Boboc, Alexandru. “‘Lucrul în sine’ kantian. Sensuri şi interpretări.” [Romanian; The Kantian „Thing in Itself”. Meanings and Interpretations] Studii de istoria filosofiei universale 22 (2014): 88-112. [RC]
Boehm, Omri. Kant’s Critique of Spinoza. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. [xxxiv, 252 p.] [WC] [review]
Bojanowski, Jochen. “New Essays on Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason.” Studi Kantiani 27 (2014): 139-58. [PW]
——. “Kants Disjunktivismus in GMS 446f.” Kants Rechtfertigung des Sittengesetzes in Grundlegung III. Ed. Heiko Puls (op cit.). 189-208. [PW]
——. “Rationales Wollen: über das Verhältnis von Kategorischem Imperativ und Goldener Regel.” Philosophie nach Kant. Neue Wege zum Verständnis von Kants Transzendental- und Moralphilosophie. Ed. Mario Egger (op cit.). 211-21. [M]
Boland, Tom. “Critique is a Thing of the World: Towards a Genealogy of Critique.” History of the Human Sciences 27.1 (2014): 108-23. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Although Foucault was clearly a critical thinker, his approach also provides for the possibility of a genealogy of critique. Such an approach problematizes critique, and I trace the emergent problematization of critique in Foucault’s later works, and briefly in Latour and Boltanski. From this I move on to the ‘critical problematic’, that is, how critique operates as a form of power/knowledge, as a discourse that creates subjects through a critical regime of truth and critical truth-games. Specifically, I argue that critique is a discourse which transforms and unmasks other ‘truth-claims’, replacing them with a starker vision of reality, which in the end is also a specific cultural vision. To elaborate this view, I return to Foucault’s discussion of Kant, his late lectures on Cynicism and also on ordo-liberalism. The wider circulation of critical discourses is demonstrated through an analysis of ‘cool’ or critical consumerism. In conclusion, the relationship between critique, crisis and modernity is considered.
Borges, Maria. “Para todo mal, a cura.” [Spanish; "For every evil, the healing"] Con-Textos Kantianos 2014.1 (2014): 10-22. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper, I present Kant`s theory of evil. I show three degrees of the propensity to evil (frailty, impurity and perversity) and relate them to affects and passions. I argue that Kant offers many ways to heal evil. I show that the texts Doctrine of Virtue, the Anthropology, the Idea and the Religion within the boundaries of mere reason show different ways to overcome evil in society. I also argue that virtue is impotent by itself to overcome the propensity to evil, and that Kant suggests other forms to heal malignity. One of these forms is the construction of an ethical community that I will compare with a juridical-civil society.
Boss, Marc. Au commencement la liberté: La religion de Kant réinventée par Fichte, Schelling et Tillich. Geneva: Labor et fides, 2014. [573 p.] [WC]
Bouterwek, Friedrich. “Kant’s Metaphysical Foundations of the Doctrine of Right.” Translated into English by Kenneth R. Westphal. Kant Studies Online (2014): 240-61; posted October 1, 2014. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Includes a brief introduction by Westphal, his translation of Bouterwek's two reviews — "Rezension von Kants Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre" (18 Feb 1797; Göttingische Anzeigen von gelehrten Sachen, 28: 265-76) and "Rezension von Kants Erläuternde Anmerkungen zu den Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre" (29 July 1799; Göttingische Anzeigen von gelehrten Sachen, Nr. 120: 1197-1200) — and a glossary and bibliographies.
Brandt, Reinhard. “Immanuel Kant: Anverwandlung und Zeitenwende.” Geschichte/History. Eds. Jürgen Stolzenberg and Fred Rush (op cit.). 18-36. [PW]
——. “Die vielfältige Verwendung der 1, 2, 3/4-Konstellation in Kants Philosophie.” Die Macht des Vierten. Über eine Ordnung der europäischen Kultur. Ed. Reinhard Brandt (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 2014). 169-221. [WC]
——. “Immanuel Kant: Anverwandlung und Zeitenwende.” Internationales Jahrbuch des Deutschen Idealismus/International Yearbook of German Idealism: Geschichte/History, eds. Jürgen Stolzenberg and Fred Rush. 10 (2014): 18-36. [PW]
Breitenbach, Angela. “Biological Purposiveness and Analogical Reflection.” Kant’s Theory of Biology. Eds. Ina Goy and Eric Watkins (op cit.). 131-47. [M]
——. “On Jennifer Mensch’s Kant’s Organicism.” Critique (blog posted: 31 Mar 2014) n.p. [PW] [online]
Brewer, Kimberly, and Andrew Chignell. Rev. of Kant’s Anatomy of Evil, edited by Sharon Anderson-Gold and Pablo Muchnik (2010). British Journal for the History of Philosophy 22.2 (2014): 393-97. [PW]
Broggi, Joshua D. Rev. of Kant and the Creation of Freedom: A Theological Problem, by Christopher Insole (2013). Journal of the American Academy of Religion 82.4 (2014): 1183-86. [PI]
Brook, Andrew. “Kant and Cognitive Science.” Estudos Kantianos 2.2 (2014): 61-77. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper I argue that while the dominant model of the mind in cognitive science is deeply Kantian, some of Kant’s most arresting ideas have not been assimilated into the contemporary picture. The Kantian elements in the contemporary picture are mainly these three: Representation requires both percepts and concepts, the study of cognition is based on inference to the best explanation (Kant called it transcendental argument), and the mind is a complex system of functions – minds are (part of) what brains do. Three other important ideas of Kant’s have played little role: that unified consciousness is essential to our kind of cognition (beginning to change), that such unity is the result of concept-using synthesizing activities of the cognitive system, and that the knowledge that such a system has of itself has some highly specific and unusual features.
Brown, Alexander. “Marx on Exploitation: A Kantian Perspective.” Rethinking Marxism 26.3 (2014): 360-81. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Despite exhaustive discussion among scholars of Karl Marx, there remains significant disagreement regarding the best conception of capitalist exploitation. This article tries to move the debate forward by drawing on the ethical theory of Immanuel Kant. The aim is to give moralizing Marxists a foundation in Kantian ethics for the injustice of capitalist exploitation that they already instinctively believe in. As well as using the formula of the end in itself to develop a Kantian articulation of capitalist exploitation (which is in turn compared and contrasted with the three leading conceptions of capitalist exploitation found in Marx scholarship), the article also develops the idea of an antihierarchy philanthropist-capitalist—someone who is not yet motivated to move beyond basic capitalist institutions but who is nevertheless willing to listen to (and forgo some gains that do not benefit) his workers.
Brown, Garrett Wallace. “The European Union and Kant’s idea of cosmopolitan right: Why the EU is not cosmopolitan.” European Journal of International Relations 20.3 (2014): 671-93. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: When surveying the literature on cosmopolitan thought, it is common to see cosmopolitans allude to theoretical, historical and practical links between Immanuel Kant’s idea for a cosmopolitan federation and the formulation of the European Union. However, this relationship between Kant and “Kant’s Europe” remains a rather underdeveloped assumption and there is compelling exegetical and practical evidence to suggest that this relationship is not as robust as is generally assumed. In response, this article explores the link between Kant’s vision for a cosmopolitan federation and its consanguinity with the formation and practice of the European Union. By doing so, it will be argued that a link between Kant and the European Union can only be reasonably claimed to exist at the level of Kant’s first two Definitive Articles and that the European Union remains rather impoverished with regard to Kant’s more radical concept of cosmopolitan right.
Bruno, G. Anthony. “A Peculiar Fate: The Unity of Human Life in Kant and Heidegger.” Canadian Philosophical Review 53.4 (2014): 715-35. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: It is commonly held that nature is knowable in itself and that death has no explanatory priority in knowing nature. I reject both claims as they undermine an account of the unity of human life, failing, respectively, to thematize the limitations of finite understanding and to acknowledge what’s most certain about finite existence. I use Kant’s idea of the thing in itself and Heidegger’s idea of death to solve two structurally analogous antinomies these failures leave intact. I conclude that to think these ideas is to represent the telos that unifies our living as, respectively, finite knowers and finite beings.
——. Rev. of Kant’s Critique of Spinoza, by Omri Boehm (2014). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (Nov 2014, #11). [M] [online]
Bunch, Aaron. “Throwing Oneself Away: Kant on the Forfeiture of Respect.” Kantian Review 19.1 (2014): 71-91. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Surprisingly often Kant asserts that it is possible to behave in such a degrading way that one ‘throws oneself away’ and turns oneself ‘into a thing’, as a result of which others may treat one ‘as they please’. Rather than dismiss these claims out of hand, I argue that they force us to reconsider what is meant and required by ‘respect for humanity’. I argue that to ‘throw away’ humanity is not to lose or extinguish it, but rather to refuse or otherwise fail to claim the respect that it authorizes one to claim. If I refuse or fail to make this claim, there is a sense in which I become a thing, and I leave others no choice but to treat me as such. This is compatible with their respect for humanity in my person.
Bunke, Simon, Katerina Mihaylova, and Daniela Ringkamp, eds. Das Band der Gesellschaft: Verbindlichkeitsdiskurse im 18. Jahrhundert. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2014. [330 p.] [WC]
Note: See the following essays –
Stephan Zimmermann (Praktische Kontingenz: Kant über Verbindlichkeit aus reiner praktischer Vernunft),
Günter Zöller (‘hne Hofnung und Furcht’: Kants Naturrecht Feyerabend über den Grund der Verbindlichkeit zu einer Handlung),
Bernhard Jakl (Die Verbindlichkeit des Rechts: Kantische Überlegungen zum Verhältnis von privater und staatlicher Normenbegründung),
Daniela Ringkamp (Erlaubnis, Erlaubnisgesetz und Verbindlichkeit in Kants Praktischer Philosophie),
Michael Städtler (Warum ist ‘[d]er Ursprung der obersten Gewalt [...] für das Volk, das unter derselben steht, in praktischer Absicht unerforschlich’? Über systematische Gründe politisch-juridischer Verbindlichkeit bei Kant).
Burbulla, Julia. Kunstgeschichte nach dem 'spatial turn'. Eine Wiederentdeckung mit Kant, Panofsky und Dorner. Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, 2014. [300 p.] [WC]
Burns, Lawrence. Rev. of The Concept of World from Kant to Derrida, by Sean Gaston (2013). Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review 53.4 (2014): 764-65. [PW]
Bus, Ioan. Expuneri, deductii si dovezi ale Criticii ratiunii pure. [Romanian] Timisoara: Editura Universitatii de Vest, 2014. [223 p.] [WC]
Busse, Ralf. “Transcendental Apperception: Consciousness or Self-Consciousness? Comments on Chapter 9 of Patricia Kitcher's Kant’s Thinker.” Kantian Review 19.1 (2014): 109-17. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: A core thesis of Kitcher’s is that thinking about objects requires awareness of necessary connections between one’s object-directed representations ‘as such’ and that this is what Kant means by the transcendental unity of apperception. I argue that Kant’s main point is the spontaneity or ‘self-made-ness’ of combination rather than the requirement of reflexive awareness of combination, that Kitcher provides no plausible account of how recognition of representations ‘as such’ should be constituted and that in fact Kant himself appears to lack the theoretical resources to clearly distinguish between (first-level) consciousness and self-consciousness or apperception properly so-called.
Büttner Andrea. Kants Kritik der Urteilskraft: Ein Künstlerbuch. Hamburg: Meiner, 2014. [600 p.] [WC]
Caimi, Mario. Kant’s B Deduction. Translated from the Spanish by Maria del Carmen Caimi. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, (2014): [xiv, 140 p.] [WC]
——. “Se piensa. Sobre una función del yo en la deducción transcendental.” [Spanish] Temas kantianos. Ed. Mario Caimi (op cit.). 95-111. [WC]
——, ed. Temas kantianos. [Spanish] Buenos Aires: Prometeo Libros, 2014. [424 p.] [WC] [review (Spanish)]
Lorenzo Langbehn (La concepción kantiana del método matemático en su escrito Sobre la nitidez de los principios de la teología natural y la moral),
Laura Pelegrín (Intuición y afección en el §1 de la Estética Transcendental. La función metodológica de la distinción entre una intuición originaria y una derivada),
Fernando Moledo (Breve exposición argumental de la Deducción metafísica de las categorías),
Claudia Jáuregui (Regularidades empíricas y condiciones de posibilidad de la experiencia),
Mario Caimi (Se piensa. Sobre una función del yo en la deducción transcendental),
Natalia A. Lerussi (Acerca de la analogía de la razón con lo orgánico. Reflexiones en torno a la expresión ‘epigénesisdela razón pura’ en Kritik der reinen Vernunft B §27),
Luciana Martínez (Algunas consideraciones acerca de la noción de substancia en la sección ‘De los paralogismos de la razón pura’ de la Crítica de la razón pura),
Miguel Alejandro Herszenbaun (￼La tercera antinomia y la cosmología racional, o ¿cómo reformular el problema de la tercera antinomia en términos idealista-trascendentales?),
Silvia del Luján Di Sanza (La presuposición transcendental de un entendimiento intuitivo: ‘el punto más interesante del sistema kantiano’)
Matías Otoño (Cuerpo, mente y espíritu en el enfoque crítico acerca de lo sublime),
Macarena Marey (La perspectiva de la voluntad omnilateral: la reformulación kantiana de la tradición contractualista),
Ileana P. Beade (La impugnación del derecho de resistencia en el marco de la filosofía kantiana del derecho),
Fiorella Tomassini (Adquisición originaria y voluntad omnilateral: un comentario de los §§10-17 dé la Doctrina del derecho),
Marcos Thisted (La paradójica función de Kant en la recepción del neoplatonismo a finales del S. XVIII),
Sandra V. Palermo (La categoría kantiana de ‘realidad’. Hermann Cohén y Luigi Scaravelli: dos lecturas de las ‘Antizipationen der Wahrnehmung’),
Héctor Oscar Arrese Igor (La pureza de la voluntad en la filosofía moral de Hermann Cohén),
Hernán Pringe (La filosofía trascendental y la interpretación de Bohr de la teoría cuántica),
Daniel Leserre (Kant y la filosofía del lenguaje: una indicación).
——. “Aeternitas, necessitas phaenomenon: das Schema der Kategorie von Notwendigkeit-Zufälligkeit.” Philosophie nach Kant. Neue Wege zum Verständnis von Kants Transzendental- und Moralphilosophie. Ed. Mario Egger (op cit.). 87-105. [M]
Callanan, John J. “Kant on the Acquisition of Geometrical Concepts.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44.5-6 (2014): 580-604. [M]
——. “Mendelssohn and Kant on Mathematics and Metaphysics.” Kant Yearbook: Kant and Rationalism 6 (2014): 1-22. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The difference between the method of metaphysics and the method of mathematics was an issue of central concern for Kant in both the Pre-Critical and Critical periods. I will argue that when Kant speaks of the ‘philosophical method’ in the Doctrine of Method in the Critique of Pure Reason (CPR), he frequently has in mind not his own methodology but rather the method of conceptual analysis associated with rationalism. The particular target is Moses Mendelssohn’s picture of analysis contained in his submission for the 1763 Prize Essay competition. By the time of the first Critique, I argue, Kant wants to maintain his own longstanding commitment to the distinctness of the methods of metaphysics and mathematics. However, Kant wants to use this same analysis of the source of the distinction to diagnose the origins of the dogmatism that is engendered by the method of the rationalists.
——. “The Role of the Holy Will.” Hegel Bulletin 35.2 (2014): 163-84. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: It is well known that Kant uses the notion of the holy will in the Groundwork so as to contrast it with the finite wills of human beings. It is less clear, however, what function this contrast is supposed to perform. I argue that one role of the holy will is to illustrate transcendental idealism’s account of the relation between moral knowledge and moral practice. The position is one intended to negotiate between ostensibly competing traditions. Kant uses the holy will as a way of endorsing the metaphysical picture of the scholastic tradition’s so-called ‘ethics of freedom’, whereby the ideal of moral perfection is conceived as the perfection of one’s power of freedom to the point where one is constitutively incapable of immoral action. This position is married however with the claim that the holy will’s inaccessibility to human cognition motivates a subject-oriented moral epistemology more usually associated with Enlightenment humanism. I conclude by claiming that the nuanced role for the holy will can be understood as part of Kant’s expansion of the value of religious faith [Glaube] to the domain of practical inquiry in general.
——. Rev. of Kant’s Observations and Remarks: A Critical Guide, edited by Susan Meld Shell and Richard Velkley (2012). Journal of the History of Philosophy 52.2 (2014): 380-82. [M]
Calori, François. “Qu’est-ce que s’orienter dans l’affectivité? (Unité et pluralité des sentiments chez Kant)” De la sensibilité: les esthétiques de Kant. Eds. François Calori, Michaël Foessel, and Dominique Pradelle (op cit.). 209-28. [M]
——, Michaël Foessel, and Dominique Pradelle. “Avant-propos.” De la sensibilité: les esthétiques de Kant. Eds. François Calori, Michaël Foessel, and Dominique Pradelle (op cit.). 7-19. [M]
——, Michaël Foessel, and Dominique Pradelle, eds. De la sensibilité: les esthétiques de Kant. Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2014. [380 p.] [M]
François Calori, Michaël Foessel, and Dominique Pradelle (Avant-propos),
Sylvain Roux (Platonisme ou aristotélisme? Matière et forme dans l’Esthétique transcendantale),
Michel Fichant (Leibniz a-t-il «intellectualisé les phénomènes»? Éléments pour l’histoire d’une méprise),
Antoine Grandjean (La constitution esthétique de l’intériorité: Kant, Locke et l’invention du sens interne),
Jean-Christophe Bardout (Kant et la tradition française du sens intime),
Daniel Dumouchel (De l’émotion thérapeutique au sentiment de l’esprit. L’explication du sublime entre philosophie transcendantale et anthropologie),
Danielle Lories (Sens commun, de la tradition anglo-saxonne à Kant),
Arnaud Pelletier (Sensualitas et Sinnlichkeit: la constitution de la sensibilité de la Dissertation de 1770 à la Critique de la raison pure),
Birgit Recki (Le bonheur chez Kant),
Michaël Foessel (Le respect: un sentiment esthétique?),
Michèle Cohen-Halimi (Une archéologie kantienne de l’égoïsme),
François Calori (Qu’est-ce que s’orienter dans l’affectivité?),
Hedwig Marzolf (Esthétique et religion: la question schillérienne de la grâce),
Hannah Ginsborg (Le plaisir du jugement: Kant et la possibilité du goût),
Arnaud Dewalque (La richesse du sensible: Stumpf contre les néokantiens),
Dominique Pradelle (Sur le sens de l’idéalisme transcendantal: Husserl critique de Kant),
Samuel Le Quitte (Sensibilité et moralité: la lecture husserlienne de Kant),
Jérôme Porée (Temps et raison. Les limites de l’interprétation heideggérienne de la deuxième Critique),
Jean-Claude Gens (Le prolongement gadamérien de l’esthétique kantienne),
Jean-Cassien Billier (L’agent moral kantien est-il insensible?).
Capozzi, Mirella. “Kant, Soemmerring and the Importance of the Sense of Hearing.” Lexicon Philosophicum 2 (2014): 25-40. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The following essay takes its cue from the importance that Soemmerring attributes to the sense of hearing in the Über das Organ der Seele (1796), a text published with a comment by Kant. First, I point out that the idea of a primacy of the sense of hearing is shared by Soemmerring with Heinse, a famous writer of the time (and by Heinse with Herder). Second, I compare these ideas with Kant’s growing interest for the close connection between the sense of hearing, language and thought, giving due attention to his theses on deafness. Finally, I propose the hypothesis that not a late and tacit agreement with Herder, but Soemmerring’s statement that hearing is the most important of our senses, might be the reason for the strengthening of Kant’s conviction that “thinking is speaking and the latter is hearing”, testified by the Opus Postumum.
——. Scritti su Kant. Raccolta di seminari e conferenze di Mirella Capozzi. Edited by Hansmichael Hohenegger. Morrisville: Lulu Press, 2014. [266 p.] [PW]
Caranti, Luigi. “The Guarantee of Perpetual Peace: Three Concerns.” Politics and Teleology in Kant. Eds. Paul Formosa, Avery Goldman, and Tatiana Patrone (op cit.). 145-62. [M]
Carson, Emily, and Lisa Shabel. “Introduction.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44.5-6 (2014): 519-23. [M]
Carus, Clara. Die Frage nach dem Verhältnis von Natur und Vernunft in der menschlichen Freiheit in Kants "Die Religion innerhalb den Grenzen der blossen Vernunft", Schellings "Uber das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit" und Heideggers Interpretation derselben Schrift. Eschborn: Fördergemeinschaft wissenschaftlicher Publikationen von Frauen, 2014. [76 p.] [WC]
Casas Klausen, Jimmy. “Jeremy Waldron’s Partial Kant: Indigenous Proximity, Colonial Injustice, Cultural Particularism.” Polity 46.1 (2014): 31-55. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Over the past two decades, liberal political theorist Jeremy Waldron has frequently cited Kant's Metaphysics of Morals in order to claim that unavoidable proximity normatively demands that persons from different cultural backgrounds abide by and actively participate in a common legal framework. For Waldron, cosmopolitanism requires engaging with others instead of pressing for any degree of political separatism. He applies his interpretation of Kant to relations between Māori and Anglo New Zealanders. This essay takes a more comprehensive view of Kant's writings on international and cosmopolitan right. It argues that Waldron misleadingly presents Kant as opposed to cultural particularism, and offers an alternative Kantian interpretation of Māori resistance to unitary sovereignty, one based on distant mutual respect between communities.
Cassin, Barbara. Sophistical Practice: Toward a Consistent Relativism. New York: Fordham University Press, 2014. [viii, 370 p.] [JSTOR]
Castro, Susan V. H. “The Morality of Unequal Autonomy: Reviving Kant's Concept of Status for Stakeholders.” Journal of Business Ethics 121.4 (2014): 593-606. [JSTOR]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Though we cherish freedom and equality, there are human relations we commonly take to be morally permissible despite the fact that they essentially involve an inequality specifically of freedom, i.e., parental and fiduciary relations. In this article, I argue that the morality of these relations is best understood through a very old and dangerous concept, the concept of status. Despite their historic and continuing abuses, status relations are alive and well today, I argue, because some of them are necessary. We must therefore carefully specify the conditions in which such status relations may morally obtain, as well as the duties of virtue and duties of right to which all parties are subject when it does (including a duty of care) to clearly articulate the ways in which these putatively moral status relations that essentially involve an asymmetry of autonomy (status relations) can go well or badly even within the context of the Kantian tradition from which our current legal and social practices arose. To this end, I offer Kant's own concept of status as a promising one because in Kant's theory, status is a nexus of virtue and right that is reducible to neither property nor contract but akin to each in familiar ways. Once status is admitted as an alternative to property and contract, status may be extended beyond Kant's domestic paradigm, most perspicuously to institutional ethics. In this article, I sketch a status-based theory of stakeholding that locates environmental impact, institutional oppression, and other significant features of our moral landscape within a Kantian framework of duties rich enough to more accurately characterize the complexities of stakeholding than current tradition has allowed.
——. Rev. of Kant on Practical Life: From Duty to History, by Kristi E. Sweet (2013). Journal of the History of Philosophy 52.2 (2014): 381-82. [M]
Caswell, Matthew. Rev. of Difficult Freedom and Radical Evil in Kant, by Joël Madore (2011). Journal of Moral Philosophy 11.4 (2014): 547-50. [PW]
Cattafi, Carmelo. “Las acepciones del término cosmopolitismo: una aportación a la taxonomía de Kleingeld.” [Spanish] CONfines de Relaciones Internacionales y Ciencia Política 19 (2014): 9-33. [ASP]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The main purpose of this paper is to analyze the concept “cosmopolitanism”, its current context, the evolution of its implication and the different meanings created debates. Starting with the taxonomy of Kleingeld, our theoretical contribution includes a classification of the cosmopolitanism today. The paper consists of two sections, the first dealing with the development of the concept and the second related to the different meanings that founded in the study of cosmopolitanism.
Cavallar, Georg. “Sources of Kant’s Cosmopolitanism: Basedow, Rousseau, and Cosmopolitan Education.” Studies in Philosophy & Education 33.4 (2014): 369-89. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The goal of this essay is to analyse the influence of Johann Bernhard Basedow and Rousseau on Kant’s cosmopolitanism and concept of cosmopolitan education. It argues that both Basedow and Kant defined cosmopolitan education as non-denominational moral formation or Bildung, encompassing-in different forms-a thin version of moral religion following the core tenets of Christianity. Kant’s encounter with Basedow and the Philanthropinum in Dessau helps to understand the development of Kant’s concept of cosmopolitanism and educational theory ‘in weltbürgerlicher Absicht’. Rousseau’s role is more complex: he clearly influenced Kant; he is usually considered a precursor of modern nationalism and national education; and recent studies have stressed the cosmopolitan dimension of his educational programme. I claim that the dilemma of education according to Rousseau is that one has to choose between education of homme or education of citoyen, and that there is no way to avoid or go beyond this stark alternative. Kant’s reinterpretation of Rousseau is favourable and creative and has found many followers up to the present, but is misleading, as he ignores the dilemma and imposes his own conception of cosmopolitanism, of cosmopolitan education and of (possible) progress in history on Rousseau while claiming that this was actually Rousseau’s message.
——. “Res publica: Kant on Cosmopolitical Formation (Bildung).” Studia Philosophica Kantiana 2014.1 (2014): 3-22. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper argues that a widespread interpretation of Kant as a typical early liberal is mistaken. Especially because of Rousseau’s influence, Kant is close to the republican tradition, even though he does not share its key features. Kant’s pedagogy is indeed distinct from the educational theories of the civic republicans: first of all, moral self-legislation and self-motivation ultimately aim at a cosmopolitan conduct of thought (Denkungsart) and a cosmopolitan compartment of mind or disposition (Gesinnung), thus going beyond the civic humanism’s focus on one’s own republic. Secondly, Kant takes a detour: in his moral theory, cosmopolitan values are not simply instilled or inculcated in pupils. A cosmopolitan disposition is a long-term result of helping adolescents to form their own moral characters. Yet Kant shared with civic republicans, especially with Rousseau, the conviction that education was indispensable for morality and virtue; subscribed to their belief in law’s educational function; and held that a republic – or rather the republican form of government – was the proper basis of moral formation. A final section outlines Kant’s vision of progress in a genuine republic.
——. Rev. of Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals: A Critical Guide, edited by Lara Denis (2010). The European Legacy: Toward New Paradigms 19.3 (2014): 387-88. [M]
Chance, Brian. “Forţele cauzale. Criticile germane timpurii la Hume şi răspunsul lui Kant la Hume.” [Romanian; “Causal Powers. Hume’s Early German Critics and Kant’s Response to Hume”], translated into Romanian by Marius Augustin Drăghici. Revista de Filosofie 61.6 (2014): 643-62. [PW]
Cheng, Chung-Ying. “Religious Foundation of Morality and Religiousness of Moral Practice: Kant and Confucianism.” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 41.S1 (2014): 567-86. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant has attempted to develop a foundation of his metaphysics of morals and this foundation ultimately turns out to be a religious one. Consequently, the question for Kant is whether morality also provides a practical foundation for independent religious faith. In contrast, we see Confucianism as providing a system of morality which has its own religiousness or sense of ultimateness in terms of a robust form of moral life and its practice of li 禮 (proprieties/ritual) and reflective thinking on humanity. In this article, I wish to present these two forms of moral thinking which can be respectively titled moral theology and onto‐ethics. A relative evaluation shows how a world morality could be consistent or justified within one's own religious tradition and yet can be and should be open to a common people humanity we experience as couched in an open cosmos we observe.
Chignell, Andrew. “Kant and the ‘Monstrous’ Ground of Possibility: A Reply to Abaci and Yong.” Kantian Review 19.1 (2014): 53-69. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: I reply to recent criticisms by Uygar Abaci and Peter Yong, among others, of my reading of Kant’s pre-Critical ‘possibility proof’ of God's existence, and of its fate in the Critical period. Along the way I discuss some implications of this debate for our understanding of Kant’s modal metaphysics and modal epistemology generally.
——. “Modal Motivations for Noumenal Ignorance: Knowledge, Cognition, and Coherence.” Kant-Studien 105.4 (2014): 573-97. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: My goal in this paper is to show that Kant’s prohibition on certain kinds of knowledge of things-in-themselves is motivated less by his anti-soporific encounter with Hume than by his new view of the distinction between “real” and “logical” modality, a view that developed out of his reflection on the rationalist tradition in which he was trained. In brief: at some point in the 1770’s, Kant came to hold that a necessary condition on knowing a proposition is that one be able to prove that all the items it refers to are either really possible or really impossible. Most propositions about things-in-themselves, in turns out, cannot meet this condition. I conclude by suggesting that the best interpretation of this modal condition is as a kind of coherentist constraint.
——. “Rational Hope, Possibility, and Divine Action.” Kant’s Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason: A Critical Guide. Ed. Gordon E. Michalson (op cit.). 98-117. [M]
——. “Can Kantian Laws Be Broken?” Res Philosophica 91.1 (2014): 103-21. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper I explore Kant’s critical discussions of the topic of miracles (including the important but neglected fragment from the 1780s called “On Miracles”) in an effort to answer the question in the title. Along the way I discuss some of the different kinds of “laws” in Kant’s system, and also the argument for his claim that, even if empirical miracles do occur, we will never be in a good position to identify instances of them. I conclude with some tentative remarks about the notorious suggestion that intelligible finite agents, too, might have some sort of influence over the laws of nature. The goal throughout is to show that exploring Kant’s answer to a traditional question in philosophical theology can deepen our understanding of his metaphysics and epistemology of nature generally.
——. See: Brewer, Kimberly and Andrew Chignell.
Cholbi, Michael. “A Direct Kantian Duty to Animals.” Southern Journal of Philosophy 52.3 (2014): 338-58. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant's view that we have only indirect duties to animals fails to capture the intuitive notion that wronging animals transgresses duties we owe to those animals. Here I argue that a suitably modified Kantianism can allow for direct duties to animals and, in particular, an imperfect duty to promote animal welfare without unduly compromising its core theoretical commitments, especially its commitments concerning the source and nature of our duties toward rational beings. The basis for such duties is that animal welfare, on my revised Kantian view, is neither a conditioned nor unconditioned good, but a final and nonderivative good that ought to be treated as an end-in-itself. However, this duty to promote animal welfare operates according to a broadly consequentialist logic that both accords well with our considered judgments about our duties to animals and explains differences between these duties and duties owed to rational agents.
Chong-Fuk, Lau. “Kant‘s Transcendental Functionalism.” Review of Metaphysics 68.2 (2014): 371-94. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article discusses functionalism in philosopher Immanuel Kant‘s philosophy of mind. Topics include the relation of Kant‘s notion of the objectivity of cognition to his transcendental idealism, Kant‘s book Critique of Pure Reason, and Kant‘s account of cognitive subjectivity. Kant‘s notion of a transcendental a priori is addressed.
Choo, Suzanne S. “Cultivating a Cosmopolitan Consciousness: Returning to the Moral Grounds of Aesthetic Education.” The Journal of Aesthetic Education 48.4 (2014): 94-110. [MUSE]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper begins by juxtaposing Immanuel Kant's claim that the beautiful is the symbol of the morally good with examples of the amoral effects of art works during the Holocaust. The paper then aims to recover a role for aesthetic education in the twentyfirst century grounded on its capacity to cultivate moral sensibilities while addressing these sociological contradictions. The first part of the paper establishes the argument that the moral value of aesthetic education, rather than its instrumental or aesthetic value, represents the strongest defense for its continued significance in contemporary societies. Essentially, this moral value is premised on an ethics of communicability integral to aesthetic education. This then leads to the second part of this paper in which I propose that aesthetic education can cultivate moral sensibilities or, more specifically, a cosmopolitan consciousness. Established on Kantian cosmopolitan principles, such a consciousness prioritizes otherness before the self, the moral value over instrumental and aesthetic values. This involves a continued process of striving for that which is nonconceptual in order to reach toward that ungraspable notion of the human in all its complexity and fullness, transcending any assigned identity. Ultimately, this seeks to accord aesthetic education a significant role in promoting hospitable ways of engaging with multiple others in a globally interconnected age.
Clewis, Robert R. “ Kant’s Empiricist Rationalism in the Mid-1760s.” Eighteenth-Century Thought, volume 5. Ed. Jeffrey D. Burson (New York: AMS Press, 2014). 179-226. [WC]
——. Rev. of The Sublime and Its Teleology: Kant – German Idealism – Phenomenology, edited by by Donald Loose (2011). Kant Studies Online (2014): 91-108. [M] [online]
Cohen, Alix. “Kant’s Anthropology and its Method: The Epistemic Uses of Teleology in the Natural World and Beyond.” The Palgrave Handbook of German Idealism. Ed. Matthew C. Altman (op cit.). 186-202. [M]
——. “The Anthropology of Cognition and its Pragmatic Implications.” Kant’s Lectures on Anthropology: A Critical Guide. Ed. Alix Cohen (op cit.). 76-93. [WC]
——. “A Defence of Kant’s Biological Model for the Human Sciences.” Estudos Kantianos 2.2 (2014): 15-27. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In Kant and the Human Sciences, I present an epistemic model of the human sciences according to which Kant’s Antinomy of reflective judgment is the “foremost” “basis of the method of human sciences” (Cohen, 2009, p. 29). In this paper, I set out to defend this model against recent objections. In the first section, I show that Kant’s anthropology is modelled on his philosophy of biology due to the fact that the development of the human species shares a number of peculiar features with the functioning of organisms, these features entailing important methodological characteristics. In the second section, I support this claim by addressing a number of issues that have been raised by Robert Louden in his contribution to this volume. Finally, I discuss a difficulty that is entailed by Louden’s interpretation of Kant’s anthropological project. Namely, pragmatic anthropology is methodologically and metaphysically incompatible with the claim that human beings are causally determined.
——. “Kant on the Ethics of Belief.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114.3-3 (2014): 317-34. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper, I explore the possibility of developing a Kantian account of the ethics of belief by deploying the tools provided by Kant's ethics. To do so, I reconstruct epistemic concepts and arguments on the model of their ethical counterparts, focusing on the notions of epistemic principle, epistemic maxim and epistemic universalizability test. On this basis, I suggest that there is an analogy between our position as moral agents and as cognizers: our actions and our thoughts are subject to the same rational norm.
——, ed. Kant’s Lectures on Anthropology: A Critical Guide. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014. [xvi, 270 p.] [WC][review]
Werner Stark (Kant’s Lectures on Anthropology: Some Orienting Remarks),
Rudolf A. Makkreel (Self-cognition and Self-assessment),
Gary Hatfield (Kant on the Phenomenology of Touch and Vision),
Tim Jankowiak and Eric Watkins (Meat on the Bones: Kant’s Account of Cognition in the Anthropology Lectures),
Alix Cohen (The Anthropology of Cognition and its Pragmatic Implications),
Patrick R. Frierson (Affects and Passions),
Paul Guyer (The Inclination toward Freedom),
Allen W. Wood (Empirical Desire),
Susan Meld Shell (Kant as “Vitalist”: The “Principium of Life” in Anthropologie Friedländer),
G. Felicitas Munzel (Indispensable Education of the Being of Reason and Speech),
Catherine Wilson (Kant on Civilisation, Culture and Moralisation),
Robert B. Louden (Cosmopolitical Unity: The Final Destiny of the Human Species),
John H. Zammito (What a Young Man Needs for his Venture into the World: The Function and Evolution of the “Characteristics”).
——, ed. Kant on Emotion and Value. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. [xiv, 301 p.] [WC]
Nancy Sherman (The Place of Emotions in Kantian Morality),
Christine M. Korsgaard (From Duty and for the Sake of the Noble: Kant and Aristotle on Morally Good Action),
Marcia Baron (Kantian Moral Maturity and the Cultivation of Character),
Angelica Nuzzo (The Place of the Emotions in Kant’s Transcendental Philosophy),
Wiebke Deimling (Kant’s Pragmatic Concept of Emotions),
Melissa McBay Merritt (Kant on the Pleasures of Understanding),
Pauline Kleingeld (Debunking Confabulation: Emotions and the Significance of Empirical Psychology for Kantian Ethics),
Patrick R. Frierson (Affective Normativity),
Lara Denis (Love of Honor as a Kantian Virtue),
Jeanine M. Grenberg (All You Need Is Love?),
Pablo Muchnik (The Heart as Locus of Moral Struggle in the Religion),
Michelle Grier (Kant and the Feeling of Sublimity),
Katrin Flikschuh (Enthusiastic Cosmopolitanism).
Cohen-Halimi, Michèle. “La flexion politique du respect: une lecture foucaldienne de «des mobiles de la raison pure pratique» (KpV, AA 05: 71).” Con-Textos Kantianos 2014.1 (2014): 23-40. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the Critique of practical reason (in «On the Motives of pure practical reason»), Kant clarifies what an «archeology» of the moral Self could mean. This kantian «archeology» has an «air de famille» with the archeology definited by Foucault: Kant does not propose to take a step back in direction to the origins, he rather proposes to compare together different facts of reason and he never quits the field of rational discursivity. The Kantian discourse aims at proposing a «history from what makes necessary some forms of thinking». Kant assigns himself the task to reorder rational events and to point out their difference so that the connection between them can be shown and understood as conditions of the emergence of the moral Self. These conditions draw a line between past and present and are aimed at setting some deeper articulation between moral and politics. This paper is the first stage of an ongoing reflexion.
——. “Une archéologie kantienne de l’égoïsme.” De la sensibilité: les esthétiques de Kant. Eds. François Calori, Michaël Foessel, and Dominique Pradelle (op cit.). 191-207. [M]
Connolly, Kevin. “Which Kantian Conceptualism (or Nonconceptualism)?” Southern Journal of Philosophy 52.3 (2014): 316-37. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: A recent debate in Kant scholarship concerns the role of concepts in Kant’s theory of perception. Roughly, proponents of a conceptualist interpretation argue that for Kant, the possession of concepts is a prior condition for perception, while nonconceptualist interpreters deny this. The debate has two parts. One part concerns whether possessing empirical concepts is a prior condition for having empirical intuitions. A second part concerns whether Kant allows empirical intuitions without a priori concepts. Outside of Kant interpretation, the contemporary debate about conceptualism concerns whether perception requires empirical concepts. But, as I argue, the debate about whether Kant allows intuitions without empirical concepts does not show whether Kant is a conceptualist. Even if Kant allows intuitions without empirical concepts, it could still be that a priori concepts are required. While the debate could show that Kant is a conceptualist, I argue it does not. Finally, I sketch a novel way that the conceptualist interpreter might win the debate — roughly, by arguing that possessing a priori concepts is a prior condition for having appearances.
Consani, Christina Foroni, and Joel Thiago Klein. “Condorcet e Kant: a esperança como horizonte do projeto político.” [Portuguese] Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia 55.129 (2014): 111-31. [PW] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper analyses the concept of hope in the works of Condorcet and Kant. It will be advocated that the concept of hope in the progress of humanity is of great importance for the comprehension of the political philosophy of both authors. On the one hand, hope gives a horizon of meaning to political philosophy that protects it against antagonistic world views. On the other hand, hope is incorporated into the political philosophy itself having, at once, a motivational function and creation of political institutions with a pedagogical character, as well.
Cooke, Steve. “Perpetual Strangers: Animals and the Cosmopolitan Right.” Political Studies 62.4 (2014): 930-44. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this article I propose a cosmopolitan approach to animal rights based upon Kant's right of universal hospitality. Many approaches to animal rights buttress their arguments by finding similarities between humans and non-human animals; in this way they represent or resemble ethics of partiality. In this article I propose an approach to animal rights that initially rejects similarity approaches and is instead based upon the adoption of a cosmopolitan mindset acknowledging and respecting difference. Furthermore, and in agreement with Martha Nussbaum, and Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka, I endorse the view that theories of animal rights need to be theories of justice and include a political component. Contra Donaldson and Kymlicka, however, I argue that the starting point for analysis of political theories of animal rights should be at the global rather than national level. Taking animals as strangers, I propose adopting a Kantian cosmopolitan mindset and ethic of universal hospitality towards them. I address how a ius cosmopoliticum that is hospitable to the interests of non-human animals can govern interactions with animals on fair terms, and I respond to concerns that cosmopolitanism cannot accommodate non-human animals because it is a democratic ideal, is grounded in logocentrism or rests upon ownership of territory by humans.
Craig, David. “Rationality, Animality, and Human Nature: Reconsidering Kant’s View of the Human/Animal Relation.” Konturen (online) 6 (2014): 62-81. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant is often criticized for his strict separation of humans and animals as categorically distinct entities. This separation hinges on the fact that, for Kant, humans are rational, while non-human animals are wholly irrational. This essay argues that a strict separation of rational humanity and irrational animality, prominent in many areas of Kant’s thinking, does not characterize his view of the human/animal relation overall. For, within Kant’s theory of human nature, rationality and animality are in fact entwined, with both contributing to the goodness and full realization of human life. Through engagement with a range of Kant’s writings on human nature, it is suggested that Kant’s view of the human/animal relation merits reconsideration by Kant scholars and animal-oriented philosophers alike.
Crary, Alice. “A Radical Perfectionist: Revisiting Cavell in the Light of Kant.” The Journal of Aesthetic Education 48.3 (2014): 87-98. [MUSE]
Croitoru, Rodica. “Două modele cognitive în Critica raţiunii pure. Cunoaştere matematică şi cunoaştere filosofică.” [Romanian; Two Cognitive Models in the Critique of Pure Reason. Mathematical Knowledge and Philosophical Knowledge] Revista de Filosofie 61.5 (2014): 504-16. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the transcendental Doctrine of Method, Kant draws a distinction between two cognitive models, represented by philosophical knowledge and by mathematical knowledge, according to the part the concept plays in both: respectively „from concepts” in the philosophical model and „from the construction of concepts” in the mathematical one. Although this distinction is made in the framework of his transcendental philosophy and according to its principles, what can we further learn from it concerns at least the status of philosophy as a sui generis science, as well as the diversity of means that philosophy has at its disposal in attaining its purposes, to compensate for the lack of certainty mathematics provides.
——. “Raţiunea pură ca unificatoare a cunoaşterii prin genuri şi specii.” [Romanian; Pure Reason as Unifier of Knowledge through Genera and Species] Studii de istorie a filosofiei universale 22 (2014): 113-21. [RC]
Crome, Keith. Rev. of Conditions of Thought: Deleuze and Transcendental Ideas, by Daniela Voss (2013). Kant Studies Online (2014): 312-21. [M] [online]
Crowe, Benjamin D. “Jacobi on Kant, or Moral Naturalism vs. Idealism.” The Palgrave Handbook of German Idealism. Ed. Matthew C. Altman (op cit.). 205-21. [M]
Crowell, Steven. “Kantianismus und Phänomenologie.” Affektivität und Ethik bei Kant und in der Phänomenologie. Ed. Inga Römer (op cit.). 19-51. [M]
Cubo, Oscar. Rev. of Immanuel Kant und die Öffentlichkeit der Vernunft, by Johannes Keienburg (2011). Kant-Studien 105.3 (2014): 452-54. [M]
Cureton, Adam. Rev. of Virtue, Rules, and Justice: Kantian Aspirations, by Thomas E. Hill (2012). Kantian Review 19.1 (2014): 171-76. [M]
Dalferth, Ingolf. “Radical Evil and Human Freedom.” Kant’s Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason: A Critical Guide. Ed. Gordon E. Michalson (op cit.). 58-78. [M]
Darwall, Stephen. “The Social and the Sociable.” Philosophical Topics 42.1 (2014): 201-17. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Beginning from Kant’s famous idea that “unsociable sociability” stimulates human progress and civilization, the essay investigates Kant’s categories of the “unsociable” and the “sociable,” and argues that the fundamental difference between them is that the former presuppose a social perspective that is third personal, whereas the latter is always a second-personal affair, instantiated when people relate to one another in various ways, or manifest the disposition to do so. Kant’s “unsociable” attitudes, like “competitive vanity,” are deeply social. They are the fruit of Rousseauean “amour propre,” presupposing a social “observer’s” (third-personal) perspective from which we can desire to be positively (and justifiably) regarded or seen. Sociability, as the concept enters into the early modern natural law tradition of Grotius and Pufendorf that led up to Kant, is an irreducibly second-personal phenomenon, realized in our mutual relatings, and the social and legal institutions that govern these. This essay explores these conceptual differences and interactions and the historical background of Kant’s remark in Grotius, Pufendorf, and Rousseau.
——. “Why Fichte’s Second-Personal Foundations Can Provide a More Adquate Account of the Relation of Right than Kant’s.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 90.1 (2014): 5-20. [PW]
David-Ménard, Monique. “Contingence et normativité. Contingence de la pensée, méthode sceptique, travail de deuil.” Con-Textos Kantianos 2014.1 (2014): 98-103. [M] [online]
Dean, Richard. “Perfected Humanity: Nature’s Final End and the End in Itself.” Politics and Teleology in Kant. Eds. Paul Formosa, Avery Goldman, and Tatiana Patrone (op cit.). 228-44. [M]
——. “Stigmatization and Denormalization as Public Health Policies: Some Kantian Thoughts.” Bioethics 28.8 (2014): 414-19. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The stigmatization of some groups of people, whether for some characteristic they possess or some behavior they engage in, will initially strike most of us as wrong. For many years, academic work in public health, which focused mainly on the stigmatization of HIV‐positive individuals, reinforced this natural reaction to stigmatization, by pointing out the negative health effects of stigmatization. But more recently, the apparent success of anti‐smoking campaigns which employ stigmatization of smokers has raised questions about whether stigmatization may sometimes be justified, because of its positive effects on public health. Discussion of the issue so far has focused on consequences, and on some Kantian considerations regarding the status of the stigmatized. In this article, I argue that further Kantian considerations regarding the treatment of the general public (the potential stigmatizers) also count against any public health policy involving stigmatization. Attempts to encourage stigmatization are likely to fail to appeal to the rational decision‐making abilities of the general public, and the creation of stigmatized groups (even if they are stigmatized for their voluntary behavior) is an obstacle to the self‐improvement of members of the general public.
de Boer, Karin. “Kant’s Multi-Layered Conception of Things in Themselves, Transcendental Objects, and Monads.” Kant-Studien 105.2 (2014): 221-60. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: While Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason maintains that things in themselves cannot be known, he also seems to assert that they affect our senses and produce representations. Following Jacobi, many commentators have considered these claims to be contradictory. Instead of adding another artificial solution to the existing literature on this subject, I maintain that Kant’s use of terms such as thing-in-itself, noumenon, and transcendental object becomes perfectly consistent if we take them to acquire a different meaning in the various parts of the work. Challenging the opposed interpretations of Allison and Langton, I argue that Kant’s account of things in themselves is primarily relevant to the second-order reflection on the possibility and limits of a scientific metaphysics that the Critique undertakes.
Deimling, Wiebke. “Kant’s Pragmatic Concept of Emotions.” Kant on Emotion and Value. Ed. Alix Cohen (op cit.). 108-25. [PW]
Deleixhe, Martin. “Une réévaluation du droit cosmopolitique kantien: La citoyenneté européenne comme transition du droit de visite vers le droit de résidence.” [Also available in English translation: Re-evaluating Kant’s cosmopolitan law: European citizenship as a transition from the right to visitation to the right to residence] Revue Française de Science Politique 64 (2014): 79-93. [PW] [online]
Deligiorgi, Katerina. “The Pleasures of Contra-purposiveness: Kant, the Sublime, and Being Human.” Journal of Aesthetics 72.1 (2014): 25-35. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Serious doubts have been raised about the coherence of theories of the sublime and the usefulness of the concept. By contrast, the sublime is increasingly studied as a key function in Kant's moral psychology and in his ethics. This article combines methodological conservatism, approaching the topic from within Kant's discussion of aesthetic judgment, with reconstruction of a conception of human agency that is tenable on Kantian grounds. I argue that a coherent theory of the sublime is possible and useful, and the experience of the sublime is significant for our self-conception as agents. However, the chief interest in the sublime is not moral.
——. “Actions as Events and Vice Versa: Kant, Hegel and the Concept of History.” Internationales Jahrbuch des Deutschen Idealismus/International Yearbook of German Idealism: Geschichte/History, eds. Jürgen Stolzenberg and Fred Rush. 10 (2014): 175-97. [PW]
——. “Reply to Adrian Piper & Jeppe von Platz.” Critique (blog posted: 22 Oct 2014) n.p. [PW] [online]
——. Rev. of Immanuel Kant und die Öffentlichkeit der Vernunft, by Johannes Keienburg (2011). Kant Studies Online (2014): 156-59. [M] [online]
Demircan, Baver. “Kant’ta Sembolizm: Estetik İdeler Aklın İdelerinin Duyusal Sunumu Olabilir Mi?” [Turkish; Symbolism in Kant: Can the Aesthetic Ideas be the Sensible Presentation of the Ideas of Reason] Felsefi Düşün 3 (2014): 5-26??. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this essay, Kant’s understanding of the symbol is discussed through the analysis of his claim that the beautiful is the symbol of the morally good. Kant justifies his claim by demonstrating the formal similarities – analogies between aesthetic judgments and moral judgments, i.e., the similarity of the acts of reflection in both kinds of judgments. On the basis of these similarities, for Kant, the beautiful is, symbolically, the sensible presentation of the morally good. In other words, there exists a symbolic relation between the domain of nature – the sensible world and the domain of morality (reason) – the supersensible (intelligible) world by the intermediary of beauty. However it is only with regard to the beauty of nature that Kant explicitly discusses the symbolic relation between the beautiful and the morally good. Yet, in Kant’s thought, the validity of this claim can be also posited with regards to the beauty of art by demonstrating the formal similarities between the aesthetic ideas and the ideas of reason.
Denis, Lara. “Moral Goodness and Human Equality in Kant’s Ethical Theory.” The Palgrave Handbook of German Idealism. Ed. Matthew C. Altman (op cit.). 85-104. [M]
——. “Love of Honor as a Kantian Virtue.” Kant on Emotion and Value. Ed. Alix Cohen (op cit.). 191-209. [PW]
——. Rev. of Kant on Moral Autonomy, edited by Oliver Sensen (2013). Kantian Review 19.2 (2014): 327-32. [M]
Dewalque, Arnaud. “La richesse du sensible: Stumpf contre les néokantiens.” De la sensibilité: les esthétiques de Kant. Eds. François Calori, Michaël Foessel, and Dominique Pradelle (op cit.). 261-84. [M]
DeWitt, Janelle. “Respect for the Moral Law: the Emotional Side of Reason.” Philosophy 89.1 (2014): 31-62. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Respect, as Kant describes it, has a duality of nature that seems to embody a contradiction – i.e., it is both a moral motive and a feeling, where these are thought to be mutually exclusive. Most solutions involve eliminating one of the two natures, but unfortunately, this also destroys what is unique about respect. So instead, I question the non-cognitive theory of emotion giving rise to the contradiction. In its place, I develop the cognitive theory implicit in Kant's work, one in which emotions take the form of evaluative judgments that determine the will. I then show that, as a purely rational emotion, respect is perfectly suited to be a moral motive.
Dhillon, Pradeep A. “Examples of Moral Perfectionism from a Global Perspective.” The Journal of Aesthetic Education 48.3 (2014): 41-57. [MUSE]
Di Sanza, Silvia del Luján. “Encuentros y Desencuentros en la Dinámica Interna de Una Facultad: la “Urteilskraft” en la Tercera Crítica de Kant.” [Spanish; Agreements and Disagreements by the Internal Dynamic of a Faculty: the “Urteilskraft” in the Third Kant´S Critique.] Estudos Kantianos 2.1 (2014): 51-68. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The discussion about the reflexive Faculty of Judgment and the transcendental principle of purposiveness of nature as its a priori legislative principle has generated, and still continues to generate, multiple and diverse interpretations. The decision about the unity or disunity of the third Critique also depends on this question. Some of these interpretations are based on the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic of the Critique of Pure Reason and they think from there, with a variety of shades, the claim presented by Kant in the third Critique. It will not be the intention of this study to question this way of research highlighted by solvent commentators of Kant´s work, but rather to confront it with the statement that Kant makes in §23 — and in other sections of this work — about the unity of the faculty of judgment and its legislative principle. If we consider this signal a way may open complementary to the above mentioned, it gives us access to another double constitution of the faculty of judgment, which is twofold double: as aesthetic and teleological; as reflective and determinative. In this paper we will only focus on to the relationship between the first two properties and the mode of their belonging to the same faculty.
——. “La presuposición transcendental de un entendimiento intuitivo: ‘el punto más interesante del sistema kantiano’.” [Spanish] Temas kantianos. Ed. Mario Caimi (op cit.). 183-201. [WC]
——. Rev. of Immanuel Kant, Fundamentación para una metafísica de las costumbres, 2nd ed., translated by Roberto R. Aramayo (2012). Con-Textos Kantianos 2014.1 (2014): 146-49. [M] [online]
——. Rev. of Immanuel Kant, Crítica del Discernimiento (o de la facultad de juzgar), translated into Spanish by Roberto R. Aramayo and Salvador Mas. (2012). Con-Textos Kantianos 2014.1 (2014): 153-57. [M] [online]
Diehl, Catharine. “The Demand for an End: Kant and the Negative Conception of History.” Messianic Thought Outside Theology. Eds. Anna Glazova and Paul North (New York: Fordham University Press, 2014). 107-23. [JSTOR]
Dispersyn, Éléonore. “L’herméneutique de la religion à l’épreuve du mal chez Kant et Ricoeur: quelle espérance? Présentation et problématisation du dossier.” Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie 146.1 (2014): 1-8. [PW]
Dörflinger, Bernd. “Por que o belo apraz com pretensão de um assentimento universal? As três justificações de Kant e o problema da sua unidade.” [Portuguese; Why the beautiful pleases with claim to universal consensus? Kant’s three justifications and the problem of their unity] Studia Kantiana 12.17 (2014): 161-83. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: One of the most controversial topics of Kant’s aesthetic theory, handled in his third Critique, is the question of the universal validity of aesthetic judgements. As this type of judgement is not determinant, neither in intellectual, nor in moral terms, but a reflective judgement, it needs a proper justification. The central figure of argumentation used by Kant in order to prove that judgements of taste can rightly claim everybody’s consensus is the “subjective universal validity”. Kant presents three ways to demonstrate this universal validity – the first based on the element of disinterestedness, the second on the relation of aesthetic judgements with the faculty of cognition, and the third on its (indirect) relation with practical reason. – My aim is to show, in contrast to the majority of other commentators, that it is only the third way, outlined in the last sections of the ‘Critique of aesthetic judgement’ that allows Kant to defend convincingly the claimed universal validity of aesthetic judgements.
Doß, Kevin-Rick. Die transzendentale Bewegung des dialektischen Materialismus: Rekonstruktion zur Aktualität des Marxschen Gesellschaftsbegriffs. Marburg: Tectum, 2014. [104 p.] [WC]
Drăghici, Marius Augustin. “Comentarii privind răspunsul lui Kant la Hume” [Romanian; On Kant’s Response to Hume] Studii de istorie a filosofiei universale 22 (2014): 122-40. [RC]
Dumas, Denis. “Toward an Aesthetics of Respect: Kant’s Contribution to Environmental Aesthetics.” Environmental Aesthetics: Crossing Divides and Breaking Ground. Eds. Martinus Antonius Maria Drenthen and Jozef Keulartz (New York: Fordham University Press, 2014). 73-86. [JSTOR]
Dumouchel, Daniel. “De l’émotion thérapeutique au sentiment de l’esprit. L’explication du sublime entre philosophie transcendantale et anthropologie.” De la sensibilité: les esthétiques de Kant. Eds. François Calori, Michaël Foessel, and Dominique Pradelle (op cit.). 111-26. [M]
Dunlop, Katherine. “Arbitrary Combination and the Use of Signs in Mathematics: Kant’s 1763 Prize Essay and its Wolffian Background.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44.5-6 (2014): 658-85. [M]
Dutra, Delamar José Volpato. “A posição original como mediação entre estado de natureza e imperativo categórico: Rawls entre Hobbes e Kant.” [Portuguese] ethic@ 13.1 (2014): 112-40. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The paper presents the concept of natural law in Hobbes, and denies that its content is purely a hypothetical imperative arising from strategic rationality. The study makes use of the Rawls’s interpretation to confer moral status to the content of natural laws as they were proposed by Hobbes. For this purpose, Rawls’s original position is interpreted as a strategy for contamination of the categorical imperative by hypothetical imperatives. If Kant states that with various limitations the golden rule can be derived from the categorical imperative, then there must be some element in the golden rule that is also in the categorical imperative. The text investigates what would be this element. The text, therefore, presents a reading inspired by Rawls's original position, whose purpose will be to show that the moral reading of Hobbes held, for example, by Taylor, Warrender, Rawls, and Habermas, are defensible, though not for the reasons alleged by some of them. The conclusion is that although could exist agreement concerning the content of what could be called justice or rules of coexistence, there is disagreement over strategies of reasoning to prove those contents.
Dyck, Corey W. Kant and Rational Psychology. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2014. [xx, 257 p.] [M]
——. “The Function of Derivation and the Derivation of Functions: a Review of Schulting’s Kant’s Deduction and Apperception.” Studi Kantiani 27 (2014): 69-76. [PW]
Edwards, Jeffrey. “Squire Allworthy’s Inclinations and Acting from Duty: The Problem of Moral Worth in Kant’s Criticism of Sentimentalist Ethics.” Philosophie nach Kant. Neue Wege zum Verständnis von Kants Transzendental- und Moralphilosophie. Ed. Mario Egger (op cit.). 251-77. [M]
Egger, Mario. “Einleitung.” Philosophie nach Kant. Neue Wege zum Verständnis von Kants Transzendental- und Moralphilosophie. Ed. Mario Egger (op cit.). 1-11. [M]
——, ed. Philosophie nach Kant. Neue Wege zum Verständnis von Kants Transzendental- und Moralphilosophie. Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2014. [xiv, 738 p.] [M]
Note: Essays written on the occasion of Manfred Baum's 75th birthday.
Mario Egger, "Einleitung"
Kristina Engelhard, "Können Dispositionen das Realismusproblem des transzendentalen Idealismus lösen?"
Karin Michel, "Zeit und Freiheit bei Kant: zu Kants Begründung der praktischen Philosophie"
Kenneth R. Westphal, "Wie Kants kognitive Semantik Newtons Regel 4 der Experimentalphilosophie untermauert und van Fraassens konstruktiven Empirismus entkräftet"
Henry E. Allison, "Revisiting Judgments of Perception"
Mario Caimi, "Aeternitas, necessitas phaenomenon: das Schema der Kategorie von Notwendigkeit-Zufälligkeit"
Henny Blomme, "L’être de l’ombre"
Matthias Wunsch, "Zur argumentativen Rekonstruktion der Theorie der Einbildungskraft in Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft"
Cinzia Ferrini, "Illusions of Imagination and Adventures of Reason in Kant’s first Critique"
Inga Römer, "Die Formeln des kategorischen Imperativs in der Grundlegung: eine Kritik der Interpretation von Klaus Reich und Julius Ebbinghaus"
Jochen Bojanowski, "Rationales Wollen: über das Verhältnis von Kategorischem Imperativ und Goldener Regel"
Bernhard Milz, "Moral und Gefühl: Konstellationen von Rationalität und Emotionalität in Kants Moralphilosophie"
Jeffrey Edwards, "Squire Allworthy’s Inclinations and Acting from Duty: The Problem of Moral Worth in Kant’s Criticism of Sentimentalist Ethics"
Elke Elisabeth Schmidt und Dieter Schönecker, "Kants Philosophie des Gewissens: Skizze für eine kommentarische Interpretation"
Marion Heinz, "Kants Kulturtheorie"
Günter Zöller, "Libertas civilis: zur politischen Prägung von Freiheit und Autonomie bei Kant"
Hermann Schmitz, "Platonismus im Werk Kants und danach"
Andree Hahmann, "Substanz vor und nach Kant"
Gregor Schiemann, "Johannes Keplers Entfernung von der modernen Wissenschaft"
Dulce María Granja Castro und Eduardo Charpenel Elorduy, "Rousseau und Kant als Friedenstheoretiker: eine kurze vergleichende Analyse. Eine Skizze des philosophischen Verhältnisses zwischen Rousseau und Kant"
Dieter Hüning, "D'Holbachs Système de la nature: Bemerkungen zur Aufklärung über die Philosophie des französischen Materialismus"
Friederike Küster, "Republikaner ohne Republik: eine Konstellation um 1800"
Gideon Stiening, "Dieser 'große Künstler von Blendwerken': Kants Kritik an Herder"
Bernward Grünewald, "Geschichtsphilosophie oder Theorie der Geschichtswissenschaft? Welchen Zweck verfolgt Kant mit seiner geschichtsphilosophischen Reflexion?"
Paul Guyer, "The Inescapability of Contingency: The Form and Content of Freedom in Kant and Hegel"
Eric Watkins, "Hegel’s Critique of Kant in the Introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit (§§73-80)"
Jacinto Rivera de Rosales, "Kant und die hegelsche Moralität"
Allegra de Laurentiis, "Race in Hegel: Text and Context"
Jürgen Stolzenberg, "Primat des Praktischen: Hermann Cohen, Paul Natorp, Wolfgang Cramer"
Gerald Härtung, "Von der Vernunftkritik zur Kulturkritik: Ernst Cassirers Kant"
László Tengelyi, "Nicolai Hartmanns Umkehrung von Kants kopernikanischer Tat"
Birgit Recki, "Freiheit bei Sartre und bei Kant: eine grundlegungstheoretische Affinität"
Giuseppe Motta, "A Historical Dogma in Two Dogmas of Empiricism — Some Reflections Concerning Kant and Quine"
Konstantin Pollok, "Im logischen Raum der Gründe: Kant zum Verhältnis zwischen kausaler Erklärung und rationaler Rechtfertigung"
Ehrsam, Raphaël. “L’herméneutique ricoeurienne de la religion, avec ou contre Kant?” Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie 146.1 (2014): 59-74. [PW]
Eldridge, Richard. “Kant, Cavell, and the Circumstances of Philosophy.” The Journal of Aesthetic Education 48.3 (2014): 73-86. [PW]
——. Rev. of Kant and the Creation of Freedom: A Theological Problem, by Christopher J. Insole (2013). Philosophical Investigations 37.2 (2014): 178-82. [PW]
Emmel, Armin. Rev. of Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten – ein intellektuelles Porträt. Studien zur Metaphysik und Ethik von Kants Leitautor, by Clemens Schwaiger (2011). Kant-Studien 105.3 (2014): 460-65. [M]
Eng, Svein. “Why Reflective Equilibrium? II: Following Up on Rawls's Comparison of His Own Approach with a Kantian Approach.” Ratio Juris 27.2 (2014): 288-310. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In A Theory of Justice (1971), John Rawls introduces the concept of 'reflective equilibrium.' Although there are innumerable references to and discussions of this concept in the literature, there is, to the present author's knowledge, no discussion of the most important question: Why reflective equilibrium? In particular, the question arises: Is the method of reflective equilibrium applicable to the choice of this method itself? Rawls's drawing of parallels between Kant's moral theory and his own suggests that his concept of 'reflective equilibrium' is on a par with Kant's concept of 'transcendental deduction.' Treating these two approaches to justification as paradigmatic, I consider their respective merits in meeting the reflexive challenge, i.e., in offering a justification for choice of mode of justification. My enquiry into this topic comprises three parts. In the first part (Eng 2014a), I raised the issue of the reflexivity of justification and questioned whether the reflexive challenge can be met within the framework of A Theory of Justice. In this second part, I shall outline a Kantian approach that represents a paradigmatic alternative to Rawls.
Engelhard, Kristina. “Können Dispositionen das Realismusproblem des transzendentalen Idealismus lösen?” Philosophie nach Kant. Neue Wege zum Verständnis von Kants Transzendental- und Moralphilosophie. Ed. Mario Egger (op cit.). 15-36. [M]
Englander, Alex. Rev. of Kant and the Creation of Freedom: A Theological Problem, by Christopher J. Insole (2013). Reviews in Religion & Theology 21.2 (2014): 230-32. [PW]
Enskat, Rainer. Kants Theorie der Erfahrung. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2014. [350 p.] [WC]
Erdle, Birgit R. Literarische Epistemologie der Zeit: Lektüren zu Kant, Kleist, Heine und Kafka. Paderborn: Fink, 2014. [324 p.] [WC]
Erler, Werner. Rev. of Das Denken als Denken. Die Philosophie des Christoph Gottfried Bardili, by Rebecca Paimann (2009). Kant-Studien 105.3 (2014): 427-32. [M]
Erlinghagen, Armin. “Karl Heinrich Heydenreich als philosophischer Schriftsteller. Hinweise anlässlich der Publikation einer Bibliographie seiner Schriften” Kant-Studien 105.1 (2014): 125-44. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This contribution portrays the Kantian philosopher Karl Heinrich Heydenreich, who for no obvious reason fell into almost total oblivion shortly after his early death. While Heydenreich did not develop his own philosophical system comparable to the representatives of German Idealism, he nevertheless played an invaluable role in communicating, disseminating and applying the philosophy of Kant. Examining specific characteristics of Heydenreich’s numerous philosophical writings, the author looks at (1) their communicative qualities, (2) their richness of content and certainty of method, and (3) the concept of a “philosophy of life”, as developed by Heydenreich. The author also looks at, but does not attempt to explain, the obvious question why a writer and academic so unusually successful and well-known during his own lifetime, praised even to the point of eulogy as a philosophical genius, should be so rapidly forgotten after his death, and why this situation has remained unchanged up to the present day.
Esser, Andrea Marlen. “Die Bedeutung von Gefühlen in Kants Moralphilosophie und die Möglichkeit ihrer phänomenologischen Erweiterung.” Affektivität und Ethik bei Kant und in der Phänomenologie. Ed. Inga Römer (op cit.). 145-71. [M]
Esteves, Julio. “The Primacy of the Good Will.” Kant-Studien 105.1 (2014): 83-112. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this article I argue that Kant’s conception of the good will in its relation to the gifts of nature and fortune listed in the opening paragraphs of Groundwork I is usually misunderstood. The misunderstanding has its roots in the attribution of the alleged predicate ‘good in a conditioned sense’ to those gifts, even when they are taken in isolation. As a result, the centrality and primacy of Kant’s concept of the good will as the condition of the goodness of those gifts is completely obscured. However, a different picture emerges if one takes into account that ‘good in a conditioned sense’ properly means ‘good only on the condition of being combined with a good will’, so that talking of the goodness of such gifts taken in isolation or apart from the good will is a logical contradiction. Accordingly, we will see that, in his practical philosophy, Kant assigns to the good will a role very similar to the role played by Aristotle’s concept of substance in his theoretical philosophy. For, according to Kant, those gifts can be good and be said to be good only on the condition of being in a will which is good. Finally, we will see how this interpretation of the primacy of the good will sheds light on Kant’s view on the moral worth of actions.
——. “The Alleged Incompatibility between the Concepts of Practical Freedom in the Dialectic and in the Canon of the Critique of Pure Reason.” Kant-Studien 105.3 (2014): 336-71. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this article, in opposition to the prevalent interpretation, I argue that Kant’s statements on practical and transcendental freedom and their relationship in the Dialectic and in the Canon of the Critique of Pure Reason are compatible with each other. In other words, I maintain that practical freedom is taken as a variety of the absolute and transcendental freedom both in the Dialectic and in the Canon. I show that Kant’s talk of freedom being cognized through experience in nature, as we find it in the Canon, is in a systematic relationship with some very similar passages from the Dialectic, to which the interpreters hitherto have not paid due attention.
Faggion, Andrea. “Kantian Right and Poverty Relief.” ethic@ 13.2 (2014): 283-302. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: I have two goals in this paper. First, I want to determine whether Kant’s justification for state programs for poverty relief in The Doctrine of Right is based on 1) Kantian duties of virtue, 2) Kantian duties of right, or instead merely on 3) instrumental arguments regarding the preservation of a State as such. I claim that the last alternative is the correct one. Second, I will argue, against Kant himself, that even his merely instrumental arguments for public programs for poverty relief are ruled out by his doctrine of right. My conclusion is that, perhaps surprisingly, the only genuinely Kantian way to provide poverty relief is privately, just as Libertarians have argued.
Failla, Mariannina, ed. Leggere il presente: questioni kantiane. [Italian] Rome: Carocci, 2014. [198 p.] [WC]
Falduto, Antonino. The Faculties of the Human Mind and the Case of Moral Feeling in Kant’s Philosophy. Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, 2014. [xv, 265 p.] [PW]
——. “Kant o pojmoch „schopnosti“ a „mysel“.” [Slovak; Kant on the Concepts of Faculties and Mind] Studia Philosophica Kantiana 2014.2 (2014): 32-42. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Immanuel Kant defends a clear and distinctive tripartite structure of the faculties of the human mind from a pure philosophical standpoint on the basis of an exact distinction between reason and sensibility. Kant unfolds what other thinkers aimed at doing before or contemporaneous with him in the psychological field and the study of the faculties gains a philosophical significance as the study on the condition of possibility of the human acts of knowing, feeling, and willing for the first time in Kant’s investigations. In order to understand the radical innovation of Kant’s concepts of “faculty” and “mind” in the history of philosophy, in my paper I will first shed some light on the debate on the faculties during the eighteenth century. I will then complete my analysis by noting how “Vermögen” can be rightly interpreted only in connection with Kant’s pure philosophical treatment of the concept of “Gemüt”.
Fang, Bo. Politischer Reformismus: ein philosophischer Entwurf Immanuel Kants. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2014. [iii, 216p.] [WC]
Feloj, Serena. “L’intenzione della natura. Il principio di finalità tra la prima e la seconda Introduzione della Critica della capacità di giudizio.” [Italian; The intention of nature. The principle of finality between the first and second introduction of the Critique of Judgment] il cannocchiale 39.1 (2014): 147-63. [PW]
Fernández, Marta. “O Cosmopolitismo Kantiano: Universalizando o Iluminismo.” [Portuguese; The Kantian Cosmopolitanism: Universalizing the Enlightenment] Contexto Internacional 36.2 (2014): 417-56. [ASP]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Since the end of the Cold War, the liberal theories of International Relations and the United Nations discourses have been invoking the authority of Immanuel Kant and his famous treatise “Perpetual Peace” to advance the idea about the connection between peace and liberal democracies. The article aims to bring forward an alternative reading of Kant vis-à-vis the mainstream literature of International Relations, pointing out the limits and ambiguities of Kant’s cosmopolitanism by rescuing the racist traits of his philosophy.
Ferreira, Jamie M. “Hope, virtue, and the postulate of God: a reappraisal of Kant’s pure practical rational belief.” Religious Studies 50.1 (2014): 3-26. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: After identifying contrasting formulations of the practical postulates of reason in Kant’s second critique, I analyse the context of each formulation, showing both how the postulate of the ‘possibility’ of God is consistent with Kant’s understanding of a significant transition arising from practical needs as well as how the postulate of the existence of God can be seen as a ‘practical belief’ acting out a ‘hope’. My goal is to re-examine Kant’s view of the relation between the practical and theoretical employments of reason in order to distinguish clearly between what Kant sees as required of the moral believer as opposed to permitted.
Ferrini, Cinzia. “Illusions of Imagination and Adventures of Reason in Kant’s first Critique.” Philosophie nach Kant. Neue Wege zum Verständnis von Kants Transzendental- und Moralphilosophie. Ed. Mario Egger (op cit.). 141-88. [M]
Fichant, Michel. “Leibniz a-t-il «intellectualisé les phénomènes»? Éléments pour l’histoire d’une méprise.” De la sensibilité: les esthétiques de Kant. Eds. François Calori, Michaël Foessel, and Dominique Pradelle (op cit.). 37-69. [M]
Fidalgo da Silva, Cláudia Maria. “A Noção de Responsabilidade na Filosofia Moral Kantiana.” [Portuguese; The Notion of Responsibility in Kantian Moral Philosophy] Estudos Kantianos 2.1 (2014): 143-67. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper aims to investigate the main considerations on the Kantian notion of responsibility Verantwortung> in his moral philosophy. The paper is composed of three moments, whose goals are the following: 1) present the main Hegel´s objections to the Kantian ethics, as they are presented in his Principles of the Philosophy of Right, especially in relation to the main concept to explore; 2) show that, contrary to what Hegel suggests, the responsibility for ours actions takes place in Kantian ethics, particularly through the notions of imputation [Zurechnung] and moral conscience [Gewissen] (here we will have as our starting point three essential aspects: a) all moral agents have consciences; b) conscience is seen as a inner court to man; c) as court, conscience pronounces a verdict that will acquit or condemn the man); 3) clarify how Kant considers not only the responsibility to ourselves — as the previous point suggests — but also before God.
——. “Uma abordagem ao sentimento moral na filosofia kantiana.” [Portuguese; "An approach to moral feeling in Kantian philosophy"] Con-Textos Kantianos 2014.1 (2014): 41-65. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The main goal of this paper is to present an approach to moral feeling [moralische Gefühl] in Kantian philosophy. Although Kant thinks that human beings should not act considering the affect [Affekt] and passion [Leidenschaft], it does not mean the author maintains that the virtuous action should not be accompanied by any feeling. In this way, the paper has three main steps: 1) highlight what Kant understands by affect; 2) demonstrate the Kantian position about passion; 3) investigate the moral feelings presented by the author, which appear in the "Introduction to the doctrine of virtue": 3.1) moral feeling; 3.2) moral conscience [Gewissen]; 3.3) philanthropy [Philanthropie]; 3.4) respect [Achtung]. We will try to point to the fact that they, ultimately, area unique feeling, the feeling of respect for the law.
Fiegle, Thomas. “Teleology in Kant’s Philosophy of History and Political Philosophy.” Politics and Teleology in Kant. Eds. Paul Formosa, Avery Goldman, and Tatiana Patrone (op cit.). 163-79. [M]
Fisac, Jesús G. “Fenómeno y Fenomenología en el período crítico de Kant.” [Portuguese; Phenomenon and Phenomenology in Kants critical period]. Estudos Kantianos 2.2 (2014): 105-137. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The aim of this paper is to show the relationship between phenomenology, as it has been explained in Kant’s precritical writings, and the concept of phenomenon which appears in the first Critique and in the MA. We will argue that, first, phaenomenologie is the very investigation which gives up the ground, Grund. Secondly, the method which Kant links to this phenomenology is a kind of reduction; this reduction, according to the aim of transcendental philosophy, aims to give account for the very fact which addresses the critic, that is, the validity of knowledge. Reduction is here just the discovery of something, a priori knowledge, which is not a thing but a possibility. Thirdly, in the critical period phenomenon shows, like a genuinely aesthetic object, a double ‘obstinacy’: physically phenomenon is an appearance that cannot be ignored nor reduced; transcendentally it is limited by the thing itself, which cannot be identified with any cause or ground, neither physical nor metaphysical. Finally, phenomenon is a mode of presencing which cannot be reduced to logic. It is linked to a particular use of the power of thinking, the mathematical use, which does not involve the transcendental synthesis of imagination.
Fisher, Mark. “Metaphysics and Physiology in Kant’s Attitude towards Theories of Preformation.” Kant’s Theory of Biology. Eds. Ina Goy and Eric Watkins (op cit.). 25-41. [M]
Fjelkestam, Kristina. “En-Gendering the Sublime: Aesthetics and Politics in the Eighteenth Century.” NORA: Nordic Journal of Women's Studies 22.1 (2014): 20-32. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this essay I expand on the analysis of the en-gendered sublime, an aesthetic concept of political consequence used in the eighteenth century. In a discussion of the initial phase of modern aesthetics I will present Immanuel Kant's opinions on the sublime's ennobling effect as having solely male connotations. This, I argue, became an important part of the construction of a new notion of citizenship on the basis of nationality and as an exclusively male domain. Furthermore, I will claim that conceptions of the “bad” sublime, as expressed by thinkers such as Edmund Burke, made up another side of this ennobling sublimity coin, which was the politically provocative defined in female terms. Aesthetics has obviously walked hand-in-hand with politics ever since Plato'sRepublic, and the concept of the sublime only make up a small part of this complex union—but undeniably a rather interesting one.
Fleischacker, Samuel. Rev. of Kant’s Political Theory: Interpretations and Applications, edited by Elisabeth Ellis (2012). Social Theory and Practice 40.1 (2014): 165-71. [PW]
Flikschuh, Katrin. “Enthusiastic Cosmopolitanism.” Kant on Emotion and Value. Ed. Alix Cohen (op cit.). 265-83. [PW]
—— and Lea Ypi. “Kant on Colonialism — Apologist or Critic?” Kant and Colonialism: Historical and Critical Perspectives. Eds. Katrin Flikschuh and Lea Ypi (op cit.). 1-18. [M] [online]
——. See: Ajei, Martin, and Katrin Flikschuh.
—— and Lea Ypi, eds. Kant and Colonialism: Historical and Critical Perspectives. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. [xi, 255 p.] [M] [review]
Katrin Flikschuh and Lea Ypi (Introduction: Kant on Colonialism — Apologist or Critic?),
Anthony Pagden (The Law of Continuity: Colonies, Provinces and the Justice of War within the Limits of Kant’s International Right),
Pauline Kleingeld (Kant’s Second Thoughts on Colonialism),
Sankar Muthu (Productive Resistance in Kant’s Political Thought: Domination, Counter-Domination, and Global Unsocial Sociability),
Lea Ypi (Commerce and Colonialism in Kant’s Philosophy of History),
Liesbet Vanhaute (Colonists, Traders or Settlers? Kant on Fair International Trade and Legitimate Settlement),
Arthur Ripstein (Kant’s Juridical Theory of Colonialism),
Peter Niesen (Restorative Justice in International and Cosmopolitan Law),
Anna Stilz (Provisional Right and Non-State Peoples),
Martin Ajei and Katrin Flikschuh (Colonial Mentality: Kant’s Hospitality Right Then and Now).
Florschütz, Gottlieb. Swedenborg’s Hidden Influence on Kant. Translated from the German by J. Durban Odhner and Kurt P. Nemitz. Bryn Athyn, Pennsylvania: Swedenborg Scientific Association Press, 2014. [viii, 309 p.] [WC]
Foessel, Michaël. “Le respect: un sentiment esthétique?” De la sensibilité: les esthétiques de Kant. Eds. François Calori, Michaël Foessel, and Dominique Pradelle (op cit.). 177-90. [M]
——. See: Calori, François, Michaël Foessel, and Dominique Pradelle.
——, ed. See: Calori, François, Michaël Foessel, and Dominique Pradelle, eds.
Føllesdal, Andreas, and Reidar Maliks, eds. Kantian Theory and Human Rights. New York: Routledge, 2014. [xxii, 209 p.] [WC]
Andreas Føllesdal and Reidar Maliks (Introduction)
Howard Williams (Kantian underpinnings for a theory of multirights)
Ariel Zylberman (Kant’s juridical idea of human rights)
Sofie Møller (Human rights jurisprudence seen through the framework of Kant’s legal metaphors)
Luke J. Davies (A Kantian defense of the right to health care)
Özlem Ayse Özgür (Human rights duties are collective duties of justice)
Svenja Ahlhaus (The democratic paradox of international human rights courts: a Kantian solution?)
Markus Patberg (Extraordinary politics and the democratic legitimacy of international human rights courts)
Reidar Maliks (Kantian courts: on the legitimacy of international human rights courts)
Aviva Shiller (Why Kant is not a democratic peace theorist)
Andreas Føllesdal (Kant, human rights, and courts).
Foreman, Elizabeth. “An Agent-Centered Account of Rightness: The Importance of a Good Attitude.” Ethical Theory & Moral Practice 17.5 (2014): 941-54. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper provides a sketch of an agent-centered way of understanding and answering the question, “What’s wrong with that?” On this view, what lies at the bottom of judgments of wrongness is a bad attitude; when someone does something wrong, she does something that expresses a bad, or inappropriate, attitude (where inappropriateness is understood, tentatively, as a failure to recognize the separateness of others). In order to motivate this account, a general Kantian agent-centered ethics is discussed, as well as Michael Slote’s agent-based ethics, in light of analysis of the grounding role of attitudes in the evaluation of two core cases. In light of these discussions, it is argued that there are advantages to preserving the grounding of the appropriateness of attitudes in facts about their objects (as opposed to Slote’s sentimentalism), while cutting such an agent-centered ethics away from a Kantian grounding.
Formosa, Paul. “Dignity and Respect: How to Apply Kant’s Formula of Humanity.” The Philosophical Forum 45.1 (2014): 49-68. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article indicates that the paper "Formula of Humanity (FH)," by 18th century German philosopher Immanuel Kant, is considered by many to be the most intuitively appealing formulation of the categorical imperative. It seeks to answer the question on how to use FH in practice in terms of two subsidiary principles, the Mere Means Principle (MMP) and the Ends in Themselves Principle (ETP). It also applies the two principles to a number of examples to illustrate how they work.
——. “The Ends of Politics: Kant on Sovereignty, Civil Disobediance and Cosmopolitanism.” Politics and Teleology in Kant. Eds. Paul Formosa, Avery Goldman, and Tatiana Patrone (op cit.). 37-58. [M]
—— and Catriona Mackenzie. “Nussbaum, Kant, and the Capabilities Approach to Dignity.” Ethical Theory & Moral Practice 17.5 (2014): 875-92. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The concept of dignity plays a foundational role in the more recent versions of Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities theory. However, despite its centrality to her theory, Nussbaum’s conception of dignity remains under-theorised. In this paper we critically examine the role that dignity plays in Nussbaum’s theory by, first, developing an account of the concept of dignity and introducing a distinction between two types of dignity, status dignity and achievement dignity. Next, drawing on this account, we analyse Nussbaum’s conception of dignity and contrast it with Kant’s conception of dignity. On the basis of this comparison between Nussbaum and Kant, we highlight tensions between Nussbaum’s Aristotelianism, which is central to her conception of dignity, and her commitment to political liberalism. This leads us to conclude that Nussbaum’s claim that her conception of dignity is only a partial political conception is implausible and that her conception of dignity seems to commit her to a satisficing form of perfectionist liberalism.
——, Avery Goldman, and Tatiana Patrone. “Introduction: The Connection between Politics and Teleology in Kant.” Politics and Teleology in Kant. Eds. Paul Formosa, Avery Goldman, and Tatiana Patrone (op cit.). 1-18. [M]
——, Avery Goldman, and Tatiana Patrone, eds. Politics and Teleology in Kant. Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2014. [xvi, 268 p.] [M]
Paul Formosa, Avery Goldman, and Tatiana Patrone (Introduction: The Connection between Politics and Teleology in Kant),
Howard Williams (Natural right in Toward Perpetual Peace),
Paul Formosa (The Ends of Politics: Kant on Sovereignty, Civil Disobediance and Cosmopolitanism),
Pauline Kleingeld (The Development of Kant’s Cosmopolitanism),
Allen Wood (Kant’s Principles of Publicity),
Susan Meld Shell (Public Reason and Kantian Civic Education, or: Are the humanities ‘Dispensable’ and If Not, Why Not?),
Sarah Holtman (Kant, Justice and Civic Fellowship),
Tatiana Patrone (Teleology and the Grounds of Duties of Juridical Right),
Luigi Caranti (The Guarantee of Perpetual Peace: Three Concerns),
Thomas Fiegle (Teleology in Kant’s Philosophy of History and Political Philosophy),
Sharon Anderson-Gold (The Political Foundations of Prophetic History),
Fotini Vaki (What Are We Allowed to Hope? Kant’s Philosophy of History as Political Philosophy),
Avery Goldman (The Principle of Purposiveness: From the Beautiful to the Biological and Finally to the Political in Kant’s Critique of Judgment),
Richard Dean (Perfected Humanity: Nature’s Final End and the End in Itself),
Angelica Nuzzo (Kant’s Pure Ethics and the Problem of ‘Application’).
Forster, Michael N. “Kant’s Philosophy of Language?” The Linguistic Dimension of Kant’s Thought. Eds. Frank Schalow and Richard L. Velkley (op cit.). 81-104. [M]
Förster, Eckart. “Immanuel Kant.” Early Modern Philosophy of Religion. Eds. Graham Oppy and N. N Trakakis (London/New York: Routledge). 277-88. [WC]
Fremstedal, Roe. Kierkegaard and Kant on Radical Evil and the Highest Good: Virtue, Happiness, and the Kingdom of God. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. [xiii, 326 p.] [WC]
Friebe, Cord. “Kants Transzendentaler Idealismus: Eine Verteidgung der »methodologischen« Zwei-Aspekte-Deutung.” Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie 39.1 (2014): pages??. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The debate over Kant’s transcendental idealism focuses on two variants of the two-aspect view: an »ontological« reading challenges the Prauss/Allison interpretation, by arguing that Kant is ontologically committed to the existence of things as they are in themselves. With this paper the original view strikes back: it will be shown that its characterization as being merely »methodological« is a misunderstanding. The original view rather implies an ontology, according to which the appearance aspect is fundamentally more basic than the in-itself aspect. This renews the sense in which Kant’s philosophy is as well a critical metaphysics as a transcendental idealism.
Friedman, Michael. “Laws of Nature and Causal Necessity.” Kant-Studien 105.4 (2014): 531-53. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper consider the necessity of causal laws of nature in relation to Kant’s works explicitly addressed to natural science (such as the Prolegomena and the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science), and also to the second edition of the Transcendental Deduction and the Critique of the Power of Judgement.
Frierson, Patrick R. Kant’s Empirical Psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014. [xii, 278 p.] [WC]
——. “Affective Normativity.” Kant on Emotion and Value. Ed. Alix Cohen (op cit.). 166-90. [PW]
——. “Affects and Passions.” Kant’s Lectures on Anthropology: A Critical Guide. Ed. Alix Cohen (op cit.). 94-113. [WC]
——. “Kant, Individual Responsibility, and Climate Change.” Ethics, Policy & Environment 17.1 (2014): 35-38. [PW]
——. Rev. of Kant’s Defense of Common Moral Experience: A Phenomenological Account, by Jeanine Grenberg (2013). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (Jan 2014, #11). [M] [online]
Fugate, Courtney D. The Teleology of Reason: A Study of the Structure of Kant’s Critical Philosophy. Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, 2014. [xvi, 433 p.] [PW]
Note: Kantstudien Ergänzungshefte, vol. 164.
This work argues that teleological motives lie at the heart of Kant’s critical philosophy and that a precise analysis of teleological structures can both illuminate the basic strategy of its fundamental arguments and provide a key to understanding its unity. It thus aims, through an examination of each of Kant’s major writings, to provide a detailed interpretation of his claim that philosophy in the true sense must consist of a teleologia rationis humanae.
The author argues that Kant’s critical philosophy forged a new link between traditional teleological concepts and the basic structure of rationality, one that would later inform the dynamic conception of reason at the heart of German Idealism. The process by which this was accomplished began with Kant’s development of a uniquely teleological conception of systematic unity already in the precritical period. The individual chapters of this work attempt to show how Kant adapted and refined this conception of systematic unity so that it came to form the structural basis for the critical philosophy.
——. “Alexander Baumgarten on the Principle of Sufficient Reason.” Philosophica 44 (2014): 127-47. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper defends the Principle of Sufficient Reason, taking Baumgarten as its guide. The primary aim is not to vindicate the principle, but rather to explore the kinds of resources Baumgarten originally thought sufficient to justify the PSR against its early opponents. The paper also considers Baumgarten’s possible responses to Kant’s pre-Critical objections to the proof of the PSR. The paper finds that Baumgarten possesses reasonable responses to all these objections. While the paper notes that in the absence of a response to Kant’s Critical discussion of the PSR (which is omitted here due to limitations of space), this result does not vindicate the principle, it shows how this discussion provides a deeper understanding of what, according to Baumgarten, the PSR really assumes and intends, and prepares the way for a more responsible discussion of Kant’s critical objections to Baumgarten’s supposed proof.
——. “‘With a Philosophical Eye’: The Role of Mathematical Beauty in Kant’s Intellectual Development.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44.5-6 (2014): 759-88. [M]
——. Rev. of Kant’s Elliptical Path, by Karl Ameriks (2012). Review of Metaphysics 68.2 (2014): 411-13. [PI]
Fukuda, Kiiricho. Ist der tugendhafte Atheist innerhalb der Kantischen praktischen Philosophie möglich? Die philosophische Schwärmerei. Untersuchungen zu Kants Religionslehre. Marburg: Blaues Schloss, 2014. [42 p.] [WC]
Gamble, Denise. Rev. of Kant’s ‘Doctrine of Right’: A Commentary, by B. Sharon Byrd and Joachim Hruschka (2010). The Philosophical Quarterly 64.255 (2014): 340-43. [PW]
Gaudet, Pascal. Philosophie et existence: qu'est-ce que l'homme? Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014. [59 p.] [WC]
——. Penser la politique avec Kant: la fondation morale de la république. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014. [70 p.] [WC]
——. Penser la liberté et le temps avec Kant: la fondation morale de l'existence. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014. [157 p.] [WC]
——. Le problème kantien de l'éthique: habiter le monde. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2014. [102 p.] [WC]
Gava, Gabriele. “Kant’s Definition of Science in the Architectonic of Pure Reason and the Essential Ends of Reason.” Kant-Studien 105.3 (2014): 372-93. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The paper analyses the definition of science as an architectonic unity, which Kant gives in the Architectonic of Pure Reason. I will show how this definition is problematic, insofar as it is affected by the various ways in which the relationship of reason to ends is discussed in this chapter of the Critique of Pure Reason. Kant sometimes claims that architectonic unity is only obtainable thanks to an actual reference to the essential practical ends of human reason, but he also identifies disciplines that do not make this reference as scientific. In order to find a solution to this apparent contradiction, I will first present Kant’s distinction between a scholastic and a cosmic concept of philosophy. This distinction expresses Kant’s foreshadowing of his later insistence on the priority of practical philosophy within a true system of philosophy. Then, I will present a related distinction between technical and architectonic unity and show how Kant seems to use two different conceptions of science, one simply attributing systematic unity to science, the other claiming that science should consider the essential practical ends of human beings. I will propose a solution to this problem by arguing that, if we give a closer look to Kant’s claims, the unity of scientific disciplines can be considered architectonic without taking into consideration the essential practical ends of human reason. In fact, it is only philosophy, as a particular discipline which aims to become a science, that cannot develop into a systematic whole without considering those essential practical ends. It is thus only in philosophy that we cannot reach scientificity without considering these ends.
——. “What is Wrong with Intuitions? An Assessment of a Peircean Criticism of Kant.” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society. 50.3 (2014): 340-59. [ASP]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In his 1868 ‘Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man’ and ‘Some Consequences of Four Incapacities’ Peirce famously rejected the possibility of having intuitions. He defined an intuition as ‘a cognition not determined by a previous cognition of the same object’ or as a ‘premiss not itself a conclusion.’ The rejection of intuitive knowledge can thus be seen as an expression of Peirce’s enduring conviction that our knowledge is by nature inferential. Even though the main polemical target of these papers is surely Descartes, Peirce specifies in a footnote that he nearly uses the word intuitive ‘as the opposite of discursive cognition,’ and that this ‘is also nearly the sense in which Kant uses it.’ Peirce’s position seems thus to be quite radical in his rejection of the Kantian distinction between intuitive and discursive cognition, between intuitions and concepts. I show that Peirce, despite this opposition to the Kantian distinction in his early writings, retained and developed in a totally new way some of its essential features in his mature semiotic. In fact, Peirce’s famous distinction between icons, indices, and symbols can be read as having functions similar to those reserved by Kant for the distinction between intuitions and concepts. In this framework, the tasks that Kant attributed to intuitions are performed by indices and icons.
——. Rev. of Thinking Through the Imagination: Aesthetics in Human Cognition,, by John Kaag (2014). Kant Studies Online (2014): 201-09. [M] [online]
——. Rev. of Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. internationalen Kant-Kongresses, edited by Stefano Bacin, Alfredo Ferrarin, Claudio La Rocca, and Margit Ruffing (2014). Con-Textos Kantianos 2014.1 (2014): 167-78. [M] [online]
Gens, Jean-Claude. “Le prolongement gadamérien de l’esthétique kantienne.” De la sensibilité: les esthétiques de Kant. Eds. François Calori, Michaël Foessel, and Dominique Pradelle (op cit.). 337-51. [M]
Gentile, Andrea. “Coscienza, volontà e libertà in Agostino, Rousseau, Kant e Bergson.” [Italian] Miscellanea Francescana 114.1-2 (2014): 7-25. [ASP]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: What does «conscience» mean? How is it possible to define human «liberty»? How is it possible to analyse the connection between «conscience», «will» and «liberty»? What does «ethics of limit» mean? What are the most important ethical problems connected with this area of research in St Augustine, Rousseau, Kant and Bergson? In history of philosophy, opinions on what constitute liberty can vary widely, but can be generally classified as «positive liberty» and «negative liberty»: we can define the difference between liberty as the «freedom» to «act» and liberty as the «absence» of «coercion». Human «tragedy» in modern society is that human life, culture and scientific-technological «automatisms» drive us too far from pure, real and deep «authenticity» of the «ethics of liberty». Moving from this point of view, the meaning of «conscience», «liberty» and «will» is analysed in St Augustine, Rousseau, Kant and Bergson and new perspectives of research in ethics are outlined, particularly in connection with anthropology and the philosophy of limit.
Giannetto, Giuseppe. Intuizione intellettuale e sintesi trascendentale in Kant. [Italian] Naples: La scuola di Pitagora, 2014. [viii. 388 p.] [WC]
Giladi, Paul. Rev. of Hegel’s Critique of Kant: From Dichotomy to Identity, by Sally Sedgwick (2012). Hegel Bulletin 35.1 (2014): 134-36. [PW]
Ginsborg, Hannah. The Normativity of Nature: Essays on Kant’s Critique of Judgement. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. [364 p.] [WC]
——. “Oughts without Intentions: A Kantian Approach to Biological Functions.” Kant’s Theory of Biology. Eds. Ina Goy and Eric Watkins (op cit.). 259-74. [M]
——. “Le plaisir du jugement: Kant et la possibilité du goût.” De la sensibilité: les esthétiques de Kant. Eds. François Calori, Michaël Foessel, and Dominique Pradelle (op cit.). 243-58. [M]
Giuspoli, Paolo. “La prospettiva trascendentale kantiana e le recenti interpretazioni americane di Hegel.” Studi Kantiani 27 (2014): 119-38. [PW]
Gobsch, Wolfram. “The Idea of an Ethical Community: Kant and Hegel on the Necessity of Human Evil and the Love to Overcome It.” Philosophical Topics 42.1 (2014): 177-200. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: “Ethical life” is Hegel’s term for the actuality of what Kant calls an “ethical community.” As members of the same ethical community, human beings are related to one another as persons in and only in acting from nothing but respect for the same practical law. Kant and Hegel both take ethical life to be a necessary, nay, the highest, end of pure reason. I argue that this is correct. And I identify the idea of ethical life with the idea of a peculiar form of love. Kant and Hegel disagree—in a curiously reciprocal fashion—about the reach of ethical life and about our capacity to know it to reside within our power: while Kant identifies ethical life with the actuality of the ethical community of all possible human (or rational) beings, Hegel holds that it is necessarily limited to some particular body politic; and while Hegel thinks that to be a human being is to self-knowingly co-constitute an ethical community, Kant believes that it is to be unable to know oneself to even be apt for this. With Hegel and against Kant, I argue that the only way to have the idea of ethical life is to live it. But with Kant and against a naïve form of Hegelianism, I argue that to be conscious of oneself as a human being, a practically rational animal, is to be conscious of oneself as morally evil, i.e. as actively prone to deeming one’s own particularity the supreme law. I show that this entails Hegelian particularism. And I end by noting that this saddles the Hegelian with the task of demonstrating that ethical particularization belongs to the very idea of pure reason itself, objectively conceived.
Godlove, Terry F. Kant and the Meaning of Religion. New York: Columbia University Press, 2014. [188 p.] [WC] [review]
——. Rev. of Kant and the Creation of Freedom: A Theological Problem, by Christopher J. Insole (year). International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 75.3 (2014): 259-62. [PW]
Goldberg, Nathaniel Jason. Kantian Conceptual Geography. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014. [online resource] [WC]
Goldman, Avery. “The Principle of Purposiveness: From the Beautiful to the Biological and Finally to the Political in Kant’s Critique of Judgment.” Politics and Teleology in Kant. Eds. Paul Formosa, Avery Goldman, and Tatiana Patrone (op cit.). 211-27. [M]
——. See: Formosa, Paul, Avery Goldman, and Tatiana Patrone.
——, ed. See: Formosa, Paul, Avery Goldman, and Tatiana Patrone, eds.
Golob, Sacha. “Kant on Intentionality, Magnitude, and the Unity of Perception.” European Journal of Philosophy 22.4 (2014): 505-28. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper addresses a number of closely related questions concerning Kant’s model of intentionality, and his conceptions of unity and of magnitude [Gröβe]. These questions are important because they shed light on three issues which are central to the Critical system, and which connect directly to the recent analytic literature on perception: the issues are conceptualism, the status of the imagination, and perceptual atomism. In Section 1, I provide a sketch of the exegetical and philosophical problems raised by Kant’s views on these issues. I then develop, in Section 2, a detailed analysis of Kant’s theory of perception as elaborated in both the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Judgment; I show how this analysis provides a preliminary framework for resolving the difficulties raised in Section 1. In Section 3, I extend my analysis of Kant’s position by considering a specific test case: the Axioms of Intuition. I contend that one way to make sense of Kant’s argument is by juxtaposing it with Russell’s response to Bradley’s regress; I focus in particular on the concept of ‘unity’. Finally, I offer, in Section 4, a philosophical assessment of the position attributed to Kant in Sections 2 and 3. I argue that, while Kant’s account has significant strengths, a number of key areas remain underdeveloped; I suggest that the phenomenological tradition may be read as attempting to fill precisely those gaps.
Gomes, Anil. “Kant on Perception: Naïve Realism, Non-Conceptualism, and the B-Deduction.” Philosophical Quarterly 64 (2014): 1-19. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: According to non-conceptualist interpretations, Kant held that the application of concepts is not necessary for perceptual experience. Some have motivated non-conceptualism by noting the affinities between Kant's account of perception and contemporary relational theories of perception. In this paper, I argue (i) that non-conceptualism cannot provide an account of the Transcendental Deduction and thus ought to be rejected; and (ii) that this has no bearing on the issue of whether Kant endorsed a relational account of perceptual experience.
González, Ana M. “Kant on History.” Estudos Kantianos 2.2 (2014): 265-89. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This essay intends to show how Kant’s approach to history paves the way for his philosophy of history. In order to do so, I will first draw on some texts included in the transcripts of Kant’s Logic Lectures to articulate his views on history. I will then argue that Kant’s philosophy of history constitutes his particular way of making sense of the contingency proper to historical knowledge in light of the interests of reason.
Goria, Giulio. Il fenomeno e il rimando: sul fondamento kantiano della finitezza della ragione umana. [Italian] Pisa: ETS, 2014. [214 p.] [WC]
Goy, Ina. “Epigenetic Theories: Caspar Friedrich Wolff and Immanuel Kant.” Kant’s Theory of Biology. Eds. Ina Goy and Eric Watkins (op cit.). 43-60. [M]
——. “Kant’s Theory of Biology and the Argument from Design.” Kant’s Theory of Biology. Eds. Ina Goy and Eric Watkins (op cit.). 203-20. [M]
——. “Die Deduktion des Sittengesetzes in den Jahren 1785, 1788 und 1788–90 und der Wandel in Kants Naturbegriff.” Kants Rechtfertigung des Sittengesetzes in Grundlegung III. Ed. Heiko Puls (op cit.). 167-88. [PW]
—— and Eric Watkins. “Introduction.” Kant’s Theory of Biology. Eds. Ina Goy and Eric Watkins (op cit.). 1-22. [M]
—— and Eric Watkins, eds. Kant’s Theory of Biology. Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2014. [x, 321 p.] [M]
Abstract: During the last twenty years, Kant’s theory of biology has increasingly attracted the attention of scholars and developed into a field which is growing rapidly in importance within Kant studies. The volume presents fifteen interpretative essays written by experts working in the field, covering topics from seventeenth- and eighteenth-century biological theories, the development of the philosophy of biology in Kant’s writings, the theory of organisms in Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment, and current perspectives on the teleology of nature.
Ina Goy and Eric Watkins, “Introduction”
Mark Fisher, “Metaphysics and Physiology in Kant’s Attitude towards Theories of Preformation”
Ina Goy, “Epigenetic Theories: Caspar Friedrich Wolff and Immanuel Kant”
Rachel Zuckert, “Organisms and Metaphysics: Kant’s First Herder Review”
Luca Illetterati, “Teleological Judgment: Between Technique and Nature”
Predrag Šustar, “Kant’s Account of Biological Causation”
Eric Watkins, “Nature in General as a System of Ends”
Angela Breitenbach, “Biological Purposiveness and Analogical Reflection”
Peter McLaughlin, “Mechanical Explanation in the Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment”
Marcel Quarfood, “The Antinomy of Teleological Judgment: What It Is and How It Is Solved”
Philippe Huneman, “Purposiveness, Necessity, and Contingency”
Ina Goy, “Kant’s Theory of Biology and the Argument from Design”
Paul Guyer, “Freedom, Happiness, and Nature: Kant’s Moral Teleology (CPJ §§83–4, 86–7)”
Ernst-Otto Onnasch, “The Role of the Organism in the Transcendental Philosophy of Kant’s Opus postumum”
Hannah Ginsborg, “Oughts without Intentions: A Kantian Approach to Biological Functions”
Siegfried Roth, “Kant, Polanyi, and Molecular Biology”
Gözkân, H. Bülent. “Kant’ın Transandantal Mantığı.” [Turkish; Kant’s Transcendental Logic] Felsefi Düşün 3 (2014): 27-34??. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The present paper considers the distinction between the general logic and the transcendental logic; it also examines the transcendental logic in its relation to time. Kant says that general logic abstracts from all content of cognition, and considers only the logical form in the relation of cognitions to one another. To say that general logic abstracts from all content of cognition means that it abstracts what is related to sensibility. But since the sensibility is not only a posteriori, and hence intuition is not only empirical, in that kind of abstraction the distinction between the empirical intuition and pure intuition disappears. Transcendental logic, on the other hand, investigates the relation of a priori representation in view of thinking. It considers the relation between pure intuition and pure thinking, and in that way it examines the ground of the categories. What gives content to the pure thinking is pure intuition. That is the constitution of the relation of logic with time. In addition, the present examination of the transcendental logic in its relation to time highlights the rupture of Kant’s transcendental philosophy with the traditional metaphysics before Kant.
Grandjean, Antoine. “La constitution esthétique de l’intériorité: Kant, Locke et l’invention du sens interne.” De la sensibilité: les esthétiques de Kant. Eds. François Calori, Michaël Foessel, and Dominique Pradelle (op cit.). 71-91. [M]
——. “La grâce de la liberté: Kant, Ricoeur et la dialectique de la foi salvatrice.” Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie 146.1 (2014): 27-42. [PW]
Granja Castro, Dulce María, und Eduardo Charpenel Elorduy. “Rousseau und Kant als Friedenstheoretiker: eine kurze vergleichende Analyse. Eine Skizze des philosophischen Verhältnisses zwischen Rousseau und Kant.” Philosophie nach Kant. Neue Wege zum Verständnis von Kants Transzendental- und Moralphilosophie. Ed. Mario Egger (op cit.). 403-23. [M]
——, and Eduardo Charpenel Elorduy. “El ideal de la paz perpetua en Rousseau y Kant.” [Spanish; The ideal of perpetual peace in Rousseau and Kant] Signos Filosóficos 16.31 (2014): 37-62. [ASP]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The aim of this paper is to discuss and compare Rousseau’s and Kant’s conceptions of perpetual peace. As writers of the Enlightenment, both authors had the philosophical concern of providing the foundations for a just international order, which would allow nations to coexist and develop peacefully. In our argument we focus upon the discursive strategies that both philosophers employ in order to present and justify their projects. A comparison is drawn between Rousseau’s pragmatic approach and Kant’s moral stand, stressing thereby the shortcomings of the former’s position and interpreting the latter’s as a robust philosophical project that can render an adequate normative basis for the goal of a perpetual peace.
Greisch, Jean. “«Que m’est-il permis d’espérer?»: Une lacune de l’anthropologie de la faillibilité?” Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie 146.1 (2014): 9-25. [PW]
Grenberg, Jeanine M. “All You Need Is Love?” Kant on Emotion and Value. Ed. Alix Cohen (op cit.). 210-23. [PW]
——. Rev. of Kant’s Questions: What is the Human Being?, by Patrick R. Frierson (2013). Mind 123.490 (2014): 592-98. [PW]
Grier, Michelle. “Kant and the Feeling of Sublimity.” Kant on Emotion and Value. Ed. Alix Cohen (op cit.). 245-64. [PW]
Grüne, Stefanie. “Précis of Blinde Anschauung.” Critique (blog posted: 19 Aug 2014) n.p. [PW] [online]
——. “Reply to Colin McLear.” Critique (blog posted: 20 Aug 2014) n.p. [PW] [online]
——. “Reply to Thomas Land.” Critique (blog posted: 22 Aug 2014) n.p. [PW] [online]
Grünewald, Bernward. “Geschichtsphilosophie oder Theorie der Geschichtswissenschaft? Welchen Zweck verfolgt Kant mit seiner geschichtsphilosophischen Reflexion?” Philosophie nach Kant. Neue Wege zum Verständnis von Kants Transzendental- und Moralphilosophie. Ed. Mario Egger (op cit.). 499-520. [M]
Guyer, Paul. “Kant’s Legacy for German Idealism: Versons of Autonomy.” The Palgrave Handbook of German Idealism. Ed. Matthew C. Altman (op cit.). 34-60. [M]
——. “The Inescapability of Contingency: The Form and Content of Freedom in Kant and Hegel.” Philosophie nach Kant. Neue Wege zum Verständnis von Kants Transzendental- und Moralphilosophie. Ed. Mario Egger (op cit.). 523-46. [M]
——. “Freedom, Happiness, and Nature: Kant’s Moral Teleology (CPJ §§83–4, 86–7).” Kant’s Theory of Biology. Eds. Ina Goy and Eric Watkins (op cit.). 221-37. [M]
——. “The Inclination toward Freedom.” Kant’s Lectures on Anthropology: A Critical Guide. Ed. Alix Cohen (op cit.). 114-32. [WC]
——. “Replies to Comments (Klas Roth, Pradeep Dhillon, Viktor Johansson, Richard Eldridge, Alice Crary, Martin Gustafsson, Timothy Gould).” The Journal of Aesthetic Education 48.3 (2014): 127-42. [MUSE]
Hahmann, Andree. “Substanz vor und nach Kant.” Philosophie nach Kant. Neue Wege zum Verständnis von Kants Transzendental- und Moralphilosophie. Ed. Mario Egger (op cit.). 357-81. [M]
Hamilton, John T. “Repetitio Sententiarum, Repetitio Verborum: Kant, Hamann, and the Implications of Citation.” The German Quarterly 87.3 (2014): 297-312. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Through a careful comparison of the citational practices of Immanuel Kant and Johann Georg Hamann, I aim to divulge salient distinctions that should contribute to, and complicate our understanding of, the Enlightenment project. To this end, I begin the present article with an investigation of Kant's famous gambit in his response to the question “Was ist Aufklärung?” and subsequently trace its links to the philosopher's earlier engagement with his Königsberg neighbor regarding the proposed collaboration to compose a physics textbook for children. What emerges from this investigation is a revealing and, at times, confounding network of citations, primarily from Horace, which serve to test the limits of critical discourse. At stake is a redefinition of eighteenth‐century language theory that takes into consideration crucial positions on the meaning and value of metaphysics, theology, and human nature.
Hammer, Carl. “Dependence on Wrongdoing in the Consumption of Meat: A Kantian Analysis..” Journal of Applied Philosophy 31.2 (2014): 169-87. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant's ethics is used by some as a defence of the exploitation of animals and is criticised by others for not recognising any moral relevance of the plight of animals. These appeals overlook the broad applicability of Kant's principles. In this article, I argue that Kant's ethics implies a duty to abstain from most meat and some other animal products derived from farming. I argue that there is a Kantian principle not to choose goods that have been derived from wrongdoing, with certain qualifications. This principle isolates the wrong of using others to commit wrongdoing on one's behalf. As has been argued by others, Kant's ethics implies that animal farming as we know it in our society almost universally involves wrongdoing and the slaughter of animals is especially tied to wrongdoing. I argue for a broad sense in which these ideas together imply that choosing farmed meat, and probably other animal products, is treating animal industry workers as mere means. Thus, we have a Kantian duty to abstain from these products.
Hanley, Ryan Patrick. “Kant’s Sexual Contract.” Journal of Politics 76.4 (2014): 914-27. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant's views on sex and marriage deserve the renewed attention of political scientists for three reasons. First, Kant's theory of marriage was shaped by his engagement with Rousseau's political thought and especially his Social Contract‹a key if unappreciated side of his engagement with Rousseau. Second, Kant's application of Rousseau's political theory to marriage suggests an egalitarian view of marriage's nature and function that helpfully illuminates marriage's role in a liberal society of free and equal persons. Third, in appropriating Rousseau's egalitarianism for his theory of marriage, Kant transfers his foundational concern with equality from the public to the private sphere: a move that suggests liberal political institutions require more than mere commitment to procedural neutrality for their perpetuation but require also a commitment to equality best cultivated by certain types of private associations and personal relationships.
Hanna, Robert. “If God’s Existence is Unprovable, Then is Everything Permitted? Kant, Radical Agnosticism, and Morality.” [English] Diametros 29 (2014): 29-69. [PW] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This essay is about how four deeply important Kantian ideas can significantly illuminate some essentially intertwined issues in philosophical theology, philosophical logic, the metaphysics of agency, and above all, morality. These deeply important Kantian ideas are: (1) Kant’s argument for the impossibility of the Ontological Argument, (2) Kant’s first “postulate of pure practical reason,” immortality, (3) Kant’s third postulate of pure practical reason, the existence of God, and finally (4) Kant’s second postulate of pure practical reason, freedom.
——. Rev. of Kant on Sublimity and Morality, by Joshua Rayman (2012). The Review of Metaphysics 67.3 (2014): 664-66. [PW]
Harich, Wolfgang. Widerspruch und Widerstreit: Studien zu Kant. Edited and with an introduction by Andreas Heyer. Marburg: Tectum 2014. [571 p.] [WC]
Harrelson, Kevin J. Rev. of Hegel’s Critique of Kant: From Dichotomy to Identity, by Sally Sedgwick (2012). Journal of the History of Philosophy 52.2 (2014): 385-86. [M]
Harriman, Kevin. “Saving the Substratum: Interpreting Kant’s First Analogy.” Res Cogitans 5.1 (2014): 152-61. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant’s transcendental idealism requires that experience be both spatial and temporal. In the First Analogy of Experience, he argues that in order for experience in time to be possible, there must be something permanent in our experience. This something permanent is substance: a bearer of properties that persists and conserves its quantity throughout any empirical change. The trajectory of Kant’s argument in the First Analogy is not entirely clear and this has left room for multiple interpretations. In this paper, I introduce the First Analogy and three suggested interpretations of its argument. I defend the so-called substratum interpretation, associated with Henry Allison and Andrew Ward, from philosophical objections raised by Paul Guyer. In order to unify all of experience within a singular time-frame, we must presuppose a persistent substratum through which all experiences can be related to one another.
Hartung, Gerald. “Von der Vernunftkritik zur Kulturkritik: Ernst Cassirers Kant.” Philosophie nach Kant. Neue Wege zum Verständnis von Kants Transzendental- und Moralphilosophie. Ed. Mario Egger (op cit.). 641-53. [M]
Hatfield, Gary. “Kant on the Phenomenology of Touch and Vision.” Kant’s Lectures on Anthropology: A Critical Guide. Ed. Alix Cohen (op cit.). 38-56. [WC]
Haworth, Michael. “Genius Is What Happens: Derrida and Kant on Genius, Rule-Following and the Event.” British Journal of Aesthetics 54.3 (2014): 323-37. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This essay examines the concept of genius in the work of Jacques Derrida and Immanuel Kant and argues that, despite Derrida’s arguments to the contrary, there is significant space for convergence between the two accounts. This convergence is sought in the complex, paradoxical relationship between the invention of the new and the contextual conditions, or ‘rules’, from which any work of genius must depart but without which no work of genius would be possible. It is my argument that Kant evades the true consequences of his own thought and escapes into a naturalist metaphysics. Only Derrida reveals the aporetic logic at the heart of genius but he fails to recognise the continuity between his own argument and that of his 18th-century predecessor. Derrida’s genius, so I contend, is Kant’s genius pushed to the limit and with all transcendental guarantees removed.
Head, Jonathan. Rev. of Kant, Religion and Politics, by James J. DiCenso (2011). Kantian Review 19.1 (2014): 161-65. [M]
——. Rev. of Kant’s Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason: A Commentary, by James DiCenso (2012). British Journal for the History of Philosophy 22.1 (2014): 183-87. [PW]
Heepe, Moritz. “Die unsichtbare Hand Gottes – Kants Antinomie der praktischen Vernunft und ihre Auflösung.” Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 68.3 (2014): 328-53. [PW]
Heidemann, Dietmar H., ed. Kant Yearbook: Kant and Rationalism. Berlin: de Gruyter, 2014. [142 p.] [PW]
Note: Kant Yearbook, vol. 6 (2014). Contents:
John J. Callanan (Mendelssohn and Kant on Mathematics and Metaphysics),
Stefan Heßbrüggen-Walter (Putting Our Soul in Place),
James Messina (Kantian Space, Supersubstantivalism, and the Spirit of Spinoza),
Osvaldo Ottaviani (From ‘Possible Worlds’ to ‘Possible Experience’. Real Possibility in Leibniz and Kant),
Matthew Rukgaber (Kant’s Criticisms of Ontological and Onto-theological Arguments for the Existence of God),
Joe Saunders (Kant, Rational Psychology and Practical Reason).
Heintel, Peter. Rev. of Globale Aufklärung. Sprache und interkultureller Dialog bei Kant und Herder, by Thomas Nawrath (2009). Kant-Studien 105.2 (2014): 302-3. [M]
Heinz, Marion. “Kants Kulturtheorie.” Philosophie nach Kant. Neue Wege zum Verständnis von Kants Transzendental- und Moralphilosophie. Ed. Mario Egger (op cit.). 313-27. [M]
Heis, Jeremy. “The Priority Principle from Kant to Frege.” Nous 48.2 (2014): 268-97. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In a famous passage (A68/B93), Kant writes that “the understanding can make no other use of [...] concepts than that of judging by means of them.” Kant’s thought is often called the thesis of the priority of judgments over concepts. We find a similar sounding priority thesis in Frege: “it is one of the most important differences between my mode of interpretation and the Boolean mode [...] that I do not proceed from concepts, but from judgments.” Many interpreters have thought that Frege’s priority principle is close to (or at least derivable from) Kant’s. I argue that it is not. Nevertheless, there was a gradual historical development that began with Kant’s priority thesis and culminated in Frege’s new logic.
——. “Kant (vs. Leibniz, Wolff and Lambert) on Real Definitions in Geometry.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44.5-6 (2014): 605-30. [M]
——. Rev. of Kant’s Construction of Nature, by Michael Friedman (2013). Philosophical Review 123.3 (2014): 342-54. [PW]
Henrich, Nikolaus. Das Emissionsrecht als Sachenrecht. Begründung, Erwerb, Inhalt und Grenzen in rechtsphilosophischer Auseinandersetzung mit den Privatrechtskonzeptionen John Lockes und Immanuel Kants. Hamburg: Kovac Verlag, 2014. [360 p.] [WC]
Henschen, Tobias. “Kant on Causal Laws and Powers.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Part A 48 (2014): 20-29. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The aim of the paper is threefold. Its first aim is to defend Eric Watkins's claim that for Kant, a cause is not an event but a causal power: a power that is borne by a substance, and that, when active, brings about its effect, i.e. a change of the states of another substance, by generating a continuous flow of intermediate states of that substance. The second aim of the paper is to argue against Watkins that the Kantian concept of causal power is not the pre-critical concept of real ground but the category of causality, and that Kant holds with Hume that causal laws cannot be inferred non-inductively (that he accordingly has no intention to show in the Second analogy or elsewhere that events fall under causal laws). The third aim of the paper is to compare the Kantian position on causality with central tenets of contemporary powers ontology: it argues that unlike the variants endorsed by contemporary powers theorists, the Kantian variants of these tenets are resistant to objections that neo-Humeans raise to these tenets.
Herszenbaun, ￼Miguel Alejandro. “￼La tercera antinomia y la cosmología racional, o ¿cómo reformular el problema de la tercera antinomia en términos idealista-trascendentales?” [Spanish] Temas kantianos. Ed. Mario Caimi (op cit.). 155-82. [WC]
——. “Síntesis categorial y síntesis empírica en la formación de las ideas cosmológicas y la Antinomia de la razón pura.” [Spanish; Categorial synthesis and empirical synthesis in the formation of the cosmological ideas and the Antinomy of pure reason] Studia Kantiana 12.16 (2014): 38-51. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper offers an interpretation about the forming of the cosmological ideas and the Antinomy of pure reason. Both are based on the cosmological syllogism of the “Section VII”. I support the thesis that (1) the forming of the ideas depends on categorial synthesis which are implied and supposed in the major premise of the cosmological syllogism, whereas (2) the forming of the Antinomy depends on the intervene or involvement of empirical synthesis which give the cosmological ideas a spatio-temporal reference (in concordance with their categorial synthesis). Finally, (3) the inadequacy of the categorial synthesis to produce the contradiction that characterizes the Antinomy may help realizing the need of empirical synthesis and the involvement of time in its forming.
Heßbrüggen-Walter, Stefan. “Putting Our Soul in Place.” Kant Yearbook: Kant and Rationalism 6 (2014): 23-42. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The majority of Kant scholars has taken it for granted that for Kant the soul is in some sense present in space and that this assumption is by and large unproblematic. If we read Kant’s texts in the context of debates on this topic within 18th century rationalism and beyond, a more complex picture emerges, leading to the somewhat surprising conclusion that Kant in 1770 can best be characterised as a Cartesian about the mind. The paper first develops a framework for describing the various positions on the place of the soul in space as varieties of ‘localism’, since German philosophers of the 18th century all agreed on the fact that the soul is in some sense present in space. Strong localists (Crusius, Knutzen) maintain that the soul occupies a place that cannot at the same time be occupied by a material substance. The Königsberg Wolffian Christian Gabriel Fischer is an ‘epistemic localist’ defending the view that our knowledge about the presence of the soul in space is limited. Bilfinger holds that the soul only represents itself as being present in space, he is a ‘representational localist’. The Cartesians, including Leonhard Euler and his teacher Samuel Werenfels, assume that the soul is effective in a region of space without truly being present there. They are ‘virtual localists’. Kant’s attitude towards this problem before the 1760s is a bit unclear. But his writings in this period are at least compatible with the strong localism defended by Knutzen. In the Herder transcripts (1762-1764) and other texts after 1760, Kant begins to distance himself from this view, but he does not articulate clearly his own position. This trend culminates in Dreams of a Spirit Seer (1766), where Kant oscillates somewhat uneasily between epistemic and virtual localism and criticises explicitly the Cartesian thesis that the soul’s presence in the body is limited to a determinate region. The dissertation from 1770 marks another radical change in Kant’s views on the place of the soul. Here, he subscribes to virtual localism and its concomitant thesis that the soul itself is, properly speaking, nowhere. Together with the thesis that the soul knows that it belongs to the mundus intelligibilis this makes Kant in 1770 a Cartesian about the mind.
Hetherington, Stephen. “Transient Global Amnesia and Kantian Perception.” Think 13 (2014): 69-72. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant’s monumental Critique of Pure Reason (1781/1787) begins with his account of perception. Look around you. An experience is the result. You seem to see a chair and a person, say – your spouse at rest. A welcome sight. A gift from the world, in more than one sense. Yet not all aspects of the experience – even perhaps of its content – are coming to you from the world, according to Kant. What else is involved?
Hill, Jr., Thomas E. “Kantian Perspectives on the Rational Basis of Human Dignity.” The Cambridge Handbook of Human Dignity: Interdisciplinary Perspectives. Eds. Marcus Düwell, Jens Braarvig, Roger Brownsword, and Dietmar Mieth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). 215-21. [M]
——. “In Defense of Human Dignity: Comments on Kant and Rosen.” Understanding Human Dignity, Proceedings of the British Academy. Ed. Christopher M. McCrudden (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). 315-27. [WC]
——. “Rüdiger Bittner on Autonomy.” Erkenntnis 79, supp. 7 (2014): 1341-50. [JSTOR]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Rüdiger Bittner surveys with a skeptical eye classic and contemporary ideas of Kantian autonomy. He allows that we can be more or less free in a mode (quasi-Hobbesian) sense and that many people may want more of this freedom from impediments that make it difficult or impossible to do various things. He argues however, that high-minded general affirmations of human freedom are unfound and not likely to retain their grip on our thinking. While acknowledging the value Bittner's challenges, I raise questions about Bittner's dismissal of ideas of freedom apparently imbedded in ordinary language and his critique of the idea of autonom in Kant's ethics and broadly Kantian theories. A key issue is how to make sense o the claim that a moral law can be a law and yet also self-imposed. Given cert background assumptions about Kant's conception of autonomy of the will, the ke claim requires different interpretations when it concerns the supreme moral law (t Categorical Imperative) and when it concerns more specific moral laws (fo example, derivative principles in Kant's Doctrine of Virtue). Bittner's challenges are valuable because they require us to work out and articulate more carefully wha we mean by autonomy and why it is important. As Bittner says, Kant's idea autonomy is not the same as the ideas of autonomy that appear in medicine, politi and everyday life. Nevertheless, those who care about either have some reason to think about how these are connected.
Hills, Alison. “Gesinnung: Responsibility, Moral Worth, and Character.” Kant’s Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason: A Critical Guide. Ed. Gordon E. Michalson (op cit.). 79-97. [M]
Hoesch, Matthias. Vernunft und Vorsehung: säkularisierte Eschatologie in Kants Religions- und Geschichtsphilosophie. Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2014. [vii, 390 p.] [WC]
Hofer, Michael. “Reine Anschauung. Heinrich Barth und Kant.” Das Wirklichkeitsproblem in Transzendentalphilosophie und Metaphysik. Eds. Christian Graf und Harald Schwaetzer (Basel: Schwabe, 2014). 79-97. [WC]
Höffe, Otfried. “Holy Scriptures within the Boundaries of Mere Reason: Kant’s Reflections.” Kant’s Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason: A Critical Guide. Ed. Gordon E. Michalson (op cit.). 10-30. [M]
Hogan, Desmond. “Kant on Foreknowledge of Contingent Truths.” Res Philosophica 91.1 (2014): 47-70. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The paper examines Kant’s views on divine foreknowledge of contingent truths, in particular truths concerning free actions of creatures. It first considers the shape this traditional philosophical problem takes in the transcendental idealist context. It then situates Kant’s views relative to three competing theories of foreknowledge discussed by Leibniz. These are Molina’s theory of middle knowledge, the Thomist theory of foreknowledge through divine predeterminations, and Leibniz’s own ‘possible worlds’ theory. The paper concludes that no consistent theory of divine foreknowledge emerges in Kant’s philosophy. His discussions alternate between two inadequate and incompatible models. One is a post-volitional model suggested by his conception of the intuitive intellect’s relation to creation. Extended to creaturely free action, it is incompatible with his commitment to the relative autonomy of free action. The other is a version of Leibniz’s possible worlds solution; it cannot underwrite certain foreknowledge of determinate outcomes in a libertarian setting.
Hohenegger, Hansmichael, ed. Scritti su Kant. Raccolta di seminari e conferenze di Mirella Capozzi. [Italian] Morrisville: Lulu Press, 2014. [266 p.] [PW]
Holtman, Sarah. “Kant, Justice and Civic Fellowship.” Politics and Teleology in Kant. Eds. Paul Formosa, Avery Goldman, and Tatiana Patrone (op cit.). 110-27. [M]
——. Rev. of Kant and Cosmopolitanism: The Philosophical Ideal of World Citizenship, by Pauline Kleingeld (2012). Journal of the History of Philosophy 52.3 (2014): 616-17. [M]
Honneth, Axel. “Die Normativität der Sittlichkeit. Hegels Lehre als Alternative zur Ethik Kants.” Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 62.5 (2014): 787-800. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the following I will attempt to exonerate the contextualist Hegelian account of morality, which he introduces under the title “Sittlichkeit” or “ethical life”, from the charge of mere conventionalism. I will try to show that his concept of ethical life furnishes the author of the Philosophy of Right with a set of historically immanent criteria that allow him to distinguish, within the horizon of a given form of life, between valid norms and merely accepted ones. It will be important to present Hegel’s method in a way that avoids, as far as possible, holding it hostage to his philosophy of spirit, which can hardly serve as an acceptable premise today. Hegel’s doctrine of ethical life will be a viable option for moral philosophy only if it can be translated into an idiom that does not rely on the ontological presupposition of a universally self-realizing spirit. In a first step, I will in this way - post-metaphysically, so to speak - identify the general criteria that Hegel sets out as immanent givens of any ethical form of life (I). In a second step, I am going to examine whether this provides us with clues for discerning a certain directionality of moral development within human history (II).
Hope, Simon. “Kantian Imperfect Duties and Modern Debates over Human Rights.” The Journal of Political Philosophy 22.4 (2014): 396-415. [PW]
Horn, Christoph. Nichtideale Normativität: eine neuer Blick auf Kants politische Philosophie. Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2014. [356 p.] [WC]
Hostetler, Karin. “Kritische Verwicklungen des kultivierten Begehrens: bürgerliche Geschlechterordnung, eurozentrische “Rassen-”theorie und die Frage der Kritik bei Immanuel Kant.” Diesseits der imperialen Geschlechterforschung vol (2014): 211-40. [WC]
Hulshof, Monique. “O conceito de liberdade e a unidade sistemática entre razão teórica e razão prática em Kant.” [Portuguese; The concept of freedom and the systematic unity between theoretical and practical reason in Kant] Cadernos de Filosofia Alemã: Crítica e Modernidade 19.2 (2014): 27-37. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the Critique of Practical Reason, the concept of freedom, considered as the “keystone” for conceiving the systematic unity between the theoretical and practical uses of reason, raises a problem: its objective reality referred to supersensible practical objects can only be thought through the category of causality, which Kant had limited to sensible objects in the first Critique. This paper aims to explain how Kant solves this problem through the distinction between the theoretical use of the category of causality that involves determining objects in order to know them, and the practical meaning of this category, by which we only conceive the determination of the will to act according to the representation of the moral law.
Humphries, James. Rev. of Kant’s Questions: What is the Human Being?, by Patrick R. Frierson (2013). Journal for Eighteenth-Century Studies 37.4 (2014): 546-47. [PW]
Huneman, Philippe. “Kant vs. Leibniz in the Second Antinomy: Organisms Are Not Infinitely Subtle Machines.” Kant-Studien 105.2 (2014): 155-95. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper interprets the two pages devoted in the Critique of Pure Reason to a critique of Leibniz’s view of organisms as infinitely organized machines. It argues that this issue of organisms represents a crucial test-case for Kant in regard to the conflicting notions of space, continuity and divisibility held by classical metaphysics and by criticism. I first present Leibniz’s doctrine and its justification. In a second step, I explain the general reasoning by which Kant defines the problem of the Antinomies, and then I specify the case of the Second Antinomy. Then, I ask why the organism raises specific issues for Kant’s solution of the Second Antinomy, and why it sheds light on the nature of Leibniz’s metaphysical assumptions about organisms. The last section considers this critique of Leibniz from the perspective of Kant’s future theory of organisms in the third Critique, specifying its role in the development of a Kantian view of organisms with regard to the changes occurring at the same time in the life sciences.
——. “Purposiveness, Necessity, and Contingency.” Kant’s Theory of Biology. Eds. Ina Goy and Eric Watkins (op cit.). 185-202. [M]
Hüning, Dieter. “D'Holbachs Système de la nature: Bemerkungen zur Aufklärung über die Philosophie des französischen Materialismus.” Philosophie nach Kant. Neue Wege zum Verständnis von Kants Transzendental- und Moralphilosophie. Ed. Mario Egger (op cit.). 425-55. [M]
Illetterati, Luca. “Teleological Judgment: Between Technique and Nature.” Kant’s Theory of Biology. Eds. Ina Goy and Eric Watkins (op cit.). 81-98. [M]
Ingala Gómez, Emma. “Entre filosofía y psicoanálisis, el arte del bricolaje. Reflexiones a propósito de "contingencia del pensamiento, método escéptico, trabajo de duelo".” [Spanish; "Between Philosophy and Psychoanalysis, The Art of Do it yourself. Reflexions on “Contingency of Thought, Skeptical Method, Work of Grief” of Monique David-Ménard"] Con-Textos Kantianos 2014.1 (2014): 104-08. [M] [online]
Insole, Christopher J. “Kant and the creation of freedom: a response to Terry Godlove.” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 76.2 (2014): 111-28. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In his review of my book, Terry Godlove raises some robust objections to the exegesis of Kant that I present in my recent book, Kant and the Creation of Freedom: a Theological Problem (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2013). I respond to these criticisms in this article. Properly to locate Godlove's exegetical objections, I dedicate the first section to setting out the arc of the argument I trace. I then set out and treat in turn Godlove's main objections to my exegesis: that it depends upon an interpretation of transcendental idealism which makes the doctrine 'flatly inconsistent and probably just silly'; that I neglect the most plausible account interpretation of Kant's various statements about transcendental idealism; and that I 'pick and choose' supporting texts too narrowly, leading to an unbalanced presentation, which is too convenient to my thesis. I conclude with some general methodological reflections-stimulated by Godlove, but not aimed at him-about how historical philosophical texts are often treated. I express some anxieties about the principle of charity that underlies much current exegesis, and 'rational reconstruction' of historical texts, and I propose a case for what might be called 'creative decomposition' (not of the text, but of the self).
——. Rev. of Kant'sReligion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason: A Commentary, by James J. DiCenso (2012). Journal of the History of Philosophy 52.4 (2014): 849-50. [M]
Jacob, Margaret C. “Assessing the Cosmopolitan.” Eighteenth-Century Studies 47.3 (2014): 349-52. [JSTOR]
[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Review of Pauline Kleingeld, Kant and Cosmopolitanism: The Philosophical Ideal of World Citizenship (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) and David Adams and Galin Tihanov, eds., Enlightenment Cosmopolitanism (Oxford: Legenda, 2011).
Jakl, Bernhard. “Die Verbindlichkeit des Rechts: Kantische Überlegungen zum Verhältnis von privater und staatlicher Normenbegründung.” Das Band der Gesellschaft: Verbindlichkeitsdiskurse im 18. Jahrhundert. Eds. Simon Bunke, et al. (op cit.). 113-24. [WC]
James, Daniel. Rev. of Understanding Moral Obligation: Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard, by Robert Stern (2012). Hegel Bulletin 35.2 (2014): 325-30. [PW]
Jankowiak, Tim. “Sensations as Representations in Kant.” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 22.3 (2014): 492-513. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper defends an interpretation of the representational function of sensation in Kant's theory of empirical cognition. Against those who argue that sensations are ‘subjective representations’ and hence can only represent the sensory state of the subject, I argue that Kant appeals to different notions of subjectivity, and that the subjectivity of sensations is consistent with sensations representing external, spatial objects. Against those who claim that sensations cannot be representational at all, because sensations are not cognitively sophisticated enough to possess intentionality, I argue that Kant does not use the term ‘Vorstellung’ to refer to intentional mental states exclusively. Sensations do not possess their own intentionality, but they nevertheless perform a representational function in virtue of their role as the matter of empirical intuition. In empirical intuition, the sensory qualities given in sensation are combined with the representation of space to constitute the intuited appearance. The representational function of sensation consists in sensation being the medium out of which intuited appearances are constituted: the qualities of sensations stand in for what the understanding will judge (conceptualize) as material substance.
——, and Eric Watkins. “Meat on the Bones: Kant’s Account of Cognition in the Anthropology Lectures.” Kant’s Lectures on Anthropology: A Critical Guide. Ed. Alix Cohen (op cit.). 57-75. [WC]
——. Rev. of Kant’s Questions: What is the Human Being, by Patrick R. Frierson (2013). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (May 2014, #17). [M] [online]
Jauch, Usula Pia. Friedrichs Tafelrunde & Kants Tischgesellschaft: ein Versuch über Preussen zwischen Eros, Philosophie und Propaganda. Berlin: Matthes & Seitz, 2014. [374 p.] [WC]
Jáuregui, Claudia. “Condiciones Conceptuales de Posibilidad de la Experiencia en la Filosofía de I. Kant.” [Spanish; Conceptual Conditions of Possibility of the Experience in I. Kant’s Philosophy] Estudos Kantianos 2.1 (2014): 11-28. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper, I analyse Kant’s position about the conceptual conditions of experience, taking into account some arguments respectively presented by conceptualist and non-conceptualist Kantian interpreters. I examine the issue on two levels: a) the problem of the possibility of an intuitive access to the world, without application of the categories, and b) the problem of the possibility of an experience without application of empirical concepts. I try to defend the thesis according to which the categories are necessary and sufficient conditions for the constitution of an objective order.
——. “Regularidades empíricas y condiciones de posibilidad de la experiencia.” [Spanish] Temas kantianos. Ed. Mario Caimi (op cit.). 77-94. [WC]
Jay, Christopher. “The Kantian Moral Hazard Argument for Religious Fictionalism.” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 75.3 (2014): 207-32. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper I do three things. Firstly, I defend the view that in his most familiar arguments about morality and the theological postulates, the arguments which appeal to the epistemological doctrines of the first Critique, Kant is as much of a fictionalist as anybody not working explicitly with that conceptual apparatus could be: his notion of faith as subjectively and not objectively grounded is precisely what fictionalists are concerned with in their talk of nondoxastic attitudes. Secondly, I reconstruct a logically distinct argument to a fictionalist conclusion which I argue Kant also gives us, this time an argument to the conclusion that it is a good thing if our commitment to the existence of God is nondoxastic. And finally, I argue that this argument is of continuing interest, to Kantians and non-Kantians alike, not only because it raises interesting questions about the relation of morality to belief in God (which go in the opposite direction to most discussions, which focus on whether and to what extent belief in God can be an aid to morality), but also because this 'Moral Hazard Argument' seems to be available to religious realists and non-realists alike, thus suggesting that religious fictionalism is not by any means just an interesting version of religious non-realism.
Jesus, Paulo. Rev. of Kant’s Organicism: Epigenesis and the Development of Critical Philosophy, by Jennifer Mensch (2013). Estudos Kantianos 2.2 (2014): 315-17. [M]
Johansson, Viktor. “Perfectionist Philosophy as a (an Untaken) Way of Life.” The Journal of Aesthetic Education 48.3 (2014): 58-72. [MUSE]
[Note] [Hide Note] First Paragraph: "I am honored to respond to Paul Guyer’s elaboration on the role of examples of perfectionism in Cavell’s and Kant’s philosophies. Guyer’s appeal to Kant’s notion of freedom opens the way for suggestive readings of Cavell’s work on moral perfectionism but also, as I will show, for controversy."
Johnston, James Scott. Kant’s Philosophy: A Study for Educators. New York: Bloomsbury, 2014. [vi, 268 p.] [WC]
Jorge Filho, Edgard José. “Direito, Coerção e Livre-Arbítrio em Kant.” [Portuguese] Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 70.2-3 (2014): 455-71. [PW]
Josifovic, Sasa. Willensstruktur und Handlungsorganisation in Kants Theorie der praktischen Freiheit . Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2014. [viii, 404 p.] [WC]
Juengel, Scott J. “Late Hospitality: Kant, Radcliffe, and the Assassin at the Gate.” European Romantic Review 25.3 (2014): 289-98. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In order to exemplify the terms that govern his interdiction against lying, Immanuel Kant has recourse to a familiar scenario from the history of moral philosophy: the assassin at the gate. Can one lie in order to redirect a murderer who pursues one’s guest? This essay considers how Kant’s commitment to truth-telling supersedes his commitment to hospitable practices, and suggests how the peculiarly inhospitable worlds of the gothic novel might depend upon a similar ethical exigency. But great crimes are paroxysms, the sight of which makes one whose soul is healthy shudder.
Kahn, Samuel. “Can Positive Duties be Derived from Kant’s Formula of Universal Law?” Kantian Review 19.1 (2014): 93-108. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: According to the standard reading of Kant’s formula of universal law (FUL), positive duties can be derived from FUL. In this article, I argue that the standard reading does not work. In the first section, I articulate FUL and what I mean by a positive duty. In the second section, I set out an intuitive version of the standard reading of FUL and argue that it does not work. In the third section, I set out a more rigorous version of the standard reading of FUL and argue that even this more rigorous version does not work.
——. “The Interconnection between Willing and Believing for Kant’s and Kantian Ethics.” International Philosophical Quarterly 54.2 (2014): 143-57. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper I look at the connection between willing and believing for Kant’s and Kantian ethics. I argue that the two main formulations of the categorical imperative are relativized to agents according to their beliefs. I then point out three different ways in which Kant or a present-day Kantian might defend this position. I conclude with some remarks about the contrast between Kant’s legal theory and his ethical theory.
——. “Defending the possible consent interpretation from actual attacks.” Journal of Early Modern Studies 3.2 (2014): 88-100. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper, I defend the possible consent interpretation of Kant’s formula of humanity from objections according to which it has counterintuitive implications. I do this in two ways. First, I argue that to a great extent, the supposed counterintuitive implications rest on a misunderstanding of the possible consent interpretation. Second, I argue that to the extent that these supposed counterintuitive implications do not rest on a misunderstanding of the possible consent interpretation, they are not counterintuitive at all.
——. “Freedom, Morality, and the Propensity to Evil.” Kant Studies Online (2014): 65-90; posted April 2, 2014. [M] [online]
——. Rev. of How to Treat Persons, by Samuel J. Kerstein (2013). Kantian Review 19.2 (2014): 319-23. [M]
Kain, Patrick. Rev. of Kant on Practical Justification: Interpretive Essays, ed. by Mark Timmons and Sorin Baiasu (2013). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (Dec 2014, #3). [M] [online]
Kalpokas, Ignas. Rev. of Kant’s Political Theory: Interpretations and Applications, edited by Elizabeth Ellis (2012). Political Studies Review 12.1 (2014): 93-94. [PW]
Kalscheuer, Fiete. Autonomie als Grund und Grenze des Rechts: Das Verhältnis zwischen dem kategorischen Imperativ und dem allgemeinen Rechtsgesetz Kants. Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, 2014. [xvi, 254 p.] [PW]
Note: Kantstudien Ergänzungshefte, vol. 179. Originally appeared as the author’s Ph.D. dissertation (Kiel-Universität, 2013).
From the publisher: Kant’s notion of the universal law of right protects the individual’s general freedom of action. The question is whether this broad law of right is an inevitable consequence of Kantian moral philosophy. Can the idea of general freedom of action be derived from the categorical imperative? Using examples from constitutional court cases, Kalscheuer examines the central problem of the relationship between law and morality in Kant.
Kannisto, Tony. Rev. of Kants Prolegomena. Ein kooperativer Kommentar, edited by Holger Lyre and Oliver Schliemann (2012). Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 96.1 (2014): 144-49. [PI]
Kanterian, Edward. Rev. of Alexander Baumgarten, Metaphysics: A Critical Translation, with Kant’s Elucidations, Selected Notes, and Related Materials, edited and translated by Courtney D. Fugate and John Hymers (2013). The Review of Metaphysics 67.4 (2014): 867-69. [PW]
Kaplama, Erman. Cosmological Aesthetics through the Kantian Sublime and Nietzschean Dionysian. Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 2014. [xiv, 207 p.] [WC]
Karabük Kovanlikaya, Aliye. “Tezahürleri Sahiden Bilebilir Miyiz?” [Turkish; Can We Really Know Appearances?] Felsefi Düşün 3 (2014): pages. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant’s theoretical and practical thoughts are both grounded on the hypothesis that “Knower determines known” and on the acceptance that “Sensibility and understanding are two different cognitive faculties”. On the basis of this hypothesis Kant claims that those which can be known are not things in themselves but their appearances. Apperance is the representation which is received in conformity with a prioriforms of sensibility; i.e., space and time. In this essay, it is claimed that within the limits of Kantian framework, not only things in themselves but also their appearances cannot be known. Understanding, as a faculty of thought and therefore of judgement, can become conscious of appearance only in accordance with its own categories. The difference between the faculty which receives apperance and the faculty which becomes conscious of it, is the reason of the latter’s being unable to access the appearance as appearance.
Kart, Berfin. “Kant’ta A Priori İki İlke: Ortak Duyu ve Ahlak Yasası.” [Turkish; Two A Priori Principles In Kant’s Philosophy: Common Sense And Moral Law] Felsefi Düşün 3 (2014): 55-64??. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant’s aesthetic theory bridges his ethics and epistemology. Kant who considers art or works of art not as imitations but productions or creations of human being, investigates in his theory of taste the rules or the principles which make possible calling an object as ‘a fine art’ or ‘a fine art work’ and which provide the sameness of the pleasure I get from an art work with pleasure of other people dealing with it. According to Kant, ‘taste’ as an ability by which we evaluate and judge fine works and give aesthetical judgments is a subjective necessity designed by a principle objectively. Kant calls this principle as ‘sensus communis’. Kant underlines the importance of a principle or a rule in both ethical and aesthetical theories. Sensus communis as the principle of his aesthetical theory has some similarities with his moral law which is the principle of ethical theory. In this paper, I will try to show the similarities and the differences between Kant’s these two a priori principles: namely the moral law which provides a criterion for our acts and sensus communis which makes possible an aesthetical judgment. Within this context, I will also try to expose the fundamental concepts of Kant’s aesthetics; the meanings of art and art works according to him; the relations between his aesthetical concepts like taste, fine and pleasure.
Katsafanas, Paul. “Nietzsche and Kant on the Will: Two Models of Reflective Agency.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89.1 (2014): 185-216. [PW]
Kauark-Leite, Patrícia. “Ciência empírica, causalidade e razão suiciente em Kant.” [Portuguese; Empirical science, causality and suicient reason in Kant] Estudos Kantianos 2.2 (2014): 183-99. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In Kant’s Transcendental Analytic we find the idea that providing a causal explanation for a certain phenomenon is necessarily equivalent with providing a sufficient reason for the occurrence of that phenomenon. In this paper, I examine in detail this fundamental equivalence between the principle of causality and the principle of sufficient reason as it is presented by Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason as well as other Kantian texts. Above all, by analyzing the conlict between the dynamical and mechanical theories of matter in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, I aim to show that the principle of sufficient reason, in the context of empirical sciences, cannot be reduced to the principle of the determination of an objective temporal ordering of the objects of perception, contrary to what is argued by Longuenesse in her 2001 paper.
Kelsey, Matthew A. “Kant’s Diagnosis of the Unity of Skepticism.” Philosophers’ Imprint 14.14 (2014): 1-21. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: I explicate and defend Kant's analysis of “skepticism” as a single, metaphilosophically unified rational phenomenon (at A756–764/B784–797, for instance). Kant anticipates one of the defining trends of contemporary epistemology's approach to radical philosophical skepticism: the thought that skepticism cannot be directly refuted, by demonstrating its falsity, but must be diagnosed, to show that its premises are unnatural, and consequently fail to be rationally compelling from within our own nonskeptical standpoint. Kant's most ambitious claim here is that he will develop this diagnosis in a unitary fashion, by demonstrating that Cartesian, Humean, Pyrrhonian, and Agrippan skepticism are essentially interrelated as so many means to “the skeptic's” defining philosophical end. This “unity thesis” comes in both weak and strong variations. First, and more weakly, Kant argues that apparently distinct skeptical problematics share certain crucial metaphilosophical assumptions about the nature of reason, and the role of philosophical self-knowledge. More strongly, he also claims that the four problematics just mentioned are related hierarchically, in that the more fundamental skeptical worries constitute the essential dialectical context for the less fundamental ones, such that the more superficial problematics only arise if a logically prior worry is first acceded to. By showing how deeply these two unity theses structure Kant's Critical methodology, I argue that the Kantian view of philosophy as a “doctrine of wisdom” incorporates, and arguably surpasses, a number of key insights found in more recent work. The final result is that the transcendental philosopher may hope to co-opt the attractions of skepticism without making any unnecessary concessions along the way.
Kerstein, Samuel J. “Kantian Dignity: A Critique.” The Cambridge Handbook of Human Dignity: Interdisciplinary Perspectives. Eds. Marcus Düwell, Jens Braarvig, Roger Brownsword, and Dietmar Mieth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). 222-29. [M]
Kerszberg, Pierre. “Kant et le principe cosmologique.” Estudos Kantianos 2.2 (2014): 139-154. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Dans la Dialectique Transcendantale de la Critique de la raison pure, Kant se réfère à un “principe cosmologique” qu’il considère comme une illustration d’un principe régulateur de la raison. Le sens et la portée de ce principe sont discutés dans le cadre de la première antinomie cosmologique.
Kervégan, Jean-François. La raison des normes: essai sur Kant. Paris: Vrin, 2014. [192 p.] [WC]
Kitcher, Patricia. “Replies.” Kantian Review 19.1 (2014): 149-59. [M]
——. “Kants Unconscious ‘Given’.” Estudos Kantianos 2.2 (2014): 79-104. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant appeals to unconscious representations for reasons that are deeply connected to his distinctive theory of cognition. He is an empirical realist, accepting the Empiricist claim that cognition must be based in sensory data. He is an idealist about spatial and temporal representations. He believes that human perception is always of objects or events with temporal and spatial properties. It follows from these three claims that the sensations that must begin the process of cognition lack spatial and temporal properties and so are not perceived, but unconscious.
Klein, Joel Thiago. See: Consani,, Christina Foroni, and Joel Thiago Klein.
Kleingeld, Pauline. “Patriotism, Peace and Poverty: Reply to Bernstein and Varden.” Kantian Review 19.2 (2014): 267-84. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this essay I reply to Alyssa Bernstein and Helga Varden's comments on my book, Kant and Cosmopolitanism. In response to Bernstein, I argue that Kant's opposition to the coercive incorporation of states into an international federation should be interpreted as permitting no exceptions. In response to Varden, I clarify Kant's conception and defence of patriotism as a duty, and I show how Kantian cosmopolitans can rebut Bernard Williams's ‘one-thought-too-many’ objection. I also explicate why, given a specific feature of Kant's defence of the state's duty to provide poverty relief, an international federation can be seen to have an analogous duty.
——. “Kant’s Second Thoughts on Colonialism.” Kant and Colonialism: Historical and Critical Perspectives. Eds. Katrin Flikschuh and Lea Ypi (op cit.). 43-67. [M]
——. “Debunking Confabulation: Emotions and the Significance of Empirical Psychology for Kantian Ethics.” Kant on Emotion and Value. Ed. Alix Cohen (op cit.). 146-65. [PW]
——. “The Development of Kant’s Cosmopolitanism.” Politics and Teleology in Kant. Eds. Paul Formosa, Avery Goldman, and Tatiana Patrone (op cit.). 59-75. [M]
Kleinherenbrink, Arjen. “Time, Duration and Freedom – Bergson’s Critical Move Against Kant.” [English] Diametros 39 (2014): pages. [PW] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Research into Bergson’s philosophy downplays a key development in his first work, Time and free will. It is there that Bergson explicitly opposes himself to Kant by arguing that succession is not a temporal concept, but a spatial one. This is the crucial point of departure for Bergson’s entire philosophy, one that allows him to radically dismiss Kant’s notion of freedom in favor of one based on duration and multiplicity. This text has two aims. Firstly to add to Bergson scholarship by explicating the structure and force of Bergson’s initial argument against Kant, demonstrating that his engagement with Kant is much less incremental than has been suggested in secondary literature. Secondly, to reconstruct the consequences regarding freedom that Bergson immediately draws in departing from Kant, which illustrates the profundity and originality of his thought at the very inception of his oeuvre.
Klemme, Heiner F. “Is the Categorical Imperative the Highest Principle of Both Pure Practical and Theoretical Reason?” Kantian Review 19.1 (2014): 119-26. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In her new book, Patricia Kitcher supports Onora O’Neill’s view that the categorical imperative is the highest principle of both practical and theoretical reason. I claim that neither O'Neill's original interpretation nor Kitcher’s additional evidence in favour of it are convincing. At its core, this misconception of Kant’s position consists in the identification of self-referential critique of reason with the concept of autonomy. It will be shown that the ‘common principle’ (Kant) of both practical and theoretical reason is not the categorical imperative, but the reflective power of judgement, as Kant claims in the Critique of the Power of Judgement.
——. “Erkennen, Fühlen, Begehren – Selbstbesitz. Reflexionen über die Verbindung der Vermögen in Kants Lehre vom Kategorischen Imperativ.” Affektivität und Ethik bei Kant und in der Phänomenologie. Ed. Inga Römer (op cit.). 79-99. [M]
——. “Freiheit oder Fatalismus? Kants positive und negative Deduktion der Idee der Freiheit in der Grundlegung (und seine Kritik an Christian Garves Antithetik von Freiheit und Notwendigkeit).” Kants Rechtfertigung des Sittengesetzes in Grundlegung III. Ed. Heiko Puls (op cit.). 59-102. [PW]
——. “Gehören hypothetische Imperative zur prakischen Philosophie? Wille und praktische Vernunft in Kants Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten und in der ‘Ersten Einleitung’ in die Kritik der Urteilskraft.” il cannocchiale 39.1 (2014): 209-31. [PW]
Klingner, Stefan. Rev. of Geist – Kultur – Gesellschaft. Versuch einer Prinzipientheorie der Geisteswissenschaften auf transzendentalphilosophischer Grundlage, by Bernard Grünewald (2009). Kant-Studien 105.1 (2014): 145-49. [M]
Kneller, Jane. Rev. of Community and Progress in Kant’s Moral Philosophy, by Kate Moran (2012). Kantian Review 19.3 (2014): 495-500. [M]
Knoepffler, Nikolaus. Schlüsselbegriffe der Philosophie Immanuel Kants. Transzendentalität und Menschenwürde. Munich: Utz, 2014. [274 p.] [WC]
Kobe, Zdravko. Automaton transcendentale. 3, Kantova teorija subjekta. [Slovenian] Ljubljana: Drustvo za teoretsko psihoanalizo, 2014. [260 p.] [WC]
Kochhar-Lindgren, Gray. Kant in Hong Kong: Walking, Thinking, and the City. Roskilde: EyeCorner Press, 2014. [127 p.] [WC]
Koehn, Daryl. “Kantian Virtue Ethics in the Context of Business: How Practically Useful Can It Be?” Business Ethics Journal Review 2.3 (2014): 15-21. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Claus Dierksmeier admirably combats the misperception that Kant is a deontologist with no regard for virtue. Dierksmeier contends Kant offers a theory of virtue that can contribute in significant ways to advancing the analysis of, e.g., stakeholder theory and internal compliance programs. His plea that business ethicists should view Kant as a resource for thinking more widely and deeply about virtue seems eminently sensible. However, there are grounds for questioning whether a Kantian approach will be of much help in thinking through the ethics of real world business practices.
Kohl, Markus. “Transcendental and Practical Freedom in the Critique of Pure Reason.” Kant-Studien 105.3 (2014): 313-35. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: To many readers, it has seemed that Kant’s discussion of the relation between practical and transcendental freedom in the Transcendental Dialectic is inconsistent with his discussion of the same relation in the Canon of Pure Reason. In this paper I argue for a novel way of preserving the consistency of Kant’s view: in both the Dialectic and the Canon, ‘transcendental freedom’ requires the absence of determination by all natural causes, whereas ‘practical freedom’ requires the absence of determination by, specifically, sensuous incentives. However, I argue that the defense of freedom presented in the Canon is abandoned by Kant in the Groundwork when he first develops his conception of the absolute purity of moral motivation.
——. Rev. of Kant on Practical justification: Interpretive Essays, edited by Mark Timmons and Sorin Baiasu (2013). Kantian Review 19.2 (2014): 332-38. [M]
Korsgaard, Christine M. “From Duty and for the Sake of the Noble: Kant and Aristotle on Morally Good Action.” Kant on Emotion and Value. Ed. Alix Cohen (op cit.). 33-68. [PW]
Krijnen, Christian, and Kurt Walter Zeidler, eds. Wissenschaftsphilosophie im Neukantianismus: Ansätze, Kontroversen, Wirkungen. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2014. [380 p.] [WC]
Note and Contents: Studien und Materialien zum Neukantianismus, vol. 32. Conference proceedings from 2012 (Vienna).
C Krijnen (Transzendentaler Idealismus und empirischer Realismus),
G. Edel (Hypothesis: Die Grundlegung ist die Grundlage),
K. W. Zeidler (Begriff und ‚Faktum‘ der Wissenschaft),
W. Flach (Die Artikulation der Wissenschaftsphilosophie im Werk Bruno Bauchs),
E. Nemeth (Überlegungen zu Michael Friedmans ‚Ernst Cassirer and Thomas Kuhn‘),
T. Kubalica (Die Begriffsbildung in der Kritik der Abbildtheorie durch Heinrich Rickert),
M. Ferrari (Neukantianismus und Relativitätstheorie),
G. Schiemann (Hermann von Helmholtz’ Kantkritik),
V. Peckhaus (Das Erkenntnisproblem und die Mathematik. Zum Streit zwischen dem Marburger Neukantianismus und dem Neofriesianismus),
S. L. Paulson (Das regulative Prinzip als Rettung der Reinen Rechtslehre Hans Kelsens?),
U. Wolfradt (Neukantianismus und Psychologie. Ein kritisches Verhältnis und die Konsequenzen),
P.-U. Merz-Benz (Soziologie als Erkenntniskritik. Zur Genesis der Soziologie aus der Philosophie des Neukantianismus),
W. Schmied-Kowarzik (Die Stellung der Pädagogik im System der Wissenschaften. Zu Jonas Cohn, Paul Natorp und Richard Hönigswald).
——, Massimo Ferrari, and Pierfrancesco Fiorato, eds. Kulturphilosophie: Probleme und Perspektiven des Neukantianismus. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2014. [283 p.] [WC]
MASSIMO FERRARI (Neukantianismus und Kulturphilosophie),
CHRISTIAN KRIJNEN (Das Dasein der Freiheit. Geltungsrealisierung bei Hegel und in der Kantianisierenden Transzendentalphilosophie),
CHRISTIAN BERMES (Deutung oder Praxis? Die Tasachen der Kultur und Wittgensteins Kulturphilosophie),
MARGRET HEITMANN (Über Kulturkritik und Selbstgestaltung. Anmerkungen zu Jonas Cohns Ansichten und Erwägungen zur „Lage der Philosophie"),
PIERFRANCESO FIORATO (Hermann Cohen über das Problem der Einheit der Kultur),
PETER-ULRICH MERZ-BENZ (Transkulturalität, Transdifferenz und die Wertsphäre. Ein Kapitel der neueren Kulturtheorie und die Kulturphilosophie des Neukantianismus),
DETLEV PÄTZOLD (Descartes, Kant und die Wandlungen des neuzeitlichen Naturbegriffs aus Cassirers kulturphilosophischer Perspektive),
KURT WALTER ZEIDLER (Das unvollendete Projekt. Theorie der Kultur oder der Vernunft?),
MARC DE LAUNAY (Kontemplation im Bild reflektiert. Zur Dialektik der Cassirerschen symbolischen Formen. Am Beispiel der Malerei),
TOMASZ KUBALICA (Von Johannes Volkelts Ästhetik des Tragischen zur Kulturphilosophie),
THOMAS KNOPPE Philosophische Regressionsanlyse: Ernst Cassirers Mythos des Staates),
PELLEGRINO FAVUZZI (Die Kulturphilosophie in den frühen Schriften Ernst Cassirers).
Kubsda, Michael. Selbstreflexion und Emanzipation: Aufklärung als Terminus in Kants kritischer Philosophie. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2014. [167 p.] [WC]
Kuehn, Manfred. “Kant’s Jesus.” Kant’s Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason: A Critical Guide. Ed. Gordon E. Michalson (op cit.). 156-74. [M]
——. “Immanuel Kant.” The Routledge Companion to Eighteenth Century Philosophy. Ed. Aaron Garrett (New York: Routledge). 812-20. [WC]
——. “Kant and Fichte on ‘Universal History’.” Internationales Jahrbuch des Deutschen Idealismus/International Yearbook of German Idealism: Geschichte/History, eds. Jürgen Stolzenberg and Fred Rush. 10 (2014): 37-53. [PW]
Kulenkampff, Jens. “Kant antwortet Hume: Die Analytik des Schönen im Lichte von Humes Abhandlung ‘Of the Standard of Taste’.” David Hume nach dreihundert Jahren. Historische Kontexte und systematische Perspektiven. Eds. Frank Brosow and Heiner F. Klemme (Münster: Mentis, 2014). 93-115. [WC]
Kuliniak, Radoslaw, and Tomasz Malyszek. Johann Heinrich Lambert und Kants Reform der Metaphysik. Dresden: Neisse Verlag, 2014. [190 p.] [WC]
Kumar, Apaar. “Kant’s Definition of Sensation.” Kant Studies Online (2014): 262-311; posted October 3, 2014. [M] [online]
——. Rev. of Kant and the Subject of Critique: On the Regulative Role of the Psychological Idea, by Avery Goldman (2012). Journal of the History of Philosophy 52.1 (2014): 175-76. [M]
Kupś, Tomasz. “Die Philosophie von Kant in den Auseinandersetzungen von Wissenschaftlern über die Universitätsausbildungsmöglichkeiten auf den Gebieten der Ersten Polnischen Republik zu Beginn des 19. Jhs.” Studia Philosophica Kantiana 2014.1 (2014): 23-39. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: I would like to draw attention to the argument which accompanied the attempts to preserve the cultural identity of Poles when the structures of the First Republic of Poland ceased to exist. It is within this period when the earliest Polish reception of Kant’s philosophy took place which caused it was entangled in political context. The authors of educational reforms within the lands of the former Republic of Poland had to choose the right form of the education of youth. The most influential reformers firmly opposed introducing Kant’s philosophy in university education. The paper sketches the most important aspects of the conflict between Polish followers of Kant (Józef Kalasanty Szaniawski, Franciszek Wigura) and the opponents of German philosophy (Jan Śniadecki, Hugo Kołłątaj, Stanisław Staszic).
——, ed. Recepcja filozofii Immanuela Kanta w filozofii polskiej w poczatkach XIX wieku. [Polish; Reception of the philosopy of Immanuel Kant in Polish philosophy in the early nineteenth century] Torun: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Mikolaja Kopernika, 2014. [266 p.] [WC]
Kuster, Friederike. “Republikaner ohne Republik: eine Konstellation um 1800.” Philosophie nach Kant. Neue Wege zum Verständnis von Kants Transzendental- und Moralphilosophie. Ed. Mario Egger (op cit.). 457-71. [M]
Land, Thomas. “Spatial Representation, Magnitude and the Two Stems of Cognition.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44.5-6 (2014): 524-50. [M]
——. “On Stefanie Grüne’s Blinde Anschauung.” Critique (blog posted: 21 Aug 2014) n.p. [PW] [online]
——. “Reply to Stefanie Grüne’s Reply.” Critique (blog posted: 27 Aug 2014) n.p. [PW] [online]
Landmann, Tino. Der Begriff des Pflichtzwecks in der Tugendlehre Immanuel Kants. Das Verhältnis von Form und Materie im Projekt einer Ethik als Metaphysik der Sitten. Hamburg: Kovac Verlag, 2014. [264 p.] [WC]
Landy, David. “A Rebuttal to a Classic Objection to Kant’s Argument in the First Analogy.” History of Philosophy Quarterly 31.4 (2014): 331-46. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant's argument in the First Analogy for the permanence of substance has been cast as consisting of a simple quantifierscope mistake. Kant is portrayed as illicitly moving from a premise such as (1) at all times, there must exist some substance, to a conclusion such as (2) some particular substance must exist at all times. Examples meant to show that Kant makes this mistake feature substances coming into and out of existence, but doing so at overlapping times. I argue that Kant offers an argument against this kind of example in the following passage. Kant's claim is that, were substances to be created and destroyed as in the example, the appearances would then be related to two different times, in which existence flowed side by side, which is absurd. For there is only one time, in which all different times must not be placed simultaneously but only one after another (A188–9/B231–32).
Lang, Berhnard. “Three Philosophers in Paradise: Kant, Tillich and Ricoeur Interpret and Respond to Genesis 3.” SJOT: Scandinavian Journal of the Old Testament 28.2 (2014): 298-314. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The story of the first sin, committed by Adam and Eve in paradise, has not only attracted the attention of biblical scholars. Philosophers have also shown much interest in the story. Study of the relevant work of Kant, Tillich and Ricoeur reveals two opposing ways of philosophically reading the biblical story and similar myths about the fate of the first human beings. According to the first way of reading, best represented by Kant and his followers, including Schiller, the fall was a fortunate event, one that set humanity on the path of development and progress. According to the second, represented by Tillich and Ricoeur, it was a tragic event, but one that had its merits, for it allowed humans to develop their own potentialities. Freedom was obtain at the cost of being estranged from humankind’s divine ground of being.
Langbehn, Lorenzo. “La concepción kantiana del método matemático en su escrito Sobre la nitidez de los principios de la teología natural y la moral.” [Spanish] Temas kantianos. Ed. Mario Caimi (op cit.). 17-40. [WC]
Langthaler, Rudolf. Geschichte, Ethik und Religion im Anschluss an Kant: Philosophische Perspektiven “Zwischen Skeptischer Hoffnungslosigkeit und Dogmatischem Trotz”. 2 vols. Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2014. [1343 p.] [WC]
Lapointe, Sandra, and Chloe Armstrong. “Bolzano, Kant, and Leibniz.” New Anti-Kant. Eds. Sandra Lapointe and Clinton Tolley (op cit.). 272-90. [PW]
——, and Clinton Tolley, eds. New Anti-Kant. Hampshire-New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. [xii, 295 p.] [WC]
[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Includes a translation into English of František Příhonský, Neuer Anti-Kant, oder Prüfung der Kritik der reinen Vernunft nach den in Bolzano’s Wissenschaftslehre niedergelegten Begriffen (1850), and four supporting essays by Tolley, Nicholas F. Stang, Timothy Rosenkoetter, and Lapointe/Chloe Armstrong.
Lau, Chong-Fuk. “Kant’s Transcendental Functionalism.” The Review of Metaphysics 68.2 (2014): 371-94. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper develops a new functionalist interpretation of Kant that aims to unify his cognitive psychology with transcendental idealism. It argues that Kant’s faculty of cognition describes neither the phenomenal nor the noumenal mind, but a theoretical construct of the transcendental subject, comparable to the abstract Turing machine. This interpretation can be called “transcendental functionalism,” which determines what functions the mind has to realize if it is to be capable of objective cognition. Transcendental functionalism resolves problems associated with other functionalist interpretations of Kant by drawing a systematic distinction between transcendental cognitive functions and their empirical realizations. While transcendental functions stipulate abstract conceptual requirements, their empirical counterparts realize the functional constraints in appearances within the spatiotemporal and causal framework. This distinction also allows a better explanation of why Kant abandoned the subjective deduction of categories in the B-deduction.
Laywine, Alison. “Kant on Conic Sections.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44.5-6 (2014): 719-58. [M]
Le Quitte, Samuel. “Sensibilité et moralité: la lecture husserlienne de Kant.” De la sensibilité: les esthétiques de Kant. Eds. François Calori, Michaël Foessel, and Dominique Pradelle (op cit.). 307-20. [M]
Leech, Jessica. “Making Modal Distinctions: Kant on the Possible, the Actual, and the Intuitive Understanding.” Kantian Review 19.3 (2014): 339-65. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: One striking contrast that Kant draws between the kind of cognitive capacities that humans have and alternative kinds of intellect concerns modal concepts. Whilst ‘it is absolutely necessary for the human understanding to distinguish between the possibility and the actuality of things’ (5: 401), the very distinction between possibility and actuality would not arise for an intuitive understanding. The aim of this paper is to explore in more detail how the functioning of these cognitive capacities relates to modal concepts, and to provide a model of the intuitive understanding, in order to draw some general lessons for our ability to make modal judgements, and the function of such judgements.
Lemos, Fabiano. “Kant e o monstro.” [Portuguese] Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia 55.129 (2014): 189-203. [PW] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This work intends to evaluate the origins and developments of the symbolic and heuristic function at stake in the term Ungeheuer [the monster or the monstrous] within Kant's philosophy, regarding the rising horizon of modern rationality. A reconfiguration of the Monster and Monstrous imagery seems to take place right at the moment when modern philosophy had to reflect upon its own identity and limits. Kant's thought, that occupies – de jure or de facto – a central place within this rupture could exemplarily, but not obviously, show the path of such transformation.
Lepe-Carrión, Patricio. “Racismo filosófico: el concepto de 'raza' en Immanuel Kant.” [Portuguese; Philosophical racism: The concept of ‘race’ in Immanuel Kant] Filosofia UNISINOS 15.1 (2014): 67-83. [ASP]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this article we will review the anthropological work of the Prussian philosopher Immanuel Kant, in its relationship with the scientific instrumentalization by imperial policies of the time, and from the point of view of the Latin American postcolonial (decolonial) perspective. Our goal is to explore Kant’s idea of ‘race’ in his courses on anthropology and physical geography, which allows us to broaden our understanding of the scope that this kind of philosophical racism had in the European view of the ‘savage’ (in America, Asia and Africa) and of the hermeneutical implications that the concept of ‘race’had in the philosophy of history.
Lerussi, Natalia A. “Acerca de la analogía de la razón con lo orgánico. Reflexiones en torno a la expresión ‘epigénesis de la razón pura’ en Kritik der reinen Vernunft B §27.” [Spanish] Temas kantianos. Ed. Mario Caimi (op cit.). 113-36. [WC]
Leserre, Daniel. “Kant y la filosofía del lenguaje: una indicación.” [Spanish] Temas kantianos. Ed. Mario Caimi (op cit.). 393-419. [WC]
Lipscomb, Benjamin J. Rev. of Kant and the Creation of Freedom: A Theological Problem, by Christopher J. Insole (2013). Journal of the History of Philosophy 52.4 (2014): 850-51. [M]
Loidolt, Sophie. “Achten, Durchfühlen, Ansinnen. Affektive Begegnisweisen der praktischen Vernunft.” Affektivität und Ethik bei Kant und in der Phänomenologie. Ed. Inga Römer (op cit.). 205-20. [M]
Longuenesse, Béatrice. “Kants ‘Ich’ in ‘Ich soll ...’ und Freuds Über-Ich.” Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 62.3 (2014): 365-81. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant’s and Freud’s respective investigations of the mind obey fundamentally different concerns. And yet their views of the structure of our mental life are strikingly similar. The article explores some of those similarities. It compares Kant’s transcendental unity of apperception and the organization of mental processes Freud calls ‘ego’ (Ich). It then proceeds to compare Kant’s categorical imperative of morality and Freud’s structure of ego/superego (Ich/ÜberIch). Freud’s structural view of the mind, it is suggested, might offer a developmental account of just those aspects of mental life Kant thought could be explained only by appealing to our belonging in a noumenal world escaping the deterministic laws of the natural world. However, Freud’s approach is exclusively developmental. He does not take any position on questions of justification, the very questions that are central to Kant’s concern. The paper offers a cautious response to the question: what remains, under the Freudian developmental account, of the justificatory ambition of Kant’s formulation of the categorical imperative as an imperative of pure practical reason?
Loogen, Dominik. Vom transzendentalen Subjekt zum transitorischen Ich: Novalis und Wilhelm von Humboldt antworten auf Kant und Fichte. Berlin: Bachmann, 2014. [265 p.] [WC]
Lories, Danielle. “Sens commun, de la tradition anglo-saxonne à Kant.” De la sensibilité: les esthétiques de Kant. Eds. François Calori, Michaël Foessel, and Dominique Pradelle (op cit.). 127-42. [M]
Lorini, Gualtiero. Il sistema della metafisica nella didattica kantiana. [Italian] Milan: AlboVersorio, 2014. [233 p.] [WC]
——. “The Origins of the Transcendental Subjectivity: On Baumgarten’s Psychology.” Philosophica 44 (2014): 107-26. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Scholars are prone to emphasize A.G. Baumgarten’s foundation of aesthetics as a discipline in its own right and Kant’s use of Baumgarten’s Metaphysica as a handbook for his lectures on metaphysics. Nonetheless there are some further and deeper reasons for Baumgarten to mark a division between the so called Leibnizian-Wolffian tradition and the Kantian transcendental revolution. The goal of this paper is to take into account these reasons and to analyze them in order to show that they are rooted in psychology as it is treated in Baumgarten’s Metaphysica. The paper’s aim is to highlight Baumgarten’s methodological approach, that is, the use of Leibnizian doctrines, which are exposed through the Wolffian order. The radical originality of this procedure can be adequately assessed only by virtue of its Kantian development.
——. “The Wholeness (universitas) within Kant’s Inaugural Dissertation: a Note Concerning Pantaleo Carabellese’s Interpretation.” Studi Kantiani 27 (2014): 51-68. [PW]
——. Rev. of Crítica da razão pura. Tradução e notas de Fernando Costa Mattos, by Immanuel Kant, translated with notes by Fernando Costa Mattos (2012). Estudos Kantianos 2.2 (2014): 319-22. [M]
Louden, Robert. “The Last Frontier: Exploring Kant’s Geography.” Society and Space 32.3 (2014): 450-65. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The first full English translation of Friedrich Theodor Rink’s edition of Kant’s Physical Geography was finally published in 2012, and several significant transcriptions of Kant’s classroom lectures on physical geography are still forthcoming in volume 26 of the German Academy edition of his Collected Writings. Why has Kant’s work on geography suffered from so much neglect? Contrary to received scholarly wisdom, I argue that the main cause of the neglect is not Rink’s editorial sloppiness. Rather, Kant’s Geography is simply not viewed as being as important as his ethics, logic, metaphysics, theology, and anthropology. In my paper I argue that Kant’s Geography deserves our respect, and I present four key reasons for taking it seriously.
——. “Nietzsche as Kant’s True Heir?” Journal of Nietzsche Studies 45.1 (2014): 22-30. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this short article, I present several challenges to Maudemarie Clark and David Dudrick’s bold claim that one of Nietzsche’s main goals in Beyond Good and Evil is to establish himself as “Kant’s true heir.” First, I critique their argument that the prefaces to the Critique of Pure Reason and BGE bear a “striking similarity” to each other. Second, I try to refute their claim that Nietzsche in BGE 11 is “positioning himself … as the true successor to Kant.” Nietzsche does not exhibit the positive interest in the a priori that one expects from even the most minimal Kantian, and his norms are hardly Kant’s. Finally, in my conclusion, I draw some qualified connections between Nietzsche’s normative project and a more naturalistic option within the history of philosophy – namely, American pragmatism.
——. “Cosmopolitical Unity: The Final Destiny of the Human Species.” Kant’s Lectures on Anthropology: A Critical Guide. Ed. Alix Cohen (op cit.). 211-29. [WC]
——. “Kant and the World History of Humanity.” Internationales Jahrbuch des Deutschen Idealismus/International Yearbook of German Idealism: Geschichte/History, eds. Jürgen Stolzenberg and Fred Rush. 10 (2014): 3-17. [PW]
——. “Kantian Anthropology: A Science Like No Other.” Estudos Kantianos 2.2 (2014): 201-15. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this essay I begin by examining Kant’s criteria for “proper science” as presented in the Preface to his Metaphysical Foundations of Science, and then ask whether Kantian anthropology can possibly qualify as a proper science according to these demanding criteria. I defend a qualified ‘yes’ answer to this question, while also drawing attention to several less tidy aspects of his anthropology project that are difficult to fit onto the Procrustean bed of science.
Lu-Adler, Huaping. “Kant on the Logical Form of Singular Judgements.” Kantian Review 19.3 (2014): 367-92. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: At A71/B96–7 Kant explains that singular judgements are ‘special’ because they stand to the general ones as Einheit to Unendlichkeit. The reference to Einheit brings to mind the category of unity and hence raises a spectre of circularity in Kant’s explanation. I aim to remove this spectre by interpreting the Einheit-Unendlichkeit contrast in light of the logical distinctions among universal, particular and singular judgments shared by Kant and his logician predecessors. This interpretation has a further implication for resolving a controversy over the correlation between the logical moments of quantity (universal, particular, singular) and the categorial ones (unity, plurality, totality).
Ludwig, Bernd. “Die Freiheit des Willens und die Freiheit zum Bösen. Inhaltliche Inversionen und terminologische Ausdifferenzierungen in Kants Moralphilosophie zwischen 1781 und 1797.” Kants Rechtfertigung des Sittengesetzes in Grundlegung III. Ed. Heiko Puls (op cit.). 227-68. [PW]
——. “‘Ohne alles moralische Gefühl ist kein Mensch...’ – lebendige, vernünftige und sittliche Weltwesen bei Kant.” Affektivität und Ethik bei Kant und in der Phänomenologie. Ed. Inga Römer (op cit.). 117-42. [M]
Mackenzie, Catriona. See: Formosa, Paul and Catriona Mackenzie.
Macleod, Christopher. “The Roots of Romantic Cognitivism: (Post) Kantian Intellectual Intuition and the Unity of Creation and Discovery.” European Romantic Review 25.4 (2014): 403-22. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: During the romantic period, various authors expressed the belief thatthrough creativity, we can directly access truth. To modern ears, this claim sounds strange. In this paper, I attempt to render the position comprehensible, and to show how it came to seem plausible to the romantics. I begin by offering examples of this position as found in the work of the British romantics. Each thinks that the deepest knowledge can only be gained by an act of creativity. I suggest the belief should be seen in the context of the post-Kantian embrace of “intellectual intuition.” Unresolved tensions in Kant's philosophy had encouraged a belief that creation and discovery were not distinct categories. The post-Kantians held that in certain cases of knowledge (for Fichte, knowledge of self and world; for Schelling, knowledge of the Absolute) the distinction between discovering a truth and creating that truth dissolves. In this context, the cognitive role assigned to acts of creativity is not without its own appeal.
Maddy, Penelope. The Logical Must: Wittgenstein on Logic. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014. [x, 135 p.] [WC]
Mahon, James Edwin. Rev. of Kant’s Theory of Virtue: The Value of Autocracy, by Anne Margaret Baxley (2010). Journal of Moral Philosophy 11.2 (2014): 245-48. [PW]
Makkreel, Rudolf A. “Self-cognition and Self-assessment.” Kant’s Lectures on Anthropology: A Critical Guide. Ed. Alix Cohen (op cit.). 18-37. [WC]
Malabou, Catherine. Avant demain: épigenèse et rationalité. Paris: PUF, 2014. [x, 337 p.] [WC]
——. “Can We Relinquish the Transcendental?” Journal of Speculative Philosophy 28.3 (2014): 242-55. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Is contemporary continental European philosophy preparing itself to break with Kant? An attack upon supposedly indestructible structures of knowledge is happening today: finitude of the subject, phenomenal given, a priori synthesis. "Relinquishing the transcendental": such is the leading project of postcritical thinking in the early twenty-first century as it appears in Quentin Meillassoux’s book After Finitude. Some questions that we thought could never be raised after the Critique of Pure Reason are reappearing with a renewed force: Was Kant genuinely able to deduce categories instead of imposing them, to prove the necessity of nature, to found the difference between "a priori" and "innate"? Should we consider, on the contrary, that the "problem of Hume" — the existence of an irreducible contingency of the world — has never been settled by the Transcendental Deduction? Such a claim implies that we are provided a sufficiently convincing concept of the irregularity of the laws of nature and of the possibility of a totally different world. Does After Finitude elaborate such concepts?
Maliks, Reidar. Kant’s Politics in Context. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. [xii, 195 p.] [WC]
——, ed. See: Føllesdal, Andreas, and Reidar Maliks, eds.
Malyszek, Tomasz. See: Kuliniak, Radoslaw, and Tomasz Malyszek.
Marcolungo, Ferdinando Luigi. “‘Schlechthin nothwendiges Wesen’: en marge de la quatrieme antinomie.” [French] Trans/Form/Ação 37.3 (2014): 33-44. [PW] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The challenge of the antinomies plays a decisive role in the development of Kantian thought. This becomes particularly significant with reference to the absolutely necessary Being, which should exceed the phenomenal domain even when, as Kant says in the fourth antinomy, it is considered as a part of the world. In the structure of the antinomies we are pushed beyond experience towards a Being which radically transcends the world; in this sense, even within Kantian thought, the classical analogy remains the specific structure of metaphysics, especially by virtue of the possibility of expressing transcendence without reducing it to the phenomenal level.
Marey, Macarena. “Sobre las Críticas de Kant a Gottlieb Hufeland, con una Traducción de Recensión del Ensayo Sobre el Principio del Derecho Natural, de Gottlieb Hufeland.” [Spanish; On Some Kantian Criticisms of Gottlieb Hufeland’s Essay, with a Spanish Translation of Recension Von Gottlieb Hufeland’s Versuch Über den Grundsatz des Naturrechts] Estudos Kantianos 2.1 (2014): 107-24. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this article, I analyse some concise criticisms Kant made of Gottlieb Hufeland’s Versuch über den Grundsatz des Naturrechts in his 1786 review of this text. My systematic aim is to cast some light on the way Kant understood a shortcoming of the modern natural law tradition, namely, its incapacity to place juridical philosophy within the wider frame of practical philosophy, without thereby turning it into an ethical theory. My paper has three parts. In the first one, I present my Spanish translation of Kant’s “Recension von Gottlieb Hufeland’s Versuch über den Grundsatz des Naturrechts”, which was published in the Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung on April 18th, 1786 and was not, as far as I could learn, made available in Spanish before. Before this, I briefly comment on three other not so amicable reviews of Hufeland’s Versuch. In the second part, I deal with the main aspects of Hufeland’s understanding of Kant’s thought, as they appear in his book and insofar as they are related to those tenets of Hufeland’s natural law system Kant decided to underline. In the third and last part of the article, I study the meaning of Kant’s interest in Hufeland’s essay and the significance of his criticisms of it within the flow of the development of his juridical and political philosophy. I maintain that Kant’s review of Hufeland is an important text within the wider framework of his criticism of modern natural lawyers, as they are put forward, for instance, in Kant’s lessons on natural law and, most of all, within the frame of Kant’s counterproposal of freeing natural law from teleological justifications and its principle from determined ends (such as perfection or happiness), and basing it upon external freedom.
——. “La perspectiva de la voluntad omnilateral: la reformulación kantiana de la tradición contractualista.” [Spanish] Temas kantianos. Ed. Mario Caimi (op cit.). 233-58. [WC]
——. Rev. of Ideas y valores. Revista colombiana de filosofía (2013). Con-Textos Kantianos 2014.1 (2014): 162-66. [M] [online]
Marius, Stan. “Kant’s Natural-Scientific Output.” Metascience 23.1 (2014): 65-70. [PI]
Marques, Ubirajara Rancan de Azevedo. “Rameau, Rousseau and Kant on Music.” Studi Kantiani 27 (2014): 39-50. [PW]
Marshall, Colin. “Does Kant Demand Explanations for All Synthetic A Priori Claims?” Journal of the History of Philosophy 52.3 (2014): 549-76. [M]
Martel, James R. The One and Only Law: Walter Benjamin and the Second Commandment. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2014. [viii, 254 p.] [JSTOR]
Marthaler, Ingo. Bewusstes Leben: Moral und Glück bei Immanuel Kant. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2014. [155 p.] [WC]
Martínez, Luciana María. “Las nociones de claridad y oscuridad en los Apuntes de Lecciones de Antropología de la “década silenciosa” de Kant.” [Spanish; The notions of clarity and obscurity in the Anthropology Notes during Kant’s “silent decade”] Studia Kantiana 12.17 (2014): 27-50. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The aim of this paper is to characterize the treatment of the concepts of clarity and obscurity in the Anthropology Notes during Kant’s “silent decade”. This paper contains three parts. First, we describe the conditions of clarity and obscurity of our representations. Second, we reconstruct the argument by which Kant questioned the way in which Baumgarten presented these notions in the part of empirical psychology of his Metaphysics. Finally, we expose two pragmatic aspects of the investigation about these notions: (i) it allows the elucidation of some subjective conditions for the possibility of science, (ii) it facilitates the understanding of an aspect on human nature, thereby it gives a helpful resource for our intervention in worldly life.
——. “Algunas consideraciones acerca de la noción de substancia en la sección ‘De los paralogismos de la razón pura’ de la Crítica de la razón pura.” [Spanish] Temas kantianos. Ed. Mario Caimi (op cit.). 137-54. [WC]
Marzano, Silvia. L’eredità di Kant e la linea ebraica. [Italian] Milan: Mimesis, 2014. [288 p.] [WC]
Marzolf, Hedwig. “Esthétique et religion: la question schillérienne de la grâce.” De la sensibilité: les esthétiques de Kant. Eds. François Calori, Michaël Foessel, and Dominique Pradelle (op cit.). 229-42. [M]
Massimi, Michela. “Prescribing laws to nature. Part I. Newton, the pre-Critical Kant, and three problems about the lawfulness of nature.” Kant-Studien 105.4 (2014): 491-508. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper traces the early reflections of the pre-Critical Kant on laws of nature back to Newton’s governing conception of laws. Three problems with the Newtonian conception are identified. I argue that in the attempt to provide a solution to them, in 1763 Kant came to forge a novel governing conception of laws. Key to Kant’s novel view are the notions of ground and its determinations. The role of these two notions in delivering the nomological necessity, explanatory power, and unity of the laws of nature is discussed and analysed.
——. “Natural Kinds and Naturalised Kantianism.” Nous 48.3 (2014): 416-49. [PW]
Matherne, Samantha. “The Kantian Roots of Merleau-Ponty’s Account of Pathology” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 22.1 (2014): 124-49. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: One of the more striking aspects of Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception (1945) is his use of psychological case studies in pathology. For Merleau-Ponty, a philosophical interpretation of phenomena like aphasia and psychic blindness promises to shed light not just on the nature of pathology, but on the nature of human existence more generally. In this paper, I show that although Merleau-Ponty is surely a pioneer in this use of pathology, his work is deeply indebted to an earlier philosophical study of pathology offered by the German Neo-Kantian Ernst Cassirer in the third volume of the Philosophy of Symbolic Forms (1929). More specifically, I argue that Merleau-Ponty, in fact, follows Cassirer in placing Kant's notion of the productive imagination at the centre of his account of pathology and the features of existence it illuminates. Recognizing the debt Merleau-Ponty's account of pathology has to the Kantian tradition not only acts as a corrective to more recent interpretation of Merleau-Ponty's views of pathology (Dreyfus, Romdenh-Romluc), but also recommends we resist the prevailing tendency to treat Merleau-Ponty's philosophy as anti-Kantian. Instead, my interpretation seeks to restore Merleau-Ponty's place within the Kantian tradition.
——. “Kant’s Expressive Theory of Music.” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 72.2 (2014): 129-45. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Several prominent philosophers of art have worried about whether Kant has a coherent theory of music on account of two perceived tensions in his view. First, there appears to be a conflict between his formalist and expressive commitments. Second (and even worse), Kant defends seemingly contradictory claims about music being beautiful and merely agreeable, that is, not beautiful. Against these critics, I show that Kant has a consistent view of music that reconciles these tensions. I argue that, for Kant, music can be experienced as either agreeable or beautiful depending on the attitude we take toward it. Although it is tempting to think he argues that we experience music as agreeable when we attend to its expressive qualities and as beautiful when we attend to its formal properties, I demonstrate that he actually claims that we are able to judge music as beautiful only if we are sensitive to the expression of emotion through musical form. With this revised understanding of Kant's theory of music in place, I conclude by sketching a Kantian solution to a central problem in the philosophy of music: given that music is not sentient, how can it express emotion?
——. “Kant and the Art of Schematism.” Kantian Review 19.2 (2014): 181-205. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant describes schematism as a ‘hidden art in the depths of the human soul’ (A141/B180–1). While most commentators treat this as Kant's metaphorical way of saying schematism is something too obscure to explain, I argue that we should follow up Kant's clue and treat schematism literally as Kunst. By letting our interpretation of schematism be guided by Kant's theoretically exact ways of using the term Kunst in the Critique of Judgment we gain valuable insight into the nature of schematism, as well as its connection to Kant's concerns in the third Critique.
Mazijk, Corijn van. “Why Kant is a Non-Conceptualist but is better regarded a Conceptualist.” Kant Studies Online (2014): 170-200; posted June 28, 2014. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper deals with the problem of characterizing the content of experience as either conceptual or non-conceptual in Kant’s transcendental philosophy, a topic widely debated in contemporary philosophy. I start out with Kant’s pre-critical discussions of space and time in which he develops a specific notion of non-conceptual content. Secondly, I show that this notion of non-conceptual intuitional content does not seem to match well with the Transcendental Deduction. This incongruity results in three interrelated problems that are inherent to Kant’s Transcendental Deduction in the Critique: the ‘Independency Disagreement’, the ‘Conceptualism Contradiction’ and the ‘Intuition Inconsistency’. These three problems derive from apparently contradictory claims concerning the possibility of non-conceptual content. Contemporary Kantian conceptualists and non-conceptualists tend to take a stance at either side of the dilemma rather than trying to dissolve these tensions. In response to this, I propose a new solution to these difficulties based on a distinction between two kinds of conceptualism. This will reveal why Kant is a nonconceptualist in one significant sense, but also why he is still better regarded a conceptualist.
——. “Kant, Husserl, McDowell: The Non-Conceptual in Experience.” [English] Diametros 41 (2014): 99-114. [PW] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper I compare McDowell′s conceptualism to Husserl′s later philosophy. I aim to argue against the picture provided by recent phenomenologists according to which both agree on the conceptual nature of experience. I start by discussing McDowell′s reading of Kant and some of the recent Kantian and phenomenological non-conceptualist criticisms thereof. By separating two kinds of conceptualism, I argue that these criticisms largely fail to trouble McDowell. I then move to Husserl’s later phenomenological analyses of types and of passive synthesis. Although Husserl appropriates McDowell’s idea of conceptually ‘saddled’ intuitions as a ‘secondary passivity’, I argue that he also provides a strong case for non-conceptual synthesis.
McAndrew, Matthew. “Healthy Understanding and Urtheilskraft: The development of the power of judgment in Kant’s early faculty psychology.” Kant-Studien 105.3 (2014): 394-405. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant posits a special mental faculty that he calls the ‘power of judgment’ [Urtheilskraft]. He describes it as our capacity to apply rules. This faculty is not found in the psychology of any of Kant’s predecessors, nor is it found in his own early philosophy. This raises the question: when did Kant first introduce the power of judgment? In this paper, I demonstrate that Kant introduced this faculty during the mid-1770s, most likely between the winter semester of 1772–1773 and the winter semester of 1775–1776. I also show that prior to this time, he attributed our capacity to apply rules, i.e. the function of the power of judgment, to what he terms ‘healthy understanding’ [gesunder Verstand]. This expression is often equated with common sense. Thus, ‘healthy understanding’ originally performed the same function that Kant would later assign to the power of judgment.
——. “Kant’s Theory of Inductive Reasoning: The reflecting power of judgment in Kant’s Logic.” Kant Studies Online (2014): 43-64; posted March 29, 2014. [M] [online]
McCumber, John. Understanding Hegel’s Mature Critique of Kant. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014. [xiii, 216 p.] [WC]
McGlynn, Ciarán. “Kant through the looking glass.” Kant Studies Online (2014): 322-44; posted December 15, 2014. [M] [online]
McLaughlin, Kevin. Poetic Force: Poetry after Kant. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014. [xxv, 178 p.] [WC]
McLaughlin, Peter. “Mechanical Explanation in the Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment.” Kant’s Theory of Biology. Eds. Ina Goy and Eric Watkins (op cit.). 149-65. [M]
——. “Transcendental Presuppositions and Ideas of Reason.” Kant-Studien 105.4 (2014): 554-72. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the Introduction to the Critique of Judgment Kant seems to present the “transcendental deduction” of the (subjective) purposiveness of nature whose necessity he had denied in the Appendix to the Critique of Pure Reason. The so-called First Introduction to the CJ promised two transcendental deductions of the (objective) purposiveness of nature, which the published text did not deliver. This paper analyzes the arguments of the CPR-Appendix showing that each of its two parts discusses a different sort of deduction. The fact that Kant at various times envisioned at least five very different deductions in the same context is taken as an occasion to rethink the project that Kant sketches in the Appendix to the CPR.
McLear, Colin. “The Kantian (Non)-conceptualism Debate.” Philosophy Compass 9.11 (2014): 769-90. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: One of the central debates in contemporary Kant scholarship concerns whether Kant endorses a “conceptualist” account of the nature of sensory experience. Understanding the debate is crucial for getting a full grasp of Kant's theory of mind, cognition, perception, and epistemology. This paper situates the debate in the context of Kant's broader theory of cognition and surveys some of the major arguments for conceptualist and non‐conceptualist interpretations of his critical philosophy.
——. “On Stefanie Grüne’s “Blinde Anschauung”.” Critique (blog posted: 19 Aug 2014) n.p. [PW] [online]
McMahon, Jennifer A. Art and Ethics in a Material World: Kant’s Pragmatist Legacy. New York: Routledge, 2014. [xv, 234 p.] [WC]
McNulty, Michael Bennett. “Kant on Chemistry and the Application of Mathematics in Natural Science.” Kantian Review 19.3 (2014): 393-418. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In his Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft, Kant claims that chemistry is a science, but not a proper science (like physics), because it does not adequately allow for the application of mathematics to its objects. This paper argues that the application of mathematics to a proper science is best thought of as depending upon a coordination between mathematically constructible concepts and those of the science. In physics, the proper science that exhausts the a priori knowledge of objects of the outer sense, only motions and concepts reducible to motions can be legitimately coordinated with mathematical constructions. Since chemistry can neither achieve its own a priori principles of coordination nor be reduced to the coordinated doctrine of motion, it is a merely improper science.
McNulty, Tracy. Wrestling with the Angel: Experiments in Symbolic Life. New York: Columbia University Press, 2014. [xiv, 300 p.] [WC]
McQuillan, J. Colin. “Oaths, Promises, and Compulsory Duties: Kant’s Response to Mendelssohn’s Jerusalem.” Journal of the History of Ideas 75.4 (2014): 581-604. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article discusses the essay “An Answer to the Question: What Is Enlightenment?” by Immanuel Kant in relation to the book Jerusalem, Or on Religious Power and Judaism, by Moses Mendelssohn. Topics include the notion of freedom of conscience, the public use of reason, and the duties of citizens and members of professions.
——. “Baumgarten on Sensible Perfection.” Philosophica 44 (2014): 47-64. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: One of the most important concepts Baumgarten introduces in his Reflections on Poetry is the concept of sensible perfection. It is surprising that Baumgarten does not elaborate upon this concept in his Metaphysics, since it plays such an important role in the new science of aesthetics that he proposes at the end of the Reflections on Poetry and then further develops in the Aesthetics. This article considers the significance of the absence of sensible perfection from the Metaphysics and its implications for Baumgarten’s aesthetics, before turning to the use Meier and Kant make of Baumgarten’s concept. In the end, this article shows that Baumgarten did not abandon his conception of sensible perfection in the Metaphysics, though its influence declined significantly after Kant rejected the idea that sensibility and the understanding could be distinguished by the perfections of their cognition.
——. Rev. of Baumgarten, Metaphysics: A Critical Translation with Kant's Elucidations, Selected Notes, and Related Materials, edited and translated by Courtney D. Fugate and John Hymers (2013). Journal for Eighteenth‐Century Studies 37.4 (2014): 561-62. [PW]
——. Rev. of The Concept of World from Kant to Derrida, by Sean Gaston (2013). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (May 2014, #32). [M] [online]
Melville, Peter. “Lying with Godwin and Kant: Truth and Duty in St. Leon” Eighteenth Century: Theory & Interpretation 55.1 (2014): 19-37. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: A literary criticism is presented to the book "St. Leon: A Tale of the Sixteenth Century," by William Godwin. The article often references the German philosopher Immanuel Kant's ethics to examine the depiction of truth, lying and morality within the aforementioned novel. The book's portrayal of the relationship between truth and duty is discussed.
Mendiola Mejía, Carlos. “La tensión entre la analogía y la descripción en Immanuel Kant.” [Spanish; "The Tightness Between Analogy and Description in Immanuel Kant"] Con-Textos Kantianos 2014.1 (2014): 109-24. [M] [online]
Menegoni, Francesca. “Kant e l’idealismo della finalità nella Prima introduzione alla Critica del Giudizio.” [Italian; Kant and the idealism of purposiveness in the first introduction to the Critique of Judgment] il cannocchiale 39.1 (2014): 129-46. [PW]
Menezes, Edmilson. “Kant: Esclarecimento e Educação Moral.” [Portuguese; Enlightenment and moral education] Cadernos de Filosofia Alemã: Crítica e Modernidade 19.1 (2014): 117-47. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article seeks to evaluate the nexus between Enlightenment and moral education in Kant’s view, based on the assumption that it is impossible to think about an enlightened man who is not educated, as well as it is difficult to think about someone who is educated but is not seeking to enlighten himself, that is, exercise his skills to reasoning freely. The circle formed by this connection guarantees a continuity that enhances mankind moral ideal endlessly.
Mensch, Jennifer. “From Crooked Wood to Moral Agency: on Anthropology and Ethics In Kant.” Estudos Kantianos 2.1 (2014): 185-203. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this essay I lay out the textual materials surrounding the birth of physical anthropology as a racial science in the eighteenth century with a special focus on the development of Kant’s own contributions to the new field. Kant’s contributions to natural history demonstrated his commitment to a physical, mental, and moral hierarchy among the races and I will spend some time describing both the advantages he drew from this hierarchy for making sense of the social and political history of inequality between peoples, and the obviously problematic relationship that such views would entail for Kant’s universalism as he began to formulate his ethical program in the 1780s. While there is continued scholarly debate regarding the purported moral “turn” made by Kant once he dropped his commitment to a racial hierarchy in the 1790s, what the narrative as a whole reveals is not only the manner by which questions of racial difference defined physical anthropology from its outset, but the easy and uncomplicated manner by which whole member groups of the population could be excluded from lofty pronouncements regarding the “rights of man”—a fact that was as true for Kant in Königsberg, as it was for Jefferson and Hamilton in Philadelphia.
——. “Kant and the Problem of Form: Theories of Animal Generation, Theories of Mind.” Estudos Kantianos 2.2 (2014): 241-63. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Although scholarly attention has been mostly paid to the many connections existing between Kant and the exact sciences, the landscape of Kant studies has begun to noticeably change during the last decade, with many new pieces devoted to a consideration of Kant’s relation to the life sciences of his day. It is in this vein, for example, that investigators have begun to discuss the importance of Kant’s essays on race for the development of Anthropology as an emerging field. The bulk of the contributions to this recent trend, however, have focused on Kant’s remarks on organic life in the Critique of Judgment, such that Kant’s “theory of biology” is now seen to be firmly located in that text. Amidst such consolidation, there are a few pieces that have begun to address Kant’s appeal to organic vocabulary within the context of his theory of cognition, though these too remain dominated by the interpretive template set by the third Critique. My own strategy in this essay will be different. Kant did indeed borrow from the life sciences for his model of the mind, but in a manner that would reject a naturalized account. His preference for epigenesis as a theory of organic generation needs to be carefully distinguished, therefore, from the use he would make of it when discussing a metaphysical portrait of reason.
——. “Précis of Kant’s Organicism. Epigenesis and the Developoment of Critical Philosophy.” Critique, No. 3 (2014): 1-2 [M]
——. “Reply to Angela Breitenbach.” Critique (blog posted: 4 Jan 2014) n.p. [PW] [online]
——. “Reply to Hein van den Berg.” Critique (blog posted: 4 Mar 2014) n.p. [PW] [online]
Merritt, Melissa McBay. “Kant on the Pleasures of Understanding.” Kant on Emotion and Value. Ed. Alix Cohen (op cit.). 126-45. [PW]
Mertens, Thomas. “Sexual Desire and the Importance of Marriage in Kant's Philosophy of Law.” Ratio Juris 27.3 (2014): 330-43. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In his moral writings, Kant states that moral duty cannot be derived from ‘the special characteristics of human nature.’ This statement is untenable if one takes seriously Kant’s moral views on sexual desire. Instead close study reveals that considerations based on both morality and nature play a role here. The combination of these two elements leads to inconsistencies and difficulties in Kant’s understanding of sexual desire, but they enable us to better understand the importance Kant attributes to marriage within his philosophy of law.
Messina, James. “Kant on the Unity of Space and the Synthetic Unity of Apperception.” Kant-Studien 105.1 (2014): 5-40. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant famously characterizes space as a unity, understood as an essentially singular whole. He further develops his account of the unity of space in the B-Deduction, where he relates the unity of space to the original synthetic unity of apperception, and draws an infamous distinction between form of intuition and formal intuition. Kant’s cryptic remarks in this part of the Critique have given rise to two widespread and diametrically opposed readings, which I call the Synthesis and Brute Given Readings. I argue for an entirely new reading, which I call the Part-Whole Reading, in part by considering the development of Kant’s views on the unity of space from his earliest works up through crucial reflections written during the silent decade.
——. “Kantian Space, Supersubstantivalism, and the Spirit of Spinoza.” Kant Yearbook: Kant and Rationalism 6 (2014): 43-64. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the first edition of Concerning the Doctrine of Spinoza in Letters to Mendelssohn, Jacobi claims that Kant’s account of space is “wholly in the spirit of Spinoza”. In the first part of the paper, I argue that Jacobi is correct: Spinoza and Kant have surprisingly similar views regarding the unity of space and the metaphysics of spatial properties and laws. Perhaps even more surprisingly, they both are committed to a form of parallelism. In the second part of the paper, I draw on the results of the first part to explain Kant’s oft-repeated claim that if space were transcendentally real, Spinozism would follow, along with Kant’s reasons for thinking transcendental idealism avoids this nefarious result. In the final part of the paper, I sketch a Spinozistic interpretation of Kant’s account of the relation between the empirical world of bodies and (what one might call) the transcendental world consisting of the transcendental subject’s representations of the empirical world and its parts.
Meyers, C.D. “Neuroenhancement in Reflective Equilibrium: A Qualified Kantian Defense of Enhancing in Scholarship and Science.” Neuroethics 7.3 (2014): 287-98. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Cognitive neuroenhancement (CNE) involves the use of medical interventions to improve normal cognitive functioning such as memory, focus, concentration, or willpower. In this paper I give a Kantian argument defending the use of CNE in science, scholarly research, and creative fields. Kant’s universal law formulation of the categorical imperative shows why enhancement is morally wrong in the familiar contexts of sports or competitive games. This argument, however, does not apply to the use of CNE in higher education, scholarly or scientific research, or creative endeavors such as visual art, fiction or poetry, or musical composition. This is because performance in these areas is embedded within practices that differ in morally significant ways from competitive practices. This important difference provides good reason to think that there is nothing morally wrong with the use of CNE in these areas. My approach is not simply to assume a full-fledged Kantian ethical theory and apply it straight away to the enhancement issue but to establish a reflective equilibrium between our moral intuitions, (Kantian) moral principles that support those intuitions, and the nature of the practices involved.
Michalson, Gordon E., ed. Kant’s Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason: A Critical Guide. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014. [xiv, 266 p.] [M]
Otfried Höffe (Holy Scriptures within the Boundaries of Mere Reason: Kant’s Reflections),
Allen W. Wood (The Evil in Human Nature),
Ingolf Dalferth (Radical Evil and Human Freedom),
Alison Hills (Gesinnung: Responsibility, Moral Worth, and Character),
Andrew Chignell (Rational Hope, Possibility, and Divine Action),
Leslie Stevenson (Kant on Grace),
Karl Ameriks (Kant, Miracles, and Religion, Parts One and Two),
Manfred Kuehn (Kant’s Jesus),
Nicholas Tampio (Pluralism in the Ethical Community),
Pablo Muchnik (Kant’s Religious Constructivism),
G. Felicitas Munzel (What Does his Religion Contribute to Kant’s Conception of Practical Reason?),
Richard Velkley (Culture and the Limits of Practical Reason in Kant’s Religion).
Michel, Karin. “Zeit und Freiheit bei Kant: zu Kants Begründung der praktischen Philosophie.” Philosophie nach Kant. Neue Wege zum Verständnis von Kants Transzendental- und Moralphilosophie. Ed. Mario Egger (op cit.). 37-53. [M]
Micheli, Giuseppe. “Kant and Zeno of Elea: Historical Precedents of the ‘Sceptical Method’.” Trans/Form/Ação: Revista de Filosofia 37.3 (2014): 57-64. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: For Kant's interpretation of Zeno in KrV A502-507/B530-535, scholars have usually referred to Plato's Phaedrus (261d); in reality the sources Kant uses are, on one hand, Brucker (who depends in turn on the pseudo-Aristotelian De Melisso, Xenophane, et Gorgia, 977 b 2-21), and, on the other, Plato's Parmenides (135e6-136b1) and Proclus' commentary on it, as quoted by Gassendi in a popular textbook he wrote on the history of logic.
Mihaylova, Katerina, ed. See: Bunke, Simon, Katerina Mihaylova, and Daniela Ringkamp, eds.
Miller, Eddis N. Kantian Transpositions: Derrida and the Philosophy of Religion. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2014. [xv, 132 p.] [WC]
Miller, Jason M. Rev. of The Dialectics of Aesthetic Agency: Revaluating German Aesthetics from Kant to Adorno, by Ayon Maharaj (2013). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (Oct 2014, #12). [M] [online]
Mills, Charles W. “Kant and Race, Redux.” Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 35.1-2 (2014): 125-57. [PW]
Milz, Bernhard. “Moral und Gefühl: Konstellationen von Rationalität und Emotionalität in Kants Moralphilosophie.” Philosophie nach Kant. Neue Wege zum Verständnis von Kants Transzendental- und Moralphilosophie. Ed. Mario Egger (op cit.). 223-50. [M]
——. “Kants Deduktion des kategorischen Imperativs in entwicklungsgeschichtlicher Perspektive.” Kants Rechtfertigung des Sittengesetzes in Grundlegung III. Ed. Heiko Puls (op cit.). 133-66. [PW]
Mion, Giovanni. “The Square of Opposition: From Russell’s Logic to Kant’s Cosmology.” History and Philosophy of Logic 35.4 (2014): 377-82. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper, I will show to what extent we can use our modern understanding of the Square of Opposition in order to make sense of Kant's double standard solution to the cosmological antinomies. Notoriously, for Kant, both theses and antitheses of the mathematical antinomies are false, while both theses and antitheses of the dynamical antinomies are true. Kantian philosophers and interpreters (including Schopenhauer, for example) have criticized Kant's solution as artificial and prejudicial. In the paper, I do not dispute such claims, but I show that our modern understanding of the Square of Opposition enables us to more naturally deliver the result Kant was aiming at. Accordingly, the paper does not pretend to be exegetically accurate. It is an attempt to revise the antinomies with the help of standard classical logic. And although such a revision entails some re-interpretation, in the end, it will actually help to unveil some of Kant's thoughts.
Mitchell-Yellin, Benjamin. Rev. of Self-Improvement: An Essay in Kantian Ethics, by Robert N. Johnson (2011). Journal of Moral Philosophy 11.4 (2014): 535-38. [PW]
Mitra, Ahinpunya. Aesthetics. East and West: A Comparative Study of Anandavardhana and Kant. New Delhi: Readworthy Publications, 2014. [xvi, 384 p.] [WC]
Mohanty, J. N. Lectures on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason , edited by Tara Chatterjea, Sandhya Basu, and Amita Chatterjee. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers, 2014. [261 p.] [WC]
Moledo, Fernando. Los años silenciosos de Kant aspectos de la génesis de la Deducción trascendental en la década de 1770: seguido de la traducción del Legado de Duisburg (ca. 1775). Buenos Aires: Prometeo Libros, 2014. [191 p.] [WC]
——. “Génesis de los Conceptos Kantianos de Dialéctica y de Dialéctica Trascendental.” [Spanish; Genesis of Kantian Concepts of Dialectic and Transcendental Dialectic] Estudos Kantianos 2.1 (2014): 41-50. [M]
——. “El despertar del sueño dogmático. Un análisis histórico y sistemático.” [Spanish; Awakening from the dogmatic slumber: a historical and systematic investigation] Studia Kantiana 12.16 (2014): 105-23. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant claims in the Prolegomena that Hume´s advice woke him from his dogmatic slumber. But many years after he claims in a letter to Garve from 1798, that the antinomy of pure reason woke him from that dogmatic slumber. The aim of this paper is to interpret these apparently contradictory statements concerning Kant´s development up until the Critique of Pure Reason in a way that shows their consistency with one another. I will propose that both awakenings refer to the same process. This process begins with Hume´s advice concerning the problem of causality, and reaches its culmination with the problematic of the antinomy of pure reason as that which finally leads Kant to undertake the critical examination of pure reason.
——. “Breve exposición argumental de la Deducción metafísica de las categorías.” [Spanish] Temas kantianos. Ed. Mario Caimi (op cit.). 61-76. [WC]
Molina, Eduardo. “Libertad Interior y Libertad Exterior en la Filosofía Kantiana del Derecho.” [Spanish; Internal and External Freedom in Kantian Philosophy of Right] Estudos Kantianos 2.1 (2014): 69-77. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper I attempt to clarify the place of the distinction between external and internal freedom in the overall Kantian doctrine of freedom, and particularly in his philosophy of right. I will briefly illustrate Kant´s general way of facing the problem of freedom and I will make comments on the different notions of freedom that, following Beck, it is possible to make in Kant´s critical philosophy. On the light of these distinctions, I will try to show how to articulate external freedom with internal freedom in the Kantian philosophy of right.
Moran, Kate. “Delusions of Virtue: Kant on Self-Conceit.” Kantian Review 19.3 (2014): 419-47. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Little extended attention has been given to Kant’s notion of self-conceit (Eigendünkel), though it appears throughout his theoretical and practical philosophy. Authors who discuss self-conceit often describe it as a kind of imperiousness or arrogance in which the conceited agent seeks to impose selfish principles upon others, or sees others as worthless. I argue that these features of self-conceit are symptoms of a deeper and more thoroughgoing failure. Self-conceit is best described as the tendency to insist upon one’s own theoretical or practical conclusions at any cost, while still wanting to appear – to oneself or to others – as though one is abiding by the constraints of theoretical or practical reason. Self-conceit is thus less centrally the tendency to impose one’s will or inclinations upon others, and more centrally the tendency to reconstruct evidence and rationalize so that one may be convinced of one’s own virtue. While the conceited agent may ultimately impose her judgement upon others, she does so in order to preserve her delusion of virtue.
Morgan, Diane. Kant Trouble: The Obscurities of the Enlightened. New York: Routledge, 2014. [xii, 238 p.] [WC]
——. “Globus terraqueus: Cosmopolitan Law and “Fluid Geography” in the Utopian Thinking of Immanuel Kant and Joseph-Pierre Proudhon.” Law and the Utopian Imagination. Eds. Austin Sarat, Lawrence Douglas, and Martha Merrill Umphrey (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014). 126-54. [WC]
Motorina, Lubov E. “Concept of Science in Kantian Philosophy.” Studia Philosophica Kantiana 2014.1 (2014): 40-46. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article considers Kantian concept of science where science is regarded as the subject’s active attitude towards the object, in the context of interconnection between philosophy and science in the history of ideas; the problem of the limits of science and its possibilities is revealed; the statement that the efficiency of science depends on the exactness of man’s “guessing” the objectives of the world itself is emphasized. According to Kant, the world has its foundations, its goals, and objectives, which are far from man’s goals and objectives in the process of cognition. The harmony between the world and the cognizing subject is a necessary provision for the development of modern science. In the presence of the total “pressure” man continuously exerts upon the world while turning science to technoscience, Kantian ideas of necessity of man’s focusing upon the goals and objectives of the world itself in his scientific activity become even more relevant.
Motta, Giuseppe. “A Historical Dogma in Two Dogmas of Empiricism — Some Reflections Concerning Kant and Quine.” Philosophie nach Kant. Neue Wege zum Verständnis von Kants Transzendental- und Moralphilosophie. Ed. Mario Egger (op cit.). 693-703. [M]
——. “Reply to Thomas Teufel.” Critique (blog posted: 17 Jun 2014) n.p. [PW] [online]
Muchnik, Pablo. “The Heart as Locus of Moral Struggle in the Religion.” Kant on Emotion and Value. Ed. Alix Cohen (op cit.). 224-44. [PW]
——. “Kant’s Religious Constructivism.” Kant’s Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason: A Critical Guide. Ed. Gordon E. Michalson (op cit.). 193-213. [M]
Mudroch, Vilem. Rev. of Immanuel Kant, Anthropology, History, and Education, edited by Günter Zöller and Robert B. Louden (2011). Kant-Studien 105.3 (2014): 447-52. [M]
Muglioni, Jean-Michel. Apprendre à philosopher avec Kant. Paris: Ellipses, 2014. [247 p.] [WC]
Munzel, G. Felicitas. “What Does his Religion Contribute to Kant’s Conception of Practical Reason?” Kant’s Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason: A Critical Guide. Ed. Gordon E. Michalson (op cit.). 214-32. [M]
——. “Indispensable Education of the Being of Reason and Speech.” Kant’s Lectures on Anthropology: A Critical Guide. Ed. Alix Cohen (op cit.). 172-90. [WC]
Murray, Terri. “Being Charitable to Kant.” Philosophy Now 101 (2014): 24. [PW]
Muthu, Sankar. “Productive Resistance in Kant’s Political Thought: Domination, Counter-Domination, and Global Unsocial Sociability.” Kant and Colonialism: Historical and Critical Perspectives. Eds. Katrin Flikschuh and Lea Ypi (op cit.). 68-98. [M]
Naragon, Steve. “Kant’s Career in German Idealism.” The Palgrave Handbook of German Idealism. Ed. Matthew C. Altman (op cit.). 15-33. [M]
Nassar, Dalia. “Pure versus Empirical Forms of Thought: Schelling’s Critique of Kant’s Categories and the Beginnings of Naturphilosophie.” Journal of the History of Philosophy 52.1 (2014): 113-34. [M]
Nelson, Eric S. “Language, Nature, and the Self: Language, Psychology, and the Feeling of Life in Kant and Dilthey.” The Linguistic Dimension of Kant’s Thought. Eds. Frank Schalow and Richard L. Velkley (op cit.). 263-87. [M]
Neslioğlu Serin, Funda. “Kant Felsefesinde Çoklu Ben’in Birleştiricisi Olarak Zaman.” [Turkish; Uniting the manifoldness of the selves in Kant’s philosophy: Time] FLSF: Journal of Philosophy and Social Science 18 (2014): 171-85. [PW] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper I will examine Kant’s theory of time, and try to show how his theory of time constitutes the self within a temporal framework. In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant’s claim about time as a necessary representation lies behind all our intuitions and is given as a priori. Time, in his general account of knowledge, is not an empirical concept taken from sensory experience, but it is presupposed as a priori concept of pure reason and a priori intuition which makes possible our thinking about experience. On the other hand Kant’s theory of time seeing time as a priori intuition of the inner sense and as the way we regulate our inner experience presents an analysis of human mind based on the idea of the self within a temporal framework. My purpose in this work is to examine how temporality and the unity of the self are indissolubly linked, and what kind of foundation Kant’s theory of time provides for the unified of selves through change.
Newton, Alexandra. “Kant on Testimony and the Communicability of Empirical Knowledge.” Philosophical Topics 42.1 (2014): 271-90. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper argues for Kantian “universalism,” according to which the subject of empirical cognition is not merely individual, but universal. In the first section, I consider the limitations of Hume’s individualist view of the subject of judgment, which is able to explain how another person exerts power over my judgments, but cannot explain how what she says can challenge or support my judgments. In the second section, I argue that Kant’s universalism accounts for the possibility of rational support both among different judgments in me, and among judgments of different subjects. The third section looks at the consequences of universalism for Kant’s account of testimony. I argue that on Kant’s view, it does not matter whether I learn something from my own experience or from your experience. Testimony thus does not emerge in Kant’s philosophy as a significant topic. In the fourth section, I argue that the enlightenment project of overcoming prejudice and acquiring wisdom makes it imperative that knowledge be not only universally shareable, but also actually shared among members of an epistemic community.
Niesen, Peter. “Restorative Justice in International and Cosmopolitan Law.” Kant and Colonialism: Historical and Critical Perspectives. Eds. Katrin Flikschuh and Lea Ypi (op cit.). 170-96. [M]
Nitzan, Lior. Jacob Sigismund Beck’s Standpunctslehre and the Kantian Thing-In-Itself Debate: The Relation Between a Representation and Its Object. Dordrecht/New York: Springer, 2014. [xiii, 398 p.] [WC]
Nizhnikov S.A., R. I. Zekrist, and A. Zhusupova. “Kant’s Moral Law in the Social and Legal Context.” Studia Philosophica Kantiana 2014.2 (2014): 43-48. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The authors of the article examine the Kantian concept of the subject in the aspect of the correlation between morality and law, which is relevant in the context of the globalizing world. According to Kant, man is “naturally predisposed” to evil, therefore, he must freely conform to the categorical imperative in order to become a moral being. However, Kantian ethics is not purely formal, since it admits the concept of the moral sense. Developing the concept of the rule of law, Kant considers the right of the personality to be superior to the state. Keywords: subject, categorical imperative, morality, evil, good, love, moral sense, duty, law, state, citizen, ethics, globalization.
Noske, Rainer. Rev. of Die Axiome der Anschauung in Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft, by Oliver Schliemann (2010). Kant-Studien 105.1 (2014): 149-51. [M]
Nowikow, Igor. Der Freiheitsbegriff bei Kant. Eine philosophische Untersuchung im Rückblick auf das christliche Freiheitsverständnis. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2014. [261 p.] [WC]
Nunez, Tyke. “Definitions of Kant’s Categories.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44.5-6 (2014): 631-57. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The consensus view in the literature is that, according to Kant, definitions in philosophy are impossible. While this is true prior to the advent of transcendental philosophy, I argue that with Kant's Copernican Turn definitions of some philosophical concepts, the categories become possible. Along the way I discuss issues like why Kant introduces the ‘Analytic of Concepts’ as an analysis of the understanding, how this faculty, as the faculty for judging, provides the principle for the complete exhibition of the categories, how the pure categories relate to the schematized categories, and how the latter can be used on empirical objects.
Nussbaum, Charles. “Models and ‘Symbolic Hypotyposis’: Kant on Music and Language.” The Linguistic Dimension of Kant’s Thought. Eds. Frank Schalow and Richard L. Velkley (op cit.). 134-53. [M]
Nuzzo, Angelica. “The Place of the Emotions in Kant’s Transcendental Philosophy.” Kant on Emotion and Value. Ed. Alix Cohen (op cit.). 88-107. [PW]
——. “Kant’s Pure Ethics and the Problem of ‘Application’.” Politics and Teleology in Kant. Eds. Paul Formosa, Avery Goldman, and Tatiana Patrone (op cit.). 245-61. [M]
——. “Merleau-Ponty and Classical German Philosophy: Transcendental Philosophy after Kant.” Chiasmi International 16 (2014): 151-66. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This essay examines the presence of Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel in Merleau-Ponty’s thought. The perspective adopted here is methodological. Central to this is the choice of “transcendental phenomenology,” understood as a rehabilitation of the idealism and subjectivism proper to the transcendentalism of Kant and Fichte—the choice by which Merleau-Ponty refuses to abandon transcendental philosophy, like Hegel on the contrary did with his dialectical-speculative philosophy, and follows instead the phenomenological perspective suggested for the first time by Schelling.
——. “The Idea of Experience as a ‘System for the Faculty of Judgment’ in the First Introduction to the Critique of Judgment.” il cannocchiale 39.1 (2014): 165-88. [PW]
Obadia, Claude. Kant prophète: éléments pour une europhilosophie. Nice: Ovadia, 2014. [169 p.] [WC]
O’Connell, Eoin. “Kantian Moral Retributivism: Punishment, Suffering, and the Highest Good.” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 52.4 (2014): 477-95. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Against the view of some contemporary Kantians who wish to downplay Kant's retributivist commitments, I argue that Kant's theory of practical of reason implies a retributive conception of punishment. I trace this view to Kant's distinction between morality and well‐being and his attempt to synthesize these two concerns in the idea of the highest good. Well‐being is morally valuable only insofar as it is proportional to virtue, and the suffering inflicted on wrongdoers as punishment for wrongdoing is morally good so long as it is proportional to the wrongdoing. According to Kantian retributivism, punishment is warranted as a means to promote proportionality between well‐being and virtue.
Oesterle, Günter. “Kunststück Alter(n): Christoph Wilhelm Hufeland und Immanuel Kant.” Altersstile im 19. Jahrhundert. Eds. Gerhard Neumann and Günter Oesterle (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann). 57-72. [M]
Öksüzan, Umut. “Hegel’in Saf Aklın Eleştirisi Yorumuna Dair Bir İnceleme.” [Turkish; A Study of Hegel’s InterpretatIon of Critique of Pure Reason] Felsefi Düşün 3 (2014): 77-103??. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this study, the analyzes and interpretations that Hegel makes in his books and courses on history of philosophy on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason are examined in the context of a discussion that seeks an answer to the question “To what extent knowledge of the absolute can lift up transcendental idealism”. In the first part of the study, we discuss the main lines of the explanations and the objections that Hegel develops in his Faith and Knowledge about the fundamental tenets of the Enlightenment considered as the context in which Kant’s critical philosophy fits. In a second part, we explain the objections that led Hegel to address Critique of Pure Reason in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy and Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in the light of his analyzes and interpretations about parts of the same work, namely transcendental aesthetic, transcendental logic and transcendental dialectic and within the framework of the problem of finitude and objectivity of knowledge. Based on the results of these two parts, we finally defend the claim that Hegel’s theory that aims to lift up the transcendental idealism remains a metaphysical theory reviving rational theology.
Olcina Cantos, Jorge. “Enseñanzas climáticas en la obra de Kant.” [Spanish; “Climatic lessons in Kant´s work”]Anales de Geografía 34.2 (2014): 119-62. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant has happened to history of the universal thought as the great philosopher of reason and transcendental idealism, but as a university lecturer he taught geography lessons for forty years. The study and understanding of "space" is one of the axes of the Kantian philosophy, because the philosopher of Königsberg considers space as one of the basic areas of human knowledge, hence it is not strange to understand Kant's interest in geography. His lectures on Physical Geography are a compendium of geographical knowledge in the enlightened age. In this work are several sections dedicated to the understanding of atmospheric phenomena, that are truly innovative for climate science. The explanation of the trade winds, the monsoons, the phenomenon of breezes and, generally, about wind movement repreent an advande in the evolution of climatology.
Oliver, Amy A. “Context and Kant in the Aesthetics of José Enrique Rodó and Samuel Ramos.” Symposium 18.1 (2014): 65-76. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the classic essays Ariel (1900) and Filosofía de la vida artística (1950), the Uruguayan José Enrique Rodó (1872–1917) and the Mexican Samuel Ramos (1897–1959) present distinctive and divergent claims about aesthetics. While Rodó asserts the existence of an innate and abundant aesthetic sensibility among Latin Americans, Ramos believes that aesthetic experience is relatively rare and that aesthetic sensibility needs to be cultivated. While historical grounding in the Latin American context is missing in the works of both Rodó and Ramos, Ariel contains an argument for an innate Latin American aesthetic sensibility linked to high moral development along with the hope that Latin America's youth will use their aesthetic and moral gifts to advance Latin America's place in the 20th century. In Filosofía de la vida artística, Ramos argues that the aesthetic experience in Mexico is far from innate or even widespread: on the contrary, it is rare and much in need of further development. Kant, referenced by both Rodó and Ramos, in his Critique of Judgment, argues against a relationship between aesthetic sensibility and moral capacity. Rodó, then, is at odds with Kant while Ramos's view is closer to Kant's.
O’Neill, Onora. “Autonomia, pluralidade e razão pública.” [Portuguese; Autonomy, plurality and practical reason] Cadernos de Filosofia Alemã: Crítica e Modernidade 19.1 (2014): 15-34. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: I shall offer a reading of Kant’s conception of autonomy, distinguish it from some other ideas that go by the name of autonomy, and propose some reasons for thinking that autonomy in Kant’s sense of the term is indeed both a conception of practical reason and fundamental to morality. The line of thought I shall pursue is, I hope, both compatible with and a sympathetic extension of claims that Schneewind makes about Kant’s position.
Onnasch, Ernst-Otto. “The Role of the Organism in the Transcendental Philosophy of Kant’s Opus postumum.” Kant’s Theory of Biology. Eds. Ina Goy and Eric Watkins (op cit.). 239-55. [M]
Onof, Christian, and Dennis Schulting. “Kant, Kästner and the Distinction between Metaphysical and Geometric Space.” Kantian Review 19.2 (2014): 285-304. [M]
Oranli, İmge. “Kant’ın Etik Anlayışı ve Radikal Kötülük Mefhumu.” [Turkish; Kantian Ethics and The Notion of Radical Evil] Felsefi Düşün 3 (2014): 65-76??. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Immanuel Kant develops his notion of radical evil in a late work entitled Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. Kant’s notion of radical evil have been attracting the attention of many while, at the same time, being perplexing since the first essay of the Religion “Concerning the Indwelling of the Evil Principle Alongside the Good or Of the Radical Evil in Human Nature” first appeared on the pages of Berlinische Monatsschrift in 1792. There have been many attempts to account for this perplexity. In this paper, I discuss some interpretations of Kant’s notion of radical evil, by way of which I attempt to present a less perplexed reading of radical evil, meanwhile demonstrating possible connections between Kant’s Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason and his earlier ethical writings. I argue that Kant’s views on freedom and will –developed very early on in his ethical writings– is at the heart of his theory of evil, and that on the question of evil his earlier and later philosophy is not in tension, as some argue. The Kantian formulation of radical evil as a natural propensity of human nature goes hand in hand with Kantian ethics in general. In fact, the aim of my insistence on showing the connection between his earlier and later works is to argue that the moral law has to be configured as a categorical imperative precisely because humans have this natural propensity towards evil.
Oroño, Matías. “El tiempo subjetivo como producto de la doctrina kantiana de la auto-afección.” [Spanish; The subjective time as a result of the Kantian doctrine of self-affection] Cadernos de Filosofia Alemã: Crítica e Modernidade 19.1 (2014): 149-68. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The aim of this work is to demonstrate that Kant’s doctrine of self-affection leads to a consciousness of a purely subjective time. First, we analyze the §§ 8 and 24 of the Critique of Pure Reason in order to understand the distinction between an a priori and an empirical point of view about self-affection. Second, we compare the doctrine of self-affection with the transcendental schematism to underline that the a priori temporality of self-affection is not identified with the objective time of the schematism.
——. “Cuerpo, mente y espíritu en el enfoque crítico acerca de lo sublime.” [Spanish] Temas kantianos. Ed. Mario Caimi (op cit.). 203-32. [WC]
O’Shea, James. Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason: An Introduction and Interpretation. London: Routledge, 2014. [249 p.] [WC]
Ottaviani, Osvaldo. “From ‘Possible Worlds’ to ‘Possible Experience’. Real Possibility in Leibniz and Kant.” Kant Yearbook: Kant and Rationalism 6 (2014): 65-86. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper moves from a disagreement with those interpreters who explain Kant’s doctrine of real possibility in terms of possible worlds. It seems to me that a possible world framework is too much indebted to the Leibnizian metaphysics of modality and, therefore, cannot serve to make sense of Kant’s theses. Leibniz’s theory of possibility, indeed, has been deeply criticized in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (CPR). Interestingly enough, however, Kant’s principal argument for rejecting that the field of what is possible is greater than the field of what is real was already anticipated by Leibniz. However, Leibniz employed it to demonstrate that there cannot be more than one actual world only (the others being purely possible ones). Moving from this fact, I argue that there is a certain tension between what Leibniz says about the actual world and his commitment to a plurality of possible worlds conceived as ideas in God’s mind. The first part of my paper is devoted to show that such a tension can be traced back to Leibniz’s claims about the relation between the possible and the real. In the second part, then, I maintain that Kant’s theory of real possibility grows from a dissatisfaction with (and a rejection of) Leibniz’s attempted solution to the problem of characterizing a kind of possibility narrower than the merely logical one and, nonetheless, not identical with existence. Finally, I present a short account of Kant’s theory of real possibility, based on the notion of transcendental conditions as conditions of possibility of experience, showing how it works in the case of the forms of intuition.
Pagden, Anthony. “The Law of Continuity: Colonies, Provinces and the Justice of War within the Limits of Kant’s International Right.” Kant and Colonialism: Historical and Critical Perspectives. Eds. Katrin Flikschuh and Lea Ypi (op cit.). 19-42. [M]
Palermo, Sandra Viviana. “In Full Sails Through the Cliffs: Kant's Critical Comparison with Spinoza in the Kritik der Urteilskraft.” Studi Kantiani 27 (2014): 23-38. [PW]
——. “La unidad que enlaza lo uno y lo múltiple. Entendimiento intuitivo y Absoluto en Glauben und Wissen.” [Spanish; The unity that links the one and the multiple. Intuitive understanding and Absolute in Glauben und Wissen] Studia Kantiana 12.17 (2014): 126-43. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article analyzes the Hegelian reading of the concept of intuitive understanding in Faith and knowledge. As we intend to show, such a concept constitutes a privileged cognitive model for Hegel by virtue of his nature of “synthetic universal”, i.e., by virtue of the fact that here the whole becomes something that contains the grounds of the possibility of its form and of the connection between the parts and between the parts and the whole. The universal that Kant attributed to the intuitive understanding of the KU § 77 presents itself, for Hegel, as a whole that should contain the ratio of the identity of the parts (what they have in common, and that make them part of a single whole), and, at the same time, the ratio of the diversity (that by virtue of which the whole is not an undifferentiated or analytical unity).
——. “La categoría kantiana de ‘realidad’. Hermann Cohén y Luigi Scaravelli: dos lecturas de las ‘Antizipationen der Wahrnehmung’.” [Spanish] Temas kantianos. Ed. Mario Caimi (op cit.). 341-54. [WC]
——. “Introduzione. Documenti e studi sulla prima diffusione della Erste Einleitung in Italia.” [Italian] il cannocchiale 39.1 (2014): 3-13. [PW]
——. “L’apertura epistemologica della filosofia critica. Scaravelli e la Prima introduzione alla Critica della facoltà di giudizio.” [Italian; The epistemological opening of Kant’s third critique. Luigi Scaravelli and the first introduction to the Critique of Judgment] il cannocchiale 39.1 (2014): 105-27. [PW]
Palmquist, Stephen R. “Transcendental Idealism as the Backdrop for Kant’s Theory of Religion.” The Palgrave Handbook of German Idealism. Ed. Matthew C. Altman (op cit.). 144-64. [M]
Pariente-Butterlin, Isabelle. Donner des raisons morales: problèmes de l'éthique kantienne. Besançon: Presses universitaires de Franche-Comté, 2014. [268 p.] [WC]
Pasternack, Lawrence R. Kant on Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. New York: Routledge, 2014. [289 p.] [WC][review]
——. “Kant on Opinion: Assent, Hypothesis, and the Norms of General Applied Logic.” Kant-Studien 105.1 (2014): 41-82. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant identifies knowledge [Wissen], belief [Glaube], and opinion [Meinung] as our three primary modes of “holding-to-be-true” [Fürwahrhalten]. He also identifies opinion as making up the greatest part of our cognition. After a preliminary sketch of Kant’s system of propositional attitudes, this paper will explore what he says about the norms governing opinion and empirical hypotheses. The final section will turn to what, in the Critique of Pure Reason and elsewhere, Kant refers to as “General Applied Logic”. It concerns the “contingent conditions of the subject, which can hinder or promote” good inquiry; and, though rarely mentioned in the secondary literature, it offers Kant’s methodological alternative to the traditional epistemological goal of finding “a sufficient and yet at the same time general criterion of truth”.
Patrone, Tatiana. “Teleology and the Grounds of Duties of Juridical Right.” Politics and Teleology in Kant. Eds. Paul Formosa, Avery Goldman, and Tatiana Patrone (op cit.). 128-44. [M]
——. See: Formosa, Paul, Avery Goldman, and Tatiana Patrone.
——, ed. See: Formosa, Paul, Avery Goldman, and Tatiana Patrone, eds.
Pätzold, Detlev. “Descartes, Kant und die Wandlungen des neuzeitlichen Naturbegriffs aus Cassirers kulturphilosophischer Perspektive.” Kulturphilosophie: Probleme und Perspektiven des Neukantianismus. Eds. Christian Krijnen, Massimo Ferrari, and Pierfrancesco Fiorato (op cit.). 161-85. [WC]
Pecere, Paolo. “Kant’s Newtonianism: a reappraisal.” Estudos Kantianos 2.2 (2014): 155-81. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article examines diferent aspects of Kant’s Newtonianism, focusing on Kant’s attempt in the Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft to realize a new “pure part” of physics, complementary to Newton’s “mathematical principles”. The first section regards the philosophical objectives of Kant’s engagement with Newtonian physics, highlighting the role of physics for the “exhibition” of metaphysical concepts and criticizing the view that Kant’s intention would have been to provide a “foundation” of Newton’s physics. The second section provides an example of Kant’s original reappraisal of Newton’s physics, focusing on the concepts of material substance and force. The third section shows how Newton’s thesis about the limited (but sufficient) knowledge of gravity represented for Kant the main example of a general limitation of philosophical knowledge.
Peine, Daniela. Moralische Motivation bei Kant: eine philosophisch-psychologische Studie. Marburg: Tectum, 2014. [xiv, 251 p.] [WC]
Pelegrín, Laura. “Intuición y afección en el §1 de la Estética Transcendental. La función metodológica de la distinción entre una intuición originaria y una derivada.” [Spanish] Temas kantianos. Ed. Mario Caimi (op cit.). 41-59. [WC]
Pelletier, Arnaud. “Sensualitas et Sinnlichkeit: la constitution de la sensibilité de la Dissertation de 1770 à la Critique de la raison pure.” De la sensibilité: les esthétiques de Kant. Eds. François Calori, Michaël Foessel, and Dominique Pradelle (op cit.). 145-58. [M]
Perez, Daniel Omar. “Idealismo Transcendental e Realismo Empírico: uma Interpretação Semântica do Problema da Cognoscibilidade dos Objetos Externos.” [Portuguese; Transcendental Idealism and Empirical Realism: a Semantic Interpretation of the Problem of Cognoscibility of External Objects] Estudos Kantianos 2.1 (2014): 29-39. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The aim of this paper is to present transcendental idealism (and empirical realism) as a transcendental semantics that allows to solve cognitive problems of science and decide on philosophical problems through new arguments and textual documents of Kantian philosophy. For this, we intend to show that the fundamental question that appears throughout the course of Kant’s work is to question the possibility of synthetic propositions. This question requires the development of a response that essentially concerns not only about its necessity and logical possibility, but also about its feasibility and show their peculiarities in each case. Specifically, the first critical conditions or ingredients of judgment distinguish between phenomena as knowledge objects and things in themselves. Thus, the transcendental idealism is defined in the narrowly, in Critique of Pure Reason, basically, from the way of interpreting the role of sensitivity in relation to the categories and the constitution of the objects of knowledge. This philosophical position allows Kant to propose a field of meaning which formulate and solve cognitive problems and valid, hence solving problems that reason itself imposes itself as well as make a refutation of idealism (material) somewhat problematic as dogmatic. Thus, we intend to prove that the problem of discernibility of objects is solved in Kant decisively in semantic terms.
——. “História e teleologia na filosofia kantiana. Resposta às críticas de Ricardo Terra contra a “Escola semântica de Campinas”.” [Portuguese; History and teleology in Kantian philosophy. A reply to Ricardo Terra’s criticism of the “Campinas semantic school”] Studia Kantiana 12.16 (2014): 144-59. [M] [online]
Pettoello, Renato. Leggere Kant. [Italian] Brescia: La Scuola, 2014. [178 p.] [WC]
Pfeuffer, Andrew. “Correcting the Caricature: God and Kant.” Quaestiones Disputatae 5.1 (2014): 105-17. [MUSE]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: (1st paragraph) This paper will offer a simple propaedeutic to several salient aspects of Kantian ethics and rational theology in order to demonstrate the necessity of God in Kantian ethics. It will be argued that the loss of God fatally compromises Kantian morality. In pursuit of this end, clarification will be offered for some commonly misunderstood or neglected elements of Kantian ethics which are essential to a holistic view of Kantian morality and essential to the integration of Kantian ethics into a coherent worldview which incorporates his rational theology. The argument advanced in this paper seeks to demonstrate that theism and reason are not at cross purposes, and that a rationalistic system of ethics may in fact include God in a prominent and deeply meaningful way.
Pillow, Kirk. “Jupiter’s Eagle and the Despot’s Hand Mill: Two Views of Metaphor in Kant.” The Linguistic Dimension of Kant’s Thought. Eds. Frank Schalow and Richard L. Velkley (op cit.). 107-33. [M]
Pimenta, Pedro Paulo. “Nota sobre as origens da filosofia da história.” [Portuguese; Notes regarding the beginnings of the philosophy of history] Cadernos de Filosofia Alemã: Crítica e Modernidade 19.2 (2014): 13-25. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The aim of the text is to show how the constitution of a philosophy of history as a discipline of philosophical thought depends in a certain measure of the way in which Kant and Herder interpret the philosophical historyof Hume.
Pinheiro Walla, Alice. “Human Nature and the Right to Coerce in Kant’s Doctrine of Right.” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 96.1 (2014): 126-39. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper explores the alleged role of a conception of human nature for Kant’s justification of the duty to leave the state of nature and the related right to coerce others to enter the civil condition in the Doctrine of Right (1797). I criticise the interpretation put forward by Byrd and Hruschka, according to which Kant’s postulate of public right is a preventive measure based on a “presumption of badness” of human beings. Although this reading seems to be supported by § 42 of the Doctrine of Right, I shall argue that the paragraph neither offers a justification of why we have a duty to leave the state of nature, nor explains why individuals are allowed to coerce others to do so. I offer an alternative interpretation of § 42 by focusing on the difference between formal and material violations of right and argue that the rationale behind the postulate of public right is the idea that remaining in the state of nature is a formal violation of the concept of right. It is therefore not prudential reason that authorizes us to coerce others to enter the lawful condition.
Piper, Adrian. “On Katerina Deligiorgi’s The Scope of Autonomy.” Critique (blog posted: 20 Oct 2014) n.p. [PW] [online]
Pires, Marcio. “O método da razão pura em Kant: o filosofar como exercício arquitetônico.” [Portuguese; Kant’s method of pure reason: philosophy as an architectonic exercise] Studia Kantiana 12.17 (2014): 51-73. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The focus of this article is the identification and exposition of the concept of rationality in Kantian philosophy, especially considering the “Transcendental Doctrine of Method” of the Critique of Pure Reason. More specifically, the investigation takes the text of the “Architectonic of Pure Reason” as its starting point, and highlights the concept of system exposed in that text, taking into account its parity with the organism which serves as its metaphor. From that point, one can qualify the method of reason as being profoundly dynamic, and from such qualification, characterize the philosophical posture itself as an activity of thought being exerted critically and systematically on the multiplicity of knowledge.
Pirni, Alberto. “Conviver com verdades penúltimas? Um percurso kantiano. [Spanish; Living with penultimate truths? A Kantian path] Studia Kantiana 12.16 (2014): 5-37. [M] [online]
Abstract: The essay focuses on the concept of truth – as search for meaning – within the Kant’s perspective, by seeking for deconstructing a link – between truth and ultimacy – that the western history of ideas has always assumed as consolidated and not modifiable. In doing that, the essay concentrates first on two different ramifications of such a link: the ramification between ultimate and stable, on the one hand, and that one between ultimate and unstable, on the other (§ 1). According to the epoché suggested by Kant about the “realm of ultimate truth”, then the essay deals with an excursus about the “realm of penultimate” and about the corresponding dual link: that one between penultimate and stable – here explored through the concept of law by Hegel – and the second one between the penultimate and unstable – following the concept of public sphere by Habermas (§ 2).
However, it seems interesting to understand how Kant precisely outlines his reflection on the topic of truth in the Critique of Pure Reason (§ 3). But it’s also of particular interest to understand possibilities and limits of extending the “discourse of truth”, by referring to its logical and ontological meaning, beyond the Transcendental Analytic, ie within the Transcendental Dialectic (§§ 4-5). Conclusively, this argumentative path would like to offer a new perspective about the dialectic between ultimate and penultimate by trying to re-read the Kantian conceptual dialectic between idea and ideal (§ 6). The main goal of such a re-reading is the search for a “third way” between stable and unstable, i.e., a renewed “logic of plurality” able of legitimizing the moral commitment of any rational agent who, according to the law of reason, tries to make effective the attempt of living together with any other.
Platz, Jeppe von. Rev. of Kant’s Elliptical Path, by Karl Ameriks (2012). Kantian Review 19.1 (2014): 165-71. [M]
——. Rev. of The Scope of Autonomy: Kant and the Morality of Freedom, by Katerina Deligiorgi (2012). Mind 123.491 (2014): 886-91. [PW]
Poggi, Davide. “Paralogismi e antinomie. Riflessioni kantiane sui concetti di seele e ich denke.” [Italian] Trans/Form/Ação: Revista de Filosofia 37.special issue (2014): 37-58. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This essay focuses on the presence, in the section of the Dialektik dedicated to the issue of the Seele and the psychological paralogisms, of an "antinomic" approach regarding, in particular, the debate on the simplicity of the soul. In the examination of Mendelssohn's thesis concerning the soul's incorruptibility, Kant shows that it is possible to assume, together with the "extensive" criterion, an "intensive" criterion which leads to admitting the "decomposability" of the soul and the possibility of its annihilatio per remissionem. Thus, as happens in the antinomies, we are faced with two theses on the "simplicity" of the soul which are both non-contradictory, but, at the same time, opposed to each other. These reflections, proposed in the 1787 edition of the Kritik (and which seem to refer back to and refine the considerations in the 1781 edition on the simplicity of the "thinking subject" and Ich denke), play an important role and show their full value in the context of the second mathematical antinomy.
Pollok, Konstantin. “‘The understanding prescribes laws to nature’: Spontaneity, Legislation, and Kant’s Transcendental Hylomorphism.” Kant-Studien 105.4 (2014): 509-30. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper I argue for the following two related claims. First, a successor version of the scholastic ‘forma-non-afficit’ theorem functions as the key to Kant’s transcendental idealism. Second, drawing on the ‘natural right’ tradition which Kant sees himself being part of, the relation between our cognitive spontaneity and the legislation of the understanding is one of acknowledgment (rather than creation) of the laws of the understanding. This interpretation allows us to make sense of pure concepts and principles of the understanding as the fundamental laws of nature. They rationally constrain our empirical concepts and judgments, and thus warrant the ‘lawfulness in the connection of appearances.’ (Prol, AA 04:§ 36)
——. “Im logischen Raum der Gründe: Kant zum Verhältnis zwischen kausaler Erklärung und rationaler Rechtfertigung.” Philosophie nach Kant. Neue Wege zum Verständnis von Kants Transzendental- und Moralphilosophie. Ed. Mario Egger (op cit.). 705-21. [M]
——. “From the Clarity of Ideas to the Validity of Judgments: Kant’s Farewell to Epistemic Perfectionism.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44.1 (2014): 18-35. [ASP]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Against the standard interpretation of Kant’s ‘Copernican revolution’ as the prioritization of epistemology over ontology, I argue in this paper that his critique of traditional metaphysics must be seen as a farewell to the perfectionism on which early modern rationalist ontology and epistemology are built. However, Kant does not simply replace ‘perfection’ with another fundamental concept of normativity. More radically, Kant realizes that it is not simply ideas but only the relation of ideas that can be subject to norms, and thus he shifts the focus from the reality of ideas to the validity of judgments. Section 1 of this paper clarifies the pre-Kantian role of the concept of perfection and examines Kant’s critical response to that concept. Section 2 identifies Kant’s point of departure from the Cartesian ‘way of ideas.’ Section 3 explains the key problem of his novel account of epistemic normativity. I conclude that Kant’s anti-perfectionism must be seen as the driving force behind his ‘Copernican revolution’ in order to fully appreciate his mature account of epistemic normativity.
Porcheddu, Rocco. Rev. of Kant’s Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, by Henry E. Allison (2011). Internationales Jahrbuch des Deutschen Idealismus/International Yearbook of German Idealism: Geschichte/History, eds. Jürgen Stolzenberg and Fred Rush. 10 (2014): pages. [PW]
Porée, Jérôme. “Temps et raison. Les limites de l’interprétation heideggérienne de la deuxième Critique.” De la sensibilité: les esthétiques de Kant. Eds. François Calori, Michaël Foessel, and Dominique Pradelle (op cit.). 321-35. [M]
Portela, Ruth Calvo. “La libertad frente a la gracia: una comparación entre Kant y Lutero.” [Spanish; Freedom in front of grace: a comparison between Kant and Luther] Revista de Humanidades 21 (2014): 119-43. [ASP]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The influence that Luther and Protestantism in general made in Kant is undeniable. Nevertheless, it is worth noting some essential points, where the Kantian philosophy differs from the ideas held by the reformer. In this paper I would like to focus on one of these contrasting points: Freedom. On the one hand, Luther's position leads him to deny free will in mankind and to defend theological determinism. On the other hand, according to Kant, Freedom becomes the touchstone of his entire system, and the axis on which Pure Practical Reason turns. Departing from the notion of Evil that defends each of these thinkers, the main purpose of this paper is to review the controversy between Freedom and Grace comparing the theories of these two authors.
Possenti, Vittorio. Pace e guerra tra le nazioni: Kant, Maritain, "Pacem in terris". [Italian] Rome: Studium, 2014. [162 p.] [WC]
Pozzo, Riccardo. Rev. of La filosofia della natura in Kant, by Paolo Pecere (2009). Kant-Studien 105.2 (2014): 301-2. [M]
——. Rev. of Goodbye, Kant! What Still Stands of the Critique of Pure Reason, by Maurizio Ferraris, translated into English by Richard Davies (2013; Italian, 2001). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (Jul 2014, #20). [M] [online]
Pradelle, Dominique. “Sur le sens de l’idéalisme transcendantal: Husserl critique de Kant.” De la sensibilité: les esthétiques de Kant. Eds. François Calori, Michaël Foessel, and Dominique Pradelle (op cit.). 285-305. [M]
——. See: Calori, François, Michaël Foessel, and Dominique Pradelle.
——, ed. See: Calori, François, Michaël Foessel, and Dominique Pradelle, eds.
Prange, Martine, et al., eds. Problematizing Cosmopolitanism. Cluj-Napoca: Argonaut, 2014. [226 p.] [WC]
[Note] [Hide Note] Note: See the essays by Edgar Valdez (Conditions for a federation of states: Kant and the limits of cosmopolitan right) and Biraj Mehta Rathi (Kantian cosmopolitanism and international relations).
Prauss, Gerold. “Die unbekannte Wurzel von Verstand und Sinnlichkeit bei Kant.” Perspektiven der Metaphysik im ‘postmetaphysischen’ Zeitalter. Eds. Paola-Ludovika Coriando und Tina Röck (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 2014). 103-7. [WC]
Příhonský, František. “Neuer Anti-Kant oder Prüfung der Kritik der reinen Vernunft nach den in Bolzano’s Wissenschaftslehre niedergelegten Begriffen / New Anti-Kant, Or Examination of the Critique of Pure Reason According to the Concepts Laid Down in Bolzano’s Theory of Science.” New Anti-Kant. Eds. Sandra Lapointe and Clinton Tolley (op cit.). 17-153. [PW]
Pringe, Hernán. “La filosofía trascendental y la interpretación de Bohr de la teoría cuántica.” [Spanish] Temas kantianos. Ed. Mario Caimi (op cit.). 373-91. [WC]
Proops, Ian. “Kant on the Cosmological Argument.” Philosophers’ Imprint 14.12 (2014): 1-21. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the first Critique Kant levels two main charges against the cosmological argument. First, it commits the fallacy of ignoratio elenchi. Second, in two rather different ways, it presupposes the ontological argument. Commentators have struggled to find merit in either of these charges. The paper argues that they can nonetheless be shown to have some merit, so long as one takes care to correctly identify the version of the cosmological argument that Kant means to be attacking. That turns out to be a charitably modified version of the argument run by Christian Wolff. Having described Kant’s target argument, the paper goes on to explicate his criticisms and to weigh their merits.
Prunea-Bretonnet, Tinca. “Mai este conceptul de ontologie potrivit pentru filosofia critică? Kant şi redefinirea ontologiei în şcoala kantiană după 1780.” [Romanian; Is the Term Ontology Still Relevant for Critical Philosophy? Kant and his School on Redefining Ontology after 1780] Studii de istoria filosofiei universale 22 (2014): 141-53. [RC]
Pulerà, Antonio M. La trasparenza del soggetto in Kant, Hegel, Heidegger e Lacan. [Italian] Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino Editore, 2014. [161 p.] [WC]
Puls, Heiko. “Quo errat demonstrator – warum es in der Grundlegung eine Faktum-These gibt. Drei Argumente gegen Dieter Schöneckers Interpretation.” Kants Rechtfertigung des Sittengesetzes in Grundlegung III: Deduktion oder Faktum? Ed. Heiko Puls (op cit.). 15-34. [PW]
——. “Quare errat disceptator? Eine Erwiderung auf Dieter Schöneckers Replik.” Kants Rechtfertigung des Sittengesetzes in Grundlegung III: Deduktion oder Faktum? Ed. Heiko Puls (op cit.). 45-58. [PW]
——, ed. Kants Rechtfertigung des Sittengesetzes in Grundlegung III: Deduktion oder Faktum? Berlin: De Gruyter, 2014. [xvi, 274 p.] [WC]
Birgit Recki, "Deduktion oder Faktum? Kants Freiheitstheorie im dritten Abschnitt der Grundlegung"
Dieter Schönecker, "Warum es in der Grundlegung keine Faktum-These gibt. Drei Argumente"
Heiko Puls, "Quo errat demonstrator – warum es in der Grundlegung eine Faktum-These gibt. Drei Argumente gegen Dieter Schöneckers Interpretation"
Dieter Schönecker, "Quare errat disceptator. Eine Erwiderung auf Heiko Puls"
Heiko Puls, "Quare errat disceptator? Eine Erwiderung auf Dieter Schöneckers Replik"
Heiner F. Klemme, "Freiheit oder Fatalismus? Kants positive und negative Deduktion der Idee der Freiheit in der Grundlegung (und seine Kritik an Christian Garves Antithetik von Freiheit und Notwendigkeit)"
Stephan Zimmermann, "Faktum statt Deduktion. Kants Lehre von der praktischen Selbstrechtfertigung des Sittengesetzes"
Bernhard Milz, "Kants Deduktion des kategorischen Imperativs in entwicklungsgeschichtlicher Perspektive"
Ina Goy, "Die Deduktion des Sittengesetzes in den Jahren 1785, 1788 und 1788–90 und der Wandel in Kants Naturbegriff"
Jochen Bojanowski, "Kants Disjunktivismus in GMS 446f."
Manfred Baum, "Sittengesetz und Freiheit. Kant 1785 und 1788"
Bernd Ludwig, "Die Freiheit des Willens und die Freiheit zum Bösen. Inhaltliche Inversionen und terminologische Ausdifferenzierungen in Kants Moralphilosophie zwischen 1781 und 1797"
Quarfood, Marcel. “The Antinomy of Teleological Judgment: What It Is and How It Is Solved.” Kant’s Theory of Biology. Eds. Ina Goy and Eric Watkins (op cit.). 167-83. [M]
——. “A Note on Schulting’s Derivation of Contingency.” Studi Kantiani 27 (2014): 87-94. [PW]
Rainsborough, Marita. “Another Cosmopolitanism. Seyla Benhabibs Antwort auf Kants philosophisches Konzept des Kosmopolitismus.” Estudos Kantianos 2.1 (2014): 125-42. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The essay takes Seyla Benhabib’s philosophical concepts as an example upon which to base an examination of the question of which aspects of Kantian philosophy are relevant to the current theory of cosmopolitanism; the way in which this theory references Kant and whether Kant’s cosmopolitan parameters have been re-interpreted. It can be demonstrated that Seyla Benhabib’s Another Cosmopolitanism makes significant alterations to the Kantian model. Taking Kant’s view of the autonomy of the subject, human rationality and the moral-practical fundamental characteristics of humans as her starting point, she overcomes formal universalism by incorporating the specific other, the dialogue-based model of procedural integration of common norms, rights and institutions and the negotiating process of democratic iteration to regulate the conditions for inclusion and exclusion to ensure world citizens’ rights. By doing so Benhabib is able to provide a new substantiation of cosmopolitanism without referencing the teleological principle of nature or neglecting the human morality which focuses on its immediate environment. Cosmopolitanism is conceived of as a utopian project which provides human beings worldwide with a variety of practical-moral objectives upon which to base their specific actions. Critical alternative theories such as the radical democratic cosmopolitanism of Ingram and Honig’s antagonistic cosmopolitanism are unable to refute Benhabib’s Another Cosmopolitanism as long as the latter is, as intended by the philosopher, understood as a utopian concept.
Ramos Souza, Luís Eduardo. “Sobre o idealismo em Kant e Berkeley.” [Portuguese; On idealism in Kant and Berkeley] Studia Kantiana 12.16 (2014): 52-64. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper aims to analyze some relations of similarities and differences between the idealism of Berkeley (1710) and Kant (1781/ 1787), whose general problem can be formulated as follows: in what sense the idealist philosophy of Berkeley and Kant's approach and distant from each other? Such a response will be focused on four aspects, divided as follows. Regarding approaches, will examine whether, on the one hand, the conception of the subject in both philosophers and on the other, their respective defenses of realism. As for distances, will address whether, in part, the criticisms of those philosophers to idealism, and another, their proper conceptions of space and time.
Rand, Sebastian. Rev. of Understanding Hegel’s Mature Critique of Kant, by John McCumber (2014). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (Apr 2014, #10). [M] [online]
——. Rev. of Kant’s Construction of Nature: A Reading of the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, by Michael Friedman (2013). The Review of Metaphysics 67.3 (2014): 635-37. [PW]
Ratto, Pietro. La passeggiata al tramonto: vita e scritti di Immanuel Kant. Sanremo, EBK, 2014. [163 p.] [WC]
Rauscher, Frederick. “The Second Step of the B‐Deduction.” European Journal of Philosophy 22.3 (2014): 396-419. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper offers a new interpretation of Kant's puzzling claim that the B‐Deduction in the Critique of Pure Reason should be considered as having two main steps. Previous commentators have tended to agree in general on the first step as arguing for the necessity of the categories for possible experience, but disagree on what the second step is and whether Kant even needs a second step. I argue that the two parts of the B‐Deduction correspond to the two aspects of a priori cognition: necessity and universality. The bulk of the paper consists of support for the second step, the universality of the categories. I show that Kant's arguments in the second half of the B‐Deduction aim to define the scope of that universality for possible experience by considering the possibilities of divine intellectual intuition, of non‐human kinds of sensible intuition, and of apperception of the self. In these ways Kant delimits the boundaries of the applicability of the categories and excludes any other possible experience for human beings.
——. Rev. of Kant on Human Dignity, by Oliver Sensen (2011). Kantian Review 19.3 (2014): 491-95. [M]
Recki, Birgit. “Freiheit bei Sartre und bei Kant: eine grundlegungstheoretische Affinität.” Philosophie nach Kant. Neue Wege zum Verständnis von Kants Transzendental- und Moralphilosophie. Ed. Mario Egger (op cit.). 673-91. [M]
——. “Le bonheur chez Kant.” De la sensibilité: les esthétiques de Kant. Eds. François Calori, Michaël Foessel, and Dominique Pradelle (op cit.). 159-75. [M]
——. “Deduktion oder Faktum? Kants Freiheitstheorie im dritten Abschnitt der Grundlegung.” Kants Rechtfertigung des Sittengesetzes in Grundlegung III: Deduktion oder Faktum? Ed. Heiko Puls (op cit.). vii-xiii. [PW]
Reitemeyer, Ursula. “Kant im Kontext der europäischen Aufklärung: Die Philosophie der Aufklärung als eine Wurzel Europas?” Studia Philosophica Kantiana 2014.2 (2014): 3-17. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The question whether the core of the European unification may be found in the philosophy of the Enlightenment in general or in Kant ́s political philosophy in particular, is preceded by the quintessential question about the impact power of philosophy in real history. It is indisputable that philosophical streams as thought movements are located in the historically mediated thought and life space, which influences them and on which they have an impact in return. This is why the question about the real political effect of philosophical ideas and Enlightenment theory designs can only be related to whether it is also possible that ideas outside their temporal-historical context, i.e. with delay, may be transformed into political acting.
Riefling, Markus. “Erziehung als Entwicklungshelfer der Moralität. Zur Bedeutung von Kants Moralphilosophie, Anthropologie und Geschichtsphilosophie für seine Theorie der Erziehung.” Kant-Studien 105.3 (2014): 406-17. [M]
Abstract: Education in the sense of Kant aims on the development of morality. But morality cannot directly be produced. However, (pre-)conditions for the moralisation that has to be done by the educated self can be improved. Thereby, education insofar can be understood as development aid of morality. Education fosters the development of morality, but anyway can not do the development on its own.
Kants educational theory combines its moral philosophical fundament with anthropological and historical side argumentations. In this context the pragmatic has the task to define the conditions in which moralisation can succeed at its best. The history-philosophical perspective of progress towards a ‘cosmopolitan condition’ is getting relevant for an education targeting on morality and thereby contributing to the ‘Perpetual Peace’.
Ringkamp, Daniela. “Erlaubnis, Erlaubnisgesetz und Verbindlichkeit in Kants Praktischer Philosophie.” Das Band der Gesellschaft: Verbindlichkeitsdiskurse im 18. Jahrhundert. Eds. Simon Bunke, et al. (op cit.). 125-44. [WC]
——, ed. See: Bunke, Simon, Katerina Mihaylova, and Daniela Ringkamp, eds.
Rinofner-Kreidl, Sonja. “Neid. Zur moralischen Relevanz einer ‘Outlaw Emotion’.” Affektivität und Ethik bei Kant und in der Phänomenologie. Ed. Inga Römer (op cit.). 173-203. [M]
Ripstein, Arthur. “Kant’s Juridical Theory of Colonialism.” Kant and Colonialism: Historical and Critical Perspectives. Eds. Katrin Flikschuh and Lea Ypi (op cit.). 145-69. [M]
Rivera de Rosales, Jacinto. “Kant und die hegelsche Moralität.” Philosophie nach Kant. Neue Wege zum Verständnis von Kants Transzendental- und Moralphilosophie. Ed. Mario Egger (op cit.). 571-89. [M]
Rivera-Castro, Faviola. “Kant’s Formula of the Universal Law of Nature Reconsidered.” Journal of Moral Philosophy 11.2 (2014): 185-208. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: I criticize the widely accepted “practical” interpretation of the universality test contained in Kant’s first formula of the categorical imperative in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals – the formula of the universal law of nature. I argue that this interpretation does not work for contradictions in conception because it wrongly takes contradictions in the will as the model for them and, as a consequence, cannot establish a clear distinction between the two kinds of contradiction. This interpretation also assumes an understanding of universality that departs from Kant’s own and, cannot, for this reason, capture the kind of contradiction that he explicitly claims to establish. I provide an alternative interpretation, which I call revised logical interpretation, that allows us to account for contradictions in conception, including those examples that the practical interpretation cannot handle, as well as to establish a clear distinction between the two kinds of contradiction.
Rivero, Gabriel. Zur Bedeutung des Begriffs Ontologie bei Kant: Eine entwicklungsgeschichtliche Untersuchung. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2014. [xiv, 247 p.] [PW]
Note: Kantstudien-Ergänzungshefte, vol. 180. Originally appeared as the author’s Ph.D. dissertation (University of Mainz, 2012).
Publ. Note: Kant uses the term ontology in a doubled way. Most of the time, he attaches a negative valence to it, but occasionally he equates ontology to transcendental philosophy. Rivera demonstrates how these two ways of using the term are not contradictory.
——. “La influencia de Pistorius en la definición kantiana de la metafísica a partir de 1787.” [Spanish; Pistorius’ influence on Kant’s definition of metaphysics since 1787] Cadernos de Filosofia Alemã: Crítica e Modernidade 19.2 (2014): 111-30. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The present article deals with Kant’s concept of metaphysics from 1787 onwards, the year in which the term supersensible has been introduced to Kant’s definition of metaphysics. The article assumes that Pistorius’ criticism of the transcendental system caused Kant to present a new definition of metaphysics, which is characterized by an assimilation and reconception of the term supersensible in the sense of a critical philosophy. A comparison with the Progresses will prove that the Kantian definition of metaphysics in the 1790s must be interpreted according to the draft of 1787.
Robinson, Jenefer. “Aesthetic Disgust?” Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 75 (2014): 51-84. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In paragraph 48 of the Critique of Judgment, Immanuel Kant claimed that “only one kind of ugliness cannot be represented in accordance with nature without destroying all aesthetic satisfaction, hence artistic beauty, namely that which arouses disgust.” However, from Baudelaire to Damien Hirst, there have been artists who delight in arousing disgust through their works, and many of these disgusting works, such as Baudelaire’s Une Charogne, have high aesthetic merit. In her splendid new book, Savoring Disgust, Carolyn Korsmeyer rejects Kant’s suggestion and argues that there is something called “aesthetic disgust,” that is, “the arousal of disgust in an audience, a spectator, or a reader, under circumstances where that emotion both apprehends artistic properties and constitutes a component of appreciation.”
Rocha de la Torre, Alfredo. “‘Totalitarismus des Seins’? Die Ethik bei Levinas als Kritik am Denken Heideggers.” Affektivität und Ethik bei Kant und in der Phänomenologie. Ed. Inga Römer (op cit.). 241-52. [M]
Rödl, Sebastian. Rev. of Transcendental Philosophy and Naturalism, edited by Joel Smith and Peter Sullivan (2011). European Journal of Philosophy 22.3 (2014): 483-504. [PW]
Rollmann, Veit Justus. Rev. of Kant’s ‘Critique of Aesthetic Judgment’. A Reader’s Guide, by Fiona Hughes (2010). Kant-Studien 105.2 (2014): 308-10. [M]
Römer, Inga. “Ethik bei Kant und in der Phänomenologie: Perspektiven der Wiederaufnahme eines Gesprächs.” Affektivität und Ethik bei Kant und in der Phänomenologie. Ed. Inga Römer (op cit.). 1-15. [M]
——. “Reue und Freiheit. Ansatz zu einer Phänomenologie der Freiheit im Ausgang von Kants Begriff der Reue.” Affektivität und Ethik bei Kant und in der Phänomenologie. Ed. Inga Römer (op cit.). 223-40. [M]
——. “Die Formeln des kategorischen Imperativs in der Grundlegung: eine Kritik der Interpretation von Klaus Reich und Julius Ebbinghaus.” Philosophie nach Kant. Neue Wege zum Verständnis von Kants Transzendental- und Moralphilosophie. Ed. Mario Egger (op cit.). 191-209. [M]
——, ed. Affektivität und Ethik bei Kant und in der Phänomenologie. Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2014. [viii, 282 p.] [M]
Inga Römer (Ethik bei Kant und in der Phänomenologie: Perspektiven der Wiederaufnahme eines Gesprächs),
Steven Crowell (Kantianismus und Phänomenologie),
Dieter Schönecker (Das gefühlte Faktum der Vernunft: Skizze einer Interpretation und Verteidigung),
Heiner F. Klemme (Erkennen, Fühlen, Begehren – Selbstbesitz. Reflexionen über die Verbindung der Vermögen in Kants Lehre vom Kategorischen Imperativ),
Manfred Baum (Kant über die Empfänglichkeit des Gemüts für Pflichtbegriffe überhaupt), Bernd Ludwig (‘Ohne alles moralische Gefühl ist kein Mensch...’ – lebendige, vernünftige und sittliche Weltwesen bei Kant),
Andrea Marlen Esser (Die Bedeutung von Gefühlen in Kants Moralphilosophie und die Möglichkeit ihrer phänomenologischen Erweiterung),
Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl (Neid. Zur moralischen Relevanz einer ‘Outlaw Emotion’),
Sophie Loidolt (Achten, Durchfühlen, Ansinnen. Affektive Begegnisweisen der praktischen Vernunft),
Inga Römer (Reue und Freiheit: Ansatz zu einer Phänomenologie der Freiheit im Ausgang von Kants Begriff der Reue),
Alfredo Rocha de la Torre (‘Totalitarismus des Seins’? Die Ethik bei Levinas als Kritik am Denken Heideggers),
László Tengelyi (Die Rolle der persönlichen Freiheit in der Antwort auf fremde Ansprüche).
Rosa, Luiz Carlos Mariano da. “Do projeto crítico kantiano: os direitos da razão entre a Lógica da verdade e a Lógica da aparência.” [Portuguese; On the Kantian critical project: the rights of reason amid the logic of truth and the logic of appearance] Studia Kantiana 12.17 (2014): 5-26. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Superimposing a critical design involving the dogmatic foundations of knowledge ontologies that are necessary to work that involves the seizure of philosophical questions, Kant’s project proposes the end of philosophy as metaphysics construction and the need to assign it an essentially genealogical theoretical task of character and critical in order terminating the legitimacy of rational knowledge by analyzing the colleges that you are linked, as the article points out, that holds the rights of reason whose legitimacy the logic of truth and whose illegitimacy recognizes the logic of appearance betrays, converging to the borders that have the potential construction of scientific knowledge, as, making understanding the universal nature of the legislature and circumscribing the use of categories to the limits of possible experience, proposes the conditions necessary to sling it on judgments synthetic a priori.
Rosefeldt, Tobias. “Commentary on Chapter 15 of Patricia Kitcher’s Kant’s Thinker.” Kantian Review 19.1 (2014): 127-33. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: I argue that Patricia Kitcher’s Kant-inspired account of self-consciousness overintellectualizes the requirements for rational cognition. Kitcher claims that a person can only believe something on the ground of another belief if she is able to recognize the grounding belief as grounding the first belief and as one of her own. I criticize this claim by arguing that (i) someone can believe something for a certain reason without recognizing this reason as a reason (the possibility of unreflected reasons), and that (ii) she can recognize something as a reason for something else without being able to self-ascribe either her original belief or the belief that grounds it (the possibility of reflected but not self-conscious reasons).
Rosenkoetter, Timothy. “Kant’s Three Transcendentals, Explanation, and the Hypothesis of Pure Apperception.” The Palgrave Handbook of German Idealism. Ed. Matthew C. Altman (op cit.). 61-84. [M]
——. “Kant, Bolzano, and Moore on the Value of Good Willing.” New Anti-Kant. Eds. Sandra Lapointe and Clinton Tolley (op cit.). 235-71. [PW]
Rossi, S.J., Philip J. “Kant’s Apophaticism of Finitude: A Grammar of Hope for Speaking Humanly of God.” The Linguistic Dimension of Kant’s Thought. Eds. Frank Schalow and Richard L. Velkley (op cit.). 154-73. [M]
Roth, Klas, Martin Gustafsson, and Viktor Johansson. “Introduction: Perfectionism and Education – Kant and Cavell on Ethics and Aesthetics in Society.” The Journal of Aesthetic Education 48.3 (2014): 1-4. [PW]
Roth, Siegfried. “Kant, Polanyi, and Molecular Biology.” Kant’s Theory of Biology. Eds. Ina Goy and Eric Watkins (op cit.). 275-91. [M]
Roux, Sylvain. “Platonisme ou aristotélisme? Matière et forme dans l’Esthétique transcendantale.” De la sensibilité: les esthétiques de Kant. Eds. François Calori, Michaël Foessel, and Dominique Pradelle (op cit.). 23-35. [M]
Ruffing, Margit. “Kant-Bibliographie 2012.” Kant-Studien 105.4 (2014): 598-639. [M]
Rukgaber, Matthew. “Kant’s Criticisms of Ontological and Onto-theological Arguments for the Existence of God.” Kant Yearbook: Kant and Rationalism 6 (2014): 87-114. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant’s objection to the ontological argument in the first Critique is thought to be contained within the claim that ‘existence is not a predicate’. This article maintains that this ‘digression’ on existence is not Kant’s main objection. Instead, Kant argues within the first eight paragraphs of this fourteen paragraph section that there is no meaningful predication - either logical or real - without a synthetic, existential judgment concerning the subject of predication. Thus, the very subject of predication of the proof (God) is an empty concept and an indeterminate nominal definition (rather than a real possibility) that allows for neither meaningful predication nor the generation of a contradiction. I argue that this objection is significantly different than classical objections that are often identified with it and from Kant’s objection in 1763. I also argue that Kant’s target is not simply the Cartesian argument but is also his own pre-critical onto-theological argument. There is little evidence that Kant continues to accept the a priori onto-theological argument, and, in fact, he rejects its core claims in his discussion of the ontological argument and in the final paragraphs of the section on the Ideal of Reason.
Rumore, Paola. “Kant's Understanding of the Enlightenment with Reference to his Refutation of Materialism.” Con-Textos Kantianos 2014.1 (2014): 81-97. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The paper focuses on the role of Kant’s refutation of materialism in his understanding of the Enlightenment, meant to be the necessary condition that allows human beings to express their proper dignity, i.e. to cultivate the urge for and the vocation of free thought. Sketching the main moments of the German struggle against the threat of materialism, the paper places Kant’s refutation within this tradition, and reconstructs the steps of his critique from the very beginning of his reflection – still dealing with the main topics of Wolff’s metaphysic – up to the definitive refutation he develops on the basis of the transcendental idealism of the first Critique. The shift from the «obscure reasons» pointed out in the Dreams, that allow a refutation of materialism on moral grounds, to the statement of the meaninglessness of the question in a transcendental perspective reveals that the attempt to find a solution to the problem of materialism – most of all in its psychological meaning –represents a neverending challenge within Kant’s reflection.
Rush, Fred, ed. See: Stolzenberg, Jürgen, and Fred Rush, eds.
Sá Pereira, Roberto Horácio de. “Non-conceptual Content or Singular Thought?” Kant Studies Online (2014): 210-39; posted September 5, 2014. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper is a new non-descriptivist defense of nonconceptualism, based on a new interpretation of Kant’s metaphysics of concepts. We advance the following claim: What distinguishes non-conceptual from conceptual singular representations is the way partial representations of the object’s features are integrated into the whole representation of the object: while at the non-conceptual level this integration takes the form of images of the object’s features that are stored and projected, at the conceptual level this integration takes the form of the recognition that those features are properties of a same object, what Kant calls “synthetic unity of Aperception”.
Sağiroğlu, Asım Aliş. “Aykırı Nesneler ve Kant Felsefesinin Sınırları.” [Turkish; Rogue Objects and the Limits of Kantian Philosophy] Felsefi Düşün 3 (2014): 104-16??. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper introduces and evaluates critically a paper by Robert Hanna: “Non-Conceptualism, Rogue Objects, and The Gap in the B Deduction”. According to Hanna, some intuitional objects that understanding cannot grasp conceptually are possible in Kant’s philosophy and this point leads to considerable difficulties in the B Deduction. He thinks that the rejection of the Kantian transcendental idealism together with a new interpretation of the B Deduction can alleviate the issues. Our point is that Kantian non-conceptualism leads to much more serious problems which cannot be solved by a partial revision of the B deduction. In order to show various dimensions of the difficulties, the final section of this paper compares conceptualist and non-conceptualist positions and invites to a critical discussion.
Salikov, Alexey N. “Kants Projekt der Aufklärung heute. Bericht über die XI. Internationale Kant-Konferenz, 21. bis 23. April 2014, Kaliningrad/Königsberg.” Kant-Studien 105.3 (2014): 418-20. [M]
Salvetti, Florence. Judaïsme et christianisme chez Kant: du respect de la loi à son accomplissement dans l'amour. Paris: Édition du Cerf, 2014. [332 p.] [WC]
Sanahuja, Lorena Cebolla. “Kant’s apple: the moral grounding of right and the interdependence of ethics and law.” Studia Kantiana 12.16 (2014): 65-90. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Much has been discussed about the relationship of dependence or independence of the Kantian philosophy of right from his moral theory. The strong independence thesis has been sustained amongst others by Allen Wood and Georg Geismann. The medium-independence thesis has been defended by Thomas Pogge in an attempt to differentiate Kantian philosophy of right from Rawlsian comprehensive liberalisms. There is also the “non-conclusive” position of Arthur Ripstein regarding this dependence. Finally there is the position of Otfried Höffe and Paul Guyer, which defends a strong dependence between right and morals, and states a deduction of the Principle of Right (PR) from the Categorical Imperative (CI) through the notion of freedom. I will base my defense on the discussion between Markus Willaschek and Gerhard Seel regarding this matter because their positions summarize many of the fundamental arguments used by both lines of thoughti and, al last, propose my own defense of the dependence thesis.
Sánchez Madrid, Nuria. “Kant’s Juridical Cosmopolitanism from the Standpoint of some Recent Global Justice Theories.” Studia Philosophica Kantiana 2014.2 (2014): 18-31. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper argues whether Kant could be regarded as a meaningful advocate of global justice or only as a valid theorist of justice within the specific context of the Westphalian Europe. This alternative should be easily solved as far as Kant asserts that the state and republican form ought to be spread through the Earth, so that different countries are invited to set up a system of states. I will especially tackle two aspects of Kant’s focusing on a worldwide political order. First, Kant assigns a systematic role to the cosmopolitan right, which suggests reading that part of the theory of law as a necessary conclusion of the legal whole, although its institutional embodiment could not to be compared with that available for the state. In fact, the states cannot behave as individual citizens do, since they do not recognize any higher authority than themselves. Second the cosmopolitan law shows that coercion is not the unique instrument to fulfill legal obligations, for a cosmopolitan order should rather reflect the moral equality among states, instead of laying down a hierarchy over governmental structure. Third, I will discuss that the only way to pursue and discharge an active role in the political sphere according to Kant stems from the statehood, so that any “bourgeois society” is committed to help other needy and less developed peoples and societies in order to boost so that they achieve their autonomy as a state. This will be the most rewarding contribution that a state could offer to the cosmopolitan order according to Kant’s theory of right.
——. “Has social justice any legitimacy in Kant's theory of right? The empirical conditions of the legal state as a civil union.” Trans/Form/Ação: Revista de Filosofia 37.2 (2014): 127-46. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper aims at shedding light on an obscure point in Kant's theory of the state. It discusses whether Kant's rational theory of the state recognises the fact that certain exceptional social situations, such as the extreme poverty of some parts of the population, could request institutional state support in order to guarantee the attainment of a minimum threshold of civil independence. It has three aims: 1) to show that Kant's Doctrine of Right can offer solutions for the complex relation between economics and politics in our present time; 2) to demonstrate the claim that Kant embraces a pragmatic standpoint when he tackles the social concerns of the state, and so to refute the idea that he argues for an abstract conception of politics; and 3) to suggest that a non-paternalistic theory of rights is not necessarily incompatible with the basic tenets of a welfare state.
Sánchez Rodríquez, Manuel. Rev. of Kants Begriff der Sinnlichkeit. Seine Unterscheidung zwischen apriorischen und aposteriorischen Elementen der sinnlichen Erkenntnis und deren lateinische Vorlagen, by Takeshi Nakazawa (2009). Kant-Studien 105.2 (2014): 304-7. [M]
Sandkühler, Hans Jörg. “Kant – Recht und Staat in weltbürgerlicher Perspektive.” [German; Kant on Law and State from the Cosmopolitan Point of View] Diametros 39 (2014): 93-108. [PW] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Nowadays, the primarily philosophical Kantian idea of the cosmopolitan law has in fact been transformed into a dynamic system of international law that still remains quite problematic and in need of further development: for human rights not to be seen as an ideal or even utopia but as a positive law, as jus cogens, erga omnes. This contribution argues for a pragmatic reinterpretation in which Kant’s doctrine is construed as a functional theory of law and state and which shows that Kant becomes important for our times if one renounces speculative and metaphysical justifications. Kant’s theory of law is not a part of his moral philosophy, subordinated to it. There is no need for ethical justifications of the fact that there is law. Why there has to be law follows ex negativo from the same reasons for which the theory of law is a normative theory: the existence of law is grounded in the requirement that people ought to act rationally, even though de facto they frequently do not respond to this “ought”. Since this is not so, there is law, according to Kant, with its “entitlement to coercion”. Kant’s doctrine of law does have an ethical dimension in which it is to be established what law and state should be like – that is, at which values they should aim – but law, in his theory, takes priority over morality in establishing legal cosmopolitan relations.
Santos, Leonel Ribeiro dos. “‘Uso polémico da razão’, ou ‘paz perpétua em filosofia’? Sobre o pensamento antinómico e o princípio de antagonismo em kant.” [Portuguese] Trans/Form/Ação: Revista de Filosofia 37.special issue(2014): 93-116. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: We compare Kant's essay Announcement of the forthcoming signing of a treaty for perpetual peace in philosophy with the second section in chapter one of the Transcendental Theory of Method of the Critique of Pure Reason ("Discipline of pure reason in respect of its polemical use"), and try to identify and understand the seeming contradiction of Kant's program. On the one hand Kant intends to solve the unending conflicts in the arena of pure reason by overcoming the apparent contradictions of reason with itself, and thus at last establishing "perpetual peace in philosophy". On the other hand he follows a dialectical procedure inspired by judicial rhetoric, appealing to a "polemical use of pure reason" as the most adequate and indeed the only way possible of neutralizing the pretensions of both dogmatism and scepticism. Our reflection leads us to characterize Kant's pax philosophica and the pressuposed homologies between the solution of political and speculative conflicts. We also recognize that Kantian philosophy is originally determined by an agonic conception of life, human society, the cosmos, and reason itself.
Satici, Murat. “Kant’a Dönüş: Yargıgücü, Gadamer ve Hermeneutik.” [Turkish; Kantian Turn: Critique Of Judgement, Gadamer and Hermeneutic] Felsefi Düşün 3 (2014): 117-41??. [PW]
Abstract: Contemporary philosophy criticizes the modernization and modern philosophy in terms of their scientific, sociological, political and aesthetic results. In doing so, these critiques unavoidably turn to the Kantian philosophy, because of his investigations on theoretical and practical reason and their results included purification of reason, actions and aesthetic. Since Kant’s investigations contributed shaping modernization and modern philosophy, criticizing them turns out to criticizing Kant and his philosophy. ‘The Kantian turn’ which is the one of the powerful and influential approaches among the critiques of modernization and modern practical philosophy is a source many rich philosophical debates.
In this article we consider Kant’s philosophy and its impact on the contemporary philosophy in the context of this ‘turn’. In doing so, we consult Gadamer’s critiques of Kantian philosophy. Gadamer’s objections to the Kant aim at criticising his theoretical philosophy of the question “what ‘understanding’ is” and the practical philosophy of the question “how people can live together”. Gadamer answered above mentioned questions using ‘hermeneutic’ approach. In order to make Kant’s impact on Gadamer and Gadamer’s critique Kant clear, we will investigate Kant’s practical philosophy, his concepts of purification of practical reason, taste, aesthetic judgement, beauty, art and also his conceptualisaiton of sensus communis which includes intersubjectivity. After that, we will investigate Gadamer’s hermeneutical philosophy in terms of his critiques of Enlightenment, the purification of reason and Kantian conception of work of art. We will seek answers to the questions of the ‘living together’ and the ‘intersubjectivity’ within Kant’s and Gadamer’s philosophical approaches. Finally we will indicate different aproaches of these issues which are also argued by some other thinkers which are in ‘Kantian turn’.
Saunders, Joe. “Kant, Rational Psychology and Practical Reason.” Kant Yearbook: Kant and Rationalism 6 (2014): 115-36. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In his pre-critical lectures on rational psychology, Kant employs an argument from the I to the transcendental freedom of the soul. In the (A-edition of the) first Critique, he distances himself from rational psychology, and instead offers four paralogisms of this doctrine, insisting that ‘I think’ no longer licenses any inferences about a soul. Kant also comes alive to the possibility that we could be thinking mechanisms - rational beings, but not agents. These developments rob him of his pre-critical rationalist argument for freedom. In the Groundwork, this is a serious problem; if we are not free, morality will be a phantasm for us. In Groundwork III, Kant attempts to overcome this by offering a new argument for our freedom, involving the standpoint of practical reason. In this paper, I detail these developments and present a practical and phenomenological reading of Kant’s approach in Groundwork III. I also venture a defence of this new argument.
Schaffar, Birgit. “Changing the Definition of Education. On Kant’s Educational Paradox Between Freedom and Restraint.” Studies in Philosophy & Education 33.1 (2014): 5-21. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Ever since Kant asked: ‘How am I to develop the sense of freedom in spite of the restraint?’ in his lecture on education, the tension between necessary educational influence and unacceptable restriction of the child’s individual development and freedom has been considered an educational paradox. Many have suggested solutions to the paradox; however, this article endorses recent discussions in educational philosophy that pursue the need to fundamentally rethink our understanding of education and upbringing. In this article it is argued that it is incomprehensible to describe an intervention of an educator as a constraint on a child’s actions and that such an intervention would be in need of justification; as Kant and many others after him have done. Educational intervention should not be understood as a restriction of a child’s endeavour to learn, because any educational intervention is educational. Furthermore, it is argued that the notion of restraint is based on the concept of human beings as radically separated which lead to the assumption that education is restrictive per se. In contrast, this article argues that indoctrination, manipulation, and coercion are rather phenomena within our educational forms of life. Recognizing the interrelations between human beings should play a constitutive part in the conceptualisation of individual freedom. A bond with others is the foundation upon which a child develops its own identity and an understanding of itself as an agent who can express its own will and takes responsibility for its words and actions.
Schalow, Frank. “The Language of Time in Kant’s Transcendental Schematism.” The Linguistic Dimension of Kant’s Thought. Eds. Frank Schalow and Richard L. Velkley (op cit.). 53-69. [M]
——, and Richard L. Velkley. “Introduction: Situating the Problem of Language in Kant’s Thought.” The Linguistic Dimension of Kant’s Thought. Eds. Frank Schalow and Richard L. Velkley (op cit.). 3-26. [M]
——, and Richard L. Velkley, eds. The Linguistic Dimension of Kant’s Thought. Historical and Critical Essays. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2014. [xi, 332 p.] [M]
Frank Schalow and Richard Velkley (Introduction: Situating the Problem of Language in Kant’s Thought),
Robert Wood (The Place of Language: from Kant to Hegel),
Frank Schalow (The Language of Time in Kant’s Transcendental Schematism),
Chris W. Surprenant (Language in Kant’s Practical Philosophy),
Michael N. Forster (Kant’s Philosophy of Language?),
Kirk Pillow (Jupiter’s Eagle and the Despot’s Hand Mill: Two Views of Metaphor in Kant),
Charles Nussbaum (Models and ‘Symbolic Hypotyposis’: Kant on Music and Language),
Philip J. Rossi, S.J. (Kant’s Apophaticism of Finitude: A Grammar of Hope for Speaking Humanly of God),
Susan Shell (Nachschrift eines Freundes: Kant on Language, Friendship, and the Concept of a People),
Robert Berman (Reason, Idealism, and the Category: Kantian Language in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit),
Jason M. Wirth (The Language of Natural Silence: Schelling and the Poetic Word after Kant),
Eric S. Nelson (Language, Nature and the Self: Language, Psychology, and the Feeling of Life in Kant and Dilthey),
Richard Velkley (The Inexhaustibility of Art and the Conditions of Language: Kant and Heidegger).
Scharfstein, Ben-Ami. The Nonsense of Kant and Lewis Carroll: Unexpected Essays on Philosophy, Art, Life, and Death. Chicago/London: University of Chicago Press, 2014. [242 p.] [WC]
[Note] [Hide Note] Content: Introduction: you, me, Kant, and Carroll — The nonsense of Kant and Lewis Carroll — A comparatist’s risks and rewards — A handful of rules against philosophical self-isolation — What death makes of philosophy — Keeping the world together — The common universe of aesthetics — Are the deaf and blind epistemologically isolated? — Pain, cruelty, and pathology in art — On the transparency and opacity of philosophers — The three philosophical traditions — Does philosophy progress? — Nonutopian observations on Machiavellism — On the nature and limits of ineffability — Ineffabilities are the demons and angels of incompleteness and incompletability — What can and cannot words express? — The bird with bread in its beak — You, me, and Kaufmann’s discovering the mind.
Schiemann, Gregor. “Johannes Keplers Entfernung von der modernen Wissenschaft.” Philosophie nach Kant. Neue Wege zum Verständnis von Kants Transzendental- und Moralphilosophie. Ed. Mario Egger (op cit.). 383-401. [M]
Schilling, Christof. Rev. of Kants Antwort auf die Globalisierung. Das kantsche Weltbürgerrecht als Prinzip einer normativen politischen Theorie zur Steuerung der Globalisierung, by Torsten Rademacher (2010). Kant-Studien 105.3 (2014): 432-37. [M]
. Rev. of Immanuel Kant – Schriften zur Geschichtsphilosophie, by Otfried Höffe (2011). Kant-Studien 105.3 (2014): 444-46. [M]
Schlicht von Rabenau, Mathias. Der philosophische Begriff des Gebrauchs: Platon, Kant, Wittgenstein. Münster: Mentis, 2014. [319 p.] [WC]
Schmidt, Elke Elisabeth, und Dieter Schönecker. “Kants Philosophie des Gewissens: Skizze für eine kommentarische Interpretation.” Philosophie nach Kant. Neue Wege zum Verständnis von Kants Transzendental- und Moralphilosophie. Ed. Mario Egger (op cit.). 279-312. [M]
——. Rev. of Kants kopernikanische Wende vom Wissen zum Glauben. Systematischer Kommentar zu Vorrede B der Kritik der reinen Vernunft, by Hilmar Lorenz (2011). Kant-Studien 105.3 (2014): 455-60. [M]
Schmidt, James. Rev. of What is Enlightenment?, by Samuel Fleischacker (2013). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (Mar 2014, #30). [M] [online]
Schmitz, Hermann. “Platonismus im Werk Kants und danach.” Philosophie nach Kant. Neue Wege zum Verständnis von Kants Transzendental- und Moralphilosophie. Ed. Mario Egger (op cit.). 341-55. [M]
Schönecker, Dieter. “Warum es in der Grundlegung keine Faktum-These gibt. Drei Argumente.” Kants Rechtfertigung des Sittengesetzes in Grundlegung III. Ed. Heiko Puls (op cit.). 1-14. [PW]
——. “Quare errat disceptator. Eine Erwiderung auf Heiko Puls.” Kants Rechtfertigung des Sittengesetzes in Grundlegung III. Ed. Heiko Puls (op cit.). 35-44. [PW]
——. “Das gefühlte Faktum der Vernunft: Skizze einer Interpretation und Verteidigung.” Affektivität und Ethik bei Kant und in der Phänomenologie. Ed. Inga Römer (op cit.). 55-77. [M]
——. Rev. of Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Moral. A Critical Guide, edited by Jens Timmermann (2009). Kant-Studien 105.2 (2014): 297-300. [M]
Schulting, Dennis. “Kant’s Deduction From Apperception: A Reply to My Critics.” Studi Kantiani 27 (2014): 95-115. [M]
——. See: Onof, Christian, and Dennis Schulting.
Sebold, Richard. Continental Anti-Realism: A Critique. London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014. [viii, 272 p.] [WC]
Seidel, Roman. Kant in Teheran: Anfänge, Ansätze und Kontexte der Kantrezeption in Iran. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2014. [xii, 364 p.] [WC]
Şenkaya, Coşkun. “Düşünenin Düşünüyorum’da Düşündüğü: Kant’ın Cogito Eleştirisi.” [Turkish; What the Thinker Thinks In the I think: Kant’s Criticism of the Cogito] Felsefi Düşün 3 (2014): 142-46??. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: According to Kant, I think is the basic proposition from which rational psychology derives all its wisdom. Kant thinks that this approach, which can be summarized as the thesis that the thinker is an I and thus knows itself as a thinker, presupposes an intellectual intuition in which the manifold the I requires for its conception of itself as it is in itself is given through mere self-consciousness. As is well known, for Kant on the other hand, insofar as our intuition is merely sensible, I think is only a representation of the act of thinking and the consciousness of this act cannot be turned into a source of the cognition of an I in itself independently of the conditions of intuition. In this study, we examine Kant’s criticism in light of Descartes’ Cogito argument, and we try to show that this criticism should be understood in terms of the difference between their approaches to objectivity in general.
Sensen, Oliver. “Universalizing as a Moral Demand.” Estudos Kantianos 2.1 (2014): 169-83. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant’s Categorical Imperative is commonly criticized as being empty, i.e., devoid of content, and therefore unable to generate any concrete duties. More specifically, the criticism is that the imperative rules out (a) too much as being morally forbidden in one respect, (b) too little in another, and (c) that it rules out maxims for the wrong reasons. In this paper I shall argue that the Categorical Imperative expresses a recognizably moral idea, and consider how it can be used reliably to generate concrete duties. My claim is that the Categorical Imperative expresses the demand of fairness: One should not make an exception for oneself in the sense that one should not regard oneself as being something better. I shall argue that the main objections against the imperative can be answered if one asks the question: Do I (1) try to make an exception for myself (2) to a rule that I regard to be objectively necessary?
——. “Respect Towards Elderly Demented Patients.” [English] Diametros 39 (2014): 109-24. [PW] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: One question of applied ethics is the status and proper treatment of marginal cases, i.e., of people who are not yet or not anymore in full possession of their rational capacities, such as elderly demented people. Does one belittle them if one does not treat them like normal human adults, or would it be disrespectful and demanding too much if one did? Are elderly demented even the proper object of respect? In this paper I explore what Kant would say about these questions if he had addressed them. I look at what Kantian respect is, how he justifies the requirement to respect others, and what it demands more specifically. My claim is that Kant conceives of respect as a maxim of not exalting oneself above others. One should adopt this attitude independently of what the other is like. Differences between normal human adults and marginal cases are important for how one should treat them, but ultimately not for the question of why one should treat them with respect. Accordingly, elderly demented people should be respected, and it depends on the individual case what kind of actions this implies.
Serban, Claudia. “Vouloir et pouvoir: Kant et Ricoeur face au problème de la grâce.” Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie 146.1 (2014): 43-57. [PW]
Shabel, Lisa. See: Carson, Emily, and Lisa Shabel.
Shaddock, Justin. “Kant and the Most Difficult Thing that Could Ever Be Undertaken on Behalf of Metaphysics.” History of Philosophy Quarterly 31.1 (2014): 41-58. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: I argue for novel solutions to two problems regarding Kant’s Transcendental Deduction. First, Kant seems to contradict his conclusion at the outset of his proof. He does so in both editions of his Deduction. Second, he seems to think he needs to give two arguments for his one conclusion in his Deduction's second edition. For the first solution, I draw on Kant’s contrast between our faculties of the understanding and sensibility. For the second, I contrast Kant's theories of the understanding in his Critique of Pure Reason and his pre-Critical Inaugural Dissertation. My broader aim is to oppose a subjectivist interpretation of Kant's Deduction and to offer an original account of how the categories relate to objects as appearances, for Kant.
Shell, Susan Meld. “Public Reason and Kantian Civic Education, or: Are the humanities ‘Dispensable’ and If Not, Why Not?” Politics and Teleology in Kant. Eds. Paul Formosa, Avery Goldman, and Tatiana Patrone (op cit.). 92-109. [M]
——. “Kant as ‘Vitalist’: The ‘Principium of Life’ in Anthropologie Friedländer.” Kant’s Lectures on Anthropology: A Critical Guide. Ed. Alix Cohen (op cit.). 151-71. [WC]
——. “Nachschrift eines Freundes: Kant on Language, Friendship, and the Concept of a People.” The Linguistic Dimension of Kant’s Thought. Eds. Frank Schalow and Richard L. Velkley (op cit.). 174-201. [M]
Sherman, Nancy. “The Place of Emotions in Kantian Morality.” Kant on Emotion and Value. Ed. Alix Cohen (op cit.). 11-32. [PW]
Shore, Daniel. “Milton and Kant.” Milton Quarterly 48.1 (2014): 26-38. [PW]
Shuster, Martin. “Kant’s Opus Postumum and McDowell’s Critique of Kant.” Southern Journal of Philosophy 52.4 (2014): 427-44. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this article, I have a modest goal: (1) to sketch how Kant can avoid the charge of “subjective idealism” advanced against him by John McDowell and (2) to do so with reference to Kant's last work, the so‐called Opus Postumum. I am interested in defending Kant on this point because doing so not only (a) shows how we need not – at least not because of this point about idealism – jump ship from Kant to Hegel (as McDowell and others think), but also (b) suggests that the Opus Postumum is a text that ought to be explored more by Kantians and those interested in Kant. A subsidiary, implicit point is that (c) we need not shy away from McDowell's reading of Kant in order to oppose McDowell's criticism of Kant. In order to defend against McDowell's charge, I focus on the argument of the Refutation of Idealism, showing how this argument evolves in Kant's later works, especially the Opus Postumum.
Siebel, Mark. “Ayers Kritik an Kants Definition analytischer Urteile.” Kant-Studien 105.2 (2014): 196-220. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant’s famous definition of analyticity states that a judgement is analytic if its subject-concept contains its predicate-concept. Ayer objects that (i) Kant makes use of the vague term ‘concept’, (ii) Kant presupposes that every judgement and every sentence has subject-predicate form, and (iii) in addition to the given ‘psychological’ criterion, Kant employs a ‘logical’ criterion not equivalent to the former. It will be shown that, taken literally, these objections are quite superficial. The third one, however, entails a serious problem.
Simon, Robert. Freiheit, Geschichte, Utopie: Schellings positive Philosophie und die Frage nach der Freiheit bei Kant. Freiburg/Munich: Alber, 2014. [xiv, 246 p.] [WC]
Sirovátka, Jakub. Rev. of Immanuel Kant, Sur l’échec de tout essai philosophique en matière de théodicée, translated and edited by Antoine Grandjean (2009). Kant-Studien 105.2 (2014): 296-97. [M]
Sloman, Aaron. “Biological, computational and robotic connections with Kant's theory of mathematical knowledge.” AI Communications 27.1 (2014): 53-62. [ASP]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In my research I meander through various disciplines, using fragments of AI that I regard as relevant, willing to learn from anyone whose ideas contribute. This makes me unfit to write the history of European collaboration on some area of AI research as originally intended for this collection. However, by interpreting the topic rather loosely, I can regard some European philosophers who were interested in Philosophy of mathematics as early AI researchers from whom I learnt much, such as Kant and Frege. Hume’s work is also relevant. Moreover, more recent work by Annette Karmiloff-Smith, begun in Geneva with Piaget then developed independently, helps to identify important challenges for AI (and theoretical neuroscience), that also connect with philosophy of mathematics and the future, rather than the history, of robotics. So this paper presents an idiosyncratic survey of a subset of AI stretching back in time, and deep into other disciplines, including philosophy, psychology and biology, and possibly also deep into the future.
Smyth, Daniel. “Infinity and Givenness: Kant on the Intuitive Origin of Spatial Representation.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44.5-6 (2014): 551-79. [M]
Somers-Hall, Henry. Rev. of Kant and Spinozism: Transcendental Idealism and Immanence from Jacobi to Deleuze, by Beth Lord (2011). Kant Studies Online (2014): 160-69. [M] [online]
Southworth, McKenzie. “Reinventing the Mirror: Reconciling Guyer’s and Allison’s Interpretations of Kant’s Second Analogy.” Res Cogitans 5.1 (2014): 162-68. [M]
Specht, Andrew. “title.” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 22.3 (2014): 514-34. [ASP]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Despite his impressive influence on nineteenth-century philosophy, F. A. Trendelenburg’s own philosophy has been largely ignored. However, among Kant scholars, Trendelenburg has always been remembered for his feud with Kuno Fischer over the subjectivity of space and time in Kant’s philosophy. The topic of the dispute, now frequently referred to as the ‘Neglected Alternative’ objection, has become a prominent issue in contemporary discussions and interpretations of Kant’s view of space and time. The Neglected Alternative contends that Kant unjustifiably moves from the claim that we have a priori intuitions of space and time to the sceptical conclusion that space and time are exclusively subjective. Most current discussions trace the objection back to Trendelenburg and often use him to motivate the objection. However, to date Trendelenburg’s actual arguments and reasons for rejecting the Kantian view of space and time have not been sufficiently uncovered; my goal here is to fill this lacuna. By better understanding what Trendelenburg actually argued, we will be in a better position to assess whether the Neglected Alternative objection against Kant is successful. But in addition, Trendelenburg’s own system is of independent philosophical interest, and my work here will shed light on one part of it.
Spegele, Roger D. Emancipatory International Relations: Critical Thinking in International Relations. New York: Routledge, 2014. [xii, 175 p.] [WC]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: See specifically chapter 2 (Between Rationalism and Empiricism: an Emancipatory Reading of Immanuel Kant’s International Relations) and chapter 3 (Neo-Kantian Emancipatory Visions and Revisions).
Speidel, Markus. Erziehung zur Mündigkeit und Kants Idee der Freiheit. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2014. [235 p.] [WC]
Spinelli, Letícia Machado. “A estrutura da ação por dever nas obras de fundamentação da moralidade e no escrito sobre a religião a partir da noção de ordem moral dos móbiles.” [Portuguese; The structure of action by duty in the writings on the foundations of morals and religion, proceeding from the notion of moral order of incentives] Studia Kantiana 12.16 (2014): 124-43. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article presents a comparative analysis of the works of foundation of morality and the book about religion in relation to the structure of the action by duty. Such analysis is justified in view of Kant, in book about religion, present the definition of the action by duty and morally evil action in terms of hierarchy and moral order of incentives formulation that apparently is not presented within the groundwork of moral. This analysis stands still, the need, at least broadly, provide data regarding the function and presence of the notion of moral order of incentives within the Kantian moral investigation.
Städtler, Michael. “Warum ist ‘[d]er Ursprung der obersten Gewalt [...] für das Volk, das unter derselben steht, in praktischer Absicht unerforschlich’? Über systematische Gründe politisch-juridischer Verbindlichkeit bei Kant.” Das Band der Gesellschaft: Verbindlichkeitsdiskurse im 18. Jahrhundert. Eds. Simon Bunke, et al. (op cit.). 145-61??. [WC]
Stan, Marius. “Unity for Kant’s Natural Philosophy.” Philosophy of Science 81.3 (2014): 423-43. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: I uncover here a conflict in Kant’s natural philosophy. His matter theory and laws of mechanics are in tension. Kant’s laws are fit for particles but are too narrow to handle continuous bodies, which his doctrine of matter demands. To fix this defect, Kant ultimately must ground the Torque Law; that is, the impressed torque equals the change in angular momentum. But that grounding requires a premise – the symmetry of the stress tensor – that Kant denies himself. I argue that his problem would not arise if he had kept his early theory of matter as made of mass points, or "physical monads."
——. “Kant’s natural-scientific output.” Rev. of Immanuel Kant, Natural Science, edted by Eric Watkins (2012). Metascience 23.1 (2014): 65-70. [PW]
——. “Once More Unto the Breach: Kant and Newton.” Rev. of Kant’s Construction of Nature. A Reading of the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, by Michael Friedman (2013). Metascience 23.2 (2014): 233-42. [PI]
Stang, Nicholas F. “The Non-Identity of Appearances and Things in Themselves.” Nous 48.1 (2014): 106-36. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: According to the 'One Object' reading of Kant's transcendental idealism, the distinction between the appearance and the thing in itself is not a distinction between two objects, but between two ways of considering one and the same object. On the 'Metaphysical' version of the One Object reading, it is a distinction between two kinds of properties possessed by one and the same object. Consequently, the Metaphysical One Object view holds that a given appearance, an empirical object, is numerically identical to the thing in itself that appears as that object. I raise various indiscernibility arguments against that view; because an appearance has different spatiotemporal and modal properties than a thing in itself, no appearance can be identical to a thing in itself. I point out that these arguments are similar to arguments against Monism, the view that material objects are numerically identical to the matter of which they are made. I outline some strategies Monists have developed to respond to these indiscernibility arguments and then develop parallel responses on behalf of the Metaphysical One Object view. However, I then raise another indiscernibility argument, to which, I argue, the Metaphysical One Object view cannot respond, even using the resources I have developed thus far. I develop a modified version of the Metaphysical One Object view that can respond to this new indiscernibility argument, but, I argue, this modified version of the One Object view is only a terminological variant of the Two Object view. When the Metaphysical One Object view is fully thought through it becomes the Two Object view. I conclude that Kantian appearances are not numerically identical to the things in themselves that appear to us.
——. “Greenberg on Kant, Existence, and De Re Necessity.” Kantian Review 19.3 (2014): 475-89. [M]
——. “Kant, Bolzano, and the Formality of Logic.” New Anti-Kant. Eds. Sandra Lapointe and Clinton Tolley (op cit.). 192-234. [PW]
——. Rev. of Essays on Kant, by Henry E. Allison (2012). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (Apr 2014, #5). [M] [online]
Stark, Werner. “Kant und Baumgarten: Exemplare der Metaphysica. Ein nachfragender Bericht.” editio. Internationales Jahrbuch für Editionswissenschaft, vol. 27 (2013). Eds. Rüdiger Nutt-Kofoth, Bodo Plachta, and Winfried Woesler (Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2014). 96-111. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the 18th century Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) held lessons at Königsberg University in Prussia (now Kaliningrad/Russia) over a period of 40 years. The philosophical discipline of Metaphysics was one of his major topics, based on a textbook of Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (Metaphysica, Halle, 11739). Since the middle of the 19th century it has been known that the Kantian copy of the 4th edition (1757) still exists at the university library in Dorpat (Tartu/Estonia). It became one of the main sources for the third part (Handschriftlicher Nachlaß) in the edition of Kant’s gesammelte Schriften (Berlin 1900 ff.) of the former Prussian Academy of Sciences. Later on (autumn 2000) it was determined that another Kantian copy of Baumgarten’s Metaphysica was held in the Gdansk library of the Polish Academy of sciences (Polska Academia Nauk Biblioteka Gdanska). A description of this formerly unknown copy is given, as well as a short discussion on topics arising from the embedded handwritten notes of Immanuel Kant.
——. “Kants Physischer Geographie und die Kritik der reinen Unvernunft: Aufklärung über zwei obskure Ausgaben aus Vollmers Verlag.” Subversive Literatur. Erfurter Autoren und Verlage im Zeitalter der Französischen Revolution (1780-1806). Eds. Dirk Sangmeister and Martin Mulsow (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2014). 381-94. [M]
——. “Kant’s Lectures on Anthropology: Some Orienting Remarks.” Kant’s Lectures on Anthropology: A Critical Guide. Ed. Alix Cohen (op cit.). 10-17. [WC]
——. “‘Naturforschung in Königsberg’ — ein kritischer Rückblick aus den Präliminarien einer Untersuchung über die Entstehungsbedingungen von Kant’s Vorlesung über Physische Geographie.” Estudos Kantianos 2.2 (2014): 29-59. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article aims at a methodologically secure approach for studying the intellectual environment in which Kant developed his intellectual training. It focuses on Kant’s two schools — the Collegium Fridericianum and the Albertus-Universität in Königsberg — as they were during the first half of the 18th century. Benno Erdmann’s Martin Knutzen und seine Zeit (1876) is critically examined, with the finding that this and similar research has made inadequate use of the 18th century publications arising out of the natural science being pursued in Königsberg at the time. A few concrete examples clarify the possible implications for future research of Kant’s writings and lectures on the sciences.
Steigerwald, Joan. Rev. of Kant’s Organicism: Epigenesis and the Development of Critical Philosophy, by Jennifer Mensch (2013). Isis 105.4 (2014): 848-49. [PW]
Stein, Sebastian. “Hegel and Kant on rational willing: The relevance of method.” Hegel Bulletin 35.2 (2014): 273-91. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Hegel’s account of rational willing has recently been misrepresented by both critics and supporters who argue that the content of willing is externally received from history, social context, practices of recognition, etc. This contradicts the conceptual structure of Hegel’s notion of rational action as free individuality, according to which the difference between the willing subject and the content of willing is an internal relation of identity. Since this ‘difference within identity’ can only be grasped by speculative thinking and not through understanding and reflection, the interpreters can be charged with employing the wrong method. Although reliance on the speculative method opens Hegel to the charge of unintelligibility, it helps explain the frequent misrepresentations of his account of freedom and why methodologically uninformed comparisons between Hegel and other thinkers run the risk of being counterproductive.
Steinsdorff, Christian von. Das ,Recht nach dem Kriege' in der Philosophie Immanuel Kants. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2014. [312 p.] [WC]
Stephenson, Andrew. “A Deduction from Apperception?” Studi Kantiani 27 (2014): 77-86. [PW]
Stern, Robert. Understanding moral obligation: Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard. Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014. [xiv, 277 p.] [WC]
Stevenson, Leslie. “Who’s Afraid of Determinism?” Philosophy 89.3 (2014): 431-50. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Because of the idealizations involved in the ideas of a total state of the world and of all the laws of nature, the thesis of all-encompassing determinism is unverifiable. Our everyday non-scientific talk of causation does not imply determinism; nor is it needed for the Kantian argument for a general causal framework as a condition for experience of an objective world. Determinism is at best a regulative ideal for science, something to be approached but never reached.
——. “Kant on Freewill, Grace and Forgiveness.” [English] Diametros 39 (2014): 125-39. [PW] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: How do our secular reflections on freewill relate to the theological tradition of human freedom and divine grace? I will pursue this question with reference to Kant, who represents a half-way house between Christianity and the atheism of other Enlightenment thinkers. But are those the only two alternatives? I suggest that Kant’s wrestling with the notion of divine grace can draw us all towards recognition of the ultimate mystery of human motivation and behaviour, and our need for forgiveness and hope.
——. “Kant on Grace.” Kant’s Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason: A Critical Guide. Ed. Gordon E. Michalson (op cit.). 118-36. [M]
Sticker, Martin. “How can Common Rational Capacities Confirm the Correctness of the Deduction in Groundwork III — and Why does it Matter?.” Hegel Bulletin 35.2 (2014): 228-51. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant claims in Groundwork IV:454 that the correctness of his complex philosophical deduction is confirmed by the ‘practical use of common human reason’. My paper discusses how this confirmation is possible, and why it is important for Kant’s project in the Groundwork. I argue that agents without philosophical training consider an intelligible standpoint, which is one of the central elements of the deduction, to be possible (i), that they take up this standpoint insofar as they reason under the idea of freedom (ii), and that they can be brought to acknowledge the higher normative authority of this standpoint (iii). Kant’s complex deduction is not alien to common agents insofar as it spells out these three elements of our ordinary understanding of metaphysics, agency, and morality. I conclude that the confirmation of the deduction by common human reason shows that even the content of Groundwork III can become popular, and can serve to inform and direct moral education and moral improvement.
——. Rev. of Kant’s Defense of Common Moral Experience, by Jeanine Grenberg (2013). Kantian Review 19.2 (2014): 315-18. [M]
——. Rev. of Kant’s Elliptical Path, by Karl Ameriks (2012). Journal of Eighteenth-Century Studies 37.3 (2014): 422-23. [PW]
Stiening, Gideon. “Dieser 'große Künstler von Blendwerken': Kants Kritik an Herder.” Philosophie nach Kant. Neue Wege zum Verständnis von Kants Transzendental- und Moralphilosophie. Ed. Mario Egger (op cit.). 473-98. [M]
Stilz, Anna. “Provisional Right and Non-State Peoples.” Kant and Colonialism: Historical and Critical Perspectives. Eds. Katrin Flikschuh and Lea Ypi (op cit.). 197-220. [M]
——. Rev. of Reading Onora O'Neill, edited by David Archard, Monique Deveaux, Neil Manson, and Daniel Weinstock (2013). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (Feb 2014, #35). [M] [online]
Stohr, Karen. “Keeping the Shutters Closed: The Moral Value of Reserve.” Philosophers’ Imprint 14.23 (2014): 1-25. [M][online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper I defend a little noted claim of Kant’s — that we should “keep the shutters closed” on our flaws and failings. Kant’s own arguments for this claim aren’t fully satisfactorily, and they rest primarily on pragmatic considerations. My aim in this paper is to provide a more robust Kantian-inspired argument for the moral value of reserve. I argue that collaborating with others to keep the shutters closed on our individual and collective flaws aids in the difficult task of building and maintaining moral community among morally frail and flawed human beings. The paper consists of three parts. In Part I, I examine what Kant himself says about reserve. In Part II, I present a Kantian-inspired argument for the moral value of reserve, drawing on sociologist Erving Goffman’s concept of a front. Moral fronts, I argue, contribute to the fulfillment of the Kantian duties of moral self-improvement and beneficence. To put it differently, they help us instantiate the kingdom of ends in a world of imperfect human beings. In Part III, I address three objections to my argument: that fronts are deceptive, that they actually interfere with moral self-improvement, and that they preclude morally valuable forms of intimacy. I argue that my account can accommodate these concerns.
Stolzenberg, Jürgen, and Fred Rush, eds. Geschichte/History. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2014. [324 p.] [WC]
Note: International Yearbook of German Idealism, vol. 10. See especially:
Louden, Robert B. (Kant and the World History of Humanity),
Brandt, Reinhard (Immanuel Kant: Anverwandlung und Zeitenwende),
Kühn, Manfred (Kant and Fichte on ‘Universal History’),
Deligiorgi, Katerina (Actions as Events and Vice Versa: Kant, Hegel and the Concept of History),
Porcheddu, Rocco (Review of Henry E. Allison, Kant’s Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals).
Stoner, Samuel A. Rev. of Kant’s Conception of Pedagogy: Toward Education for Freedom, by G. Felicitas Munzel (2012). The Review of Metaphysics 67.3 (2014): 654-56. [PW]
Strohmeyer, Ingeborg. Kantischer und moderner Apriorismus. Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann, 2014. [226 p.] [WC]
Stroud, Scott R. Kant and the Promise of Rhetoric. University Park, Penn.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2014. [x, 274 p.] [WC] [review]
Sturm, Thomas. “‘Kant our Contemporary’? Kitcher on the Fruitfulness of Kant’s Theory of the Cognitive Subject.” Kantian Review 19.1 (2014): 135-41. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In chapter 15 of Kant’s Thinker, Patricia Kitcher claims that we can treat Kant as ‘our contemporary’, and that his theory of apperception ‘offers “new” and plausible perspectives on issues of considerable recent interest’. I question this with respect to two of her four chosen topics. First, I address her attempt to show that Kant’s theory of apperceptive self-knowledge is immune to sceptical doubts of the sort Barry Stroud presents. Second, I turn to her argument that this theory is superior to current accounts of the special authority of self-knowledge. Over and above specific weaknesses, it seems that Kitcher’s considerations generally lack sufficient reflection on how philosophical arguments of the past can be relevant to current agendas.
Sullivan, Laura Specker. “The Self-Contradictory Identity of the Personal Self: Nishida’s Argument against Kantian Pure Practical Reason.” Journal of Japanese Philosophy 2.1 (2014): 33-56. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Throughout his entire career, Nishida Kitarō was, arguably, interested in challenging Immanuel Kant’s formulation of the moral will. In his first work, An Inquiry into the Good, he criticizes Kant’s pure practical reason as idealistic, arguing that the good should be understood not in terms of an abstract, formal relation of reason with itself, but in terms of personality as a single, unique, unifying power that is the true reality of the self. He echoes this language in his last work, “The Logic of the Place of Nothingness and the Religious Worldview,” proposing that the personal self exists as a self-determining individual through creative expression. This article will investigate how Nishida’s development of this concept of the personal self grounds his proposal that the goal of the moral will is realization of the good as a personal, rather than abstract, ideal, through the intentional action of active intuition.
Šustar, Predrag. “Kant’s Account of Biological Causation.” Kant’s Theory of Biology. Eds. Ina Goy and Eric Watkins (op cit.). 99-115. [M]
Surprenant, Chris W. Kant and the Cultivation of Virtue. New York: Routledge, 2014. [x, 137 p.] [WC]
——. “Language in Kant’s Practical Philosophy.” The Linguistic Dimension of Kant’s Thought. Eds. Frank Schalow and Richard L. Velkley (op cit.). 70-80. [M]
Sutherland, Daniel. “Kant on the Construction and Composition of Motion in the Phoronomy.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44.5-6 (2014): 686-718. [M]
Suzuki, Márcio. “Georg Friedrich Meier e os paraísos artificiais de Immanuel Kant.” [Portuguese] Cadernos de Filosofia Alemã: Crítica e Modernidade 19.1 (2014): 105-16. [M] [online]
Svoboda, Toby. “A Reconsideration of Indirect Duties Regarding Non-Human Organisms.” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17.2 (2014): 311-23. [JSTOR]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: According to indirect duty views, human beings lack direct moral duties to non human organisms, but our direct duties to ourselves and other humans give rise to indirect duties regarding non-humans. On the orthodox interpretation of Kant's account of indirect duties, one should abstain from treating organisms in ways that render one more likely to violate direct duties to humans. This indirect duty view is subject to several damaging objections, such as that it misidentifies the moral reasons we have to treat non-humans in certain ways and that it sanctions only weak obligations vis-a-vis organisms. I develop an alternative indirect duty view: given a direct duty to oneself to cultivate virtuous dispositions, one has an indirect duty to abstain from treating organisms in ways that erode one's virtues or develop vices. I argue that this indirect duty view strictly proscribes knowingly causing unnecessary harm to organisms, and I show that it is not subject to the damaging objections directed against the indirect duty view attributed to Kant by the orthodox interpretation. This suggests that indirect duty views are more worthy of consideration than is often supposed.
Swazo, Norman K. “A Grave Problem of Conscience: Kantian Morality in the Face of Psychopathy.” International Journal of Applied Philosophy 28.1 (2014): 89-106. [ASP]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Clinical psychologists remain puzzled about the diagnostic basis and therapeutic disposition of individuals who present with a clinical profile of psychopathy. Psychopaths have been characterized as lacking in conscience and presenting a mask of sanity, thus differentiating them from psychotics and neurotics. The clinical profile of the psychopathic personality seems at odds with Kant's moral philosophy, in which Kant characterizes not only the central role of conscience in moral judgment, but in which Kant also insists that every person has a conscience. In this paper the clinical assessments presented by Cleckley and Hare in particular are juxtaposed to Kant's philosophical position, thereby to gain an understanding what is at the base of the psychopathic personality disorder. The clinical and the moral-philosophical assessments are reconciled, nonetheless leaving the clinical psychologist with the difficult task of therapeutic disposition.
Switzer, Adrian. “The Precritical Idea of a Complete Metaphysics: On the Principled Use of the Intellect in Kant’s Inaugural Dissertation.” Kant Studies Online (2014): 109-55; posted April 26, 2014. [M] [online]
——. “The Traditional Form of a Complete Science: Baumgarten’s Metaphysica in Kant’s Architectonic of Pure Reason.” [Portuguese] Philosophica 44 (2014): 149-64. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article treats as significant the formal coincidence between Kant’s presentation of the science of metaphysics in the “Architectonic of Pure Reason” chapter of the first Critique and Alexander Baumgarten’s presentation of the same in the Metaphysica. From his comments on Baumgarten in the metaphysics lectures, the article shows that for Kant metaphysics in its traditional form lacked completeness and systematic order. Kant fits completeness into his architectonic plan of a scientific metaphysics by converting Baumgartian ontology into an “analytic of the understanding”; Kant achieves the systematicity by modeling a rational “idea of the form of the whole” after Baumgarten’s tree-like ordering of the special sciences of metaphysics. Thus, Kant realizes the completeness and systematicity in a theoretical presentation of the science of metaphysics that he finds lacking in Baumgarten precisely by borrowing from the latter his scheme for metaphysics.
Tampio, Nicholas. “Pluralism in the Ethical Community.” Kant’s Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason: A Critical Guide. Ed. Gordon E. Michalson (op cit.). 175-92. [M]
Tan, Necmettin. Imana yer açmak: Immanuel Kant'in bilgi ve iman felsefesi. [Turkish] Istanbul: Iz Yayincilik, 2014. [238 p.] [WC]
Telegdi-Csetri, Áron. Filosofia politica a lui Immanuel Kant. [Romanian] Cluj-Napoca: Argonaut, 2014. [183 p.] [WC]
Tengelyi, László. “Nicolai Hartmanns Umkehrung von Kants kopernikanischer Tat.” Philosophie nach Kant. Neue Wege zum Verständnis von Kants Transzendental- und Moralphilosophie. Ed. Mario Egger (op cit.). 655-72. [M]
——. “Die Rolle der persönlichen Freiheit in der Antwort auf fremde Ansprüche.” Affektivität und Ethik bei Kant und in der Phänomenologie. Ed. Inga Römer (op cit.). 253-68. [M]
Tepe, Harun. “Günümüz Sorunları Karşısında Kant Etiği Çaresiz Midir?” [Turkish; Is Kantian Ethics Helpless in the Face of Current Problems?] Felsefi Düşün 3 (2014): 157-69. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Even today Kantian ethics still stands at the center of ethical discussions, but mostly as opposed and criticized one. It is accused for restricting ethics to only human being or person and not including nature in ethical realm. One of the foremost critics is Hans Jonas who considered nature as an ethical category and put forward a new ethics of responsibility as opposed to traditional ethics. Among those critics is also K. Otto Apel who claims that Kantian ethics needs a transcendental pragmatic transformation and Kantian ethics of attitude (Gesinnung) has to be transformed to an ethics of responsibility. Parallel to the view of H. Jonas, K. O. Apel asserts that growing power of man’s abilities, resulted from the advancement of technology necessitates a new ethics of responsibility and Kantian ethics is insufficient for such a purpose. In this article those arguments are dealt with and the question whether Kantian ethics is incapable at facing these challenges or not is investigated. In the article, it is also asserted that though some of its critiques are right in their claims, Kantian ethics stands as an important ethical theory even today and is indispensable especially in terms of evaluating the actions of persons.
Teruel, Pedro Jesús. “‘Das Hippocratische Geschäft’. Significado, Sentido y Ubicación Estructural de la Medicina en la Filosofía Kantiana.” [Portuguese; Das Hippocratische Geschäft. Meaning, Sense and Structural Status of Medicine in Kantian Philosophy] Estudos Kantianos 2.2 (2014): 217-39. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: he present paper aims to show the structural link between medicine and the moral-practical concerns of Kantian work, laying emphasis on the late critical period. It begins by clarifying the meaning of the expression ‘hippocratical question’ and distinguishing the disciplines that are part of it. Following this, the procedures through which medicine strives to restore or to maintain health are presented; they lead to two agency models that link with two heterogeneous facets of the human being. The so delineated place of medicine within the entirety of knowledge about man is revealed to occupy a crucial place of transition.
Tester, Steven. “Some Early‐Modern Discussions of Vagueness: Locke, Leibniz, Kant.” Philosophy Compass 9.1 (2014): 33-44. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: There has recently been a growing interest in the topic of vagueness and indeterminacy in contemporary metaphysics, with two views taking center stage. The semantic view holds that indeterminacy is due to vagueness in the extension of concepts, while the ontological view holds that indeterminacy is due to the vagueness of certain objects. There has, however, been little research on discussions of vagueness and indeterminacy in early‐modern philosophy despite the relevance of vagueness and indeterminacy for issues such as real and nominal definitions, clear and distinct ideas, and the principle of complete determination. In this paper, I survey discussions of vagueness in Locke, Leibniz, and Kant and point to ways in which the problem of vagueness and indeterminacy touches on broader issues in their respective philosophies. Although Locke, Leibniz, and Kant all suggest that vagueness is a semantic phenomenon, Kant also appears to countenance an ontological view according to which objects as appearances may sometimes be indeterminate.
Teufel, Thomas. “On Giuseppe Motta’s “Die Postulate des empirischen Denkens überhaupt”.” Critique (blog posted: 13 Jun 2014) n.p. [PW] [online]
Thiel, Detlef. Rev. of Kants Philosophie der Natur. Ihre Entwicklung im Opus postumum und ihre Wirkung, edited by Ernst-Otto Onnasch. (2009). Kant-Studien 105.3 (2014): 421-26. [M]
Thiel, Udo. “Physiologische Psychologie des Selbstbewusstseins zwischen Wolff und Kant.” Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 62.5 (2014): 963-83. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Having outlined the development of early modern conceptions of selfconsciousness, this paper then examines and critically evaluates the late eighteenth- century empirical psychology of Karl Franz von Irwing, a German enlightenment thinker. Irwing’s four volume work Erfahrungen und Untersuchungen über den Menschen is devoted to an empirical ‘science of man’. In terms of the notions of consciousness and self-consciousness, he nevertheless follows Wolff in that he adopts the latter’s idea that the capacity to distinguish among perceptions must be assumed for self-consciousness to be possible. As it turns out, however, Irwing’s main interest is in line with his general project and concerns the empirical development of self-consciousness. He argues that non-conceptual, immediate selfawareness or Selbstgefühl has its origin in the sense of touch, but that a conceptually mediated form of self-consciousness requires in addition the development of certain mental activities which are in turn dependent on language. Further he accounts for what he calls ‘continued self-consciousness’ in which consists our personality. Irwing does not explain diachronic personal identity, however, as he is instead concerned only with how the idea of identity develops. This points to the limitations of a project such as Irwing’s, as it avoids the fundamental philosophical issues concerning self-consciousness and personal identity.
Thisted, Marcos A. “Mario Caimi, traductor de Kant.” [Spanish; "Mario Caimi, translator of Kant"] Con-Textos Kantianos 2014.1 (2014): 127-40. [M] [online]
——. “La paradójica función de Kant en la recepción del neoplatonismo a finales del S. XVIII.” [Spanish] Temas kantianos. Ed. Mario Caimi (op cit.). 319-39. [WC]
Thorpe, Lucas. The Kant Dictionary. London: Bloomsbury, 2014. [248 p.] [PW]
Tierney, Brian. Liberty and Law: The Idea of Permissive Natural Law, 1100-1800. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2014. [xii, 380 p.] [WC]
Timmerman, Jens. “Kant and the Second-Person Standpoint.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 90.1 (2014): 131-47. [PW]
Tolley, Clinton. “Bolzano and Kant on Space and Outer Intuition.” New Anti-Kant. Eds. Sandra Lapointe and Clinton Tolley (op cit.). 157-91. [PW]
——. “Kant on the Content of Cognition.” European Journal of Philosophy 22.2 (2014): 200-28. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: I present an argument for an interpretation of Kant's views on the nature of the ‘content [Inhalt]’ of ‘cognition [Erkenntnis]’. In contrast to one of the longest standing interpretations of Kant's views on cognitive content, which ascribes to Kant a straightforwardly psychologistic understanding of content, and in contrast as well to the more recently influential reading of Kant put forward by McDowell and others, according to which Kant embraces a version of Russellianism, I argue that Kant's views on this topic are of a much more Fregean bent than has traditionally been admitted or appreciated. I conclude by providing a sketch of how a better grasp of Kant's views on cognitive content in general can help bring into sharper relief what is, and what is not, at stake in the recent debates over whether Kant accepts a particular kind of cognitive content—namely, non‐conceptual content.
——, ed. See: Lapointe, Sandra, and Clinton Tolley, eds.
Tomassini, Fiorella. “Adquisición originaria y voluntad omnilateral: un comentario de los §§10-17 dé la Doctrina del derecho.” [Spanish] Temas kantianos. Ed. Mario Caimi (op cit.). 295-318. [WC]
——. “Algunas consideraciones sobre el rol de la sección ‘El derecho privado’ de la Doctrina del derecho en la filosofía kantiana del Estado.” [Spanish; Some Considerations about the Role of 'Private Right' of the Doctrine of Right in the Kantian Philosophy of the State] Areté: Revista de Filosofía 26.2 (2014): 229-46. [ASP]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: “Some Considerations about the Role of ‘Private Right’ of the Doctrine of Right in the Kantian Philosophy of the State”. The purpose of this paper is to examine the role of the section “Private right” of Kant’s Doctrine of Right. I propose that the analysis of “the external mine and thine”, which takes place in this section, has the function of proving that there is a kind of subjective right related to the possession of external objects of choice: the acquired rights. These rights, as well as the innate right, require for their effective exercise the foundation of a state legislated by the general will.
Tomaszewska, Anna. The Contents of Perceptual Experience: A Kantian Perspective. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2014. [157 p.] [PW]
Publ. Note: The book addresses the debate on whether the representational content of perceptual experience is conceptual or non-conceptual, by bringing out the points of comparison between Kant’s conception of intuition and the contemporary accounts of non-conceptual content, encountered in the writings of G. Evans, Ch. Peacocke, F. Dretske, T. Crane, M. G. F. Martin, and others. Following R. Aquila’s reading of Kant’s conception of representation, the author argues that intuition (Anschauung, intuitus) provides the most basic form of intentionality – pre-conceptual reference to objects, which underlies the acts of conceptualization and judgment.
The book advances an interpretation of Kant’s theory of experience in the light of such questions as: Does conscious perceptual experience of objects require that subjects possess concepts of these objects? Do the contents of experience differ from the contents of beliefs or judgments? And if they do, what accounts for this difference? These questions take us to the most puzzling philosophical topic of the relation between mind and world. Anna Tomaszewska argues that this relation does not involve conceptual capacities alone but also, on the most basic level of perceptual experience, pre-cognitive “sensible intuition,” enabling relatedness to objects that remains uninformed by concepts. In a nutshell, on her interpretation, Kant can be taken to subscribe to the view that perceptual cognition does not have rational underpinnings.
Torres, João Carlos Brum. “Haverá uma antinomia na doutrina kantiana do direito público?” [Portuguese] Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia 55.129 (2014): 223-45. [PW] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The aim of this paper is to examine the hypothesis that Kantian theory of public rights is founded on an antinomic conceptual structure, even though Kant only admitted the paradoxical character of his doctrine. Kant's theory on public right states, at the same time, that: (i) the access to a rightful condition is dependent on our compliance to the command of reason to celebrate the pactum unionis civilis and the corresponding submission of the citizens under a civil constitution; (ii) we shall accept as our legitimate sovereign whoever is able to impose his power over us. Good interpreters, as Bouterwek and Hermann Cohen thought, however, that the true difficulty with his analysis is that it contains an astonishing confusion of the concepts of sovereign and sovereignty. The hypothesis I would like to explore in this paper is that perhaps a better understanding of Kant's position on this theme can be obtained by admitting that the two levels of analysis and the conflicting thesis we found in his doctrine of public rights are in a position reciprocally analogous to that occupied by thesis and antithesis in the dynamical antinomies assessed in the Critique of Pure Reason.
Traversa, Guido. “Riflessioni sulla cosiddetta Prima introduzione alla Critica del Giudizio.” [Italian; Reflections on the so-called first introduction to the Critique of the Judgment] il cannocchiale 39.1 (2014): 189-207. [PW]
Trentani, Federica. “A política como realização do projeto da razão prática.” [Portuguese; Politics as realization of the project of practical reason] Studia Kantiana 12.16 (2014): 91-104. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article concerns three main topics: Kant’s conception of politics, his relation with the doctrine of Right and the role of the Urteilskraft in the sphere of politics. In § 1 I underline that the Kantian perspective is characterized by a contextual flexibility which enables us to realize the normative model of the Rechtslehre in different cultural circumstances: indeed, politics pertains the ‘translation’ of the prescriptions of Right into contextual principles that can effectively adapt to a certain human community. In § 2 I analyze the role of the capacity of judgment as an instrument that can grasp the specificities of the context in which we realize the political reforms required by practical reason; in this regard, I stress that through the reflektierende Urteilskraft we can construct rules (i.e. new laws) that mirror the peculiarities of the context to which we apply the a priori norms of Right.
Trevisan, Diego Kosbiau. “Sentidos de metafísica na filosofia crítica de Kant.” [Portuguese; Senses of metaphysics in Kant’s critical philosophy] Studia Kantiana 12.17 (2014): 104-25. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article aims to further the long-standing debate on Kant’s relation to metaphysics by exposing the different senses that this discipline assumes in the critical philosophy. The present research, which is guided by a systematic interest and based on the chapter on the Architectonic of Pure Reason of the Critique of Pure Reason, aims to explain the ways in which the traditional disciplines of rationalist metaphysics, namely metaphysica generalis and metaphysica specialis, were reformulated in Kant’s critical philosophy. Both disciplines were reconfigured respectively into an analytic of understanding and a physiology of pure reason and based upon the very Kantian project of a Metaphysics of Morals and a Metaphysics of Nature
——. “Os Direitos da Razão. Metáforas Jurídicas na Filosofia de Bacon e Kant.” [Portuguese] Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 70.2-3 (2014): 493-510. [PW]
Trullinger, Joseph. Rev. of Community and Progress in Kant’s Moral Philosophy, by Kate Moran (2012). Review of Metaphysics 68.2 (2014): 438-39. [PI]
Truwant, Simon. “The Turn from Ontology to Ethics: Three Kantian Responses to Three Levinasian Critiques.” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 22.5 (2014): 696-715. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Both Kant and Levinas state that traditional ontology is a type of philosophy that illegitimately forces the structure of human reason onto other beings, thus making the subject the center and origin of all meaning. Kant’s critique of the ontology of his scholastic predecessors is well known. For Levinas, however, it does not suffice. He rejects what we could call an ‘existential ontology’: a self-centered way of living as a whole, of which all philosophical ontology is but a branch. Alternatively, he presents an ethical way of living centered on ‘the Other’. Kant also, however, eventually turns to ethics to uncover a more fundamental domain of meaning. Hence, both thinkers ultimately agree about the primacy of ethics over theory. Despite this concurrence, Levinas nevertheless criticizes all aspects of Kant’s turn towards ethics: his reason for making this turn, the kind of critique that he applies to this domain, and the outcome thereof. These three points reflect Levinas’ more general critique that Kant did not succeed in overcoming ontological discourse. This paper shows how Kant can reply to, and overcome, each of Levinas’ three critiques. In this way, I reveal certain commonalities between these two thinkers that commentators still often overlook.
Tuppini, Tommaso. Kant. [Italian] Milan: Corriere della Sera, 2014. [167 p.] [WC]
Ünlü, Özlem. “Kant’ın Ahlak Felsefesinin Rousseau’daki Kökleri: Vicdan-İstenç-Akıl Birliğinden Aklın Birliğine.” [Turkish; Rousseauesque Roots Of Kant’s Moral Philosophy: From The Unity Of Conscience-Will-Reason To The Unity Of Reason] Felsefi Düşün 3 (2014): 170-86. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Undoubtedly one of the most persistent philosophical problems of the Enlightenment is to defuse the tension between individual and political freedom. Rousseau prevents the conflict between two different experiences of freedom by introducing the general will as the law of the unity of conscience, will and reason; while Kant dissolves the same conflict by developing the concept of the moral law. The aim of this paper is to survey how Kant’s way of formulating freedom is related to Rousseau’s moral and political views. I shall propose a transition which takes place between Rousseau’s attempt to confine individuals to the political unity by virtue of their being free, and Kant’s moral law. This proposal will inevitably lead us to examine Kant’s elimination of the inherited conception of conscience from Rousseau’s, and Kant’s constitution of the unity of reason.
Uribe Rincón, Catalina. El papel de las emociones en la toma de decisiones (Un Análisis a Partir de Kant). [Spanish; the role of emotions in decision-making] Bogota: Universidad de los Andes, 2014. [88 p.] [WC]
Vaida, Iuliana Corina. “The Problem of Agency and the Problem of Accountability in Kant’s Moral Philosophy.” European Journal of Philosophy 22.1 (2014): 110-37. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper discusses the function and scope of incompatibilist or transcendental freedom in Kant's moral philosophy. The prevailing view among scholars, most notably Allison, is that the function of transcendental freedom is to enable us to articulate a first-person conception of ourselves as rational agents involved in deliberation and choice. Thus, the scope of transcendental freedom is rational agency in general. In order to perform this function, freedom has to be merely conceivable. Pace Allison, I argue that our first-person conception is neutral with respect to causal determinism, and that the function of transcendental freedom is to provide the metaphysical conditions of the possibility of genuine moral responsibility and perfect justice, and to get rid of moral luck. In order to perform this function, transcendental freedom has to be not just conceivable, but metaphysically real. My view suggests that we only have reason to attribute freedom to ourselves in situations in which we are aware that the moral law commands us categorically. We do not have a similar reason to believe we are free in purely prudential choices. Thus, the scope of transcendental freedom is not rational agency in general, but only moral agency.
Vaki, Fotini. “What Are We Allowed to Hope? Kant’s Philosophy of History as Political Philosophy.” Politics and Teleology in Kant. Eds. Paul Formosa, Avery Goldman, and Tatiana Patrone (op cit.). 194-210. [M]
Vanden Auweele, Dennis. “For the Love of God: Kant on Grace.” International Philosophical Quarterly 54.2 (2014): 175-90. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Most philosophers do not read Kant’s philosophy of religion as providing a foundation for Christianity, or even as in line with it. Recently, however, a number of so-called “affirmative Kantians” have argued that Kant’s philosophy of religion explicitly aims at recovering the spirit of Christianity. In this article I scrutinize this claim with regard to Kant’s conceptualization of “grace” as a supplement to his moral theory. Contrary to these “affirmative Kantians,” I argue that Kant’s account of grace stems from Kant’s moral pessimism, not from any sense of the shortcomings of human beings in fulfilling their duties or the religious need for supernatural cooperation. Kant’s concept of grace tries to moderate this pessimism by providing what is needed for the possibility of moral progress. But simply by the way in which Kant regards grace as a rational concept needed for his moral theory, it seems to me that his philosophy of religion runs counter to certain central convictions of Christianity.
Vanhaute, Liesbet. “Colonists, Traders or Settlers? Kant on Fair International Trade and Legitimate Settlement.” Kant and Colonialism: Historical and Critical Perspectives. Eds. Katrin Flikschuh and Lea Ypi (op cit.). 127-44. [M]
Van Impe, Stijn. “Kant’s Moral Theism and Moral Despair Argument Against Atheism.” The Heythrop Journal 55.5 (2014): 757-68. [PI]
Vanzo, Alberto. “Kant on Existential Import.” Kantian Review 19.2 (2014): 207-32. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article reconstructs Kant’s view on the existential import of categorical sentences. Kant is widely taken to have held that affirmative sentences (the A and I sentences of the traditional square of opposition) have existential import, whereas negative sentences (E and O) lack existential import. The article challenges this standard interpretation. It is argued that Kant ascribes existential import only to some affirmative synthetic sentences. However, the reasons for this do not fall within the remit of Kant’s formal logic. Unlike traditional logic and modern standard quantification theory, Kant’s formal logic is free from existential commitments.
Varden, Helga. “Patriotism, Poverty, and Global Justice: A Kantian Engagement with Pauline Kleingeld’s Kant and Cosmopolitanism.” Kantian Review 19.2 (2014): 251-66. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this article I critically engage some of the philosophical ideas Kleingeld presents in Kant and Cosmopolitanism, namely patriotism, poverty and global justice. Against Kleingeld, I propose, first, that perhaps democracy is less important and affectionate love more so to both Kant himself as well as to an account that can successfully refute a Bernard Williams style ‘one-thought-too-many’ objection to Kantian patriotism; second, that guaranteeing unconditional poverty relief for all its citizens is constitutive of the minimally just state for Kant; and, third, that there seem to be more disanalogies between the domestic and the global public authorities in Kant's account of right than Kleingeld's interpretation allows for.
——. “The Terrorist Attacks in Norway, July 22nd 2011 – Some Kantian Reflections.” Norsk filosofisk tidsskrift 49.3-4 (2014): 236-59. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper provides a Kantian interpretation of core issues involved in the trial following the terrorist attacks that struck Norway on July 22nd 2011. After a sketch of the controversies surrounding the trial itself, a Kantian theory of why the wrongdoer’s mind struck us as so endlessly disturbed is presented. This Kantian theory, I proceed by arguing, also helps us understand why it was so important to respond to the violence through the legal system and to treat the perpetrator, Anders Behring Breivik, so respectfully before, during, and after the trial. I close by addressing the controversial issue now facing Norway: how capable is the Norwegian legal system to deal with cases involving extreme violence, including as committed by psychologically impaired mass murderers?
Vardoulakis, Dimitris. “The Freedom to Lie.” Philosophy Today 58.2 (2014): 141-62. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article examines the connection between lying and the concept of freedom, especially in the wake of the social contract tradition. I show that the liar poses a particular threat to the social contract. As a result, lying has been portrayed as a pernicious threat to the political. This culminates in Kant’s outright rejection of lying under any circumstance. From the Kantian perspective, one can be free only if one does not lie. Conversely, Spinoza’s co-implication of virtue and power entails that lying is acceptable under certain circumstances, which enhance one’s freedom. The contrast between Kant’s and Spinoza’s response to lying reveals two fundamentally different ways of conceiving freedom.
Velkley, Richard. “Culture and the Limits of Practical Reason in Kant’s Religion.” Kant’s Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason: A Critical Guide. Ed. Gordon E. Michalson (op cit.). 233-49. [M]
——. “The Inexhaustibility of Art and the Conditions of Language: Kant and Heidegger.” The Linguistic Dimension of Kant’s Thought. Eds. Frank Schalow and Richard L. Velkley (op cit.). 288-309. [M]
——. See: Schalow, Frank, and Richard L. Velkley.
——, ed. See: Schalow, Frank, and Richard L. Velkley, eds.
Vilhauer, Benjamin. “Kant and the Possibility of Transcendental Freedom.” The Palgrave Handbook of German Idealism. Ed. Matthew C. Altman (op cit.). 105-125. [M]
Von Platz, Jeppe. “On Katerina Deligiorgi’s The Scope of Autonomy.” Critique (blog posted: 21 Oct 2014) n.p. [PW] [online]
Vujošević, Marijana. “The Judge in the Mirror: Kant on Conscience.” Kantian Review 19.3 (2014): 449-74. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant’s conception of conscience has been relatively neglected by Kant scholars and the secondary literature offers no explanation of whether (and if so, how) his treatments of conscience fit together. To achieve a fuller understanding of Kant’s general position on conscience, I question the widespread assumption that conscience is a feeling and account for the nature of conscience and its multiple functions. On my reading, conscience is ‘the internal judge’ whose verdict triggers certain emotional reactions. Through the moral self-evaluative activities of this inner judge, we come to know our character better. In the judgements of conscience, we take account of various psychological conditions while judging both whether these conditions stand in the way of our establishing moral maxims and whether we hold ourselves accountable for our actions. By arousing certain feelings, these judgements also move us to moral action.
Waggoner, Matt. “Kant and the Perversion of the End.” Critical Horizons 15.1 (2014): 95-113. [ASP]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant’s philosophy treated endings as necessary but necessarily elusive for the moral and political imagination, and he employed irony, among other things, to draw attention to the risks of perverting the figure of the end. Kantian endings, this essay suggests, give rise to two possible orientations which exist in tension with each other: melancholic confrontations with impossibility alongside a more forward-looking, optimistic gaze. I examine the two features of Kantian endings and the affective orientations they inspire under the headings of succession and secession. In addition to the mathematical-logical language of Kant’s writing, however, one also has to be able to appreciate the noirish qualities of Kant’s thought, which is to say, elements of culpability and aversion with respect to figures of transcendence that posit the space within which finite experience takes shape.
Waleszczuk, Zbigniew. Die Person bei Immanuel Kant und Karol Wojtyla. Breslau: 2014. [171 p.] [WC]
Walsh, Kate Padgett. “Consent, Kant, and the Ethics of Debt.” Philosophy in the Contemporary World 21.2 (2014): 14-25. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The 2008 housing and financial crisis brought to light many ethically questionable lending and borrowing practices. As we learn more about what caused this crisis, it has become apparent that we need to think more carefully about the conditions under which can loans be ethically offered and accepted, but also about when it might be morally permissible to default on debts. I critique two distinct philosophical approaches to assessing the ethics of debt, arguing that both approaches are too simplistic because they focus only on individual borrowers and lenders. As a result, neither approach can adequately grasp the moral implications of the social and economic failures that frame actual dilemmas of debt facing many individuals today.
Ware, Owen. “Kant on Moral Sensibility and Moral Motivation.” Journal of the History of Philosophy 52.4 (2014): 727-46. [M]
——. “Rethinking Kant’s Fact of Reason.” Philosophers’ Imprint 14.32 (2014): 1-21. [M][online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant’s doctrine of the Fact of Reason is one of the most perplexing aspects of his moral philosophy. The aim of this paper is to defend Kant’s doctrine from the common charge of dogmatism. My defense turns on a previously unexplored analogy to the notion of ‘matters of fact’ popularized by members of the Royal Society in the seventeenth century. In their work, ‘facts’ were beyond doubt, often referring to experimental effects one could witness first hand. While Kant uses the German equivalent (‘Tatsachen’) in different contexts, I argue that the scientific analogy opens up a new framework for interpreting his strategy of justification in the Critique of Practical Reason. In the final section, I address a few possible objections to my reading, one of which I anticipate coming from Dieter Henrich (1989) and Ian Proops (2003), who have argued that Kant’s Fact of Reason is best understood under a legal analogy.
Watkins, Brian. “Why Should We Cultivate Taste? Answers from Kant’s Early and Late Aeshetic Theory.” The Palgrave Handbook of German Idealism. Ed. Matthew C. Altman (op cit.). 126-43. [M]
Watkins, Eric. “What is, for Kant, a Law of Nature?” Kant-Studien 105.4 (2014): 471-90. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper I explore Kant’s understanding of a law of nature. I begin by reviewing Kant’s explicit statements about what a law is in general before describing an important challenge to the very idea of a law of nature that emerges from the conjunction of the natural law tradition and laws of nature in the early modern period. I then articulate how Kant can respond to that challenge by noting how he can draw on a univocal concept of law involving necessity and legislation in articulating his accounts of laws of nature and the moral law. In this way, we not only come to a better appreciation of Kant’s views on the laws of nature, but also see more clearly some significant structural similarities between his theoretical and practical philosophies as a whole.
——. “Nature in General as a System of Ends.” Kant’s Theory of Biology. Eds. Ina Goy and Eric Watkins (op cit.). 117-30. [M]
——. “Hegel’s Critique of Kant in the Introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit (§§73-80).” Philosophie nach Kant. Neue Wege zum Verständnis von Kants Transzendental- und Moralphilosophie. Ed. Mario Egger (op cit.). 546-69. [M]
——. Rev. of Kant’s Elliptical Path, by Karl Ameriks (2012). European Journal of Philosophy 22 (2014): e1-e6. [PW]
——. See: Jankowiak, Tim, and Eric Watkins.
——. See: Goy, Ina and Eric Watkins.
——, ed. See: Goy, Ina and Eric Watkins, eds.
Waxman, Wayne. Kant’s Anatomy of the Intelligent Mind. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014. [xx, 582 p.] [WC]
Wayne, Mike. Red Kant: Aesthetics, Marxism, and the Third Critique. London: Bloomsbury, 2014. [226 p.] [WC]
——. “Aesthetics and Class Interests: Rethinking Kant.” Third Text 28.2 (2014): 137-48. [ASP]
Weatherby, Leif. “Das Innere der Natur und ihr Organ: von Albrecht von Haller zu Goethe.” Goethe Yearbook 21 (2014): 191-218. [JSTOR]
Webel, Charles. The Politics of Rationality: Reason Through Occidental History. New York: Routledge, 2014. [227 p.] [WC]
Weinrib, Jacob. “Permissive Laws and the Dynamism of Kantian Justice.” Law and Philosophy 33.1 (2014): 105-36. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: If Kant’s theory of justice is known for one thing, it is for offering a vision of a perfectly just society that is utterly disconnected from the imperfect societies that we occupy. The purity of Kant’s account has attracted criticism from those who claim that if a theory of justice is to be practical, it must offer more than a vision of a perfectly just society. It must also explain how existing societies mired in injustice are to be brought into ever-closer conformity with the ideal that justice prescribes. In this essay, I will argue that this is exactly what Kant’s mature legal and political theory offers. To discern this feature of Kant’s theory, a neglected component must be integrated into his broader framework. This component is what Kant refers to in Toward Perpetual Peace as a permissive law of public right.
Wenzel, Christian Helmut. Rev. of Inspirations from Kant. Essays, by Leslie Stephenson (2011). Mind 123.490 (2014): 644-49. [PW]
Westphal, Kenneth R. “Wie Kants kognitive Semantik Newtons Regel 4 der Experimentalphilosophie untermauert und van Fraassens konstruktiven Empirismus entkräftet.” Philosophie nach Kant. Neue Wege zum Verständnis von Kants Transzendental- und Moralphilosophie. Ed. Mario Egger (op cit.). 55-69. [M]
Whistler, Daniel. “Purely Practical Reason: Normative Epistemology from Leibniz to Maimon.” Epoché 18.2 (2014): 395-419. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper, I contend that a crucial historical precedent for contemporary interest in virtue epistemology is to be found in Leibniz-Wolffian rationalism. For philosophers from Wolff to Lessing, epistemology was thoroughly normative; that is, the task of epistemology was not to describe knowledge, but set rules for the amelioration of knowledge. Such a normative stance was transferred into cognate disciplines, such as aesthetics, as well. I further argue that after Kant’s Copernican revolution in philosophy in 1781 strands of this normative epistemology lived on in both Schiller’s aesthetics and Maimon’s reworking of transcendental idealism. Finally, I suggest some provisional reasons for considering Kant’s epistemology a break with this tradition.
Wicks, Robert. Kant: A Complete Introduction. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2014. [x, 246 p.] [WC]
Wiegerling, Klaus. Rev. of Kants Opus postumum und das Ganze der Philosophie – Gesellschaft, Wissenschaft, Menschenbild, by Johann Rheindorf (2010). Kant-Studien 105.3 (2014): 441-44. [M]
Wike, Victoria S. “Kantian Friendship: Duty and Idea.” [English] Diametros 39 (2014): 140-53. [PW] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant commentators have recently begun to pay attention to Kant’s account of friendship. They have asked questions, such as: Is his description of friendship consistent and robust and does it provide an account of friendship that satisfies common intuitions and expectations of friendship? Their answers to these questions have often been negative. At the same time, many of these critics share a common understanding of two basic aspects of Kant’s account of friendship. Kant sees friendship as both a duty and an ideal state. One critic, Patricia Flynn, considers the implications of this dual claim. She argues that the view that friendship is both duty and idea gives rise to a tension in the concept of friendship. This tension makes the duty of friendship different from all other Kantian moral duties and leaves us with a duty that we cannot achieve. My aim is to revisit Flynn’s argument and by reassessing Kant’s claims to show that there is indeed complexity in Kant’s understanding of friendship, but there is no conceptual problem that makes friendship a duty unlike all other duties or makes it an impossible duty.
Wilford, Paul T. Rev. of Kant on Practical Life: From Duty to History, by Kristi E. Sweet (2013). The Review of Metaphysics 68.1 (2014): 208-10. [PI]
Williams, Howard. “Natural Right in Toward Perpetual Peace.” Politics and Teleology in Kant. Eds. Paul Formosa, Avery Goldman, and Tatiana Patrone (op cit.). 19-36. [M]
——. “Colonialism in Kant’s Political Philosophy.” [English] Diametros 39 (2014): 154-81. [PW] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article examines the controversy that has arisen concerning the interpretation of Immanuel Kant's account of European colonialism. One the one hand there are those interpreters such as Robert Bernasconi who see Kant's account as all of a piece with his earlier views on race which demonstrate a certain narrow mindedness in relation to black and coloured people and, on the other hand, there are those such as Pauline Kleingeld and Allen Wood who argue that the earlier writings on race are not wholly typical of Kant's approach and suggest that Kant's later discussions of colonialism in Perpetual Peace and the Metaphysics of Morals provide a better indication of Kant's progressive views on the treatment of non-European societies. The article draws attention to the very strong evidence of Kant's dislike for the pattern of European expansion to other parts of the globe and indicates that within Kant's writings there are the seeds of a wholly unconventional critical understanding of western colonialism that have yet to be developed fully. The article suggests that this critical understanding surpasses the unsystematic objections made to colonialism in post - modernist thought and also the critique proffered by the determinist Marxist account.
Wilson, Catherine. “Kant on Civilisation, Culture and Moralisation.” Kant’s Lectures on Anthropology: A Critical Guide. Ed. Alix Cohen (op cit.). 191-210. [WC]
Wilson, Eric Entrican. “Kant’s Moral Philosophy.” The Routledge Companion to Eighteenth Century Philosophy. Ed. Aaron Garrett (New York: Routledge). 442-64. [WC]
Winegar, Reed. “An Unfamiliar and Positive Law: On Kant and Schiller.” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 95.3 (2014): 275-97. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: A familiar post-Kantian criticism contends that Kant enslaves sensibility under the yoke of practical reason. Friedrich Schiller advanced a version of this criticism to which Kant publicly responded. Recent commentators have emphasized the role that Kant’s reply assigns to the pleasure that accompanies successful moral action. In contrast, I argue that Kant’s reply relies primarily on the sublime feeling that arises when we merely contemplate the moral law. In fact, the pleasures emphasized by other recent commentators depend on this sublime feeling. These facts illuminate Kant’s views regarding the relationship between morality, freedom, and the development of moral feelings.
Wines, Ryan H. Rev. of The Scope of Autonomy: Kant and the Morality of Freedom, by Katerina Deligiorgi (2012). Hegel Bulletin 35.2 (2015): 319-24. [PW]
Wirth, Jason M. “The Language of Natural Silence: Schelling and the Poetic Word after Kant.” The Linguistic Dimension of Kant’s Thought. Eds. Frank Schalow and Richard L. Velkley (op cit.). 237-62. [M]
Wittwer, Héctor. Rev. of Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason. A Critical Guide, edited by Andrews Reath and Jens Timmermann (2010). Kant-Studien 105.3 (2014): 437-41. [M]
. Rev. of Kant on Human Dignity, by Oliver Sensen (2011). Kant-Studien 105.3 (2014): 465-68. [M]
Wloch, Wojciech. Wolnosc i przymus: kantowska teoria legitymizacji prawa i panstwa. [Polish; "Freedom and coercion: Kant's theory of the legitimacy of law and state] Torun: Towarzystwo Naukowe, 2014. [226 p.] [WC]
Wood, Allen W. The Free Development of Each: Studies of Freedom, Right and Ethics in Classical German Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. [352 p.] [WC]
——. “Kant’s Political Philosophy.” The Palgrave Handbook of German Idealism. Ed. Matthew C. Altman (op cit.). 165-85. [M]
——. “Kant’s Principles of Publicity.” Politics and Teleology in Kant. Eds. Paul Formosa, Avery Goldman, and Tatiana Patrone (op cit.). 76-91. [M]
——. “The Evil in Human Nature.” Kant’s Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason: A Critical Guide. Ed. Gordon E. Michalson (op cit.). 31-57. [M]
——. “Empirical Desire.” Kant’s Lectures on Anthropology: A Critical Guide. Ed. Alix Cohen (op cit.). 133-50. [WC]
Wood, Robert. “The Place of Language: From Kant to Hegel.” The Linguistic Dimension of Kant’s Thought. Eds. Frank Schalow and Richard L. Velkley (op cit.). 29-52. [M]
Wuerth, Julian. Kant on Mind, Action, and Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. [xvi, 349 p.] [WC] [review]
Wunderlich, Falk. “The Nature of the ‘I Think’: Comments on Chapter 11 of Kant’s Thinker.” Kantian Review 19.1 (2014): 143-48. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article deals with Kant’s theory of the self in Patricia Kitcher’s Kant’s Thinker in three respects: (1) I argue that it is doubtful whether accompanying representations with the ‘I think’ as such yields a principle for the categories since it does not require any strong kind of connection between them. (2) I discuss textual evidence for and against Kitcher’s attempt to make sense of Kant’s claim that the ‘I think’ requires the continued existence of cognizers per se. (3) I ask whether Kitcher's understanding of Kant’s positive theory of the self leans towards minimal substantialism or towards functionalism.
Wunsch, Matthias. “Zur argumentativen Rekonstruktion der Theorie der Einbildungskraft in Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft.” Philosophie nach Kant. Neue Wege zum Verständnis von Kants Transzendental- und Moralphilosophie. Ed. Mario Egger (op cit.). 127-40. [M]
Wyrwich, Thomas. “Kants Anti-Spinozismus – Eine Antwort auf Omri Boehm.” Kant-Studien 105.1 (2014): 113-24. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In a paper (recently published in the Kant-Studien) Omri Boehm claims that Kant argues for a “Spinozist substance monism” in his pre-critical writing Über den einzigen Beweisgrund vom Dasein Gottes (as an adequate understanding of God) and that he conserves this principle, henceforth as a regulative one, in the shape of the transcendental ideal in the first Critique. I try to reply on the basis of the following considerations: first, Kant is at least literally rejecting the idea of God as the one and only substance in the Beweisgrund, apparently by regarding as correct a different understanding of “substance” than that had by Spinoza. Second, the transcendental ideal also has a non- or even anti-Spinozist character in three regards, which can be deduced with the support of several restrictive and regulative claims of transcendental theology and physicotheology, which are still accepted by the critical Kant: it is designed as an extramundane principle; it is identified as a global ground of a consequence; and it is conceived as a potential, non-excludable source of purposive structures in the world.
Yildirim, Yusuf. “Zamansız Eylem: Özgürlüğün Sonuçları Üzerine.” [Turkish; Timeless Act: On The Consequences Of Freedom] Felsefi Düşün 3 (2014): pages. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant believed that freedom is causality of the moral principle. He also saw actions resulting from intelligible causes as compatible with the principle of natural causality as it is formulated in Second Analogy of Experience. But, Kant’s arguments for compatibility of freedom and nature seem very contestable for even for the most charitable reader and the main argument is far from being clear. In this paper, I try to understand Kant’s solution not only as an argument based on the ideal nature of time, but also on the nature of different time determinations. Even if the direct Kantian solution is to assert that, by its intelligible character, free human action is a noumenal causality, this solution rests unintelligible and irrelevant to human agency if we do not reformulate it in relation to different modes of temporal determinations. Here, in a twofold presentation, I try to exhibit a valid form of Kant’s argument and to give a rather modest reading of its metaphysical implications from a practical aspect.
Yong, Peter. “God, Totality and Possibility in Kant’s Only Possible Argument.” Kantian Review 19.1 (2014): 27-51. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: There has been a groundswell of interest in the account of modality that Kant sets forth in his pre-Critical Only Possible Argument. Andrew Chignell’s reconstruction of Kant’s theistic argument in terms of what he calls ‘real harmony’ has a prima facie advantage in that it appears to be able to block the plurality objection (namely, that even if every modal fact presupposes some ground, this does not entail that all modal facts share the same ground). I argue that it is both textually and philosophically problematic to interpret Kant’s argument in terms of real harmony. Then, I set forth an alternative response to the plurality objection which does not require the adoption of the problematic notion of real harmony. Instead, I argue that the objection can be overcome by observing that the argument seeks to ground modal facts as a totality and that, according to Kant, such relations can be accounted for only by their schematization in a single intellect.
Young, Steve. Rev. of Kant's Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason: A Commentary, by James J. DiCenso (2012). Dialog 53-2 (2014): 162-64. [PW]
Ypi, Lea. “Commerce and Colonialism in Kant’s Philosophy of History.” Kant and Colonialism: Historical and Critical Perspectives. Eds. Katrin Flikschuh and Lea Ypi (op cit.). 99-126. [M]
——. “On Revolution in Kant and Marx.” Political Theory 42.3 (2014): 262-87. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This essay compares the thoughts of Kant and Marx on revolution. It focuses in particular on two issues: the contribution of revolutionary enthusiasm to the cause of emancipatory political agents and its educative role in illustrating the possibility of progress for future generations. In both cases, it is argued, the defence of revolution is offered in the context of illustrating the possibility of moral progress for the species, even if not for individual human beings, and brings out the centrality of collective agency in moving toward universal moral goals. Discussing the implications of these points is of significant historical interest: it allows us to defend an interpretation of Kant’s political thought which is sensitive to the material conditions of historical development and to rescue Marx from an amoral reading of his philosophy of history. Reflecting on the role and preconditions of transformative collective agency is also of normative interest: it allows us to better evaluate the significance of political events that, firstly, re-shape the boundaries of political feasibility and, secondly, play a crucial educative role in motivating future progressive initiatives.
——. See: Flikschuh, Katrin, and Lea Ypi.
——, ed. See: Flikschuh, Katrin, and Lea Ypi, eds.
Zákutná, Sandra. Rev. of Kant a Machiavelli: historicko-filozofická analýza a komparácia, by L'umbomír Belás (2013). Studia Philosophica Kantiana 2014.1 (2014): 74-75. [M]
Zammito, John H. “What a Young Man Needs for his Venture into the World: The Function and Evolution of the ‘Characteristics’.” Kant’s Lectures on Anthropology: A Critical Guide. Ed. Alix Cohen (op cit.). 230-48. [WC]
——. Rev. of Kant and the Concept of Race: Late Eighteenth-Century Writings, ed. by Jon M. Mikkelsen (2013). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (Jan 2014, #10). [M] [online]
——. Rev. of Kant’s Organicism: Epigenesis and the Development of Critical Philosophy, by Jennifer Mensch (2013). Kantian Review 19.2 (2014): 323-27. [M]
Zimmermann, Stephan. “Praktische Kontingenz: Kant über Verbindlichkeit aus reiner praktischer Vernunft.” Das Band der Gesellschaft: Verbindlichkeitsdiskurse im 18. Jahrhundert. Eds. Simon Bunke, et al. (op cit.). 81-98??. [WC]
——. “Faktum statt Deduktion. Kants Lehre von der praktischen Selbstrechtfertigung des Sittengesetzes.” Kants Rechtfertigung des Sittengesetzes in Grundlegung III. Ed. Heiko Puls (op cit.). 103-32. [PW]
Zöller, Günter. “Libertas civilis: zur politischen Prägung von Freiheit und Autonomie bei Kant.” Philosophie nach Kant. Neue Wege zum Verständnis von Kants Transzendental- und Moralphilosophie. Ed. Mario Egger (op cit.). 329-38. [M]
——. “‘[O]hne Hofnung und Furcht’: Kants Naturrecht Feyerabend über den Grund der Verbindlichkeit zu einer Handlung.” Das Band der Gesellschaft: Verbindlichkeitsdiskurse im 18. Jahrhundert. Eds. Simon Bunke, et al. (op cit.). 99-112??. [WC]
——. “Wissenschaft und Weisheit. Kant über die Formen der Metaphysik.” Con-Textos Kantianos 2014.1 (2014): 66-80. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article explores Kant's conception of metaphysics in its systematic tension between a doctrine of science (Wissenschaftslehre) und a doctrine of wisdom (Weisheitslehre). The first section analyzes the methodological and architectonic relation between transcendental critique and theoretical metaphysics in Kant's critical philosophy, especially in the Critique of Pure Reason (1781/1787). The second section presents Kant's critical conception of a limitative metaphysics of (psychological) antimaterialism, (cosmological) anti-determinism und (theological) anti-fatalism in the Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics (1783). The third section deals with Kant's critical conception of a practical dogmatic metaphysics of the "supersensible in us, above us and after us" in the fragmentary Prize Essay on the Advances of Metaphysics (1793).
Zouhar, Jan. Rev. of Kant a Machiavelli. Historicko-filozofická analýza a komparácia, by Ľubomír Belás (2013). Studia Philosophica 61.2 (2014): 100. [PW]
Zuckert, Rachel. “Organisms and Metaphysics: Kant’s First Herder Review.” Kant’s Theory of Biology. Eds. Ina Goy and Eric Watkins (op cit.). 61-77. [M]
Brelje, Kate. Beauty and Openness: Kant's Aesthetic Judgment of Taste, Yogācāra, and Open Presence Meditation. Master’s thesis. Colorado State University/Fort Collins, 2014. [v, 74 p.] Advisors: Jane Kneller and Matthew MacKenzie. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper provides a comparative analysis of Kant’s aesthetic judgment of taste and Open Presence meditation interpreted through a Yogācāra philosophical framework. I begin with an expository analysis of Kant’s cognitive and aesthetic judgments, highlighting the presence of attention, form of reflection, and structure of purposeless purposiveness in the judgment. Next, I address the Buddhist idealist Yogācāra philosophical tradition. Through this theoretical lens, I examine Open Presence meditation, with an emphasis on meditative non-dualism, attention, and meditative goals. In the final chapter, I tie together the groundwork laid in the first two chapters into a comparative analysis identifying points of compatibility and contention within the general areas of judgment, attention, purpose-less purposiveness, and transformation. Finally, I suggest that, given the results of this analysis, Kant’s aesthetic judgment of taste might benefit from being construed as a type of meditation.
Buckman, Christopher. Negative Beauty: Ugliness in Kant’s Theory of Taste. Ph.D. diss. State University of New York at Buffalo, 2014. [245 p.] Advisor: Carolyn Korsmeyer. [PQ]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant's theory of taste, as expounded in the Critique of Judgment, deals exhaustively with judgments of beauty. Rarely does Kant mention ugliness. This omission has led to a debate among commentators about how judgments of ugliness should be explained in a Kantian framework. I argue in this dissertation that the judgment of ugliness is best conceived as being a disinterested disliking that is universally valid without a concept, contrapurposive without the presentation of a purpose, and necessary. It originates in the disharmonious conflict between the faculties of imagination and understanding which occurs when the understanding finds that it cannot form any concept suitable to a representation as it is presented by the imagination. In explicating my interpretation, I rely on Kant's theory of negative magnitudes, which implies that beauty and ugliness are real opposites. I also locate Kant's theory of taste within the early modern view of judgment as a synthesis of representational elements.
Caro Plaza, Ramón. El orden del ser: aproximaciones al bien y a la ley natural en Rosmini y Kant. [Spanish] Ph.D. diss. Universidad Complutense de Madrid, 2014. [555 p.] Advisor: Juan José García Norro. [WC] [online]
Clarke, Evan. Kant, Husserl, and Analyticity. Ph.D. diss. Boston College, 2014. [292 p.] Advisor: Andrea Staiti. [PQ]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This study concerns the nature and role of analyticity in the work of Immanuel Kant and Edmund Husserl. Its initial goal is that of clarifying the place of analytic judgment in Kant's critical project. Against the widely held assumption that analytic judgment has no role to play in the critical project, I show that analytic judgment has a precise and genuinely important role to play in the context of Kant's metaphysics. Analytic judgment has the role of clarifying our a priori conceptual repertoire and thus of making possible the synthetic a priori judgments that are properly constitutive of metaphysics. The next goal of the study is that of unifying and defending Kant's various characterizations of analytic judgment. Whereas a number of commentators have suggested that Kant is vague or ambivalent as regards the properties of analytic judgment, I show that we can extract a clear, consistent picture of analytic judgment from his work. The key to seeing this, I argue, is becoming clear on Kant's basic assumptions concerning concepts, logic, and propositional form. Subsequently, I turn to Husserl. Picking up on the fact that for Husserl, too, analyticity has metaphysical, or ontological significance, I spell out his conception of analyticity in detail. I show that analyticity for Husserl embraces two essentially symmetrical domains of law: the a priori laws of objective givenness and the a priori laws of propositional form. I then bring Husserl and Kant together. After showing that Husserl fails to capture the essence of Kant's theory of analytic judgment, and so fails to see exactly where he stands relative to Kant, I argue that what ultimately distinguishes Husserl from Kant is the claim that analytic truth is properly articulated in a purely formal context. I show that this departure from Kant has extremely significant consequences. For example, it enables Husserl to describe whole systems of judgment, such as mathematics or logic, as analytic; and it enables Husserl to defend the possibility of analytic judgments having empirical content.
Clímaco, Humberto de Assis. Intuição e conceito: a transformação do pensamento matemático de Kant a Bolzano. [Portuguese; Intuition and concept: the transformation of the mathematical thinking from Kant to Bolzano] Ph.D. diss. Universidade Federal de Goiás, 201. [170 p.] Advisor: Ildeu Moreira Coêlho. [ASP]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Taking part of the research line Grounds of the Educational Process of Post-graduate program in education of Universidade Federal de Goiás, this thesis reflects, in an original way, on the core issues the fundamentals of core issues of the today‘s mathematical education, opening new horizons for this area of knowledge. It discusses the transformation of the relationship between intuition and concept in the philosophy of mathematics occurred in the early nineteenth century, when the nature of mathematical knowledge has undergone such profound changes that mathematics came to be called Pure Mathematics, a subject that is relevant to understand the contradiction between simplicity and clarity sought by the creators of Pure Mathematics to make it a language, and the difficulty and lack of meaning with which it is often seen in schools. The way of conceiving knowledge was profoundly changed by this transformation, and in particular changed the meaning of intuition. Kant's work has been discussed in this thesis due to the constructive role that the philosopher attributed, in its critical period, to the intuition of the knower subject; with the work of Kant, a genetic issue, about the origins and the conditions in which knowledge occurs, was inaugurated in philosophy, whence derives the importance that gained in its system the subject's ability to perceive objects through the notions of space and time, as conditions for any knowledge. Kant concludes that what makes knowledge possible is the fact that for its development contributes the subject‘s intuition and constructive action, and that this is how he achieves the concept, general representation, based on intuition, particular representation. Bolzano sought to eliminate from the investigations on the theory of science the study of the conditions and origins of knowledge, which he considered as a social issue that should be written in an order that would allow it to be communicated. Therefore, Bolzano denied that space and time could support language and mathematics, and sought to found principles able to reorganize knowledge in a hierarchical structure in which more conceptual truths could not be substantiated by more intuitive ones. Although Bolzano has not investigated the learning process itself, the importance he gave to education was so great that in his most important work, the Doctrine of Science, Wissenschaftslehre, he defined science as determined organized knowledge so as to compose a textbook. The philosophical, scientific and cultural consequences of the Industrial Revolution that occurred in the early nineteenth century, were studied in this thesis because it was in the context of its emergence that emerged deep processes, on the one hand, to create a public knowledge through the reorganization of universities, the emergence of large Polytechnics who needed graduate engineers in large scale, proliferation of publications with educational concerns; and, on the other hand, a search for reorganizing knowledge created or arisen in previous centuries in a hierarchical manner according to principles, which led to a search for treating in a theoretical manner the knowledge hitherto seen as a set of isolated truths. The study of the authors treated in the thesis, especially Kant and Bolzano, were made based on their original works, and any recourse to commentators did not substitute a careful reading of their ones.
Easley, William Eric. Of Mice and Kant: Re-Examining Moral Considerability to Non-human Animals on Kant’s Cognitive Grounds. Master’s thesis. Colorado State University/Fort Collins, 2014. [v, 139 p.] Advisor: Bernard E. Rollin. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this thesis, I examine Kant‘s criterion for moral considerability in light of the intersection between the moral, critical, and epistemic principles Kant commits himself to and evidence of advanced cognitive capacities in non-human animals. As I argue, Kant‘s denial of crucial cognitive capacities in non-human animals represents a flawed attempt at applying a principle of parsimony which threatens to undermine the transcendental base of his theories. Further, expelling the anachronisms and human exceptionalism Kant fell victim to in his theories reveals a robust sense of ethical duties directly to non-human animals, beyond non-cruelty. In Chapter One, I argue that the basis of moral considerability in Kant‘s ethics ought to extend directly to non-human animals if they possess sufficient degrees of the three cognitive capacities that comprise dignity and the ability to meaningfully set ends: reason, autonomy, and self-consciousness. In Chapter Two, I examine Kant‘s cognitive theory and argue that it lacks a developmental account in terms of degrees of these capacities that is crucial to completing Kant‘s ethical project. In Chapters Three and Four, I develop a model for such an account based upon evidence and theories in the philosophy of mind and the sciences, concluding that many non-human animals do possess advanced cognitive capacities and the we, thus, have moral duties directly to most non-human animals.
Enslin, John Victor. Kant on Human Fignity: A Conversation Among Scholars. Ph.D. diss. Boston College, 2014. [323 p.] Advisor: Ronald K. Tacelli. [PQ]
Abstract: This dissertation aims to examine the notion of 'human dignity' in Kant by means of a conversation with three Kantian scholars.
One cannot understand Kant's notion of human dignity without placing it in the context of his moral thought. For this reason we look in Chapter One at the philosopher Roger Sullivan. His major work Immanuel Kant's Moral Theory includes a highly detailed treatment of human dignity. I shall present an analysis of his understanding within the context of his methodology and his general approach to Kant's moral philosophy.
We look in Chapter Two at Susan Shell and her 'Kant on Human Dignity.' In addition to this, we consider Shell's methodology and some of her work on the early Kant where we find the roots of Kant's conception of dignity.
Chapter Three addresses Oliver Sensen and his novel interpretation of Kant's use of the term 'dignity.' Utilizing the tools of Analytical Philosophy, he enters into dialogue with Kantian interpreters, suggesting that their understanding of dignity in Kant harbours elements at odds with Kant's thought and that they thus fail to grasp the radical nature of Kant's notion.
In the final and Fourth Chapter, I try to bring these scholars into a conversation with each other. First, I show the strengths of each position and then, using insights of Sullivan, Shell and Sensen, I venture to ask whether one could not develop the notion of a phenomenology of dignity. I also consider whether in both Shell's and Sensen's account there is not an implicit dynamic at work, which suggests the necessity of transcendence and the Good.
Everett, Jonathan James. Constitutive or Regulative Principles? The Kantian Legacy for Contemporary Philosophy of Science. Ph.D. diss. University College London (science and technology studies), 2014. [249 p.] Advisor: Michela Massimi. [EBSCO]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant’s philosophy of science is often taken to be straightforwardly refuted by the development of modern science and mathematics. I identify two ways in which key Kantian insights can be defended in contemporary physics: the first—associated with Michael Friedman—emphasises the role of constitutive principles in Kant’s philosophy and the second—associated with Ernst Cassirer—emphasises the role of regulative principles. I argue that the regulative approach of Cassirer is the more promising. I identify two challenges that a Kantian philosophy of science must meet in order to be deemed plausible: (CR) it must provide an account of the rationality of theory change and (CC) it must make sense of the central Kantian idea of constitutivity. I use these challenges to gauge the success of constitutive and regulative approaches throughout. In §1 I introduce Friedman’s constitutive approach. His answers to CR and CC are examined. I outline the role of philosophy in Friedman’s answer to CR and stress the importance for Friedman of defending the syntheticity of the relativized a priori. In §2 I detail the origins of constitutive and regulative principles in Kant’s philosophy of science. It is emphasised that for Kant, both types of principle are essential to the possibility of science. In §3 I introduce Cassirer’s regulative approach. The regulative approach is defended from Friedman’s objection that it cannot provide an account of the prospective rationality of theory change. Cassirer’s understanding of the constitutive and regulative a priori are distinguished. Cassirer’s structuralism is introduced. In §4 I provide a case study of the role of the equivalence principle in the development of general relativity. A regulative Kantian answer to CR is defended. In §5 I defend Cassirer’s answer to CC as a plausible contemporary alternative to ontic structural realism.
Franklin, Aaron Matthew. Disambiguating Kantian Non-conceptual Representation. Master’s thesis. San Francisco State University, 2014. [46 p.] Advisor: ??. [WC]
Gasdaglis, Katherine. Intuition in Kant’s Theoretical Epistemology: Content, Skepticism, and Idealism. Ph.D. diss. Columbia University, 2014. [vi, 209 p.] Advisor: Patricia Kitcher. [PQ]
Abstract: Kant famously wrote, “Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind.” The traditional reception of Kant understands this claim as a synopsis of his views about semantic content. On the one hand, according to this reading, our concepts and the thoughts they compose would be meaningless without perception, or “intuition,” to verify them and thereby provide them with content; on the other, our perceptions would have no structure and would be of no cognitive use without concepts to direct them. Against the traditional reading, this dissertation argues that Kant’s many claims about the necessary relations that run between intuitions and concepts are most fundamentally of epistemological rather than semantic significance. Kant’s ultimate aim was to articulate the necessary conditions that must obtain for sensibility and understanding, intuitions and concepts, to cooperate in the pursuit of theoretical knowledge of the world. This interpretation is grounded on an analysis of three puzzles that arise around the function of intuition in his theoretical epistemology.
The first puzzle arises for Kant’s view of the nature of the content of perception. Is perception exhaustively conceptual in structure, or is it at all an independent representational faculty? According to Orthodox Conceptualism, Kant’s central argument in the Transcendental Analytic entails that perception is conceptual. It is widely agreed that, in the Analytic, Kant aims to show that certain fundamental metaphysical concepts, called “categories,” including the relation of cause and effect, genuinely apply to objects. Orthodox Conceptualism argues that the categories can only be shown to apply to objects if they necessarily structure our perception of objects. Against this orthodox reading, I argue that, in fact, the success of the Analytic presupposes a strong version of Non-Conceptualism. Orthodox Conceptualism saddles Kant with a kind of error theory of categorial judgments, by showing that the categories apply only to our mind’s subjective organization of perceptual experience and not to the objects of that experience. Kant is and should be a non-conceptualist about perceptual content.
The second puzzle arises when we consider Kant’s postulate of actuality, which claims that perception provides necessary and sufficient justification for knowledge of the reality of things. Cartesian external world skepticism challenges this principle by, in part, appeal to an inferential model of perception. On that model we are only ever immediately aware of our own inner representations and then must infer the existence of things external to those inner states. If Descartes is right, then our knowledge of the external world will always be less certain than the knowledge we have of our own minds. How exactly does Kant mean to respond to this challenge and to what extent, if any, is it successful? Traditional interpretations of Kant’s “Refutation” of Cartesian skepticism argue that even our knowledge of the temporal order of our own mental states, knowledge of the kind “I saw x, then saw y,” depends on our possession of certain causal information about the things that caused those thoughts and which those thoughts are about, namely x and y. While I agree that Kant aims to argue that some form of self- knowledge, which Descartes thinks can be foundational for philosophy, is mediated by our knowledge of the external world, the traditional Causal Reading falls short in a variety of ways. Kant aimed to show that the capacity to have knowledge of our existence as a time-determinable self, in an objective empirical time, depends on our capacity to make true determinations about objects in space. Objects in space, according to Kant, must be used to fix the frames of reference in which empirical time-determinations can be made. So, if it is true that we can have objective knowledge of our own existence in time, then the objects in space that we use to ground those judgments must exist. If the Cartesian wishes to challenge the capacity to objectively determine even our own existence, then he leaves himself no philosophical ground to stand on, nor any way to move forward from the bare bones of his cogito. He also thereby transforms himself into an extreme skeptic. Although Kant cannot answer this extreme form of skepticism on its own terms, I argue that he has systematic resources for dismissing it as a real threat to theoretical philosophy. Extreme skepticism is nothing more than a subject’s mere longing for a kind of perspective on her own cognitive situation that is in principle impossible for her to have, given the very nature of cognition. Such a perspective is what Kant would call “noumenal” and is therefore not a genuine question for theoretical reason.
The third puzzle arises when we consider Kant’s Transcendental Idealism in light of his claims that “noumena” are “merely logically possible.” Noumena, by definition, are paradigmatic “empty” concepts, in Kant’s sense, insofar as we can never experience them, and therefore have “no insight” into their real possibility. Nevertheless a core thesis of Kant’s Transcendental Idealism is that the concept of noumena somehow epistemologically “limits” our empirical knowledge to the realm of “appearances,” rather than “things in themselves.” Now the puzzle arises: How can a mere empty concept, the object of which we cannot even say is really possible, set any kind of restriction on the scope of our empirical knowledge? I argue that the source of the puzzle lies in “metaphysical” interpretations of the distinction between phenomena and noumena, readings which distinguish either between two worlds with two kinds of objects, or between two kinds of property of one type of object. Dissolving the puzzle, I argue, requires adopting a strongly methodological reading of the distinction, according to which the phenomenal refers to that domain of metaphysical possibility into which we can legitimately inquire, and the noumenal to that space of mere logical possibilities that falls beyond. By distinguishing between the domains of legitimate metaphysically inquiry and metaphysical possibility per se, Kant can consistently demand a theoretical agnosticism about the real possibility of noumena while at the same time showing that the concept of noumena restricts the domain of empirical knowledge.
Glass, Jeffrey E. Corrupt Princes: Kant and Fichte on Human Evil. Master’s thesis. Indiana University, 2014. [33 p.] Advisor: Allen Wood. [PQ]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant and Fichte's respective accounts of evil share many similarities. This paper seeks to determine if and identify where the two accounts diverge. Due to the systematic nature of German Idealist writing, it is impossible to compare the relevant doctrines of Kant and Fichte and passages in a vacuum. Each explanation belongs to a broader account of evil which itself fits into an even more expansive moral philosophy. Thus, the paper has two goals, one belonging to history of philosophy, the other to moral philosophy. The former involves analyzing the differences that exist between the accounts of evil provided by Kant in Part One of Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason and Fichte in section 16 of his System of Ethics. The latter furthers our understanding of self-conceit by comparing Kant and Fichte's explanations of this evil disposition. Ultimately, Fichte's account helps to explain the Kantian doctrine taken from Rousseau of 'unsociable sociability.'
Haller, Ursina. Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der kollektiven Vernunft: der Öffentlichkeitsbegriff bei Immanuel Kant, John Stuart Mill und Jürgen Habermas. Lizenziatsarbeit, Universität-Zürich, 2014. [100 p.] Advisor: Urs Marti. [WC]
Johnson, Helen. Critical Form: On Proceeding as a Painter. Ph.D. diss. Monash University (department of fine arts), 2014. [vi, 157 p.] Advisor: Jan Bryant. [WC]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This thesis considers the critical possibilities of aesthetic experience in a contemporary context, particularly in relation to painting. It puts forth an argument for the relevance of painting as a critically engaged means of producing art today.As a ground for the argument I look to Immanuel Kant's formulation of aesthetic experience as implicitly connected to critical reflection, and propose an extended understanding of how the aesthetic experience of painting might be thought today. There are two distinct parts to this argument. The first concerns producing a contemporary formulation of aesthetic experience, accounting for relevant factors that have influenced art-theoretical interpretations of aesthetics. The second involves positioning this formulation of aesthetic experience in relation to the complex and loaded system of meaning that we might now understand painting to be. I argue for a non-juridical conception of aesthetic judgement, and attendantly for an understanding of criticality as an open, pluralistic space rather than a conclusive, rational one.The aspects of Kantian aesthetics I draw upon are the sensus communis, the aesthetic idea, the symbol as a structural stopping-short and purposiveness without purpose. These ideas, notably excluded from Clement Greenberg's recourse to Kant, form the basis of a mobilisation of aesthetics for the reading of painting beyond formalism; indeed, emphasising how the aesthetic experience of form might lead to an expanded contemplation of content. I draw upon theorisations of discursive stupidity and wit towards an extended conception of aesthetic experience, and discuss the work of Juan Davila and Martin Kippenberger through the lens of these theories. I argue that painting's ability to gesture towards an idea, whilst investing it with complexity, is one thing that enables it to open spaces for a renewed contemplation of agreed meanings.As this exegesis outlines an understanding of painting in relation to aesthetic experience, my practical research is undertaken within, and feeds back into that understanding: the relation between painting and critical aesthetics outlined herein acts as a receptive ground for my practice as a painter.
Kiernan, Sarah Loselani. Universal Validity and Hermeneutics in Kant’s Theory of Art. Master’s thesis. University of Auckland, 2014. [iii, 96 p.] Advisor: ??. [WC]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Immanuel Kant's Critique of Judgment (1790) is classically interpreted as an attempt to locate aesthetic judgments within a formalist framework. This formalism is taken to construe judgments of beauty as possessing a subjective universal validity. However, Kant's theory of fine art, wherein artistic beauty is characterized as 'adherent' and aesthetic ideas are expressed through the genius of the artist, does not immediately appear to be consistent with the absolute formalism that renders judgments of taste as inter-subjectively valid. Recent commentators have attempted to integrate Kant's theory of fine art with his broader formalism. Nevertheless, these attempts fail to overcome hermeneutical considerations that threaten the supposed ahistorical universal communicability of judgments of taste. Despite the failure of these previous analyses to contend with cultural and personal relativism, it is possible to maintain Kant's account of normative universal assent regarding artistic beauty by virtue of its relationship to the supersensible whilst simultaneously recognising that hermeneutics has significant consequences for the personal experience of art.
Kleiner, Rose. Kantian Zombies in Modernity’s Graveyard: Benjaminian Allegory and the Critique of Enlightenment in Sigizmund Krzhizhanovsky. Master’s thesis. University of Colorado at Boulder (Comparative Literature), 2014. [60 p.] Advisor: Mark Leiderman. [PQ]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Sigizmund Krzhizhanovsky (1887-1950) is known for his dense, surreal fiction that engages extensively with philosophical figures and concepts. His literary method of experimental realism brings abstract ideas to concrete life, exploring conceptual frameworks in fantastic allegory. This theoretically rich and historically oriented method resonates strikingly with Walter Benjamin's analysis of allegory in his Trauerspiel; reading them together, we can gain a clearer sense of Krzhizhanovsky's critical dimensions. This project narrows in specifically on the use of allegory in his interactions with the works of Immanuel Kant, often made to stand in for the Enlightenment project broadly conceived. Taking up three stories that illustrate the breadth of his engagement with Kant, this project closely reads the connections Krzhizhanovsky draws between the Kantian worldview and the catastrophic violence of the twentieth century. In reading his allegorical interactions with Kant through a Benjaminian lens, we see that Krzhizhanovsky is centrally concerned with the violent potential at the heart of the intellectual foundations of modernity. Tracing the decay of reason and Kantian subjectivity, Krzhizhanovsky presents the Enlightenment impulse as akin to a ruinous disease transforming humanity into a society of zombies.
Larson, David. Beyond the Dichotomy of Faith and Reason: German Idealism, Philosophy of Religion, and the Modern Idea of the University. Ph.D. diss. Boston University (Religious and Theological Studies), 2014. [292 p.] Advisor: Ray L. Hart and Garth W. Green. [PQ]
Abstract: This dissertation critically reconsiders the dichotomy drawn in modern philosophy between faith and reason, especially as formalized by the German Idealists. The latter, I suggest, continue to influence how the philosophy of religion is conceived and what it is considered to be capable of accomplishing. Though originally used to reconcile religious faith with the philosophical reason that had animated forceful skepticism, this dichotomy also underscores a tension between the conceptualization of a rational public good and private religious values within pluralistic societies. I focus on the efforts of Kant, Hegel, and F.W.J. Schelling to develop a philosophy of religion that distinguished philosophical reason and religious faith as distinct sources of theory while nevertheless establishing meaningful dialogue between each.
The first chapter surveys Kant's and Hegel's philosophy of religion and argues that they struggled to maintain the otherness of religious faith relative to philosophical interpretation. The subsequent chapters each focus on a period of Schelling's intellectual development—his early criticisms of Kant, his mature rejection of German Idealism's subjective metaphysics, and his late philosophy of religion—as he developed an alternative philosophical approach to religion. This provides a means of exploring the challenges that a philosophy of religion must navigate to move beyond the problematic opposition of faith and reason.
I conclude by considering the university as a promising context for reformulating this problematic dichotomy central to the philosophy of religion. The professional division of faculties embodies the abstract delineation of faith and reason and indicates the social and political dimension of such academic efforts. I argue that Schelling's contributions to the philosophy of religion point to the idea of the university as a vital framework for both reconsidering the opposition of faith and reason and moving beyond this schema in order to conceptualize effectively the contemporary conflicts between rational and religious authority within pluralistic societies.
Liang, Hao. Freedom as Morality. Master’s thesis. University of Wisonsin-Milwaukee, 2014. [33 p.] Advisor: William Bristow. [PQ]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper, I offer a reading concerning Kant's concept of freedom and its relation to morality. In Groundwork III, Kant deduces morality from freedom, such strategy in which requires a metaphysical understanding of freedom. However, according to Kant's argument in the first Critique, we do not have knowledge of freedom as an idea of reason. That is: we cannot know that we are free. In the second Critique, Kant clams that morality is a "fact of reason", which is not dependent on any antecedent data. We could cognize that we are free when we are conscious of the moral law. In this paper, I do some preliminary work regarding this argumentative shift in Kant's moral philosophy. I reconstruct Kant's arguments in the Groundwork III and the second Critique to show that freedom as an idea of reason gains its reality from a practical standpoint view.
Lockwood, Charles Evans. The Religious Significance of Kant's Copernican Revolution. Ph.D. diss. Harvard University (Dept. of Religion), 2014. [321 p.] Advisor: David Lamberth. [PQ]
Abstract: This dissertation argues that Immanuel Kant's critical philosophy must be understood as an attempt to hold together a robust commitment to divine transcendence and an affirmation of immanent human activity. This argument is developed through an examination of Kant's Copernican revolution, or his account of how human beings must play an active rather than merely passive role in the theoretical and practical domains. Kant's revolution involves an appeal to what can be called our self-legislation, or our role in giving ourselves laws that structure our cognition and volition. A persistent strand of interpretation has maintained that Kant's emphasis on our self-legislation, signaled through his Copernican revolution, rules out any significant role for religious or theological claims. Indeed, Kant is often seen as initiating a modern anthropocentric turn, marking the shift away from a pre-modern theocentric perspective. This dissertation shows, however, that rather than privileging either a God-centered or a human-centered perspective, Kant is instead concerned both with what the divine and human share and with what distinguishes them from one another, and this theme is borne out in Kant's theoretical philosophy, his practical philosophy, and his philosophy of religion.
The dissertation is divided into three parts, each of which corresponds to one of Kant's famous three questions: What can I know? What should I do? What may I hope? These questions map on to Kant's theoretical philosophy, practical philosophy, and philosophy of religion, respectively. Kant sometimes added a fourth question: What is the human being? The dissertation suggests that Kant's answers to these first three questions involve an account of what it means to be a human being and thereby also serve to address his fourth question. This examination of Kant's Copernican revolution suggests that his anthropology is not a substitute for a discarded theology, but is itself theologically inflected. The dissertation draws on a number of works from Kant's mature corpus, including his three Critiques and Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, as well as other works of his theoretical and practical philosophy, including the Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics and Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals.
Mattox, Daniel. Objectified in the Best Possible Way: A Radical Feminist Solution to the Kantian Sex Problem. Master’s thesis. Morehead State University (Caudill College of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences), 2014. [88 p.] Advisor: Ric Caric. [PQ]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: One of the problems left in Kantian moral theory is the Kantian sex problem; how can one justify any act of sex, when sex requires the treatment of another person as merely a means to an end? The treatment that Kant's problem describes is now known as sexual objectification, and it has become a major concern for feminist theory. My thesis begins by examining the Kantian sex problem and its context within Kant's moral theory. I then employ a typology from the work of Alan Soble in order to typify and better explore Kant's own response and the responses of four feminist theorists. I then examine the theories of sexual objectification offered by Andrea Dworkin, Catharine MacKinnon, Martha Nussbaum, and Rae Langton. After explaining and critiquing each of these theories, I offer my own theory of how to solve the Kantian sex problem by synthesizing the major advancements of each of the radical feminist approaches to sexual objectification. My thesis concludes with a novel theory that responds to the Kantian sex problem by judging the context of the treatment and the attitudes held by those treating another person as a sexual object. The three criteria for this judgment of the morality of any act of sexual objectification are respect, recognition, and reciprocation.
McGrath, Austin. A Solution to the Problem of Affection. Master’s thesis. Ohio University, 2014. [60 p.] Advisor: James Petrik. [EBSCO]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Immanuel Kant speaks of human sensation in the Transcendental Aesthetic as occurring only on the condition that an object be "given to us" by way of affecting the mind. Some commentators think there is problem with Kant's account of affection in that they read Kant to be illegitimately applying some of the categories of the understanding, e.g., causality and existence, beyond the realm of possible experience. This is problematic in that Kant repeatedly states that the categories (including causality and existence) have application only to objects of experience and thus have no application to things in themselves or noumena. This reading holds Kant's philosophy to be internally inconsistent. In this essay, I try to save Kant from inconsistency and offer a solution to the problem of affection that is supported by a specific interpretation of transcendental philosophy. Specifically, I argue that the solution to the problem of affection is given by considering the relation obtaining between affecting object and the senses to be logical. This logical relation is found in the hypothetical form of antecedent and consequent where the antecedent grounds the consequent. I will also argue that we must think of this grounding relation in analogy to a causal one, that is, we think of the affecting object as if it were the cause of the matter of sensibility. In the process of expounding this solution, I will also be arguing for a "one world" interpretation of transcendental idealism.
McNulty, Michael Bennett. Kant’s Philosophy of Chemistry. Ph.D. diss. University of California/Irvine, 2014. [175 p.] Advisor: Jeremy Heis. [PQ]
Abstract: In his Metaphysiche Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft (1786), Immanuel Kant claims that chemistry is an improper, but rational, science. In this dissertation, I explain Kant's conception of chemistry by situating his discussions of the science with respect to his theoretical philosophy and his scientific context.
In the first chapter, I explain why Kant believes chemistry to be an improper science. In the Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft, Kant maintains that the a priori application of mathematics in proper science distinguishes it from improper science. Because of his opposition to mechanical philosophy, which reduces natural phenomena to mathematically expressible qualities, Kant took the application of mathematics to be a nontrivial problem. He contends that there must be a priori, metaphysical principles that validate the application of mathematics to a proper science. Ultimately, Kant argues that the forces of chemistry, unlike those of physics, are incapable of such a priori validation, making chemistry a merely improper science.
The second chapter concerns chemistry's status as a rational science. I contend that rational sciences, unlike mere sciences, are capable of genuine, causal laws for Kant. I argue that there are different kinds of causal laws in different sciences: whereas the laws of physics are conditions for the possibility of experience of external objects, the laws of chemistry are quite different. Kant believes that the cognitive faculty of reason postulates chemical elements as the absolute, fundamental bearers of chemical powers, and that chemical laws are possible only insofar as they follow from the nature of these postulated entities.
In the last chapter, I argue that Kant continues to believe chemistry to be an improper, though rational, science in his unfinished Opus Postumum (ca. 1795–1803). In this work, after his exposure to Lavoisier's chemical revolution, Kant claims that the existence of the caloric can be deduced a priori and that the elements can be enumerated a priori. Nevertheless, I contend that the newly added a priori components neither belong to chemistry nor validate the mathematization of the science. Rather, they are parts of the transition (Übergang), which explains the systematicity of natural science.
Mitchell, Kevin Michael. The Transcendental Turn: Kant’s Critical Philosophy, Contemporary Theory, and Popular Culture. Ph.D. diss. Trent University (Cultural Studies), 2014. [325 p.] Advisor: Alan O’Connor. [PQ]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This dissertation traces the concept of transcendentalism from Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (1781) to Michel Foucault's historical a priori and Pierre Bourdieu's field and habitus, with implicit reference to Deleuze's 'transcendental empiricism,' and the influence this trajectory has had on contemporary theory and culture. This general conceptual framework is used as the basis for a critical analysis of a series of examples taken from popular culture to highlight their transcendental conditions of possibility and the influence this conceptual paradigm has had on today's theory. The examples include the NFL 'concussion crisis,' South Park's problematization of the discourse surrounding it, as well as the literature of Charles Bukowski, as an exemplification of an immanent writer-written situation. It is further suggested that, not only is transcendentalism an epistemological framework for thought, but it also doubles as an ontological principle for the emergence of a constitutively incomplete and unfinished reality.
Mitzen, Lindsey Marie. “Michael Kohlhaas” and the limits of Kantian Reason, Morality, and Law. Master’s thesis. University of Oregon (Dept. of German and Scandinavian), 2014. [60 p.] Advisor: Martin Klebes. [PQ]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kleist's work is often read within the context of his Kant Crisis. My thesis will follow in that tradition and give a close reading of Kleist's novella Michael Kohlhaas within the context of Kantian morality in Kritik der praktischen Vernunft and Kantian legal theory in Metaphysik der Sitten. Kleist doubted that humans could really understand the world and use reason to find truth, as he indicated in one of his letters that he gave up on finding a "Schatz der Wahrheiten" or an ability to find truth in the world. Michael Kohlhaas is a novella by Kleist that deals with the question of justice in the positive law and forming moral decisions. Since Kant addressed morality within the context of Kantian practical principles or maxims in his Kritik der praktischen Vernunft and his philosophy of law inMetaphysik der Sitten, these two texts are particularly helpful in gaining further insight into Kleist's novella Michael Kohlhaas.
Mongengo Edudu, Florent. Penser l'humanité universelle aujourd'hui: confrontations des idées de Kant et de quelques penseurs africains. Ph.D. diss. Institut catholique de Paris, 2014. [456 p.] Advisor: Hubert Faes. [WC]
Osawa,, Toshiro. Perfection and Morality: A Commentary on Baumgarten’s Ethica Philosophica and Its Relevance to Kantian Ethics. Ph.D. diss. Macquarie University, 2014. [x, 251 p.] Advisor: Jean-Philippe Deranty. [WC]
[Note] [Hide Note] Contents: Part I. Baumgarten's intellectual background – Chapter one. General historical background – Chapter two. Leibniz – Chapter three. Christian Wolff – Chapter four. Kant's grounding of ethics in religion – Part II. Baumgarten's Ethica philosophica – Chapter five. Baumgarten's definition of ethics and its religious ground – Chapter six. Duties towards oneself – Chapter seven. Duties towards others – Chapter eight. Special ethics.
Rios, Steven Leo. Against Kant’s View of Monogamy. Master’s thesis. San Diego State University, 2014. [76 p.] Advisor: Steven Barbone. [PQ]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Traditional notions of marriage have been the foundations for many families in contemporary Western culture. Philosopher Immanuel Kant, who attempted to create a unified system of ethics, believed that the only true way for sex to be moral is through a heterosexual, monogamous marriage union, blasting the notions of homosexuality and polygamy, among other types of sexual activities, as "unnatural." These views were presented in Kant's Metaphysics of Morals and Lecture on Ethics. But as time has passed, there has been an evolution of thought away from this point of view for many people. This thesis examines the possibility that polygamous, same-sex, and group marriages could fit into Kant's marriage right that was previously reserved only for heterosexual, monogamous marriage. Kant created a marriage right that allowed for moral sexual activity using the Categorical Imperative, most notably the "formula of humanity," as the basis for not objectifying sexual partners. The research examines area that the topic of marriage debate has been held, including biological and sociological journals, as well as philosophical journals which question the integrity of Kant's marriage right. I defend Kant's formation of the marriage right as it is presented since it focuses on the equality of partners in the marriage union. Acknowledging the marriage right and using the research, I present arguments against Kant's critiques of polygamous and same-sex marriage, claiming that these types of marriages are natural and they follow the guidelines that Kant establishes for the marriage right. I also examine the case of group marriage, which is not explicitly critiqued by Kant. I come to the conclusion that polygamous, same-sex, and group marriage could be moral on the grounds that Kant lays out in his marriage right and that he wrongly excluded them on the false premise of their being "unnatural."
Robinson, Elzabeth Ann. Speaking in Circles: Completeness in Kant’s Metaphysics and Mathematics. Ph.D. diss. Boston University, 2014. [250 p.] Advisor: Manfred Kuehn. [PQ]
Abstract: This dissertation presents and responds to the following problem. For Kant a field of enquiry can be a science only if it is systematic. Most sciences achieve systematicity through having a unified content and method. Physics, for example, has a unified content, as it is the science of matter in motion, and a unified method because all claims in physics must be verified through empirical testing. In order for metaphysics to be a science it also must be systematic. However, metaphysics cannot have a unified content or method because metaphysicians lack a positive conception of what its content and method are. On Kant's account, metaphysicians can say with certainty what metaphysics does not study and what methods it cannot use, but never how it should proceed. Without unified content and method systematicity can only be guaranteed by some either means, namely, completeness. Without completeness metaphysics cannot have systematicity and every science must be systematic. Completeness can only be achieved if we severely limit the scope of metaphysics so that it contains only the conditions for the possibility of experience.
This dissertation defends the claims made about the centrality of completeness in understanding Kant's conception of metaphysics as a science in two ways. First, the first two chapters point to a substantial body of textual evidence that supports the idea that Kant was directly concerned about the notion of completeness and links it to his conception of metaphysics as a science. Chapters 3 and 4 consider some possible objections to thinking that metaphysics as a science can be complete, giving special consideration to Gödel's incompleteness theorem. Chapter 5 explains why, if this position is as clear as this dissertation has argued, previous scholars have failed to acknowledge it. Giving a full answer to this question requires considering the general neglect of the "Doctrine of Method" section of Kant's primary theoretical text, The Critique of Pure Reason. The Doctrine of Method contains many of the passages which most directly support my thesis. Chapter 6 explains why scholars have ignored this important passage and argues that they should not continue to do so.
Salam, Abdallah. Perfect and Imperfect Rights, Duties and Obligations: From Hugo Grotius to Immanuel Kant. Ph.D. diss. Oxford University, 2014. [175 p.] Advisor: Alison Hills and John Gardner. [EBSCO]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this doctoral thesis, Kant's distinction between perfect and imperfect duties is examined. The thesis begins with an exploration of how the distinction originates and evolves in the writings of three of Kant's most prominent natural law predecessors: Hugo Grotius, Samuel von Pufendorf, and Christian Wolff. The thesis then moves on to Kant's own writings. It is argued that Kant draws the perfect-imperfect distinction in as many as twelve different ways, that these ways are not entirely consistent with one another, and that many of them, even taken by themselves, do not hold up to scrutiny. Furthermore, it is argued that Kant's claim that perfect duties always trump imperfect duties - which can be referred to as "the priority claim" - is not actually supported by any one of the ways in which Kant draws the perfect-imperfect distinction. After this critical reading of Kant's writings, the thesis then switches gears and a more "positive" project is attempted. It is argued that the perfect-imperfect distinction, even though it does not support the priority claim, is not altogether normatively neutral or uninteresting. In particular, for some of the ways in which the distinction is drawn, it is shown that the distinction yields the following normative implication: Sometimes perfect duties override imperfect duties and all other times there is no priority one way or the other. Finally, it is explained that this normative implication - which can be referred to as the "privilege claim" - translates into the following practical directive: When there is a conflict between a perfect duty and an imperfect duty, sometimes one must act in conformity with the former duty and all other times one is free to choose which of the two duties to act in conformity with. This practical directive represents the ultimate finding of this thesis.
Specht, Andrew F. Kant and the Neglected Alternative. Ph.D. diss. Syracuse University, 2014. [239 p.] Advisor: Frederick Beiser. [PQ]
Abstract: In this work, I conduct a reconstruction and evaluation of the Neglected Alternative objection to Immanuel Kant's philosophy. Kant famously argues in the Transcendental Aesthetic section of the Critique of Pure Reason that space and time are subjective forms of human intuition, and the Neglected Alternative maintains that this argument is a failure. According to the Neglected Alternative, Kant completely overlooks the possibility that space and time are in some way both subjective and objective, and so Kant's conclusions about the nature of space and time are not justified by his arguments. This objection was first formulated very soon after the publication of the Critique of Pure Reason but is still subject to great controversy among Kant scholars.
I argue that the Neglected Alternative objection is unsuccessful. To do this, I provide a close analysis of Kant's key technical term "a priori intuition," and I reconstruct the work of two important critics of Kant: H.A. Pistorius and F.A. Trendelenburg. I then argue that in the Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant is justified in deriving the conclusion that space and time have nothing to do with things in themselves, or objects entirely independent of human cognition. Finally, I look at Kant's works as a whole and consider Kant's arguments that seem to rule out the possibility that things in themselves have a structure that is even similar to space and time.
Stachowiak, K. Thing in itself in Kantian Philosophy. Ph.D. diss. Queen’s University Belfast, 2014. [# p.] Advisor: ??. [EBSCO/PQ]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The aim of my thesis is to explain the meaning of the thing in itself in Kant's philosophy. In my thesis I propose a threefold approach to this key concept. I take Kant's system in its theoretical aspect to be the philosophy of cogito, its representations and the conditions of their possibility. Not only do I introduce my own approach to the problem of thing in itself, but I also explain most of the issues directly related to it. In Chapter I give a few preliminary remarks concerning various meanings of metaphysics in Kant's philosophy and I explain the term "representation". Chapter" analyses the particular meanings of the thing in itself: the empirical one, the transcendental one and the metaphysical one. Here I present the table of the technical terms used by Kant. In Chapter III I analyse some of the interpretations of the thing in itself in contemporary philosophy. I use my own independent analysis from Chapter" as an interpretative tool to analyse and assess the most often raised objections against Kant. I argue that despite these objections the properly understood teaching on the thing in itself is entirely coherent.
Stoner, Samuel A. On Kant’s Philosophical Authorship. Ph.D. diss. Tulane University, 2014. [474 p.] Advisor: Richard L. Velkley. [PQ]
Abstract: This dissertation explores Kant's understanding of philosophical communication and his understanding of his own philosophical authorship. The dissertation as a whole has two overarching goals. To start with, it aims to demonstrate that Kant did, in fact, reflect on the nature and purpose of philosophical communication and on his own philosophical authorship throughout his career. I argue that, early in his career, Kant self-consciously employed a poetic mode of writing in order to inspire his audience and to provoke an enthusiasm for philosophical inquiry within his readers (Chapters 1-2), that Kant eventually rejected this poetic philosophizing in favor of clear and distinct logical argumentation because of the former's tendency to undermine rational autonomy (Chapter 3), that, in large part due to the poor reception of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant came to question his one-sided emphasis on logic (Chapter 4), and that this ultimately led Kant to reconsider the relationship between philosophy and poetry (Chapters 5-12).
In addition to demonstrating that Kant was concerned with philosophical communication and his own philosophical authorship throughout his career, this dissertation attempts to locate and articulate Kant's mature understanding of philosophical communication and of his own philosophical authorship. After laying the conceptual foundation for this project by examining Kant's accounts of the communicability of cognition, common-sense, and genius (Chapters 6-8), I argue that Kant gains crucial insight into the nature and meaning of philosophical communication and, by implication, his own philosophical authorship, in and through his fundamental investigation human communication in the Critique of the Power of Judgment, especially his investigation of genius's distinctive mode of communication in and through beautiful art. Specifically, I argue that Kant's exploration of genius's distinctive mode of communication reveals to Kant that philosophers must supplement their logical arguments with poetic images in order to communicate philosophical doctrines to their audience while simultaneously provoking individual audience members to think for themselves about these doctrines (Chapters 9-11). I conclude by exploring how Kant's mature understanding of philosophical communication informs his own practice of writing works of philosophy for public consumption (Chapter 12).
Taylor, Bradley M. Human Beings and the Moral Law: Moral Precariousness in Kant’s Ethical Philosophy. Ph.D. diss. University of Pennsylvania, 2014. [259 p.] Advisor: Paul Guyer. [PQ]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This dissertation is an examination of human moral precariousness in Kant's ethics. Human beings are in a state of moral precariousness insofar as they are ever-capable of transgressing the moral law and are often uncertain of the moral worth of their actions. Put another way, in this dissertation I argue that the basic relationship between human beings and the moral law, in Kant's moral philosophy, is, most fundamentally, one of tenuousness and vacillation. This relation is the fundamental characteristic of the human moral condition because such a relation is built into Kant's account of human moral agency. We have a tenuous relation to the moral law because we always have at least the possibility of conflict between our desire for happiness (i.e. the satisfaction of our inclinations) and the requirements of the moral law. We also may have a vacillating relation to the moral law insofar as we usually find ourselves acting in accordance with the moral law (that is, we often find ourselves committing lawful actions), while also (for many, if not all, human beings) finding ourselves occasionally deviating from the requirements of the moral law (this is a consequence of Kant's doctrine of radical evil). In my dissertation, I argue that this moral precariousness manifests itself as a set of ongoing, perpetual moral crises. That is, there are several crucial points in Kant's moral thinking that provide the occasion for a crisis. In each of these crucial points, Kant's account of human beings as dual-natured (both natural and rational) generate a struggle (or at least the representation of a struggle) that has a variety of moral consequences. This dissertation approaches this moral precariousness through analyses of several key features of Kant's moral philosophy: his concept of humanity, the dignity of human beings, the moral feeling of respect, and experience of sublimity, and Kant's theory of radical evil. Through an examination of each of these topics, I argue that Kant's account of the moral condition of human beings is one of perpetual open-endedness, uncertainty about one's moral worth, and, above all, (at least) potential crisis.
Tester, Steven. Kant’s Metaphysics of Mind and Rational Psychology. Ph.D. diss. Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, 2014. [179 p.] Advisors: Rolf-Peter Horstmann and Rachel Zuckert. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This dissertation considers Kant’s discussions of the metaphysics of mind in his critical encounter with the rational psychology of Baumgarten, Wolff, and others in the Critique of Pure Reason and his lectures on metaphysics. In contrast with prevailing interpretations, I argue that Kant does not offer a straightforward rejection of his predecessors but that he retains some commitments to the substantial view of the self and modifies others within the framework of transcendental idealism to provide accounts of the nature of personhood, mental powers, the possibility of mind-body interaction, and the possibility of freedom of the will. This interpretation of Kant reveals continuity between Kant’s pre-critical and critical positions on the metaphysics of mind and points forward to a role for aspects of Kant’s metaphysics of mind in his practical philosophy.
Toymentsev, Sergey. Deleuze and Russian Film: Transcenendental Exercise of the Faculties on (Post-) Totalitarian Screen. Ph.D. diss. Rutgers University, 2014. [300 p.] Advisor: Andrew Parker. [PQ]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This dissertation provides a new philosophical periodization of Russian film history according to Gilles Deleuze’s Cinema volumes. Chapter One argues that Deleuze’s film-philosophy should not be disengaged from its larger metaphysical basis provided in his Difference and Repetition, since the latter structurally organizes his overall argument in Cinema volumes. I demonstrate that Deleuze’s reading of Euro-American cinema is framed according to his theory of the dynamic genesis modeled after the three syntheses of time and the doctrine of the faculties derived from Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and Critique of Judgment: the first synthesis of the present provides the ground for the movement-image, the second synthesis of the past underlies the structure of the Bergsonian crystal-image, and the third synthesis of the future gives the way to the thought-image. Viewed in the context of Difference and Repetition, Deleuze’s Cinema project presents itself as a cinematic version of the epistemological progression of the image from matter to the virtual through the faculties of sensibility, memory and thought. Chapter Two contextualizes this progression within the historical evolution of Russian cinema. Given its long imprisonment within the doctrinal confines of socialist realism, Russian cinema begins its ascendance toward the virtual only after Stalin’s death in 1953, i.e. in the Thaw era when the Soviet action-image undergoes a definitive crisis. Chapter Three explores the second synthesis of time exemplified by Andrei Tarkovsky’s crystal-images. I argue that Tarkovsky’s emphasis on time and memory shares intrinsic affinity with Bergson’s philosophy and that his visual poetics of specular reciprocity could be explained as that of resonance between divergent film components. Chapter Four examines the emergence of the Soviet thought-image in Alexander Askoldov, Vadim Abdrashitov, Necrorealism and Alexander Sokurov, whose poetics follows the logic of the third disjunctive synthesis which foregrounds caesura between film components as the main principle of cinematic representation. In the light of such alternative genealogy, I argue that the historical coincidence of the collapse of the Soviet empire and the appearance of the thought-image in Russian cinema in the late 1980s testifies to the revolutionary potential of cinematic thinking promoted by Deleuze.
Trexler, Meredith C. Aesthetic Experience and Becoming Good: An Examination of the Connection between Aesthetics and Ethics in Plato, Kant, and Iris Murdoch. Ph.D. diss. University of Kansas, 2014. [253 p.] Advisor: Thomas M. Tuozzo. [PQ]
Abstract: In my dissertation, I examine the connection between aesthetic experience and morality. I specifically focus on the work of Plato, Kant, and Iris Murdoch, who all share the thesis that aesthetic experience has an ineluctable moral component, which enables it to play various roles in moral education and development. In chapter 1, I give an analysis of Plato's discussion of experiences of beauty via art in the Republic, and his arguments that art can be used in moral training. I also examine Plato's discussion of erotic experiences of beautiful people in the Symposium and Phaedrus and his arguments that these sorts of experiences provide an insight into the nature of true value and a certain kind of vision: they lead to the knowledge of true Beauty, and illuminate the value of the life lived by the lover of wisdom. In Chapter 2, I give an analysis of Kant's discussion of beauty in nature and art, and his discussion of sublimity. I argue that, as a result of the different symbolic relationships that the beautiful and the sublime have with the moral, these kinds of experiences, each in a different way, are morally instructive.
In Chapters 3 and 4, I examine Iris Murdoch's view regarding the connection between moral progress and aesthetic experience. Drawing Plato's and Kant's theories together, Murdoch argues for her own theory of moral progress, which involves a pilgrimage that one must make from the self-focused fantasy life into which one is born to the apprehension of reality, particularly in its moral dimensions. I examine the way in which aesthetic experience is involved in the Murdochain moral pilgrimage and the connection between aesthetic experience and what Murdoch refers to as 'unselfing.'
In Chapter 5, I address the theoretical underpinnings of the relation between morality and aesthetics that I argue for. I present three interrelated theses, one in moral psychology, one in normative value theory, and one in the intersection between them. The first thesis is motivational internalism about the good, and the second thesis is the substantive claim that the moral is, in fact, good. Therefore, when one understands the moral as good she has motivation towards it. However, humans do not necessarily have such an understanding. A person may believe that something is morally required without believing it to be good. Thus, the third thesis is that art may help us to see the moral as good by giving us a new kind of perspective: a new point of view from which one understands that there is a higher self.
I end the dissertation with a Coda, wherein I review the way in which aesthetic experience functions in Plato, Kant, and Murdoch. Then, I consider the main philosophical objections that arise against the thesis that aesthetic experience gives rise to moral transformation. Finally, I sketch a view of aesthetics in which I make some relevant distinctions that help clear up these difficulties.
Villaverde López, Guillermo. Estructura y deixis: la teoría kantiana de la objetividad en el horizonte de la época moderna. [Spanish] Ph.D. diss. Universidad Complutense de Madrid, 2014. [588 p.] Advisor: María José Callejo Hernanz. [WC]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This thesis puts forward an interpretation of Kantian theory of objectivity and, at the same time, tries to show that this theory, construed in this fashion, is crucial to the comprehension of the legitimacy of Modern Age. The material subject of the investigation is Immanuel Kants critical philosophy, and more concretely, the Analytics of reason of the two first Critiques, along with GMS and Prolegomena. Its formal subject is the Kantian theory of objectivity, that is, the Kantian theory about what does it mean, both in the theoretical and practical realms, for something to be objective or valid. Its main objective is to show the relationship between this theory and the normative principles of the Modern Age. Relying on the phenomenological interpretation of Kant initiated by Heidegger, the texts referred to as the material subject are reconstructed under the operators structure and deixis. We try to show that these two concepts can show considerable light on Kantian thought, for both in the theoretical (section I) and the practical (section II) use of reason so runs our hypothesis a structural dimension and a deictic dimension can be found. Section III systematizes and outlines the results of sections I and II towards a single formulation of the link between structurality, subjectivity and objectivity in Kant, so the general hypothesis of the investigation can be put to the test. If the Kantian understanding of objectivity is also the modern understanding of objectivity, then the hypothesis could be verified by confronting Kants theory with the development of modern history of thought and science. This confrontation takes place in the last part of section III.
Zambianchi, Patrick D. From Romantic Aesthetics to Environmental Ethics: Rethinking the Role of Natural Aesthetics in Ecocritical Discourse. Ph.D. diss. University of Washington (Comparative Literature), 2014. [238 p.] Advisor: Raimonda Modiano. [PQ]
This dissertation questions the growing tendency in contemporary ecocriticism to regard the Romantic concept of nature as antithetical to a modern system of environmental ethics. By emphasizing the inherent interconnectedness between human and non-human organisms, most ecocritics overlook the fact that a genuine appreciation for the natural world can only be obtained through the mediation of aesthetic concepts and artistic devices (such as a refined style, lyrical tone, and diction) that are prevalent in the Romantic theory of nature. In this study, I focus on selected works by Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant and William Wordsworth, in order to examine the relation between late eighteenth-century ideas of nature, aesthetics and ethics, and illustrate the specific contribution of natural aesthetics to the formation of ethics. I argue that the Romantics' theorization of nature aimed at constituting an ethical system that was significantly secularized, and rivaled the capitalistic values that fueled the rapidly expanding process of modernization. With this project, I hope to reorient ongoing ecocritical debates by offering an alternative reading of Romantic aesthetics and its implicit purposes. In particular, by foregrounding the ethical project that lies at the core of the Romantic theorization of nature – and which incudes in its realm of concern non-human organisms as well as the environment – I contend that the Romantic concept of nature has advanced the development of modern environmentalism, and that it may play a prominent role in establishing a better environmental order of the future.
Chapter one profiles Rousseau as one of the earliest proponents of the green movement by shedding light on the pre-environmental sensibility that informs much of his theoretical work, such as the Discourse on Inequality and the Discourse on the Sciences and Arts. Chapter two examines Rousseau's literary production – including Julie, Or the New Heloise and The Reveries of the Solitary Walker – where his views of the natural environment are articulated by means of literary techniques and aesthetic criteria from which they cannot be divorced. This points to the inextricable connection between our ideas of the environment and the field of aesthetics, which constitutes a fundamental premise in the Romantic conception of nature. Chapter three is dedicated to a study of Kant's Critique of the Power of Judgment and the "Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals," that illustrates the formal similarities between aesthetic activity and morality and stresses the importance of natural aesthetics to the establishment of ethical frameworks. In chapter four, I discuss Wordsworth's treatment of affect as a distinctive component of his ethical theory as outlined in the "Essay on Morals," Lyrical Ballads and the Prelude. By highlighting the compelling ethical values and the pre-environmental implications of Romantic aesthetics, I show that modern environmental ethics has been greatly influenced by the Romantic concept of nature, and that the solution to a better natural order might have been with us for more than two hundred years
Citation Source Key
[JSTOR] — Journal Storage
[M] — material copy of the book or journal
[MUSE] — Project Muse
[PI] — Philosopher’s Index
[PQ] — ProQuest
[PW] — publisher’s website
[RC] — Rodica Croitoru
[WC] — WorldCat
I thank Andrey Zilber for his kind assistance with the articles from the Russian journal Kantovskij Sbornik, and Rodica Croitoru for her help with many of the items from the Romanian literature, and my student assistant, Katy Ashpole, for her help in preparing some of the entries.