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Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1781)
——. 순수이성비판 / Sunsu iseong bipan [Korean] Translated by Myeongo Jeong. Seoul: Dongseo Munhwasa. [ p.] [WC]
Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysic (1783)
——. Prolegomeni ad ogni futura metafisica che possa presentarsi come scienza [Italian] Translated by Renato Pettoello. Brescia: La scuola. [306 p.] [WC]
Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (1785)
——. Fundamentación de la metafísica de las costumbres. [Spanish] Translated by Alejo García Moreno. Madrid: Deloitte, 2016. [150 p.] [WC
Kritik der praktischen Vernunft (1788)
——. Käytännöllisen järjen kritiikki [Finnish] Translated by Markus Nikkarla. Helsinki: Gaudeamus. [240 p.] [WC]
Kritik der Urteilskraft (1790)
——. Crítica da faculdade de julgar [Portuguese] Translated by Fernando Costa Mattos. Petrópolis: Vozes. [390 p.] [WC]
Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft (1793)
——. La religion dans les limites de la seule raison. [French] Translated by Alain Renaut. Paris: PUF, 2016. [344 p.] [WC]
“Von einem neuerdings erhobenen vornehmen Ton in der Philosophie.” (1796)
——. “Despre un ton elevat adoptat recent în filosofie” [Romanian] Translated by Alexandru Boboc. Revista de Filosofie 63.4 (2016): 515-27. [PW] [online]
Über Pädagogik (1803)
. Om pedagogikk. [Norwegian] Translated, with introduction and commentary, by Bjarne Hansen; introduction by Lars Løvlie; afterword by Svein Østerud. Oslo: Aschehoug, 2016. [146 p.] [WC]
. Lezioni sul diritto naturale. [Italian/German] Translated and with an introduction and commentary by Gianluca Sadun Bordoni; edited by Bordoni and Norbert Hinske. Milan: Bompiani, 2016. [303 p.] [WC]
——. Eberhard, Johann August. Preparation for Natural Theology. [English] With Kant’s notes and the rational theology transcript. Translated by Courtney Fugate and John Hymers. London: Bloomsbury, 2016. [xlvii, 279 p.] [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Translations into English of (1) Eberhard, Vorbereitung zur natürlichen Theologie (1781) [pp. 1-67], (2) Kant’s annotations written in his copy of Eberhard (Refl. 6206-6310; AA 18:489-606) [pp. 69-129], and (3) notes from Kant’s lectures on Natural Theology [Mrongovius 3] [pp. 131-218].
——. “La ‘Introducción’ a las Lecciones sobre derecho natural de Kant anotadas por Feyerabend.” [Spanish; The ‘Introduction’ to Kant’s lectures on natural right by Feyerabend] Translated and with an introduction by Macarena Marey and Nuria Sánchez Madrid. Con-Textos Kantianos 3 (2016): 391-414. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper offers the first Spanish version of the “Introduction” of Naturrecht Feyerabend (1784), translated from the new edition of the manuscript edited by Heinrich P. Delfosse, Norbert Hinske and Gianluca Sadun Bordoni (2010). Our translation is preceded by a study in which we claim that this is a juridical and political work. We try to show that although the text may complement the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, its central concern focuses on at least three conceptual axes that pertain to the realm of juridical and political philosophy. First, we find in the text a definition of the concept of juridical obligation based on the idea of coercion, which separates it from the concept of ethical obligation and associates it to the definition of subjective rights as legitimate titula to coerce. Second, the thesis that law must be grounded on external freedom and its possible universal concordance, and not on happiness as natural end and purpose of the state, is central in the text. Third, we can detect already in this work those conceptual foundations by which Kant situates juridical obligations within the practical reality of the state of law, and not in an alleged pre-juridical and natural confluence of private self-interests.
——. Lectures and Drafts on Political Philosophy. [English] Edited by Frederick Rauscher, translated by Frederick Rauscher and Kenneth R. Westphal. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016. [xxxv, 431 p.] [M]
1. Reflections on the Philosophy of Right
2. Natural Right Course Lecture Notes by Feyerabend
3. Drafts for Published Works: Theory and Practice, Towards Perpetual Peace, Metaphysics of Morals, and Conflict of the Faculties.
. “As representações obscuras. Lições de Antropologia de Immanuel Kant.” [Portuguese; “Obscure representations. Immanuel Kant's Lectures on Anthropology”] Translated and with an introduction by Fernando M. F. Silva. Con-Textos Kantianos 4 (2016): 296-304. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Translation into Portuguese of passages on obscure representations from the Friedländer (AA 25: 479-82), Menschenkunde (AA 25: 867-71), and Mrongovius (AA 25: 1221-24) lectures on anthropology.
. “As Anotações nas ‘Observações sobre o sentimento do belo e do sublime’ (seleção de notas).” [Portuguese/German] Translation and introduction by Bruno Cunha. Kant e-Prints 11.2 (2016): 51-79. [M] [online]
——. “Cartas sobre educação e ensino, de Immanuel Kant.” [Portuguese] Translation and introduction by Edmilson Menezes. Cadernos de Filosofia Alemã: Crítica e Modernidade 21.1 (2016): 163-71. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Translation into Portuguese of three letters on education at the Philanthropinum: To Christian Heinrich Wolke (28 March 1776), to Joachim Heinrich Campe (31 October 1777), and to Wilhelm Crichton (29 July 1778).
[De Bianchi 2016] La fenice della natura: scritti di geofisica e astronomia. [Italian] Translated and edited by Silvia De Bianchi. Milan/Udine: Mimesis, 2016. [257 p.] [WC]
[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Translations into Italian of “Untersuchung der Frage, ob die Erde in ihrer Umdrehung”, “Die Frage, ob die Erde veralte, physikalisch erwogen”, “Neue Anmerkungen zur Erläuterung der Theorie der Winde”, “Nachtrag. Recension von Silberschags Schrift: Theorie der am 23. Juli 1762 erschienenen Feuerkugel”, “Uber die Vulkane im Monde”, “Auszug aus Kants Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels”, “Etwas über den Einfluss des Mondes aud die Witterung”.
[Acimovic/Smiljanic 2016] Metafizika prirode: Odabrani spisi. [Serbian; Metaphysics of nature: selected texts.] Translated by Goran Rujevic, Damir Smiljanic, and Milan Soklic; edited by Mirko Acimovic and Damir Smiljanic. Novi Sad: Akademska knjiga, 2016. [346 p.] [WC]
[Note] [Hide Note] Contents: Translation into Serbian of: Theory of the Heavens (1755), Physical Monadology (1756), “Negative Magnitudes” (1763), “Directions in Space” (1768), “Races of Human Beings” (1775), Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (1786), “Teleological Principles” (1788).
[Li 2016a] 康德政治哲学文集: 注释版 / Kang de zheng zhi zhe xue wen ji: Zhu shi ban. [Chinese; Kant’s political philosophy: annotated edition] Translated by Qiuling Li. Beijing: Zhong guo ren min da xue chu ban she, 2016. [289 p.] [WC]
[Li 2016b] 康德美学文集: 注释版 / Kang de mei xue wen ji: Zhu shi ban. [Chinese; Kant’s aesthetics: annotated edition] Translated by Qiuling Li. Beijing: Zhong guo ren min da xue chu ban she, 2016. [343 p.] [WC]
Abaci, Uygar. “The Coextensiveness Thesis and Kant’s Modal Agnosticism in the ‘Postulates’.” European Journal of Philosophy 24.1 (2016): 129-58. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the Critique of Pure Reason, following his elucidation of the ‘postulates’ of possibility, actuality, and necessity, Kant makes a series of puzzling remarks. He seems to deny the somewhat metaphysically intuitive contention that the extension of possibility is greater than that of actuality, which, in turn, is greater than that of necessity (A230/B283). Further, he states that the actual adds nothing to the possible (B284). This leads to the view, fairly common in the literature, that Kant holds that all modal categories, in their empirical applications, are coextensive. I diverge from the common view. First, Kant is not committed to the coextensiveness thesis, understood as above. Instead, he espouses a weaker, epistemological version of the coextensiveness thesis, namely that what we can assert to be really possible is coextensive with what we cognize to be actual. Second, Kant's remarks are not intended to introduce a positive ontological thesis about the extensions of modal categories. Rather, he means to criticize a certain conception of modalities that was prevalent among his rationalist predecessors, i.e., the conception of modalities as various determinations that enter the intensions of concepts of things.
Abath, André J. “Concepts and Experience.” Kant e-Prints 11.1 (2016): 123-34. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper, I focus on the thesis of Non-conceptualism regarding perceptual experience, such as construed by Robert Hanna in his reading of Kant. My aim here is two-fold. First, I argue that Non-conceptualism so construed is motivated by worries distinct from the ones that motivate Conceptualism, such as construed by John McDowell in his influential book Mind and World. Second, I argue that Non-conceptualism and Conceptualism, as construed by Hanna and McDowell, respectively, are in fact compatible views.
Acosta, Emiliano. “Racionalização da Natureza: Cosmopolitismo kantiano como uma predisposição natural?” [Portuguese; Rationalizing Nature: Kantian Cosmopolitanism as a Natural Predisposition?] Studia Kantiana 14.21 (2016): 55-76. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Departing from Agamben’s notion of the “anthropological machine” I explore the role of the Kantian delimitation between the human and the animal in conceiving cosmopolitanism as the main goal of human existence as well as the mechanism of social and political exclusion Kant’s cosmopolitanism justifies. The paper focuses on Kant’s conception of man and the cosmopolitan subject developed in his political/historical writings between 1784 and 1795 and more specifically in his Ideen zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht (1784). The main thesis of the paper is that cosmopolitanism is for Kant a natural predisposition or condition. My claim is that although these ideas can surely serve for articulating an emancipative and egalitarian discourse about humanity and its history, Kant’s proposal for an ontological continuity ends at justifying extreme mechanisms of socio-political exclusion based on the disjunctive human/inhuman.
Acosta López, María del Rosario. “The Resistance of Beauty. On Schiller’s Kallias Briefe in Response to Kant’s Aesthetics.” Epoché 21.1 (2016): 235-49. [PW]
Alam, Justin. “Kantian Radical Evil and Sartrean Bad Faith.” Comparing Kant and Sartre. Ed. Sorin Baiasu (op cit.). 158-75. [M]
Alberti, Giovanni. Rev. of Il tempo dell’agire libero. Dimensioni della filosofia pratica di Kant, by Francesca Fantasia (2016). [Italian] Con-Textos Kantianos 4 (2016): 391-94. [M] [online]
Albrecht, Michael. “Können ‘wir uns glücklich machen’?” Kant-Studien 107.3 (2016): 496-513. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The critical Kant no longer advanced the view that man can achieve his happiness with the aid of prudence. In the Critique of Practical Reason, happiness is a part of the highest good, which presupposes the existence of God. Rather than prudence, it is morality alone by which man can contribute to realizing the highest good. In his Anthropology, Kant discusses issues which are relevant for each philosophy of happiness, for example the importance of change as such.
Alegría Fuentes, Daniela Victoria. Rev. of Kant and the Foundations of Morality, by Halla Kim (2015). [Spanish] Revista de Estudios Kantianos 1.1 (2016): 101-2. [M] [online]
Alessiato, Elena. “‘Um tremendo espetáculo’: Kant e Fichte frente à Revolução Francesa.” [Portuguese; “A terrible spectacle”: Kant and Fichte on French Revolution] Studia Kantiana 14.21 (2016): 37-53. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The French Revolution did leave nobody indifferent. Not even the important thinkers who, from the land beyond the border, followed with interest and surprise the events in Paris. Among those who looked at that «terrible spectacle» Kant and Fichte deserve an exceptional place. The event which marks the beginning of the modern age gave them the opportunity for thinking about origin and tasks of the institution put in trouble by the Revolution, the State, about the legitimacy of the Revolution itself and about the rights which the Revolution wanted to universally declare. The present paper aims at illustrating and putting in comparison the stances of the two philosophers. It focuses the attention both on the “spectacular character” connected with the perception of the Revolution by the public (meant as group of “spectators”) and on the question about people’s right of resistance against the established political power.
Allais, Lucy. “Strawson and Transcendental Idealism.” European Journal of Philosophy 24.4 (2016): 892-906. [PW]
——. “Conceptualism and Nonconceptualism in Kant: A Survey of the Recent Debate.” Kantian Nonconceptualism. Ed. Dennis Schulting (op cit.). 1-25. [PW]
——. “Replies to Critics” Kantian Review 21.2 (2016): 303-11. [M]
——. “An Overview.” [Book Symposium on Lucy Allais, Manifest Reality: Kant’s Idealism and His Realism] European Journal of Philosophy 24.1 (2016): 235-40. [PW]
——. “Kant’s Tightrope: Responses to Grüne, Kreines, and Walker.” European Journal of Philosophy 24.1 (2016): 275-83. [PW]
——. “Reply to McLear and Marshall.” Critique (blog posted: 31 Aug 2016) n.p. [PW] [online]
Alles, Nicolás. “Kant, Rawls y la razón pública.” [Spanish; Kant, Rawls and the public reason] Cadernos de Filosofia Alemã: Crítica e Modernidade 21.1 (2016): 73-91. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The aim of this article is to provide a critical reading of John Rawls’ public reason from a Kantian point of view. We believe that an account of the public reason closer to Kant’s public use of reason could face some problems of the Rawlsian liberalism. In particular, those regarding political equality.
Allison, Henry. “Transcendental Deduction and Transcendental Idealism.” European Journal of Philosophy 24.4 (2016): 920-33. [PW]
Alpert, Avram. “Philosophy Against and in Praise of Violence: Kant, Thoreau and the Revolutionary Spectator.” Theory, Culture & Society 33.6 (2016): 51-73. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this article, the author argues that the works of Immanuel Kant and Henry David Thoreau can help reframe current political discussions about violence and nonviolence within revolutionary movements. For both of them, the means and ends of political change must coincide. Since they seek a nonviolent state of affairs, each argues against violent political change. However, they are also concerned to articulate a relationship between armed and unarmed struggle. After all, Kant and Thoreau worked to find what was positive in violent acts: the French Revolution and John Brown’s raid on Harpers Ferry, respectively. They suggest that one of the ethical acts of revolutionary nonviolence is the sympathetic spectatorship of comrades in struggle who have chosen violent means. This opens up a theory of revolutionary nonviolence as a dual injunction to remain resolutely opposed to violence, but also to be capable of finding within violent acts a deeper desire for the end of violence.
Andaluz Romanillos, Ana María. Rev. of Kant zu Geschichte, Kultur und Recht, by Werner Flach (2015). [Spanish] Con-Textos Kantianos 4 (2016): 332-37. [M] [online]
Aportone, Anselmo. “Mysteries of Feeling versus Horizons of Reflection: On the ‘Super-sensible Substratum’ of Experience and the (Public) Use of Reason.” Kant’s Shorter Writings: Critical Paths Outside the Critiques. Eds. Rafael V. Orden Jiménez, Robert Hanna, Robert Louden, Jacinto Rivera de Rosales, and Nuria Sánchez Madrid (op cit.). 96-115. [M]
Aquila, Richard E. “The Transcendental Idealisms of Kant and Sartre.” Comparing Kant and Sartre. Ed. Sorin Baiasu (op cit.). 217-56. [M]
——. “Cartesian Consciousness and the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories.” Internationales Jahrbuch des Deutschen Idealismus/International Yearbook of German Idealism: Bewusstsein/Consciousness, eds. Dina Emundts and Sally Sedgwick. 11 (2016): 3-24. [PW]
Aramayo, Roberto R. “Right as a Sign of a Philosophical Chiliasm: Freedom and its Evolution in Kant’s Opuscules.” Kant’s Shorter Writings: Critical Paths Outside the Critiques. Eds. Rafael V. Orden Jiménez, Robert Hanna, Robert Louden, Jacinto Rivera de Rosales, and Nuria Sánchez Madrid (op cit.). 398-409. [M]
Armitage, Duane. “ Imagination as Groundless Ground: Reconsidering Heidegger’s Kantbuch.” Epoché 20.2 (2016): 477-96. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This essay attempts to further the Heideggerian reading of the transcendental imagination in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, by substantiating Heidegger’s contested claims, that (1.) the imagination is identical to “original time,” (2.) the imagination generates secondary, successive time, and (3.) therefore categories of the understanding are formal abstractions from a more primordial temporal horizon. I argue that Heidegger’s reading of Kant remains completely tenable based on A 142-143, by first examining Heidegger's thesis, and then defending it by analyzing the above-mentioned section. Finally, I comment on the implications of the Heideggerian reading, in terms of both the role of the transcendental imagination in the Kantian system, as well as the implications of Heidegger’s overall deconstruction of reason itself.
Arroyo,Christopher. “Kant on the Emotion of Love.” European Journal of Philosophy 24.3 (2016): 580-79. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Although recent Kant scholarship has focused on Kant's treatment of various emotions, one that has not received much attention is love. There are three main reasons for this. First, Kant does not have a single, sustained analysis of the emotion of love; what he does say appears scattered throughout his corpus. Second, Kant identifies a number of different kinds of love, and it is not always clear which kinds are emotions or how the different kinds of love are related. Finally, in general Kant is quite critical of the emotion of love, and his critical remarks seem not to fit with the intuitions of some people when it comes to some of the more positive instances of love (e.g., the love a parent has for a child). In this paper I pursue two related aims. First, I identify and sort out the different kinds of love in Kant's writings, and I address a particular difficulty of interpretation, namely the status of love of human beings (Menschenliebe) in Kant's writings. Second, I argue that, despite Kant's criticisms of the emotion of love, he views it as an expression of our unsocial sociability, and it plays a positive and indispensible role in the moral development of human beings.
Audi, Robert. Means, Ends, and Persons: The Meaning and Psychological Dimensions of Kant’s Humanity Formula. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016. [xvi, 171 p.] [WC] [online]
Axt-Piscalar, Christine. “Kant zur Bedeutung und Funktion der Kirche und die biblischen Anleihen in Kants Ekklesiologie.” Bibelhermeneutik und dogmatische Theologie nach Kant. Eds. Harald Matern, Alexander Heit, and Enno Edzard Popkes (op cit.). 129-52. [M]
Azavedo, José H. A. Rev. of Temas semânticos em Kant, by Andrea Faggion and Joãosinho Beckenkamp (2013). [Portuguese] Kant e-Prints 11.3 (2016): 44-48. [M] [online]
Bacin, Stefano. “«Only one obligation»: Kant on the Distinction and the Normative Continuity of Ethics and Right.” Studi Kantiani 29 (2016): 77-90. [M]
——. Rev. of Reading Kant’s Lectures, edited by Robert R. Clewis (2015). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (Aug 2016, #1). [M] [online]
——. Rev. of The Genesis of Neo-Kantianism, 1796-1880, by Frederick C. Beiser (2014). [Italian] Studi Kantiani 29 (2016): 230-31. [M]
Baciu, Claudiu. “Libertate şi cauzalitate a raţiunii la Kant.” [Romanian] Studii de istoria filosofiei universale 24 (2016): pages. [PW] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Starting from the meaning of the phenomenon as having a double condition, as being a representation and also a result of a noumenal affection, the paper shows that the moral action may be conceived în the Kantian moral philosophy as beeing free and thus as a consequence of a causality of reason, and not of a phenomenal cause, without to violate the demand of the intellect that each phenomenon has to be determined from a causal point of view.
Badiou, Alain. "L’Un: Descarates, Platon, Kant: 1983-1984. Paris: Fayard, 2016. [278 p.] [WC]
Bagnoli, Carla. “Kantian Constructivism and the Moral Problem.” Philosophia 44.4 (2016): 1229-46. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: According to the standard objection, Kantian constructivism implicitly commits to value realism or fails to warrant objective validity of normative propositions. This paper argues that this objection gains some force from the special case of moral obligations. The case largely rests on the assumption that the moral domain is an eminent domain of special objects. But for constructivism there is no moral domain of objects prior to and independently of reasoning. The argument attempts to make some progress in the debate by defending a robust conception of construction, which names a distinctive view of practical reasoning as transformative.
Baiasu, Sorin. “Right’s Complex Relation to Ethics in Kant: The Limits of Independentism.” Kant-Studien 107.1 (2016): 2-33. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The recent literature on the relation in Kant between duties of right and duties of virtue is dominated by a debate on whether duties of right can be derived from duties of virtue. According to one important argument, there is a tension or even a paradox in Kant between various claims concerning juridical norms, a paradox which can best be solved by assuming an “Independentist” position, that is, the view that the Universal Principle of Right is independent from the Categorical Imperative and, hence, that duties of right are normatively independent from duties of virtue. My claim in this paper is that the paradox which supports the independentist reading affects Kant’s claims only when the focus is on the subjective validity of duties. Once the focus is changed to objective validity, with which Kant is actually concerned, the paradox is dissolved and the Universal Principle of Right can appear as normatively dependent on the Categorical Imperative. In other words, in this paper, I argue that the scope of the paradox of juridical norms is confined to a specific focus and independentism (the view that duties of right are independent from duties of virtue) is confined in a similar way. Hence, the complexity of Kant’s account makes it possible for him to accommodate both independentist and dependentist views of the relation between right and virtue.
——. “Transcendental Unity of Apperception and Non-reflective Consciousness of Self.” Comparing Kant and Sartre. Ed. Sorin Baiasu (op cit.). 21-44. [M]
——. “Is Kant’s Metaphysics Profoundly Unsatisfactory? Critical Discussion of A. W. Moore’s Critique of Kant.” Kantian Review 21.3 (2016): 465-81. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In his recent book, The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics, Adrian W. Moore takes Kant to play a crucial role in the evolution of modern philosophy; yet, for him, Kant’s metaphysics is ultimately and profoundly unsatisfactory. In this article, I examine several of Moore’s objections and provide replies. My claim is that Moore’s reading points to fundamental issues, yet these are not issues of Kant’s transcendental idealism, but of the traditional idealism his view has often been taken to represent.
——. “Constitutivism and Transcendental Practical Philosophy: How to Pull the Rabbit Out of the Hat.” Philosophia 44.4 (2016): 1185-1208. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Constitutivism aims to justify substantial normative standards as constitutive of practical reason. In this way, it can defend the constructivist commitment to avoiding realism and anti-realism in normative disciplines. This metaphysical debate is the perspective from which the nature of the constitutivist justification is usually discussed. In this paper, I focus on a related, but distinct, debate. My concern will not be whether the substantial normative claims asserted by the constructivist have some elements, which are not constructed, but real, given independently from us; instead, my concern will be more narrowly epistemic – whether those claims can be derived from premises, which are normatively less substantial than the normative conclusions themselves. I focus on Korsgaard’s transcendental articulation of the constitutivist argument. I conclude that more work would need to be done, in order for this argument to function as intended.
——. “Ethical and Politico-juridical Norms in the Tugendlehre.” Studi Kantiani 29 (2016): 59-75. [M]
——. See: Demiray, Ruhi, and Sorin Baiasu.
——. See: Hanisch, Christoph, and Sorin Baiasu.
——. See: Head, Jonathan, Anna Tomaszewska, Jochen Bojanowski, Alberto Vanzo, and Sorin Baiasu.
——, ed. Comparing Kant and Sartre. Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. [ix, 262 p.] [M] [review]
Jonathan Head, Anna Tomaszewska, Jochen Bojanowski, Alberto Vanzo, and Sorin Baiasu (Kant and Sartre: Existentialism and Critical Philosophy),
Sorin Baiasu (Transcendental Unity of Apperception and Non-reflective Consciousness of Self),
Daniel Herbert (Kant and Sartre on Temporality),
Thomas R. Flynn (Kant and Sartre: Psychology and Metaphysics: The Quiet Power of the Imaginary),
Christian Onof (Drawing on Sartre’s Ontology to Interpret Kant’s Notion of Freedom),
Leslie Stevenson (Self-Knowledge in Kant and Sartre),
Peter Poellner (Action, Value, and Autonomy: A Quasi-Sartrean View),
Justin Alam (Kantian Radical Evil and Sartrean Bad Faith),
Michelle R. Darnell (The Pursuit of Happiness),
Katherine Morris (Sartre’s Method: Philosophical Therapy or Transcendental Argument?),
Richard E. Aquila (The Transcendental Idealisms of Kant and Sartre).
Balanovskiy, Valentin. “Whether Jung Was a Kantian?” Con-Textos Kantianos 4 (2016): 118-26. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Researchers often talk about a powerful heuristic potential of the Kantian heritage, but sometimes they do not show concrete examples in defense of this opinion outside Kantianism and Neo- Kantianism. This article contains an attempt to demonstrate that on the example of how efficiently C.G. Jung used Kant’s ideas to construct the theoretical basis of analytical psychology in general and his conception of archetypes in particular, we can see the urgency of Kant’s heritage not only for his direct spiritual successors. In addition the question is discussed: why did Jung claim that epistemologically he took his stand on Kant?
Ballestrem, Matthias. “Konstruktion, Diskurs und Wahrnehmung - Der Versuch einer Anwendung von Lidia Gasperonis Reaktualisierung der Kantischen Philosophie auf die Architektur.” Con-Textos Kantianos 4 (2016): 287-95. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The present text builds upon Gasperonis essay „Designing spaces of possibility. A reactualization of Kantian Philosophy for the contemporary architecture“. Along the history of formation and reception of Balthasar Neumann’s design for the staircase of the castle Bruchsal the potential application of Gasperoni’s proposed categories construction, discursive thinking and subjective perception in the architectural practice is tested. The categories find their counterpart in the difficulty of the geometric construction of the stair, the nomination as “Treppensaal” and the sensation of being round. The second part of the text argues how such an approach can help to clarify and define aims and the use of media in the design process.
Barth, Christian. “Consciousness in Early Modern Philosophy.” Kant-Studien 107.3 (2016): 515-25. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This commentary on Udo Thiel’s rich and inspiring book The Early Modern Subject consists of three parts. The first part expresses agreement with Thiel’s claim that the early modern philosophers use terms such as “conscientia”, “conscience”, “consciousness”, and “Bewusstsein” in order to refer to forms of “relating to one’s own self”. However, Thiel’s additional claim that the early modern philosophers were not much concerned with object consciousness is found wanting. The second part takes issue with Thiel’s understanding of the way in which René Descartes’s psychological usage of the term “conscientia” is innovative. It is argued that Descartes does not arrive at the psychological meaning of the term by abstraction from its moral meaning. Instead, Descartes only widens the application of the term in one of its established ancient meanings. The third part presents objections to Thiel’s higher-order reading of Cartesian conscientia.
Bartuschat, Wolfgang. “Der eine „Gegenstand der reinen praktischen Vernunft“ und die vielen „Kategorien der Freiheit“.” Die “Kategorien der Freiheit” in Kants praktischer Philosophie. Ed. Stephan Zimmermann (op cit.). 295-308. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper develops an interpretation of the passage in the Critique of Practical Reason, which is dedicated to the „categories of freedom“, by considering and discussing in more detail the context in which it is located. That is what Kant calls the „Second Chapter“ of the analytic of pure practical reason. My thesis is that this entire chapter serves as a demarcation of the, as Kant puts it there, „empiricism concerning practical reason“, that in emphasising this demarcation the typic-subchapter is a „comment“ on the „Second Chapter“ and, finally, that also the passages which deal with the categories of freedom are to be read in this respect. As a result this means, that the categories of freedom have their actual place only in the Metaphysics of Morals: in the application of the pure principles of reason to objects of desire given to moral reason, which reason has to recognise, and to which it has to respond without having to bow before it.
Basile, Giovanni Pietro. Rev. of The Post-Critical Kant, by Bryan Wesley Hall (2015). Journal of the History of Philosophy 54.2 (2016): 342-43. [M]
Baum, Manfred. “Praktische Erkenntnis a priori in Kants Kritik der praktischen Vernunft.” Die “Kategorien der Freiheit” in Kants praktischer Philosophie. Ed. Stephan Zimmermann (op cit.). 91-106. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The paper first explains why Kant, contrary to the wish of his reviewer H. A. Pistorius, cannot introduce his ethics with a definition „of that which is good“. A detailed interpretation of the chapter „On the Concept of an Object of Pure Practical Reason“ follows, which deals above all with the „paradox of method in a critique of practical reason“. Here again the focus is on Kant’s claim that the justification of his new method at the same time explains „the basis that occasions all the strayings of philosophers with regard to the supreme principle of morality“. It is in this context, that Kant’s remarks on the „categories of freedom“ as concepts that ground practical cognition a priori of actions belong. The analysis of these categories and their table conclude the paper.
Baz, Avner. “The Sound of Bedrock: Lines of Grammar between Kant, Wittgenstein, and Cavell.” European Journal of Philosophy 24.3 (2016): 607-28. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In ‘Aesthetics Problems of Modern Philosophy’ Stanley Cavell proposes, first, that Kant's characterization of judgments of beauty may be read as a Wittgensteinian grammatical characterization, and, second, that the philosophical appeal to ‘what we say and mean’ partakes of the grammar of judgment of beauty. I argue first that the expression of the dawning of an aspect partakes of the grammar of judgments of beauty as characterized by Kant, and may also be seen—on a prevailing way of thinking about concepts and how they relate to their instances—to have the same kind of significance that judgments of beauty have according to Kant. And then I argue that there are good (Wittgensteinian) reasons for being suspicious of the prevailing conception of concepts, and therefore good reasons for being suspicious of the proposed understanding of the significance of aspect perception—an understanding that has attracted many readers of Wittgenstein's remarks on aspects. This leads me to suggest that it is actually the philosophical appeal to ordinary language that has the kind of significance that the Kantian picture attributes to judgments of beauty and to the seeing of aspects. In this way, I offer a way to vindicate Cavell's second proposal.
Bazzan, Marco Rampazzo. “Sobre la huella de Kant en la doctrina del derecho berlinesa de Fichte.” [Spanish] Estudos Kantianos 4.1 (2016): 83-104. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper studies how Fichte refers to Kant at the beginning of his lectures on Rechtslehre, that he holds at the University of Berlin in the Spring of 1812. On this way its aim is to analyze the presences of Kant in the elaboration of Fichte’s concept of right. Following our hypothesis, 1812 Fichte discloses completely his criticism to Kant, that he had dissimulated in 1796 by addressing it to the so-called “new Kantians”. In 1796 Fichte didn’t criticize directly Kant, because he hoped yet to gain his endorsement. On this way our purpose is double. We aim at introducing to the Berliner lecture on right on the one hand, and at enlightening the historic-philosophical perspective from which the relationship between the doctrines of right of both Philosophers has to be analyzed on the other one.
Beade, Ileana. “Acerca del concepto de dignidad humana en la filosofía kantiana: del hombre como fin en sí mismo al hombre como ciudadano del mundo.” [Spanish; On the concept of human dignity in Kant’s Philosophy: from the human being as an end in itself to the human being as a citizen of the world] Revista de Estudios Kantianos 1.1 (2016): 24-38. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper analyzes Kant’s conception of human dignity, with the aim of explaining its doctrinal meaning, not only in the frame of Kant’s moral philosophy, but also in his juridical-political and historical-philosophical writings. The goal of my analysis is to emphasize the importance, within this context, of the notion of human dignity as the foundation of all human rights and all duties in general. I will furthermore suggest that the dignity inherent in every human being relies on his rational condition and, more specifically, on his pure practical reason.
——. “Some Remarks on Kant’s Concept of an a priori History.” Studia Kantiana 14.22 (2016): 71-84. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Despite the a priori character of philosophical history, in several passages of his main juridical and political writings, Kant identifies certain historical events as signs of progress. Moreover, he provides no criterion in order to justify the consideration of certain facts as relevant, while neglecting others as providing no supporting evidence against the progress of the human race. In this paper I analyze these difficulties in order to show that they can be solved, to some extent, if one considers the features Kant assigns to philosophical history, and more specifically, if one takes into account its a priori and normative character.
——. Rev. of Crítica y metafísica. Homenaje a Mario Caimi, edited by Claudia Jaúregui, Fernando Moledo, Hernán Pringe, and Marcos Thisted (2015). [Spanish] Con-Textos Kantianos 3 (2016): 462-80. [M] [online]
——. Rev. of Crítica y metafísica. Homenaje a Mario Caimi, edited by Claudia Jaúregui, Fernando Moledo, Hernán Pringe, and Marcos Thisted (2015). [Spanish] Con-Textos Kantianos 3 (2016): 462-80. [M] [online]
Beckenkamp, Joãosinho. “Kant e Gerard sobre imaginação.” [Portuguese; Kant and Gerard on imagination] Studia Kantiana 14.20 (2016): 117-27. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Alexander Gerard, a scottish philosopher, is nowadays almost forgotten, but at the time of Kant’s philosophical development he was a very popular author and his works were translated to German. Kant mentioned Gerard sometimes in his lectures on anthropology, particularly about genius and imagination. A near analysis and comparing of their conception of genius and imagination shows a significant influence of Gerard on Kant. Purpose of this paper is to analyse this influence in the particular case of imagination and active imagination.
——. “Contraponto a Hanna.” [Portuguese] Kant e-Prints 11.1 (2016): 36-45. [M] [online]
Belás, Ľubomír. “Angehrnova interpretácia Kantovej filozofie dejín.” [Slovak; Angehrn’s Reflection on Kant’s Philosophy of History] Studia Philosophica Kantiana 2016.1 (2016): 65-81. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The paper deals in greater detail with the analysis of the approach of the Swiss philosopher and historian E. Angehrn towards the philosophical-historical concept of the founder of the German classical philosophy. The author relies mainly on Angehrn’s two fundamental texts – monograph Geschichtsphilosophie and an interesting study Kant und die gegenwärtige Geschichtsphilosophie published in (the jubilee year) 2004 in a collection of papers with distinctive title Warum Kant heute? and its subtitle Systematische Bedeutung und Rezeption seiner Philosophie in der Gegenwart. The aim of the paper is to productively use also the original works of the German philosopher, and to justify, highlight and demonstrate the uniqueness and particularly timelessness of Kant’s philosophy of history.
——, and Sandra Zákutná. “Kantian Research in Slovakia.” Con-Textos Kantianos 4 (2016): 180-83. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The paper focuses on the state of the research on Kant’s philosophy in Slovakia, particularly at the University of Prešov. In the first part the authors describe the situation of Kantian research between the 1850s and 1963 as a period during which there was almost no interest in Kant and his philosophy in the region. The main part of the paper deals with the revival of Kantian philosophy, presented by a group of scholars approximately twenty years ago, that gave rise to a series of successful research projects on Kant supported by the Slovak Ministry of Education, Science, Research and Sport. The paper outlines the series of five successive research projects that have been realized since 2004 focusing mainly on Kant’s practical philosophy and its relevance for contemporary society. It summarizes the achievements based on the international cooperation in the research and describes the main events and publications realized so far.
——. Rev. of Die Freiheit zum radikal Bösen: Das Problem der Fatalismus-These in Reinholds Interpretation zu Kant, by Martin Muránsky (2015). Studia Philosophica Kantiana 2016.1 (2016): 90-96. [M] [online]
——, and Ľudmila Belásová. “Problematika obˇcianstva v diele I. Kanta.” [Slovak; The Issue of Citizenship in the Work of I. Kant] Studia Philosophica Kantiana 2016.2 (2016): 39-50. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The paper focuses on a big philosophical theme of man in its two basic specifications. The first one, starting from classical philosophical tradition, deals with the characteristics of good man and good society and it terminates with the resignation connected with the Renaissance thinking, reacting to a crucial axiological transformation based on the change of priorities when truth was in the shadow of usefulness. Philosophy had to reflect and reflected the transformation, too. Good man was replaced by the term good citizen and good society became civil society. A model example of this philosophical reaction is, inter alia, I. Kant. This case proves the relevance and productivity of mutual interconnection of Kant’s practical philosophy and philosophy of history with “philosophy of education”. The authors claim that Kant’s idea of cosmopolitanism and also his other philosophical concepts could represent not only a useful device of critical analysis but they may also have a normative arsenal (the a priori principles of freedom, equality, and independence) for revitalisation and reconstruction of contemporary society, especially in connection with its non- human characteristics represented by the comeback of social hierarchy, and the growth of inequality and extremism. On one hand, it is the education towards citizenship or civil literacy and culture, on the other hand, it is, according to Kant, a strong republican state.
——, and Sandra Zakutna. “Kant’s method of teaching philosophy.” Studia Kantiana 14.21 (2016): 27-36. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article focuses on Kant’s emphasis on the importance of education, especially teaching philosophizing, in the development of moral character of an individual who is at the same time able to think for oneself. The Enlightenment motto “Sapere aude!” is discussed in the first part of the article as it represents the groundwork for teaching students to philosophize (not philosophy, which is impossible to teach). The ability to think for oneself is an important issue in Kant’s Announcement of the Programme of Lectures for the Winter Semester 1765—1766 in which he explains the zetetic method of teaching and describes his plan of lectures on metaphysics, logic, doctrine of virtues and physical geography – all of them being based on a new way of teaching that plays an important role in shaping and cultivating the character of students. The last part of the article aims to show Kant’s educational method incorporated in his cosmopolitan theory.
Belásová, Ľudmila. See: Belás, Ľubomír, and Ľudmila Belásová.
Berg, Hein van den. Rev. of The Post-Critical Kant: Understanding the Critical Philosophy through the Opus postumum, by Bryan Wesley Hall (2015). Kantian Review 21.2 (2016): 329-33. [PW]
Binkelmann, Christoph. “De volta a Kant? A fenomenologia transcendental tardia de Fichte.” [Portuguese; Back to Kant? Late Fichte’s Transcendental Phenomenology] Estudos Kantianos 4.1 (2016): 43-55. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The paper examines the role played by the concept of “phenomenon” (Erscheinung) in Fichte’s late philosophy. In the conferences on the “doctrine of science” that he held in 1812 in Berlin, Fichte develops a transcendental phenomenology whose roots go back to the dispute on the thing in itself initiated by Jacobi and Schulze. Fichte explains why the use of the concept of “phenomenon” by Kant averts the risk of dogmatism, and shows how the human faculties of intuition and concept, as well as the “I think” (“ich denke”), can be deduced from the notion of phenomenon.
Bird, Graham. “Consciousness in Kant and William James.” Pragmatism, Kant, and Transcendental Philosophy. Eds. Gabriele Gava and Robert Stern (op cit.). 177-95. [M]
——. “Consciousness in the Critique of Pure Reason.” Internationales Jahrbuch des Deutschen Idealismus/International Yearbook of German Idealism: Bewusstsein/Consciousness, eds. Dina Emundts and Sally Sedgwick. 11 (2016): 221-44. [PW]
Birrer, Mathias. “Kant on the Originality of Time (and Space) and Intellectual Synthesis.” Contemporary Studies in Kantian Philosophy 1 (2016): 1-21. [M] [online]
Abstract: Immanuel Kant advocates a dualist doctrine of human cognition. In the First Critique, he distinguishes between two fundamentally different elements of a priori (objective) cognition: on the one hand, the original, sensible, and intuitive representations of time and space, and on the other hand, the conceptual, categorial thinking of the pure intellect. Despite their heterogeneity, representing pure, sensible contents, and thinking by means of the categories, are connected through an intellectually guided synthesis of the imagination. But the way we have to qualify the nature of this connection is still unclear.
This problem is the focus of my paper. In following the lines of a non-conceptualist reading of Kant’s First Critique, I argue that there is a necessary mismatch between two distinguishable kinds of determination: first, a non-conceptual sense of determination and necessity engrained in our original representations of time and space, and second, the conceptual determination of the spatiotemporal manifold by means of the functions of the intellect. According to this reading, the formal intuition of time (and space) retains a sense of non-conceptual determination while it is intellectually synthesised in accordance with the categories. I thus maintain that possible candidates for representations with non-conceptual content are not only intellectually un-synthesised representations, but also sensible representations that are furnished with a conceptual unity. Finally, I point out that also pure sensible concepts, insofar as they are grounded in the imaginative procedure that Kant calls a schema, must rely on non-conceptual capacities in an essential sense.
Blomme, Henny. “On the mediate proof of transcendental idealism.” Studia Kantiana 14.21 (2016): 11-26. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Scholars who consider that the Transcendental Analytic contains the core of what Kant calls ‘transcendental idealism’ are mistaken. Indeed, Kant’s transcendental idealism of space, time and spatiotemporal objects is sufficiently proved in the Transcendental Aesthetic and does not depend on complementary claims made later on in the Critique. This does not mean, however, that we are allowed to subscribe to the so-called separability-thesis, which states that we can endorse Kant's views in the Transcendental Logic without endorsing the results of the expositions and arguments laid out in the Aesthetic. Nor does it mean that the Aesthetic contains the only proof for transcendental idealism. Indeed, as Kant himself explicitly recognizes, the antinomies provide the premise for an indirect or mediate proof of his position with respect to the nature of space and time. First, I analyze Kant’s argument for the claim that the production of transcendental illusion is inherent to the function of human reasoning, and therefore inevitable. I then follow the presuppositions and the argumentation of the mediate proof of transcendental idealism and argue that it has a more general validity than could be assumed on the basis of Kant’s text, because it is in its essence independent from the particular determinations of the cosmological idea in the form of the four antinomies. Indeed, as I argue, the nature of reason itself and the content of the general cosmological idea suffice as elements for a mediate proof. Thus, I claim that transcendental idealism can be mediately established on the basis of the general antinomical relation between transcendental realism and material idealism, without any requirement to refer to the particular realisations of this antagonism as they are presented in the four antinomies. If the argument is correct, it shows that the mediate proof of transcendental idealism does not depend on a sympathetic account of the antinomies and is not automatically invalidated if the proofs of thesis and antithesis are considered unconvincing.
Bohlken, Eike. “Kants Theorie der Personalität als Selbstverhältnis in der „Tugendlehre“ und in der Kritik der reinen Vernunft.” Kant-Studien 107.2 (2016): 219-55. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The main thesis of this article holds that the theory of personhood as a relation of the self to itself is a fundamental structure not only of Kant’s practical but also of his theoretical philosophy. The first section discusses Kant’s theory of duties to oneself as an obligation of homo phaenomenon to homo noumenon. The focus is on §§ 3, 11, and 13 of the “Tugendlehre”. The second section analyses Kant’s theory of personhood in the Paralogism chapter, in the solution of the third antinomy, and in the transcendental deduction of the Critique of Pure Reason, and refutes some arguments against the claim that there is such a theory. A third section combines the former results and outlines their consequences for the debate on the unity of reason from Fichte to Henrich.
Bojanowski, Jochen. “Kant über praktischen Gegenstandsbezug.” Die “Kategorien der Freiheit” in Kants praktischer Philosophie. Ed. Stephan Zimmermann (op cit.). 107-28. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant’s „Table of the Categories of Freedom“ has been widely dismissed and major revisions to the table have been suggested. In this paper, I want to show how a non-hybrid account of practical reason can help us to appreciate the table of the categories as a necessary consequence of Kant’s moral philosophy. If we want to hold on to the main tenets of Kant’s moral philosophy, we also have to hold on to the table of the categories of freedom.
——. “Kant’s Solution to the Euthyphro Dilemma.” Philosophia 44.4 (2016): 1209-28. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Are our actions morally good because we approve of them or are they good independently of our approval? Are we projecting moral values onto the world or do we detect values that are already there? For many these questions don’t state a real alternative but a secular variant of the Euthyphro dilemma: If our actions are good because we approve of them moral goodness appears to be arbitrary. If they are good independently of our approval, it is unclear how we come to know their moral quality and how moral knowledge can be motivating. None of these options seems attractive; the source of moral goodness unclear. Despite the growing literature on Kant’s moral epistemology and moral epistemology the question remains open what Kant’s answer to this apparent dilemma is. The Kantian view I attempt to lay out in this paper is supposed to dissolve the secular version of the Euthyphro dilemma. In responding to this dilemma we need to get clear about the source or the origin of our moral knowledge: Voluntary approval or mind-independent moral facts? Projectivism or detectivism? Construction or given? I believe that all these ways of articulating the problem turn out, on closer inspection, to be false alternatives.
——. See: Head, Jonathan, Anna Tomaszewska, Jochen Bojanowski, Alberto Vanzo, and Sorin Baiasu.
Bonaccini, Juan A. “Analítica e ontologia: sobre a teoria Kantiana dos objetos.” [Portuguese; Analytic and ontology: on the Kantian theory of objects] Studia Kantiana 14.20 (2016): 79-115. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the present study we argue for an ontological interpretation of the Critique of Pure Reason. Specifically, it is maintained that the Analytic presents a "theory of objects", namely a special kind of category theory that operates a meta-theoretical reconstruction of the objective structure of thought and experience by starting from conceptual reflection on the form of our cognitive faculties. Thus, contrary to interpretations which tend to reduce categories either to logical functions, or to epistemic, or even to semantic conditions, several texts are scrutinized to show that Kant considers them primarily as "ontological predicates". Moreover, since they constitute a priori the structure of the "objectuality" of things, categories, aspure concepts, enable us to think of the "objects" that make up the inventory of the world one can think and know. It is also argued that epistemology and semantics issues are certainly contained in the Kantian project, yet both suppose a critical ontology as a meta-theory of objects: first, "objects" that one can only think in general (objects¹), secondly,"objects" that one can think and also know (objects²), and finally, objects one can think by transcendental predicatesonly, but cannot know (objects³).
——. “Ontología, epistemología y semántica: sobre la teoría kantiana acerca de la estructura objetual del mundo.” [Spanish; Ontology, epistemology and semantic: on kantian theory about the objectual structure of the world] Kant e-Prints 11.3 (2016): 6-27. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The aim of this paper is to claim an interpretation of the Transcendental Analytic as “ontology”, it do not in the heideggerian sense of a “fundamental ontology” of the Dasein, but in the general sense of a theory a priori of the objects: a categorical theory that operates a meta-theoretic reconstruction of the formal objective structure of our world from the frame of the our thinking and cognitive faculties. Nevertheless, I recognize that theory presents epistemological and semantics consequences. Thus, I do not see Analytic in a way that categories are reducible to mere simple functions of the judgment or mere epistemic conditions or semantics. But as ontological predicates that a priori propitiates the ordering frame of the “objectuality” of the given sensorial elements that compose the inventorial of our world in general and empirical space-temporal world; such a way that the last case is a particular of the first by which the knowledge is possible and effective. So that each and every “object” it is a formal frame constructed and acquired a priori. by our cognitive faculties in the occasion of an input of sensory data, it is a frame that designate a way that everything that can be thought and known it can be in fact thought and known as “object”.
Books, Julie N. The Supersensible in Kant's Critique of Judgment. New York: Peter Lang, 2016. [xi, 112 p.] [WC]
Bordoni, Gianluca Sadun. “Some Notes on Law, Reason and Moral Sentiment in the Kantian Lectures on Natural Law.” Lexicon Philosophicum: International Journal for the History of Texts and Ideas 4 (2016): 201-07. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant’s juridical thought enjoys renewed attention and his reading on Natural Law provides for a better possible understanding of it, with the emergence of the crucial distinction between laws of nature and laws of freedom, and the difference of freedom and morality from simple rationality and moral sentiment.
——, tr. and ed. See: Kant, Immanuel.
Borges, Maria. “High Doses of Hellebore.” Kant’s Shorter Writings: Critical Paths Outside the Critiques. Eds. Rafael V. Orden Jiménez, Robert Hanna, Robert Louden, Jacinto Rivera de Rosales, and Nuria Sánchez Madrid (op cit.). 180-88. [M]
Bosáková, Kristína. “Kantian Turning Point in Gadamer's Philosophical Hermeneutics.” Con-Textos Kantianos 4 (2016): 167-79. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The paper is treating the theme of a Kantian turning-point in the philosophical hermeneutics of H.-G. Gadamer based on of the harmonic relationship between metaphysics and science in Kantian philosophy from the point of view of the philosophical hermeneutics of Gadamer. The philosophical work of Kant had such an influence on Gadamer that without exaggerating we can talk about the Kantian turning-point in Gadamerian hermeneutics. Grondin, a former student of Gadamer, is talking about Kantian turning-point on the field of aesthetics, but in reality Kantian turning-point means much more than a mere change in the reception of the concept of judgement. It is a discovery of harmonical relationship between the beauty and the moral, between the reason and the sensitivity, between the modern sciences and the metaphysical tradition in the Kantian philosophy, made by Gadamer. This is what we call the Kantian turning-point in Gadamerian hermeneutics.
Brandt, Reinhard. “Kants Systeme.” Kant-Studien 107.4 (2016): 681-703. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant uses the concept ‘system’ in three ways: It is applied to all natural and cultural combinations of elements, it designates the final structure of his own philosophy, and it is applied to cultural structures with four elements in the pattern 1, 2, 3 / 4. There are many occurrences of this last use in the critical writings that have not been acknowledged until now.
——. Rev. of Kants Einleitung in die Rechtslehre von 1784. Immanuel Kants Rechtsbegriff in der Moralvorlesung „Mrongovius II“ und der Naturrechtsvorlesung „Feyerabend“ von 1784 sowie in der „Metaphysik der Sitten“ von 1797, by Philipp-Alexander Hirsch (2012). [German] Kant-Studien 107.2 (2016): 391-92. [PW]
——. Rev. of Kant's Lectures on Anthropology, edited by Alix Cohen (2014). ISIS: Journal of the History of Science in Society 107.2 (2016): 380-82. [PW]
Bristow, Daniel. “Does Clarissa Explain It All? A Prolegomena to Discovering Interplays Between Richardson and Kant.” Notes & Queries 63.1 (2016): 84-86. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article discusses the influence and references from the novel "Clarissa, or The History of a Young Lady," by Samuel Richardson, found within the writings of the German philosopher Immanuel Kant. Topics addressed include biographical information on Kant noting his enthusiasm for novels, examples of several allusions made to Richardson's work in Kant's treatises, and explanation of Kant's philosophical critiques of the morals set forth in the novel.
Brook, Andrew. Rev. of Kant on Mind, Action, and Ethics, by Julian Wuerth (2014). Philosophical Review 125.2 (2016): 302-6. [PW]
Bühler, Pierre. “Kants Schrifthermeneutik als Herausforderung in Identitätsprozessen - am Beispiel von Paul Ricoeurs Hermeneutik des Selbst.” Bibelhermeneutik und dogmatische Theologie nach Kant. Eds. Harald Matern, Alexander Heit, and Enno Edzard Popkes (op cit.). 91-104. [M]
Bunte, Martin. Erkenntnis und Funktion: Zur Vollständigkeit der Urteilstafel und Einheit des kantischen Systems. Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2014. [viii, 349 p.] [WC]
Burkhanov, Rafael Ayratovich. “The Transcendental, the Immanent, and the Transcendent in the Philosophy of Immanuel Kant.” [Russian] Society: Philosophy, History, Culture Issue 6 (2016): 1-5. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article analyses the fundamental concepts of "transcendental", "immanent" and "transcendent" in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. The author identifies and substantiates their relationship with the concepts of "a thing in itself", "phenomenon" and "noumenon", "a priori" and "a posteriori", "transcendence" and "transcendentness".
Buroker, Jill Vance. Rev. of Manifest Reality: Kant’s Idealism and his Realism, by Lucy Allais (2015). Kantian Review 21.2 (2016): 313-18. [M]
Callanan, John J. “Kant on the Acquisition of Geometrical Concepts.” Kant: Studies on Mathematics in the Critical Philosophy. Eds. Emily Carson and Lisa Shabel (op cit.). 62-86. [M]
Caranti, Luigi. “Kantian Peace and Liberal Peace: Three Concerns.” Journal of Political Philosophy 24.4 (2016): 446-69. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article discusses political philosopher Immanuel Kant's theory for democratic peace. In this article, the author intends to show that Kant's model is superior to the Democratic Peace Theory (DPT) from a normative standpoint, which implies that it offers a better guidance for progressing towards a more peaceful world than the model based on the separate peace as suggested by philosopher Michael Doyle and his followers.
Caramel, Niccolò. See: Poggi, Davide, and Niccolò Caramel.
Carson, Emily, and Lisa Shabel. “Introduction.” Kant: Studies on Mathematics in the Critical Philosophy. Eds. Emily Carson and Lisa Shabel (op cit.). 1-5. [M]
——, and Lisa Shabel, eds. Kant: Studies on Mathematics in the Critical Philosophy. London/New York: Routledge, 2016. [x, 282 p.] [M]
Contents: These essays first appeared in the Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44.5-6 (2014).
Thomas Land (Spatial Representation, Magnitude and the Two Stems of Cognition), Daniel Smyth (Infinity and Givenness: Kant on the Intuitive Origin of Spatial Representation), John J. Callanan (Kant on the Acquisition of Geometrical Concepts), Jeremy Heis (Kant (vs. Leibniz, Wolff and Lambert) on Real Definitions in Geometry), Tyke Nunez (Definitions of Kant’s Categories), Katherine Dunlop (Arbitrary Combination and the Use of Signs in Mathematics: Kant’s 1763 Prize Essay and its Wolffian Background), Daniel Sutherland (Kant on the Construction and Composition of Motion in the Phoronomy), Alison Laywine (Kant on Conic Sections), and Courtney David Fugate (‘With a Philosophical Eye’: The Role of Mathematical Beauty in Kant’s Intellectual Development).
Cassam, Quassim. “Knowledge and its Objects: Revisiting the Bounds of Sense.” European Journal of Philosophy 24.4 (2016): 907-19. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The Kantian project of investigating the necessary structure of experience presupposes answers to three questions: what is the purpose of such an investigation, what is the source of necessary features of experience, and by what means is it possible to establish the necessary structure of experience? This paper is a critical examination of Strawson's answers to these questions in The Bounds of Sense and his later work. The realism that is implicit in The Bounds of Sense is much more explicit in Strawson's later work but relies on problematic assumptions about the relationship between epistemology and metaphysics.
Castillo, Monique. “Kant éducateur.” Con-Textos Kantianos 3 (2016): 153-60. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: To educate an individual to freedom is a paradoxical project because freedom cannot be made as a thing. To educate a people to freedom as a collective end needs a guide who is not an ideologue. These issues are current. But Kant already has treated them in his Pädagogik.
——. “Kant éducateur.” Con-Textos Kantianos 3 (2016): 153-60. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: To educate an individual to freedom is a paradoxical project because freedom cannot be made as a thing. To educate a people to freedom as a collective end needs a guide who is not an ideologue. These issues are current. But Kant already has treated them in his Pädagogik.
Cavallar, Georg. “Islamisch geprägte Gesellschaften und der Prozess der Aufklärung.” Studia Philosophica Kantiana 2016.1 (2016): 42-64. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The starting point of this essay is the thesis that the Enlightenment can either be understood as a historical period of European culture (roughly between 1650 and 1800) or as a transcultural phenomenon: the attempt of individuals, groups or communities to „think for themselves“. The essay argues that the process of Enlightenment in the second meaning is taking place among individuals usually labelled „Muslims“. I try to show this with the help of the intellectual biographies of Ed Husain, Irshad Manji, Reza Hajatpour and Abdolkarim Soroush. Manji understands ijtihâd not just as the exegetical interpretation of religious texts within a fixed theological framework, but also as the generic capacity to think independently and for oneself. The essay claims that there is not one monolithic entity called „Islam“, but a plurality of voices. Essentialist thinking concerning texts, traditions and groups labelled „Islamic“ or „Muslim“ should be avoided. There is hardly any evidence for the theory of „Islamic exceptionalism“, which claims that Islamic societies are in a unique way immune to processes of modernization, secularization or the Enlightenment.
——. Rev. of Community and Progress in Kant’s Moral Philosophy, by Kate A. Moran (2012). [German] Kant-Studien 107.2 (2016): 408-11. [PW]
——. Rev. of Kant’s Conception of Pedagogy. Toward Education for Freedom, by G. Felicitas Munzel (2012). Kant-Studien 107.3 (2016): 567-69. [PW]
Cecchinato, Giorgia. “Fichte em debate com Schiller acerca da herança da Critica do Juízo.” [Portuguese; The debate between Fichte and Schiller as to the legacy of the Critique of Judgment] Estudos Kantianos 4.1 (2016): 105-15. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The paper provides an interpretation of Fichte’s On the Spirit and the Letter in Philosophy. The proposed reading underlies the link that ties this work to Kant’s Critique of Judgment and Schiller’s Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man. On the one hand, Fichte addresses the questions raised by Schiller in his Letters, based on the foundations of the philosophy of the former. On the other hand, in addressing those questions, Fichte refers to Kant, claiming that this work of his provides a clear and consistent interpretation of one of the most important parts of the Third Critique.
Chaly, Vadim. “Rationality in Machiavelli and in Kant.” Con-Textos Kantianos 4 (2016): 89-97. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The paper contains interpretation and comparative analysis of Machiavelli’s and Kant’s conceptions on rationality as two prime examples of “realist” and “idealist” modes of agency. Kantian model of rationality is viewed as an augmentation of the Machiavellian one, not an opposition to it. To elaborate the point, Robert Aumann’s model of act-rationality and rulerationality is applied to the two philosophical models. Kantian practical reason is interpreted as an addition to Aumann’s instrumental rationality, providing rules for rules, or “rule-rule-rationality”.
——. “Rationality in Machiavelli and in Kant.” Con-Textos Kantianos 4 (2016): 89-97. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The paper contains interpretation and comparative analysis of Machiavelli’s and Kant’s conceptions on rationality as two prime examples of “realist” and “idealist” modes of agency. Kantian model of rationality is viewed as an augmentation of the Machiavellian one, not an opposition to it. To elaborate the point, Robert Aumann’s model of act-rationality and rulerationality is applied to the two philosophical models. Kantian practical reason is interpreted as an addition to Aumann’s instrumental rationality, providing rules for rules, or “rule-rule-rationality”.
——, and Sandra Zákutná. “Kant in Eastern Europe.” Con-Textos Kantianos 4 (2016): 32-34. [M] [online]
Cherkaoui, Mohammed D. “Immanuel Kant in Tahrir Square.” What is Enlightenment? Continuity or Rupture in the Wake of the Arab Uprisings (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2016). 41-65. [M]
Chevalier, Jean-Marie. “Forms of Reasoning as Conditions of Possibility: Peirce’s Transcendental Inquiry Concerning Inductive Knowledge.” Pragmatism, Kant, and Transcendental Philosophy. Eds. Gabriele Gava and Robert Stern (op cit.). 114-32. [M]
Chiurazzi, Gaetano. “The Critique as a Passage of the Reason from the State of Nature to the State of Law.” Kant’s Shorter Writings: Critical Paths Outside the Critiques. Eds. Rafael V. Orden Jiménez, Robert Hanna, Robert Louden, Jacinto Rivera de Rosales, and Nuria Sánchez Madrid (op cit.). 357-71. [M]
Cholbi, Michael. Understanding Kant’s Ethics. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016. [#, # p.] [WC]
Clewis, Robert R. “Kant’s Natural Teleology? The Case of Physical Geography.” Kant-Studien 107.2 (2016): 314-42. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article comprehensively examines Kant’s conceptions of organisms, animals, nature’s agency, and apparent design in essays and physical geography Nachschriften from the 1750s to 1790s: manuscripts “Holstein”, “Kaehler”, “Dönhoff”, and “Dohna”. The methodological distinctions between empirical science and pure, transcendental philosophy, and between popular, worldly philosophy and scholastic philosophy, are crucial for understanding his use of teleological principles in the geography course. Kant applies teleological principles to nature in a rather ‘direct’ fashion in these lectures, although this should not be taken to mean that he considers the teleological judging of organisms to be incompatible with judging them mechanistically.
Cohen, Alix. “The Role of Feelings in Kant’s Account of Moral Education.” Journal of Philosophy of Education 50.4 (2016): 511-23. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In line with familiar portrayals of Kant's ethics, interpreters of his philosophy of education focus essentially on its intellectual dimension: the notions of moral catechism, ethical gymnastics and ethical ascetics, to name but a few. By doing so, they usually emphasise Kant's negative stance towards the role of feelings in moral education. Yet there seem to be noteworthy exceptions: Kant writes that the inclinations to be honoured and loved are to be preserved as far as possible. This statement is not only at odds with Kant's general claim that education should not encourage feelings, but more importantly, it encourages a feeling that is in many ways paradigmatically un-Kantian. How are we to understand the fact that of all feelings, the love of honour should be preserved? To answer this question, I begin by clarifying the reasons behind Kant's negative stance towards feelings in moral education. I then turn to his account of the feeling of love of honour. After distinguishing between its good and its bad forms, I consider two ways of making sense of the positive role Kant assigns to it. The first, modest reading will suggest that the feeling of love of honour is morally useful because it has two functions: an epistemic one, and a motivational one. The second, more ambitious reading will suggest that the feeling of love of honour enables the child to experience her inner worth as bearer of value.
Colapietro, Vincent. Rev. of Pragmatism, Kant, and Transcendental Philosophy, edited by Gabriele Gava and Robert Stern (2016). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (Sep 2016, #16). [M] [online]
Collins, David. Rev. of The Theory of the Sublime from Longinus to Kant, by Robert Doran (2015). Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review (posted 24 June 2016): 1-2. [PW]
Conant, James. “Why Kant is not a Kantian.” Philosophical Topics 44.1 (2016): 75-125. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: A central debate in early modern philosophy, between empiricism and rationalism, turned on the question which of two cognitive faculties—sensibility or understanding—should be accorded logical priority in an account of the epistemic credentials of knowledge. As against both the empiricist and the rationalist, Kant wants to argue that the terms of their debate rest on a shared common assumption: namely that the capacities here in question—qua cognitive capacities—are self-standingly intelligible. The paper terms this assumption the Layer-Cake Conception of Human Mindedness and focuses on Kant’s argument against the empiricist version of the assumption, in particular, as that argument is developed in the B version of the Transcendental Deduction in the Critique of Pure Reason. The paper seeks to show how a proper understanding of the structure of the B Deduction reveals its aim to be one of making sense of each of these two capacities (sensibility and understanding) in the light of the other. For the front of the argument that is directed against the empiricist, this means coming to see how a reading of the text that is informed by the layer-cake conception (and which therefore takes the Transcendental Aesthetic to furnish us with the full story about the nature of our faculty for sensory apprehension) is mistaken. For the front of the argument which is directed against the rationalist, this requires coming to see how a mere inversion of the central claim of such a reading would be equally wrong. It would require seeing how a discursive faculty of understanding able to traffic in nothing more than empty concepts would no more amount to a genuinely cognitive power than would a faculty of intuition able to traffic in nothing more than blind intuitions. That is, it requires seeing how each of these faculties depends on its relation to the other to be the sort of faculty that it is in a finite rational being.
Conill, Jesús. “Disposiciones de la naturaleza humana y autonomía moral en la filosofía práctica de Kant.” [Spanish; Dispositions of Human Nature and Moral Autonomy in Kant’s Practical Philosophy] Revista de Estudios Kantianos 1.1 (2016): 11-23. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: At a time when new forms of naturalism and even of naturalisation of the reason are once more coming forward, my intention is to show that Kant represents a classical model of thought in which the natural and the moral domains can be brought together in harmony, from the pragmatic roots of practical pure reason in human nature (Pragmatic Anthropology) and from natural and moral dispositions, set forth in an aesthetics of customs or aesthetics of freedom, which constitute a necessary complement to the metaphysics of customs or metaphysics of freedom, understood as moral autonomy.
Cooper, Andrew. The Tragedy of Philosophy: Kant’s Critique of Judgment and the Project of Aesthetics. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2016. [xvi, 297 p.] [WC]
——. “Interested Creatures: Kant on Normativity and Nature.” Kant Studies Online (2016): 48-77; posted April 20, 2016. [M] [online]
——. “Nature’s Ultimate End: Hope and Culture in Kant’s Third Critique.” Philosophica 48 (2016): ??. [PW]
Corradetti, Claudio. “Kant’s Legacy and the Idea of a Transitional Jus Cosmopoliticum.” Ratio Juris 29.1 (2016): 105-21. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article discusses the contribution of German philosopher Immanuel Kant regarding the cosmopolitanism in his political writings. It mentions that the practical implementation of cosmopolitan law as a form of legal transition with the idea of an inherent transitional character of transnational improvements brought about by cosmopolitan right. It also mentions that achievement of international peace as a solution to conflict through legal means with the element of originality
Cresti, Matteo. Rev. of Le origini della normativitá, by Christine M. Korsgaard (2014). Studi Kantiani 29 (2016): 225-26. [M]
Cristy, Rachel. “Does Wine Have a Place in Kant's Theory of Taste?” Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2.1 (2016): 36-54. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant claims in the third Critique that one can make about wine the merely subjective judgment that it is agreeable but never the universally valid judgment that it is beautiful. This follows from his views that judgments of beauty can be made only about the formal (spatiotemporal) features of a representation and that aromas and flavors consist of formless sensory matter. However, I argue that Kant's theory permits judgments of beauty about wine because the experience displays a temporal structure: the aromas and flavors evolve over the course of a tasting from the bouquet through the palate to the finish. An analogy with music, which Kant describes as ‘a play of sensations in time’, illuminates how wine qualifies as an object of pure judgments of taste: the ‘structure’ of a wine can be compared to harmonic structure, and its development throughout the taste can be compared to the unfolding of melody and harmonic progression.
Croitoru, Rodica. “Psihologia raţională, o doctrină a paralogismelor.” [Romanian] Studii de istoria filosofiei universale 24 (2016): 71-78. [PW]
Cubo, Oscar. Rev. of Das Minimum der reinen praktischen Vernunft. Vom kategorischen Imperativ zum allgemeinen Rechtsprinzip bei Kant, by Reza Mosayebi (2013). Kant-Studien 107.3 (2016): 581-85. [PW]
Cunha, João Geraldo Martins da. “Notas sobre intuição, conceito e reflexão: Fichte e a Anfibolia da primeira Crítica.” [Portuguese] Estudos Kantianos 4.1 (2016): 31-42. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper aims to show that Fichte’s first philosophy is rooted in one of the most central theses of Kantian philosophy: the assumption that human understanding is primarily a synthetic capacity. Therefore, it analyzes the Amphiboly of the first Critique aiming to show that if Fichte is open to be criticized by Kant, and indeed he is, this cannot be summarily understood as an accusation that the Doctrine-of-science would result in a kind of return to Leibniz’s pre-critical rationalism. It seems that certain ambiguities inherent to the formulations of the first Critique would open space, in the post-Kantian scenario and against Schulze’s skepticism, for Fichte’s intention of rewriting the Critique departing from a possible common root between sensitivity and understanding. Accordingly, the deduction of the categories, at least in Longuenesse’s formulation, would already contain certain clues that, ultimately, led Fichte to assume a radical idealism.
Dall'Agnol, Darlei. Rev. of Naturalism and Realism in Kant’s Ethics, by Frederick Rauscher (20115). [English] Kant e-Prints 11.3 (2016): 41-43. [M] [online]
Dalton, Drew M. “On the Possibility of Absolutes after Kant.” Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities 21.4 (2016): 157-72. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: According to Quentin Meillassoux, one of the principal aims of speculative philosophy “must be the immanent inscription of values in being.” In this regard, the return to speculation in contemporary philosophy is in many ways a deeply ethical project. This “inscription of values” can only be successful, however, if it can somehow assert an absolute ethical value without, on the one hand, resorting to the kind of dogmatism laid to rest by the Kantian critique; or, on the other, by falling into some form of ethical relativism incapable of grounding universal ethical judgments. Unfortunately, too many of these attempts have failed. The aim of this paper is twofold: firstly, to explore the structure and failures of two such attempts through an analysis of the ethical projects of Alain Badiou and Quentin Meillassoux, respectively; and then, secondly, to show how both of these thinkers, and the project of speculative ethics in general, could benefit by turning to the work of F.W.J. Schelling on the concept of good and evil as absolute ethical values.
Darnell, Michelle R. “The Pursuit of Happiness.” Comparing Kant and Sartre. Ed. Sorin Baiasu (op cit.). 176-94. [M]
De Boer, Karin. “Categories versus Schemata: Kant’s Two-Aspect Theory of Pure Concepts and his Critique of Wolffian Metaphysics.” Journal of the History of Philosophy 54.3 (2016): 441-68. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Challenging the common view that categories are prior to schemata, I argue that Kant considers transcendental schemata and categories to represent different guises of the a priori rules that allow the mind to unify a manifold. Since only transcendental schemata present these rules as ways of unifying successive representations, they can be said to constitute the sensible condition of any a priori cognition of objects. I take Kant to argue, on this basis, that Wolffian metaphysics abstracted from this condition, thus unwarrantedly using categories to obtain a priori knowledge of the soul, the world as such and God.
Debona, Vilmar. “Caráter, liberdade e "Aseität": sobre a assimilação das noções de caráter inteligível e caráter empírico de Kant por Schopenhauer.” [Portuguese; Character, freedom, and Aseität: on the assimilation of the notion of intelligible character and empirical charcter of Kant by Schopenhauer] Kant e-Prints 11.2 (2016): 32-50. [M] [online]
De Kock, Liesbet. “Helmholtz’s Kant Revisited (Once more). The All-pervasive Nature of Helmholtz’s Struggle with Kant’s Anschauung.” Studies in History & Philosophy of Science, Part A 56 (2016): 20-32. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this analysis, the classical problem of Hermann von Helmholtz's (1821–1894) Kantianism is explored from a particular vantage point, that to my knowledge, has not received the attention it deserves notwithstanding its possible key role in disentangling Helmholtz's relation to Kant's critical project. More particularly, we will focus on Helmholtz's critical engagement with Kant's concept of intuition [Anschauung] and (the related issue of) his dissatisfaction with Kant's doctrinal dualism. In doing so, it soon becomes clear that both (i) crucially mediated Helmholtz's idiosyncratic appropriation and criticism of (certain aspects of) Kant's critical project, and (ii) can be considered as a common denominator in a variety of issues that are usually addressed separately under the general header of (the problem of) Helmholtz's Kantianism. The perspective offered in this analysis can not only shed interesting new light on some interpretive issues that have become commonplace in discussions on Helmholtz's Kantianism, but also offers a particular way of connecting seemingly unrelated dimensions of Helmholtz's engagement with Kant's critical project (e.g. Helmholtz's views on causality and space). Furthermore, it amounts to the rather surprising conclusion that Helmholtz's most drastic revision of Kant's project pertains to his assumption of free will as a formal condition of experience and knowledge.
Demiray, Mehmet Ruhi. “The Intrinsic Normativity of Law in Light of Kant`s Doctrine of Right.” Con-Textos Kantianos 3 (2016): 161-87. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper claims that a particular interpretation of Kant`s legal-political philosophy, as it is presented in his Doctrine of Right, provides us with the much needed resolution to the question of the normativity of law, precisely because it brings in a perspective that avoids both positivism and ethicism. This particular interpretation follows a strategy of argumentation that I call the “argument for the intrinsic normativity of law”, i.e., the argument that law is defined and justified on its own grounds, without any need to refer to ethics, or rational/enlightened self-interest. This argument highlights the concept of legal person with the innate right to freedom as the necessary presupposition of legal practices, and sets forth a fundamental sense of justice inherent to the concept of law that consists in the reciprocal recognition of legal personality. In the end, I come up with a distinctive conception of law that I formulate as a last resort of normativity in the face of a conflict wherein an ethical solution does not appeal to all parties.
——, and Sorin Baiasu. “Kant on the Relation between Duties of Virtue and of Right: Introduction.” Studi Kantiani 29 (2016): 11-19. [M]
Di Bella, Stefano. “Kant’s reevaluation of monadology: a historical - philosophical puzzle.” Estudos Kantianos 4.2 (2016): 47-70. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the Amphiboly chapter of the Critique of Pure Reason, as is well known, Kant launches a devastanting attack against Leibniz’s philosophical framework. Some years later, however, in a Remark in his Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Philosophy, he suggests a positive appreciation of Leibniz’s monadology, by sharply distinguishing it from his Wolffian allegedly heirs and assimilating Leibniz’s originary intention to his own view. This re-evaluation will be confirmed in the polemics againt Eberhard, although meanwhile Kant had reproposed his Amphiboly without any correction in the second edition of the Critique. This intirguing reassessment of Leibniz’s view poses to interpreters several puzzling issues, both conceptual and historical – concerning Kant’s intentions, the viability of his ‘charitable’ reading of Leibniz and his possible textual basis – which I try to clarify in my paper.
Dickerson, A. B. Rev. of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction: An Analytical-Historical Commentary, by Henry E. Allison (2015). Journal of the History of Philosophy 54.3 (2016): 507-8. [M]
Domski, Mary. Rev. of Space, Geometry and Kant’s Transcendental Deduction of the Categories, by Thomas C. Vinci (2015). Journal of the History of Philosophy 54.1 (2016): 174-75. [M]
Dörflinger, Bernd. “Juridical and Ethical Aspects of the Idea of Peace in Kant.” Studia Kantiana 14.20 (2016): 5-19. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The categorical imperative central to Kant's Essay on Perpetual Peace is the imperative: “There ought to be no war!”. This imperative is more fundamental than all more specific imperatives that we find in both the preliminary and the definitive articles on perpetual peace, for instance the imperatives that there ought to be no standing armies and that the civil constitution should be republican. In this paper, it will be shown that this general imperative that motivates the Essay on Perpetual Peace can be understood in two ways, namely, first, as an imperative of an ethical law-order and, second, as a juridical imperative of the pure reason of right. Moreover, the considerations on the juridical character of this central imperative will unavoidably lead us to Kant’s conception of the law of peoples and to the question whether his differentiated conception of international law is able to cope with the demands of the juridical imperative of peace.
——. “Právne a etické aspekty Kantovej idey mieru.” [Sslovak; Juridical and Ethical Aspects of the Idea of Peace in Kant] Studia Philosophica Kantiana 2016.1 (2016): 3-17. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Despite the fact that there is a widespread opinion that the final state which guarantees peace and the international law is federalism of free states the paper claims that this final state can only exist in such world republic, which is armoured by restricted rights against limited sovereign individual states. Although Kant’s Perpetual Peace accepts this meaning, it also requires a rational-legal reflection. The paper also points out that the establishment of the internationally requested world state requires an ethical form of motivation. After its establishment, only the legal way of motivation is required, i.e. the one created by the threat of coercion.
Dos Santos, Robinson. Rev. of Kant and Education: Interpretations and Commentary, edited by Klas Roth and Chris W. Suprenant (2012). [Portuguese] Con-Textos Kantianos 3 (2016): 499-502. [M] [online]
Dostal, Robert. “Gadamer, Kant, and the Enlightenment.” Research in Phenomenology 46.3 (2016): 337-48. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Gadamer is prominent on the list of counter-enlightenment philosophers of the 20th century. He is on this list for good reasons, reasons that I will briefly explore here. Gadamer borrows much from Heidegger's critique of modernity and he adds to it. As we all know, Gadamer's critique of the Enlightenment and modernity serves as an opening for a reappropriation of the Greeks, especially Plato and Aristotle. Gadamer is often taken, again with good reason, to be one of the leading voices revivifying the battle of ancients and moderns and urging, at least in some regards, the superiority of the ancients. Kant is without question the leading figure of the Enlightenment--at least within the German tradition, if not for the European Enlightenment in general. As such we should expect Gadamer to be strongly critical of Kant. And yet we find Gadamer's relation to Kant displaying a deep ambivalence. It is this ambivalence that this paper examines.
Dragalina-Chernaya, Elena. “Kant’s Dynamic Hylomorphism in Logic.” Con-Textos Kantianos 4 (2016): 127-37. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The aim of this paper is to provide a dynamic interpretation of Kant’s logical hylomorphism. Firstly, various types of the logical hylomorphism will be illustrated. Secondly, I propose to reevaluate Kant’s constitutivity thesis about logic. Finally, I focus on the design of logical norms as specific kinds of artefacts.
Drăghici, Marius Augustin. “Despre conceptul de infinit în Critica raţiunii pure.” [Romanian] Studii de istoria filosofiei universale 24 (2016): pages. [PW]
Drechsel, Paul. Immanuel Kant als Quantenphilosoph: eine neue Sichtweise des Opus postumum. Mainz: Prof. Dr. Paul Drechsel, 2016. [263 p.] [WC]
Duarte Amaral, Lucas Alessandro. “Origens e antecedentes da intuição pura do espaço em Kant (1768-1769).” [Portuguese; Origins and antecedents of pure intuition of space in Kant (1768-1769)] Studia Kantiana 14.22 (2016): 105-20. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The present paper aims to investigate the space theme in two years inside Immanuel Kant’s theoretical framework: 1768 and 1769. Though it treats of just a couple of years among an intellectual career occupied by several decades, we defend the thesis that it was precisely in this specific period that we find some changes from Kant’s part concerning positions claimed by himself in his writings before these years which we intend to explore here, on the one hand, and, from another, the discovering of problems in which the space theme plays a fundamental role. To fulfill such task, we opt to proceed this way: firstly we’ll treat the 1768 opuscule, on the directions of space, written in which Kant breaks definitively with the notion of relative space (which goes back, ultimately, to the name of Leibniz), and passes to accept the Newtonian thesis of absolute space. From this, we’ll point out to the possible contributions of the refereed text to Kant’s posterity, as well, some problems there contained in view of what the philosopher would say about space in the following years. In the next step, from Reflection 5037, it will be expose Kant’s new understanding: this time, a little bit different from the 1768 opuscule, showing a doctrine closer from that defended by the philosopher on his critical period.
Duke, George. “Aquinas, Kant, and the Eclipse of Practical Reason.” Review of Metaphysics 69.4 (2016): 709-38. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article examines the nature and scope of practical reason with regard to Saint Thomas Aquinas' work offering materials for defending a substantive view of practical rationality. Topics include the differences between procedural and substantive views of practical rationality, philosopher Christine M. Korsgaard's interpretation of philosopher Immanuel Kant's views on practical reason, and modern versions of the natural law theory.
Dumont, Augustin. “La métaphysique et l’intérêt pratique chez Kant. Remarques sur la transition vers la systématicité idéaliste.” Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review 55.4 (2016): 759-89. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this article, I examine two aspects of the transition from Kant to Fichte: systematicity and the primacy of practical reason. It is commonly agreed that Kant saw the critical exercise as an occasion to renew, rather than supress, the possibility of a positive metaphysics; however, most scholars now consider the “system” he sketched to be the sole heritage of Schulmetaphysik. However, I take literally Kant’s demand for a system that expects from the “practical” a new and absolute “foundation,” rather than a system that must be completed. Here, Fichte’s perspective gives us the common thread.
Dumsday, Travis. Rev. of Kant on Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, by Lawrence R. Pasternack (2014). American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 90.4 (2016): 761-65. [PW]
Dunlop, Katherine. “Arbitrary Combination and the Use of Signs in Mathematics: Kant’s 1763 Prize Essay and its Wolffian Background.” Kant: Studies on Mathematics in the Critical Philosophy. Eds. Emily Carson and Lisa Shabel (op cit.). 140-67. [M]
Dunn, Nicholas. Rev. of Kant’s Lectures on Ethics: A Critical Guide, edited by Lara Denis and Oliver Sensen (2015). Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review online (2016): 2 pp. [PI]
Dupeyrix, Alexandre. “Réflexions sur l’idée de société (post-)séculière.” Con-Textos Kantianos 4 (2016): 209-22. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article emphasizes to what extent Charles Taylor and Jürgen Habermas have integrated in their recent publications on religious issues the results produced in last decades by sociology of religion. It deals with the concepts of “secular” and “postsecular” and sheds a light on the what is (sociological approach) or how should be understood a secularized democratic society. The first part of this paper presents the main theses advocated by Taylor in his book A Secular Age; the second part, dealing with Habermas’ comprehension of a “postsecular society”, asks under which conditions the cooperation between religious and non-religious citizens as well as the inclusion of religious contributions into public debates are possible or not.
Duplá, Leonardo Rodríguez. “Die Kohärenz der Gnadenlehre im kantischen Denken.” Kant-Studien 107.2 (2016): 256-90. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Despite his outright rejection of grace as commonly understood in historical religion, Kant accords a prominent role to grace within his own “natural religion”. His vindication of grace rests on a practical, strictly rational argument based on two premises: man’s “natural inability” to meet the requirements of virtue and the uncompromising authority of moral law. In spelling out this argument, this paper shows that Kant’s theory of grace belongs rightfully in his doctrine of the postulates of practical reason. It also highlights common misconceptions of Kant’s view, specifies the different functions of grace distinguished by Kant, and explains the nature of grace as a mystery.
Dyck, Corey W. “The Scope of Inner Sense: The Development of Kant’s Psychology In The Silent Decade.” Con-Textos Kantianos 3 (2016): 326-44. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper I argue, contrary to a widely influential account of Kant’s development in the “silent decade,” that key changes in his empirical and rational psychology throughout the 1770’s are traceable to changes in the scope he assigns to inner sense. Kant’s explicit inclusion of our access to the I or soul within the scope of inner sense in the early 1770’s (after its apparent exclusion in the Dissertation) yields a more robust empirical psychology. Given the Wolffian character of Kant’s pre-Critical conception rational psychology, this in turn provides a firmer foundation for the rational cognition of the soul, as exemplified in Kant’s treatment in the ML1 notes. Even so, I contend that Kant’s eventual rejection of the pretenses of rational psychology to offer cognition of the soul likewise has its basis in his later exclusion of any access to the I from the scope of inner sense, which also reveals a previously unnoticed continuity between his pre-Critical and Critical conceptions of rational psychology.
——. “The Priority of Judging: Kant on Wolff’s General Logic.” Estudos Kantianos 4.2 (2016): 99-118. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper, I consider the basis for Kant’s frequent praise of Wolff’s general logic as “the best we have.” I argue that while Kant took issue with a number of distinctive aspects of Wolff’s logic, particularly his account of the adequacy of concepts, the utility of nominal definitions, and his syllogistics, Wolff’s novel analysis of the three operations of the mind (tres operationes mentis) was highly esteemed by Kant. As I argue, what Kant likely found worthy of praise was Wolff’s account of the formation of general concepts, in the course of which he anticipates Kant’s argument for the priority of the understanding’s activity of judging which provides the central thesis (and Leitfaden) of the Transcendental Analytic.
Earle, William James. Rev. of Poverty of Conceptual Truth: Kant’s Analytic Synthetic Distinction and the Limits of Metaphysics, by R. Lanier Anderson (2015). Philosophical Forum 47.1 (2016): 19-23. [PW]
Ebadi Aref. Rev. of Kant’s Politics in Context, by Reidar Maliks (2014). Political Studies Review 14.1 (2016): 71. [PI]
Ebels-Duggan, Kyla. “The Right, the Good, and the Threat of Despair: (Kantian) Ethics and the Need for Hope in God.” Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 7 (2016): ??. [PW]
Eberhard, Johann August. Preparation for Natural Theology, with Kant’s Notes and the Rational Theology Transcript. Translated by Courtney Fugate and John Hymers. London: Bloomsbury, 2016. [xlvii, 279 p.] [M]
Edwards, Jeffrey. “On Bryan Hall’s The Post-Critical Kant.” Critique (blog posted: 31 Oct 2016) n.p. [PW] [online]
Ehrsam, Raphaël. Le problème du langage chez Kant. Paris: J. Vrin, 2016. [287 p.] [WC]
——. “Du caractère sociable de l’intime: le plaisir esthétique chez Kant, entre solitude et communication.” Con-Textos Kantianos 4 (2016): 239-51. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: To a large extent, during the 17th century and the 18th century, one can witness a major shift in the relations linking pleasure, solitude and sociability. During the 17th century (and still for many thinkers and writers in the 18th), pleasure is often described as a public experience fostered if not made possible by sociability, while meditation is frequently supposed to require solitude. On the other hand, during the 18th century, pleasure is mostly accounted for as a private and solitary experience, as opposed to knowledge, which is supposed to be closely connected to the possibility of communication. With that shift in mind, one can assess anew Kant’s view of aesthetic experience. Since Kant’s design is to make room for a type of intimate pleasure, which immediately encompasses a claim of universality and communicability, one can argue that Kant’s final purpose is to break the traditional opposition that runs through the two preceding centuries.
Eldridge, Richard Thomas. Images of History: Kant, Benjamin, Freedom, and the Human Subject. New York: Oxford University Press, 2016. [xvi, 235 p.] [WC] [review]
Elizondo, E. Sonny. “Morality is its own Reward.” Kantian Review 21.3 (2016): 343-65. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Traditionally, Kantian ethics has been thought hostile to agents’ well-being. Recent commentators have rightly called this thought into question, but they do not push their challenge far enough. For they assume, in line with the tradition, that happiness is all there is to well-being – an assumption which, combined with Kant’s rationalism about morality and empiricism about happiness, implies that morality and well-being are at best extrinsically related. Drawing on Kant’s underappreciated discussion of self-contentment, an intellectual analogue of happiness, I reconstruct an alternative account of morality’s relation to well-being. Morality is intrinsically related to well-being – and so is its own reward – not because it makes us happy but because it makes us self-contented.
Emundts, Dina. “Die systematische Bedeutung der Philosophiegeschichte am Beispiel von Kant und Hegel.” Deutsches Jahrbuch Philosophie 8 (2016): 875-89. [PW]
Englezos, Anastasios. See: Kontos, Pavlos, and Anastasios Englezos.
Engstrom, Stephen. “Self-consciousness and the Unity of Knowledge.” Internationales Jahrbuch des Deutschen Idealismus/International Yearbook of German Idealism: Bewusstsein/Consciousness, eds. Dina Emundts and Sally Sedgwick. 11 (2016): 25-48. [PW]
Ercolini, G. L. Kant’s Philosophy of Communication. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2016. [285 p.] [WC]
Eshleman, Andrew. “The Afterlife: Beyond Belief.” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 80.2 (2016): 163-83. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: When a Christian refers to the future full realization of the kingdom of God in an afterlife, it is typically assumed that she is expressing (or implying) beliefs about the existence and activity of God in conjunction with supernatural beliefs about an otherworldly realm and the possibility of one's personal survival after bodily death. In other words, the religious language is interpreted in a realist fashion and the religious person here is construed as a religious believer. A corollary of this widely-held realist view is the assumption that if one were to conclude that there is no good reason to believe the asserted claims-for example, no reason to believe that we may survive our bodily deaths in a heavenly realm-then there is no reason to engage in the use of such religious language and the practices which accompany it. I argue that this assumption is false-that there is a meaningful way to use such language in a religious context that does not rest on believing supernatural claims. Against the backdrop of Kant's discussion of a kingdom of ends understood as a regulative ideal, I argue that religious discourse about the kingdom of God being brought to fruition may be reinterpreted as a useful fiction to draw our attention to and engage our emotions with a distinctive ideal of restorative justice. Though I and others have previously offered fictionalist accounts of language about God, I extend the view here to some religious language about the afterlife.
Esteves, Julio. “Freedom and Nature in Kant’s Philosophy of History.” Kant’s Shorter Writings: Critical Paths Outside the Critiques. Eds. Rafael V. Orden Jiménez, Robert Hanna, Robert Louden, Jacinto Rivera de Rosales, and Nuria Sánchez Madrid (op cit.). 231-45. [M]
Euler, Werner. “Verstand und Wille. Die Kausalitätskategorie als Schlüssel zum Verständnis der „Kategorien der Freiheit“ in Kants Kritik der praktischen Vernunft.” Die “Kategorien der Freiheit” in Kants praktischer Philosophie. Ed. Stephan Zimmermann (op cit.). 175-215. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In my paper, I intend to outline a new understanding of the „categories of freedom“ in Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason. The main idea of my proposition concerns the role and the significance of the category of causality through freedom as a key-term for the understanding required, for this predominant role allows the reader to interpret the table of the categories of freedom as consisting in mere modifications of causality which are, of course, at the same time elementary concepts essentially determined by the moral law of practical reason. Therefore, the function of those categories is not to determine moral human action as their object, but to express only the modalities or options of the free will. The conclusion drawn from that conception is that we should not regard the categories of freedom as a new system of categories alongside and in addition to the categories of pure understanding presented in the Critique of Pure Reason, but as mere transformations of these categories of nature according to the causality of freedom, in other words, as mere „predicables“. This means that the categories of nature are still valid and present in the background, even in the second Critique, although they are interpreted in terms of the freedom of the will.
——. “Kantova kopernikovská revolúcia v estetike.” [Slovak; Kant’s Copernican revolution in aesthetics] Studia Philosophica Kantiana 2016.2 (2016): 25-38. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In Bezug auf Kants Selbstbeschreibung der Idee und des Anspruchs seines allgemeinen Programms zur Kritik und Erneuerung der Grundlagen der Metaphysik wird seit langer Zeit die in der KrV verwendete Formel von der „Erneuerung der Denkungsart“ diskutiert. Zu diesem Programm gehören nun auch besondere Programme, wie z.B. die Reformierung der Grundlagen der Moral und des Rechts. Will man wissen, worin die einer Revolution der Denkart vergleichbare Leistung Kants auf dem Feld der Ästhetik besteht, so kann man sich nicht auf ein analoges Lehrstück mit dem fiktiv gewählten Titel „Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Geschmackslehre“ beziehen. In meinem Text soll es darum gehen, einige Konsequenzen aus Kants Theorie des ästhetischen Urteils im Hinblick auf die Frage ihres innovativen Wertes gegenüber älteren Theorien auf diesem Gebiet, und zwar bezogen auf die ästhetischen Gegenstände des Schönen und des Erhabenen der Natur, zu untersuchen.
——. Rev. of Christoph Gottfried Bardili. Kleine Schriften zur Logik. Mit Einleitung und ausführlichem textkritischem Kommentar , edited by Rebecca Paimann (2012). Kant-Studien 107.1 (2016): 207-16. [M]
Faggion, Andrea. “The Duty to Leave the State of Nature and Non-Coercive Rights in the Civil Condition.” Kant’s Shorter Writings: Critical Paths Outside the Critiques. Eds. Rafael V. Orden Jiménez, Robert Hanna, Robert Louden, Jacinto Rivera de Rosales, and Nuria Sánchez Madrid (op cit.). 410-25. [M]
——. Rev. of Naturalism and Realism in Kant’s Ethics, by Frederick Rauscher (2015). [English] Con-Textos Kantianos 3 (2016): 455-61. [M] [online]
——, Alessandro Pinzani, and Nuria Sánchez Madrid, eds. Kant and Social Policies. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. [xiii, 177 p.] [WC]
Susan Meld Shell (Kant on Citizenship, Society, and Redistributive Justice),
Alessandro Pinzani and Nuria Sánchez Madrid (The State Looks Down: Some reassessments of Kant's Appraisal of Citizenship),
Aguinaldo Pavão and Andrea Faggion (Kant For and Against Human Rights),
Alberto Pirni (The Place of Sociality: Models of Intersubjectivity According to Kant),
Helga Varden (Rawls vs. Nozick vs. Kant on Domestic Economic Justice),
Faviola Rivera Castro (Rawls and Kant on Compliance with International Laws of Justice),
Joel Thiago Klein (Kant and Public Education for Enhancing Moral Virtue: The Necessary Conditions for Ensuring Enlightened Patriotism).
Failla, Mariannina. “L’empirismo di Kant: illusione, menzogna e biasimo.” [Italian; “Kantian Empiricism: Illusion, Falsehood and Blame”] Con-Textos Kantianos 3 (2016): 55-80. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The essay aims to examine the theory of Kantian empiricism as mediation between finity and infinity; therefore it focuses on Kant's affinities with Lambert's analytical phenomenology and on the young Hegel's criticism towards Kant's philosophy; then the essay treats the matter of illusion and falsehood. These are interpreted as two different faces of the Kantian empiricism: the former relates to the anthropological studies and social integration. The latter transfers the focus on the problem of social disunion, its moral condemnation and, last but not least, the possibility to relate the sensible world with the intelligible principle of freedom, through the concept of “blame” (of Lockean origin).
Falduto, Antonino. “Freedom and Obligation: The Moral Debate between Kant and Hegel (1781-1807).” Kant’s Shorter Writings: Critical Paths Outside the Critiques. Eds. Rafael V. Orden Jiménez, Robert Hanna, Robert Louden, Jacinto Rivera de Rosales, and Nuria Sánchez Madrid (op cit.). 171-79. [M]
——. Rev. of Karl Leonhard Reinhold: Gesammelte Schriften. Kommentierte Ausgabe. Hrsg. von Martin Bondeli. Bd. 1: Versuch einer neuen Theorie des menschlichen Vorstellungsvermögens, edited by Martin Bondeli und Silvan Imhof (2013). Kant-Studien 107.1 (2016): 199-201. [M]
——. Rev. of Ragione pratica. Kant, Reinhold, Fichte, by Marco Ivaldo (2012). [German] Kant-Studien 107.2 (2016): 393-95. [PW]
Fantasia, Francesca. “Das Ende aller Dinge: The Duratio Noumenon and the Problem of the Atemporality of Gesinnung.” Kant’s Shorter Writings: Critical Paths Outside the Critiques. Eds. Rafael V. Orden Jiménez, Robert Hanna, Robert Louden, Jacinto Rivera de Rosales, and Nuria Sánchez Madrid (op cit.). 154-70. [M]
Favaretti Camposampiero, Matteo. “Ens imaginarium: Kant e Wolff.” [Portuguese] Estudos Kantianos 4.2 (2016): 119-31. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The present article clarifies Kant’s use of the expression ens imaginarium by confronting this use, on the one hand, with the traditional (which is still present in Leibniz), and, on the other hand, with Wolff’s use. After considering the revival of the debate on the distinction between “imaginary” and “real” after the publication of the correspondence between Leibniz and Clarke (§ 1), the article illustrates Wolff’s transformation of the traditional concept of ens imaginarium, a transformation carried out through the theory of imaginary notions (§ 2). Contrary to the fictitious ens, Wolff’s ens imaginarium can work as a surrogate of the real ens, and thus play a heuristic function. In Kant, however, the expression ens imaginarium keeps the more traditional sense of “not real”: space and time are imaginary beings if we conceive them as contents of the representation, rather than as pure forms of it (§ 3). Thereby, Kant aims to oppose precisely the changes introduced by Wolff, which he considers incompatible with the a priori character of the concepts of space and time (§ 4).
Fernandes Guimarães, Caroline F. “A Crítica de Hegel ao Formalismo Kantiano em Defesa da Eticidade.” [Portuguese] Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 72.1 (2016): 199-217. [PW]
Ferraguto, Federico. “Natura e rivelazione. Il concetto di fine nel saggio di una critica di ogni rivelazione di J.G. Fichte. Una rilettura fichteana di Kant.” [Italian; Nature and Revelation. The Concept of Purpose in Fichte’s Attempt at a Critique of All Revelation. A Fichtean Reading of Kant] Estudos Kantianos 4.1 (2016): 15-29. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The paper analyses the relationship between teleology and revelation in J.G. Fichte’s Attempt at a Critique of All Revelation. The following issues are considered in turn: the teleological conception of nature and will; the function of revelation in the subjective genesis of the teleological path, in which the revelation finds its sense; finally, the relevance of revelation to the development of a transcendental philosophy of the nature.
Ferrarin, Alfredo. Ill pensare e l'io: Hegel e la critica di Kant. [Italian] Rome: Carocci, 2016. [244 p.] [WC]
——. “Reason in Kant and Hegel.” Kant Yearbook: Kant and German Idealism 8 (2016): 1-16. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper I want to compare and contrast Kant and Hegel on reason. While both emphasize the close connection between reason and its ends, motivations and needs, and denounce a futile understanding of reason as a formal, instrumental, or simply logical reasoning, they diverge on how to interpret reason’s restlessness, teleology and life. After a section illustrating some uncritical assumptions widespread among readings of Kant, I move to a treatment of their respective views on reason’s self-realization (the relation between thought and the I, concepts and intuitions, faith and history), and conclude by showing the main differences in their respective understandings of method, dialectic, limit and ideas.
Ferreiro, Héctor. “Die Streit um die hundert Taler: Begriff und Erkenntnis des Wirklichen bei Kant und Hegel.” Revista Eletrônica Estudos Hegelianos 13.21 (2016): 23-38. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the Transcendental Dialectic (KrV, A 599-560/B 627-628), Kant presents the argument of the hundred talers as a concrete example of his general claim against conceiving existence as a real predicate. According to Kant, the content of concepts can be completely determined as merely possible content; in the existential judgment, the subject then relates the completely determined content of his internal thoughts with perception: it is only through perception that the subject knows the content of his concepts as real things of the world. Thus, although in his epistemology conceptual activity plays a crucial role in perceptual activity, Kant still offers an empiricist account of empirical knowledge. Hegel criticizes Kant´s theory of perception by distinguishing representation (Vorstellen) from comprehension (Begreifen) and by developing on that basis a more complex theory of the relation between concept, existence, and empirical knowledge. From the standpoint of representation, concept and existence, being-determined and being-real exclude each other; in comprehension, on the contrary, representation and perception are no longer unilateral forms of knowing: for the mind that comprehends what it perceives, the existence of what it perceives is – when abstractly considered as such – only a collateral product of the way it knows the real world. According to Hegel, comprehension develops the internal necessity of the contents of knowledge and, by doing so, grasps the individual objects that constitute our world.
Ferrié, Christian. La politique de Kant: un réformisme révolutionnaire. Paris: Payot, 2016. [492 p.] [WC]
Fichant, Michel. “Leibniz a-t-il “intellectualisé les phénomènes”? Eléments pour l’histoire d’une méprise.” Estudos Kantianos 4.2 (2016): 19-45. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The present paper starts from Kant’s well-known statement, according to which “Leibniz intellectualized the appearances” (KrV, A 271/B 327), and considers the historical circumstances that have mediated Kant’s reception of Leibniz’s philosophy, with a particular emphasis on Wolff’s role in this mediation. The goal is to highlight that, although Kant has taken as Leibnizian a theory of sensibility that was essentially Wolffian, he has recognized that Wolff’s theory of the simple corporeal elements did not suit Leibniz’s monadology. However, Kant’s attempt at rehabilitating the meaning and the value of the Leibnizian concept of monad does not avoid conceiving it as an intelligible substrate of the sensible intuition. Therefore, even this rehabilitation does not escape the limit represented by the inaccessibility of the human being to this supposed intelligible substrate.
Fidalgo da Silva, Cláudia. Rev. of A civilizaçao como destino: Kant e as formas da reflexão., by Nuria Sánchez Madrid (2016). [Portuguese] Filosofia. Revista da Faculdade de Letras da Universidade do Porto 33 (2014): 365-75. [M]
Figueiredo, Vinícius Berlendis de. “Reflexão na Crítica da razão pura.” [Portuguese; Reflection in the Critique of pure reason] Studia Kantiana 14.20 (2016): 51-77. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper aims to investigate the notion of reflection in the Critique of Pure Reason in three steps: (1) first, I supply an understanding of its general meaning, corresponding to the self-examination of reason; (2) I sustain that, beyond its definition in the amphiboly of the concepts of reflection, in the first Critique Kant works with two other meanings of reflection, each of wich corresponding to a specific way of thinking that are not assimilable to the objective use of the concepts; (3): I propose an hierarchy between this two meanings of reflection, sustaining that the most important Kantian purpose in the three Critiques is to provide us with a reasonable judgement, understood as the faculty of reflection.
Finlayson, James Gordon. “Where the Right Gets in: On Rawls’s Criticism of Habermas’s Conception of Legitimacy.” Kantian Review 21.2 (2016): 161-83. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Many commentators have failed to identify the important issues at the heart of the debate between Habermas and Rawls. This is partly because they give undue attention to differences between Rawls’s original position and Habermas’s principle (U), neither of which is germane to the actual dispute. The dispute is at bottom about how best to conceive of democratic legitimacy. Rawls indicates where the dividing issues lie when he objects that Habermas’s account of democratic legitimacy is comprehensive and his is confined to the political. But his argument is vitiated by a threefold ambiguity in what he means by ‘comprehensive doctrine’. Tidying up this ambiguity helps reveal that the dispute turns on the way in which morality relates to political legitimacy. Although Habermas calls his conception of legitimate law ‘morally freestanding’, and as such distinguishes it from Kantian and natural law accounts of legitimacy, it is not as freestanding from morality as he likes to present it. Habermas’s mature theory contains conflicting claims about the relation between morality and democratic legitimacy. So there is at least one important sense in which Rawls’s charge of comprehensiveness is made to stick against Habermas’s conception of democratic legitimacy, and remains unanswered.
Fischer, Norbert. “Zum Sinn von Kants Grundfrage: ‘Was ist der Mensch?’.” Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 70.4 (2016): 493-526. [PW]
Fleitas González, Martín. “Una travesía kantiana a través del Escila constructivista y el Caribdis realista. Apuntes para un abordaje kantiano-constitutivista de las fuentes de la normatividad.” [Spanish; A Kantian journey through the Constructivist Scylla and realist Charybdis. Notes for a Kantian-Constitutivist approach of sources of normativity] Revista de Estudios Kantianos 1.2 (2016): 146-72. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article addresses the problem of the sources of normativity in the context of contemporary neo-Kantian disputes. Noting the limitations that the Constructivists and Realistic approaches show to reconstruct a faithful and solvent reading of Kantian ethics, the paper suggests an alternative line called constitutivist. This approach proposes a performative reading of Kant’s texts to defend the thesis that the Kantian normative sources lie in reflective constructions of mandates involving, at the same time, the realist assumption of the value of the idea of freedom. The moral would then stand in the self-constitution as an agent.
Flikschuh, Katrin. “The Arc of Personhood: Menkiti and Kant on Becoming and Being a Person.” Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2.3 (2016): 437-55. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article seeks to come to a better understanding of the account of normative personhood given by the Nigerian philosopher Ifeyani Menkiti by engaging it with that of Kant. The idea is not to adjudicate between the two accounts, but to explore the philosophical possibilities and constraints in both. I focus on the moral significance of the afterlife in each account. I engage Kant’s doctrine of the postulates in support of Menkiti’s defense of belief in this-worldly ancestral existence and evaluate Kant’s moral commitment to belief in the immortality of the soul in the light of Menkiti’s more social conception of the afterlife. I close with some comments on the general need for greater cross-cultural philosophical engagement.
Flynn, Thomas R. “Kant and Sartre: Psychology and Metaphysics: The Quiet Power of the Imaginary.” Comparing Kant and Sartre. Ed. Sorin Baiasu (op cit.). 62-76. [M]
Fonnesu, Luca. “ Zwischen Wissen und Glauben: Moralität und Religion bei Kant und Fichte.” Fichte-Studien 43 (2016): 128-44. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article deals with the relationship between morality and religion in Kant’s and Fichte’s thought. These two spheres are carefully distinguished by Kant: the knowledge of moral law as genuine conviction has a completely different status than religious faith, and the certainty of faith is just a “moral” certainty, which derives from a need. In the years of Jena Fichte stresses the immediate, active dimension of conviction, which characterizes also the conscience. In the writings of the dispute concerning atheism this conviction of the conscience implies the absolute certainty of the faith: the voice of the conscience is identified with faith.
Forgione, Luca. “Kant and Natural Kind Terms.” Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 31.1 (2016): 55-72. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: As is well known, the linguistic/philosophical reflection on natural kind terms has undergone a remarkable development in the early seventies with Putnam and Kripke’s essentialist approaches, touching upon different aspects (metaphysical and epistemological in particular) of Kant’s slant. Preliminarily, however, it might be useful to review some of the theoretical stages in Locke and Leibniz’s approaches on natural kind terms in the light of contemporary reflections, to eventually pinpoint Kant’s contribution and see how some commentators have placed it within the theory of direct reference. Starting with textual evidence even from the logical corpus, in the present essay I will attempt to discuss some of the arguments dismissing Kant’s adherence to this view. These assume that in his approach to the semantics of natural kind terms, Kant appears to be still holding on to a nominalist/conceptualist position, though he seems to be well aware of a few key issues for the theorists of direct reference.
Forman, David. “Kant’s Moderate Cynicism and the Harmony between Virtue and Worldly Happiness.” Journal of the History of Philosophy 54.1 (2016): 75-109. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: For Kant, any authentic moral demands are wholly distinct from the demands of prudence. This has led critics to complain that Kantian moral demands are incompatible with our human nature as happiness-seekers. To address this worry, Kant would need to show us that aiming at morality does not require us to abandon our hope for happiness in this life. This paper argues that Kant — building on insights from Rousseau that Kant identifies with Cynicism — offers an account of a harmony between virtue and worldly happiness that can sustain such a hope.
Fracalossi, Ivanilde. “Os 'paradoxos' da Crítica do juízo e a interação entre o gosto e o gênio.” [Portuguese; The ‘paradoxes’ of the Critique of Judgment and the interaction between taste and genius] Kant e-Prints 11.2 (2016): 17-31. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to examine and to demonstrate that what founds the judgments of taste and makes them legitimate is exactly what seems to be more paradoxical in the Kantian aesthetics, in other words, the so-called „nonsense‟ that Kant makes use in the Critique of Judgment and of which each of the logical moments of "analytic of the beautiful" talks about, namely: aesthetic judgment, finality without purpose, subjective universality, lawless legality. And in the second part of the text to assess how the reconciliation occurs promoted by the genius between two distinct elements: art and nature.
Franceschet, Antonio. “The International Criminal Court’s Authority Crisis and Kant’s Political Ethics.” International Criminal Law Review 16.2 (2016): 201-15. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The International Criminal Court (ICC) faces a profound authority crisis. This article explores the underlying conditions and ethical implications of this crisis in light of Immanuel Kant’s (1724–1804) political theory. The ICC’s authority crisis is twofold: First, having been constructed as a purely legal actor, the Court’s inevitable role in politics has undermined perceptions of its legitimacy. Second, having been constructed as a supranational substitute for domestic legal authority, the ICC has been subverted by other, political branches of the state, such as the executive. These problems have been particularly salient in Africa where states have vociferously challenged the Court’s investigations and prosecutions. Kantian political ethics show that the ICC’s authority crisis is an intractable moral problem that must be addressed collectively and coercively by sovereign states acting upon a larger, cosmopolitan duty to enforce universal rights.
Franco, Paul L. “On Nathaniel Goldberg’s Kantian Conceptual Geography.” Critique (blog posted: 24 Aug 2016) n.p. [PW] [online]
Friebe, Cord. Rev. of Manifest Reality: Kant’s Idealism and his Realism., by Lucy Allais (2015). Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 98.4 (2016): 369-72. [PW]
Frierson, Patrick. “Kantian Feeling: Empirical Psychology, Transcendental Critique, and Phenomenology.” Con-Textos Kantianos 3 (2016): 353-71. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper explores the relationship between empirical psychology, transcendental critique, and phenomenology in Kant’s discussion of respect for the moral law, particularly as that is found in the Critique of Practical Reason. I first offer an empirical-psychological reading of moral respect, in the context of which I distinguish transcendental and empirical perspectives on moral action and defend H. J. Paton’s claim that moral motivation can be seen from two points of view, where “from one point of view, [respect] is the cause of our action, but from another point of view the moral law is its ground.” Then, after a discussion of a distinction between first- and second-order transcendental/practical perspectives where reasons for action are first-order practical judgments while the conditions of possibility for those reasons’ authority are expressed in second-order judgments, I turn to a third kind of perspective: the properly phenomenological one. I explain the general notion of Kantian phenomenology with an example of the experience of time from Kant’s Anthropology before applying this to a phenomenological reading of the discussion of respect in the Critique of Practical Reason. I end by noting that on my account, in contrast to that of Jeanine Grenberg, the distinctive phenomenology of respect is not systematically important for grounding claims in moral philosophy.
Frierson, Patrick. “Towards a Transcendental Critique of Feeling (A Response to Grenberg).” Con-Textos Kantianos 3 (2016): 381-90. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper focuses on responding to Jeanine Grenberg’s claim that my discussion of Kant’s feeling of respect leaves no meaningful room for investigating feeling first-personally. I first make clear that I do think that feelings can be investigated first-personally, both in that they can be prospective reasons for action and in that – at least in Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment – there are feelings that we should have (for aesthetic reasons). I then show that at the time of writing the “Incentives” chapter of the second Critique, Kant had not yet determined an a priori basis for aesthetic (or affective) normativity. On this basis, I argue that the “Incentives” chapter provides a sort of consolation prize for not (yet) having an transcendental account of feeling. In that sense, it’s a properly transcendental analysis of feeling in which Kant examines feeling from within and a priori to show that there are good (moral) reasons to have certain feelings. I end by acknowledging the extent to which, on this reading, I agree with Grenberg that Kant is doing a transcendentally significant form of phenomenology here, while I also highlight some remaining areas of disagreement.
Frilli, Guido. Rev. of La raison des normes. Essai zur Kant, by Jean-François Kervégan (2015). [Italian] Studi Kantiani 29 (2016): 197-200. [M]
Frketich, Elise. “Reinhold’s Elementarphilosophie: A Scholastic or Critical Philosophical System?” Kant Yearbook: Kant and German Idealism 8 (2016): 17-38. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Karl Leonhard Reinhold (1757–1823) is hailed as one of the most influential thinkers of early post-Kantian philosophy. He is best known for popularising critical philosophy through his Letters on the Kantian Philosophy, first published in the Teutsche Merkur (1786), and for restructuring it into a kind of axiomatic-deductive system in the Elementarphilosophie (1789–1794). An axiomatic-deductive system is based on one or several self-evident principles from which all subsequent principles are deduced. Reinhold’s restructuring of Kant’s critical project was highly influential for Fichte and the early Schelling, and thus, for the transition from Kantian critical philosophy to German Idealism. Most Reinhold scholars interpret the system of the Elementarphilosophie as belonging to the pre-critical tradition. Counter to this view, I consider the possibility that Reinhold was influenced by the idea of a philosophical system put forth by Kant in the Architectonic. I proceed by first discussing Kant’s criteria of both a pre-critical and a critical system, before assessing which the Elementarphilosophie can best be described as. I conclude that although Reinhold’s system is more adequately classified as a critical than as a pre-critical system, it must ultimately be viewed as something new.
Fugate, Courtney David. “‘With a Philosophical Eye’: The Role of Mathematical Beauty in Kant’s Intellectual Development.” Kant: Studies on Mathematics in the Critical Philosophy. Eds. Emily Carson and Lisa Shabel (op cit.). 241-270. [M]
——. “Kant and Leibniz on Negative Magnitudes.” Estudos Kantianos 4.2 (2016): 149-68. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This essay argues that Kant’s standpoint in the essay Negative Magnitudes is not essentially different from that of Leibniz. Rather, if seen in the context of Kant’s views on the nature of the divine being and its grounding relation to the essences of created things in the same period, it becomes clear that Kant here comes closer to Leibniz’s original views than did Wolff or his followers. On this basis, the essay argues that the prevailing view of Negative Magnitudes as marking a turn from rationalism to empiricism is mistaken. Moreover, the article shows and analyses some significant elements of continuity of Kant’s Essay on the Negative Magnitudes with both the New Elucidation and the Only Possible Argument.
——. “Reply to Huaping Lu-Adler.” Critique (blog posted: 23 Oct 2016) n.p. [PW] [online]
Fulda, Hans Friedrich. “Kants „Kategorien der Freiheit“ in rein praktischer, pragmatischer und technisch-praktischer Funktion.” Die “Kategorien der Freiheit” in Kants praktischer Philosophie. Ed. Stephan Zimmermann (op cit.). 247-68. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper considers the relation in which the „categories of freedom“ that Kant systematically presents in the Critique of Practical Reason, stand to Kant’s general distinction between the purely practical (or moral), the pragmatic and the technical-practical. The thesis is that this distinction is indeed preserved also in the context of the doctrine of the categories of freedom; they, or individuals among them, perform different functions. For reasons of space, I thereby focus on the fourth quadrant in Kant’s table of categories, in other words on the categories of modality. Although these categories are, as I argue, to be considered primarily in their purely practical, i.e. moral function, prior to this consideration, they are to be interpreted initially in and of themselves. Moreover, under additional prerequisites that include the empirical, they also have a pragmatic and a technical-practical function.
Gadris, Stelios. “Two Cases of Irony: Kant and Wittgenstein.” Kant-Studien 107.2 (2016): 343-68. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper, I propose that Kant’s Träume eines Geistersehers, erläutert durch Träume der Metaphysik (TG) and Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico–Philosophicus (TLP) be read as ironic texts. I will argue that both Kant and Wittgenstein deliberately deploy a literary device, i.e. irony, in order to express their ambiguous attitudes towards metaphysics and philosophy. Both texts are to be regarded as critiques of metaphysics; nevertheless, they stop short of straightforwardly rejecting metaphysics. Irony thus captures the love-hate attitude held by Kant and Wittgenstein toward philosophy. Irony might even serve as a means of critique of philosophy; it might serve as a self-reflexive and self-critical activity for both Kant and Wittgenstein – perhaps as a means of catharsis for their (empty) aspirations for metaphysical knowledge. Irony, however, preserves the possibility of an incomprehensible metaphysical insight (for Kant) or an ineffable metaphysical feeling (for Wittgenstein). This feeling constantly eludes our understanding (Kant) and language (Wittgenstein). I will argue that irony resides in the concept of a Kantian pre-critical symbol. In its multiple significances, the concept of a symbol preserves the possibility of a multiplicity of meanings. Thus irony finds shelter within this multiplicity. In this way, it can both deny and entertain the possibility of the revelation of a metaphysical picture over and above every given sign. Thus the sign becomes a symbol open to interpretation. Both the pre-critical Kant and the Wittgenstein of the TLP were held captive by such a metaphysical picture. I will conclude that the critiques of pure reason (Kant) and language (Wittgenstein) presuppose a critique of the symbolic pictures that held Kant and Wittgenstein captive.
García Ferrer, Soledad. “The Concept of Work in some of Kant’s Shorter Writings.” Kant’s Shorter Writings: Critical Paths Outside the Critiques. Eds. Rafael V. Orden Jiménez, Robert Hanna, Robert Louden, Jacinto Rivera de Rosales, and Nuria Sánchez Madrid (op cit.). 372-84. [M]
Gardner, Sebastian. “German Idealism, Classical Pragmatism, and Kant’s Third Critique.” Pragmatism, Kant, and Transcendental Philosophy. Eds. Gabriele Gava and Robert Stern (op cit.). 22-45. [M]
——. “Kant's Third Critique: The Project of Unification.” Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements 78 (2016): 161-85. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper offers a synoptic view of Kant's Critique of the Power of Judgement and its reception by the German Idealists. I begin by sketching Kant's conception of how its several parts fit together, and emphasize the way in which the specifically moral motivation of Kant's project of unification of Freedom and Nature distances it from our contemporary philosophical concerns. For the German Idealists, by contrast, the CPJ's conception of the opposition of Freedom and Nature as defining the overarching task of philosophy provides a warrant and basis for bold speculative programmes. The German Idealist development therefore presupposes Kant's failure in the CPJ to resolve the problem of the relation of Freedom and Nature. What is fundamentally at issue in the argument between Kant and his successors is the question of the correct conception of philosophical systematicity and in this context I reconstruct Kant's defence of his claim to philosophical finality.
——. “On Omri Boehm’s Kant’s Critique of Spinoza.” Critique (blog posted: 26 Dec 2016) n.p. [PW] [online]
Gasperoni, Lidia. Versinnlichung. Kants transzendentaler Schematismus und seine Revision in der Nachfolge · Actus et Imago. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2016. [x, 349 p.] [WC]
——. “Möglichkeitsräume entwerfen. Eine Re-Aktualisierung der Kantischen Philosophie für die heutige Architektur.” Con-Textos Kantianos 4 (2016): 252-86. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The present paper aims to propose an application of the Kantian philosophy to architectural design in particular according to Kant's critique of construction and his distinction of different dimensions of perception and thinking. The paper will do this in three steps: firstly I will explain the method of investigation, which allows to consider some questions concerning design in architecture from a Kantian point of view. Secondly I will present some references to Kant within the work of architects like Oswald Mathias Ungers, Otl Aicher and Lars Spuybroek. In the third part I will apply Kant’s theory of Schematism and construction to architecture, in order to develop the notion of spaces of possibility within architectural design, underlining the relevance of a transcendental philosophy of architecture.
——. Rev. of Kant’s Lectures on Anthropology. A Critical Guide, edited by Alix Cohen (2014). Estudos Kantianos 4.2 (2016): 209-13. [M] [online]
——. “Antinomie, Sprache und Fiktion. Ein Vergleich zwischen Kant, Maimon und Herder.” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 72.2-3 (2016): 383-99. [PW]
Gaudet, Pascal. Qu'est-ce que la philosophie? Recherche kantienne. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2016. [85 p.] [WC]
Gaukroger, Stephen. “Kant and the Nature of Matter: Mechanics, Chemistry, and the Life Sciences.” Studies in History & Philosophy of Science, Part A 58 (2016): 108-14. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant believed that the ultimate processes that regulate the behavior of material bodies can be characterized exclusively in terms of mechanics. In 1790, turning his attention to the life sciences, he raised a potential problem for his mechanically-based account, namely that many of the operations described in the life sciences seemed to operate teleologically. He argued that the life sciences do indeed require us to think in teleological terms, but that this is a fact about us, not about the processes themselves. Nevertheless, even were we to concede his account of the life sciences, this would not secure the credentials of mechanics as a general theory of matter. Hardly any material properties studied in the second half of the eighteenth century were, or could have been, conceived in mechanical terms. Kant's concern with teleology is tangential to the problems facing a general matter theory grounded in mechanics, for the most pressing issues have nothing to do with teleology. They derive rather from a lack of any connection between mechanical forces and material properties. This is evident in chemistry, which Kant dismisses as being unscientific on the grounds that it cannot be formulated in mechanical terms.
——, and Dalia Nassar. “Introduction: Kant and the empirical sciences.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Part A 58 (2016): 55-56. [PW]
Gava, Gabriele. “The Fallibilism of Kant’s Architectonic.” Pragmatism, Kant, and Transcendental Philosophy. Eds. Gabriele Gava and Robert Stern (op cit.). 46-66. [M]
——, and Robert Stern, eds. Pragmatism, Kant, and Transcendental Philosophy. New York: Routledge, 2016. [viii, 297 p.] [M] [review]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Essays by Sebastian Gardner (German Idealism, Classical Pragmatism, and Kant’s Third Critique), Gabriele Gava (The Fallibilism of Kant’s Architectonic), David Macarthur (A Kant-Inspired Vision of Pragmatism as Democratic Experimentalism), Cheryl Misak (Peirce, Kant, and What We Must Assume), Daniel Herbert (Peirce and the Final Opinion: Against Apel's Transcendental Interpretation of the Categories), Jean-Marie Chevalier (Forms of Reasoning as Conditions of Possibility: Peirce's Transcendental Inquiry Concerning Inductive Knowledge), Marcus Willaschek (Kant and Peirce on Belief), Robert Stern (Round Kant or Through Him? On James's Arguments for Freedom, and Their Relation to Kant's), Graham Bird (Consciousness in Kant and William James), James R. O'Shea (Concepts of Objects as Prescribing Laws: A Kantian and Pragmatist Line of Thought), Sami Pihlstrom (Subjectivity as Negativity and as a Limit: On the Metaphysics and Ethics of the Transcendental Self, Pragmatically Naturalized), Wolfgang Khlmann (A Plea for Transcendental Philosophy), and Boris Rahme (Transcendental Arguments, Epistemically Constrained Truth, and Moral Discourse).
Gazga, Alfonso. “El papel de la violencia civil dentro de la heurística teleológica en la Crítica de la facultad de juzgar.” [Spanish; The Role of Civil Violence in Teleological Heuristic of Kant´s Critique of Judgement] Con-Textos Kantianos 3 (2016): 256-73. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper I will analyze the characterization of civil violence as it appears developed by Kant in the Critique of the faculty of judgment and his 1798 essay “A renewed attempt to answer the question: “Is the human race continually improving?”. I firstly defend the need to expressly attend to the regulatory-prescriptive nature of the teleological judgment as shown in the third Critique, with the express purpose of showing the scope of such judgmental mode in teleological understanding of nature. In a second stage I develop an interpretation of the role of civil violence inside the teleological understanding of nature as a foster culture instance. Finally, I argue that for Kant not all civil violence is justified or supports to be legitimately integrated into the “teleological story” of nature when such story is referred to future events; in the latter case, the only legitimate violence is that which has the express aim of socially enhance individual freedom.
Geis, Robert. “A Failed Point in Kant: Boundary, Indivisibility, Fluxion, and the A Priori Form of Space.” International Philosophical Quarterly 56.4 (2016): 445-67. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: A critical flaw in Kant, hitherto unremarked in the literature, is our focus here. Kant’s doctrine of the a priori form of space as a condition for human experience and that of space as a fluxion makes impossible experiences of objects that he admits constitute human awareness. Imaginative synthesis in accord with the categories provides Kant no egress from this difficulty. The Kantian critical project does not account for how we experience and for this reason fails at what it attempts, viz., a metaphysic of knowledge.
Gentile, Andrea. Rev. of Comprehensive Commentary on Kant’s Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason, by Stephen Palmquist (2016). [Italian] Studi Kantiani 29 (2016): 201-4. [M]
Gillessen, Jens. “Kants ethischer Kohärentismus.” Kant-Studien 107.4 (2016): 651-80. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In ethics, deductivism strives for self-evident premises as a foundation for normative claims, whereas coherentism seeks moral justification in relations between abstract normative claims and moral judgments. While Immanuel Kant is still widely believed to have pursued a deductivist project, the article contends that he endeavored to justify his moral philosophy in general, and the Categorical Imperative in particular, in the coherentist manner that has since been advocated by John Rawls. First, the characteristics of Rawls’s method of reflective equilibrium are summarized and traced within Kant’s writings. The resulting coherentist interpretation is then defended against the opposing view that Kant’s appeal to the ‘fact of reason’ proves his adherence to ethical intuitionism.
Gilli, Franco. Rev. of Ragione pratica. Kant, Reinhold, Fichte, by Marco Ivaldo (2012). [Italian] Studi Kantiani 29 (2016): 222-23. [M]
Ginsborg, Hannah. The Role of Taste in Kant’s Theory of Cognition. Abingdon/New York: Routledge, 2016. [ix, 225 p.] [WC]
Girottie, Armando. Kant. Bologna: Diogene Multimedia, 2016. [179 p.] [WC]
Gjesdal, Kristin, ed. Debates in Nineteenth Century European Philosophy: Essential Readings and Contemporary Responses. New York: Routledge, 2016. [xxi, 393 p.] [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Note: See the essays by Rolf-Peter Horstmann (The reception of the Critique of Pure Reason in German idealism) and Paul Guyer (The reception of the Critique of Pure Reason in German idealism: a response to Rolf-Peter Horstmann).
Goldberg, Nathaniel. “Reply to Paul Franco.” Critique (blog posted: 25 Aug 2016) n.p. [PW] [online]
——. Rev. of The Poverty of Conceptual Truth: Kant’s Analytic/Synthetic Distinction and the Limits of Metaphysics, by R. Lanier Anderson (2015). Kantian Review 21.1 (2016): 146-51. [PI]
Golob, Sacha. “Kant as Both Conceptualist and Nonconceptualist.” Kantian Review 21.3 (2016): 367-91. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article advances a new account of Kant’s views on conceptualism. On the one hand, I argue that Kant was a nonconceptualist. On the other hand, my approach accommodates many motivations underlying the conceptualist reading of his work: for example, it is fully compatible with the success of the Transcendental Deduction. I motivate my view by providing a new analysis of both Kant’s theory of perception and of the role of categorical synthesis: I look in particular at the categories of quantity. Locating my interpretation in relation to recent research by Allais, Ginsborg, Tolley and others, I argue that it offers an attractive compromise on this important theoretical and exegetical issue.
——. “Why the Transcendental Deduction is Compatible with Nonconceptualism.” Kantian Nonconceptualism. Ed. Dennis Schulting (op cit.). 27-52. [PW]
——. “On Sorin Baiasu’s Kant and Sartre: Re-Discovering Critical Ethics.” Critique (blog posted: 19 Sep 2016) n.p. [PW] [online]
Gomes, Anil. “Unity, Objectivity, and the Passivity of Experience.” European Journal of Philosophy 24.4 (2016): 946-69. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the section ‘Unity and Objectivity’ of The Bounds of Sense, P. F. Strawson argues for the thesis that unity of consciousness requires experience of an objective world. My aim in this essay is to evaluate this claim. In the first and second parts of the essay, I explicate Strawson's thesis, reconstruct his argument, and identify the point at which the argument fails. Strawson's discussion nevertheless raises an important question: are there ways in which we must think of our experiences if we are to self-ascribe them? In the third part of the essay, I use Kant's remarks concerning the passivity of experience to suggest one answer to this question: in self-ascribing experiences, we must be capable of thinking of them as passive to their objects. This can be used to provide an alternative route from unity to objectivity.
——. Rev. of Manifest Reality: Kant’s Idealism and his Realism, by Lucy Allais (2015). Journal of Philosophy 113.2 (2016): 112-16. [PW]
—— and Andrew Stephenson. “On the Relation of Intuition to Cognition.” Kantian Nonconceptualism. Ed. Dennis Schulting (op cit.). 53-79. [PW]
González Fisac, Jesús. “Enlightenment as a Philosophical Drama: Kant and Foucault on the Political Field.” Kant’s Shorter Writings: Critical Paths Outside the Critiques. Eds. Rafael V. Orden Jiménez, Robert Hanna, Robert Louden, Jacinto Rivera de Rosales, and Nuria Sánchez Madrid (op cit.). 322-42. [M]
Goria, Giulio. Rev. of Zur Bedeutung des Begriffs Ontologie bei Kant. Eine entwicklugsgeschichtliche Untersuchung, by Gabriel Rivero (2014).] [Italian Con-Textos Kantianos 3 (2016): 503-7. [M] [online]
——. Rev. of Zur Bedeutung des Begriffs Ontologie bei Kant. Eine entwicklungsgeschichtliche Untersuchung, by Gabriel Rivero (2014). [Italian] Con-Textos Kantianos 3 (2016): 503-7. [M] [online]
Gottlieb, Gabriel. Rev. of The Palgrave Handbook of German Idealism, edited by Matthew C. Altman (2014). British Journal for the History of Philosophy 24.6 (2016): 1204-13. [M]
Goy, Ina. “Momente der Freiheit.” Die “Kategorien der Freiheit” in Kants praktischer Philosophie. Ed. Stephan Zimmermann (op cit.). 149-73. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Among the most important controversies about the form and content of the „Table of the Categories of Freedom“ are the questions, first, what this table is about; second, if the categories of freedom have moral content or if they can be morally indifferent; and third, if the categories of freedom are a priori unconditioned or a posteriori conditioned concepts. I will argue, first, that the categories of freedom thematise particular aspects of determining grounds of human actions and man’s voluntary treatment of these determining grounds. Second, they are determining grounds of human actions „with respect to the concepts of the good and evil“, that is, they do have good or evil moral content and cannot be morally indifferent. And third, all categories of freedom thematise aspects of determining grounds of human actions under empirical conditions in their relation to the unconditioned: the practical law (which is itself not part of the table of the categories of freedom) and the generation of moral contents (the concepts of good and evil which are derived from the practical law).
Graham, Gordon. “Nature, Kant, and God .” Faith and Philosophy 33.2 (2016): 163-78. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper draws on some lines of thought in Kant’s Critique of Judgment to construct an aesthetic counterpart to the moral argument for the existence of God that Kant formulates in the Critique of Practical Reason. The paper offers this aesthetic version as a theistic way of explaining how the natural world can be thought valuable independently of human desires and purposes. It further argues that such an argument must commend itself to anyone who is as deeply committed to the preservation of nature as to the promotion of justice.
Granado Almena, Víctor. Rev. of Kant and International Relations Theory. Cosmopolitan Community-Building, by Dora Ion (2012). [Spanish] Con-Textos Kantianos 3 (2016): 508-13. [M] [online]
Grapotte, Sophie. Rev. of Kant’s Lectures on Ethics. A Critical Guide, edited by by Lara Denis and Oliver Sensen (2015). Estudos Kantianos 4.2 (2016): 203-8. [M] [online]
——. Rev. of Immanuel Kant, Natural Science, edited by Eric Watkins (2012). [French] Kant-Studien 107.2 (2016): 396-400. [PW]
Greenberg, Robert. The Bounds of Freedom: Kant’s Causal Theory of Action. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2016. [150 p.] [WC]
Grenberg, Jeanine M. “Response to Frierson’s “Kantian Feeling: Empirical Psychology, Transcendental Critique and Phenomenology”.” Con-Textos Kantianos 3 (2016): 372-80. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper, I reject Frierson’s interpretation of Kantian reductionist phenomenology. I diagnose his failure to articulate a more robust notion of phenomenology in Kant as traceable to a misguided effort to protect pure reason from the undue influence of sensibility. But in fact Kant himself relies regularly on a phenomenological and felt first personal perspective in his practical philosophy. Once we think more broadly about what Frierson calls “the space of reasons,” we must admit a robust role for attentive reflection upon felt, phenomenological experience at the center of Kantian practical deliberation.
——. Rev. of Kant’s Empirical Psychology, by Patrick R. Frierson (2014). Kantian Review 21.1 (2016): 130-37. [PI]
Grüne, Stefanie. “Sensible Synthesis and the Intuition of Space.” Kantian Nonconceptualism. Ed. Dennis Schulting (op cit.). 81-98. [PW]
——. “Allais on Intuitions and the Objective Reality of the Categories.” European Journal of Philosophy 24.1 (2016): 241-52. [PW]
Grzeliński, Adam, and Tomasz Kupś. “The Research on Kant’s Philosophy in the Institute of Philosophy at Nicolaus Copernicus University, Torun, Poland.” Con-Textos Kantianos 4 (2016): 184-87. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The paper shortly summarizes the research on the philosophy of Kant in the Institute of Philosophy at the Nicolaus Copernicus University (Toruń, Poland). About 30 years ago professor Mirosław Żelazny with a group of collaborators started their research which focuses on three main topics: the reconstruction of Kant’s philosophical system against the background of eighteenth-century German philosophy, historical investigation into its reception in Poland, and the translation of Kant’s works. One of the greatest achievements are the source investigations and the discovery of some unknown manuscripts, the first Polish edition of the “Collected Works of Immanuel Kant” and several monographies on various aspects of Kant’s thought. The paper also stresses the importance of international collaboration with eminent Kant scholars from Germany and Eastern Europe for the projects carried out in Toruń.
Guevara, Juan Felipe. “El malestar kantiano. Filosofía y ciencia al encuentro con la naturaleza.” [Spanish; The Kantian Discontent. Philosophy and Science Meet Nature] Revista de Estudios Kantianos 1.2 (2016): 174-90. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The concept of nature is very problematic in Kant’s critical philosophy because, on the one hand, it denotes a mechanically determinable passive entity that, on the other hand, introduces a productive character that may only be grasped through reflection. This ambiguity in the concept of nature has facilitated the emergence of recent interpretations that claim to find in Kant’s philosophy some sort of naturalizing enterprise or that it is susceptible of being naturalized. However, it is my aim in the present article to use the said ambiguity to show the problems that arise when we take this kind of interpretations seriously and prepare the ground for a concept of nature that allows the encounter between philosophy and science.
Gutiérrez Aguilar, Ricardo. “Immanuel Kant sobre la redención de los ejemplos y la vida buena en la Methodenlehre (KpV).” [Spanish; “Immanuel Kant on Redemption through Examples and on Good Life in the Methodenlehre (KpV)”] Con-Textos Kantianos 3 (2016): 188-209. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The present article has its aim in some ancillary Kantian considerations about how examples should be used in the context of his philosophy, either in the speculative or the practical application in which reason itself engages. The argument is set parting from the general conception on examples and illustrations according to Kant’s first Critique – a conception that deems them as utterly irrelevant – and tries to make a turning point and respond in the fashion of a correction based on the apparent utility examples have in the Doctrine of Method of KpV, an utility confronted with remarks found in the Trascendental Doctrine of Method of the first Critique. It will be intended to make plausible the thesis by means of which exempla would have a similar and fundamental role to empirical intuitions, but practicalwise.
——. Rev. of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction. An Analytical-Historical Commentary, by Henry E. Allison (2015). [Spanish] Con-Textos Kantianos 4 (2016): 351-56. [M] [online]
Gutschmidt, Holger. “Depositum. Ein Fall moralischer Zuschreibung bei Immanuel Kant.” Kant-Studien 107.2 (2016): 369-88. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this contribution, the author develops a new interpretation of Immanuel Kant’s casuistic example in the Critique of Practical Reason, where Kant considers whether there are circumstances in which it would be permissible to embezzle a deposit. For this purpose, the author discusses two recently published articles on the subject by Konrad Cramer (1999) and Jens Timmermann (2003) and gives an explanation of how Kant’s maxim test should be understood. The contribution also reveals that Kant’s analysis of this case is fully justifiable.
Guyer, Paul. Virtues of Freedom: Selected Essays on Kant. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016. [xxii, 314 p.] [WC] [review]
Note: This is a collection of sixteen essays, three previously unpublished, and two that were originally published in German and now appearing in English translation:
1. “Kant, Autonomy, and Modernity.” Not previously published.
2. “Is and Ought: From Hume to Kant, and Now.” Previously published in German translation as “Ist und Soll: Von Hume bis Kant, und nun.” In Heiner F. Klemme, ed., Kant und die Zukunft der Aufklärung. Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 2009. pp. 210–32.
3. “Freedom as the Foundation of Morality: Kant’s Early Efforts.” In Susan Meld Shell and Richard E. Velkley, eds, Kant’s Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime and the Notes on the “Observations”: A Critical Guide. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012. pp. 77–98.
4. “Freedom and the Essential Ends of Humankind.” Kant und die Philosophie in Weltbürgerlicher Ansicht: Akten des XI. Internationaler Kant Kongress. Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 2013. Vol. 1, pp. 229–44.
5. “Kantian Perfectionism.” In Lawrence Jost and Julian Wuerth, eds., Perfecting Virtue: New Essays on Kantian Ethics and Virtue Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. pp. 194–214.
6. “Setting and Pursuing Ends: Internal and External Freedom.” Not previously published.
7. “Freedom, Ends, and Duties in the Vigilantius Notes.” In Lara Denis and Oliver Sensen, eds., Kant’s Lectures on Ethics: A Critical Guide. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015. pp. 187–204.
8. “The Proof-Structure of the Groundwork and the Role of Section III.” Previously published in German translation as “Die Beweisstruktur der Grundlegung und die Rolle des dritten Abschnittes.” In Dieter Schönecker, ed., Kants Begründung von Freiheit und Moral in Grundlegung III. Münster: Mentis Verlag, 2015. pp. 111–37.
9. “Proving Ourselves Free.” In Valerio Rhoden, Ricardo R. Terra, Guido de Almeida, and Margit Ruffing, eds., Recht und Frieden in der Philosophie Kants: Akten des X. International Kant Kongresses. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2008. Vol. 1 (Hauptvorträge). pp. 115–37.
10. “Problems with Freedom: Kant’s Argument in Groundwork III and its Subsequent Emendations.” In Jens Timmerman, ed., Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: A Critical Guide. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. pp. 176–202.
11. “Natural and Rational Belief: Kant’s Final Words?” Not previously published.
12. “A Passion for Reason: Hume, Kant, and the Motivation for Morality.” Presidential Address, Eastern Division, American Philosophical Association, 2011. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 86/2 (2012): 4–21.
13. “The Obligation to be Virtuous: Kant’s Conception of the Tugendverpflichtung.” Social Philosophy and Policy 27 (2010): 206–32; also in book form in Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller, Jr., and Jeffrey Paul, eds., Moral Obligation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 206–32.
14. “Moral Feelings in the Metaphysics of Morals.” In Lara Denis, ed., Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals: A Critical Guide. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. pp. 130–51. German version: “Kant über moralische Gefühle: Von den Vorlesungen zur Metaphysik der Sitten.” In Werner Euler and Burkhard Tuschling, eds., Kant’s “Metaphysik der Sitten” in der Diskussion. Berlin: Dunker & Humblot, 2013. pp. 177–210.
15. “Examples of Moral Possibility.” In Klas Roth and Chris W. Surprenant, eds., Kant and Education: Interpretations and Commentary. London: Routledge, 2011. pp. 124–38.
16. “Kantian Communities: The Realm of Ends, the Ethical Community, and the Highest Good.” In Charlton Payne and Lucas Thorpe, eds., Kant and the Concept of Community, North American Kant Society Studies in Philosophy 9. Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2011. pp. 88–120.
——. “The Twofold Morality of Recht: Once More Unto the Breach.” Kant-Studien 107.1 (2016): 34-63. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Authors such as Allen Wood and Marcus Willaschek continue to argue that Kant’s doctrine of right is “independent” of or “freestanding” from his moral theory, as Thomas Pogge earlier put it. I argue that some of the recent arguments in behalf of this position repeat mistakes made by Johann Gottlieb Fichte before Kant had even published his own doctrine of right, and depend upon confusing his account of moral obligation with his account of morally estimable motivation. In particular, I argue that on Kant’s moral theory perfect duties, generally duties of omission, must be fulfilled regardless of motivation, even though agents earn moral esteem only for fulfilling even these duties out of respect for the moral law, and that this requirement is what creates the conceptual space for duties of right as part of rather than independent from Kant’s moral theory.
. “Arguing for Transcendental Idealism: Lucy Allais on Manifest Reality.” Kantian Review 21.2 (2016): 261-72. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: I endorse Allais’s ‘moderate metaphysical’ approach to transcendental idealism, but find tension between her concept of ‘manifest reality’ and her relational interpretation of the doctrine. And I think her reconstruction of Kant’s argument for transcendental idealism fails to block the famous ‘missing alternative’ objection, although in my view Kant’s fundamental argument for the position was intended precisely to block such an objection.
. “The Reception of the Critique of Pure Reason in German Idealism: A Response to Rolf-Peter Horstmann.” Debates in Nineteenth Century European Philosophy: Essential Readings and Contemporary Responses. Ed. Kristin Gjesdal (op cit.). 19-32. [M]
. “Kant’s Politics of Freedom.” Ratio Juris 29.3 (2016): 427-32. [PI]
. Rev. of Art and Ethics in a Material World: Kant’s Pragmatist Legacy, by Jennifer A. McMahon (2014). British Journal of Aesthetics 56.2 (2016): 212-15. [PW]
Hahmann, Andree. “What Leibniz missed - or Kant misread? Kant’s critique of Leibnizian metaphysics in light of two recent interpretations.” Estudos Kantianos 4.2 (2016): 169-88. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper is devoted to the Kantian critique of Leibnizian metaphysics provided in the so-called amphiboly chapter of Kant’s Critique of pure Reason. Contrary to two recent interpretations, the paper stresses the special role of the transcendental aesthetics for a proper understanding of Kant’s critique of his predecessors. The paper is divided into three sections. First, the it addresses Langton’s view on the intrinsic properties of substance and things in themselves. Second, the relationship between Kant’s pre-critical and critical philosophy is discussed. The third section draws attention to the community of substances and discusses Watkins’ influential interpretation of the Third Analogy of Experience.
Hall, Bryan. “Fichte and Kant on the Ground of Experience.” Contemporary Studies in Kantian Philosophy 1 (2016): 22-43. [M] [online]
Abstract: In the first of his two 1797 Introductions to the Wissenschaftslehre (IWL), Fichte claims there are only two options for understanding the ground of experience. Either experience is grounded on the side of the object as a thing in itself (dogmatism) or it is grounded on the side of the subject as an absolute ‘I’ (idealism) where both the thing in itself and the absolute ‘I’ are outside of experience. IWL was intended to introduce a new presentation of the Wissenschaftslehre, one that Fichte himself did not publish, entitled Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo (WLnm). Much as he did throughout his career, in WLnm, Fichte offers an impassioned defense of idealism. The correct way of understanding Fichte’s idealism, however, has been a subject of fierce debate.
In this paper, I consider two competing views: (1) the Realist view: the absolute 'I' exists and serves as the real ground of experience (abbreviated ‘RV’); (2) the Fictionalist View: the absolute 'I' is only fictional but must be thought as the logical ground of experience (abbreviated ‘FV’). Claims invoking the absolute 'I' are not literally true, though they must be made within a certain domain of discourse, viz., a theoretical one concerning the ground of experience. Although one can find textual support for RV in the Wissenschaftslehre, I shall argue that there are significant interpretative and philosophical advantages to viewing both Kant and Fichte as committed to FV
——. “Reply to van den Berg, Edwards and Westphal.” Critique (blog posted: 2 Nov 2016) n.p. [PW] [online]
Hanisch, Christoph. “Kant on Democracy.” Kant-Studien 107.1 (2016): 64-88. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The first part of this paper analyzes Kant’s remarks on state forms. It is true that Kant uses the term “democracy” in a pre-modern sense, denoting a radical form of despotic sovereignty that is incompatible with representative government and the separation of powers. In addition, he makes clear that it is only in non-ideal conditions that the provisional standards of republican legitimacy are less stringent than those that apply in ideal circumstances. These qualifications notwithstanding, the first part concludes that Kant fails to consider a satisfying conception of democratic sovereignty. In the remainder of this paper, I first develop this criticism in terms of the neglect of procedural (in contrast to substantive) criteria of republican legitimacy in Kant: a public norm’s normative status is determined, partly but necessarily, by the procedures that led to its enactment. Second, I show that the multifarious aspects of the one innate right of humanity (independence, equality, the duty of rightful honor, etc.) provide sufficient grounds for identifying democratic procedures as non-optional features of a Kantian republic. Moreover, that the non-optionality of democratic sovereignty, on the one hand, and the validity of the normative limits put on democratic procedures and their outcomes in the form of individual rights, on the other, rest in the same normative source (viz. innate right) presents a promising way to overcome problems concerning the idea of democratic authority.
——, and Sorin Baiasu. “Constitutivism and Kantian Constructivism in Ethical Theory: Editorial Introduction.” Philosophia 44.4 (2016): 1125-28. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The introduction summarizes the main arguments formulated in the six papers of this special issue on Constitutivism and Kantian Constructivism in Ethical Theory. We highlight the unifying theme addressed in the essays, i.e., the question of whether constitutivism is able to fulfill the promise of providing an account of normativity starting from relatively slender assumptions, including the avoidance of realist presuppositions. [The six essays in this special issue were initially presented at the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) General Conference that took place at the University of Glasgow in September 2014. The papers collected here are revised versions of what was presented and discussed there under the aegis of the ECPR Standing Group on Kantian Political Thought.]
Hanke, Thomas. Rev. of Motivationen für das Selbst. Kant und Spinoza im Vergleich., edited by Anne Tilkorn (2012). Kant-Studien 107.1 (2016): 196-99. [M]
Hanna, Robert. “Kantian Madness: Blind Intuitions, Essentially Rogue Objects, Nomological Deviance, and Categorial Anarchy.” Contemporary Studies in Kantian Philosophy 1 (2016): 44-64. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant says that “appearances can certainly be given in intuition without functions of the understanding” (A90/B122) and also that “intuition by no means requires the functions of thinking” (A91/B123). This opens up the real possibility of what Kant calls “blind intuitions” (A71/B75), that is, empirical or a priori intuitions that represent objects without involving either empirical or a priori (categorial) concepts, and also the real possibility of what I call essentially rogue objects, that is, objectively real objects, veridically represented by empirical or a priori intuitions, that necessarily fall outside the scope of either empirical or categorial concepts. Correspondingly, the three-part purpose of this paper is, first, to spell out the basic issues at stake in the contemporary debate about Kant’s conceptualism vs. Kant’s non-conceptualism, second, to identify, compare, and contrast five different kinds of essentially rogue objects described by Kant in his Critical and post-Critical periods, and third, to explore the systematic significance and two profound implications of their nomological deviance and categorial anarchy for Kant’s metaphysics of transcendental idealism, and for his Critical philosophy more generally.
——. “Directions in Space, Non-Conceptual Form, and the Foundations of Transcendental Idealism.” Kant’s Shorter Writings: Critical Paths Outside the Critiques. Eds. Rafael V. Orden Jiménez, Robert Hanna, Robert Louden, Jacinto Rivera de Rosales, and Nuria Sánchez Madrid (op cit.). 2-19. [M]
——. “Kant, Natural Piety, and the Limits of Science.” Kant e-Prints 11.1 (2016): 1-18. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Although Kant‘s anti-mechanism has had a non-trivial impact in philosophical aesthetics and the philosophy of biology, an impact that in turn has been well-covered and well-studied in recent Kant-scholarship in those areas, this has not been, ironically enough, worked out in its specifically metaphysical implications, but instead only in either its history-of-ideas influence or its epistemological implications.
——. “Directions in Space, Nonconceptual Form and the Foundations of Transcendental Idealism.” Kantian Nonconceptualism. Ed. Dennis Schulting (op cit.). 99-115. [PW]
Head, Jonathan, Anna Tomaszewska, Jochen Bojanowski, Alberto Vanzo, and Sorin Baiasu. “Kant and Sartre: Existentialism and Critical Philosophy.” Comparing Kant and Sartre. Ed. Sorin Baiasu (op cit.). 3-18. [M]
Hedengren, Mary. Rev. of Kant and the Promise of Rhetoric, by Scott Stroud (2014). Rhetoric Review 35.4 (2016): 376-78. [PI]
Heidemann, Dietmar H. “Kant’s Aesthetic Nonconceptualism.” Kantian Nonconceptualism. Ed. Dennis Schulting (op cit.). 117-44. [PW]
——. “Schopenhauers Kritik an Kants Freiheitsantinomie und ihrer Auflösung.” Revista de Estudios Kantianos 1.1 (2016): 60-68. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Der Aufsatz zeigt, mit welchen Argumenten Schopenhauer Kants dritte als eine nur scheinbare Antinomie darzustellen versucht, die keiner Auflösung bedürfe. Die Prüfung dieser Argumente ergibt, dass Schopenhauers Lehre vom Ding an sich als freien Willen eine metaphysische Position repräsentiert, die Kant in der dritten Antinomie dem von ihm kritisierten transzendentalen Realismus zurechnen würde. Schopenhauers Kritik, Kant schließe in der Auflösung unrechtmäßig auf die Existenz des Dinges an sich als kausale Ursache der Erscheinung, erweist sich dabei als unzutreffend, und seine These vom unmittelbaren Bewusstsein der Freiheit des Willens als bloße Gegenbehauptung. Das heißt Schopenhauers grundsätzlich positive Adaption und Fortentwicklung der Kantischen Freiheitstheorie vermag gegen die Kantische Metaphysikkritik selbst nicht zu bestehen.
Heintel, Peter. Rev. of Kants transzendentale Dialektik. Zu ihrer systematischen Bedeutung, by Jannis Pissis (2012). [German] Kant-Studien 107.2 (2016): 411-13. [PW]
——. Rev. of Transzendentalphilosophie und die Kultur der Gegenwart, edited by Steffen Dietzsch and Udo Tietz (2012). Kant-Studien 107.3 (2016): 570-74. [PW]
Heis, Jeremy. “Kant (vs. Leibniz, Wolff and Lambert) on Real Definitions in Geometry.” Kant: Studies on Mathematics in the Critical Philosophy. Eds. Emily Carson and Lisa Shabel (op cit.). 87-112. [M]
Heit, Alexander. “Die Bedeutung des christlichen Rechtfertigungsgedankens für Kants Religionsphilosophie.” Bibelhermeneutik und dogmatische Theologie nach Kant. Eds. Harald Matern, Alexander Heit, and Enno Edzard Popkes (op cit.). 107-28. [M]
Helbig, Daniela, and Dalia Nassar. “The metaphor of epigenesis: Kant, Blumenbach and Herder.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Part A 58 (2016): 98-107. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Over the last few decades, the meaning of the scientific theory of epigenesis and its significance for Kant's critical philosophy have become increasingly central questions. Most recently, scholars have argued that epigenesis is a key factor in the development of Kant's understanding of reason as self-grounding and self-generating. Building on this work, our claim is that Kant appealed to not just any epigenetic theory, but specifically Johann Friedrich Blumenbach's account of generation, and that this appeal must be understood not only in terms of self-organization, but also in terms of the demarcation of a specific domain of inquiry: for Blumenbach, the study of life; for Kant, the study of reason. We argue that Kant adopted this specific epigenetic model as a result of his dispute with Herder regarding the independence of reason from nature. Blumenbach's conception of epigenesis and his separation of a domain of the living from the non-living lent Kant the tools to demarcate metaphysics, and to guard reason against Herder's attempts to naturalize it.
Henning, Tim. Kants Ethik. Eine Einführung. Stuttgart: Reclam, 2016. [160 p.] [WC]
Herbert, Daniel. “Peirce and the Final Opinion: Against Apel’s Transcendental Interpretation of the Categories.” Pragmatism, Kant, and Transcendental Philosophy. Eds. Gabriele Gava and Robert Stern (op cit.). 94-113. [M]
——. “Kant and Sartre on Temporality.” Comparing Kant and Sartre. Ed. Sorin Baiasu (op cit.). 45-61. [M]
Herman, Barbara. “Kantian Commitments.” Studi Kantiani 29 (2016): 131-43. [M]
Herrero Olivera, Laura. Rev. of Constructing Authories. Reason, Politics and Interpreation in Kant’s Philosophy, by Onora O'Neill (2015). [Spanish] Con-Textos Kantianos 3 (2016): 432-36. [M] [online]
——. Rev. of Der Zweck an sich selbst. Eine Untersuchung zu kants “Grundlegung zur Metaphysik ser Sitten”, by Rocco Porcheddu (2016). [Spanish] Con-Textos Kantianos 4 (2016): 374-79. [M] [online]
Herszenbaun, Miguel. “Algunas consideraciones sobre la antítesis de la primera antinomia kantiana.” [Spanish; “Some Thoughts on the Antithesis of the First Kantian Antinomy” Con-Textos Kantianos 3 (2016): 81-89. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper intends to give a new reading on the proofs of the antithesis of the first antinomy, different from the main reading. While the traditional interpretation understands these proofs in terms of causality or sufficient reason, I intend to explain these proofs based only on the concept of relative location of the bodies or temporal events. Hence, I will reject that in these proofs Kant claims that in an extra-mundane time or space there is no sufficient reason (or cause) for the location of the world in certain region of space or time. I claim that these proofs demonstrate that the world cannot have a relative location if it is surrounded by empty space or time, which must be necessarily assumed if we suppose a finite world.
Hinske, Norbert, tr. and ed. See: Kant, Immanuel.
Hoffmann, John. “Kant’s Aesthetic Categories: Race in the Critique of Judgment.” diacritics 44.2 (2016): 54-81. [M]
Hoffer, Noam. “The Relation between God and the World in the Pre-Critical Kant: Was Kant a Spinozist?” Kantian Review 21.2 (2016): 185-210. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Andrew Chignell and Omri Boehm have recently argued that Kant’s pre-Critical proof for the existence of God entails a Spinozistic conception of God and hence substance monism. The basis for this reading is the assumption common in the literature that God grounds possibilities by exemplifying them. In this article I take issue with this assumption and argue for an alternative Leibnizian reading, according to which possibilities are grounded in essences united in God’s mind (later also described as Platonic ideas intuited by God). I show that this view about the distinction between God’s cognition of essences as the ground of possibility and the actual world is not only explicitly stated by Kant, but is also consistent with his metaphysical picture of teleology in nature and causality during the pre-Critical period. Finally, I suggest that the distinction between the conceptual order of essences embodied in the idea of God and the order of the objects of experience plays a role in the transition into the Critical system, where it is transformed into the distinction between the intelligible and the sensible worlds.
Holberg, Erica A. “The Importance of Pleasure in the Moral for Kant’s Ethics.” Southern Journal of Philosophy 54.2 (2016): 226-46. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: I argue for a new reading of Kant's claim that respect is the moral incentive; this reading accommodates the central insights of the affectivist and intellectualist readings of respect, while avoiding shortcomings of each. I show that within Kant's ethical system, the feeling of respect should be understood as paradigmatic of a kind of pleasure, pleasure in the moral. The motivational power of respect arises from its nature as pleasurable feeling, but the feeling does not directly motivate individual dutiful actions. Rather, the feeling is motivational in the sense that, after an agent has acted in a morally good way, the pleasure that results from that action contributes to the cultivation of virtue in the agent and, consequently, morally good actions in the future. Understanding the feeling of respect to be moral pleasure not only gives us insight into how finite rational beings develop virtue, but also a new way of understanding respect as an incentive.
Horn, Christoph. “Kant’s Political Philosophy as a Theory of Non-Ideal Normativity.” Kant-Studien 107.1 (2016): 89-110. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant’s political philosophy confronts its interpreters with a crucial difficulty: it is far from clear if (or how) Kant, in his political theory, makes use of the Categorical Imperative (CI). It is notoriously demanding to clarify the relationship that exists between his political thought on the one hand and the ethics of the Groundwork and the Critique of Practical Reason on the other. There are basically two interpretative options available: the more traditional dependence reading and the somewhat provocative separation reading. Following the first option, the normativity included in ‘right’ (Recht) is immediately derived from the normativity of the ‘Moral Law’ as we know it from the 1780s. According to the second reading, Kant’s legal normativity is substantially different from what we know as those foundations and procedures on which the Categorical Imperative is based. In this article, a third interpretation is defended that tries to combine the advantages of the previous two. In the political realm we are, according to Kant, dealing with a somewhat different type of normativity which still shows some connection with the moral law. It turns out that Kant’s political normativity is not just a kind of ‘applied ethics’. Kant has formulated a non-ideal form of normativity, according to which ‘non-ideal’ means: a weaker version of normativity which can be lived up to by human beings, which is appropriate to specific situations and which is intended for a long-term effect, namely that of a historical development.
Horstmann, Rolf-Peter. “The Reception of the Critique of Pure Reason in German Idealism.” Debates in Nineteenth Century European Philosophy: Essential Readings and Contemporary Responses. Ed. Kristin Gjesdal (op cit.). 3-18. [M]
——. “Kant, the German Idealists, the I, and the Self – A ‘Systematic Reconstruction’.” Internationales Jahrbuch des Deutschen Idealismus/International Yearbook of German Idealism: Bewusstsein/Consciousness, eds. Dina Emundts and Sally Sedgwick. 11 (2016): 245-72. [PW]
Houlgate, Stephen. “Hegel, Kant and the Antinomies of Pure Reason.” Kant Yearbook: Kant and German Idealism 8 (2016): 39-62. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Hegel argues that Kant’s antinomies of pure reason are important because they implicitly show the categories of thought to be contradictory. In so doing Hegel disregards much of what interests Kant about the antinomies and interprets the latter “against Kant’s intention”. He also gets Kant wrong when he claims that Kant’s “trivial” resolution of the antinomies simply shifts contradiction from things in themselves to appearances. Nonetheless, I contend that Hegel’s interpretation is defensible, insofar as the antinomies do, indeed, show (what Hegel regards as) the categories of the “infinite” and the “finite” to be both opposed to and inseparable from one another. I also argue that Hegel is right to maintain that Kant’s proofs of the theses and antitheses in the antinomies assume what they are meant to prove and that Kant’s resolution of the antinomies is unsatisfactory.
Howell, Robert. Rev. of The Transcendental Turn, edited by Sebastian Gardner and Matthew Grist (2015). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (Jan 2016, #24). [M] [online]
Höwing, Thomas, ed. The Highest Good in Kant’s Philosophy. Berlin/Boston: Walter de Gruyter, 2016. [viii, 285 p.] [WC]
Hrbatý, Peter Gustáv. Rev. of Res Publica. Plato’s Republic in Classical German Philosophy, by Günter Zöller (2015). Studia Philosophica Kantiana 2016.1 (2016): 82-84. [M] [online]
Hudačová, Alexandra. Rev. of Detours. Approaches to Immanuel Kant in Vienna, in Austria, and in Eastern Europe, edited by Violetta L. Waibel (2015). Studia Philosophica Kantiana 2016.1 (2016): 85-89. [M] [online]
Hulshof, Monique. “O conceito de númeno na Crítica da razão prática: uma exigência paradoxal.” [Portuguese; The concept of noumena in the Critique of Practical Reason: a paradoxical requirement] Studia Kantiana 14.22 (2016): 49-69. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the Critique of Practical Reason Kant answers the objections to the critical project that involves the "paradoxical demand" of considering a free subject as a noumenon or as belonging to the intelligible world. The aim of this article is to show that Kant offers this answer by making it clear that the distinction between two points of view plays no role in the foundation of the supreme principle of morality. This distinction is introduced only as a mode of representation that necessarily results from the subject’s consciousness of the moral law and, consequently, of its freedom.
Hyder, David. The Determinate World: Kant and Helmholtz on the Physical Meaning of Geometry. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2016. [viii, 229 p.] [WC]
Insole, Christopher J. The Intolerable God: Kant’s Theological Journey. Grand Rapids, Michighan: William B. Eerdmans, 2016. [x, 176 p.] [WC]
James, David. “Independence and Property in Kant’s Rechtslehre.” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 24.2 (2016): 302-22. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: I argue that the freedom which is to coexist with the freedom of choice of others in accordance with a universal law mentioned in Kant's Rechtslehre is not itself freedom of choice. Rather, it is the independence which is a condition of being able to exercise genuine free choice by not having to act in accordance with the choices of others. Kant's distinction between active and passive citizenship appears, however, to undermine this idea of independence, because the possession of a certain type of property right on the part of some citizens makes it possible for them to dominate others. Kant's account of property in this way turns out to be central to the question as to whether his Rechtslehre represents an internally consistent account of how freedom can be guaranteed within a legal and political community. I go on to argue that Kant's attempt to justify a pre-political right of property cannot be viewed as a successful justification of private property, and that he should have abandoned the notion of such a right together with any presumption in favour of private property.
Jameson, Fredric R. “Ancient Society And The New Politics: From Kant To Modes Of Production.” Criticism 58.2 (2016): 327-39. [M]
Jankowiak, Tim. “Intentionality and Sensory Consciousness in Kant .” Journal of Philosophical Research 41 (2016): 623-49. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: According to “intentionalist” interpretations of Kant’s transcendental idealism, Kant’s empirical objects are to be understood as mere intentional objects. This interpretation requires a corresponding account of intentionality and intentional objects. This paper defends an account of how the intentionalist should understand the intentional structures at work in the sensory consciousness of physical bodies. First a relational conception of intentionality (articulated in terms of an object’s presence to consciousness) is distinguished from a non-relational conception (articulated in terms of representational content). I argue that the intentionalist’s claim that Kant’s empirical objects are mere intentional objects is primarily a claim about non-relational intentionality. I then ask whether the intentionalist should also recognize a role for relational intentionality as well. After rejecting two possible answers (that there is no relational intentionality, or that there are intentional relations to things in themselves), I argue that sensory consciousness involves having spatially arrayed collections of sensations presented to consciousness in intuition, and then conceptualizing these sensation-arrays as physical objects. The obvious worry about such a phenomenalist interpretation has to do with the consistency of this interpretation with Kant’s empirical realism; these concerns are addressed in detail in the final section.
Janowski, Johanna Christine. “Biblische Spuren und Motive in der Eschatologie I. Kants. Eine Skizze.” Bibelhermeneutik und dogmatische Theologie nach Kant. Eds. Harald Matern, Alexander Heit, and Enno Edzard Popkes (op cit.). 221-73. [M]
Jiménez Rodríguez, Alba. “Die Projektion des Schematismus in den vorkritischen Schriften Kants: Das Problem der mathematischen Konstruktion.” Kant-Studien 107.3 (2016): 429-50. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This essay aims to provide a reconstruction of the antecedents to Kant’s doctrine of transcendental schematism in the pre-critical period. To this end, the work’s common thread is based on an analysis of the following issues: the delimitation of a jurisdiction of metaphysics, the transition from the concept of construction in the mathematical context to the constructive processes of the imagination, subsequently applied to all pure concepts, the difference between the intellectus archetypus and the intellectus ectypus, outlined in MSI, and the relevance of this distinction to the particular type of mediation operations that will later take place within the development of the theory of transcendental schematism.
——. “The Duisburg Nachlaß as a Key to Interpreting Salomon Maimon’s Reading of the Transcendental Deduction of Categories.” Kant’s Shorter Writings: Critical Paths Outside the Critiques. Eds. Rafael V. Orden Jiménez, Robert Hanna, Robert Louden, Jacinto Rivera de Rosales, and Nuria Sánchez Madrid (op cit.). 39-54. [M]
——. Rev. of Crítica y Metafísica. Homenaje a Mario Caimi. Studien und Materialen zur Geschichten der Philosophie, edited by Claudia Jáuregi, Fernando Moledo, Hernán Pringe, and Marcos Thisted (2015). [Spanish] Revista de Estudios Kantianos 1.2 (2016): 217-26. [PW]
——. Rev. of Immanuel Kant. Lezioni sul Diritto Naturale, (Naturrecht Feyerabend), edited by Norbert Hinske and Gianluca Sadun Bordoni (2016). [Spanish] Con-Textos Kantianos 4 (2016): 338-42. [M] [online]
Johnson, Ryan J. “Homesickness and Nomadism: Traveling with Kant and Maimon.” Polish Journal of Philosophy 10.2 (2016): 45-69. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Solomon Maimon argues that while Kantianism does venture quite a way toward the establishment of an immanent critical project that more satisfyingly addresses real experience, it does not fulfill the aims of its own project. In order to negotiate Maimon’s claim, I utilize the primary metaphorics of the First Critique: homesickness. The Kantian longing for home is an insatiable yearning, a striving for the end of something that cannot end, namely, the end of the search for home (Zuhause). According to Maimon, although home is unattainable, there is a different sense of home: home is the path itself, a sort of nomadism, a roving life of the path that never leads home. The Kant of the first Critique did not fully realize that the project could not reach an actual final resting place; in fact, this realization, that home is a transcendental ideal, might be the very motivation for the third Critique. Thus, in order not merely to justify the possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge, but also to allow the application of such knowledge to reach the facts themselves, actuality as such, the “well-groundedness” of the critical project requires some re-direction from Maimon. To do this, Maimon renders Kantian transcendental conditions truly genetic.
Jones, Andrew. Rev. of The Normativity of Nature: Essays on Kant’s Critique of Judgement, by Hannah Ginsborg (2015). Kantian Review 21.3 (2016): 510-16. [PW]
Jovanov, Rastko. Rev. of Artur Libert/Arthur Liebert: Život i dela. Leben und Werke. Life and Works, by Zdravko Kučinar (2015). [German] Kant-Studien 107.2 (2016): 424-26. [PW]
Kain, Patrick. Rev. of Kant’s Lectures on Anthropology: A Critical Guide, edited by Alix Cohen (2014). Journal of the History of Philosophy 54.2 (2016): 339-40. [M]
Kang, Soon Jeon. “Intuitiver Verstand bei Kant und Hegels Begriff des Begriffs.” Kant-Studien 107.4 (2016): 704-28. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Combing the approaches of the deduction of categories and the intuitive understanding, Hegel demonstrates the possibility of human thinking from the perspective of intuitive understanding. According to Hegel, the thinking of the synthetic universal is only partially and inconsequently achieved in the deduction of categories. It is limited to the divine cognition in the Third Critique and lacks explanation as to how it is implemented. Through the logical processing of intuitive understanding, Hegel invents a Notion as a method that accounts for objects that are not given in Kant’s discursive understanding.
Kannisto, Toni. “Positio contra complementum possibilitatis – Kant and Baumgarten on Existence.” Kant-Studien 107.2 (2016): 291-313. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the course of his philosophy, in various contexts, Kant comes to reject three theses about existence: (i) that the thoroughgoing determination of a thing implies its existence, (ii) that existence is a real predicate or determination of a thing, and (iii) that existence is the complement of inner possibility or essence. Kant’s target here is Baumgarten, who advocates these theses as the criterion, classification, and definition of existence. In this article I seek to clarify Kant’s elusive theory of existence through its opposition to Baumgarten. I will show that Kant’s refutation of (i)–(iii) does not stand alone but is grounded on his own definition of existence as (absolute) positing. Thus contrary to common practice, Kant’s negative claims about what existence is not cannot be understood in isolation but must be taken as jointly dependent on Kant’s positive claim about what existence is. I will show that theses (i)–(iii) fail because they presuppose that existence contributes to the intension or content of a concept, whereas according to Kant existence in fact posits a (non-empty) extension of the concept.
Kanterian, Edward. “Reason’s Disunity with Itself: Comments on Adrian Moore on Kant’s Dialectic of Human Reason.” Kantian Review 21.3 (2016): 483-93. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Adrian Moore develops a helpful distinction between good and bad metaphysics. Employing this distinction, I argue, first, that some contemporary metaphysical theories might be ‘bad’, insofar as they employ, unreflectively, concepts akin to Kant’s Ideas of reason. Second, I investigate the difficulty Kant himself has with explaining our craving for bad metaphysics. Third, I raise some problems for Kant’s doctrine of ‘transcendental cognition’, which rests on the difficult assumption that Ideas have objective reality. I conclude that, while Kant has given us means to combat certain bad metaphysics, his own philosophy is not entirely free of it either.
Katrechko, Sergey. “On Kant’s Transcendental Argument(s).” Con-Textos Kantianos 4 (2016): 98-117. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Presented in the Critique of Pure Reason transcendental philosophy is the first theory of science, which seeks to identify and study the conditions of the possibility of cognition. Thus, Kant carries out a shift to the study of ‘mode of our cognition’ and TP is a method, where transcendental argumentation acts as its essential basis. The article is devoted to the analysis of the transcendental arguments. In § 2 the background of ТА — transcendental method of Antiquity and Leibniz’s Principle of Sufficient Reason — are analyzed and their comparison with ТА is given. § 3 is devoted to the analysis of TA in the broad and narrow senses; a formal propositional and presupposition models are proposed. In § 4 I discuss the difference between TA and metaphysics’ modes of reasoning. It analyzes the Kant’s main limitations of the use TA shows its connection with the Modern Age and contemporary science.
Kauark-Leite, Patricia. “Contemporary Science Between Theoretical and Practical Reason: A Transcendental-Pragmatic Approach to Quantum Theory.” Revista de Estudios Kantianos 1.1 (2016): 49-59. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The aim of this paper is to show that in the contemporary context of quantum theory, the Kantian radical distinction between theoretical and practical reason can no longer be held. I argue that the theoretical and a priori subjective conditions of experience, as represented in quantum mechanics, are inexorably connected to the a priori conditions of communication between agents in the world. Therefore, theoretical reason cannot be detached from practical reason, as Kant holds, but on the contrary we now have one unified capacity for reason that is at the same time theoretical and practical, and, in that sense, transcendental-pragmatic.
——. “Kant's empirical realism and scientific realism: a critical analysis of Hanna's interpretation of Kant.” Kant e-Prints 11.1 (2016): 19-35. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper is concerned with Robert Hanna‟s Kantian solution to the Two Images Problem and his defense of Kant‟s supposed manifest realism. My aim is to offer an alternative solution that I consider, on the one hand, more coherent with Kant's transcendental idealism, and, on the other, better fitted to the context of physical contemporary science. By contrast to Hanna‟s account, I argue that Kant is the most radical representative of an antirealist position in the philosophy of science that allows us to overcome the impasses and limitations of empiricist anti-realism and the whole range of variations of realistic perspectives.
Kauhaus, Hanna. “Vernunftreligion und Schriftgelehrsamkeit. Wege der Bibelauslegung nach Kants Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft und Der Streit der Fakultäten.” Bibelhermeneutik und dogmatische Theologie nach Kant. Eds. Harald Matern, Alexander Heit, and Enno Edzard Popkes (op cit.). 35-54. [M]
Kaushall, Justin Neville. Rev. of Red Kant: Aesthetics, Marxism, and the Third Critique, by Michael Wayne (2014, 2016). The British Journal of Aesthetics 56.3 (2016): 323-25. [PW]
Keller, Pierre. Rev. of Understanding Hegel’s Mature Critique of Kant, by John McCumber (2014). Journal of the History of Philosophy 54.3 (2016): 509-10. [M]
Kisilevsky, Sari. “Kant’s Juridical Conception of Freedom as Independence.” Studi Kantiani 29 (2016): 41-57. [M]
Kitcher, Patricia. “Kant on the Faculty of Apperception.” British Journal for the History of Philosophy (online, 3 Oct 2016): 1-28. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Although I begin with a brief look at the idea that as a faculty of mind, apperception must be grounded in some (noumenal) power of the soul, my focus is on claims about the alleged noumenal import of some of Kant’s particular theses about the faculty of apperception: it is inexplicable, immaterial, and can provide evidence that humans are members of the intelligible world (and so possess the noumenal freedom required for morality). I argue that when the claim of inexplicability is placed in the context of Kant’s standards for transcendental psychological explanation, it has no noumenal implications. Similarly, when understood in the context of his views about scientific explanations, Kant’s claim that the faculty of apperception cannot be understood in materialist terms has no important metaphysical payoff. The case of freedom is different, because for a long time, Kant believed that he could establish the freedom required for morality by appealing to the freedom required for thought. In the end, however, he abandoned this hoped for noumenal implication of the faculty of apperception.
——. “What Can Humans Cognize about the Self from Experience? Comments on Corey Dyck’s “The Development of Kant’s Psychology during the 1770’s”.” Con-Textos Kantianos 3 (2016): 345-52. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: I agree with Dyck’s basic claim that Kant follows the methodology of Rational Psychology in setting up his critique of it: He starts as it starts, with an existential proposition ‘I think.’ On the other hand, I am not convinced of Dyck’s use of the Dreams essay in establishing a timeline for the development of Kant’s views on inner sense. That essay is evidence that Kant thinks that Schwendenborg’s metaphysics is ungrounded, because he has a crazy sort of inner sense, but it does not show that Kant rejected a more standard internal sense at this time. I also suggest that some of Kant’s vacillation about inner sense depends on an unusual feature of his doctrine of the representations of space and time: They are composed of both sensory and a priori elements. My hypothesis is that the seeming vacillation about inner sense may be a reflection of whether whether he is considering it broadly, as a faculty that provides intuitions with a particular form, or whether he is restricting what it provides to what can be sensed.
Klein, Joel Thiago. “The Highest Good and the Practical Regulative Knowledge in Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason.” Con-Textos Kantianos 3 (2016): 210-30. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper I defend three different points: first, that the concept of highest good is derived from an a priori but subjective argument, namely a maxim of pure practical reason; secondly, that the theory regarding the highest good has the validity of a practical regulative knowledge; and thirdly, that the practical regulative knowledge can be understood as the same “holding something to be true” as Kant attributes to hope and believe.
——. “Three Problems with the Theoretical Reading of the Idea of a Universal History in Context of the Critique of Pure Reason.” Kant’s Shorter Writings: Critical Paths Outside the Critiques. Eds. Rafael V. Orden Jiménez, Robert Hanna, Robert Louden, Jacinto Rivera de Rosales, and Nuria Sánchez Madrid (op cit.). 246-65. [M]
Kleingeld, Pauline. “Kant’s Moral and Political Cosmopolitanism.” Philosophy Compass 11.1 (2016): 14-23. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this essay, I first outline the contexts in which the idea of cosmopolitanism appears in Kant's moral and political philosophy. I then survey the three main debates regarding his political cosmopolitanism, namely, on the nature of the international federation he advocated, his theory of cosmopolitan right, and his views on colonialism and ‘race’, and I consider the relation between patriotism and cosmopolitanism in Kant's work. I subsequently discuss Kant's moral cosmopolitanism. Kant is widely held to be a defender of moral cosmopolitanism, but the terminology of world citizenship is in fact strikingly rare in Kant's writings on moral theory. I offer a two‐part explanation for why this is the case.
Klemme, Heiner. “¿“El yo propiamente tal” (I. Kant) o “el originario ser sí mismo” (D. Heinrich)? Sobre algunas características del concepto kantiano de autoconciencia.” [Spanish; “Proper Self” (I. Kant) or “Original Self-Being” (D. Henrich)? Some Characteristics of the Kantian Concept of Self-Consciousness] Revista de Estudios Kantianos 1.2 (2016): 113-25. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Since the 1960s, Dieter Henrich has published a series of very influential papers on the genesis of the modern concept of self-consciousness and on Kant’s contribution to it. Henrich’s philosophical interest in the genesis of this concept rests on the assumption that self-consciousness is the clue for understanding what our “original self-being” (“ursprüngliches Selbstsein”) is all about. With “original self-being”, Henrich intends to reply to Martin Heidegger’s critique of modern philosophy in general and the concept of self-consciousness in particular. In this paper, I argue that Henrich’s critique of Kant is not convincing. Kant seems to have good arguments for denying the possibility of being aware of one’s own “ursprüngliches Selbstsein”. Kant’s concept of “proper self” (“eigentliches Selbst”) is not the object of a hermeneutics of our life but a core concept of moral philosophy. The meaning of this concept is clearly explained in the moral law.
Klempe, Sven. “A Philosophical vs. a Psychological Perspective on Borders.” Integrative Psychological & Behavioral Science 50.1 (2016): 77-90. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper questions to what extent borders are to be understood from a philosophical or a psychological perspective. This is done by investigating the distinction between philosophy and psychology that comes up as a result of Immanuel Kant's investigation of the pure reason. Ontology is found as a demarcation criterion between the two fields in the sense that it is of crucial importance in philosophy, but not of certain interest from a psychological point of view. An investigation of three assumptions in the perspective of affective loading follows this up, which confirms the efficiency of borders in psychological meaning production.
Klingner, Stefan. “Kants Begriff einer intellektuellen Anschauung und die rationalistische Rechtfertigung philosophischen Wissens.” Kant-Studien 107.4 (2016): 617-50. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In his critical works, Kant specifies the concept of “intellectual intuition” in three different ways. First, he identifies intellectual intuition with God’s original intuition. Second, he describes intellectual intuition as non-sensible intuition that can apprehend noumenal objects. And third, he characterizes a kind of non-discursive but intellectual perception as intuitive understanding. The paper points out that this ambiguity is coherent by considering the polemical context in which Kant criticizes rationalistic metaphysics and epistemology, especially the views of Spinoza and Leibniz. In addition, it is shown that “moderate” rationalism in contemporary epistemology ignores Kant’s decisive criticism of the view that non-sensible intuition can justify philosophical knowledge.
——. Rev. of Die Postulate des empirischen Denkens überhaupt, by Giuseppe Motta (2012). Kant-Studien 107.1 (2016): 202-7. [M]
Knauss, Gerhard. Synthetische Sätze apriori und Metaphysik. St. Ingbert, Germany: Röhrig Universitätsverlag, 2016. [371 p.] [WC]
Kobusch, Theo. “Die praktischen Elementarbegriffe als Modi der Willensbestimmung. Zu Kants Lehre von den „Kategorien der Freiheit“.” Die “Kategorien der Freiheit” in Kants praktischer Philosophie. Ed. Stephan Zimmermann (op cit.). 17-76. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant’s doctrine of the „categories of freedom“ is one of the most obscure parts of his practical philosophy. This obscurity has its reason not only in Kant’s particular train of thought, but also in our unfamiliarity with the historical background of Kantian practical philosophy, which in actuality reaches back to medieval theories of the will.The categories of freedom,which prima facie seem to have been composed by strict analogy with those of theoretical reason, in fact unveil the particular nature of the realmof freedom, i. e. the practical field. As one of the most difficult parts of Kant’s thinking, the doctrine of the categories of freedom clearly shows the influence of thoughts and terminology belonging to the philosophical tradition of Chr. Wolff and his school, especially G. F. Meier and A. G. Baumgarten. Furthermore, it also demonstrates Kant’s practical philosophy to be primarily a theory of the will, not of action.
Kohl, Markus. “Kant on Idealism, Freedom, and Standpoints.” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 98.1 (2016): 21-54. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: I propose a new way of understanding Kant’s doctrine of freedom. My reading seeks to combine features of two popular opposed lines of interpretation, namely, of metaphysical and anti-metaphysical readings. I defend the view that Kant’s idealist attempt to ‘save’ human freedom involves substantive metaphysical commitments. However, I show that this interpretation can fruitfully integrate important insights that are standardly associated with deflationary readings: first, the idea that for Kant freedom and natural necessity can be ascribed to one and the same human being; and second, the idea that for Kant the belief in freedom and the belief in natural necessity belong to two different standpoints.
Kontos, Pavlos, and Anastasios Englezos. Rev. of Funktionen der Freiheit, by Heiko Puls (2013). Kant-Studien 107.3 (2016): 585-86. [PW]
Koterski, S.J., Joseph W. Rev. of The Intolerable God: Kant’s Theological Journey. By Christopher J. Insole, by Christopher J. Insole (2016). International Philosophical Quarterly 56.3 (2016): 383-86. [PW]
Kratochwil, Friedrich. “Immanuel Kant (1724-1804): A Little Kantian ‘Schwaermerei’.” The Return of the Theorists: Dialogues with Great Thinkers in International Relations. Eds. Richard Ned Lebow, Peer Schouten, and Hidemi Suganami (op cit.). 99-109. [PW]
Kraus, Katharina Teresa. “Quantifying Inner Experience? – Kant's Mathematical Principles in the Context of Empirical Psychology.” European Journal of Philosophy 24.2 (2016): 331-57. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper shows why Kant's critique of empirical psychology should not be read as a scathing criticism of quantitative scientific psychology, but has valuable lessons to teach in support of it. By analysing Kant's alleged objections in the light of his critical theory of cognition, it provides a fresh look at the problem of quantifying first‐person experiences, such as emotions and sense‐perceptions. An in‐depth discussion of applying the mathematical principles, which are defined in the Critique of Pure Reason as the constitutive conditions for mathematical‐numerical experience in general, to inner sense will demonstrate why it is in principle possible to justify a quantitative structure of psychological judgments on the grounds of Kant's critical thinking. In conclusion, it will propose how Kant's critique could be used in a constructive way to develop first steps towards a transcendental foundation of psychological knowledge.
Kravitz, Amit. “Absolute Counterpurposiveness? On Kant’s First Arguments Against Theodicy.” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 98.1 (2016): 89-105. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This essay discusses the first of Kant’s anti-theodicean arguments as unfolded in his 1791 On the Miscarriage of All Philosophical Trials in Theodicy. In this argument, Kant coins a neologism, the absolute counterpurposive (=ACP), and vehemently rejects the theodicean claim that denies that there is ACP in the world. As I show, Kant’s rejection of the theodicean denial of ACP is not based on epistemological, but on moral grounds: a denial of ACP seems to lead to a denial of the unconditional status of morality. Thus, it is not the denial of ACP as such but rather the consequence of its denial that truly troubles Kant. Upon thoroughly construing Kant’s argument, and unveiling two major ambiguities which lurk in his argument, I argue that Kant’s anti-theodicean argument is not cogent.
Kreis Guido. Rev. of New Approaches to Neo-Kantianism, edited by Nicolas de Warren and Andrea Staiti (2015). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (Oct 2016, #9). [M] [online]
Kreines, James. “Things in Themselves and Metaphysical Grounding: On Allais’ Manifest Reality.” European Journal of Philosophy 24.1 (2016): 253-66. [PW]
Krijnen, Christian. “Kants „Kategorien der Freiheit“ und das Problem der Einheit der Vernunft.” Die “Kategorien der Freiheit” in Kants praktischer Philosophie. Ed. Stephan Zimmermann (op cit.). 309-32. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The problem of the unity of Kant’s critical philosophy has inspired the development of German idealism from the beginning. This paper discusses the problem of the unity of theoretical and practical philosophy as the problem of an original unity that precedes Kant’s legislation of nature and freedom. Whereas from the perspective of the post-Kantian German idealists, a concept that conceives of such an original and overarching unity as freedom seems to fail in Kant, it is my thesis that within his conception of activity, Kant indeed offers a distinction for constructing such a concept. Unfortunately, Kant’s distinction remains rather implicit in his philosophy: the distinction between activity qua performance of validity, and hence the subject as the logical instance that individuates or singularises validity (intentionality, act), and activity qua realisation of validity, and hence the real or concrete subject as the factor that realises validity.
Krouglov, Alexei. “Kant und der Siebenjährige Krieg.” Studies in East European Thought 68.2/3 (2016): 149-64. [PW]
[Abstract] [Hide Abstract] Russian occupation of Königsberg during the Seven Years' War (1758-1762) had a great impact on the residents of East Prussia capital. That time significantly changed the cultural city life, i.e. there was a release from narrow-mindedness and prejudices of the Protestant city that was influenced by Pietism; social mores were liberalized; in comparison with pre-war time the university started playing a more significant part, and the status of university professors rose. All these changes positively affected Kant's life and his philosophical formation. Because of the occupation Kant remained in contact with Prussian, Austrian, and Russian officers for many years, and made friends with a number of merchants. This influenced his position regarding the war, history understanding, and his assessment of Frederick the Great's role and significance.
Kryshtop, Ludmila E. “The Reception of Kant’s Doctrine of Postulates in Russia.” Con-Textos Kantianos 4 (2016): 56-69. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article concerns the reception of practical philosophy of Kant in general and the doctrine of the postulates of the practical reason in particular in Russia in the 18th and the first half of the 19th century. Author analyzes the views on Kant’s philosophy of the most representative Russian thinkers and attempts to answer the question why the way practical philosophy of Kant and his postulates of the existence of God and immortality of soul were interpreted in Russia as rather negative and hostile.
Kuhlmann, Wolfgang. “A Plea for Transcendental Philosophy.” Pragmatism, Kant, and Transcendental Philosophy. Eds. Gabriele Gava and Robert Stern (op cit.). 239-58. [M]
Kumar, Apaar. “Transcendental Self and the Feeling of Existence.” Con-Textos Kantianos 3 (2016): 90-121. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this essay, I investigate one aspect of Kant’s larger theory of the transcendental self. In the Prolegomena, Kant says that the transcendental self can be represented as a feeling of existence. In contrast to the view that Kant errs in describing the transcendental self in this fashion, I show that there exists a strand in Kant’s philosophy that permits us to interpret the representation of the transcendental self as a feeling of existence — as the obscurely conscious and temporally inaccessible modification of the state of the discursive subject, which is built into all the representations of such a subject. I also provide an account of how the transcendental self can be legitimately understood both as an epistemic condition for the possibility of experience as well as the representation of a non-naturalistic feeling of existence.
Kupś, Thomasz. “Idea Boha v Opus postumum.” [Slovak; The Idea of God in the Opus Postumum] Studia Philosophica Kantiana 2016.1 (2016): 32-41. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The work of Opus postumum (esp. the late notes of the philosopher, which have been collected in the first and the seventh convolution) contains the original sequel of the theology-philosophy. Kant’s opinions presented in these late manuscripts differ on the background of earlier versions of religious philosophy (developed e.g. in works such as Critique of Practical Reason or Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason) in the radical sense of the idea of God, in the “disappearance” or even rejection of the traditional idea of God. Similarly, the importance and role of the morality in Kant’s Opus postumum leads in the philosophical concept of religion to a certain extreme. Although Kant’s reflections in Opus postumum do omit the question of religion and are a part of the metaphysical-epistemological analysis (Adickes), they also concentrate on the practical aspects of the idea of God which was previously presented in Kantian ethics-theology.
——. See: Grzeliński, Adam, and Tomasz Kupś.
Kurak, Michael. “Causation in Reflective Judgment.” Kant Studies Online (2016): 12-41; posted Feb. 29, 2016. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The existing body of scholarship on Kant’s Critique of Judgment is rife with disagreement. At the centre of much of this disagreement is the issue of precisely what Kant understands to be taking place in a harmonization of the cognitive faculties. Is aesthetic reflective judgment to be identified with, or separated from, this harmonious state of the faculties of imagination and understanding? If aesthetic judgment is identified with this state, as is argued herein, then upon what is a judgment of beauty to be based? These questions are addressed by focussing on two closely related aspects of Kant’s theory of reflective judgment; the role Kant assigns to the power of desire (i.e., to the will) and to the causal structure implicated in reflective judgment. In brief, we argue that a judgment of beauty is not, strictly speaking, something that I do, but is better described that something that happens of itself.
Kyslan, Peter. “What is Culture? Kant and Simmel.” Con-Textos Kantianos 4 (2016): 158-66. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Immanuel Kant and Georg Simmel both lived in different cultural atmospheres. While the former is the one who reflects upon the enlightenment era with criticism and hope, the latter evaluates capitalism and the industrial era with apathetic criticism. However, both of them have managed to philosophically grasp the phenomenon of culture in its universality and true meaning. This text aims at identifying the parallels between the spirits of both eras.
Laiho, Hemmo. “On the referential function of intuition.” Kant e-Prints 11.1 (2016): 90-102. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In contemporary terms, this short paper is about perceptual reference. In Kant‘s terms, the topic is intuition. The main explanandum is that intuition can indeed be understood in terms of perceptual reference. More specifically, I examine two issues with two intermingled questions: How, on the one hand, should intuition be understood when it comes to perceptually referring to locally present macroscopic objects, such as chairs and tables? How, on the other hand, should intuition be understood when it comes to perceptually referring to huge objects that cannot be perceptually present to us in their entirety, such as oceans, galaxies, and ultimately the world itself?
——. Rev. of The Poverty of Conceptual Truth. Kant’s Analytic/Synthetic Distinction and the Limits of Metaphysics., by R. Lanier Anderson (2015). Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 98.3 (2016): 369-72. [PW]
Lamarra, Antonio, Pietro Pimpinella, and Ada Russo, eds. Kant-Index, Bd. 44.1-2: Stellenindices und Konkordanz zu den vier lateinischen Dissertationen. 2 vols. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 2016. [xlvii, viii, 684 p.] [WC]
Lambier, Joshua D. “A Capacity to Resist: Kant’s Aesthetics and the Right of Revolution.” European Romantic Review 27.3 (2016): 393-403. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Taking Kant’s well-known refusal of the “right of resistance” as a point of departure, this paper outlines an alternative approach to the Kantian theory of revolution by investigating the aesthetic dimension of his reception of global insurrectionary movements, particularly his interest in the world spectator’s “enthusiasm” for the French Revolution. Like the experience of the sublime, where the subject confronts instances of nature’s immensity and power that exceed the imagination’s capacity for presentation, revolution confronts us with formless events of human history. The sublime, however, occasions a second moment of recovery. Following the painful experience of the imagination’s impotence, the judging subject is enlivened by the discovery of what Kant calls “a capacity for resistance,” that is, our ability to transcend forces that produce feelings of futility and powerlessness. This paper argues that Kant’ssublime right to resistnot only anticipates the revolutionary imperative of Romanticism, but also foregrounds the way in which aesthetics defies the law’s efforts to prohibit disobedience and dissent. But it concludes with a note of caution towards the sublime’s tendency to suppress the rights of nature, a suppression that could be overturned by what Kant calls “a second epoch of natural revolution” that pushes aside the human species altogether
Land, Thomas. “Spatial Representation, Magnitude and the Two Stems of Cognition.” Kant: Studies on Mathematics in the Critical Philosophy. Eds. Emily Carson and Lisa Shabel (op cit.). 6-32. [M]
——. “Moderate Conceptualism and Spatial Representation.” Kantian Nonconceptualism. Ed. Dennis Schulting (op cit.). 145-70. [PW]
Landes, Donald A. “Spielraum, phenomenology, and the art of virtue: hints of an ‘embodied’ ethics in Kant.” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24.2 (2016): 234-51. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Although the suggestion that Kant offers a significant contribution to Virtue Ethics might be a surprising one, in The Metaphysics of Morals Kant makes virtue central to his ethics. In this paper, I introduce a Merleau-Pontian phenomenological perspective into the ongoing study of the convergence between Kant and Virtue Ethics, and argue that such a perspective promises to illuminate the continuity of Kant’s thought through an emphasis on the implicit structure of moral experience, revealing the insights his perspective contains for establishing an embodied phenomenology of virtue. These two aims are accomplished by exploring Kant’s ‘proto-phenomenological’ descriptions of the weight of the moral law, his implicit ‘existential’ account of human nature, and his notion of the art of navigating the complex moral terrain that involves a certain Spielraum (leeway). When thus viewed, Kant’s virtue ethics sketches out a subtle understanding of embodiment and temporality.
Landmesser, Christof. “Spuren der Schrifthermeneutik Immanuel Kants in Rudolf Bultmanns Bibelinterpretation.” Bibelhermeneutik und dogmatische Theologie nach Kant. Eds. Harald Matern, Alexander Heit, and Enno Edzard Popkes (op cit.). 325-41. [M]
Landy, David. “Scientific realism without rigid designation in Kant’s analogies.” Kant e-Prints 11.1 (2016): 70-89. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In Kant, Science, and Human Nature, Robert Hanna argues against a version of scientific realism founded on the Kripke/Putnam theory of reference, and defends a Kant-inspired manifest realism in its place. I reject Kriple/Putnam for different reasons than Hanna does, and argue that what should replace it is not manifest realism, but Kant‘s own scientific realism, which rests on a radically different theory of reference. Kant holds that we picture manifest objects by uniting manifolds of sensation using concepts-qua-inferential-rules. When these rules are demonstrated to be invalid, we replace the picture of the macroscopic world with a picture of the microscopic entities of theoretical science that unites the very same manifolds using different rules of inference. Thus, we refer to “unobservable” theoretical entities in the same way that we do manifest ones: by specifying both their determinate location in space and time and the concepts by which they are understood.
——. Rev. of Cognition, Content, and the A Priori: A Study in the Philosophy of Mind and Knowledge, by Robert Hanna (2015). Kantian Review 21.2 (2016): 333-39. [PW]
La Rocca, Claudio. “Kant and the Problem of Conscience.” Contemporary Studies in Kantian Philosophy 1 (2016): 65-79. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The appeal to conscience still has a great importance in common moral reasoning and in political discourse; at the same time, the notion of conscience has played only a limited role in the philosophical foundation of ethics since the 20th century. This is the fundamental trait of the ‘problem of conscience’ mentioned in the title. In relation to many aspects of this peculiar situation, Kant’s position is of particular significance, since he limits, on the one hand, the systematic role of conscience in moral theory, anticipating to some extent its contemporary ‘dismissal’, but, on the other hand, he gives to conscience a crucial role in the phenomenology of moral life. Kant’s theory can be examined in this context by posing two questions: (1) Why doesn’t Kant develop an ethics of conscience? (2) Which still important role does he give to conscience in moral life and how can it be justified? I address both questions, giving more importance to the second one, which involves an interpretation of many features of Kant’s very intriguing theory of conscience, and in particular of the alleged ‘infallibility’ of this faculty, which needs to be understood in accordance with the fallibility of moral judgment. I shall argue that Kant undertakes a sort of ‘formalisation’ of conscience, which represents an interesting position for the ‘problem of conscience’: according to this view, conscience does not guarantee the content of any moral evaluation, of any belief, but it prescribes a way of proceeding which demands that any moral deliberation should take place in the space of moral shareable reasons.
——. Rev. of Wahrnehmung und Wahrnehmungsurteil. Zur Kritik eines philosophiegeschichtlichen Dogmas, by Katrin Nolte (2013). [Italian] Studi Kantiani 29 (2016): 224-25. [M]
Laudin, Gérard. “Was ist Aufklärung? : «unité et diversité des Lumières», «wahre Aufklärung» ou «radical Enlightenment»? Esquisse d'un bilan de quelques recherches récentes.” Con-Textos Kantianos 4 (2016): 223-38. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article relates some stages in the research on the 18th century which, after being mainly interested in the beginning of the century (Paul Hazard, 1935) and then in the mid-century (1730-1770) has, for about forty years, turned to what is now called «second Enlightenment» or Spätaufklarung. The emphasis is, particularly, put on the works concerning the «Aufklärungsdebatte» (« wahre Auflärung» of the years 1973 and the following ones (since Werner Schneiders, 1974, Norbert Hinske, 1973, Wolfgang Albrecht, 1995), in particular in relation with what Margarete Jacob (1981) and Jonathan Israel (2001) identified as a specific movement born in the second half of the 17th century and named «Radical Enlightenment», the latter having been the object of critical reviews. What are the modes of «radicality» in the years 1780? What is the very relevance of this expression?
Laywine, Alison. “Kant on Conic Sections.” Kant: Studies on Mathematics in the Critical Philosophy. Eds. Emily Carson and Lisa Shabel (op cit.). 201-40. [M]
Lazos, Efraín. “Kant la violencia. Presentación del Dossier de CTK 3.” [Spanish; Kant on Violence. Presentation of CTK 3 Dossier] Con-Textos Kantianos 3 (2016): 253-55. [M] [online]
Lebovitz, Adam. “The Battlefield of Metaphysics: Perpetual Peace Revisited.” Modern Intellectual History 13.2 (2016): 327-55. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Basic questions about Kant's international theory remain unresolved, in part because the ambiguous language and sketchy blueprints given in Perpetual Peace lend themselves to a wide variety of interpretations. This essay proposes a novel solution for this difficulty: a careful reconsideration of the political concepts embedded in Kant's first philosophy. In the First Critique, the “Conflict of the Faculties,” and in particular his neglected essay “Perpetual Peace in Philosophy,” Kant repeatedly draws on the language of sovereignty, war, and international law, in order to describe how the critical philosophy will bring peace to what he terms the “battlefield of metaphysics.” The most striking feature of this program for “perpetual peace in philosophy” is that it does not end disagreement over ideas, but rather prevents it from becoming pathological by subjecting it to the “discipline” of critical reason. And I argue that Kant's proposal for global peace is precisely parallel: a sovereign world court that arbitrates decisively between states, while otherwise leaving them free to clash, compete, and disagree.
Lebow, Richard Ned, Peer Schouten, and Hidemi Suganami, eds. The Return of the Theorists: Dialogues with Great Thinkers in International Relations. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. [x, 393 p.] [WC]
Leeten, Lars. Rev. of Kant and the Promise of Rhetoric, by Scott R. Stroud (2014). International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24.2 (2016): 263-66. [PI]
Legg, Catherine. Rev. of Peirce’s Account of Purposefulness: a Kantian Perspective, by Gabriele Gava (2014). International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24.2 (2016): 267-70. [PI]
Lemanski, Jens. “Galilei, Torricelli, Stahl – Zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte der Physik in der B-Vorrede zu Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft.” Kant-Studien 107.3 (2016): 451-84. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the second preface to the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant claims that Galileo Galilei, Evangelista Torricelli and Georg Ernst Stahl caused a scientific revolution in experimental physics (B xii). In this paper, I advance the historical thesis that Kantʼs claim refers precisely to three passages from Discursus et demonstrationes mathematicae (Galilei), Lettera a Filaleti Di Timauro Antiate (Torricelli), and Beweiß von den Saltzen (Stahl). This historical thesis provides evidence for a newer systematic interpretation, which says that the topic of the second preface is not epistemological, but rather methodological.
Lenz, Martin. “Is Locke’s Account of Personal Identity Really Subjectivist?” Kant-Studien 107.3 (2016): 526-35. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The aim of this paper is to challenge the notion of subjectivism involved in Udo Thiel’s and in other reconstructions of Locke’s account of personal identity. Although subjectivism is often taken to be the hallmark of Locke’s position, it is not entirely clear how we should understand this characterization. Thus, I will first address some general worries about this label. In a second step, I will discuss possible ways of construing Locke’s account as subjectivist and show how they rely on objective and intersubjective features. I shall conclude with a plea to drop this label with regard to Locke altogether.
Lequan, Mai. Rev. of Kant, Réflexions sur la philosophie morale et Baumgarten. Principes de la philosophie pratique première, edited and translated by Luc Langlois (2014). [French] Estudos Kantianos 4.2 (2016): 223-25. [M] [online]
Leserre, Daniel. Rev. of The Origins of the Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. Kant, Hegel, and Cassirer, by Donald P. Verene (2012). [English] Kant-Studien 107.2 (2016): 420-23. [PW]
Leyva, Gustavo. “Kant and Cosmopolitanism in Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht (1784).” Kant’s Shorter Writings: Critical Paths Outside the Critiques. Eds. Rafael V. Orden Jiménez, Robert Hanna, Robert Louden, Jacinto Rivera de Rosales, and Nuria Sánchez Madrid (op cit.). 438-59. [M]
Licht dos Santos, Paulo R. “Qual Problema da Dedução Transcendental na Critica da Razão Pura?.” [Portuguese] Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 72.2-3 (2016): 401-34. [PW]
Lima, Francisco Jozivan Guedes de. “A dimensão social da epistemologia e da estética de Kant: uma reconstrução para além dos limites do mentalismo.” [Portuguese; The social dimension of Kant’s epistemology and aesthetics: A reconstruction beyond the limits of mentalism] Studia Kantiana 14.21 (2016): 77-92. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper aims to reconstruct the Kantian Reason beyond monological limits of mentalism. The fundamental argument is that Reason has an intersubjective and social validation both in Epistemological level and Aesthetical level. At the Epistemological level will be used the concepts of belief as persuasion and belief while conviction shown in the Transcendental Dialectic of Critic of Pure Reason in order to defend a social position about epistemic truths. On the Aesthetical level the Social dimension of Art will be argued from the concept of “sensus communis” (Gemeinsinn).
Lorini, Gualtiero. “‘Till I die I will not remove mine integrity from me’: On Kant’s ‘Anthropological’ Theodicy.” Kant’s Shorter Writings: Critical Paths Outside the Critiques. Eds. Rafael V. Orden Jiménez, Robert Hanna, Robert Louden, Jacinto Rivera de Rosales, and Nuria Sánchez Madrid (op cit.). 116-31. [M]
——. “Tertium datur: Kant entre harmonia pré-estabelecida e influxo físico.” [Portuguese] Estudos Kantianos 4.2 (2016): 133-47. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The present essay aims to provide an overview on Kant’s dealing with the main theories of causality which were proposed and discussed in his time. The goal is to show that, since the pre-critical period, he has never simply accepted the theories of causality that he could find in second-scholastic sources, but has always tried to develop an original position. Starting from a general acceptance of the theory of the “physical influx”, Kant tries to amend this theory, as it had been roughly provided by Knutzen and Crusius. This emendation is carried out through elements coming from the Leibnitian tradition. However, in this field Kant never totally embraces the Wolffian, as well as the Baumgartenian model. The paper tries also to shed light on the way in which the critical conception of space allows Kant to fulfill his original theory of causality as an amended version of the physical influx.
Losch, Andreas. “Kant’s Wager. Kant’s Strong Belief in Extra-terrestrial Life, the History of this Question and its Challenge for Theology Today.” International Journal of Astrobiology 15.4 (2016): 261-70. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant was not the first in whom the ‘starry heavens’ above us inspired awe and wonder. For Kant, who was firmly convinced of the existence of inhabitants of other worlds, these heavens were inhabited. He is certain that ‘If it were possible to settle by any sort of experience whether there are inhabitants of at least some of the planets that we see, I might well bet everything that I have on it. Hence I say that it is not merely an opinion but a strong belief (on the correctness of which I would wager many advantages in life) that there are also inhabitants of other worlds.’ In this statement by Kant in no less a work than the Critique of Pure Reason one can, on the one hand, recognize a reflection of Kant's earlier convictions and expositions, on the other hand, the context of the citation and the contemporary background are, of course, relevant. Following the example of Kant, this paper investigates the meaning of such reflections about inhabitants of alien worlds, which due to advances in planetary astronomy are today again on the agenda. Consideration of this subject also represents a challenge for theology.
Louden, Robert B. “‘Total Transformation’: Why Kant Did Not Give up on Education.” Kantian Review 21.3 (2016): 393-413. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this essay I argue that Kant remained committed to the necessity and fundamental importance of education throughout his career. Like Johann Bernhard Basedow (1724–90), Kant holds that a ‘total transformation’ of schools is necessary, and he holds this view not only in the 1770s but in his later years as well. In building my case I try to refute two recent opposing interpretations – Reinhard Brandt’s position that Kant’s early ‘education enthusiasm’ was later replaced by a politics enthusiasm, and Manfred Kuehn’s view that the increasing importance of autonomy in Kant’s mature ethics leads him to de-emphasize education.
——. “‘Transformação total’: Por que Kant não desistiu da educação.” [Portuguese; ‘Total transformation’: Why Kant did not give up on education] Studia Kantiana 14.22 (2016): 5-28. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this essay I argue that Kant remained committed to the necessity and fundamental importance of education throughout his career. Like Johann Bernhard Basedow (1724-1790), Kant holds that a ‘total transformation’ of schools is necessary, and he holds this view not only in the 1770s but in his later years as well. In building my case I try to refute two recent opposing interpretations – viz., Reinhard Brandt’s position that Kant’s early ‘education enthusiasm’ was later replaced by a politics enthusiasm, and Manfred Kuehn’s view that the increasing importance of autonomy in Kant’s mature ethics leads him to deemphasize education.
——. “Argue but Obey? Questioning Kant’s Enlightenment.” Kant’s Shorter Writings: Critical Paths Outside the Critiques. Eds. Rafael V. Orden Jiménez, Robert Hanna, Robert Louden, Jacinto Rivera de Rosales, and Nuria Sánchez Madrid (op cit.). 284-300. [M]
——. Rev. of Kant’s Embedded Cosmopolitanism: History, Philosophy, and Education for World Citizens, by Georg Cavallar (2015). Kantian Review 21.2 (2016): 324-29. [PI]
Lu-Adler, Huaping. “Kant on Proving Aristotle’s Logic as Complete.” Kantian Review 21.1 (2016): 1-26. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant claims that Aristotle’s logic is complete. He defends this claim from the nature of a strictly scientific logic, and rejects as futile the attempts by some modern philosophers at extending it. I analyse what it means for Kant to regard Aristotle’s (formal) logic as complete, explain the historical and philosophical considerations that commit him to proving the completeness claim and sketch the proof based on materials from his logic corpus. The proof will turn out to be an integral part of Kant’s larger reform of formal logic in response to a foundational crisis facing it.
——. “On Courtney Fugate’s The Teleology of Reason.” Critique (blog posted: 22 Oct 2016) n.p. [PW] [online]
Lyssy, Ansgar. Rev. of Hans Heinz Holz, Leibniz in der Rezeption der klassischen deutschen Philosophie, edited by Jörg Zimmer (2015). [German] Estudos Kantianos 4.2 (2016): 215-17. [M] [online]
Macarthur, David. “A Kant-Inspired Vision of Pragmatism as Democratic Experimentalism.” Pragmatism, Kant, and Transcendental Philosophy. Eds. Gabriele Gava and Robert Stern (op cit.). 67-84. [M]
MacInnis, Luke. “Agency and Attitude.” Philosophy and Social Criticism 42.3 (2016): 289-19. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Critics charge that Kantian conceptions of human dignity and normative agency, which some suggest underwrite the modern doctrine of human rights, are parochial, unable to account for the dynamism and context-dependence of human rights, aloof from human rights practice, and incapable of distinguishing human rights from the vast array of other political rights constitutional democracies generally recognize as demands of justice. I argue here that whatever force these charges might have against human rights theories inspired by Kant’s work, they do not impugn Kant’s own conception of human rights. By tying human rights to official attitudes toward justice rather than, as familiar approaches do, to concrete conformity with ‘minimum prerequisites’ of justice, Kant’s approach fits core features of human rights practice while providing a dynamic, context-sensitive guideline for auditing the conduct of states and public officials. Just as Kant’s critical writings argue that agents must be able to assume that the natural world of efficient causes is purposive for morality’s ultimate ends, we can profitably understand Kant’s political philosophy as claiming, analogously, that agents must also be able to assume that the juridical world of state action is purposive for justice. Kant’s conception of human rights, I suggest, identifies the conditions under which that assumption is warranted.
Mahoney, Brendan. “Engaging the Sublime without Distance: Environmental Ethics and Aesthetic Experience.” Environmental Ethics 38.4 (2016): 463-81. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Over the past decade or two, a number of scholars have proposed that the aesthetic experience of the sublime offers a ground on which to build an environmental ethic. Among these scholars, Emily Brady has offered the most sustained and comprehensive analysis of this topic. Her position is firmly grounded in Kant’s aesthetic theory. She (and others) conclude that the experience of the sublime provides a robust aesthetic basis for an environmental ethic; however, Kant’s aesthetic theory presents difficulties for this position insofar as he claims that the experience of the sublime reveals the superiority of humans (via our morality and faculty of reason) over nature. One source of Kant’s anthropocentrism is his concept of “safe distance.” However, drawing on Arnold Berleant’s theory of aesthetic engagement and Thoreau’s account of the sublime in “Ktaadn,” an engaged—or de-distanced—experience of the sublime offers a more solid foundation for an aesthetically grounded environmental ethic.
Maler, Matt. “Kant’s Rational Morality and the Mentally Impaired: The Quest for a Universal Moral Account.” Res Cogitans 7.1 (2016): 112-19. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kantian deontology makes at least three central claims: (1) All humans are ends in themselves, (2) All humans have moral obligations, and (3) Morality (the categorical imperative) is a rational endeavor. However, the universal claims of Kantian deontology become suspect when we consider the mentally impaired who, in some cases, cannot meet the rationality requirements implicit in the categorical imperative. In this paper, I argue that Kantian deontology cannot account for the entirety of the human population lest it exclude the mentally impaired as either non-moral agents or sub-human entities. I then suggest that by adopting the paradigm of virtue ethics, we can sufficiently avoid this problem and account for the dignity and moral agency of the mentally impaired. Finally, I consider one objection to this moral picture and respond.
Maliks, Reidar. Rev. of Kant and Colonialism, by Katrin Flikschuh and Lea Ypi (2014). Perspectives on Politics 14.3 (2016): 858-59. [PW]
Marchevsky, Ondrej. “Matej Szlávik’s Analysis of Kant’s Moral Philosophy.” Con-Textos Kantianos 4 (2016): 147-57. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Work of Immanuel Kant is subject matter of investigation not only in modern Slovak history. Already in the past, it had a great influence on intellectual development of Slovak region within The Kingdom of Hungary. One of the attentive and critical readers of Kant's works was Matej Szlávik, a professor of Evangelical College in Prešov. The study analyses Szlávik’s interpretation of Kant's works and it particularly focuses on analysis of Szlávik’s evaluations of Kant's practical and moral philosophy.
Marcolungo, Ferdinando Luigi. “Variations on the Possible: ‘What Does it Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking?’.” Kant’s Shorter Writings: Critical Paths Outside the Critiques. Eds. Rafael V. Orden Jiménez, Robert Hanna, Robert Louden, Jacinto Rivera de Rosales, and Nuria Sánchez Madrid (op cit.). 301-12. [M]
——. “Giuseppe Zamboni interprete di Kant.” [Italian] Estudos Kantianos 4.1 (2016): 193-220. [M] [online]
Abstract: Within Italian Neo-Scholastic philosophy of the first half of 20th century, Giuseppe Zamboni (1875-1950) holds a special place by virtue of his ‘pure gnoseology’, which is similar, under many aspects, to Husserl’s phenomenology, mainly for its criticism against Positivism and the focus on development of human knowledge starting from immediate givens of consciousness. Zamboni was among the founders of the “Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore” of Milan: here, during his teaching (1921-1932), he dealt with Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason on several occasions, devoting many articles to it (published on the Rivista di filosofia neoscolastica) and, in 1932, even the essay Studi esegetici, critici, comparativi (Exegetical, Critical, and Comparative Studies). That same year, he was definitively removed by the University.
A careful examination of this text shows both the reasons of dispute between Zamboni and some of his University’s colleagues, and the value that Zamboni’s interpretation may have even for current Kantian studies: on the one hand, he claims that human subject has the intellective power to analyse sense data by means of abstraction as dis-individuation, on the other hand, he underline the importance of one’s “own body” for the representation of space and, first and foremost, the central role of the “self” (ego) involved in sentiments and willing acts, besides the “pure cognitive self” of Kant’s transcendental apperception.
Marcon Bark, Gehad. “Percepção como Representação Conceitual: Uma Proposta para a Compreensão do Enativismo de Alva Noë a partir da Tese Kantiana da Complementaridade.” [Portuguese] Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 72.2-3 (2016): 661-95. [PW]
Marey, Macarena. “Synthetic a Priori Propositions of Right: Kant on Political Obligation.” Kant’s Shorter Writings: Critical Paths Outside the Critiques. Eds. Rafael V. Orden Jiménez, Robert Hanna, Robert Louden, Jacinto Rivera de Rosales, and Nuria Sánchez Madrid (op cit.). 426-37. [M]
Marian, Raoul Andrei. “Descoberta do númeno? Um paradoxo na estética kantiana.” [Portuguese] Philosophica 48 (2016): ??. [PW]
Mariña, Jacqueline. Rev. of Kant and the Meaning of Religion: The Critical Philosophy and Modern Religious Thought, by Terry Godlove (2014). Kantian Review 21.1 (2016): 138-41. [PI]
Marques, Ubirajara Rancan de Azevedo. “Notas histórico-filológicas sobre a ‘autogeração’ em Kant.” [Portuguese; Historical-philological notes on “self-generation” in Kant] Studia Kantiana 14.20 (2016): 129-53. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Present in both “A” and “B” editions of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft, the word “Selbstgebärung” [self-generation] occurs only once in the latter. Likewise, it does not seem to appear in any other text of Kant’s “Gesammelte Schriften”, and even if we extend our search beyond the field of Philosophy, no other reference is to be found that may precede its occurrence in the first Critique. In fact, apart from two occurrences registered during Kant’s lifetime – in passages of works by Tieftrunk and Jacobi, both pertaining to Pure Reason – only from 1845 on did I again come across the word. Hence, I assume that “Selbstgebärung” is a neologism of the philosopher’s making, and that, from an historical point of view, it may have resulted from the condensation of two terms – namely: “selbst” and “Gebärung” – whose mutual vicinity had long been established, especially in the mystical-theosophical field; in which case, by merging them and depriving them of that ancestral meaning, Kant would have endowed the new word with a secularized, speculative-embryological attire. Throughout the present study, the exegesis of which is of an historicalphilological nature, I shall examine the following points: [I] a possible mysticaltheosophical origin of the expression at hand; [II] the philological difficulties inherent to the understanding of “Selbstgebärung” as “epigenesis”, “spontaneous generation”, “parthenogenesis” and “spontaneous labor”; [III] the elements pertaining to a “self-generation” of the understanding and reason. The previous points shall be followed by a short synopsis, by way of a conclusion.
Marshall, Colin R. Rev. of Self, World, and Art: Metaphysical Topics in Kant and Hegel, by Dina Emundts (2013). Internationales Jahrbuch des Deutschen Idealismus/International Yearbook of German Idealism: Bewusstsein/Consciousness, eds. Dina Emundts and Sally Sedgwick. 11 (2016): 281-85. [PW]
——. “On Lucy Allais’s Manifest Reality.” Critique (blog posted: 29 Aug 2016) n.p. [PW] [online]
Martínez, Luciana. Rev. of Immanuel Kant, Lecciones de Antropología. Fragmentos de estética y antropología, edited/translated by Manuel Sánchez Rodríguez (2015). Anales del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía 33.1 (2015): 334-37. [M]
——. Rev. of Zur Bedeutung des Begriffs Ontologie bei Kant, by Gabriel Rivero (2014). [Spanish] Revista de Estudios Kantianos 1.2 (2016): 233-35. [PW]
Marton, Scarlett. “«Majestätische sittliche Gebäude». La critique de Nietzsche à la doctrine morale kantienne.” Nietsche-Studien 45.1 (2016): 33-55. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper aims at elucidating Nietzsche’s critique of the way that Kant institutes his moral doctrine. Taking as point of departure the analysis of the conceptions of philosophy and the role played by the critical enterprise in both philosophers’ works, first of all it attempts to examine the divergences which are the basis of their philosophical thoughts. Then, it attempts to evaluate to which extent Nietzsche understands the solution of the third antinomy present in the “Transcendental Dialectic” of Critique of Pure Reason. At last, it intends to enlighten the Nietzschean undertaking’s goal.
Matern, Harald. “Das absolute Individuum? Anmerkungen zur Christologie Immanuel Kants und ihrer Rezeption bei Hermann Cohen und Wilhelm Herrmann.” Bibelhermeneutik und dogmatische Theologie nach Kant. Eds. Harald Matern, Alexander Heit, and Enno Edzard Popkes (op cit.). 173-220. [M]
——. “Schriftverständnis und Bibelhermeneutik bei F. D. E. Schleiermacher und A. Ritschl. Notizen zur Rezeption der kantischen Religionsphilosophie.” Bibelhermeneutik und dogmatische Theologie nach Kant. Eds. Harald Matern, Alexander Heit, and Enno Edzard Popkes (op cit.). 277-306. [M]
——, Alexander Heit, and Enno Edzard Popkes, eds. Bibelhermeneutik und dogmatische Theologie nach Kant. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2016. [viii, 390 p.] [M]
Contents: Originally presented at a conference: Kant und die Bibel - die Schrifthermeneutik Immanuel Kants und Ihre Nachwirkungen (Basel 2010). Articles include:
Hanna Kauhaus (Vernunftreligion und Schriftgelehrsamkeit. Wege der Bibelauslegung nach Kants Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft und Der Streit der Fakultäten),
Konrad Schmid (‘Daß du, der du mir erscheinst, Gott sei, davon bin ich nicht gewiß.’ Kant und der Gott der Bibel),
Matthias Petzoldt (Die Bibel verstehen können müssen? Diskussion um Kants Beitrag zu einem Begründungsproblem theologischer Erkenntnis),
Pierre Bühler (Kants Schrifthermeneutik als Herausforderung in Identitätsprozessen - am Beispiel von Paul Ricoeurs Hermeneutik des Selbst),
Alexander Heit (Die Bedeutung des christlichen Rechtfertigungsgedankens für Kants Religionsphilosophie),
Christine Axt-Piscalar (Kant zur Bedeutung und Funktion der Kirche und die biblischen Anleihen in Kants Ekklesiologie),
Arnulf von Scheliha (Kants Deutung von Judentum und Islam - Kant in der Deutung von Judentum und Islam),
Harald Matern (Das absolute Individuum? Anmerkungen zur Christologie Immanuel Kants und ihrer Rezeption bei Hermann Cohen und Wilhelm Herrmann),
Johanna Christine Janowski (Biblische Spuren und Motive in der Eschatologie I. Kants. Eine Skizze),
Harald Matern (Schriftverständnis und Bibelhermeneutik bei F. D. E. Schleiermacher und A. Ritschi. Notizen zur Rezeption der kantischen Religionsphilosophie),
Enno Edzard Popkes (Immanuel Kant und die Entwicklungsgeschichte historisch-kritischer Exegese. Beobachtungen zu den Werken von Heinrich Eberhard Gottlob Paulus, Friedrich Lücke und Johannes Weiß),
Christof Landmesser (Spuren der Schrifthermeneutik Immanuel Kants in Rudolf Bultmanns Bibelinterpretation),
Georg Pfleiderer (Zum (Anti-)Kantianismus protestantischer Ethik im 20. Jahrhundert. Eine Fallstudie).
Matherne, Samantha. “Kant’s Theory of the Imagination.” The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Imagination. Ed. Amy Kind (London/New York: Routledge, 2016). 55-68. [M]
——. “Kantian Themes in Merleau-Ponty’s Theory of Perception.” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 98.2 (2016): 193-230. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: It has become typical to read Kant and Merleau-Ponty as offering competing approaches to perceptual experience. Kant is interpreted as an ‘intellectualist’ who regards perception as conceptual ‘all the way out’, while Merleau-Ponty is seen as Kant’s challenger, who argues that perception involves non-conceptual, embodied ‘coping’. In this paper, however, I argue that a closer examination of their views of perception, especially with respect to the notion of ‘schematism’, reveals a great deal of historical and philosophical continuity between them. By analyzing Kant’s theory of schematism, the interpretation of it by the Neo-Kantian Pierre Lachièze-Rey, and Merleau-Ponty’s theory of the body schema, we find that aspects of Merleau-Ponty’s theory of perception are better understood as a development of Kant’s theory of perception.
Mazijk, Corijn. “Kant and Husserl on the Contents of Perception.” Southern Journal of Philosophy 54.2 (2016): 267-87. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper focuses on the contents of perception in Kant's first Critique and Husserl's later writings. Both Kant and Husserl are known for their appeal to synthesis in their transcendental accounts of perceptual experience and objective judgment. Especially regarding Kant, the precise nature of perceptual synthesis has recently been the cause of much debate. Whereas some argue that for Kant perception must have nonconceptual content, others believe he is a conceptualist. After offering an alternative solution to this interpretative problem in Kant's philosophy, I turn to Husserl's later theory of perception. My main claims here are that Husserl departs from Kant specifically regarding (i) the sort of synthetic contents that govern affective perception and (ii) the role of conceptual capacities in the contents of attentive perception..
McCall, Bradford. Rev. of Kant on Mind, Action, and Ethics, by Julian Wuerth (2014). Review of Metaphysics 69.4 (2016): 835-38. [PI]
McCarty, Richard. Rev. of How Hume and Kant Reconstruct Natural Law: Justifying Strict Objectivity without Debating Moral Realism, by Kenneth R. Westphal (2016). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (Jul 2016, #19). [M] [online]
McDaniel, Kris. Rev. of Manifest Reality: Kant’s Idealism and His Realism, by Lucy Allais (2015). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (May 2016, #24). [M] [online]
McLaughlin, Peter. Rev. of Kant’s Construction of Nature: A Reading of the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, by Michael Friedman (2013). Internationales Jahrbuch des Deutschen Idealismus/International Yearbook of German Idealism: Bewusstsein/Consciousness, eds. Dina Emundts and Sally Sedgwick. 11 (2016): 286-90. [PW]
McLear, Colin. “Kant on Perceptual Content.” Mind 125 (2016): 95-144. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Call the idea that states of perceptual awareness have intentional content, and in virtue of that aim at or represent ways the world might be, the ‘Content View.’ I argue that though Kant is widely interpreted as endorsing the Content View there are significant problems for any such interpretation. I further argue that given the problems associated with attributing the Content View to Kant, interpreters should instead consider him as endorsing a form of acquaintance theory. Though perceptual acquaintance is controversial in itself and in attribution to Kant, it promises to make sense of central claims within his critical philosophy.
——. “Getting Acquainted with Kant.” Kantian Nonconceptualism. Ed. Dennis Schulting (op cit.). 171-97. [PW]
——. “On Lucy Allais’s Manifest Reality.” Critique (blog posted: 30 Aug 2016) n.p. [PW] [online]
McQuillan, J. Colin. Immanuel Kant: The Very Idea of a Critique of Pure Reason. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2016. [xv, 176 p.] [WC] [review]
——. “A Merely Logical Distinction: Kant's Objection to Leibniz and Wolff.” Epoché 20.2 (2016): 387-405. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Throughout his career, Immanuel Kant objects that Leibniz and Wolff make the distinction between sensible and intellectual cognition into a “merely logical” distinction. Although it is not clear that anyone in the Leibnizian-Wolffian tradition actually holds this view, Kant’s objection helps to define the “real” distinction between sensible and intellectual cognition that he defends in his inaugural dissertation in 1770. Kant raises the same objection against Leibniz and Wolff in the Critique of Pure Reason, but replaces the “real” distinction he defends in his inaugural dissertation with a new “transcendental” distinction between intuitions and concepts. This paper examines Kant’s objection to Leibniz and Wolff and the different alternatives he proposes, in order to highlight an important element in the development of his critical philosophy.
——. “Philosophical Archaeology and the Historical A Priori: from Kant to Foucault.” Symposium 20.2 (2016): 142-59. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Most accounts of the historical a priori can be traced back to Husserlian phenomenology. Foucault’s appeals to the historical a priori are more problematic because of his hostility to this tradition. In this paper, I argue that Foucault’s diplôme thesis on Hegel, his studies of Kant’s Anthropology, his response to critics of The Order of Things, and his later work on Kant’s essay “An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?” all suggest that eighteenth- and nineteenth-century German philosophy helped to shape his conception of the historical a priori.
——. “Reply to Michael Olson.” Critique (blog posted: 20 Nov 2016) n.p. [PW] [online]
McWherter, Dustin. “The Moore-Walker Dilemma: A Critique of Transcendental Idealism.” Philosophical Forum 47.2 (2016): 195-206. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article discusses the different objections of philosophers G. E. Moore and Ralph Walker regarding the argument of philosopher Immanuel Kant on transcendental idealism. Topics discussed include the rationale of idealism of Kant, the extensive definition between Kant scholarship's the transcendental realism and transcendental idealism, and the alternative interpretation proposed by philosopher Lucy Allais on the argument of Kant.
Medeiros de Araújo, Alexandre. “Sobre a dinâmica das faculdades e a ‘comoção’ da lei moral.” [Portuguese; About the dynamic between the faculties and ‘commotion’ of the moral law] Studia Kantiana 14.22 (2016): 121-53. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article aims at arguing that Kant´s proposal to morality does not consist in an “empty”, and, therefore “cold” and “without sentiment” “formalism” as some of his commentators interpreted. According to these commentators, Kant´s proposal of morality is seen as not having any connection to the real human life, given the fact that he grounds moral decision in a principle of pure reason. The article presents the main elements that make up that totality of Kant’s proposal of morality: the faculties of reason, its powers (to know, to judge and to will), the dynamics between them, the feelings generated by this dynamics, the feeling of respect and the satisfaction named of “self-contentment”.
Mehlich, Julia. “Der radikale Pragmatismus N. F. Fedorovs als Überwindung der Philosophie Kants.” Studies in East European Thought 68.2/3 (2016): 193-211. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article shows how the discussion between representatives of pragmatism and neo-Kantianism reveals an evident similarity between the two opposing philosophical positions. This similarity consists in their reliance on Kant's philosophy as well as in their attempt to surpass it by turning to relativism and irrationalism. A particularly clear example of this is the projective philosophy of Nikolai F. Fedorov. By attempting to surpass Kant in a radically pragmatic way, Fedorov exposes the problems of pragmatism and 'blows' it up from inside. In his philosophical construction, Fedorov pursues a 'universal synthesis' of both the belief in reason inherent in Enlightenment and the belief in God, positivism and dialectic, projectivism and phantasy. On the one hand, he introduces a number of new notions, such as ideolatry, supramoralism, etc., on the other hand, he utilizes Christian dogmas. As a result, Fedorov fails to create a conception, which would dialectically combine contradictory approaches, producing a utopia or myth instead.
Meier, Georg Friedrich. Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason. Translated by Aaron Bunch, in collaboration with Axel Gelfert and Riccardo Pozzo. London/New York: Bloomsbury, 2016. [xii, 195 p.] [WC]
Meli, Carmelo Alessio. Kant e la possibilità dell’etica. Lettura critico-sistematica dei Primi principi metafisici della dottrina della virtù. Milan: Mimesis, 2016. [324 p.] [WC]
Mertens, Thomas. “On Kant’s Duty to Speak the Truth.” Kantian Review 21.1 (2016): 27-51. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In ‘On the Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy’, Kant defends a position that cannot be salvaged. The essay is nonetheless important because it helps us understand his philosophy of law and, more specifically, his interpretation of the social contract. Kant considers truthfulness a strict legal duty because it is the necessary condition for the juridical state. As attested by Kant’s rejection of Beccaria’s arguments against the death penalty, not even the right to life has such strict unconditional status. Within the juridical state, established by the social contract, the (single) innate right to freedom is transformed into a bundle of merely positive rights, including the right to life. Understanding the reason for the rejection of ‘the right to lie from philanthropy’ thus helps us understand the, in a sense, ‘positivist’ character of Kant’s legal philosophy. In conclusion, some suggestions are made to bring his position closer to our common moral understanding.
——. “Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals: a Conversation with my Student.” Studi Kantiani 29 (2016): 21-39. [M]
Miller, David. “Neo-Kantian Theories of Self-Determination: A Critique.” Review of International Studies 42.5 (2016): 858-75. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Neo-Kantian political theories, such as those developed by Jeremy Waldron and Anna Stilz, aim to provide an account of state legitimacy and territorial boundaries that avoids the problems faced by rival nationalist theories. Immanuel Kant’s own theory of the state appears to be biased towards the status quo, and therefore has difficulty in explaining what is wrong with rights-respecting colonialism or the annexation of one state by another. Two possible ways forward are explored. One involves making state legitimacy conditional on meeting more stringent standards of distributive justice. The other involves appealing to the idea of a self-determining ‘people’. However the latter must avoid collapsing into either a version of nationalism (if the ‘people’ are identified in cultural terms) or a form of voluntarism (if the ‘people’ are required subjectively to ‘affirm’ the regime that governs them). Thus neo-Kantian theories cannot deliver a plausible account of self-determination without, like Kant himself, tacitly invoking political identities of the kind that they seek to repudiate.
Misak, Cheryl. “Peirce, Kant, and What We Must Assume.” Pragmatism, Kant, and Transcendental Philosophy. Eds. Gabriele Gava and Robert Stern (op cit.). 85-93. [M]
Mitchell-Yellin, Benjamin. “Deep Reflection: In Defense of Korsgaard's Orthodox Kantianism.” Res Philosophica 93.1 (2016): 1-25. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article defends the Kantian moral theory developed by Christine Korsgaard against the charge that it does not establish that immorality is always irrational because moral obligations are inescapable and overriding. My aim is to show that two versions of a well-known criticism of the view fail for the same reason. They do not recognize the role of inadequate reflection in accounting for immoral actions and, consequently, they do not fully appreciate the commitments that come with accepting the supposed structure of human psychology that is bedrock to the view. I argue, first, that G. A. Cohen makes too much of the difference between Korsgaard and Kant on the source of moral norms and that we can appeal to what she says about practical reason in an early paper of hers in order to handle his Mafioso case. Next, I take up J. David Velleman’s more recent treatment of Korsgaard’s view in response to Cohen’s Mafioso case. I show that Velleman’s argument that her view is concessive conflates his own view of human agency with Korsgaard’s practical identity theory. My hope is that this discussion shows how Korsgaard’s view can be made to work as an orthodox Kantianism.
Moisés de Oliveira, Carlos. Rev. of The Normativity of Nature, Essays on Kant’s Critique of Judgment, by Hannah Ginsborg (2015). [Portuguese] Con-Textos Kantianos 4 (2016): 357-63. [M] [online]
Moland, Lydia L. Rev. of Kant’s Politics in Context, by Reidar Maliks (year). Intenrational Philosophical Quarterly 56.1 (2014): 113-15. [PW]
Moledo, Fernando. “La deducciòn metafisica de las categorìas en torno a 1772 y una hipotesis sobre el primer estadio de la historia evolutiva de la Deducciòn trascendental.” [Spanish] Studi Kantiani 29 (2016): 145-59. [M]
——. “Die neue Auffassung der Metaphysik als reine Philosophie in der Inauguraldissertation und ihre propädeutische Bedeutung im Rahmen der Entwicklungsgeschichte der Kritik der reinen Vernunft.” Kant-Studien 107.3 (2016): 485-95. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant criticizes Baumgarten’s definition of metaphysics as the science of the first principles of human knowledge (Metaphysica §1). He maintains that this definition doesn’t consider the distinction between sensible and pure knowledge. Instead of this definition, Kant provides a new one in the first Critique: metaphysics is the system of pure reason (KrV, A 841/B 869). This definition is first anticipated eleven years before in the Inaugural Dissertation, where metaphysics is defined as pure philosophy (MSI, AA 02: 411). Kant presents the Dissertation as a proof of the propaedeutic that must precede metaphysics, and so anticipates the idea that will be fully developed in the Critique of Pure Reason. In this paper, I will argue that the new definition of metaphysics in the Inaugural Dissertation must be seen as the text’s very important result, establishing the Dissertation’s status as a propaedeutic to metaphysics and as a specific step in the development of the Critique of Pure Reason.
——. “Límites y contradicciones de la razón pura, entre la Dissertatio (1770) y la Crítica de la razón pura (1781).” [Spanish; Boundaries and contradictions of pure reason, between the Dissertatio (1770) and the Critique of pure reason (1781)] Cadernos de Filosofia Alemã: Crítica e Modernidade 21.2 (2016): 49-59. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper I claim that it is possible to find a particular stage in the development of the Antinomy of pure reason, understand as a conflict of reason whit itself. This stage is placed between 1770 and 1781 and consists in a conflict which arises in reason itself but between the functions that later will be assigned to pure understanding and pure reason in strict sense.
Molloy, Sean. “A Fine Bromance: Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) and Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527).” The Return of the Theorists: Dialogues with Great Thinkers in International Relations. Eds. Richard Ned Lebow, Peer Schouten, and Hidemi Suganami (op cit.). 110-16. [PW]
Moore, A. W. “One World.” European Journal of Philosophy 24.4 (2016): 934-45. [PW]
——. “Reply to Sorin Baiasu and Edward Kanterian.” Kantian Review 21.3 (2016): 495-506. [PW]
Moran, Kate. “Much Obliged: Kantian Gratitude Reconsidered.” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 98.3 (2016): 330-63. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In his published texts and lectures on moral philosophy, Kant repeatedly singles out gratitude for discussion. Nevertheless, puzzles about the derivation, content, and nature of this duty remain. This paper seeks to solve some of these puzzles. Centrally, I argue that it is essential to attend to a distinction that Kant makes between well-wishing benevolence (Wohlwollen) and active beneficence (Wohlthun) on the part of a benefactor. On the Kantian account, I argue, a different type of gratitude is owed in response to each. With this distinction in place, I argue further that we can construct what many have thought to be missing from Kant’s discussion of gratitude – an argument explicating the precise contradiction generated by a maxim of ingratitude.
——. Rev. of Kant and Colonialism, ed. by Katrin Flikschuh and Lea Ypi (2014). British Journal for the History of Philosophy 24.1 (2016): 185-88. [PW]
——. Rev. of Kant and the Cultivation of Virtue, by Chris W. Surprenant (2014). Kantian Review 21.1 (2016): 141-46. [PI]
Morawski, Tommaso. Rev. of Scritti su Kant. Raccolta di seminari e conferenze di Mirella Capozzi, edited by Hansmichael Hohenegger (2014). [Italian] Con-Textos Kantianos 3 (2016): 446-54. [M] [online]
Mori, Massimo. “Ancora sul cosmopolitismo.” [Italian] Studi Kantiani 29 (2016): 169-78. [M]
Morris, Katherine. “Sartre’s Method: Philosophical Therapy or Transcendental Argument?” Comparing Kant and Sartre. Ed. Sorin Baiasu (op cit.). 197-216. [M]
Morscher, Edgar. Rev. of Die theoretische Philosophie Kants. Unter Berücksichtigung der Grundbegriffe seiner Ethik , by Jan Berg (2014). Philosophischer Literaturanzeiger 69.2 (2016): 105-12. [PW]
Moscón, Pablo. Rev. of Los años silenciosos de Kant: Aspectos de la génesis de la Deducción Trascendental en la década de 1770. Seguido de la traducción del Legado de Duisburg (ca. 1775)., by Fernando Moledo (2014). [Spanish] Revista de Estudios Kantianos 1.2 (2016): 227-30. [PW]
Moutsopoulos, Evanghelos. Rev. of Immanuel Kant, Antropologia din perspectivă pragmatică (2013), Immanuel Kant, Visurile unui vizionar interpretate prin visurile metafizicii (2013), Immanuel Kant Întemeierea metafizicii moravurilo (2013), and Immanuel Kant, Metafizica moravurilor (2013), all edited and translated by Rodica Croitoru. Kant-Studien 107.4 (2016): 766-71. [PW]
Muchnik, Pablo. “The Implications of Kant’s Empirical Psychology.” Con-Textos Kantianos 3 (2016): 316-25. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Note: This overview essay introduces a set of papers given at the North American Kant Society meeting at the Easter APA (2016): Dyck (The Scope of Inner Sense: The Development of Kant’s Psychology In The Silent Decade), Kitcher (What Can Humans Cognize about the Self from Experience? Comments on Corey Dyck’s “The Development of Kant’s Psychology during the 1770’s”), Frierson (Kantian Feeling: Empirical Psychology, Transcendental Critique, and Phenomenology), Grenberg (Response to Frierson’s “Kantian Feeling: Empirical Psychology, Transcendental Critique and Phenomenology”), and Frierson (Towards a Transcendental Critique of Feeling — A Response to Grenberg).
Mudd, Sasha. “Rethinking the Priority of Practical Reason in Kant.” European Journal of Philosophy 24.1 (2016): 78-102. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Throughout the critical period Kant enigmatically insists that reason is a ‘unity’, thereby suggesting that both our theoretical and practical endeavors are grounded in one and the same rational capacity. How Kant's unity thesis ought to be interpreted and whether it can be substantiated remain sources of controversy in the literature. According to the strong reading of this claim, reason is a ‘unity’ because all our reasoning, including our theoretical reasoning, functions practically. Although several prominent commentators endorse this view, it is widely thought to lack exegetical support. This paper seeks to strengthen the case for this reading by showing how theoretical reason's positive function, as Kant presents it in the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic, may be construed as fundamentally practical. I argue that reason's supreme regulative principle ought to be understood as a categorical practical imperative. This interpretation, I suggest, resolves the apparent inconsistencies that blight Kant's account of the principle in the Appendix, while bringing greater overall coherence to his account of theoretical reason's regulative function.
——. Rev. of Understanding Moral Obligation: Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard, by Robert Stern (year). Journal of Moral Philosophy 13.4 (2016): 498-501. [PW]
Mulherin, Thomas J. “Is a 'Kantian' Musical Formalism Possible?” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 74.1 (2016): 35-46. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this article, I consider whether a suitably stripped-down version of Kant's aesthetic theory could nevertheless provide philosophical foundations for musical formalism. I begin by distinguishing between formalism as a view about the nature of music and formalism as an approach to music criticism, arguing that Kant's aesthetics only rules out the former. Then, using an example from the work of musicologist and composer Edward T. Cone, I isolate the characteristics of formalist music criticism. With this characterization in mind, I conclude by showing that even if Kant's aesthetic theory is reduced to its most fundamental claims, the logic of formalist music criticism precludes its practice within even a Kantian perspective.
Muñoz Velasco, Julia. “Más allá de la unilateralidad de la violencia: el rechazo kantiano a un pretendido derecho a la revolución.” [Spanish; “Beyond the One-Sidedness of Violence: Kant’s Rejection of the Right to Revolution”] Con-Textos Kantianos 3 (2016): 285-300. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This essay shows that Kant’s rejection of the right to revolution does not imply that any situation of injustice must be passively accepted. Instead, Kant’s rejection can be understood in terms of the category of community. This concept is presented in the Critique of Pure Reason as a construction formed by relations of mutual dependence. The unique bond that a community entails help us to comprehend that any action that can be regarded as a restitution of justice must consider all of the community’s members. Revolution cannot abide this demand because it entails a kind of violence that is always one-sided. Even if it has the support of the majority by consensus, a revolution will always be a partial force that cannot represent the whole community and thus, cannot be legitimately considered as a right.
Muránsky, Martin. Die Freiheit zum radikal Bösen. Das Problem der Fatalismus-These in Reinholds Interpretation zu Kant. city: Peter Lang, 2016. [182 p.] [WC]
Nabolsy, Zeyad El. “Why did Kant conclude the Critique of Pure Reason with "the history of pure reason"?” Kant Studies Online (2016): 78-104; posted Aug. 27, 2016. [M][online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper I examine Kant's conception of the history of pure reason and its relation to his metaphilosophy as it is presented in the Critique of Pure Reason [Kritik der reinen Vernunft] (KrV). In particular, I will attempt to answer the following question: why did Kant conclude the KrV with the history of pure reason and why did he insist that, without it, a gap would remain in his system? In the course of attempting to answer this question, I will argue that Kant chose to conclude the KrV with a sketch of the history of pure reason because he took his ability to provide the history of pure reason to be a mark of the adequacy and success of his own philosophical system, in so far as it is the system which comprehends the nature of human reason, specifically the teleological nature of human reason (i.e., the system that recognizes that reason has intrinsic, self-imposed interests and goals) and insofar as it is the only system which, as the culmination of all the past systems of philosophy, is in a position to identify and satisfy all of the interests of human reason.
Naragon, Steve. “Herder’s Student Notes from Kant’s Metaphysics Lectures.” Herder: From Cognition to Cultural Science/Herder: Von der Erkenntnis zur Kulturwissenschaft. Ed. Beate Allert (Heidelberg: Synchron, 2016). 249-58. [M]
Nassar, Dalia. “Analogical Reflection as a Source for the Science of Life: Kant and the Possibility of the Biological Sciences.” Studies in History & Philosophy of Science, Part A 58 (2016): 57-66. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In contrast to the previously widespread view that Kant's work was largely in dialogue with the physical sciences, recent scholarship has highlighted Kant's interest in and contributions to the life sciences. Scholars are now investigating the extent to which Kant appealed to and incorporated insights from the life sciences and considering the ways he may have contributed to a new conception of living beings. The scholarship remains, however, divided in its interest: historians of science are concerned with the content of Kant's claims, and the ways in which they may or may not have contributed to the emerging science of life, while historians of philosophy focus on the systematic justifications for Kant's claims, e.g., the methodological and theoretical underpinnings of Kant's statement that living beings are mechanically inexplicable. My aim in this paper is to bring together these two strands of scholarship into dialogue by showing how Kant's methodological concerns (specifically, his notion of reflective judgment) contributed to his conception of living beings and to the ontological concern with life as a distinctive object of study. I argue that although Kant's explicit statement was that biology could not be a science, his implicit and more fundamental claim was that the study of living beings necessitates a distinctive mode of thought, a mode that is essentially analogical. I consider the implications of this view, and argue that it is by developing a new methodology for grasping organized beings that Kant makes his most important contribution to the new science of life.
——. See: Gaukroger, Stephen, and Dalia Nassar.
——. See: Helbig, Daniela, and Dalia Nassar.
Navarro Cordon, Juan Manuel, Rafael V. Orden Jiménez, and Rogelio Rovira, eds. Nuevas perspectivas sobre la filosofía de Kant. Madrid: Escolar y Mayo Editories, 2016. [334 p.] [WC]
——. See: Orden Jiménez, Rafael V., Juan M. Navarro Cordón, and Rogelio Rovíra, eds.
Newton, Alxandra. “Non-Conceptualism and Knowledge in Lucy Allais’s Manifest Reality.” Kantian Review 21.2 (2016): 273-82. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Lucy Allais’s Manifest Reality presents a systematic discussion of the role that Kant assigns to concepts in making knowledge of objects possible. In this paper, I ascribe to Allais a version of non-conceptualism, according to which knowledge is a ‘hybrid’ or loose unity of concept and intuition; concept relates to intuition as form relates to matter in an artefact. I will show how this view has trouble accommodating the distinction between knowledge and accidentally true belief, and how it leads to objectionable forms of idealism.
Nunez, Tyke. “Definitions of Kant’s Categories.” Kant: Studies on Mathematics in the Critical Philosophy. Eds. Emily Carson and Lisa Shabel (op cit.). 113-39. [M]
Nyholm, Sven. “On Kant’s Idea of Humanity as an End in Itself.” European Journal of Philosophy 24.2 (2016): 358-74. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Writers like Christine Korsgaard and Allen Wood understand Kant's idea of rational nature as an end in itself as a commitment to a substantive value. This makes it hard for them to explain the supposed equivalence between the universal law and humanity formulations of the categorical imperative, since the former does not appear to assert any substantive value. Nor is it easy for defenders of value‐based readings to explain Kant's claim that the law‐giving nature of practical reason makes all beings with practical reason regard the idea of a rational nature as an end in itself. This article seeks to replace these value‐based readings with a reading of the idea of rational nature as an end that fits better with the overall argument of the Groundwork.
Olk, Carsten. Kants Theorie der Synthesis: zu einem grundlegenden Gedanken der kritischen Philosophie. Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2016. [#, # p.] [WC]
Olson, Michael J. “Kant on anatomy and the status of the life sciences.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Part A 58 (2016): 77-84. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper contributes to recent interest in Kant's engagement with the life sciences by focusing on one corner of those sciences that has received comparatively little attention: physical and comparative anatomy. By attending to remarks spread across Kant's writings, we gain some insight into Kant's understanding of the disciplinary limitations but also the methodological sophistication of the study of anatomy and physiology. Insofar as Kant highlights anatomy as a paradigmatic science guided by the principle of teleology in the Critique of the Power of Judgment, a more careful study of Kant's discussions of anatomy promises to illuminate some of the obscurities of that text and of his understanding of the life sciences more generally. In the end, it is argued, Kant's ambivalence with regard to anatomy gives way to a pessimistic conclusion about the possibility that anatomy, natural history, and, by extension, the life sciences more generally might one day become true natural sciences.
O’Neill, Onora. “Enactable and Enforceable: Kant’s Criteria for Right and Virtue.” Kant-Studien 107.1 (2016): 111-25. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant’s distinction between duties of right and of virtue remains controversial, for a number of reasons. A close look at the distinctions he draws and the claims that he makes suggests that a distinction between the requirements of enforceable duties of right and of unenforceable duties of virtue is neither exclusive nor exhaustive. It is not exclusive because it is possible to fulfil duties of right as a matter of principle, in which case what is done is both right and virtuous. It is not exhaustive because certain duties, among them the duty to enter a civil condition and duties of equity, are not in principle enforceable, yet are duties of right.
——. “La concepción de la razón pública en Kant.” [Spanish; Kant’s conception of public reason] Translated and introduced by Laura Herrero Olivera. Con-Textos Kantianos 4 (2016): 305-22. [M] [online]
Onof, Christian. “Drawing on Sartre’s Ontology to Interpret Kant’s Notion of Freedom.” Comparing Kant and Sartre. Ed. Sorin Baiasu (op cit.). 77-111. [M]
——. “Is There Room for Nonconceptual Content in Kant’s Critical Philosophy?” Kantian Nonconceptualism. Ed. Dennis Schulting (op cit.). 199-226. [PW]
Orden Jiménez, Rafael V., Robert Hanna, Robert Louden, Jacinto Rivera de Rosales, and Nuria Sánchez Madrid, eds. Kant’s Shorter Writings: Critical Paths Outside the Critiques. Newcastle-upon-Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2016. [viii, 490 p.] [M]
I. Logics and Reality in Kant’s Transcendental Idealism
Robert Hanna (Directions in Space, Non-Conceptual Form, and the Foundations of Transcendental Idealism),
Jacinto Rivera de Rosales (The Logical, the Real and the Existence of God in The Only Possible Argument (1763)),
Alba Jiménez (The Duisburg Nachlaß as a Key to Interpreting Salomon Maimon’s Reading of the Transcendental Deduction of Categories),
Helke Panknin-Schappert (Awakening from his Dogmatic Slumber: David Hume and Immanuel Kant’s Reception of Hume’s Sceptical Doubts in the Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics),
Fernando M. F. Silva (The Combined Force of Sensory Impressions: Kant’s View on the Benefits of Poetry to Philosophy),
II. Moral Questions: Intelligible Temporality and Obligation
Margit Ruffing (A Little Bit Evil? Reflections on Part One of Kant’s Religion),
Anselmo Aportone (Mysteries of Feeling versus Horizons of Reflection: On the ‘Super-sensible Substratum’ of Experience and the (Public) Use of Reason),
Gualtiero Lorini (‘Till I die I will not remove mine integrity from me’: On Kant’s ‘Anthropoligical’ Theodicy),
Giovanni Panno (The End of All Things and Kant’s Revolution in Disposition),
Francesca Fantasia (Das Ende aller Dinge: The Duratio Noumenon and the Problem of the Atemporality of Gesinnung),
Antonino Falduto (Freedom and Obligation: The Moral Debate between Kant and Hegel (1781-1807)),
Maria Borges (High Doses of Hellebore),
III. Teleology and Philosophy of History
Renato Valois (On the Use of Teleological Principles in Biology),
Davide Poggi (Kant and Soemmerring: A ‘Two Letters Correspondence’ between Transcendental Philosophy and Medicine),
Paolo Pecere (Kant’s Über das Organ der Seele and the Limits of Physiology: Arguments and Legacy),
Julio Esteves (Freedom and Nature in Kant’s Philosophy of History),
Joel T. Kline (Three Problems with the Theoretical Reading of the Idea of a Universal History in Context of the Critique of Pure Reason),
Francesco V. Tommasi (Kant’s ‘Historical Sign’ as Sacrament: On the Distinction between Revolution and Church),
IV. Enlightenment and Public Realm
Robert Louden (Argue but Obey? Questioning Kant’s Enlightenment),
Ferdinando L. Marcolungo (Variations on the Possible: ‘What Does it Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking?’),
Sandra Zakutna (Political Issues in Kant’s Philosophy),
Jesús González Fisac (Enlightenment as a Philosophical Drama: Kant and Foucault on the Political Field),
Alberto Pirni (The Philosopher’s Public Calling: Problems and Implications of Kant’s Proclamation of the Imminent Conclusion of a Treaty of Perpetual Peace in Philosophy),
Gaetano Chiurazzi (The Critique as a Passage of the Reason from the State of Nature to the State of Law),
Soledad García Ferrer (The Concept of Work in some of Kant’s Shorter Writings),
V. Doctrine of Right and Cosmopolitanism
Federica Trentani (Politics, Urteilskraft and the Realization of Right: Kant’s Contextual Perspective),
Roberto R. Aramayo (Right as a sSign of a Philosophical Chiliasm: Freedom and its Evolution in Kant’s Opuscules),
Andrea Faggion (The Duty to Leave the State of Nature and Non-Coercive Rights in the Civil Condition),
Macarena Marey (Synthetic a Priori Propositions of Right: Kant on Political Obligation),
Gustavo Leyva (Kant’s Cosmopolitanism in Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht (1784)),
Nuria Sánchez Madrid (Passive Citizenship, Poverty and Peace: Kant’s Cosmopolitanism in the Shorter Writings),
Marita Rainsborough (Rethinking Kant’s Shorter Writings: Kant’s Philosophy of History and Today’s Cosmopolitanism).
——, Juan M. Navarro Cordón, and Rogelio Rovíra, eds. Kant en nuestro tiempo: Las realidades en que habitamos. Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2016. [432 p.] [PW]
——, ed. See: Navarro Cordon, Juan Manuel, Rafael V. Orden Jiménez, and Rogelio Rovira, eds.
Orr, James. “Teleology as a Theological Problem in Kant's Pre-Critical Thought.” Modern Theology 32.4 (2016): 522-43. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The author describes Immanuel Kant's integration of teleological and mechanistic principles with articular reference to two key pre-critical texts to elucidate the broad continuities of his solution across the Critical turn. The author explains how the appropriate philosophical application of teleological principles to the natural world continue to exercise his contemporary interpreters. Physico-theology is one of the two or three dominant themes of the second half of the third Critique.
O’Shea, James R. “Concepts of Objects as Prescribing Laws: A Kantian and Pragmatist Line of Thought.” Pragmatism, Kant, and Transcendental Philosophy. Eds. Gabriele Gava and Robert Stern (op cit.). 196-216. [M]
Ostaric, Lara. “Creating the Absolute: Kant’s Conception of Genial Creation in Schlegel, Novalis and Schelling.” Kant Yearbook: Kant and German Idealism 8 (2016): 63-86. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In contrast to the current tendencies in secondary literature to interpret the notion of the Absolute of the Early Romantics and Schelling from either an epistemological or an ontological perspective, I argue that these philosophers found in Kant’s notion of genius in the third Critique a model for the Absolute that combines both perspectives in the act of the artist’s free creation. However, I contend that Schlegel and Novalis followed more closely the modesty of Kant’s Critical philosophy, both epistemologically and ontologically: epistemologically as a lack of our capacity to know and ontologically as a lack of our capacity to fully realize the Absolute. With their conceptions of the Absolute as an infinite becoming and an endless oscillation, they defied philosophical systems with an absolutely certain principle as its basis and embraced Kant’s doctrine of the ignorance of things as they are in themselves. In contrast, Schelling’s philosophy from its early beginnings was marked by ambition to extend Kant’s notion of the Unconditioned from both epistemological and ontological perspectives. For him, an act of genial creation was equivalent to a full realization of the Absolute, which presupposed and afforded its theoretical transparency.
Paeth, Scott R. “Feeling, Thinking, Doing: Ethics and Religious Self-Consciousness in Kant and Schleiermacher.” Philosophy & Theology 28.2 (2016): 311-29. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article examines the relationship between Schleiermacher’s conception of religious self-consciousness and morality. It argues that Schleiermacher’s theological approach to morality provides a possible alternative to Kant’s philosophical attempt to ground religious belief in practical reason. Schleiermacher grounds morality in religious faith rather than the other way around. After tracing Kant’s approach to the question of religious faith and ethical thought through its development in the work of Fichte and Schelling, the article considers in more detail Schleiermacher’s approach to this issue.
Palermo, Sandra V. Rev. of Intuizione intellettuale e sintesi trascendentale in Kant, by Giuseppe Giannetto (2014). [Italian] Studi Kantiani 29 (2016): 193-96. [M]
Palmquist, Stephen R. Comprehensive Commentary on Kant’s Religion Within the Bounds of Bare Reason. Chichester, West Sussex/Malden, MA: John Wiley & Sons, 2016. [xxix, 604 p.] [WC]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Stephen Palmquist's Comprehensive Commentary provides the first definitive explication of Kant's Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason. The volume includes the full text of Kant's original work in a revised version of Pluhar's translation, divided into short quotations. Palmquist offers editorial commentary on each segment, as well as detailed notes tracing other important issues, including problems of translation, Kant's sources, and key arguments in the recent secondary literature. -- The Commentary reflects contemporary currents in Kant scholarship and takes Kant seriously as a theorist on religion rather than merely a philosopher who discusses religion as an appendix to his ethics. Palmquist's distinctive interpretation provides detailed evidence that Kant's approach is not reductionist; a balanced focus on both of Kant's two so-called "experiments"; and an appreciation for and acknowledgment of the deep respect Kant had for the Christian tradition, despite his criticisms. In doing so, Palmquist offers Kant's students and scholars an essential reference book, demonstrating that Kant's arguments in Religion not only are cogent, but have clear and profound practical applications to the way religion is actually practiced in the world today.
——. “The Paradox of Inwardness in Kant and Kierkegaard.” Journal of Religious Ethics 44.4 (2016): 738-51. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Aside from bioethics, the main theme of Ronald Green's lifework has been an exploration of the relation between religion and morality, with special emphasis on the philosophies of Immanuel Kant and Søren Kierkegaard. This essay summarizes and assesses his work on this theme by examining, in turn, four of his relevant books. Religious Reason (1978) introduced a new method of comparative religion based on Kant's model of a rational religion. Religion and Moral Reason (1988) expanded on this project, clarifying that religious traditions cannot be reduced to their moral grounding. Kierkegaard and Kant: The Hidden Debt (1992) offered bold new evidence that Kant, not Hegel, was the philosopher whose ideas primarily shaped Kierkegaard's overtly religious philosophy; both philosophers focused on the problem of how to understand the relation between moral reasoning and historical religion. And Kant and Kierkegaard on Time and Eternity (2011) republished ten essays that explore various aspects of this theme in greater depth. I argue that throughout these works Green defends a 'paradox of inwardness': principles or ideals that are by their nature essentially inward end up requiring outward manifestation in order to be confirmed or fully justified as real.
——. “Kant’s Perspectival Solution to the Mind-Body Problem.” Culture and Dialogue 4.1 (2016): 194-213. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant’s Critical philosophy solves Descartes’ mind-body problem, replacing the dualism of the “physical influx” theory he defended in his early career. Kant’s solution, like all Critical theories, is “perspectival,” acknowledging deep truth in both opposing extremes. Minds are not separate from bodies, but a manifestation of them, each viewed from a different perspective. Kant’s transcendental conditions of knowledge portray the mind not as creating the physical world, but as necessarily structuring our knowledge of objects with a set of unconscious assumptions; yet our pre-conscious (pre-mental) encounter with an assumed spatio-temporal, causal nexus is entirely physical. Hence, today’s “eliminative materialism” and “folk psychology” are both ways of considering this age-old issue, neither being an exclusive explanation. A Kantian solution to this version of the mind-body problem is: eliminative materialism is good science; but only folk psychologists can consistently be eliminative materialists. Indeed, the mind-body problem exemplifies a feature of all cultural situations: dialogue between opposing perspectives is required for understanding as such to arise.
——. Rev. of Johann August Eberhard and Immanuel Kant, Preparation for Natural Theology: With Kant's Notes and the Danzig Rational Theology Transcript, edited and translated by Courtney D. Fugate and John Hymers (2016). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (Jun 2016, #28). [M] [online]
Panknin-Schappert, Helke. “Awakening from his Dogmatic Slumber: David Hume and Immanuel Kant’s Reception of Hume’s Sceptical Doubts in the Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics.” Kant’s Shorter Writings: Critical Paths Outside the Critiques. Eds. Rafael V. Orden Jiménez, Robert Hanna, Robert Louden, Jacinto Rivera de Rosales, and Nuria Sánchez Madrid (op cit.). 55-67. [M]
Panno, Giovanni. “The End of All Things and Kant’s Revolution in Disposition.” Kant’s Shorter Writings: Critical Paths Outside the Critiques. Eds. Rafael V. Orden Jiménez, Robert Hanna, Robert Louden, Jacinto Rivera de Rosales, and Nuria Sánchez Madrid (op cit.). 132-53. [M]
Parsons, Charles. “Reply to Feferman, Koellner, Tait, and Sieg.” Journal of Philosophy 113.5-6 (2016): pages. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: I comment on Feferman’s views on set theory, in particular criticizing a priori arguments claiming that the continuum hypothesis has no determinate truth value and commenting on his responses to my paper on his skepticism about set theory. I respond to criticisms of his of the structuralism that I have advocated and comment on his view of proof theory. On Koellner’s paper, I register little disagreement but note a difference of sympathy about views such as constructivism. On Tait’s paper, I note that Kant gives more play to the notion of whole number than Tait seems to allow and that Kant’s conception of real numbers is unclear. Responding to Sieg’s paper, I note his emphasis on how much mathematics and its foundations changed from Kant’s time to that of Dedekind and Hilbert and mention my effort to find a limited role for an intuition distantly descended from Kant’s.
Pascoe, Jordan. “Patriarchy and Enlightenment in Immanuel Kant (1784).” Patriarchal Moments: Reading Patriarchal Texts. Eds. Cesare Cuttica and Gaby Mahlberg (London/New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2016). 115-22??. [WC]
——. Rev. of Kant and Colonialism, ed. by Katrin Flikschuh and Lea Ypi (2014). Kantian Review 21.1 (2016): 127-30. [PI]
Pasternack, Lawrence. Rev. of Comprehensive Commentary on Kant’s Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason, by Stephen R. Palmquist (2015). Kantian Review 21.3 (2016): 516-21. [PW]
——. Rev. of The Highest Good in Aristotle and Kant, edited by Joachim Aufderheide and Ralf M. Bader (2015). Kantian Review 21.2 (2016): 318-23. [M]
Pauer-Studer, Herlinde. “‘A Community of Rational Beings’. Kant’s Realm of Ends and the Dinstinction between Internal and External Freedom.” Kant-Studien 107.1 (2016): 125-59. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper proposes a new account of the relationship between Kant’s ethics and Kant’s philosophy of right. I reject the claim of some philosophers that Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals cannot offer a foundation for Kant’s philosophy of right. While I agree that the basic principles of Kant’s philosophy of right cannot be deduced from Kant’s ethical Categorical Imperatives, I try to show that we find in Kant’s Groundwork the normative resources for grounding his philosophy of right. My thesis is that Kant’s conception of a realm of ends, as he develops it in the Groundwork, provides a common normative source for Kant’s ethical Categorical Imperatives, on the one hand, and the Universal Principle of Right, on the other. Agreement on common universal principles, which is crucial for Kant’s notion of a realm of ends provides, I will argue, a justification of the ethical Categorical Imperatives and the Universal Principle of Right.
Peterson, Jonathan. Rev. of Kant’s Politics in Context, by Reidar Maliks (2014). Ethics 126.2 (2016): 513-17. [PI]
Pavão, Aguinaldo. “Coerção política e dever de obediência: considerações a partir de Kant e Rawls.” [Portuguese; Political coercion and duty of obedience: remarks from Kant and Rawls] Kant e-Prints 11.3 (2016): 28-40. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article takes as a general reference the claims of Kant and Rawls about the legitimacy of the demands that political power makes on individuals to obey laws. It is tried to take a step beyond these two authors, respecting their differences, towards the thesis that the duty of obedience could only be established by means of voluntarists, that is, by respect to moral autonomy of individuals. In this way, both the Rawlsian alternative, certainly more attractive in our times, as the Kantian proposal, are considered insufficient. It is sustained on the basis of Kant's moral philosophy from the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and Critique of Practical Reason, that the moral authority of a law can only be accepted if it agrees with the autonomy of my will. Thus, the only way one can envisage in order to political obligation to be morally justified is the individual's express consent.
Pecere, Paolo. “Kant’s Über das Organ der Seele and the Limits of Physiology: Arguments and Legacy.” Kant’s Shorter Writings: Critical Paths Outside the Critiques. Eds. Rafael V. Orden Jiménez, Robert Hanna, Robert Louden, Jacinto Rivera de Rosales, and Nuria Sánchez Madrid (op cit.). 214-30. [M]
——. Rev. of Kant's Construction of Nature, by Michael Friedman (2013). [English] Con-Textos Kantianos 3 (2016): 437-45. [M] [online]
Peláez Cedrés, Álvaro. “The Transcendental Aesthetic.” Contemporary Studies in Kantian Philosophy 1 (2016): 80-92. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper focuses on the Transcendental Aesthetic. It starts with the idea that, according to Kant, objective perceptual cognition (Erkenntnis) and knowledge (Wissen) is possible only in virtue of the combination of the activities of the faculties of sensibility and understanding in judgements of experience. But this does not entail that there cannot be cognitions of particular apparent or phenomenal objects yielded by the operations of sensibility outside the context of judgements of experience. That is to say, I share the contemporary Kantian nonconceptualist view that, according to Kant, the contribution of sensibility is functionally and representationally separable from that of the understanding, since the structural conditions of sensibility, which are essentially different from those of the understanding, independently enable the cognition of particular objects.
Peña, Javier. “Kant en la encrucijada del cosmopolitismo.” [Spanish; Kant on the crossroad of cosmopolitanism] ethic@ 15.3 (2016): 443-66. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant is a crucial figure in the history of cosmopolitanism: previous cosmopolitan ideas and approaches converge on him, and his proposals originate a great amount of later cosmopolitanism. The Prussian philosopher addresses the central questions about cosmopolitanism that are still important: what it means, how to ground a cosmopolitan proposal, how to institutionalize it. Any present critical reflection on cosmopolitanism must take Kant into account.The aim of this article is to attend to the lessons of Kantian cosmopolitanism about these previous questions, with an eye to how a cosmopolitan proposal could and should be nowadays realized. For Kant cosmopolitanism is something more than a metaphorical brotherhood: it is a project of peaceful world republic united by shared legal rules. He offers reasons to be a cosmopolitan: the increasing effective interdependence of men but, above all, their shared moral condition of autonomous subjects that owe each other mutual respect and must not be mere instruments of the power or profit of others. Furthermore, he points to possible ways to incarnate cosmopolitanism in a universal political community grounded on law.
Perez, Daniel Omar. “Semântica, natureza humana e objetos externos. Divergência entre semântica transcendental e semântica cognitiva.” [Portuguese] Kant e-Prints 11.1 (2016): 103-22. [M] [online]
Perin, Adriano. “Lambert’s Influence on Kant’s Theoretical Philosophy.” Con-Textos Kantianos 3 (2016): 44-54. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper aims at presenting a reconstruction of the main theses of Lambert’s thought and their role in the establishment of Kant’s theoretical philosophy. In order to do so, the paper is divided into three sections. Initially, a consideration of Lambert’s attempt to assure illusion (Schein) within the domain of phenomenology (Körperwelt) and to institute the domain of metaphysical truth (Intellectualwelt) is carried out. Secondly, Kant’s first step away from Lambert’s proposal, which is presented in the Inaugural Dissertation’s thesis that the sensible and intellectual domains of knowledge are grounded upon two distinct and intransmutable faculties, is taken into account. Finally, Kant’s definitive step away from Lambert’s proposal, i.e., the justification of appearances in the Duisburg Nachlaβ in an objective and non-illusory domain, due to the determination of the faculty of understanding, is pointed out.
Perini Santos, Ernesto. “This is not an indexical concept! A note on Robert Hanna's theory of natural kind concepts.” Kant e-Prints 11.1 (2016): 46-57. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: According to Robert Hanna, natural kind concepts have an indexical component, represented by ‘THIS BODY’, that refers to the totality of matter found in any given possible world, and an attributive component, made up of phenomenological identifying features. I will argue that there is no place for indexicals in Hanna‘s theory. Initially, demonstratives don't select worlds, as his theory requires. Moreover, even as we try to amend his theory, either giving a proper reference to demonstratives or postulating the indexical reference to worlds by other linguistic mechanisms, we still can‘t find a place for indexicals. The reason is that the satisfactional semantics of general terms, needed to vindicate his approach of modalities as evaluated at a rationally shaped modal space, requires no indexical component.
Peters, Julia. Rev. of Understanding Hegel’s Mature Critique of Kant, by John McCumber (2014). Internationales Jahrbuch des Deutschen Idealismus/International Yearbook of German Idealism: Bewusstsein/Consciousness, eds. Dina Emundts and Sally Sedgwick. 11 (2016): 291-95. [PW]
Peterson, Jonathan. Rev. of Kant’s Politics in Context, by Reidar Maliks (2014). Ethics 126.2 (2016): 513-17. [PW]
Petonzio, Silvia. Rev. of The Highest Good in Kant’s Philosophy, edited by Thomas Höwing (2016). Con-Textos Kantianos 4 (2016): 380-90. [M] [online]
Petzoldt, Matthias. “Die Bibel verstehen können müssen? Diskussion um Kants Beitrag zu einem Begründungsproblem theologischer Erkenntnis.” Bibelhermeneutik und dogmatische Theologie nach Kant. Eds. Harald Matern, Alexander Heit, and Enno Edzard Popkes (op cit.). 69-90. [M]
Pfleiderer, Georg. “Zum (Anti-)Kantianismus protestantischer Ethik im 20. Jahrhundert. Eine Fallstudie.” Bibelhermeneutik und dogmatische Theologie nach Kant. Eds. Harald Matern, Alexander Heit, and Enno Edzard Popkes (op cit.). 343-65. [M]
Picardi, Roberta. Rev. of Immanuel Kant, Idea per una storia universale in prospettiva cosmopolitica, edited by Roberto Mordacci, translated by Stefano Bacin and Francesca Pongiglione (2015). [Italian] Studi Kantiani 29 (2016): 217-19. [M]
Pickering, Mark. “Kant’s Theoretical Reasons for Belief in Things in Themselves.” Kant-Studien 107.4 (2016): 589-616. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: I argue that Kant’s commitment to the existence of things in themselves takes the form of a commitment short of knowledge that does not violate the limitations on knowledge which he lays down. I will argue that Kant’s commitment fits his description of what he calls “doctrinal belief”: acceptance of the existence of things in themselves which is subjectively sufficient but not objectively sufficient. I outline two ways in which we accept the existence of things in themselves which are subjectively sufficient. First, we must accept the existence of appearances, which requires us to accept the existence of things in themselves. Second, we must accept the existence of an unconditioned ground of appearances.
Pihlström, Sami. “Subjectivity as Negativity and as a Limit: On the Metaphysics and Ethics of the Transcendental Self, Pragmatically Naturalized.” Pragmatism, Kant, and Transcendental Philosophy. Eds. Gabriele Gava and Robert Stern (op cit.). 217-38. [M]
Pimpinella, Pietro, ed. See: Lamarra, Antonio, Pietro Pimpinella, and Ada Russo, eds.
Pinheiro, Ulysses. “A dinâmica do passado e do futuro.” [Portuguese] Estudos Kantianos 4.2 (2016): 198-202. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The rejection of an exhaustive opposition between realism and antirealism in the determination of personal identity conduces Leibniz, in his critiques to Locke in the New Essays, to criticize both conventionalism and the thesis on the irreality of the past – both of them elements of Locke’s theory. Leibniz attacks the thesis on the irreality of the past not because he adopts an anti-justificationist thesis, antitetical to Locke’s, but, instead, due to the radicalization of his rival’s justificationist thesis. Conventionalism, on its turn, will be proven as false by the fact that the “self ” and the infinite set of its past, present and future perceptions perfectly coincide. In the conclusion of this paper, we will see how some passages of Kant’s Anthropology rend him, contrary to what would initially be supposed , closer to Leibniz than to Locke.
Pinheiro Walla, Alice. “Common Possession of the Earth and Cosmopolitan Right.” Kant-Studien 107.1 (2016): 160-78. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Common possession of the earth was a prominent idea in seventeenth-century modern philosophy. In this paper I will argue that Kant not only provides a secularized version of common possession of the earth but also radically departs from the conception of his natural law theory predecessors. I argue that Kant’s account of cosmopolitan right seeks to address the same problem as Grotius’ right of necessity, namely the implausibility of assuming inflexible acquired rights when this would go against the rationale for introducing these rights. However, while Grotius intended to excuse violations of private property in cases of necessity, Kant restricts his discussion to the right of host peoples to reject entrants in their territory. I show that in Kant’s account, to deny life-saving occupation of space to another being who is in principle just as entitled as anyone else to any place of the earth is to contradict the very justification for the territorial rights of states. This is because the permission to control territory and the right of the involuntary visitor to be admitted are based on the same legal foundation or Rechtsgrund, namely, the original community of the earth.
——. Rev. of Kant’s Lectures on Ethics: A Critical Guide, ed. by Lara Denis and Oliver Sensen (2015). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (Oct 2016, #13). [M] [online]
Pinkard, Terry. Rev. of La raison des normes: Essai sur Kant, by Jean-François Kervégan (2015). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (Aug 2016, #38). [M] [online]
Pirni, Alberto. “The Philosopher’s Public Calling: Problems and Implications of Kant’s Proclamation of the Imminent Conclusion of a Treaty of Perpetual Peace in Philosophy.” Kant’s Shorter Writings: Critical Paths Outside the Critiques. Eds. Rafael V. Orden Jiménez, Robert Hanna, Robert Louden, Jacinto Rivera de Rosales, and Nuria Sánchez Madrid (op cit.). 343-56. [M]
Podoksik, Efraim. “Neo-kantianism and Georg Simmel’s Interpretation of Kant.” Modern Intellectual History 13.3 (2016): 597-622. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This essay explores the development of Georg Simmel's interpretation of Immanuel Kant's philosophy in the context of neo-Kantianism and its preoccupation with the question of unity in modern diversity. It argues that the neo-Kantian movement can be divided into two periods: in the first, unity was addressed with regard to Kant's epistemology; in the second period, the main issue was the overall coherence of Kantian teaching. Simmel, who belonged to the younger generation of neo-Kantians, absorbed the conclusions of the previous generation that purged Kantian epistemology from its metaphysical foundations related to the noumenal world. Yet he did not share the views of his peers who considered Kant to be the philosopher of cultural plurality. On the contrary, he argued that Kant's system is thoroughly intellectualistic, and that ethics, aesthetics and religion within it are subordinated to logic. At the same time, his own philosophy presupposed cultural plurality akin to that of other neo-Kantians. In other words, Simmel abandoned Kant in order to develop his own version of neo-Kantianism.
Poellner, Peter. “Action, Value, and Autonomy: A Quasi-Sartrean View.” Comparing Kant and Sartre. Ed. Sorin Baiasu (op cit.). 132-57. [M]
Poggi, Davide. “Kant and Soemmerring: A ‘Two Letters Correspondence’ between Transcendental Philosophy and Medicine.” Kant’s Shorter Writings: Critical Paths Outside the Critiques. Eds. Rafael V. Orden Jiménez, Robert Hanna, Robert Louden, Jacinto Rivera de Rosales, and Nuria Sánchez Madrid (op cit.). 200-13. [M]
——, and Niccolò Caramel. “Se non esistesse un luogo dove stare al sicuro? Terremoto e sublime: dagli scritti pre-critici alla Kritik der Urteilskraft.” [Italian] Estudos Kantianos 4.1 (2016): 145-76. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The dreadful Lisbon earthquake, which occurred on 1 November 1755, did not only cause an untold socioeconomic devastation, but it also profoundly affected both public imagination (by undermining everyday certainties) and the savants of 18th century Europe, stimulating an intense debate (which covered the entire spectrum of points of view, ranging from the theological to the scientific). Young Kant is a clear exemplum of the interest aroused by this unprecedented seismic phenomenon amongst European thinkers of the Enlightenment: between January and April 1756, he published three brief essays entirely devoted to the scientific description of the Portuguese earthquake, essays that must be understood in the context of his studies on natural philosophy and, in particular, on the age, origin, and formation of the Earth (which were the topics of the essays of 1754 and 1755). With this paper, we aim to draw the Reader’s attention to the evolution that has characterised, in our opinion, Kant’s theses concerning the value and the benefit of the earthquakes, from the pre-critical to the critical period. We intend to focus on the Kritik der Urteilskraft (1790), in which Kant seems to exclude earthquakes from the list of catastrophic natural events, the experience of which generates the concept of dynamic sublime “wenn wir uns nur in Sicherheit befinden” (KU, AA 05: 261). Why do earthquakes have no place in this discourse? Namely, does the earthquake lose its catastrophic essence in Kant’s eyes, or is it judged to be so terrifying that it deprives man of rational thought and suppresses any glimmer of further interpretation?
Pomerleau, Wayne. Rev. of German Idealism, by Matthew C. Altman (2014). Continental Philosophy Review 49.2 (2016): 251-57. [PW]
Popkes, Enno Edzard. “Immanuel Kant und die Entwicklungsgeschichte historisch-kritischer Exegese. Beobachtungen zu den Werken von Heinrich Eberhard Gottlob Paulus, Friedrich Lücke und Johannes Weiß.” Bibelhermeneutik und dogmatische Theologie nach Kant. Eds. Harald Matern, Alexander Heit, and Enno Edzard Popkes (op cit.). 307-24. [M]
Porcheddu, Rocco. Der Zweck an sich selbst: eine Untersuchung zu Kants "Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten". Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2016. [xi, 193 p.] [PW]
——. “Wie argumentiert Kant in den Sektionen 2 und 3 des Deduktionskapitels der Grundlegung?” Con-Textos Kantianos 3 (2016): 231-52. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper, once again, deals with the central arguments for human’s free will in the second and third section of GMSIII, with particular regard to the famous circle of freedom and morality in section three. It turns out that there is no proof of freedom of the will in section 2; rather the argument in section 2 anticipates the proper proof in the third section by sketching it. The third section indeed presents a complete chain of evidence leading form reason and epistemic freedom to practical freedom and morality. However, this reading depends on the interpretation of the circle as a petitio principii, which has a lot to commend it. Nevertheless, this very reading seems to collide with Kant’s own recapitulation of the central arguments, which, in his view, resolve the circle.
Posada Kubissa, María Luisa. “Observaciones, universalismo ético y Kant: lectura desde el feminismo filosófico.” [Spanish; Observations, ethical universalism and Kant: a reading matter from the philosophical feminism] Revista de Estudios Kantianos 1.1 (2016): pp. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The Observations on the feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime is one of the places where Kant more explicitly deals with the characterology of the "fair sex" and the difference between the sexes. From the blunt sexual diversity present in this precritical writing, we will go beyond it with the intention to show how this concept casts doubts on the subsequent positions of the Kantian ethical universalism. We will follow the philosophical feminism which suspects that such universalism denies itself, because it excludes half of the humankind from it.
Poulakos, John. Rev. of Kant and the Promise of Rhetoric, by Scott R. Stroud (2014). Kant Studies Online (2016): 42-47. [M] [online]
Pozzo, Riccaardo. Rev. of Immanuel Kant: The Very Idea of a Critique of Pure Reason, by J. Colin McQuillan (2016). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (Nov 2016, #16). [M] [online]
Puls, Heiko. “Kant’s Justification of Parental Duties.” Kantian Review 21.1 (2016): 53-75. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In his applied moral philosophy, Kant formulates the parents’ duty to make their child happy. I argue that, for Kant, this duty is an ad hoc attempt at compensating for the parental guilt of having brought a person into the condition of existence – and hence also having created her need for happiness – on their own initiative. I argue that Kant’s considerations regarding parental duties and human reproduction in general imply arguments for an ethically justified anti-natalism, but that this position is abolished in his teleology for meta-ethical reasons.
Puls, Heiko. “Was versteht Kant unter einem „übersinnlichen Gebrauche der Kategorien“? Eine Interpretation von KpV, Ak. 5, S. 5.24–6.1.” Die “Kategorien der Freiheit” in Kants praktischer Philosophie. Ed. Stephan Zimmermann (op cit.). 77-90. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The expression of a „supersensible use of the categories“ utilised in the „Preface“ to the Critique of Practical Reason has barely received any attention in literature on the „categories of freedom“. Typically, it is interpreted solely in the sense of an extension of reason towards the supersensible, which was to be justified by the insight into the practical reality of freedom legitimised by the fact of reason. This paper analyses KpV, Ac. 5, pp. 5.24-6.1 against the backdrop of Kant’s reflections on the categories of freedom in the „Second Chapter“ of the analytic and the role of the non-schematised categories in the second edition of the first Critique. It attempts to show that by the phrase „supersensible use of the categories“ in the „Preface“ Kant refers to the categories of freedom - and that these are, thus, declaredly and systematically at the centre of the second Critique.
Raatz, Georg. “Religion als Aufklärung - Anmerkungen zum Religions- und Christentumsverständnis John Lockes (1632-1704).” Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie 58.3 (2016): 309-24. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article reconstructs John Locke's conception of religion in his Reasonableness of Christianity (1695). In this text he grounds the function of supernatural revelation for genesis of common cognition, application und motivation of ethical and religious basic verities. Georg Raatz places this theory in line to his previous Essay concerning human understanding (1690). In historical regard Christianity, especially the person of Jesus, has three functions: 1st Message of a monotheistic conception of God, of moral sense and recompense. 2nd Accreditation of these messages' divineness via miracles. 3rd Ethical motivation through recompense's accreditation via Jesus' raisings from dead und his own resurrection. With this conception Locke initiates a historical development which leads to Gotthold Ephraim Lessing's Die Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts and Immanuel Kant's Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft.
Rähme, Boris. “Transcendental Arguments, Epistemically Constrained Truth, and Moral Discourse.” Pragmatism, Kant, and Transcendental Philosophy. Eds. Gabriele Gava and Robert Stern (op cit.). 259-85. [M]
Rainsborough, Marita. “Rethinking Kant’s Shorter Writings: Kant’s Philosophy of History and Today’s Cosmopolitanism.” Kant’s Shorter Writings: Critical Paths Outside the Critiques. Eds. Rafael V. Orden Jiménez, Robert Hanna, Robert Louden, Jacinto Rivera de Rosales, and Nuria Sánchez Madrid (op cit.). 473-90. [M]
Rambo, David. “Of Fear and Exaltation.” Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities 21:2 (2016): 83-98. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This essay considers the political economic ideology in recent popular cinematic depictions of finance in terms of Immanuel Kant’s aesthetics of the sublime. Think, for instance, of the contingent and risky peaks and valleys of the stock market’s price paths as the jagged mountains that inspire the fear and terror necessary for sublime feeling. I give a sustained reading of how the Kantian sublime operates in Neil Burger’s 2011 film Limitless. By subordinating both the technics of neuro-augmentation and the contingency of the economy to an innate human reason, the protagonist shows audiences what it might mean today to experience sublimity – but not without hinting at a latent anti-Kantian fissure that would reorient us against this bourgeois discourse.
Raulet, Gérard. “Humboldt était-il kantien? Kant était-il libéral? Sur la confusion entre libéralisme et républicanisme.” Con-Textos Kantianos 4 (2016): 193-208. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: There is a legend counting that Humboldt would be a Kantian. The sole purpose of this legend is to enlist Kant on the side of the liberalism and to increase the confusion between liberalism and republicanism. The present study objects to these ideological strategies. It shows that Humbolt is much more close to Edmund Burke and to those who tried to thwart the republican refoundation of the sovereignty by opposing to it a conception of the state which rests certainly on the rule of law but which is primarily liberal and aims only at a minimal regulation of the struggle of all against all. This frontline remains a topical issue.
Rauscher, Frederick, ed. and transl. See: Kant, Immanuel. Lectures and Drafts on Political Philosophy.
Reitemeyer, Ursula. “Bildungstheoretische Implikationen der Kritik der reinen (praktischen) Vernunft.” Studia Philosophica Kantiana 2016.1 (2016): 18-31. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Although the Critique of Pure Reason clearly implies (based of its final methodological chapter) the pedagogical theory of self-education, it is still quite unusual to read Kant’s critique of reason from the perspective of the education theory. The reasons why we should approach such plan sceptically is that despite all of his early pedagogical files and anthropological lectures, Kant gained almost no reputation as a pedagogue. If we insist to attempt to perceive Kant’s theory of knowledge and especially transcendental unity of apperception in the context of current reflections on the theory of education, then we must be willing to accept the thesis of the unity of reason and its justification from the theoretical position of the action.
Renz, Ursula. “The Idea of Philosophical Development.” Kant-Studien 107.3 (2016): 536-44. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper takes Udo Thiel’s The Early Modern Subject: Self-Consciousness and Personal Identity from Descartes to Hume as an example of a study that aims to provide an account of a particular philosophical development, and discusses both the methodological requirements and the philosophical commitments connected with this ambition. In a first step, I distinguish between two fundamentally different ways of thinking about philosophical development, viz. externalism and internalism with regard to historical developments in philosophy, and I consider two ways of defining the two respective positions. Next, I specify certain methodological decisions that are relevant when writing a study on a particular philosophical development, and I characterize Udo Thiel’s book with respect to them. While no definitive position is taken with regard to the issues raised, the paper does advocate a reflective approach to them.
Ribeiro dos Santos, Leonel. “Pensar a catástrofe, pensar a atualidade: Os ensaios de Kant sobre o terremoto de Lisboa.” [Portuguese; Thinking the catastrophe, thinking the present: Kant's essays on the Lisbon earthquake] Studia Kantiana 14.20 (2016): 21-49. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper I approach three essays Kant wrote regarding and following the Lisbon Earthquake on 1st November 1755. I consider them not only for their contribution to the scientific explanation of that telluric phenomenon (uncommon for its dimension, spatial dissemination and power of destruction), but also for what they represent while expression of a new philosophical attitude characterized by the attention to actuality and the capacity of the philosopher to read and interpret the meaning of events (whether relating to the history of the Earth, to cultural history or to the political history of humanity), whenever such events affect the collective destiny of mankind and bear the strength of a given historical moment or entire era, or are powerful enough to cause a rupture and set the beginning of a new world vision. Particular attention is given to what these essays already reveal respecting what can be considered Kant’s characteristic way of thinking; to the relation of the therein exposed perspectives with the young philosopher’s naturalistic, cosmologic-cosmogonic and geographical interests; and to the anthropological conception that can be drawn from the exposed considerations and reflexions, which point to the place of man in nature and suggest what should be its adequate relationship with her. Lastly, young Kant’s vision regarding this catastrophe (that has destroyed Lisbon and has physically and intellectually shaken Europe and the very foundations of Enlightenment’s philosophical rationality) will be contrasted with that of two of his contemporaries, Voltaire and Rousseau, in the context of the 18th Century debate on the theodicy.
Ripstein, Arthur. “Just War, Regular War, and Perpetual Peace.” Kant-Studien 107.1 (2016): 179-95. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant characterizes war as the “barbaric way (the way of savages)” of deciding disputes. This opposition to war is paired with a discussion of right in war, with respect to each of going to war, the conduct of war, and the behaviour of the victorious party after a war. I explain how Kant can have a conception of right in war, against the background of his more general view that war is by its nature barbaric and to be repudiated entirely. Right cannot be decided by war, but can only be “found” in it if we suppose it can decide a dispute, and so in another sense resolve a question of right. Kant’s solution has two pillars: an account of the distinctively public nature of a state, and an account of peace as the only condition under which disputes can be resolved on their merits.
Rivera de Rosales, Jacinto. “The Logical, the Real and the Existence of God in The Only Possible Argument (1763).” Kant’s Shorter Writings: Critical Paths Outside the Critiques. Eds. Rafael V. Orden Jiménez, Robert Hanna, Robert Louden, Jacinto Rivera de Rosales, and Nuria Sánchez Madrid (op cit.). 20-38. [M]
Rocchi, Moreno. Rev. of Immanuel Kant, Dissertazioni latine, translated and edited by Igor Agostini (2014). [Italian] Con-Textos Kantianos 4 (2016): 364-73. [M] [online]
Rometsch, Jens. “Kants „Kategorien der Freiheit“: Freiheit als empirischer und transzendentaler Bratenwender?” Die “Kategorien der Freiheit” in Kants praktischer Philosophie. Ed. Stephan Zimmermann (op cit.). 129-47. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: One of the most fundamental questions with respect to Kant’s „categories of freedom“ concerns the overall character of freedom in Kant’s second Critique. Kant operates with a juxtaposition of „transcendental freedom“ and the „comparative freedom“ instantiated by a turnspit. Obviously, „comparative freedom“ is no freedom at all, since Kant considers the movements of a turnspit to be absolutely determined by natural causes. Absolute determination implies that at any given point in time, preceding conditions limit the future course of the turnspit’s movements to just one possible option. The article examines if actions or processes characterised by „transcendental freedom“ aren’t determined in essentially the same manner, albeit not by natural causes, but nonetheless absolutely. By means of being absolutely determined by the moral law, processes (actions, maxim-forming thoughts, decisions etc.) that count as cases of „transcendental freedom“ seem to be simply bound to another form of absolute determination. Inasmuch as moral obligation leaves us without options, „transcendental freedom“ turns out to be a higher-order variation of empirical turnspit freedom.
Ros Velasco, Josefa. Rev. of Pragmatism, Kant, and Transcendental Philosophy, edited by Gabriele Gava and Robert Stern (2016). [Spanish] Con-Textos Kantianos 4 (2016): 323-31. [M] [online]
Rosefeldt, Tobias. “Closing the Gap: A New Answer to an Old Objection against Kant’s Argument for Transcendental Idealism.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 116.2 (2016): 181-203. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper I present a new solution to the so-called ‘neglected alternative’ objection against Kant’s argument for transcendental idealism. According to this objection, Kant does not give sufficient justification for his claim that not only are space and time forms of our intuition but they also fail to be things in themselves or properties thereof. I first discuss a proposal by Willaschek and Allais, who try to defend Kant against this charge by building on his account of a priori intuition, and argue that it is insufficient to meet the objection in its full force. I then present my own solution to the problem. It is based on a reconstruction of Kant’s account of properties of appearances, and tries to show that this account implies that spatio-temporal properties could in principle not pertain both to appearances and to things in themselves.
Rossi, Philip J. “War As Morally Unintelligible: Sovereign Agency and the Limits of Kantian Autonomy.” Monist 99.1 (2016): 1-12. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant's treatment of war is usually discussed as part of his political philosophy or philosophy of history. In contrast, this essay locates these discussions in direct reference to major elements of his moral philosophy: autonomy, the categorical imperative, and the moral relationality of the kingdom of ends. Within this context, Kant's account of war, particularly in writings from the 1790s, can be read as affirming war as morally unintelligible: It is the expression of a collective withdrawal from the constitutive relationality of moral community. This results in a radical disparity in the exercise of moral autonomy by the sovereign agency of the state with respect to peace, on one hand, and with respect to war, on the other.
——. “Peacemaking and Victory: Lessons from Kant’s Cosmopolitanism.” Philosophia 43.3 (2016): 747-57. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the texts in which Immanuel Kant discusses the principles governing international relations—including texts explicitly dealing with the sources leading states to armed conflict and the circumstances enabling its cessation—he does not directly engage the question “What constitutes victory in war?” This should not be surprising, given that Kant’s treatment of war may be read as consonant with just war thinking for which victory seems an unproblematic concept Yet there are elements in the tone and the substance of his discussion that destabilize a placement of his views as unproblematically part of that tradition. The mordant tone of his dismissal of the Realpolitik guiding “political moralists” suggests a trenchant skepticism about almost any justification offered for leading a state into war. More substantively, an antinomy is at work in the contrast Kant makes, in the two sets of articles for perpetual peace, between a “state of nature” that, construed from the standpoint of the theoretical use of reason, defines the order of international relations as necessarily one of constant war, and the radical transformation of that order, enacted by moral reason in the definitive articles of perpetual peace, into a cosmopolitan order that heeds the categorical imperative “there shall be no war.” In consequence, one may construct a Kantian answer to the question “What constitutes victory in war?” by framing it in reference to this cosmopolitan hope for an international order securing enduring peace. Within the moral horizon of cosmopolitan hope, victory in war—like war itself—is unmasked as morally unintelligible.
Rößner, Christian. Der "Grenzgott der Moral": Eine phänomenologische Relektüre von Immanuel Kants praktischer Metaphysik im Ausgang von Emmanuel Levinas. Freiburg: Alber, 2016. [608p.] [WC]
Rostbøll, Christian F. “Kant, Freedom as Independence, and Democracy.” Journal of Politics 78.3 (2016): 792-805. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: While the influence of Kant's practical philosophy on contemporary political theory has been profound, it has its source in Kant's autonomy-based moral philosophy rather than in his freedom-based philosophy of Right. Kant scholars have increasingly turned their attention to Kant's Rechtslehre, but they have largely ignored its potential contribution to discussions of democracy. However, Kant's approach to political philosophy can supply unique insights to the latter. His notion that freedom and the public legal order are co-constitutive can be developed into a freedom argument for constitutional democracy. This freedom argument goes beyond freedom as moral autonomy and a libertarian idea of freedom as noninterference to a notion of freedom as a form of standing constituted by the public legal order. The trouble with other attempts to connect freedom and democracy is that they have operated with a moral ideal that is independent of a public legal order.
Rovira, Rogelio. See: Orden Jiménez, Rafael V., Juan M. Navarro Cordón, and Rogelio Rovíra, eds.
——, ed. See: Navarro Cordon, Juan Manuel, Rafael V. Orden Jiménez, and Rogelio Rovira, eds.
Ruffing, Margit. “Kant-Bibliographie 2014.” Kant-Studien 107.4 (2016): 733-65. [PW]
——. “A Little Bit Evil? Reflections on Part One of Kant’s Religion.” Kant’s Shorter Writings: Critical Paths Outside the Critiques. Eds. Rafael V. Orden Jiménez, Robert Hanna, Robert Louden, Jacinto Rivera de Rosales, and Nuria Sánchez Madrid (op cit.). 84-95. [M]
Ruhi Demiray, Mehmet. “The Intrinsic Normativity of Law in Light of Kant`s Doctrine of Right.” Con-Textos Kantianos 3 (2016): 161-87. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper claims that a particular interpretation of Kant`s legal-political philosophy, as it is presented in his Doctrine of Right, provides us with the much needed resolution to the question of the normativity of law, precisely because it brings in a perspective that avoids both positivism and ethicism. This particular interpretation follows a strategy of argumentation that I call the “argument for the intrinsic normativity of law”, i.e., the argument that law is defined and justified on its own grounds, without any need to refer to ethics, or rational/enlightened self-interest. This argument highlights the concept of legal person with the innate right to freedom as the necessary presupposition of legal practices, and sets forth a fundamental sense of justice inherent to the concept of law that consists in the reciprocal recognition of legal personality. In the end, I come up with a distinctive conception of law that I formulate as a last resort of normativity in the face of a conflict wherein an ethical solution does not appeal to all parties.
Ruíz Esquivel, Mónica. “Terrorismo mediático y la vía del silencio total: una justificación a partir del principio de publicidad.” [Spanish; “Media Terrorism and the Way to Total Silence: A Justification from Publicity Principle”] Con-Textos Kantianos 3 (2016): 301-15. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The aim of this essay is to show that the thesis of total silence as a means of action against media terrorism is compatible with the Kantian principle of publicity, something that gives moral and political legitimacy. The thesis of total silence states that terrorism and the media have a relationship of dependency, therefore, if we assume that the purpose of terrorism is to cause and spread fear among the population to get certain claims, denying media publicity imply restrict that purpose. At first glance, the Kantian principle of publicity could be interpreted as incompatible with the path of total silence since the latter implies secrecy to take place, that is, completely deprived of valuable information to citizens about terrorist acts. Against this position I intend to show that the thesis of total silence and the Kantian principle of publicity are compatible and thus, this thesis can be considered a course of action legitimate and effective by the media and the citizenship against terrorism.
Rukgaber, Matthew S. “The Asymmetry of Space: Kant’s Theory of Absolute Space in 1768.” Kantian Review 21.3 (2016): 415-35. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: I propose that we interpret Kant’s argument from incongruent counterparts in the 1768 article ‘Concerning the Ultimate Ground of the Differentiation of Directions in Space’ in light of a theory of dynamic absolute space that he accepted throughout the 1750s and 1760s. This force-based or material conception of space was not an unusual interpretation of the Newtonian notion of absolute space. Nevertheless, commentators have continually argued that Kant’s argument is an utter failure that shifts from the metaphysics of space to its epistemology, because he has no way to connect ‘directionality’ and ‘handedness’ to absolute space. This supposed failure is based on an understanding of absolute space in purely mathematical terms and as an absolute void that lacks any qualitative or dynamic features. If we recognize that Kant held that space had an intrinsic directional asymmetry then his argument successfully connects incongruent counterparts to absolute space. The presence of this notion in Kant’s pre-Critical thought is rarely noted, and its necessity in understanding his incongruence argument is novel.
Russo, Ada, ed. See: Lamarra, Antonio, Pietro Pimpinella, and Ada Russo, eds.
Saemi, Amir. “The Form of Practical Knowledge and Implicit Cognition: A Critique of Kantian Constitutivism.” Social Theory and Practice 42.4 (2016): 733-47. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Moral realism faces two worries: How can we have knowledge of moral norms if they are independent of us, and why should we care about them if they are independent of rational activities they govern? Kantian constitutivism tackles both worries simultaneously by claiming that practical norms are constitutive principles of practical reason. In particular, on Stephen Engstrom’s account, willing involves making a practical judgment. To will well, and thus to have practical knowledge (i.e., knowledge of what is good), the content of one’s will needs to conform to the formal presuppositions of practical knowledge. Practical norms are thus constitutive of practical knowledge. However, I will argue that the universality principles from which Engstrom derives the formal presuppositions of practical knowledge are reflectively and psychologically unavailable. As a result, they cannot help Kantian constitutivism provide an answer to moral realism's worries.
Salikov, Alexey. “Russian Contribution to the International Kant Studies from the Late 19th Century until the Present Day: An Analysis of Publications in Kant-Studien.” Con-Textos Kantianos 4 (2016): 35-55. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article gives a general characteristic of the publications of the Russian philosophers in the oldest Kantian Journal Kant-Studien. The study embraces the entire period of the existence of this magazine, from the very beginning down to our days. In general, after compiling all materials related to Russia published in “Kant-Studien”, I became aware of get a picture of a significant presence of Russian philosophers in this periodical. This gives me a good reason to conclude that even if the impact of the Russian philosophical thought on the international Kant studies was not decisive, then, at least, it was tangible. This influence was due to the phenomenon which was later called the “Silver Age of Russian philosophy”, as well as the phenomenon of Russian emigration, arising as a result of wars and revolutions in Russia and the exodus of the Russian philosophers of the West, where one of their main initial shelters was Germany.
Sánchez Madrid, Nuria. A civilizaçao como destino: Kant e as formas da reflexão. [Portuguese] Florianópolis, Nefiponline, 2016. [288 p.] [WC]
——. “Passive Citizenship, Poverty and Peace: Kant’s Cosmopolitanism in the Shorter Writings.” Kant’s Shorter Writings: Critical Paths Outside the Critiques. Eds. Rafael V. Orden Jiménez, Robert Hanna, Robert Louden, Jacinto Rivera de Rosales, and Nuria Sánchez Madrid (op cit.). 460-72. [M]
——. “¿Puede haber una fundamentación kantiana de los derechos humanos? Algunas consideraciones críticas.” [Spanish; There may be any Kantian Foundation of Human Rights? Some Critical Remarks] Revista de Estudios Kantianos 1.2 (2016): 191-206. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper mainly aims at clarifying whether Kant’s thought might provide a sound basis for human rights contemporary discourses, focusing on recent discussions about this issue. First I shall attempt to display the meaning of Kant’s expression “right of humanity”, which should be linked to freedom as the “unique innate right” according to the Doctrine of Right. Second I will discuss some recent readings about the scope of Kant’s claims regarding the juridical character of cosmopolitanism and the original common possession of the earth, which could justify to see Kant as a proto-founder of what we understand as human rights in our times. Third I will claim that the metaphysical groundings of Kant’s usual hints to the sacred right of humanity prevent to argue for a transition between his argumentation and the clearly individual agent-based conception of human rights from the XXth Century.
——. “Kantian Theory of Human Rights: a Skeptical Appraisal.” Studia Philosophica Kantiana 2016.2 (2016): 3-15. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper discusses that Kant’s claim of the sacred rights of humanity might be viewed as an allegedly foreshadow of the current defenses of human rights. First I will display the skeptical view that scholars as Onora O’Neill and Katrin Flikschuh have addressed to the claim that Kant might have argued for human rights as a moral tenet able to guide his political theory, highlighting that at most this kind of rights fulfils the function of a transcendent idea, intended to orientate collective judgment regarding the conduct of the ruler. Second I will consider some recent accounts seeking to assign a political scope to human rights in Kant’s political theory, highlighting on the consequences entailed by cosmopolitan right and common possession of the earth. Finally I will attempt to sketch a short account of the value that Kant acknowledges to humanity as species and in each human being, so that it might be distinguished from the usual theoretical basis assigned to human rights. All in all, the main aim of my paper will be to display the reasons that in my view hinder Kant to argue for a coercive theory of human rights, concluding the purport of demurring the anachronistic view often adopted by most Kant-inspired theory of human rights.
——. “Transcendentalidade, mundo e certeza em Kant e Wittgenstein.” [Portuguese; Transcendentality, world and certainty in Kant and Wittigenstein] Studia Kantiana 14.22 (2016): 29-47. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The paper aims at contributing to discuss the different function that transcendentality fulfills in Kant and Wittgenstein. First I shall attempt to highlight the function fulfilled by tautology —real according to Wittgenstein or merely apparent and rhetoric according to Kant— for the grounding of logic, especially focusing on how feeling arises in both thinkers. Second I will display an interpretation of the function that esthetics and the most changeable forms of nature fulfill in both philosophical projects. Third I shall draw some conclusions about the appraisal of the meaning that trascendentality of thinking and reflection does have for Kant and Wittgenstein, taking into account the acroamatic orientation argued by the first and the logical-mathematical orientation claimed by the second and the fact that acroamatic conception of reason necessarily requires discursivity as the threshold of sense.
——. “"La Ilustración múltiple / Lumières plurielles". Presentación del dossier.” [Spanish] Con-Textos Kantianos 4 (2016): 192. [M] [online]
Santini, Barbara. Rev. of Die Klassische Deutsche Philosophie nach Kant. Systeme der reinen Vernunft und ihre Kritik 1785–1845, by Walter Jaeschke and Andreas Arndt (2012). Internationales Jahrbuch des Deutschen Idealismus/International Yearbook of German Idealism: Bewusstsein/Consciousness, eds. Dina Emundts and Sally Sedgwick. 11 (2016): 296-300. [PW]
Santos, Leonardo Rennó. “A imaginação antropológica: conhecimento conjetural e teleologia nos escritos de Kant sobre as raças.” [Portuguese; Anthropological imagination: conjectural knowledge and teleology in Kant's writings on races] Cadernos de Filosofia Alemã: Crítica e Modernidade 21.2 (2016): 61-78. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The objective of this study is to comprehend the specification of a suitable method for Natural History as seen on Kant's famous essays on race, based on the debate regarding the faculty of imagination carried out in Lectures on Anthropology. We seek to pinpoint the way in which Physical Geography and Anthropology articulated within Weltkenntnis as seen in Kant's investigations on the nature of human faculties.
Santos, Robinson dos. Rev. of Kant and Education: Interpretations and Commentary, edited by Klas Roth and Chris W. Suprenant (2012). [Portuguese] Con-Textos Kantianos 3 (2016): 499-502. [M] [online]
Sá Pereira, Roberto Horácio de. “Transcendental propositions as indispensable conditions of our self-understanding as human beings a brief commentary on Hanna's Kant.” Kant e-Prints 11.1 (2016): 58-69. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this critical review of Robert Hanna's ingenious book (2006), I aim to support Hanna‟s main insightful reading of Kant, namely what he calls “a priori truth with a human face," without appealing to Kant's divide between a priori and a posteriori and analytic and synthetic truths. My suggestion is that transcendental propositions are necessary neither in the usual epistemological sense that analytic propositions are, let alone in the metaphysical sense that some empirical propositions are. Instead, they are necessary in the theoretical domain in the weak alternative sense that they make possible the empirical recognition of appearances as an object as an indispensable condition of our self-consciousness experience, and they are a priori in the practical domain in the sense that their truth is vital for our self-comprehension as human beings.
Saraiva, Marcelo H. Rev. of Kant, Foucault and Forms of Experience, by Marc Djaballah (2008). [English] Kant e-Prints 11.3 (2016): 49-57. [M] [online]
Satne, Paula. “Forgiveness and Moral Development.” Philosophia 44.4 (2016): 1029-55. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Forgiveness is clearly an important aspect of our moral lives, yet surprisingly Kant, one of the most important authors in the history of Western ethics, seems to have very little to say about it. Some authors explain this omission by noting that forgiveness sits uncomfortably in Kant’s moral thought: forgiveness seems to have an ineluctably ‘elective’ aspect which makes it to a certain extent arbitrary; thus it stands in tension with Kant’s claim that agents are autonomous beings, capable of determining their own moral status through rational reflection and choice. Other authors recognise that forgiveness plays a role in Kant’s philosophy but fail to appreciate the nature of this duty and misrepresent the Kantian argument in support of it. This paper argues that there is space in Kant’s philosophy for a genuine theory of forgiveness and hopes to lay the grounds for a correct interpretation of this theory. I argue that from a Kantian perspective, forgiveness is not ‘elective’ but, at least in some cases, morally required. I claim that, for Kant, we have an imperfect duty of virtue to forgive repentant wrongdoers that have embarked on a project of self-reflection and self-reform. I develop a novel argument in support of this duty by drawing on Kant’s theory of rational agency, the thesis of radical evil, Kant’s theory of moral development, and the formula of humanity. However, it must be noted that this is a conditional duty and Kant’s position also entails that absence of repentance on the part of the wrongdoer should be taken as evidence of a lack of commitment to a project of self-reflection and self-reform. In such cases, Kant claims, we have a perfect duty to ourselves not to forgive unrepentant wrongdoers. I argue that this duty should be understood as one of the duties of self-esteem, which involves the duty to respect and recognise our own dignity as rational beings.
Saunders, Joe. “Kant and the Problem of Recognition: Freedom, Transcendental Idealism, and the Third-Person.” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24.2 (2016): 164-82. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant wants to show that freedom is possible in the face of natural necessity. Transcendental idealism is his solution, which locates freedom outside of nature. I accept that this makes freedom possible, but object that it precludes the recognition of other rational agents. In making this case, I trace some of the history of Kant’s thoughts on freedom. In several of his earlier works, he argues that we are aware of our own activity. He later abandons this approach, as he worries that any awareness of our activity involves access to the noumenal, and thereby conflicts with the epistemic limits of transcendental idealism. In its place, from the second Critique onwards, Kant argues that we are conscious of the moral law, which tells me that I ought to do something, thus revealing that I can. This is the only proof of freedom consistent with transcendental idealism, but I argue that such an exclusively first-personal approach precludes the (third-personal) recognition of other rational agents. I conclude that transcendental idealism thus fails to provide an adequate account of freedom. In its place, I sketch an alternative picture of how freedom is possible, one that locates freedom within, rather than outside of nature.
——. Rev. of Kant on Mind, Action, and Ethics, by Julian Wuerth (2014). British Journal for the History of Philosophy 24.2 (2016): 382-84. [PI]
Saunders, John. Rev. of The Kant Dictionary, by Lucas Thorpe (2015). Kantian Review 21.3 (2016): 521-22. [PW]
Schaller, Philipp. Rev. of Kant über die symbolische Erkenntnis Gottes, by Sebastian Maly (2012). [German] Kant-Studien 107.2 (2016): 400-7. [PW]
Scharding, Tobey. “Crafting Maxims.” Teaching Philosophy 16.1 (2016): 37-53. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article examines the role of maxims in Kantian ethics. Maxims are propositions that describe individual actions as instances of general rules. Because Kantian ethics evaluates the morality of actions by testing the actions’ maxims, it is important to formulate the maxim well. I begin by (1) investigating how maxims relate to actions. Next, I (2) review how Kantian ethics tests maxims, focusing on the Formula of Universal Law (FUL). I engage Kant’s conceptions of determining and reflecting judgment from the Third Critique to illuminate the role of judgment in crafting and testing maxims. Then, I present (3) my interpretation of how to craft maxims in a Kantian context: In condition C, I do action A. I apply my interpretation to (4) several examples, including Kant’s own, Kant’s critics, and contemporary Kantians. I (5) consider several objections and (6) explain how this interpretation of crafting maxims has helped my applied ethics students.
Scheliha, Arnulf von. “Kants Deutung von Judentum und Islam - Kant in der Deutung von Judentum und Islam.” Bibelhermeneutik und dogmatische Theologie nach Kant. Eds. Harald Matern, Alexander Heit, and Enno Edzard Popkes (op cit.). 153-71. [M]
Scherer, Fábio César. “Interpretation der kantschen Theorie des rechtlichen Besitzes angesichts seiner Transzendentalphilosophie.” ethic@ 15.3 (2016): 369-97. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the context of the Kantian theory about reason problems and his auxiliary theory (transcendental philosophy), the article aims to interpret the juridical possession theory exposed in Rechtslehre (1797), through an analytical-logical reading key, which contains as proof procedure the analysis and synthesis method. This study contributes to the critical interpretation of this late juridical text, since such intelligible possession theory is related to the critical level of enunciation on the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments in general.
——. “A revolução copernicana de Kant enquanto contraponto ao materialismo.” [Portuguese; Kant´s Copernican revolution as opposed to materialism] Kant e-Prints 11.2 (2016): 1-16. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The object of this article is to retake the starting point of Kant´s critical thinking held by neo-Kantian Friedrich Albert Lange, as anchor for the criticism of the German materialism of the second half of the nineteenth century. The article starts with some thoughts about Lange, as a contributor to the theoretical knowledge and his acceptance among German philosophers; then it will be analyzed the materialism and the foundations of the Copernican revolution performed by Kant; finally, it will be discussed the nature of the principles of Mathematics as opposed to the materialist concept of knowledge. The second and third steps are involved in the problematic proposal. The first stage aims to contextualize Lange, since, after the rise of German Nazism to power and the World War II, he ceased to occupy a remarkable position among European researchers in philosophy, being currently little mentioned.
Schlüter, Stephan. “Praxeologische Implikationen einer kritischen Theorie von Bildung im Anschluss an Kant.” Studia Philosophica Kantiana 2016.2 (2016): 51-72. [M] [online]
Abstract: Kant geht es in seiner Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht weniger um naturwissenschaftlich-empirisches bzw. rein physiologisches Wissen hinsichtlich der „Kenntniß des Menschen“, sondern um die Ergründung dessen, was der Mensch als „freihandelndes Wesen aus sich selber macht, oder machen kann und soll“ (Anth AA 07: 119). So zielt bei einem „mit Vernunft begabte[n] Erdwesen“ (ebd.) die Urteilskraft v.a. auf die „Erkenntniß des Menschen als Weltbürger“(ebd., 120) ab.
Wenn demnach in Kants praktischer Geschichtsphilosophie die kosmopolitische Rechtsgemeinschaft einen normativen Maßstab in Aussicht stellt, an dem Menschen, Parteien und Staaten ihre Zwecke und Handlungen gegenüber der Welt ausrichten und überprüfen können, so muss abgerückt werden vom „moralische[n] Egoist, welcher alle Zwecke auf sich selbst einschränkt, der keinen Nutzen worin sieht, als in dem, was ihm nützt“ (ebd., 130). Diesem müsse, wie Kant ausführt, die intelligible Figur des Weltbürgers entgegentreten, denn seine „Denkungsart“ des „Pluralism“ ermöglicht es ihm, „sich nicht als die ganze Welt in seinem Selbst befassend, sondern als einen bloßen Weltbürger zu betrachten und zu verhalten“ (ebd.).
Soll die „Anlage zu einem Erziehungsplane [...] kosmopolitisch gemacht werden“ (Päd AA 09: 448) -wie es in Kants Vorrede zur Pädagogik steht-, so erfordert dies, dass auch Schülerinnen im bildenden Unterricht auf ihre Verantwortung vorbereitet werden müssen, damit im Sinne eines sensus communis die eigene „Reflexion auf die Vorstellungsart jedes andern in Gedanken (a priori) Rücksicht nimmt, um gleichsam an die gesammte Menschenvernunft sein Urtheil zu halten“ (KU AA 05: 293). Handeln und Urteilen sind insofern keine isolierten, lokalen Angelegenheiten, sondern sind mit Konsequenzen verbunden, die sich auf den ganzen Globus auswirken.
Eine kritische Theorie von Bildung in kosmopolitischer Sicht steht hierbei vor der Herausforderung, wie normativ- kantische Postulate der Aufklärung der politischen Mündigkeit, der Diskursöffentlichkeit und die Bereitschaft zur politischen Partizipation edukativ gefördert werden können. Ferner geht es um die Frage, wie Unterricht i.S. eines kosmopolitischen Bewusstseins gestaltet sein müsste und welches Verständnis von Bildung und Erziehungswirklichkeit dem zugrunde liegt. Eine mögliche Annäherung dazu soll in diesem Vortrag vorgenommen werden.
Schmid, Konrad. “‘Daß du, der du mir erscheinst, Gott sei, davon bin ich nicht gewiß.’ Kant und der Gott der Bibel.” Bibelhermeneutik und dogmatische Theologie nach Kant. Eds. Harald Matern, Alexander Heit, and Enno Edzard Popkes (op cit.). 55-68. [M]
Schmidt, Elke Elisabeth, and Dieter Schönecker. “Kant on Moral Necessitation by Another Subject's Will (Tugendlehre, 16).” Studi Kantiani 29 (2016): 91-108. [M]
Scholten, Matthé. “Schizophrenia and Moral Responsibility: A Kantian Essay.” Philosophia 44.1 (2016): 205-25. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper, I give a Kantian answer to the question whether and why it would be inappropriate to blame people suffering from mental disorders that fall within the schizophrenia spectrum. I answer this question by reconstructing Kant’s account of mental disorder, in particular his explanation of psychotic symptoms. Kant explains these symptoms in terms of various types of cognitive impairment. I show that this explanation is plausible and discuss Kant’s claim that the unifying feature of the symptoms is the patient’s inability to enter into an exchange of reasons with others. After developing a Kantian Quality of Will Thesis, I analyze some real life cases. Firstly, I argue that delusional patients who are unable to enter into an exchange of epistemic reasons are exempted from doxastic rather than moral responsibility. They are part of the moral community and exonerated from moral blame only if their actions do not express a lack of good will. Secondly, I argue that disorganized patients who are unable to form intentions and to make plans are exempted from moral responsibility because they do not satisfy the conditions for agency.
Schönecker, Dieter. See: Schmidt, Elke Elisabeth, and Dieter Schönecker.
Schouten, Peer, ed. See: Lebow, Richard Ned, Peer Schouten, and Hidemi Suganami, eds.
Schulting, Dennis. “On an Older Dispute: Hegel, Pippin and the Separability of Concept and Intuition in Kant.” Kantian Nonconceptualism. Ed. Dennis Schulting (op cit.). 227-55. [PW]
——. “In Defence of Reinhold’s Kantian Representationalism: Aspects of Idealism in Versuch einer neuen Theorie des menschlichen Vorstellungsvermögens.” Kant Yearbook: Kant and German Idealism 8 (2016): 87-116. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper, I want to zero in on the Kantian idea that,whilst things in themselves must logically be presupposed as the ground underlying appearances and things are not reducible to their representations, (1) objects as appearances are not properties of things in themselves, and (2) things in themselves or the thing in itself cannot properly be represented or even thought. To do this, I turn to one of the earliest defenders and champions of the Kantian philosophy, Karl Leonhard Reinhold, and specifically to his first major work Versuch einer neuen Theorie des menschlichen Vorstellungsvermögens, published in 1789. I am here interested neither in the extent to which Reinhold’s interpretation of Kant is correct or even adequately represents Kant’s thought in all of its aspects, nor whether Reinhold’s attempt to present a systematic philosophy based on a rigorous deduction from a single principle (his strong foundationalism) stands up to scrutiny. I am here solely interested in some of Reinhold’s positive insights, in the Versuch, concerning elements of his representationalism that may shed light on Kant’s idealism, specifically, the relation between appearances (as objects of knowledge) and things in themselves, i. e., points (1) and (2) described above. I read the early Reinhold of the Versuch as confirming the Kantian view that objects as appearances are not properties of things in themselves and that we are radically ignorant of things in themselves, in the sense that we can neither know things in themselves (through the senses) nor even intellectually grasp things in themselves through the understanding alone.
——. Rev. of Hegel’s Critique of Kant. From Dichotomy to Identity, by Sally Sedgwick (2012). [English] Kant-Studien 107.2 (2016): 414-19. [PW]
——, ed. Kantian Nonconceptualism. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. [xxvi, 322 p.] [PW]
Lucy Allais (Conceptualism and Nonconceptualism in Kant: A Survey of the Recent Debate),
Sacha Golob (Why the Transcendental Deduction is Compatible with Nonconceptualism),
Anil Gomes and Andrew Stephenson (On the Relation of Intuition to Cognition),
Stefanie Grüne (Sensible Synthesis and the Intuition of Space),
Robert Hanna (Directions in Space, Nonconceptual Form and the Foundations of Transcendental Idealism),
Dietmar H. Heidemann (Kant’s Aesthetic Nonconceptualism),
Thomas Land (Moderate Conceptualism and Spatial Representation),
Colin McLear (Getting Acquainted with Kant),
Christian Onof (Is There Room for Nonconceptual Content in Kant’s Critical Philosophy?),
Dennis Schulting (On an Older Dispute: Hegel, Pippin and the Separability of Concept and Intuition in Kant),
Clinton Tolley (The Difference Between Original, Metaphysical and Geometrical Representations of Space).
——. Rev. of Kant and Rational Psychology, by Corey W. Dyck (year). [English] Studi Kantiani 29 (2016): 185-91. [M]
Schwaiger, Clemens. Rev. of The Founding of Aesthetics in the German Enlightenment. The Art of Invention and the Invention of Art, by Stefanie Buchenau (2013). Kant-Studien 107.3 (2016): 574-77. [PW]
Seidel, George J. “The Imagination in Kant and Fichte, and Some Reflections on Heidegger’s Interpretation.” Forum Philosophicum 21.2 (2016): 213-23. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The paper deals with the meaning of the transcendental imagination in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, comparing it with the productive imagination proposed by Fichte in his Wissenschaftslehre of 1794. It also presents Heidegger’s views concerning both Kant and Fichte. Regarding Kant there is also a discussion of the difference between the first and second editions of the First Critique. It may be noted that Heidegger prefers the first edition to the second, since, in his view, the latter leads into German Idealism. In Fichte’s philosophy the imagination plays a considerably larger role than it does in Kant. And Heidegger early on (in 1929) recognizes the importance of Fichte as a philosopher in its own right, and not just, as was customary in the period, a mere transitional figure between Kant and Hegel. The paper concludes with a critique of Heidegger’s views regarding both Fichte and Kant. Though there is an addendum discussing the function of the imagination in the aesthetics of Kant (classicism), in that of Fichte (romanticism), and a brief comparison with Heidegger’s own aesthetics.
Seidengart, Jean. “Science et philosophie dans le poème inachevé sur l’éternité d’Albrecht von Haller et sa reprise dans la philosophie de Kant.” Con-Textos Kantianos 3 (2016): 21-43. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article strives to reach a twofold goal. The first part of it aims to analyze how Albrecht von Haller succeeded in combining science and metaphysics in his famous “unfinished poem on eternity” (1736). Then the second part tries, to elucidate how the same poem inspired Kant with some cosmological considerations in his Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens (1755). In the same way, it has to be established the reason why this poem provided also to Kant an exemplary model of “sublime poetry” the subjective and transcendental conditions of which he analyzed in his last writings while turning to the mind which produces it or which is inspired by it.
Sgarbi, Marco. Kant and Aristotle: Epistemology, Logic, and Method. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2016. [x, 282 p.] [WC]
Shabel, Lisa. See: Carson, Emily, and Lisa Shabel.
——, ed. See: Carson, Emily, and Lisa Shabel, eds.
Shepherd, Melanie. Rev. of Cosmological Aesthetics through the Kantian Sublime and Nietzschean Dionysian, by Erman Kaplama (2014). The Journal of Nietzsche Studies 47.2 (2016): 316-18. [PW]
Sieg, W. “Tait on Kant and Finitism.” Journal of Philosophy 113.5-6 (2016): 274-85. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In his “Kant and Finitism” Tait attempts to connect his analysis of finitist arithmetic with Kant’s perspective on arithmetic. The examination of this attempt is the basis for a distinctive view on the dramatic methodological shift from Kant to Dedekind and Hilbert. Dedekind’s 1888 essay “Was sind und was sollen die Zahlen?” gives a logical analysis of arithmetic, whereas Hilbert’s 1899 book Grundlagen der Geometrie presents such an analysis of geometry or, as Hilbert puts it, of our spatial intuition. This shift in the late ninteenth century required a radical expansion of logic: first by the inclusion of principles for “systems” (sets) and “mappings” (functions), but second by a structuralist broadening of axioms and inferential principles. The interaction of mathematics and logic in mathematical logic opened, around 1920, fields of investigation with enormous impact on the philosophy of mathematics, promoting a deeper integration of mathematical practice and philosophical reflection.
Silva, Fernando M. F. “The Combined Force of Sensory Impressions: Kant’s View on the Benefits of Poetry to Philosophy.” Kant’s Shorter Writings: Critical Paths Outside the Critiques. Eds. Rafael V. Orden Jiménez, Robert Hanna, Robert Louden, Jacinto Rivera de Rosales, and Nuria Sánchez Madrid (op cit.). 68-82. [M]
Silva, Walter Valdevino Oliveira. “Rawls leitor de Kant.” [Portuguese; Rawls reader of Kant] Estudos Kantianos 4.1 (2016): 177-92. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This text has two objectives: first, showing that in order to understand the interpretation shift regarding Immanuel Kant’s theory between John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice (1971) and Political Liberalism (1993) a return to the manuscripts of the courses taught by Rawls in Harvard, on Kantian theory, is paramount. Reading his two main works is not sufficient for the proper understanding of his appropriation of Kant’s moral theory. Second, this text aims at an elucidation and synthesis of the main aspects of Rawls’s reading of Kant, stressing what Rawls takes and rejects out of the philosopher of Königsberg.
Skirke, Christian. “On Sorin Baiasu’s Kant and Sartre: Re-Discovering Critical Ethics.” Critique (blog posted: 20 Sep 2016) n.p. [PW] [online]
Slowik, Edward. “Situating Kant’s Pre-Critical Monadology: Leibnizian Ubeity, Monadic Activity, and Idealist Unity.” Early Science and Medicine 21.4 (2016): 332-49. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This essay examines the relationship between monads and space in Kant’s early pre-critical work, with special attention devoted to the question of ubeity, a Scholastic doctrine that Leibniz describes as “ways of being somewhere.” By focusing attention on this concept, evidence will be put forward that supports the claim, held by various scholars, that the monad-space relationship in Kant is closer to Leibniz’ original conception than the hypotheses typically offered by the later Leibniz-Wolff school. In addition, Kant’s monadology, in conjunction with God’s role, also helps to shed light on further aspects of his system that are broadly Leibnizian, such as monadic activity and the unity of space.
Smyth, Daniel. “Infinity and Givenness: Kant on the Intuitive Origin of Spatial Representation.” Kant: Studies on Mathematics in the Critical Philosophy. Eds. Emily Carson and Lisa Shabel (op cit.). 33-61. [M]
Śnieżyński, Krzysztof. Rev. of Vernunftreligion und Offenbarungsglaube. Zur Erörterung einer seit Kant verschärften Problematik, edited by Norbert Fischer and Jakub Sirovátka (2015). Forum Philosophicum 21.1 (2016): 115-21. [PW]
Somers-Hall, Henry. Rev. of Comparing Kant and Sartre, edited by Sorin Baiasu (2016). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (Sep 2016, #18). [M] [online]
Sommerlatte, Curtis. “Empirical Cognition in the Transcendental Deduction: Kant’s Starting Point and his Humean Problem.” Kantian Review 21.3 (2016): 437-63. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this article, I argue that in the sense of greatest epistemological concern for Kant, empirical cognition is ‘rational sensory discrimination’: the identification or differentiation of sensory objects from each other (whether correctly or not), occurring through a capacity of forming judgements (whether correct or not). With this account of empirical cognition, I show how the Transcendental Deduction of the first Critique is most plausibly read as having as its fundamental assumption the thesis that we have empirical cognition, and I provide evidence that Kant understood Hume as granting this assumption.
Sorensen, Kelly. Rev. of Kant on Mind, Action, and Ethics, by Julian Wuerth (2014). Journal of the History of Philosophy 54.1 (2016): 175-76. [M]
Souza, Luís Eduardo Ramos de. “Felicidade e moralidade na ética de Kant: oposições e conciliações.” [Portuguese; Happiness and morality in Kant’s ethics: oppositions and conciliations] Studia Kantiana 14.22 (2016): 85-103. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper aims to show the opposition and reconciliation relations between the concepts of happiness and morality in practical philosophy of Kant, as set out in the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (1785), the Critique of Practical Reason (1788) and Doctrine of Virtue (1797). This task will be carried out in three moments. First, it is shown that happiness, morality and freedom are the three fundamental concepts of Kant's ethics, whose first two are considered under the form and the last under the matter of practical reason. Second, it will be argued that Kant initially emphasizes the opposition between these two concepts and only gradually thematizes the conciliation in the three books mentioned. Third, it will be stated that the limitation of Kant’s ethics to the concept of empirical happiness, to the detriment of pure happiness, brings limitations of his philosophical reflection on the moral feelings and on possible relations between the practical and aesthetic systems.
Spencer, Tom. “The Root of All Evil: On the Monistic Implications of Kant’s Religion.” International Philosophical Quarterly 56.1 (2016): 23-43. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In Religion Within the Bounds of Reason Alone Kant claims that human beings are radically evil and that this evil is to be regarded as both freely chosen and universal. Scholars have long struggled to makes sense of this paradoxical notion. In this paper I propose that the regulative concept of the supersensible as presented in the third Critique can be legitimately extended to cover the mysterious “subjective ground” of radical evil. More specifically, I argue that the symmetry between radical evil (the appearance of law-like universality within the realm of freedom) and purposive nature (the appearance of self-determination within the realm of natural law) warrants the notion of a common supersensible principle underlying both phenomena that is neither nature nor freedom but that motivates their mutual incursions. I call this doctrine of reflective judgment “supersensible monism.”
Staiti, Andrea. Rev. of The Genesis of Neo-Kantianism 1796-1880, by Frederick C. Beiser (2014). Journal of the History of Philosophy 54.1 (2016): 177-78. [M]
Stang, Nicholas Frederick. Kant’s Modal Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016. [xv, 360 p.] [WC] [review]
——. “Appearances and Things in Themselves: Actuality and Identity.” Kantian Review 21.2 (2016): 283-92. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Lucy Allais’s anti-phenomenalist interpretation of transcendental idealism is incomplete in two ways. First of all, like some phenomenalists, she is committed to denying the coherence of claims of numerical identity of appearances and things in themselves. Secondly, she fails to explain adequately what grounds the actuality of appearances. This opens the door to a phenomenalist understanding of appearances.
Stephenson, Andrew. “Relationalism about Perception vs. Relationalism about Perceptuals.” Kantian Review 21.2 (2016): 293-302. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: There is a tension at the heart of Lucy Allais’s new account of Kant’s transcendental idealism. The problem arises from her use of two incompatible theories in contemporary philosophy – relationalism about perception, or naïve realism, and relationalism about colour, or more generally relationalism about any such perceptual property. The problem is that the former requires a more robust form of realism about the properties of the objects of perception than can be accommodated in the partially idealistic framework of the latter. On Allais’s interpretation, Kant’s notorious attempt to balance realism and idealism remains unstable.
——. “Manifest Reality: Kant’s Idealism and his Realism.” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 24.6 (2016): 1220-23. [PI]
——. Rev. of Manifest Reality: Kant’s Idealism and his Realism, by Lucy Allais (2015). British Journal for the History of Philosophy 24.6 (2016): 1220-23. [M]
——. See: Gomes, Anil, and Andrew Stephenson.
Stern, Robert. “Round Kant or Through Him? On James’s Arguments for Freedom, and Their Relation to Kant’s.” Pragmatism, Kant, and Transcendental Philosophy. Eds. Gabriele Gava and Robert Stern (op cit.). 152-76. [M]
——, ed. See: Gava, Gabriele, and Robert Stern, eds.
Stevenson, Leslie. “Self-Knowledge in Kant and Sartre.” Comparing Kant and Sartre. Ed. Sorin Baiasu (op cit.). 115-31. [M]
Sticker, Martin. “Experiments in Ethics? Kant on Chemistry and Practical Philosophy.” Idealistic Studies 46.1 (2016): 41-64. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: I discuss two puzzling and neglected passages in the Critique of Practical Reason, namely, V:92 and V:163. In these passages Kant claims that practical philosophers should follow the paradigm of the chemist and conduct experiments on common human reason. I explain Kant’s conception of the chemical experiment, provide a detailed interpretation of the two passages in question, and conclude by applying the structure of the chemical experiment to the Analytic of the Critique of Practical Reason. Chemical experiments as a model of ethics should be understood as a method of confirming that a philosophical theory systematizes and defends ideas that ordinary rational agents are already committed to.
Stoner, Samuel A. “On the Primacy of the Spectator in Kant’s Account of Genius.” Review of Metaphysics 70.1 (2016): 87-116. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: An essay is presented on the primacy of the spectator in German philosopher Immanuel Kant's account of genius in his 1790 philosophical work Critique of the Power of Judgment. The author argues that Kant's artist-centered interpretation of the genius are misguided as it elucidate the nature of genius. He says that Kant approaches the question of the nature of genius indirectly through an analysis of the spectator's interaction with artworks.
——. Rev. of The Possibility of Culture: Pleasure and Moral Development in Kant’s Aesthetics, by Bradley Murray (2015). Kantian Review 21.2 (2016): 340-42. [PW]
Straulino Torre, Stéfano. “La noción kantiana de verdad transcendental.” [Spanish; Kant’s notion of transcendental truth] Revista de Estudios Kantianos 1.2 (2016): 126-45. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The aim of this work is to elucidate the notion of “transcendental truth” and to show its role in the Kantian system. I will argue that this notion is in line with the traditional definition of truth, i.e., that it consists in the correspondence between knowledge and object. I will also argue that criteria of transcendental truth are provided by transcendental logic, and that it is this notion of truth what makes it possible to establish the truth of a priori knowledge and delimitate the field of empirical truth.
Stroe, Constantin. “Idei etice kantiene vehiculate de profesorii de filosofie de la "Sf. Sava" în perioada paşoptistă.” [Romanian; Kantian ethical ideas circulated by the philosophy professors at the „Sf. Sava” high school during the forty-eighters’ period of the XIXth Century.] Revista de Filosofie 63.1 (2016): 17-32. [PW] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The study’s author supports the idea – also promoted by Mircea Vulcănescu – that almost all the philosophy professors of Sf. Sava, who created the starting nucleus for education and philosophy in the Romanian language (the founder, Gheorghe Lazăr, and his followers, Eufrosin Poteca, August Treboniu Laurian, Ion Zalomit) manifested interest and admiration for Kant’s practical philosophy – mainly for ethics, as they found in it many useful theses for achieving the political, national, cultural and social emancipation ideals. Most of them joined these Kantian ethics, because apparently they disliked the speculative side of the criticist philosophy, as it was very much commented upon, though contested, while they preferred its moral side for the certainty offered, thus considered more appropriate in view of educating the studious youth in the Principalities.
Sturm, Thomas. “Por que rejeitou Kant explicações fisiológicas na sua antropologia?” [Portuguese] Estudos Kantianos 4.1 (2016): 117-44. [M] [online]
Suganami, Hidemi, ed. See: Lebow, Richard Ned, Peer Schouten, and Hidemi Suganami, eds.
Sussman, David. Rev. of Reason, Value, and Respect: Kantian Themes from the Philosophy of Thomas E. Hill, Jr., edited by Mark Timmons and Robert N. Johnson (2015). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (Aug 2016, #35). [M] [online]
Sutherland, Daniel. “Kant on the Construction and Composition of Motion in the Phoronomy.” Kant: Studies on Mathematics in the Critical Philosophy. Eds. Emily Carson and Lisa Shabel (op cit.). 168-200. [M]
——. Rev. of Kant’s Construction of Nature: A Reading of the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, by Michael Friedman (2013). Journal of the History of Philosophy 54.1 (2016): 173-74. [M]
Tait, W. W. “Kant and Finitism.” Journal of Philosophy 113.5-6 (2016): 261-73. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: An observation and a thesis: The observation is that, whatever the connection between Kant’s philosophy and Hilbert’s conception of finitism, Kant’s account of geometric reasoning shares an essential idea with the account of finitist number theory in “Finitism” (Tait 1981), namely the idea of constructions f(X) from ‘arbitrary’ or ‘generic’ objects of various types (triangles, natural numbers, etc.). The thesis is that, contrary to a substantial part of contemporary literature on the subject, when Kant referred to number (as a common noun) and arithmetic, he was not referring to the natural or whole numbers and their arithmetic, but rather to the real numbers (as then understood) and their arithmetic. (This thesis owes, and will receive, some account of Kant’s discussion of number as the schema of magnitude.)
Tartaglia, James. “Rorty’s Ambivalent Relationship with Kant.” Contemporary Pragmatism 13.3 (2016): 298-318. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: I argue that Kant is a key figure in understanding Rorty’s work, by drawing attention to the fact that although he is ostensibly the principal villain of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, at the end of that book Kant provides the basis of Rorty's positive proposal that we view the world “bifocally”. I show how this idea was re-worked as “irony” in Continency, Irony, and Solidarity, and became central to Rorty’s outlook. However, by allowing this Kantian influence into his thinking, Rorty made his position untenable. For Rortyan pragmatism undercuts the higher stance required by the concept of irony; and yet without this Kantian influence, Rorty would have been unable to justify his pluralism. Rorty could not live with Kant but could not live without him either.
Tegtmeyer, Henning. “Ein Vorläufer Kants?” Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 64.3 (2016): 488-94. [PW]
Teruel, Pedro Jesús. “Kant in Deutschland. La revista Kant-Studien entre 1897 y 2015.” [Spanish] Revista de Estudios Kantianos 1.1 (2016): 69-84. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The journal Kant-Studien is the leading international publication on the Kantian universe. We focus here on its progression as a mirror of the philosophical developments of recent history. In the first section the inaugural paper of Hans Vaihinger is considered, focusing on its programmatic side. We analyse thereafter what we call the “first” and “second series” (from 1897 to 1937 and from 1954) together with the spurious interim 1942-1944; its cartography is designed under the light of textual, thematic and bibliographical items. Thus, a contribution is made to the contemporary history of ideas from the point of view of one of its most worthy vehicles.
——. Rev. of Filosofia i Modernitat. La reconstrucció de l’ordre del món, by Salvi Turró (2016). [Spanish] Revista de Estudios Kantianos 1.2 (2016): 231-32. [PW]
Tester, Steven. “Mental Powers and the Soul in Kant’s Subjective Deduction and the Second Paralogism.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46.3 (2016): 426-52. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant’s claim in the Subjective Deduction that we have multiple fundamental mental powers appears to be susceptible to some a priori metaphysical arguments made against multiple fundamental mental powers by Christian Wolff who held that these powers would violate the unity of thought and entail that the soul is an extended composite. I argue, however, that in the Second Paralogism and his lectures on metaphysics, Kant provides arguments that overcome these objections by showing that it is possible that a composite could ground the unity of thought, that properties are powers and therefore the soul could possess multiple powers, and the soul is a thing in itself so it cannot be an extended composite. These arguments lend additional support to the attribution of multiple mental powers to us in the Subjective Deduction.
Teufel, Thomas. Rev. of Kantian Conceptual Geography, by Nathaniel J. Goldberg (2015). Philosophical Forum 47.1 (2016): 79-82. [PW]
Theunissen, L. Nandi. “Kant's Commitment to Metaphysics of Morals.” European Journal of Philosophy 24.1 (2016): 103-28. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: A definitive feature of Kant's moral philosophy is its rationalism. Kant insists that moral theory, at least at its foundation, cannot take account of empirical facts about human beings and their circumstances in the world. This is the core of Kant's commitment to ‘metaphysics of morals’, and it is what he sees as his greatest contribution to moral philosophy. The paper clarifies what it means to be committed to metaphysics of morals, why Kant is committed to it, and where he thinks empirical considerations may enter moral theory. The paper examines recent work of contemporary Kantians (Barbara Herman, Allen Wood, and Christine Korsgaard) who argue that there is a central role for empirical considerations in Kant's moral theory. Either these theorists interpret Kant himself as permitting empirical considerations to enter, or they propose to extend Kant's theory so as to allow them to enter. With some qualifications, I argue that these interpretive trends are not supported by the texts, and that the proposed extensions are not plausibly Kantian. Kant's insistence on the exclusion of empirical considerations from the foundations of moral theory is not an incidental feature of his thought which might be modified while the rest remains unchanged. Rather, it is the very centre of his endeavours in moral philosophy. If we disagree with it, I argue, we have grounds for moving to a distinctly different theoretical framework.
Thiel, Udo. “The Early Modern Subject Revisited – Responses to Barth, Lenz, Renz and Wunderlich.” Kant-Studien 107.3 (2016): 554-66. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Responding to comments on The Early Modern Subject, this paper focuses on a strictly limited range of issues: methodology, Descartes on consciousness, and Locke and Hume on personal identity. 1) Ursula Renz’s comments prompt an explanation of the notion of development in historical studies of philosophy. 2) Contra Christian Barth, although it is difficult to determine what kind of self-relation consciousness is for Descartes on the basis of the texts, it is argued that a higher-order reading is a more plausible interpretation than a first-order reading. 3) It is shown that Locke’s account of personal identity can usefully be characterized as ‘subjectivist’, in spite of Martin Lenz’s objections. 4) And finally, in consideration of Falk Wunderlich’s comments, the paper argues against both a traditional ‘ontological’ reading and a ‘sceptical realist’ interpretation of Hume’s bundle theory of the mind.
Thisted, Marcos. Rev. of Kant’s Lectures / Kants Vorlesungen, edited by Bernd Dörflinger, Claudio La Rocca, Robert Louden, and Ubirajara Rancan de Azevedo Marques (2015). [Spanish] Con-Textos Kantianos 4 (2016): 343-50. [M] [online]
Thompson, Michael L, ed. Imagination in Kant’s Critical Philosophy. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2016. [vi, 225 p.] [WC]
Timmermann, Jens. “Quod dubitas, ne feceris. Kant on Using Conscience as a Guide.” Studi Kantiani 29 (2016): 163-67. [M]
——. “Kant über Mitleidenschaft.” Kant-Studien 107.4 (2016): 729-32. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In his discussion of sympathetic participation in § 34 of the Doctrine of Virtue, Kant twice uses an unusual word that does not reappear anywhere in his writings: Mitleidenschaft. So far, the significance of this has gone unnoticed. But there is a historical source that reveals precisely why he uses this word, which in turn sheds new light on the philosophical substance of Kant’s theory of sympathy.
Timponelli, Luca. Rev. of The Highest Good in Aristotle and Kant, by Joachim Aufderheide and Ralf M. Bader (2015). [Italian] Studi Kantiani 29 (2016): 221. [M]
Tolley, Clinton. “The Difference Between Original, Metaphysical and Geometrical Representations of Space.” Kantian Nonconceptualism. Ed. Dennis Schulting (op cit.). 257-85. [PW]
——. “Between ‘perception’ and understanding, from Leibniz to Kant.” Estudos Kantianos 4.2 (2016): 71-98. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In previous work I have argued that more care must be taken when discussing Kant’s views on ‘perception’ and ‘perceptual experience’, in light of Kant’s own technical use of ‘perception [Wahrnehmung]’ to pick out the mental act distinct from both empirical ‘intuition [Anschauung]’ and ‘experience [Erfahrung]’, insofar as Wahrnehmung involves consciousness of empirical intuition over and above the intuition itself, and insofar as this consciousness of the intuition itself is not yet empirical cognition of the object it represents. In the present essay I argue, first, that Kant›s use of ‹Wahrnehmung› is continuous in key respects with how the term is used both among German translators of Leibniz and among the later Leibnizians themselves, insofar as they all also associate ‹Wahrnehmung› with the consciousness or apperception of sensory representation, rather than with the elementary sensory representation itself. I show that this is so, despite the potentially misleading fact that Leibniz and his successors (following Descartes) use the French ‹perception› and Latin ‹perceptio› to refer to the more elementary sensory representation itself. I also demonstrate a continuous commitment to the imagination and its synthesis playing a mediating role in between mere sensation and Wahrnehmung (apperception). I then argue, finally, that Kant nevertheless departs from this tradition by decoupling consciousness and apperception per se – and hence, Wahrnehmung as well – from acts of understanding, precisely insofar as Kant means to distinguish the mental activity required for Wahrnehmung as mere empirical consciousness of representations, from what is required for empirical cognition of objects via concepts.
Tommasi, Fancesco Valerio. Rev. of The Bloomsbury Companion to Kant, edited by Gary Banham, Denis Schulting and Nigel Hems (2015). [Italian] Estudos Kantianos 4.2 (2016): 219-22. [M] [online]
Tomassini, Fiorella. Rev. of Global Justice, Kant and the Responsibility to Protect. A Provisional Duty, by Heather M. Roth (2014). [Spanish] Con-Textos Kantianos 3 (2016): 486-94. [M] [online]
——. Rev. of Immanuel Kant, Lecciones de Antropología. Fragmentos de estética y antropología. Edited and translated by Manuel Sánchez Ródriguez (2015). [Spanish] Revista de Estudios Kantianos 1.1 (2016): 99-100. [M] [online]
Tomaszewska, Anna. “Kant’s Reconception of Religion and Contemporary Secularism.” Roczniki Filozoficzne 64.4 (2016): 125-48. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In Secularism and Freedom of Conscience Jocelyn Maclure and Charles Taylor distinguish two models of a secular state: a republican and a pluralist-liberal one. Whereas the former displays a tendency to relegate religious beliefs from the public sphere for the sake of its postulated neutrality, the latter emphasizes the importance of freedom of conscience and, consequently, the right of individuals to manifest their religious commitments also in public. In this paper, I argue that Kant’s views on religion cannot provide a general framework that would warrant the pluralist-liberal kind of secularism. To that effect, focusing on Kant’s distinction between the private and the public use of reason, introduced in his 1784 essay on enlightenment, I claim that the public sphere construed along the Kantian lines could not provide a space in which a plurality of different, heteronomously grounded beliefs, could coexist with one another. Comparing Kant’s theory with Spinoza’s—particularly with regard to their critique of revelation and the proposal to reinterpret the Scripture in the light of universal moral principles—I also suggest that, as a rationalist about religion, Kant comes close to the secularizing tendency of the ‘radical Enlightenment.’
——. See: Head, Jonathan, Anna Tomaszewska, Jochen Bojanowski, Alberto Vanzo, and Sorin Baiasu.
Tommasi, Francesco Valerio. “Kant’s ‘Historical Sign’ as Sacrament: On the Distinction between Revolution and Church.” Kant’s Shorter Writings: Critical Paths Outside the Critiques. Eds. Rafael V. Orden Jiménez, Robert Hanna, Robert Louden, Jacinto Rivera de Rosales, and Nuria Sánchez Madrid (op cit.). 266-82. [M]
Torralba, José María. “Zur Rolle der „Typik der reinen praktischen Urtheilskraft“ und der „Kategorien der Freiheit“ in der Konstitution des Gegenstandes der reinen praktischen Vernunft.” Die “Kategorien der Freiheit” in Kants praktischer Philosophie. Ed. Stephan Zimmermann (op cit.). 269-94. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The paper deals with the role of the faculty of judgement in Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason. It provides an interpretation of the role of the „Typic“ of the faculty of pure practical judgment and the categories of freedom in the constitution of the object of the will. For Kant, the object of the will is, properly speaking, a maxim. It is argued that in the second chapter of the Critique two notions of object and, thus, of maxim are used: one corresponding to the pure practical reason (a second-order maxim) and the other to the empirically conditioned practical reason (a first-order maxim). The object of the will (i.e., of the pure practical reason) is a second-order maxim, to which Kant also sometimes refers as inner attitude (Gesinnung). The categories of freedom provide the necessary knowledge in order to a priori assess any possible maxim. In particular, the „Typic“ allows the moral modality of a maxim to be determined, that is, whether it is morally possible or not. In this way, pure reason meets one of the essential requirements of autonomy: to constitute by itself the object of a will determined by the moral law. It is then justified to conceive the causality of the will independently of its matter.
Torsen, Ingvild. “Disinterest and Truth: On Heidegger’s Interpretation of Kant’s Aesthetics.” British Journal of Aesthetics 56.1 (2016): 15-32. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this article, I aim to interpret and contextualize Heidegger’s short interpretation of Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgement. I provide a more accurate picture of Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant, showing that his reading is both appreciative and original, if speculative. I argue that Heidegger’s analysis of Kant’s aesthetics is surprisingly at odds with his general characterization and criticism of modern aesthetics. The latter can be captured by two basic theses – art is determined by a subject’s experience and art reveals metaphysical truth – but neither of these theses applies to Heidegger’s Kant. Instead, Heidegger understands Kant and the third Critique’s notions of disinterestedness and purposiveness as sources of insight, offering an interpretation of Kantian disinterestedness as analogous to his own notion of ‘letting be’. The seeming inconsistency between Heidegger’s general story and his interpretation of Kant is revealing of Heidegger’s twofold use of history, as allowing for a diagnosis of the present, as well as positive inspiration for a future aesthetics .
Tredanaro, Emanuele. “Liberdade como princípio político: os primeiros pronunciamentos de Kant e Fichte sobre a Revolução.” [Portuguese; Freedom as political principle: the first pronouncements of Kant and Fichte on the Revolution] Estudos Kantianos 4.1 (2016): 57-82. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The aim of this paper is to present some observations about the developments that the debate on the French Revolution takes in Germany, particularly through the positions of Kant and Fichte in 1793. We propose, first, a quick historical overview, and then we sketch out the theses, in our opinion, most significant of Achenwall, Burke and Rehberg, all of which turn around the centrality of experience in political theory and practice. In dialogue with them, we will try to show how Fichte’s thought about the revolution is articulated, specifically in Zurückforderung der Denkfreiheit and in the first Beitrag über die französische Revolution, in which the conception of the moral law as unlimited freedom plays a key role. From here, we will indicate, in the different emphasis put by Kant on the moral law, the theoretical moment by which, in Über den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht für die Praxis, he moves away from Fichte, with whom he shares, to a certain extent, the premises but not the conclusions. We will see that, in this sense, the concepts of law and contract will be of central relevance.
Trentani, Federica. “Politics, Urteilskraft and the Realization of Right: Kant’s Contextual Perspective.” Kant’s Shorter Writings: Critical Paths Outside the Critiques. Eds. Rafael V. Orden Jiménez, Robert Hanna, Robert Louden, Jacinto Rivera de Rosales, and Nuria Sánchez Madrid (op cit.). 386-97. [M]
Trevisan, Diego Kosbiau. “O caminho para uma leitura política do projeto crítico.” [Portuguese; The path to a political reading of Kant’s critical project] Studia Kantiana 14.21 (2016): 93-120. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper discusses what I call the “political reading” of the Critique of Pure Reason. First, I argue for a possible political meaning of Criticism in German Enlightenment. Second, I present three major interpretive trends in Kant scholarship which, along with the recent rehabilitation of Kant’s legal philosophy, pave the way for the emergence of the recent political reading of Kant’s philosophy as a whole. Finally, I examine the contours of such reading and present its leading proponents.
——. “O ‘sistema’ da moral? Uma investigação sobre a sistematicidade interna da metafísica dos costumes de Kant.” [Portuguese] Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia 57.134 (2016): 401-19. [PW] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper casts doubt on two objections commonly raised against the Metaphysics of Morals, namely, its lack of "systematic consistency" when compared with other central works of Kant's critical philosophy and also the apparently misleading admission of legality as a legitimate concept of his practical metaphysical system. It will be argued that the identification of the act of free choice as the supreme concept of the system allows us to face these criticisms firstly by presenting a principle of systematic arrangement which is employed in other admittedly systematic works, and secondly by justifying the central position occupied by the right act, or the action in conformity with duty in Kant's system of morals, which allows for the possibility that both Law and ethical legality be considered as authentic elements of a “Metaphysics of Morals”.
Tritten, Tyler. “Against Kant.” Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities 21.4 (2016): 143-55. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: F.W.J. Schelling’s late distinction between negative and positive philosophy correlates negative philosophy with critical philosophy, which delimits what could be said of things without yet actually being able to do so. Positive philosophy, however, is able to make assertions about the actual existence of such objects without transgressing Kant’s prison of finitude, i.e., without moving from an immanent, subjective and transcendental position to a transcendent (read: noumenal) object. Schelling’s later positive philosophy rather asserts that one begins outside Kant’s prison. This is not a dogmatism or, more properly, a dogmatizing philosophy, that attempts to reach the transcendent from an immanent locus, transcendental subjectivity, but it is a “doctrinal philosophy” that begins in transcendence and then has as its task the consequent construction of the domain of transcendental subjectivity. By this means, Schelling’s positive philosophy, which he also deems a “historical” and “progressive” philosophy, exposes what Quentin Meillassoux has termed “the great outdoors.” Schelling, however, does not show how one might acquire access to this absolute outside, but he argues that one should depart from it. Transcendence is not the aim of knowledge but the absolute prius from which positive, i.e., progressive, philosophy begins.
Tuna, Emine Hande. “A Kantian Hybrid Theory of Art Criticism: A Particularist Appeal to the Generalists.” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 74.4 (2016): 397-411. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Noël Carroll proposes a generalist theory of art criticism, which essentially involves evaluations of artworks on the basis of their success value, at the cost of rendering evaluations of reception value irrelevant to criticism. In this article, I argue for a hybrid account of art criticism, which incorporates Carroll's objective model but puts Carroll-type evaluations in the service of evaluations of reception value. I argue that this hybrid model is supported by Kant's theory of taste. Hence, I not only present an alternative theory of metacriticism, which has the merit of reinstating the centrality of reception value in art critics’ evaluations, but also show that, contrary to a common conception, Kant's aesthetic theory can house a fruitful account of art criticism. The benefit of this hybrid account is that, despite being essentially particularist, it should be appealing even to generalists, including Carroll.
Uleman, Jennifer. “No King and No Torture: Kant on Suicide and Law.” Kantian Review 21.1 (2016): 77-100. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant’s most canonical argument against suicide, the universal law argument, is widely dismissed. This paper attempts to save it, showing that a suicide maxim, universalized, undermines all bases for practical law, resisting both the non-negotiable value of free rational willing and the ordinary array of sensuous commitments that inform prudential incentives. Suicide therefore undermines moral law-governed community as a whole, threatening ‘savage disorder’. In pursuing this argument, I propose a non-teleological and non-theoretical nature – a ‘practical nature’ or moral law governed whole – the realization of which morality demands.
Urteaga Rodríguez, Maria José. “Desobediencia civil: la autoridad de la reflexión vs la autoridad civil.” [Spanish; “Civil Disobedience: Authority of Reflection Vs Civil Authority”] Con-Textos Kantianos 3 (2016): 274-84. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Is civil disobedience morally justified? Throughout this paper I try to offer an affirmative answer to this question. In order to explain why civil disobedience is morally justified, I first describe some of the essential features of civil disobedience. Then I explain that the tension between civil and individual powers – which is often considered as the trigger of civil disobedience – is only in appearance. Some passages of Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals are essential for this task. Once the tension is proved to be unimportant, there is room for stating that the social and individual sources of normativity have to complement each other if civil disobedience is to be justified. As paradoxical as it may sound: Civil disobedience can only be morally justified if obedience and law are reinforced.
Valagussa, Francesco. Rev. of Kant’s Lectures / Kants Vorlesungen, edited by Bernd Dörflinger, Claudio la Rocca, Robert B. Louden, and Ubirajara Rancan de Azevedo Marques (2015). [Italian] Studi Kantiani 29 (2016): 205-7. [M]
Valerio Tommasi, Francesco. Rev. of Comprehensive Commentary on Kant’s Religion Within the Bounds of Bare Reason, by Stephen R. Palmquist (2016). [Italian] Con-Textos Kantianos 3 (2016): 495-98. [M] [online]
Valois Cordeiro, Renato. “On the Use of Teleological Principles in Biology.” Kant’s Shorter Writings: Critical Paths Outside the Critiques. Eds. Rafael V. Orden Jiménez, Robert Hanna, Robert Louden, Jacinto Rivera de Rosales, and Nuria Sánchez Madrid (op cit.). 190-99. [M]
van den Berg, Hein. “On Bryan Hall’s The Post-Critical Kant.” Critique (blog posted: 30 Oct 2016) n.p. [PW] [online]
Van Mazijk, Corijn. “Kant and Husserl on the Contents of Perception.” Southern Journal of Philosophy 54.2 (2016): 267-87. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper focuses on the contents of perception in Kant's first Critique and Husserl's later writings. Both Kant and Husserl are known for their appeal to synthesis in their transcendental accounts of perceptual experience and objective judgment. Especially regarding Kant, the precise nature of perceptual synthesis has recently been the cause of much debate. Whereas some argue that for Kant perception must have nonconceptual content, others believe he is a conceptualist. After offering an alternative solution to this interpretative problem in Kant's philosophy, I turn to Husserl's later theory of perception. My main claims here are that Husserl departs from Kant specifically regarding (i) the sort of synthetic contents that govern affective perception and (ii) the role of conceptual capacities in the contents of attentive perception.
Vanzo, Alberto. Rev. of Scritti su Kant, by Mirella Capozzi (2014). [Italian] Studi Kantiani 29 (2016): 181-83. [M]
——. See: Head, Jonathan, Anna Tomaszewska, Jochen Bojanowski, Alberto Vanzo, and Sorin Baiasu.
Vasile, Mihai D. “Canonul Aristotel-Kant.” [Romanian] Studii de istoria filosofiei universale 24 (2016): pages. [PW]
Vassiliou, Konstantinos. “Kant and Leroi-Gourhan: Remapping Aesthetics in the Context of Cosmopolitanization.” Continuum: Journal of Media & Cultural Studies 30.6 (2016): 726-33. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article will try to reconfigure the aesthetical dimension of cosmopolitanism within global and interconnected experience. Starting its analysis from Kant, it will show that for the German philosopher cosmopolitanism was closely patterned on an interdependence of technical civilization and aesthetics, which would initiate a cosmopolitan matrix for the development of human faculties. The essay relates this interdependence to the theories of André Leroi-Gourhan that pose a serious challenge to Kant’s views about human progress and evolution. In this framework, aesthetics and sensoriality turn out to be of vital importance for the subjective integration into technological and interconnected experience, where a constant negotiation between Kant’s ‘disinterested’ aesthetics and Leroi-Gourhan’s ‘functional’ aesthetics is involved. It is with the help of this negotiation, this article will argue, that an ‘aesthetic cosmopolitanization’ – a bottom-up process of promoting cosmopolitan sensibilities – could be inscribed into digital media and global experience.
Vieira, Patricia I. “Perpetual Peace: Kant’s History of the Future.” Epoché 20.2 (2016): 407-25. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This essay discusses Immanuel Kant’s project of perpetual peace. Kant runs into several difficulties in this undertaking, a series of “political antinomies” such as the opposing goals of nature or providence and of individuals, and the competing models of a federation of states or a world state to enforce perpetual peace. I argue that cosmopolitan right is Kant’s answer to the inconsistencies of his political philosophy and of his philosophy of history. Cosmopolitanism brings the individual back into historical development by merging the political rights each person enjoys within a state with the relentless progress of the human race as a whole. Further, it provides a transition from a federation of states to a global political system of rights. I contend that cosmopolitanism can be regarded as the political supplement to the categorical imperative that applies universally to all rational beings.
Villsante, Roberto. Rev. of What Is Enlightenment: Can China Answer Kant’s Question?, by Wei Zhang (2010). Frontiers of Philosophy in China 11.3 (2016): 521-26. [PW]
Vincent, Bernadette. “From self-organization to self-assembly: a new materialism?” History & Philosophy of the Life Sciences 38.3 (2016): 1-13. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: While self-organization has been an integral part of academic discussions about the distinctive features of living organisms, at least since Immanuel Kant's Critique of Judgement, the term 'self-assembly' has only been used for a few decades as it became a hot research topic with the emergence of nanotechnology. Could it be considered as an attempt at reducing vital organization to a sort of assembly line of molecules? Considering the context of research on self-assembly I argue that the shift of attention from self-organization to self-assembly does not really challenge the boundary between chemistry and biology. Self-assembly was first and foremost investigated in an engineering context as a strategy for manufacturing without human intervention and did not raise new perspectives on the emergence of vital organization itself. However self-assembly implies metaphysical assumptions that this paper tries to disentangle. It first describes the emergence of self-assembly as a research field in the context of materials science and nanotechnology. The second section outlines the metaphysical implications and will emphasize a sharp contrast between the ontology underlying two practices of self-assembly developed under the umbrella of synthetic biology. And unexpectedly, we shall see that chemists are less on the reductionist side than most synthetic biologists. Finally, the third section ventures some reflections on the kind of design involved in self-assembly practices.
Viviana Palermo, Sandra. “Unidad, totalidad, conformidad a fin. Reflexiones sobre el concepto de universal sintético del apartado 77 de la Kritik der Urteilskraft.” [Spanish; “Unity, Totality, Purposiveness. Reflections on the Concept of Synthetic Universal of Critique of Judgment, Paragraph 77”] Con-Textos Kantianos 3 (2016): 139-52. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The goal of this text is to examine the structure of wholeness, within the notion of «synthetical universal» of §77 of KU, in order to show that in these passages Kant is considering a concept of unity which differs from any other collective unity described within his philosophy. In the KU, in fact, Kant regards wholeness as one which becomes such due to the fact that its parts would, in this sense, not be mere determinations or limitations of the totality they constitute, thus gaining sense and meaning, but they would organize themselves as well as their function with regards to the other parts and the whole, which, in turn, acquires sense and meaning, in virtue of the parts that constitute it.
Vogt, David Chelsom. “Med rett til å bli straffet - om Kant og Hegels teorier om straff som respekt for forbryteren.” [Norwegian; The Right to be Punished: On Kant and Hegel's theories of punishment as respect for the criminal] Norsk filosofisk tidsskrift 51.3-4 (2016): 148-62. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article discusses Kant and Hegel's theories of punishment in light of their broader legal philosophies. The purpose of punishment, and law in general, is to secure mutual freedom and mutual recognition. Punishment is a way of expressing respect for the freedom of the criminal, as well as the freedom of victims and all members of society. Though it might seem odd that imprisoning somebody means respecting their freedom, Hegel famously insists that punishment is a right for the criminal. The article explains how punishment may respect mutual freedom, and defends the claim that this is a necessary condition for just punishment. However, the purpose of re-establishing mutual freedom may possibly be achieved by other methods than punishment. The article discusses the potential of restorative justice processes for expressing the kind of mutual recognition that Hegel ascribes to punishment. Punishment is therefore not necessary for achieving the just purpose that Kant and Hegel ascribe to it. We may thus accept the Kantian-Hegelian framework for the just sanctioning of crime while challenging their more controversial claim that punishment is a categorical imperative.
Von Platz, Jeppe. “Singularity Without Equivalence: The Complex Unity of Kant’s Categorical Imperative.” Journal of Value Inquiry 50.2 (2016): 369-84. [PW]
Wahsner, Renate. Rev. of Kants Ontologie der raumzeitlichen Wirklichkeit. Versuch einer anti-realistischen Interpretation der „Kritik der reinen Vernunft“, by Kiyoshi Chiba (2012). [German] Kant-Studien 107.2 (2016): 389-90. [PW]
Waibel, Violetta L., ed. Ausgehend von Kant: Wegmarken der klassischen deutschen Philosophie. Würzburg: Ergon Verlag, 2015. [347 p.] [WC]
Note: Studien zur Phänomenologie und praktischen Philosophie, vol. 38. (These essays are not listed separately in this bibliography.)
Anschauung und Begriff
Giorgia Todaro (Die transzendentale Einbildungskraft bei Kant und Fichte und ihre produktive und reproduktive Funktion)
Mathias Einer (Der Begriff des reinen Bildes bei Kant: zum Ubergang von den Deduktionen zum Schematismuskapitel)
Carsten Olk (Die Modifikation der kantischen Synthesistheorie in Peter F. Strawsons The Bounds of Sense)
Max Brinnich (Die Zeit als Grenze des Verstandes: zum Verhältnis von Zeit und diskursivem Denken bei Kant)
Erkenntnis und Wirklichkeit
Wiebke Henning (Naturgesetze bei Kant: Eine andere Antwort auf Hume)
Alexander Gunkel (Die Autonomie endlicher Wesen bei Kant: das Selbstdenken als Probierstein der Wahrheit)
Andrija Soc (Dogmatic Idealism: Post-Kantian Criticism of the Thing-in-itself)
Daniel Wenz (Wirklichkeit als Reflexionskategorie: Hegels normativer Realismus)
Menschliche Natur und praktische Vernunft
Jörg Noller (Reflexionen des Willens: Probleme und Perspektiven der Freiheit nach Kant)
Martin Sticker (Kant, gemeine Menschenvernunft und vier Formen der moralischen Erziehung)
Alyona Kharitonova (Kants Anthropologie und gegenwärtige Alternativen anthropologischer Projekte)
Freiheit und Spekulation
Barbara Santini (Hölderlin und das "spekulative Pro und Contra")
Michael Hackl (Natur, Freiheit und Verantwortung: F.W.J. Sendlings objektiver Idealismus als spekulative Naturethik)
Alexander Bilda (Das Denken des Unvordenklichen: Sendlings Konzeption von System und Freiheit in der 'Erlanger Vorlesung' von 1821)
Philipp Höfele (Das Tragische als Strukturmoment von Philosophie? Affinitäten zwischen Schelling und Heidegger in der Frage)
Philipp Schaller (Die Wiederaneignung der menschlichen Natur : zum Verhältnis von Philosophie und Dichtung bei Kant, Schiller und Dostojewskij)
Johannes Epple (Erhabene Schönheit: Lesarten von Kants ästhetischen Gefühlen in Hölderlins Hyperion und Nietzsches Also sprach Zarathustra)
Alexander Wilfing (Eduard Hanslick zwischen Deutschem Idealismus und Österreichischem Realismus: eine Fallstudie zur österreichischen Kant-Rezeption).
Walden, Kenneth. Rev. of Means, Ends, and Persons: The Meaning and Psychological Dimensions of Kant’s Humanity Formula, by Robert Audi (2016). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (June 2016, #15). [M] [online]
Waldow, Anik. “Natural History and the Formation of the Human Being: Kant on Active Forces.” Studies in History & Philosophy of Science, Part A 58 (2016): 67-76. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In his 1785 review of the Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit, Kant objects to Herder's conception of nature as being imbued with active forces. This attack is usually evaluated against the background of Kant's critical project and his epistemological concern to caution against the “metaphysical excess” of attributing immanent properties to matter. In this paper I explore a slightly different reading by investigating Kant's pre-critical account of creation and generation. The aim of this is to show that Kant's struggle with the forces of matter has a long history and revolves around one central problem: that of how to distinguish between the non-purposive forces of nature and the intentional powers of the mind. Given this history, the epistemic stricture that Kant's critical project imposes on him no longer appears to be the primary reason for his attack on Herder. It merely aggravates a problem that Kant has been battling with since his earliest writings.
Walker, Ralph. “Comments on Lucy Allais, Manifest Reality: Kant's Idealism and his Realism.” European Journal of Philosophy 24.1 (2016): 267-74. [PW]
Walschots, Michael. Rev. of Kant’s Lectures on Ethics: A Critical Guide, edited by Lara Denis and Oliver Sensen (2015). [English] Studi Kantiani 29 (2016): 209-13. [M]
Ware, Owen. “Skepticism in Kant’s Groundwork.” European Journal of Philosophy 24.2 (2016): 375-96. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper offers a new interpretation of Kant's relationship with skepticism in the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. My position differs from commonly held views in the literature in two ways. On the one hand, I argue that Kant's relationship with skepticism is active and systematic (contrary to Hill, Wood, Rawls, Timmermann, and Allison). On the other hand, I argue that the kind of skepticism Kant is interested in does not speak to the philosophical tradition in any straightforward sense (contrary to Forster and Guyer). On my reading, Kant takes up a skeptical method in the Groundwork as a way of exposing certain obstacles in our ordinary and philosophical thinking about morality. The central obstacle he is interested in is practical in character, arising from a natural tendency we have to rationalize against the moral law. In attempting to resolve this tendency, I argue, the Groundwork turns out to have a profoundly educative task.
Watkins, Eric. “Kant on Materialism.” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 24.5 (2016): 1035-52. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper I argue that Kant’s complex argument against materialism involves not only his generic commitment to the existence of non-spatio-temporal and thus non-material things in themselves (which follows directly from Transcendental Idealism), but also considerations pertaining to reason and the subject of our thoughts. Specifically, I argue that because Kant conceives of reason in such a way that it demands a commitment to the existence of the unconditioned so that we can account for whatever conditioned objects we encounter in experience, our thoughts, which are also conditioned, require something unconditioned that, because it is unconditioned, cannot be material. In this way, Kant’s attitude towards materialism is based not only on abstract features of his metaphysics and epistemology, but also on specific features that were under serious discussion in the early modern period.
——. “The Unconditioned and the Absolute in Kant and Early German Romanticism.” Kant Yearbook: Kant and German Idealism 8 (2016): 117-42. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper argues not only that Schelling, Novalis, and Friedrich Schlegel are reacting directly to Kant (rather than simply to each other and to other post-Kantian figures), but also that they are responding in complex ways to one particularly prominent and distinctive line of thought in Kant, namely his account of reason, conditions, and the unconditioned. Though Kant argues that we cannot have cognition of unconditioned objects, he none the less thinks that reason demands that we accept the existence of such objects. The paper argues that the German Romantics take over this general line of thought, though they do so in different contexts and to different ends. Specifically, focusing on this dimension of Kant’s thought allows us to see both how the logic of conditioning relations can be seen to be driving their arguments for the Absolute, and how Kant’s particular conception of conditioning relations gives rise to important differences from the views of the German Romantics. For whereas he distinguishes different kinds of real conditioning relations, they operate with a generic conception of conditioning that leads to their distinctive Romantic views.
Wehofsits, Anna. Anthropologie und Moral: Affekte, Leidenschaften und Mitgefühl in Kants Ethik. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2016. [viii, 164 p.] [WC]
Westphal, Kenneth R. How Hume and Kant Reconstruct Natural Law: Justifying Strict Objectivity without Debating Moral Realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016. [xvi, 252 p.] [WC] [review]
——. “Enlightenment, Reason and Universalism: Kant’s Critical Insights.” Studies in East European Thought 68.2/3 (2016): 127-48. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: 'Universalist' moral principles have fallen into disfavour because too often they have been pretexts for unilateral impositions upon others, whether domestically or internationally. Too widely neglected has been Kant's specifically Critical re-analysis of the scope and character of rational justification in all non-formal domains, including the entirety of epistemology and moral philosophy, including both justice and ethics. Rational judgment is inherently normative because it is in part constituted by our self-assessment of whether the considerations we now integrate into a candidate judgment have been integrated as they ought, so as to form a cogent, justifiable judgment. Constitutive of this self-assessment is that rational judgments must be based upon considerations which can be communicated to all others, such that they too can assess them as sufficiently cogent justification; also constitutive of this rational self-assessment is that we actually engage with others who do assess our judgments. Kant's Critical principles rule out in principle any unilateral imposition upon others, whether in cognition or morals. Using Kant's Critical principles and methods in connection with 'practical anthropology' and the enormously important domain of acquired rights and obligations shows how Kant had already justified fundamentally universal principles of justice which can be institutionalised in variously distinctive cultures, and which form the proper bases for our acquired, specifically social rights and obligations, including those of friendship and community.
——. “Kant, Aristotle and our Fidelity to Reason.” Studi Kantiani 29 (2016): 109-28. [M]
——. “On Bryan Hall’s The Post-Critical Kant.” Critique (blog posted: 1 Nov 2016) n.p. [PW] [online]
——, transl. See: Kant, Immanuel. Lectures and Drafts on Political Philosophy.
Westra, Adam. The Typic in Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason: Moral Judgment and Symbolic Representation. Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2016. [xvi, 264 p.] [PW]
Wicks, Robert. Rev. of The Impact of Idealism: The Legacy of Post-Kantian German Thought, Volume III: Aesthetics and Literature, edited by Christoph Jamme and Ian Cooper (2013). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (Apr 2016, #1). [M] [online]
Wiegerling, Klaus. Rev. of Kants ‚Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten‘ – Ein systematischer Kommentar, by Philipp Richter (2013). Kant-Studien 107.3 (2016): 587-88. [PW]
Wilford, Paul T. Rev. of Logic and the Limits of Philosophy in Kant and Hegel, by Clayton Bohnet (2015). Kantian Review 21.3 (2016): 507-10. [PW]
——. Rev. of The Powers of Pure Reason: Kant and the Idea of Cosmic Philosophy, by Alfredo Ferrarin (2015). Kantian Review 21.1 (2016): 151-55. [PI]
Willaschek, Marcus. “Kant and Peirce on Belief.” Pragmatism, Kant, and Transcendental Philosophy. Eds. Gabriele Gava and Robert Stern (op cit.). 133-51. [M]
——, and Silvia del Luján Di Sanza (transl.). “¿Derecho sin Ética? Kant: acerca de las razones para no quebrantar el derecho” [Spanish; Right without Ethics? Kant: On Reasons for not Infringing Right] Con-Textos Kantianos 3 (2016): 415-31. [M] [online]
Williams, Howard Rev. of Kant and Colonialism, edited by Katrin Flikschuh and Lea Ypi (2014). Journal of the History of Philosophy 54.2 (2016): 340-41. [M]
Williamson, Diane. Rev. of Kantianism, Liberalism, and Feminism: Resisting Oppression, by Carol Hay (2013). Journal of Moral Philosophy 13.5 (2016): 623-26. [PW]
Wilson, Eric Entrican. “Habitual Desire: On Kant’s Concept of Inclination.” Kantian Review 21.2 (2016): 211-35. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Tamar Schapiro has offered an important new ‘Kantian’ account of inclination and motivation, one that expands and refines Christine Korsgaard’s view. In this article I argue that Kant’s own view differs significantly from Schapiro’s. Above all, Kant thinks of inclinations as dispositions, not occurrent desires; and he does not believe that they stem directly from a non-rational source, as she argues. Schapiro’s ‘Kantian’ view rests on a much sharper distinction between the rational and non-rational parts of the soul. In the process of explaining these (and other) differences, I argue that Kant’s own view is in some respects philosophically superior to Schapiro’s.
Wilson, Holly L. “Kant’s Anthropology as Klugheitslehre.” Con-Textos Kantianos 3 (2016): 122-38. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this essay I show that Kant intended his anthropology lectures and book, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, to be a Klugheitslehre (theory of prudence). The essay draws on many quotes from these sources to show that Kant wanted to develop a theory of how to use other people for one’s own ends. Although so much of the lectures and book are in conversation with Baumgarten’s empirical psychology, there are enough references to Klugheitslehre (prudence) and klug (clever) action to support this thesis. Prudence is a skill that human beings should develop and hence is not excluded from human life even though it is not the basis of morality. The purpose of Klugheitslehre is to achieve happiness but the means to that happiness involves using other people for one’s own ends. In order to use others as a means to one’s own ends, a person must in some way satisfy the inclinations of the other person so that they cooperate in one’s ends. However it is also possible to dominate another person and use them as well if they are dominated by a passion but this is not prudent since it does not achieve happiness except in the case of a husband and wife. Kant’s distinction between Weltklugheit and Privatklugheit also appears to be confirmed in that he advances the idea that sociable means of gaining the cooperation of others (Privatklugheit) leads to the lasting happiness of a person and to the development of civilization.
Wimmer, Simon, and Tristan Kreetz. Rev. of Logic and the Limits of Philosophy in Kant and Hegel, by Clayton Bohnet (2015). Kant Studies Online (2016): 1-11. [M] [online]
Winegar, Reed. “title.” Hegel Bulletin 37.1 (2016): 81-103. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Hegel famously criticizes Kant’s resolution of the antinomies. According to Sedgwick, Hegel primarily chastises Kant’s resolution for presupposing that concepts are ‘one-sided’, rather than identical to their opposites. If Kant had accepted the dialectical nature of concepts, then (according to Sedgwick) Kant would not have needed to resolve the antinomies. However, as Ameriks has noted, any such interpretation faces a serious challenge. Namely, Kant’s first antinomy concerns the universe’s physical dimensions. Even if we grant that the concept of the finite is necessarily related to that of the infinite, the physical universe cannot both have and lack a temporal beginning. I argue that Hegel neither adopts Sedgwick’s view that Kant’s antinomies require no resolution nor absurdly accepts that the physical universe both has and lacks a temporal beginning. Instead, Hegel proposes a sophisticated resolution of Kant’s first antinomy (including its physical aspect) that depends on Hegel’s theory of the Absolute.
Wittwer, Héctor. Rev. of Kant’s “Tugendlehre”: a Comprehensive Commentary, edited by Andreas Trampota, Oliver Sensen, and Jens Timmermann (2013). Kant-Studien 107.3 (2016): 577-81. [PW]
Wolff, Michael. “Kants Auflösung des Leib-Seele-Problems.” Internationales Jahrbuch des Deutschen Idealismus/International Yearbook of German Idealism: Bewusstsein/Consciousness, eds. Dina Emundts and Sally Sedgwick. 11 (2016): 49-76. [PW]
Wunderlich, Falk. “Author Meets Critics: Udo Thiel, The Early Modern Subject” Kant-Studien 107.3 (2016): 514. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Introduction to a set of papers published in this issue of Kant-Studien that stem from a workshop held at the Johannes-Gutenberg-Universität-Mainz (November 21-23, 2013). See essays by Christian Barth, Martin Lenz, Ursula Renz, Falk Wunderlich, and Udo Thiel.
——. “Bundles, Selves, and Sceptical Realism in Udo Thiel’s The Early Modern Subject.” Kant-Studien 107.3 (2016): 545-53. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper deals with how to understand David Hume’s theory of personal identity. Udo Thiel endorses a view that resembles the Sceptical Realist interpretation to some extent while taking issue with its ontological implications. Thiel argues that Hume’s so-called bundle theory of the mind is not a theory about its real essence but rather only a theory about our idea of the self. Thiel thus argues for an epistemological reading of the bundle theory and rejects the mainstream reading as unjustifiably ontological. In this paper, I challenge Thiel’s view by discussing some textual and philosophical evidence against it.
Yost, Benjamin S. “Kant’s Demonstration of Free Will, Or, How to Do Things with Concepts.” Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2.2 (2016): 291-309. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant famously insists that free will is a condition of morality. The difficulty of providing a demonstration of freedom has left him vulnerable to devastating attack: critics charge that Kant's post-Groundwork justification of morality amounts to a dogmatic assertion of morality's authority. My paper rebuts this objection, showing that Kant offers a cogent demonstration of freedom. My central claim is that the demonstration must be understood in practical rather than theoretical terms. A practical demonstration of x works by bringing x into existence, and what the demonstration of freedom brings into existence is a moral will, a will regulated by the moral law and capable of acting in accordance with it. Since to act morally is to act freely, bringing a moral will into existence actualizes our capacity for freedom and demonstrates that we possess it. To confirm the viability of such a demonstration, Kant must establish that agents can regulate their wills by practical principles, and that practical judgments are efficacious of themselves (i.e., that non-Humean motivational internalism is true). Kant, I argue, is successful on both counts.
Zákutná, Sandra. “Stephan Tichy on Incorporating Kant’s Philosophy into University Education at the End of the 18th Century.” Con-Textos Kantianos 4 (2016): 138-46. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The paper deals with Stephan Tichy, the very first Slovak scholar who dealt with Kant’s philosophy in his work Philosophische Bemerkungen über das Studienwesen in Ungarn, anonymously published in 1792. In this work Tichy openly advocates incorporating Kant’s philosophy into university education, with an emphasis on the significance of Kant’s philosophy to the educational system and the total independence of philosophy as such. The paper also compares Kant’s method of teaching philosophy introduced in the Announcement of the Programme of Lectures for the Winter Semester 1765—1766 with Tichy’s ideas on how to teach philosophy at universities.
——. “Political Issues in Kant’s Philosophy.” Kant’s Shorter Writings: Critical Paths Outside the Critiques. Eds. Rafael V. Orden Jiménez, Robert Hanna, Robert Louden, Jacinto Rivera de Rosales, and Nuria Sánchez Madrid (op cit.). 313-21. [M]
——. “Kant and Eastern Europe in Vienna 2015.” Con-Textos Kantianos 4 (2016): 188-91. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The text deals with the theme of Kant and Eastern Europe at the University of Vienna in 2015. Except the section of contributions to the theme “Kant and Eastern Europe” at the 12th International Kant Congress, it focuses on other activities of the organizers connected with the theme, namely the exhibition and publication “Detours. Approaches to Immanuel Kant in Vienna, in Austria, and in Eastern Europe”.
——. See: Belas, Ľubomir, and Sandra Zakutna.
——. Rev. of Kant’s Embedded Cosmopolitanism. History, Philosophy and Education for World Citizens, by Georg Cavallar (2015). [English] Con-Textos Kantianos 3 (2016): 481-85. [M] [online]
——. See: Chaly, Vadim, and Sandra Zákutná.
Zammito, John H. “Epigenesis in Kant: Recent Reconsideration.” Studies in History & Philosophy of Science, Part A 58 (2016): 85-97. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Epigenesis has become a far more exciting issue in Kant studies recently, especially with the publication of Jennifer Mensch's Kant’s Organicism. In my commentary, I propose to clarify my own position on epigenesis relative to that of Mensch and others by once again considering the discourse of epigenesis in the wider eighteenth century. Historically, I maintain that Kant was never fully an epigenesist because he feared its materialist implications. This makes it highly unlikely that he drew heavily, as other interpreters like Dupont and Huneman have suggested, on Caspar Friedrich Wolff for his ultimate theory of “generic preformation.” In order to situate more precisely what Kant made of epigenesis, I distinguish his metaphysical use, as elaborated by Mensch, from his view of it as a theory for life science. In that light, I raise questions about the scope and authority of philosophy vis a vis natural science.
Zamora, Damián Bravo. “On the Soberer Conclusions that May Be Drawn from Kantian and Cantorian Antinomies.” International Philosophical Quarterly 56.2 (2016): 221-38. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper explores the connection between Kant's first antinomy and the set-theoretical paradox of the largest cardinal. The lesson to be drawn is that we should refrain from reifying (i.e., treating as an individual object or thing) the collections that generate the antinomies: the collection of all spatio-temporal objects (the world) in the case of Kant's first antinomy, the collection of all objects whatsoever (the universe) in the case of the Cantorian paradox. This conclusion is not only one that we are entitled to draw but also one that does not generate new philosophical problems of its own. In this respect it is more attractive than other contemporary reactions to the paradoxes of set theory
Zapero, David. “La doctrine kantienne du Faktum de la raison et la justification de la loi morale.” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 98.2 (2016): 169-92. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: According to a widespread view, Kant abandons in the Critique of Practical Reason the attempt to justify the moral law. This paper argues against that view and presents a new interpretation of the doctrine that deals with the justification problem. The paper seeks not simply to affirm what the predominant view denies; it seeks instead to show that Kant’s argumentation isn’t an alternative that the predominant view allows for. On the predominant view, the impossibility of providing the relevant kind of proof, i.e. a transcendental deduction, amounts to the impossibility of providing a satisfactory justification. The paper shows that one thing doesn’t entail the other. Kant can resolve the justification problem without providing the relevant kind of proof because the mere exposition of that law already accomplishes what a proof would have accomplished. The purpose of the Fact of Reason is to point to the characteristic of the moral law – its particular relation to the act of willing –, which accounts for this convergence of exposition and justification. This new interpretation of the Fact of Reason sheds light both on the overall structure of the second Critique and on the second Critique’s relation to the Groundwork.
Żelazny, Mirosław. “Grundsätze der kantischen Philosophie der Aufklärung.” Studia Philosophica Kantiana 2016.2 (2016): 16-24. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Die Phrase „Kants Aufklärungsphilosophie“ bezieht sich gewöhnlich auf den Inhalt des bekannten Essays Was ist Aufklärung?, in dem der Philosoph aus Königsberg die Grundprinzipien des moralischen Gesetzes und bürgerlichen Rechts vorstellt, die auch in der Neuzeit gültig sein sollten. Der vorliegende Beitrag befasst sich mit der Aufklärung, die als ein spezifischer kognitiver Prozess verstanden wird. Kant fragt nicht nur, wer aufgeklärt ist, sondern auch wie sich dieser Prozess vollzieht und in welcher Stimmung sich der Mensch befindet, der diesen Prozess absolviert. Die Frage ist auf die Beziehung zwischen der Welt der praktischen menschlichen Aktivität und der Ordnung der Natur, die die Welt determiniert, gestellt.
Zhouhuang, Zhengmi. Der sensus communis bei Kant: Zwischen Erkenntnis, Moralität und Schönheit. Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2016. [x, 132 p.] [PW]
Zilber, Andrey. “„Zum Geständnisse zu bringen“: Wahrheit, Glückseligkeit und Publizität bei Kant.” Con-Textos Kantianos 4 (2016): 70-88. [M] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Two „principles of public law“, formulated in the second part of the Appendix to the treatise Toward Perpetual Peace, weren’t obviously repeated in other Kant’s writings. What is their place in Kant’s system of rights, outside of political philosophy? Is it proper to define these principles as transcendental, as juridical and at the same time ethical? It proves to be problematic to treat the notion public as a pure a priori concept as well as in a radical empirical way. However we can find the fundamental basis for the principles and some examples of referring to public opinion in Kant’s writings and lectures on moral philosophy and anthropology, where he explains principles of law enforcement and cognitive aspects of social communication. Discussing the wide range of spreading interpretations and considering also the rhetorical aspect of argumentation, I come to a moderate and comprehensive version of understanding, which still doesn’t give all answers, but allows to adjust the publicity formulas as (meta-)principles of lawmaking and enforcement with the kernal of Kant’s system of rights and morality.
Zimmermann, Stephan. “Zu den Freiheitskategorien der Quantität, Qualität und Relation. Eine Selbstkorrektur.” Die “Kategorien der Freiheit” in Kants praktischer Philosophie. Ed. Stephan Zimmermann (op cit.). 217-46. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The paper deals with the „Table of the Categories of Freedom“. Revisiting my elucidations in Kants „Kategorien der Freiheit“ (2011), I attempt a self-correction with regards to my interpretation of the first three quadrants of the table. The question I want to pose anew concerns the meaning of the titles by which the categories are arranged, namely „quantity“, „quality“ and „relation“. What exactly is the specific task Kant allocates to each of these category classes? More so than I have done before, the peculiarity of the practical use of reason has to be taken into account which must, of course, also and especially be reflected in the categorical basic concepts involved in this use. As a consequence, the new reading which I develop raises a follow-up question once more, concerning the precise conceptual content of each category that has its place here. What is the respective meaning of the categories of quantity, quality and relation?
——. “Einleitung.” Die “Kategorien der Freiheit” in Kants praktischer Philosophie. Ed. Stephan Zimmermann (op cit.). 1-15. [M]
——, ed. Die “Kategorien der Freiheit” in Kants praktischer Philosophie. Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2016. [x, 344 p.] [M]
Note: Kantstudien Ergänzungshefte 193. Volume includes an introduction by the editor and essays by:
Theo Kobusch (Die praktischen Elementarbegriffe als Modi der Willensbestimmung. Zu Kants Lehre von den „Kategorien der Freiheit“),
Heiko Puls (Was versteht Kant unter einem „übersinnlichen Gebrauche der Kategorien“? Eine Interpretation von KpV, Ak. 5, S. 5.24–6.1),
Manfred Baum (Praktische Erkenntnis a priori in Kants Kritik der praktischen Vernunft),
Jochen Bojanowski (Kant über praktischen Gegenstandsbezug),
Jens Rometsch (Kants „Kategorien der Freiheit“: Freiheit als empirischer und transzendentaler Bratenwender?),
Ina Goy (Momente der Freiheit),
Werner Euler (Verstand und Wille. Die Kausalitätskategorie als Schlüssel zum Verständnis der „Kategorien der Freiheit“ in Kants Kritik der praktischen Vernunft),
Stephan Zimmermann (Zu den Freiheitskategorien der Quantität, Qualität und Relation. Eine Selbstkorrektur),
Hans Friedrich Fulda (Kants „Kategorien der Freiheit“ in rein praktischer, pragmatischer und technisch-praktischer Funktion),
José Maria Torralba (Zur Rolle der „Typik der reinen praktischen Urtheilskraft“ und der „Kategorien der Freiheit“ in der Konstitution des Gegenstandes der reinen praktischen Vernunft),
Wolfgang Bartuschat (Der eine „Gegenstand der reinen praktischen Vernunft“ und die vielen „Kategorien der Freiheit“),
Christian Krijnen (Kants „Kategorien der Freiheit“ und das Problem der Einheit der Vernunft).
Zinkin, Melissa. “Making the Ideal Real: Publicity and Morality in Kant.” Kantian Review 21.2 (2016): 237-59. [M]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article discusses the concept of publicity in Kant’s moral philosophy. Insofar as the concepts of ‘public’ and ‘private’ can describe our relations with others, they can be considered to be moral concepts. I argue that we can find in Kant a moral duty not to keep our maxims of action private, or secret. Whereas Korsgaard argues that sometimes in the face of evil it is permissible to sidestep the moral law, I argue that it is rather through publicity that we can deal with evil in the non-ideal world. Moreover, by being open with our maxims, moral progress is possible.
Zylberman, Ariel. “The Public Form of Law: Kant on the Second-Personal Constitution of Freedom.” Kantian Review 21.1 (2016): 101-26. [PI]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The two standard interpretations of Kant’s view of the relationship between external freedom and public law make one of the terms a means for the production of the other: either public law is justified as a means to external freedom, or external freedom is justified as a means for producing a system of public law. This article defends an alternative, constitutive interpretation: public law is justified because it is partly constitutive of external freedom. The constitutive view requires conceiving of external freedom in a novel, second-personal way, that is, as an irreducibly relational norm.
Adair, Stephanie. Thinking Without Concepts: The Aesthetic Role of Logical Functions in Kant’s Third "Critique". Ph.D. diss. Duquesne University, 2016. [373 p.] Advisor: Jennifer Ann Bates and Claudia Bickmann. [PQ]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: I defend an understanding of Kant’s theory of Geschmacksurteil as detailing an operation of the faculties that does not violate the cognitive structure laid out in the first Critique, even though one would not easily anticipate it from the standpoint of that work, nor would one initially expect aesthetic judgment to be of transcendental interest to Kant. My orientation is primarily epistemological, elaborating the determinations that govern the activity of pure aesthetic judging so as to specify it as a bestimmte type of judgment without transforming it into einem bestimmenden Urteil. I focus on identifying how the logical functions from the table of judgments operate in the pure aesthetic judgment of taste to reveal “the moments to which this power of judgment attends in its reflection” (Critique of the Power of Judgment, 5:203). In the course of doing so, a picture emerges of how the world is not just cognizable in a Kantian framework but also charged with human feeling, acquiring the inexhaustible, inchoate meaningfulness that incites “much thinking” (Critique of the Power of Judgment, 5:315). The universal communicability of aesthetic pleasure serves as the foundation that grounds robust intersubjective relations, enabling genuine connection to others through a shared a priori feeling.
Baumeister, David Craig. Kant on the Human Animal: Anthropology, Ethics, Nature. Ph.D. diss. University of Oregon, 2016. [148 p.] Advisor: Ted Toadvine. [PQ]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This dissertation gives an account of Kant’s understanding of the human animal through examination of a range of published works and lecture transcripts from the 1770s through the 1790s, with particular attention paid to texts concerning anthropology, ethics, and human nature. It is argued that too exclusive a focus on Kant’s view of the moral differences between humans and other animals neglects the substantial role played by animality in Kant’s conception of the human being. Though the possession of reason grants humans access to a practical realm unavailable to other animals, thus establishing a basic tension between humanity and animality, such unique access does not and cannot negate the human’s status as an animal being. Indeed, as analysis of Kant’s anthropology and theory of human nature shows, human animality provides the necessary physiological basis for humanity’s development in the world, whether individually or historically. To become properly human must therefore be seen, as Kant himself does, as the achievement of one particular animal—the “rational animal” that is the human being.
Britton, William. Kant and the Ground(s) of Dignity: The Centrality of the Fact of Reason. Master’s thesis. Georgia State University, 2016. [vi, 30 p.] Advisor: Eric Wilson. [WC]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant famously claims that autonomy is the ground of dignity. If he is correct about the grounding relationship, then doubts about our autonomy entail doubts about our dignity. Here, I attempt to show that Kant is sensitive to this problem, and invokes the ‘fact of reason’ (Faktum der Vernunft) as the key piece of evidence for our autonomy, and therefore our dignity. But as is well known, Kant’s appeal to the Faktum is controversial. After presenting an exegetical case for the connection between dignity and the fact of reason, I respond to two prominent criticisms of Kant’s strategy in the Critique of Practical Reason in attempt to defend Kant’s use of the Faktum, and hence to preserve his conception of the dignity of humanity.
Chen, Ruiping. On Intellectual Feelings, Imagination and The Reconciliation of Kant’s Dualistic Ethics. Ph.D. diss. The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2016. [205 p.] Advisor: Lau Kwok-Ying. [PQ]
Abstract: The paper is discussing the theory of Moral Feeling in Kant's ethical theory from the perspective of phenomenology of feelings. Here Kant's ethical thoughts are not only regarded as the deontological or formulaic ethics, but also as some practical ethical theory sustains a harmony of a dualistic pattern between sensibility and understanding. The first part of the thesis reveals that Kant is hovering between the Moral Sense School mainly represented by Hucheson and the German Idealism School mainly represented by Wolff in his early days. At that time Kant could not yet provide a twofold framework of the interpretation for the sensible world and the intelligible world . Therefore Kant could only hovers between them instead of finding his own way to resolve the problem. However things changes when Kant begins establishing his principle of the twofold worlds in 1770, his thoughts on the problem of moral feelings becomes independent from those predecessors. A framework of the world between sensibility and understanding would be a significant presupposition to understand Kant's Moral Feeling theory. Thus the dissertation tends to empathize that Kant's edictal thoughts should be considered under such important background of the twofold framework of a world between sensibility and understanding. Though at the first sight it seems that such twofold framework of the world completely cuts off the sensible world and the intelligible world, the true aim for Kant is to bridge a gap between them and to provide whole world picture of the harmony of the dualistic elements through the surmounting of the causality for freedom to the causality for nature.
Such reconciliation could only be settled down through our mind's unique practical experience of the intellectual feelings. In its broadest sense, moral feeling here exactly refers to some positive intellectual feelings of the mind. In Kant's writings it broadly contains feelings of respect, sublime and common sense. These three most important a priori feelings are analyzed in the second part of the dissertation. All of them show their positive meanings: they provide the possibility for bringing the ideal of freedom into the reality. Obviously Kant never rejects the elements of feelings in a rough way. On the contrary, he admits that the faculty of feeling is really vital hence it is one of the fundamental mental faculties. What Kant aims is to make the higher faculties of mind lead those lower faculties of mind harmoniously, and finally to bring the whole harmonious accordance of the faculties of mind.
The suprasensible intellectual feelings echoes the power of imagination of mind, that is to say, the higher faculties of feelings and imagination of mind play the core role in the function of the power of judgement. The harmonious accordance of the activity of the mind could not success without the power of imagination. In such activity, the mind manifests different kinds of feelings in term of different objects. It is the analysis of these intellectual feelings brings insight to the 'attunement\quivering' of the mind in the sense of phenomenology. What's more, in analyzing the theme on 'Schema-Typik-Symbol' in Kant's three Critiques, we see the function of imagination directly or indirectly responds to the tough problem on the realization of the rational ideals. The Schema of imagination is a direct exhibition of the concept of understanding, while the Symbol of imagination is an indirect exhibition of the concept of reason. And the transformation of the law of nature to the law of freedom (as its Typik) could be possible with the participation of suprasensible power of mind.
In Kant's bigger system, the faculties of cognition, feeling and desire are regarded as three fundamental faculties of the mind and are always under the twofold framework between sensibility and understanding. They are searching for their way of reconciliation between each other, and are eventually leading to reconciliation in practice. Such aim would be achieved through the suprasensible power of intellectual feelings and imagination of our mind. And both of the power of reflective judgment and the power of intellectual feelings implicate an a priori principle of purposiveness, that is to say, comparing to analysis and separation, both of them are close to a property of synthesis and unify. It's also the key point for the power of judgment as a principle of regulation. The spontaneous activity of the higher faculties of mind brings about the unique experience of the intellectual feelings. Thus Kant's 'moral picture of the world' emerges gradually. Finally all these discussion on imagination\feelings and the reconciliation of the faculties of the mind are toward to an interpretation on Kant's ethical theory as an 'ethics on conscience'.
Clarke, Lewis. Kant’s Transcendental Idealism as Empirical Realism. Ph.D. diss. University of East Anglia, 2016. [# p.] Advisor: ??. [PQ] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This thesis examines Kant’s transcendental idealism. It argues that the key to understanding Kant’s idealism lies in appreciating how it is compatible with Kant’s empirical realism. It suggests against the so-called traditional view that transcendental idealism is not a distinction between illusion and reality, where appearances are how things merely seem to be to us in virtue of the nature of our minds, and where things in themselves are understood to be how things really are. Instead, it argues that transcendental idealism, when charitably interpreted, reveals how minds such as ours can have genuine cognitive access to reality, based on exploring the links between the conditions of experience, in terms of a priori forms of intuition and categories that the cognitive subject supplies to its experience, and the conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience, in terms of the necessary ontological structures that objects of experience must have in order to be representable through human forms of intuition (space and time). The thesis suggests that Kant uses his transcendental distinction between appearances and things in themselves in at least three ways and that unpacking these three uses helps us to get a better grasp on Kant’s idealism. The three senses of the transcendental distinction are: (1) the traditional phenomenalist conception, according to which appearances are ‘mere representations’ and things in themselves are the putatively ‘real’ things, (2) the notion that things in themselves are ‘objects of a pure understanding’ and (3) that appearances are conditioned phenomena while things in themselves are the unconditioned ground of phenomena. The thesis argues that senses (2) and (3) can be combined to yield transcendental idealism as empirical realism, while the arguments and passages that turn on sense (1) must be rejected.
Clément, Céline Marie Agnès. Leituras do kantismo: Cohen e Heidegger, perspectivas antagônicas sobre a estética e a analítica. [Portuguese; Lectures du kantisme: Cohen et Heidegger, perspectives antagonistes de l’esthétique et de l’analitique] Ph.D. diss. Universidade Federal de Goiás, 2016. [77 p.] Advisor: Hans Christian Klotz. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Ce travail se propose d‟analyser deux lectures considérées comme radicalement opposées de la Critique de la Raison Pure de Kant, et ce notamment à partir de deux livres principaux : la Théorie kantienne de l’expérience de Hermann Cohen, et Kant et le probléme de la Métaphysique de Martin Heidegger. Notre objectif est de montrer comment la lecture de Heidegger s‟est construite contre celle de Cohen, laquelle elle-même est une réponse au psychologisme régnant à la fin du 19ème siècle, tout en tentant d‟éclairer certains points de convergence des deux lectures, comme par exemple la radicalisation du transcendantalisme chez les deux auteurs. Ressort donc un probléme herméneutique lié à l‟utilisation d‟un texte classique par un philosophe en vue de justifier ses propres théses, probléme auquel Cassirer se consacrera en montrant que même si l‟interprétation néokantienne est orientée, celle de Heidegger est « arbitraire » et « manipulatrice » selon les termes propres de l‟adversaire de Heidegger au débat de Davos, débat sur lequel nous nous appuierons pour mieux comprendre la position cassirerienne relativement tant à Cohen qu‟à l‟interprétation heidegerienne de la Critique.
Cooper, Carol Browning. The State of Nature as the Moral Foundation for Political Society: Kant’s Contribution to Contract Theory and its Application to Theories of International Relations. Ph.D. diss. The Catholic University of America (Politics), 2016. [268 p.] Advisor: David Walsh. [PQ]
Abstract: The image of the state of nature has played an important role in political philosophy, international relations, and practical politics for the last several centuries. As the basis of social contract theories, it contributed to the development of the doctrine of government by consent; as a metaphor for the anarchical context in which nation-states relate to each other, it has continuing relevance for theories of international relations and the practice of foreign policy. But how useful is it as a construct for understanding the nature of human beings, the purpose of the states they create, and their political and international relationships?
This dissertation answers this question by exploring the state of nature within Immanuel Kant’s political philosophy. Uniquely among social contract theorists, Kant rejects both the putatively historical state of nature and the consensual contract. Nonetheless, this dissertation argues not only for his place within the contractarian tradition, but for the philosophical superiority of his treatment of the state of nature in comparison with Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau.
Kant’s metaphysical approach to the state of nature allows him to identify and articulate the moral foundations of such problems as property rights, freedom, coercion, and law, thus insisting on the necessity of the state while still defending republican consent as the ideal political standard. He achieves this on the basis of the essential moral self-awareness of the human person—the perspective the historical state of nature and social contract try to achieve, with less success.
Finally, this dissertation examines Kant’s logic of the state of nature with regard to states in the international sphere. Here, it is argued that a consistently Kantian approach to international relations results neither in resignation to the international state of nature as a permanent status quo, nor in the imperative to instantiate a world state. Rather, by appealing to the metaphysical approach Kant used at the individual and state level, this dissertation concludes by arguing that states can accept the reality of the international state of nature without viewing such a state as normal or necessary.
Crowley-Buck, John R. Kant, the Natural Law, and the Question of Normativity in Catholic Ethics. Ph.D. diss. Loyola University Chicago (Theology), 2016. [436 p.] Advisor: Hille Haker. [PQ]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This dissertation explores the question of normativity in 21st century Catholic ethical reflection. While, today, the natural law tradition frames and founds the normative question in Catholic ethics in terms of the imago Dei, this project explores the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant and the challenge it presents to the natural law's claim to normativity. Specifically, this dissertation argues that in Kant's ethics, the normative question is answered in terms of the dignity of humanity, rather than the imago Dei, and that the dignity of humanity is a more relevant, shareable, and normative grounding for ethical reflection. To this end, the project begins with a systematic summary of where we find ourselves today with respect to the natural law tradition in Catholic ethics. Beginning with St. Thomas Aquinas, this summary will highlight a few of the prominent voices in contemporary Catholic ethical discourse, as well as their take on the natural law tradition. It will then interrogate Immanuel Kant’s philosophical ethics and the interpretation of Kant's project offered by Christine Korsgaard, with special attention being given to Kant’s articulation, and Korsgaard’s reading, of the ‘Formula of Humanity.’ The project will then evaluate which of the aforementioned traditions – Kantian ethics or the natural law – will serve as the most adequate framework for robust conceptualizations of dignity, humanity, and the question of normativity. The final move in this project will turn to the discourse of human rights in order to illustrate the need in Catholic ethics for a shift from the natural law to Kantian ethics. If undertaken, this shift in ethical reflection from the natural law to Kant will allow Catholic ethics to remain relevant, shareable, and normative in the 21st century.
Dowd, Matthew J. The Perpetual Finishing of Nature and Reason. Kant on Work, Creativity, and Individual Fulfillment. Ph.D. diss. Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, 2016. [281 p.] Advisor: Anthony J. Steinbock. [PQ]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Following clues suggested by Merleau-Ponty regarding Kantian intentionality, we lay out a phenomenological reading of Kant wherein aesthetic experience offers a unity of self and community, now and across time. What is new in our understanding is that the unity we articulate is not the abstract logical possibility of the rational idea, the community of ends and individuals as ends in themselves. Highlighting certain elements Kant addresses regarding work, education, and the genius, we will argue that it is not merely the abstract person working toward abstract ends that measures and directs our unity, but rather the concrete work of the concrete individual. It is only with the work of the individual that reason and nature can fulfill their trajectories by finishing. Finishing, as a unity of self and community, is a style that can show itself across a wide range of human comportments. Finishing is at once the concrete fulfillment of the essence and power of humanity, but in the individual and the individual’s work, and so also a soliciting invitation to all individuals, according to their universality, to do the same: become individual. No only does this reading loosen, but not set loose, Kant’s otherwise tight teleological ideology, but it also loosens, but not set loose, the bounds where we might find the concrete universal or exemplary individuation. This phenomenological reading of Kant allows for a more pliable, dynamic, and critical understanding of enlightenment and history than the rational idea alone allowed.
Emmett, Kelin A. Kant’s Hypothetical Imperative. Ph.D. diss. University of Toronto, 2016. [170 p.] Advisor: Sergio Tenenbaum. [PQ]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant famously distinguishes between hypothetical and categorical imperatives and the conditional and unconditional necessitation they express. Hypothetical imperatives command conditionally, and they govern our instrumental and prudential reasoning. Categorical imperatives command unconditionally, and they govern our moral reasoning. There is significant disagreement in the literature about how to construe the nature and normativity of Kant’s hypothetical imperatives. In the first part of the dissertation, I consider three, seemingly divergent, contemporary interpretations. I argue, that all three of these views collapse the crucial distinction between conditional and unconditional necessity that was supposed to distinguish between the imperatives. Moreover, on the standard interpretation of the hypothetical imperative’s command, an interpretation that each of these views share, the “material interpretation,” is the logical consequence. The material interpretation understands hypothetical imperatives as deriving from reason’s endorsement of our ends, and thus ends that are set by the categorical imperative. Accordingly, all practical rational failing is a form of moral failing, and so, on Kant’s view, we collapse the practical distinction between stupidity and evil. In the second part of the dissertation, I explain how the standard interpretation of hypothetical imperatives as anti-akratic rational principles that command agents to will the means to their ends, even in the face of any temptation not to, inevitably leads to the material interpretation. I offer an alternative understanding of hypothetical imperatives, and correlatively of Kant’s conception of willing an end, that avoids this view, and which preserves the distinction between the conditional and unconditional necessitation that Kant thought the two imperatives express, and so also the crucial practical distinction between stupidity and evil.
Fisher, Naomi. Kant, Schelling, and a New Philosophy of Nature. Ph.D. diss. University of Notre Dame, 2016. [219 p.] Advisor: Karl Ameriks and Fred Rush. [PQ]
Abstract: This dissertation provides a new framework for thinking about the relationship of rationality to nature. The philosophy of F. W. J. Schelling, namely the philosophy of nature he develops between the years of 1797 and 1800, is a developmental account of nature and rationality. According to this account, the structures of rationality are independently manifested in the natural world, particularly in the activity of organisms. Thus by looking at the precursors to rationality in animals and their capabilities, we can develop a conception of rationality according to which it emerges in harmony with nature.
The developments in science and philosophy since 1800 require that Schelling’s framework be supplemented and modified. And so I take Schelling’s Naturphilosophie as inspiration and guide in developing accounts of rationality and nature in light of such developments.
The first three chapters of this dissertation are historical, focusing on the work of Kant and Schelling. In the first chapter I lay out Kant’s conception of animal cognition, and in the second I explore the place he gives animals in nature, as it is cognized by rational subjects. I contend that Kant has trouble accounting for the complexity of animal cognition and behavior as well as the gradual emergence of reason. In the third chapter, I lay out Schelling’s Naturphilosophie and the resultant conception of rationality, which does not suffer from the same problems.
In the fourth and fifth chapters, I discuss the work of philosophers such as John McDowell, Christine Korsgaard, Tyler Burge, and Michael Thompson. With varying degrees of success, these philosophers attempt to incorporate animals into their philosophical systems. And finally, in the sixth and seventh chapters, I lay out accounts of nature and rationality inspired by Schelling and mindful of evolutionary biology and the philosophical tradition discussed in the fourth and fifth chapters. I contend that treating nature and organic activity as purposive allows for a rich account of rationality as making explicit the norms implicit in this purposive activity.
Guerin, Robert M. Imagination Bound: A Theoretical Imperative. Ph.D. diss. University of Kentucky, 2016. [231 p.] Advisor: Daniel Breazeale. [PQ]
Abstract: Kant’s theory of productive imagination falls at the center of the critical project. This is evident in the 1781 Critique of Pure Reason, where Kant claims that the productive imagination is a “fundamental faculty of the human soul” and indispensable for the construction of experience. And yet, in the second edition of 1787 Kant seemingly demotes this imagination as a mere “effect of the understanding on sensibility” and all but withdraws its place from the Transcendental Deduction.
In his 1929 Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Martin Heidegger provided an explanation for the revisions between 1781 and 1787. Heidegger suggested that the Critique was supposed to be a foundation for Kant’s metaphysics of morals, which holds that practical reason is freely bound by a categorical imperative. Yet after 1781 Kant recognized that the Critique implicates the productive imagination as the “unknown root” of the faculties of understanding and sensibility. If the 1781 Critique reveals this imagination to be the source of theoretical rules and practical imperatives, then, according to Heidegger, Kant could not but “shrink back” from this shocking discovery. A faculty so intimately tied to sensibility, and hence contingency and particularity, is a poor progenitor of freedom and universal rules.
I think there is some truth to Heidegger’s explanation. But I also think there is something more important to draw from the revisions between 1781 and 1787. In this dissertation, I assume that something about the productive imagination did frighten Kant. But, pace Heidegger, I do not think that Kant shrank back from his initial position. Rather, I argue that the revisions clarify a theory that was implicit in 1781 but made explicit by 1787. If the imagination is a power for representation, which is at times a dream and at times a veridical experience, then the difference lies in the rule according to which the construction of the representation is bound. Furthermore, I argue that Kant’s revisions reveal a duty to bind the reproductive imagination according to a common concept, what Kant sometimes refers to as common sense. This is what I call the theoretical imperative.
Head, Jonathan. The Religious Framework of Kant’s Philosophy: Practical Knowledge, Evil and Religious Faith. Ph.D. diss. Keele University, 2016. [v, 268 p.] Advisor: Sorin Baiasu. [PQ] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This thesis explores the religious underpinnings of Kant’s thought through a consideration of the related topics of the problem of evil, the nature of religious faith, the possibility of practical knowledge, and the nature of philosophy, as well as his approach to various aspects of Christian theology, such as Scripture, eschatology, and Christology. Texts from both the pre-Critical and Critical period of Kant’s works are considered, building up a picture of Kant as a philosopher deeply concerned with the cultivation and maintenance of religious faith within the bounds of reason. The links between the philosophies of Kant, Leibniz and the Pietists are also considered in order to emphasise their shared commitments in using philosophy to complement moral faith. Further, it is argued that Kant is also concerned to combat superstition, enthusiasm and immorality in the Church, which are seen as barriers to ‘true’ faith. Through these considerations, we also discern an underlying realist religious framework to discussions on religious topics in Kant’s works, even in the Critical philosophy. It is argued that Kant’s philosophy of religion and ethical theory are intended to be not only compatible with but complementary to orthodox Christianity. As a result, a number of contemporary interpretive lines surrounding Kant’s philosophy of religion that intend to dilute the Christian commitments of the Critical system are rejected. These discussions are then employed to provide context for a reading of Religion within the Bounds of Mere Reason (1793) as lying within a realist religious framework. Current interpretive issues in the literature surrounding Religion are discussed in relation to this framework.
Hromas, Christopher Alan Lee. Beauty and morality: Kant’s Theory of Beauty and 20th Century Philosophical Aesthetics. Ph.D. diss. Fordham University, 2016. [211 p.] Advisor: Jennifer Gosetti-Ferencei. [PQ]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Philosophical aesthetics and philosophy of art are notable in the twentieth century for their general lack of interest in beauty and their separation of aesthetic and moral value. This has led to two unfortunate developments. First, beauty in art became trivialized because expression and meaning were thought to give the arts a more profound philosophical calling than the mere production of pleasure. The second development was that a general distrust of beauty arose, partly spurred by moral condemnations of beauty as a social value by artists like the Dadaists and Philip Guston, and partly by the worry, expressed by Mary Devereaux in her analysis of the Nazi propaganda film Triumph of the Will, that beauty could lend immoral ideas an air of attractiveness. This second development is based on what I call the moral objection to beauty: that beauty, as a form of pleasure, is either trivial or potentially irresponsible in the face of serious moral concerns. Such an objection only arises if aesthetic value and moral value are independent of one another, a view that gained traction in the twentieth century due to the relegation of beauty to a merely sensible phenomenon of enjoyment. By describing beauty as indicative of something more than a mere evocation of pleasure, Immanuel Kant gives beauty an inherent moral significance in two key ways. First, beauty reassures us that nature can be amenable to universal moral ends and thereby help us avoid falling into moral despair when faced with nature’s indifference toward moral virtue. Second, since beauty is a disinterested feeling that is not responding to any interest or desire of the subject, it is similar to the disinterested feeling of pleasure involved in moral appraisals. Thus, the cultivation of taste can assist us in recognizing moral feeling associated with correct moral action. The advantage of Kant’s theory over other theories of beauty in the twentieth century is that it does not require us to be suspicious of beauty and allows us to pursue aesthetic value without compromising moral value because beauty itself is morally valuable.
Johnson, Michelle J. A Pedagogy for Justice: Kant, Hegel, Marcuse and Freire on Education and the Good Society. Ph.D. diss. University of Kentucky, 2016. [247 p.] Advisor: Arnold Farr. [PQ]
Abstract: Rousseau’s educational treatise Emile is a well-known pedagogical work often noted for its progressive educational insights. Although Kant’s Lectures on Pedagogy is much less well known, Kant suggests a solution to an educational problem Rousseau is unable to solve: the problem of whether or not education can work for the good of humanity. Rousseau is concerned that society, and the schools in society, inflames people’s passions and leads to inequality and enslavement. Rousseau sketches an educational program that ideally develops students’ autonomous moral reasoning untainted by inflamed passion, an education which enables students to be moral and just citizens, working for the good of humanity. I argue that Rousseau’s educational philosophy ultimately fails because Rousseau maintains a deep skepticism that society, and therefore schools, can ever be a good place for humans. Rousseau suggests education must go to extreme measures such as isolating students in a rural environment and manipulating all aspects of their lives to prevent passions from becoming inflamed. Implementing this kind of education is not only improbable for individual students; it is especially improbable that it could be implemented on a large scale.
I further argue that Kant’s educational philosophy provides a solution to the problems which beset Rousseau’s educational philosophy. Kant embraces negative passions as necessarily educative, and so his educational philosophy does not require extreme measures to combat negative passion. In addition, Kant argues that is only in society and through these negative passions that humanity develops. Kant’s educational philosophy is achievable for both the individual student and also on a large scale because it focuses on developing three key aspects of students that draw on capacities within the student and that are developed in community with others: a robust will bent towards the good; good and skilled moral judgment; and a commitment to the ethical commonwealth. Lastly, I argue that Hegel, Marcuse and Freire, three philosophers who follow after Kant, develop important aspects of Kant’s solution to Rousseau’s problem. Taken together, these four philosophers present a compelling educational philosophy which suggests that education not only can but indeed must work for the good of humanity.
Kim, Hyeongjoo. Zur Empirizität des „ich denke“ in Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Ph.D. diss. Universität Siegen, 2016. [# p.] Advisor: ??. [PQ]
Kronenberg, Tobias. Maximen in Kants praktischer Philosophie - über das verknüpfende Element der kantischen Theorie des Handelns, der Freiheit des Willens und der Moralität. Ph.D. diss. Karlsruher Institut für Technologie, Universität Karlsruhe, 2016. [# p.] Advisor: ??. [PQ]
Lim Hui Hui, Jade. Kant’s Formula of Universal Law and the Right to Non-Interference. Master’s thesis. National University of Singapore, 2016. [112 p.] Advisor: ??. [PQ] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This thesis focuses on Kantian justifications for the right to non-interference. In the first part of the thesis, it will be shown that two existing Kantian approaches to grounding this right are problematic. The second part will argue that if the Formula of Universal law is a justified moral principle, then the right to non-interference can be justified by deriving the duty of non-interference from the formula. More specifically, if we apply the formula to "act only on the maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it become a universal law", it is likely that many of us are unable to will some maxims, which express reasons to interfere with others’ pursuits of their ends, as universal law. As a result, it is not morally permissible for us to always compromise others' pursuits and we must sometimes refrain from doing so. Since this duty of non-interference is widely shared by the majority, I argue that it can serve as the basis for our claim to the right to non-interference.
Martin, Richard S. The Logical Analysis of Key Arguments in Leibniz and Kant. Master’s thesis. The University of Mississippi, 2016. [35 p.] Advisor: Timothy P. Yenter. [PQ]
Abstract: This paper addresses two related issues of logic in the philosophy of Gottfried Leibniz. The first problem revolves around Leibniz’s struggle, throughout the period of his mature philosophy, to reconcile his metaphysics and epistemology with his antecedent theological commitments. Leibniz believes that for everything that happens there is a reason, and that the reason God does things is because they are the best that can be done. But if God must, by nature, do what is best, and if what is best is predetermined, then it seems that there may be no room for divine freedom, much less the human freedom Leibniz wished to prove. I conclude the first part of the paper by arguing that Leibniz’s defenses cannot withstand a contemporary logical analysis, and his project is doomed to fail.
In the second half of the paper, I explore Leibniz’s use of the traditional laws of logic – particularly the Principle of Non-Contradiction. I examine some criticisms of Leibniz’s employment of the principles by Kant and his allies and, in the end, determine that, while Leibniz ought to have been a bit more careful in his deployment of the principles, the Kantian criticisms are not devastating.
Poole, Nicholas. Kant, Heidegger, and the Problem of Indifference: From Reason to Releasement. Master’s thesis. University of Victoria (British Columbia), 2016. [vii, 287 p.] Advisor: Arthur Kroker. [WC]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This thesis presents a study of Immanuel Kant and Martin Heidegger on the theme of indifference. There are two main argumentative trajectories. First, I establish the coherency of indifference as a unifying theme across both of their works. Specifically, it will be shown that for both thinkers indifference emerges as a "problem" bound up with the history of western metaphysics tending towards nihilism. For Kant, this appears as a problem of reason, and for Heidegger a loss of Being. Their responses to this problem can also be seen as broadly analogous: Both are concerned to demonstrate how a certain "authentic" relation to the inner possibility of metaphysics is possible, and do so without assuming anything in advance about the being for whom metaphysics is an issue. Second, I aim to show that Heidegger's notion of indifference, as a closure of ecstatic time and loss of Being, more sufficiently accounts for the breadth of indifference as an experiential phenomenon, as well as makes possible a "turning" (Verwindung) of this closed mode into an kind of "open indifference" that makes possible the presencing of things. From the perspective of Heidegger's response to the problem of indifference, Kant's response will be shown to regenerate the very problem he seeks to overcome.
Rey Salamanca, Santiago. “Words Made Flesh”: A Stereoscopic Account of Conceptual Praxis. Ph.D. diss. The New School, 2016. [237 p.] Advisor: Richard J. Bernstein. [PQ]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this dissertation I explore the intersection of two distant philosophical traditions, Sellars’s strand of neopragmatism and philosophical hermeneutics. The aim is to offer a stereoscopic account of the role of concepts in experience, incorporating insights from both traditions and countering contemporary approaches that, for all their professed novelty, remain trapped in a rather antiquated paradigm of the discursive. The picture of the conceptual I am opposing in my dissertation is one that finds its roots in Kant and is characterized by its formalism and its reliance on the paradigm of explicit judgment. One of the limitations of such a view is revealed in its incapacity to harmonize the pragmatic and the conceptual, our embodied-embedded dealings and rule-governed behavior, as has been recently exposed by the McDowell/Dreyfus debate. Both sides of the divide, I argue, share the same flawed premise, a rationalistic view of concepts that easily falls prey to accusations of intellectualism and detachment. The remedy, I claim, comes in the shape of an enlarged understanding of concepts that draws its inspiration primarily from philosophical hermeneutics and, not without an air of irony, incorporates valuable pragmatic insights from Sellars’s reflections on normativity and his discussion of pattern-governed behavior. The resulting account locates language and concepts squarely within the realm of our embodied skillful coping—concepts incarnated in praxis.
Saenz de Sicilia, Andres. The Problem of Subsumption in Kant, Hegel and Marx. Ph.D. diss. Kingston University, 2016. [275 p.] Advisor: ??. [PQ] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This thesis explores the concept of subsumption in the work of Immanuel Kant, G.W.F. Hegel and Karl Marx in order to construct a distinct theoretical problem resting on the articulation of conceptual and social relations. Each of these authors develops a ‘logic’ within which subsumptive relations are operative: Transcendental logic, dialectical logic and finally Marx’s ‘logic of the body politic’; these are investigated in turn. The thesis opens with a close reading of subsumption in Kant’s philosophy, arguing that it is here that the concept first attains its modern or critical sense. This critical sense distinguishes it from the classical notion of subsumption (as a formal or purely logical relation) and gives rise to a novel philosophical account of how synthetic subsumption acts unite heterogeneous elements within a compositional totality. In Hegel’s philosophy this account takes on a series of new determinations, as social, historical and developmental aspects to subsumption are introduced. Nonetheless, Hegel’s concept of subsumption remains within the ambit of a ‘closed’ idealist discourse, just as Kant’s does. The second section of the thesis explores how this closure is thrown into crisis by Marx’s materialist attack on philosophy as a self-sufficient branch of knowledge, altering the stakes of conceptual relations as such, and therefore subsumption. Drawing on the work of Mexican-Ecuadoran philosopher Bolívar Echeverría, Marx’s materialism is reconstructed as a theory of social reproduction, encompassing the practical process of social life in its entirety. This then provides the basis for an analysis of subsumption in its specifically capitalist form, which, the thesis argues, must be thought as operative at three levels of social activity: exchange, production and reproduction, each with their own distinct but interconnected logics of power and resistance. Grasping these three dimensions in their unity, the thesis finally outlines an original framework for comprehending capitalist domination in its concrete specificity. In order to do so it goes beyond Marx’s own theory of (formal and real) subsumption as well as interpretations of it that reinstate theoretical closure to historical contingency (for example in the work of Negri and Adorno). Instead, a dynamic theory of capitalist subsumption is proposed in order to register the diverse mechanisms of control through which capitalist power shapes the course of social reproduction and historical development.
Scaramal, Elliot Santovich. Singularidade e intuição: Kant contra a teoria leibniziana das representações singulares. [Portuguese; Singularity and intuition: Kant against the Leibnizian theory of singular representations] Ph.D. diss. Universidade Federal de Goiás, 2016. [121 p.] Advisor: Thiago Suman Santoro. [PW]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The main goal of this dissertation is to offer both an interpretation to the theory of singular representations as presented by Leibniz in his writings from the 1680’s, as well as a hypothesis of a criticism made by Kant to what we take to be the cornerstones of such a theory. These cornerstones consist in (i) the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles (ii) the Doctrine of the Complete Notion of the Individual Substance (iii) the Intensional Definitions of the Truth Values. Once the writings in which (ii) and (iii) are presented only began to be published in the XIX century, we argue in favor of the plausibility of such a hypothesis by means of logical arguments, which intend to show that Kant could have deduced (ii) and (iii) from Leibniz’ commitment to (i) as well as to the existence of a parfaite représentation of ordinary objects in the divine understanding, and historical arguments, which intend to show that Kant could have had access to both (ii) and (iii) and even ascribed these to Leibniz by means of Meier’s Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre and Wolff’s Philosophia Rationalis sive Logica. We will add to these, also textual arguments in order to show that there is in Kant’s philosophy not only a critique to (i), but also to (ii) e (iii), as well as an interpretation of what this criticism consists in.
Segall, Matthew David. title. Ph.D. diss. California Institute of Integral Studies, 2016. [296 p.] Advisor: Jacob H. Sherman. [PQ]
Abstract: In this dissertation, I lure the process philosophies of F. W. J. Schelling and A. N. Whitehead into orbit together around the transcendental philosophy of Immanuel Kant. I argue that Schelling and Whitehead’s descendental aesthetic ontology provides a way across the epistemological chasm that Kant’s critiques opened up between experience and reality. While Kant’s problematic scission between the phenomenal world and the thing-in-itself remains an essential phase in the maturation of the human mind, it need not be the full realization of mind’s potential in relation to Nature. I contrast Schelling’s and Whitehead’s descendental philosophies with Kant’s transcendentalism by showing how their inverted methods bridge the chasm—not by resolving the structure of reality into clear and distinct concepts—but by replanting cognition in the aesthetic processes that power it. Hidden at the generative root of our seemingly separate human capacities for corporeal sensation and intellectual reflection is the same universally distributed creative power or imaginal ether underlying star formation and blooming flowers. Human consciousness is not a transcendental onlooker upon the world but a microcosmic participant in the Life of the Whole. Humanity is a development of what has always been enveloped in the Earth and wider universe, as natural as leaves on a tree.
Through a creative interweaving of their process-relational orientations, I show how the power of imagination so evident in Schelling’s and Whitehead’s thought can provide philosophy with genuine experiential insight into cosmos, theos, and anthropos in the aftermath of the Kantian revolution. The two — anthropos and cosmos — are perceived as one by a common sense described in this dissertation as etheric imagination. This etheric sense puts us in touch with the divine life of Nature, which the ancients personified as the ψυ&khgr;η &tgr;oυ κóσμoυ or anima mundi.
Sitorus, Fitzerald Kennedy. Das Selbstbewusstsein als Subjekt im Begriff: Zu Kants Begriff des Selbstbewusstseins im Lichte der Kritik der heidelberger Schule. Ph.D. diss. Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität, 2016. [# p.] Advisor: ??. [PQ]
Sommerlatte, Curtis. title. Ph.D. diss. Indiana University, 2016. [xv, 210 p.] Advisor: Allen W. Wood. [PQ]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: I argue that Kant’s primary epistemological concern in the Critique of Pure Reason’s transcendental deduction is empirical cognition. I show how empirical cognition is best understood as “rational sensory discrimination”: the capacity to discriminate sensory objects through the use of concepts and with a sensitivity to the normativity of reasons. My dissertation focuses on Kant’s starting assumption of the transcendental deduction, which I argue to be the thesis that we have empirical cognition. I then show how Kant’s own subjective deduction fleshes out his conception of empirical cognition and is intertwined with key steps in the transcendental deduction’s arguments that the categories have objective validity and that we have synthetic a priori cognition.
Song, Seung-min. Transcendence: Kant, Lacan, and mid-Nineteenth-century American Literature. Ph.D. diss. The Claremont Graduate University (English), 2016. [179 p.] Advisor: Henry Krips. [PQ]
Abstract: This dissertation investigates the question of transcendence in mid-nineteenth-century American Literature. American Literature has various terms to identify the mid-nineteenth-century, 1830-1865: the American Romantic Period, the Age of Transcendentalism, or the American Renaissance. During this time, numerous outstanding writers appeared, especially Ralph W. Emerson, Edgar A. Poe, Nathaniel Hawthorne, and Herman Melville, and scholars have suggested various ways to distinguish among them. One conventional account divides them into yea-saying and nay-saying: Emerson as a yea-sayer; Poe, Hawthorne, and Melville as nay-sayers. Others group Emerson and Poe together because both assert God's transcendence beyond the material. Along different lines, Maurice Lee views Emerson as a yea-sayer of Christian faith, Melville and Hawthorne as critics of providential discourse (even though Hawthorne's works "imply teleology"), and Poe as an in-between between the opposite poles of Emerson and Melville. These studies and distinctions are helpful but still confusing and inconsistent. For example, whereas Robert Spiller and Harry Levine consider Poe a nay-sayer closer to Hawthorne and Melville, Stuart Levine and Laura Walls view him as a yea-saying transcendentalist. This thesis redresses the unclear meaning of yea-saying and nay-saying as well as researchers' different views.
To avoid conceptual and analytical inconsistency and also to reorganize the relationship among these four American writers and their representative works, I use Jacques Lacan's psychoanalytic studies as a methodological framework. Lacan's studies are useful and important because (1) his concepts, especially desire, fantasy, and the drive, function as a reliable methodology to clarify the meaning of yea-saying and nay-saying or transcendence and negativity; (2) his concepts develop major themes of Immanuel Kant's transcendental philosophy and thereby engage with themes shared by Kant and the four authors. For these reasons, examining Lacan's studies leads the reader to the intersection among Kant's philosophy, American transcendentalism, and the American Romantic writers. Accordingly, what I do in this research is to explore the theoretical relationship between Kant and Lacan, the relationship between Kant's philosophy and the views of Emerson, Poe, Melville, and Hawthorne, and the relationship between the four writers and their works in terms of Lacan's structures of desire-in-fantasy (transcendence) and the drive (negativity).
Based on Lacan's conceptual frame, I place yea-saying, transcendence, and the Lacanian structure of desire-in-fantasy at one axis, and place nay-saying, negativity, and the Lacanian structure of the drive at the other. The former axis maintains the linear causality between the primary transcendence and its representation and affirms the original status of the transcendent object. In contrast, the latter pole radically inverts the order of the linear causality and views the primary status of transcendence as a secondary effect of fantasy.
According to this conceptual distinction, (1) I place Emerson's transcendentalism and his literary works in the category of desire-in-fantasy without the drive. Emerson is a yea-saying transcendentalist because he asserts the primary status of God as a fundamental cause of nature. His literary works on the Over-Soul and nature support his optimistic view which denies any fundamental negativity. (2) I approach Poe's views of the universe and his literary texts from the perspective of the drive within desire-in-fantasy. Poe, despite his radical ideas of death or annihilation, is a transcendentalist because he finally affirms the Godhead's transcendent and primary status. His literary texts introduce both notions of transcendence and negativity, but he incorporates the object of negativity into the structure of transcendence. (3) Hawthorne's view of God remains in the Lacanian desire-in-fantasy; in contrast, I place Hawthorne's The Blithedale Romance in the category of desire-in-fantasy to the drive. Hawthorne shows a critical distance from transcendentalism, but nevertheless he keeps a sincere faith in "the holy of the holies." His work The Blithedale Romance mirrors these two opposite views—skepticism of and faith in transcendence—and furthermore can be viewed structurally radical because the viewer's belief in the Veiled Lady's transcendent power turns out to be totally false and thereby the linear causality between the absolute power and its phenomenal effect becomes radically reversed. I view this structural shift in perspective from transcendence to negativity as the novel's major characteristic. (4) Melville's radical view of God's providence places him at the axis of the Lacanian drive; however, Melville's Moby-Dick takes the category of desire-in-fantasy vs. the drive. Melville oscillates between belief and disbelief in the omnipotent God but at some point he radically rejects God's primary status. His novel Moby-Dick reflects his psychic agony between transcendence and its falsity, but, without any side prioritized, the novel maintains the perspectival tension between the whale's teleological meaning and its symbolic meaninglessness. I hope this interdisciplinary research about Kant, Lacan, and the American Romantic writers will contribute to the development of mid-nineteenth-century American literature.
Sprod, L. M. ‘Space alone persistently determines’: The Roles and Relations of Time and Space in Kant and Meillassoux. Ph.D. diss. Kingston University/London, 2016. [388 p.] Advisor: ??. [PQ] [online]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This thesis addresses the criticism of the philosophy of Immanuel Kant put forward by Quentin Meillassoux under the charge of ‘correlationism.’ It uses Meillassoux’s interpretation of Kant as a starting point to develop an alternative interpretation in which space plays a central role within Kant’s thought, thus contributing to the wider philosophy of space. The argument progresses through an analysis of the three stages of dogmatism, skepticism and Criticism, which are central to Kant’s thought and which Meillassoux attempts to circumvent. It demonstrates how Kant develops his Critical philosophy through a rejection of dogmatism as a commitment to the principle of sufficient reason, which is reconfigured using the insights of Hume’s skepticism. Thus the system outlined in the Critique of Pure Reason is at heart a temporal philosophy, in which the principle of sufficient reason is reconceptualized in terms of the issue of timedetermination. Meillassoux’s alternative system of ‘speculative materialism,’ it is argued, proceeds along the same path: Criticizing the principle of sufficient reason and reconfiguring it through the insights of Hume’s skeptical problematization of induction, in order to assert a temporal philosophy based upon the ‘hyper-chaos’ of the ‘principle of unreason.’ However, with this unexpected parallel between Kant and Meillassoux in regard to the issue of time, the problematic role of space also becomes apparent. Meillassoux’s temporal philosophy is disrupted by his use of the spatial metaphor to fully express the features of time that he sets out, and thus space becomes a point of tension within his temporal system of ‘speculative materialism.’ Working back through the parallel between Meillassoux and Kant reveals that the role of space and its connection to time is also a problematic point of tension within Kant’s Critical philosophy and one that is central to his reworking of the Critique of Pure Reason for the 1787 B-Edition. Thus, through a detailed interpretation of the Critical philosophy, and especially its role in the Refutation of Idealism added to the B-Edition, the centrality of space within Kant’s system is reasserted and evaluated. This recognition of the importance of space and its relation to time within Kant’s system also provides the means to reassess Meillassoux’s criticism of Kant as a ‘correlationist’ and recast the debate between idealism and realism in the history of post-Kantian philosophy terms of the roles and relations of time and space.
Starke, Steven C. Kant’s Just War Theory. Ph.D. diss. University of South Florida, 2016. [213 p.] Advisor: Martin Schönfeld and Sidney Axinn. [PQ]
Abstract: The main thesis of my dissertation is that Kant has a just war theory, and it is universal just war theory, not a traditional just war theory.
This is supported by first establishing the history of secular just war theory, specifically through a consideration of the work of Hugo Grotius, Rights of War and Peace. I take his approach, from a natural law perspective, as indicative of the just war theory tradition. I also offer a brief critique of this tradition, suggesting some issues that are endemic to these kinds of theories.
From this general understanding, the version of Kant’s just war theory present in Brian Orend’s work War and International Justice: A Kantian Perspective, is explored and rejected as another traditional just war theory. Orend attempts to shoehorn Kant into a tradition which Kant rejects as ineffective, and poorly grounded. Orend’s work is not without merit, and his view is reconceptualized in the last chapter.
If not a traditional just war theory, then either a new category of just war theory needs to be established, or the thesis ought to be rejected. Thus, the next task is to defend against the claim that Kant does not have a just war theory at all, as claimed by Howard Williams in his work Kant and the End of War. This is rejected as insufficiently nuanced in its interpretation of Kant, and also for resulting in principles contrary to Kant’s moral theory. This view is also utilized in a new manner in the last chapter.
Prior to describing the new category of just war theory, I consider the general approach Kant had to war. To do this, I explore his philosophical approach on ever more specific areas of philosophical investigation. I conclude that Kant has a dynamic and progressive understanding of the concepts he investigated, including philosophy, humanity, ethics, politics, and, eventually, war.
In the penultimate chapter, I establish what I call a universal just war theory. I consider and name the traits of both a traditional just war theory and a universal just war theory, using Marxist communism as an explanatory example of universal just war theory. This provides an intellectual space for Kant’s theory to reside, which is also consistent with his philosophical approach.
The last chapter is universal devoted to the explanation and application of Kant’s universal just war theory. I offer an overarching principle for Kant’ view of conflict and defend it as a universal just war theory. I also revisit the place Orend and Williams views’ have in a proper understanding of Kant on just war. I end with an application of Kant’s just war theory to previous conflicts, as a demonstration of the practical value of this view.
Thus, through first a negative argument against current conceptions of Kant’s views of just war theory, and then a positive argument for Kant’s general philosophical approach and a new category of just war theory, I offer an interpretation of Kant on just war theory. I argue this interpretation is superior to previous ones, and recommends real world applications for just war theorists to utilize.
Steffen, Jason R. A Kantian Theory of Criminal Law. Ph.D. diss. University of Minnesota, 2016. [263 p.] Advisor: Sarah Holtman. [PQ]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this dissertation, I develop a new theory of criminal law that rests on Kantian principles. I show that attention to two aspects of Kant’s political theory—his accounts of civic freedom and civic virtue—can help us develop a more just model of criminal law. In particular, I argue that we may properly criminalize only those activities which, by their nature, violate certain conditions enabling citizens to pursue their civic freedom. I then propose expanding the use of the jury in order to develop civic virtues that citizens of a just society ought to embrace. Finally, I argue that Kantian principles can both show why criminal punishment is necessary, and also help us discern its proper modes and extent.
Sullivan, Dennis John. Uncivil Wars: Does Kantian Adaptive Networks Theory Provide Significant Indications and Warning of Cntra-state conflict? Ph.D. diss. Boston University (Political Science), 2016. [216 p.] Advisor: John Gerring and Michael T. Corgan. [PQ]
Abstract: Reviewing inter-state warfare literature, I observe a correlation between the growth of international institutions, economic interchange, and levels of democracy, and corresponding decreases in incidents of international war. Conversely, internal conflicts comprise most conflicts in the post-1945 world, compared to inter-state conflicts.
Within the larger intra-state literature, I note an underlying lineage to concepts evolving from Kant’s writings, specifically Kantian democratic peace theory (DPT) literature posited by Russett and ONeal (2001), and the informal social-juridical relationship within Metaphysics of Morals.
From that pedigree, could a deeper understanding of internal political risks gained through application of Kantian DPT, interpolating Putnam’s (2002) Social Capital Theory (SCT) hold potential to provide researchers and policy makers insight into propensity for descent into conflict early enough to implement corrective actions?
This investigation initially questions existence of intra-state processes performing similar ameliorating or exacerbating functions observed at inter-state level. Assessing that intra-state dynamics exhibit an elevated dependence on social factors necessitates adjustments to DPT to accommodate the adaptable nature of social constructs, leading to the designation of my theory as Kantian Adaptable Networks Theory (KANT).
To test hypotheses, I start with DPT, incorporate elements of SCT, and identify a hybrid combination presenting greater explanatory power than either DPT or SCT factors alone. Fund for Peace’s Fragile State Indices (FSI) for 2005-2013 provides the dataset to conduct regression analysis to determine significance of DPT and/or SCT elements in static and time-series. Initial results indicate DPT/SCT provides explanatory value at the intra-state level with the Group Grievance factor generally presenting the most significant effect on probability of conflict.
To assess resilience to intra-state conflict, I then explore brittleness of social-contract dynamics through the lens of Clausewitz’ center of gravity theory. In my exploration of applicability of KANT at the case level, I analyze FSI data for Syria and Kenya to determine resilience to shocks and ratcheted pressures, and explanation for differing outcomes.
Based on the results of quantitative and case analysis, I present policy prescription considerations. Finally, I discuss additional avenues for follow-on research of issues and opportunities identified during the course of the investigation.
Tuna, Emine Hande. A Kantian Theory of Art Criticism. [English] Ph.D. diss. University of Alberta/philosophy, 2016. [229 p.] Advisor: Alexander Rueger. [WC] [online]
Abstract: My dissertation explores the role of art criticism within Immanuel Kant’s aesthetic theory and its relevance for the particularism-generalism debate in contemporary aesthetics. In doing so, it provides a Kantian answer to the meta-critical question that generated the particularism-generalism divide in the first place, namely whether or not our aesthetic appraisals of artworks are based on natural facts concerning the non-aesthetic properties of those artworks. This is an examination of a neglected area in Kant scholarship since it is standardly assumed that a theory of criticism flies in the face of some of Kant’s most central aesthetic tenets, such as his rejection of aesthetic testimony and general objective principles of taste. If art criticism is an enterprise of providing evaluations of artworks supported by reasons, then it is hard to see what the Kantian art critic can do for us. It does not seem to matter whether the critic provides evaluations since we cannot defer to them. Likewise, any reasons the critic provides by referring to the non-aesthetic properties of artworks would seem completely arbitrary in the absence of general principles governing the relation between aesthetic evaluations and non-aesthetic properties.
Nevertheless, the assumption that these Kantian tenets preclude the possibility of art criticism is mistaken and it is my aim to show how this can be. The project has two phases. In the first phase I develop a new interpretation of Kant’s theory of artistic beauty. In the second phase I make use of this interpretation to put forward a Kantian account of art criticism, an essentially particularist account which integrates generalist elements. Central to my interpretation is the notion that judgments of perfection, which are non-aesthetic evaluations of artworks’ success in meeting or exceeding our expectations regarding works of that kind, inform our aesthetic assessments. It is precisely this underappreciated role of judgments of perception that I exploit in making room for Kantian art criticism. Critics’ reasons are not arbitrary because these reasons, listing non-aesthetic properties of the work, support non-aesthetic evaluations of success value which in turn contribute to the determination of aesthetic value of artworks.
In short, I propose that Kant’s aesthetic theory yields a fruitful theory of art criticism and that this theory presents an alternative to both existing theories of his time and to contemporary theories.
Valentine, Matthew. Kant with Foucault: On the Dangers of the Theoretical Reification of the Subject to Freedom and the Need for a Practical Psychology. Ph.D. diss. Duquesne University, 2016. [428 p.] Advisor: James Swindal. [PQ]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this dissertation I consider the question, “Is it possible to think the subject qua subject or must any theoretical attempt to understand the subject necessarily reify it?” To answer this question, I appealed to Immanuel Kant’s distinction between theoretical and practical reason, noting that practical reason could think the subject as a free soul rather than as a naturally-determined object. I then divided the sciences of the subject into four general types to determine which science could think the subject qua subject. Three sciences were shown to necessarily reify the subject: empirical psychology, rational psychology, and heteronomous ethics. I then paralleled Kant’s insight with Michel Foucault’s analyses of the human sciences, showing the concrete consequences of objectification. Using Foucault’s work on ethical practice and askesis as a guide, I returned to Kant and explained how practical reason can think the subject qua subject only insofar as it considers the subject as something to be made rather than a theoretical object to know. I then posed the question, “What are the necessary conditions for someone to be a subject of possible experience?” which led into a Kantian-inspired theory of love and intersubjectivity. Finally, I concluded that contemporary psychology is mired in an impasse between happiness and freedom, insofar as therapeutic practice is no longer an ethic. I suggest the need for a practical psychology to solve this impasse.
Weaver, Christopher. The Presuppositions of Freedom: Kant and the Social Contract. Master’s thesis. Northern Illinois University, 2016. [36 p.] Advisor: Adam Seagrave. [PQ]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: More than 200 years after his death, scholars continue to struggle with the works of Immanuel Kant and how to systematize it within the larger agglomerate of intellectual history. Among these struggles is a debate over Kant’s political philosophy and its relationship with the social contract theory. In this study, I suggest more scrutiny should be given to what exactly Kant meant when he used the word freedom throughout his writings on politics and the importance this has for better understanding Kantian thought. Freedom presupposes a lot of things for Kant, but within the context of his politics, it includes a need for explicit and implicit consent within the epistemic constraints of human knowledge. Considered within the larger context of Kant’s suggestions for how our politics should be done, my more meticulous investigation into Kantian freedom not only helps us better understand Kant, but also the status of the social contract theory in a post-Humean era.
Weyls, John M. Kant and the Nonspatiality of Things in Themselves. Ph.D. diss. Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, 2016. [160 p.] Advisor: Robert Hahn. [PQ]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant says that space has no independently real existence. What he means is that apart from the human mind, space is not real. Of course, it is real to us, he argues—in fact, space is the very condition that makes possible an experience of objects in space. However, space and time are mere forms of human sensibility, and as such: That which is not sensed is neither spatial nor temporal. With regard to space, commentators have argued that although they are inclined to accept that space is a form of human sensibility—a subjective condition of thought or mode by which representations (empirical) are manifest in intuition—nevertheless, space might be a feature of a world that exists independent of the mind. These commentators accuse Kant of having neglected two possibilities: (1) that the representation of space is both subjective and objective at once—that is, a subjective condition of human sensible intuition yet an “objective” quality of a mind-independent reality; and (2) that although the representation of space in sensible intuition is subjective, as Kant suggests, it could be the case that things as they are in themselves exist in space, independent of human sensibility. The focus of the following chapters is first to consider Kant’s subjectivity thesis in its strongest sense—the view that space and time are mere forms of human sensibility. Second, I address the alternative to the view that things in themselves are nonspatial—the alternative that Kant is alleged to have neglected. Finally, I consider responses to “neglected alternative” proponents. For the underlying question is this: What would lead us to believe that although things appear to us in space (and time), that is, side-by-side with other things, that this is not really so? I argue that Kant gives us good reason to think that this is not so, provided we accept his arguments for the subjectivity of space.
Wilberg, Henrik Sunde. Language before Critique. Figures of Aesthetics from Leibniz to Herder. Ph.D. diss. Northwestern University, 2016. [278 p.] Advisor: Samuel M. Weber. [PQ]
[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This dissertation examines the relation between theories of language and the emergence of the new discipline of aesthetics in the “pre-critical” period, the late German Enlightenmen before Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (1781). Primarily through Leibniz and Kant, but also Wolff, Baumgarten, and Lambert, I demonstrate how the rise of aesthetics alters the position of language both as an object of study and subjective means of expression, particularly with respect to logic and mathematics as dominant modes of rationality. In the age of critique, I argue, language shifts from a universal to a particular, precipitating a new “logic” of singularity that in the late eighteenth century extends across literary criticism, theological speculations, and poetic practice in authors such as Johann Gottfried Herder, Johann Georg Hamann and Friedrich Klopstock. Without such an analysis, I argue, the place of language in the subsequent revolutions of Romanticism and Idealism cannot be understood: Romanticism proper–the first article in the journal Athenäum–begins, after all, with a response to the language theories of Klopstock. My analysis departs from Leibniz’s writings on language and explores their influence in the works of Kant himself, along with the critical practices of his contemporaries Johann Gottfried Herder and Johann Georg Hamann, and the poet Friedrich Gottlieb Klopstock. Leibniz’s study of language, I argue, requires a new, post-Cartesian form of analysis that accounts for natural and artificial languages, mathematical combinatorics, and Baroque poetry, expressed in the idea of the knot, in an idea of human understanding based on entanglement and perplexity. For Kant, this is a problem of orientation in thinking that, as the capacity to judge, I show, is first and foremost an orientation in language; in Herder, Hamann and Klopstock, this orientation in language as both a repository for culture and an injunction to always, creatively, begin again, gives rise to aesthetic theories and practices that sought neither to found a discipline of linguistics nor a philosophy of language, but to liberate language from the tyranny of its present speakers and enable language’s free use of its own, singular qualities–qualities that can only manifest themselves in a language’s potential and future use.
Citation Source Key
[ASP] — Academic Search Premier
[M] — material copy of the book or journal
[MUSE] — Project Muse
[PI] — Philosopher’s Index
[PQ] — ProQuest
[PW] — publisher’s website
[RC] — Rodica Croitoru
[WC] — WorldCat
I thank Andrey Zilber for his kind assistance with the articles from the Russian journal Kantovskij Sbornik, and Rodica Croitoru for her help with many of the items from the Romanian literature.