Moses Maimonides (1135-1204) was the greatest Jewish scholar of the middle ages. “Between Moses and Moses there are none greater than Moses” — a common saying about Maimonides suggesting the high regard in which he was held.

Maimonides grew up in Muslim Spain, in Cordoba, but his family was forced into exile when he was thirteen, eventually settling in Cairo, where he and his brother became successful jewel merchants. After the death of both his brother and father, he took up the study of medicine, and his fame as a physician resulted in his appointment as court physician to the great Muslim ruler Saladin (1138-1193) — the same man who had defeated Richard the Lionhearted during the Third Crusade.

Maimonides’ fame in the history of philosophy rests squarely on his main work, The Guide for the Perplexed, written in Arabic, and in which he hoped to harmonize Greek philosophy with his Jewish faith — or, in more general terms, the claims of reason with the claims of faith. Aquinas was deeply influenced by this work.

The following selection (drawn from the 1881 translation, out of the original Arabic, by Michael Friedländer), concerns our ability to gain knowledge of God.

PART I
Chapter 51

[1] There are many things whose existence is manifest and obvious; some of these are innate notions or objects of sensation, others are nearly so; and in fact they would require no proof if man had been left in his primitive state. Such are the existence of motion, of man’s free will, of phases of production and destruction, and of the natural properties perceived by the senses, e.g., the heat of fire, the coldness of water, and many other similar things. False notions, however, may be spread either by a person laboring under error, or by one who has some particular end in view, and who establishes theories contrary to the real nature of things, by denying the existence of things perceived by the senses, or by affirming the existence of what does not exist. Philosophers are thus required to establish by proof things that are self-evident, and to disprove the existence of things that only exist in man’s imagination. Thus Aristotle gives a proof for the existence of motion, because it had been denied; he disproves the reality of atoms, because it had been asserted.

[2] To the same class belongs the rejection of essential attributes in reference to God. For it is a self-evident truth that the attribute is not inherent in the object to which it is ascribed, but it is superadded to its essence, and is consequently an accident; if the attribute denoted the essence of the object, it would be either mere tautology, as if, e.g., one would say “man is man,” or the explanation of a name, as, e.g., “man is a speaking animal”; for the words “speaking animal” include the true essence of man, and there is no third element besides life and speech in the definition of man; when he, therefore, is described by the attributes of life and speech, these are nothing but an explanation of the name “man,” that is to say, that the thing that is called man, consists of life and speech. It will now be clear that the attribute must be one of two things, either the essence of the object described — in that case it is a mere explanation of a name, and on that account we might admit the attribute in reference to God, but we reject it from another cause as will be shown — or the attribute is something different from the object described, some extraneous superadded element; in that case the attribute would be an accident, and he who merely rejects the appellation “accidents” in reference to the attributes of God, does not thereby alter their character; for everything superadded to the essence of an object joins it without forming part of its essential properties, and that constitutes an accident. Add to this the logical consequence of admitting many attributes, viz., the existence of many eternal beings. There cannot be any belief in the unity of God except by admitting that He is one simple substance, without any composition or plurality of elements; one from whatever side you view it, and by whatever test you examine it; not divisible into two parts in any way and by any cause, nor capable of any form of plurality either objectively or subjectively, as will be proved in this treatise.

[3] Some thinkers have gone so far as to say that the attributes of God are neither His essence nor anything extraneous to His essence. This is like the assertion of some theorists,
that the Forms, i.e., the *universalia*, are neither existing nor non-existent, and like the views of others, that the atom does not fill a definite place, but keeps an atom of space occupied; that man has no freedom of action at all, but has acquirement. Such things are only said; they exist only in words, not in thought, much less in reality. But as you know, and as all know who do not delude themselves, these theories are preserved by a multitude of words, by misleading similes sustained by declamation and invective, and by numerous methods borrowed both from dialectics and sophistry. If after uttering them and supporting them by such words, a man were to examine for himself his own belief on this subject, he would see nothing but confusion and stupidity in an endeavor to prove the existence of things that do not exist, or to find a mean between two opposites that have no mean. Or is there a mean between existence and nonexistence, or between the identity and non-identity of two things? But, as we said, to such absurdities men were forced by the great licence given to the imagination, and by the fact that every existing material thing is necessarily imagined as a certain substance possessing several attributes; for nothing has ever been found that consists of one simple substance without any attribute. Guided by such imaginations, men thought that God was also composed of many different elements, viz., of His essence and of the attributes superadded to His essence. Following up this comparison, some believed that God was corporeal, and that He possessed attributes; others, abandoning this theory, denied the corporeality, but retained the attributes. The adherence to the literal sense of the text of Holy Writ is the source of all this error, as I shall show in some of the chapters devoted to this theme.

**Chapter 52**

[4] Every description of an object by an affirmative attribute, which includes the assertion that an object is of a certain kind, must be made in one of the following five ways:

[5] First. The object is described by its definition, as e.g., man is described as a being that lives and has reason; such a description, containing the true essence of the object, is, as we have already shown, nothing else but the explanation of a name. All agree that this kind of description cannot be given of God; for there are no previous causes to His existence, by which He could be defined: and on that account it is a well-known principle, received by all the philosophers, who are precise in their statements, that no definition can be given of God.

[6] Secondly. An object is described by part of its definition, as when, e.g., man is described as a living being or as a rational being. This kind of description includes the necessary connection [of the two Forms]; for when we say that every man is rational we mean by it that every being that has the characteristics of man must also have reason. All agree that this kind of description is inappropriate in reference to God; for if we were to speak of a portion of His essence, we should consider His essence to be a compound. The inappropriateness of this kind of description in reference to God is the same as that of the preceding kind.

[7] Thirdly. An object is described by something different from its true essence, by something that does not complement or establish the essence of the object. The description, therefore, relates to a quality; but quality in its most general sense, is an accident. If God could be described in this way, He would be the substratum of accidents: a sufficient reason for rejecting the idea that He possesses quality, since it diverges from the true conception of His essence. It is surprising how those who admit the application of attributes to God can reject, in reference to Him, comparison and qualification. For when they say “He cannot be qualified,” they can only mean that He possesses no quality; and yet every positive essential attribute of an object either constitutes its essence — and in that case it is identical with the essence — or it contains a quality of the object.

[8] There are, as you know, four kinds of quality; I will give you instances of attributes of each kind, in order to show you that this class of attributes cannot possibly be applied to God. (a) A man is described by any of his intellectual or moral qualities, or by any of the dispositions appertaining to him as an animate being, when, e.g., we speak of a person who is a carpenter, or who shrinks from sin, or who is ill. It makes no difference whether we say, a carpenter, or a sage, or a physician; by all these we represent certain physical dispositions; nor does it make any difference whether we say “sin-fearing” or “merciful.” Every trade, every profession, and every settled habit of man are certain physical dispositions. All this is clear to those who have occupied themselves with the study of Logic. (b) A thing is described by some physical quality it possesses, or by the absence of the same, e.g., as being soft or hard. It makes no difference whether we say “soft or hard,” or “strong or weak”; in both cases we speak of physical conditions. (c) A man is described by his passive qualities, or by his emotions; we speak, e.g., of a person who is passionate, irritable, timid, merciful, without implying that these conditions have become permanent. The description of a thing by its color, taste, heat, cold, dryness, and moisture, belongs also to this class of attributes. (d) A thing is described by any of its qualities resulting from quantity as such; we speak, e.g., of a thing that is long, short, curved, straight, etc.
[9] Consider all these and similar attributes, and you will find that they cannot be employed in reference to God. He is not a magnitude that any quality resulting from quantity as such could be possessed by Him; He is not affected by external influences, and therefore does not possess any quality resulting from emotion. He is not subject to physical conditions, and therefore does not possess strength or similar qualities; He is not an animate being, that He should have a certain disposition of the soul, or acquire certain properties, as meekness, modesty, etc., or be in a state to which animate beings as such are subject, as, e.g., in that of health or of illness. Hence it follows that no attribute coming under the head of quality in its widest sense, can be predicated of God. Consequently, these three classes of attributes, describing the essence of a thing, or part of the essence, or a quality of it, are clearly inadmissible in reference to God, for they imply composition, which, as we shall prove, is out of question as regards the Creator. We say, with regard to this latter point, that He is absolutely One.

[10] Fourthly. A thing is described by its relation to another thing, e.g., to time, to space, or to a different individual; thus we say, Zaid, the father of A, or the partner of B, or who dwells at a certain place, or who lived at a stated time. This kind of attribute does not necessarily imply plurality or change in the essence of the object described; for the same Zaid, to whom reference is made, is the partner of Amru, the father of Beer, the master of Khalid, the friend of Zaid, dwells in a certain house, and was born in a certain year. Such relations are not the essence of a thing, nor are they so intimately connected with it as qualities. At first thought, it would seem that they may be employed in reference to God, but after careful and thorough consideration we are convinced of their inadmissibility. It is quite clear that there is no relation between God and time or space. For time is an accident connected with motion, in so far as the latter includes the relation of anteriority and posteriority, and is expressed by number, as is explained in books devoted to this subject; and since motion is one of the conditions to which only material bodies are subject, and God is immaterial, there can be no relation between Him and time. Similarly there is no relation between Him and space.

[11] But what we have to investigate and to examine is this: whether some real relation exists between God and any of the substances created by Him, by which He could be described? That there is no correlation between Him and any of His creatures can easily be seen; for the characteristic of two objects correlative to each other is the equality of their reciprocal relation. Now, as God has absolute existence, while all other beings have only possible existence, as we shall show, there consequently cannot be any correlation [between God and His creatures]. That a certain kind of relation does exist between them is by some considered possible, but wrongly. It is impossible to imagine a relation between intellect and sight, although, as we believe, the same kind of existence is common to both; how, then, could a relation be imagined between any creature and God, who has nothing in common with any other being; for even the term existence is applied to Him and other things, according to our opinion, only by way of pure homonymy. Consequently there is no relation whatever between Him and any other being. For whenever we speak of a relation between two things, these belong to the same kind; but when two things belong to different kinds though of the same class, there is no relation between them. We therefore do not say, this red compared with that green, is more, or less, or equally intense, although both belong to the same class — color; when they belong to two different classes, there does not appear to exist any relation between them, not even to a man of ordinary intellect, although the two things belong to the same category; e.g., between a hundred cubits and the heat of pepper there is no relation, the one being a quality, the other a quantity; or between wisdom and sweetness, between meekness and bitterness, although all these come under the head of quality in its more general signification. How, then, could there be any relation between God and His creatures, considering the important difference between them in respect to true existence, the greatest of all differences. Besides, if any relation existed between them, God would be subject to the accident of relation; and although that would not be an accident to the essence of God, it would still be, to some extent, a kind of accident. You would, therefore, be wrong if you applied affirmative attributes in their literal sense to God, though they contained only relations; these, however, are the most appropriate of all attributes, to be employed, in a less strict sense, in reference to God, because they do not imply that a plurality of eternal things exists, or that any change takes place in the essence of God, when those things change to which God is in relation.

[12] Fifthly. A thing is described by its actions; I do not mean by “its actions” the inherent capacity for a certain work, as is expressed in “carpenter,” “painter,” or “smith” — for these belong to the class of qualities that have been mentioned above — but I mean the action the latter has performed — we speak, e.g., of Zaid, who made this door, built that wall, wove that garment. This kind of attributes is separate from the essences of the thing described, and, therefore, appropriate to be employed in describing the Creator, especially since
we know that these different actions do not imply that different elements must be contained in the substance of the agent, by which the different actions are produced, as will be explained. On the contrary, all the actions of God emanate from His essence, not from any extraneous thing superadded to His essence, as we have shown.

[13] What we have explained in the present chapter is this: that God is one in every respect, containing no plurality or any element superadded to His essence; and that the many attributes of different significations applied in Scripture to God, originate in the multitude of His actions, not in a plurality existing in His essence, and are partly employed with the object of conveying to us some notion of His perfection, in accordance with what we consider perfection, as has been explained by us. The possibility of one simple substance excluding plurality, though accomplishing different actions, will be illustrated by examples in the next chapter.

Chapter 53

[14] The circumstance that caused men to believe in the existence of divine attributes is similar to that which caused others to believe in the corporeality of God. The latter have not arrived at that belief by speculation, but by following the literal sense of certain passages in the Bible. The same is the case with the attributes; when in the books of the Prophets and of the Law, God is described by attributes, such passages are taken in their literal sense, and it is then believed that God possesses attributes; as if He were to be exalted above corporeality, and not above things connected with corporeality, i.e., the accidents, I mean psychical dispositions, all of which are qualities [and connected with corporeality]. Every attribute that the followers of this doctrine assume to be essential to the Creator, you will find to express, although they do not distinctly say so, a quality similar to those that they are accustomed to notice in the bodies of all living beings. We apply to all such passages the principle, “The Torah speaketh in the language of man,” and say that the object of all these terms is to describe God as the most perfect being, not as possessing those qualities that are only perfections in relation to created living beings. Many of the attributes express different acts of God, but that difference does not necessitate any difference as regards Him from whom the acts proceed. This fact, viz., that from one agency different effects may result, although that agency has not free will, and much more so if it has free will, I will illustrate by an instance taken from our own sphere. Fire melts certain things and makes others hard, it boils and burns, it bleaches and blackens. If we described the fire as bleaching, blackening, burning, boiling, hardening and melting, we should be correct, and yet he who does not know the nature of fire, would think that it included six different elements, one by which it blackens, another by which it bleaches, a third by which it boils, a fourth by which it consumes, a fifth by which it melts, a sixth by which it hardens things — actions that are opposed to one another, and of which each has its peculiar property. He, however, who knows the nature of fire, will know that by virtue of one quality in action, namely, by heat, it produces all these effects. If this is the case with that which is done by nature, how much more is it the case with regard to beings that act by free will, and still more with regard to God, who is above all description. If we, therefore, perceive in God certain relations of various kinds — for wisdom in us is different from power, and power from will — it does by no means follow that different elements are really contained in Him, that He contains one element by which He knows, another by which He wills, and another by which He exercises power, as is, in fact, the signification of the attributes of God according to the Attributists. Some of them express it plainly, and enumerate the attributes as elements added to the essence. Others, however, are more reserved with regard to this matter, but indicate their opinion, though they do not express it in distinct and intelligible words. Thus, e.g., some of them say: “God is omnipotent by His essence, wise by His essence, living by His essence, and endowed with a will by His essence.” (I will mention to you, as an instance, man’s reason, which being one faculty and implying no plurality, enables him to know many arts and sciences; by the same faculty man is able to sow, to do carpenter’s work, to weave, to build, to study, to acquire a knowledge of geometry, and to govern a state. These various acts resulting from one simple faculty, which involves no plurality, are very numerous; their number, that is, the number of the actions originating in man’s reason, is almost infinite. It is therefore intelligible how in reference to God, those different actions can be caused by one simple substance, that does not include any plurality or any additional element. The attributes found in Holy Scripture are either qualifications of His actions, without any reference to His essence, or indicate absolute perfection, but do not imply that the essence of God is a compound of various elements.) For in not admitting the term “compound,” they do not reject the idea of a compound when they admit a substance with attributes.

[15] There still remains one difficulty that led them to that error, and which I am now going to mention. Those who assert the existence of the attributes do not find their opinion on the variety of God’s actions; they say it is true that one substance can be the source of various effects, but His essential attributes cannot be qualifications of His actions,
because it is impossible to imagine that the Creator created Himself. They vary with regard to the so-called essential attributes — I mean as regards their number — according to the text of the Scripture that each of them follows. I will enumerate those on which all agree, and the knowledge of that they believe that they have derived from reasoning, not from some words of the Prophets, namely, the following four: life, power, wisdom, and will. They believe that these are four different things, and such perfections as cannot possibly be absent from the Creator, and that these cannot be qualifications of His actions. This is their opinion. But you must know that wisdom and life in reference to God are not different from each other; for in every being that is conscious of itself, life and wisdom are the same thing, that is to say, if by wisdom we understand the consciousness of self. Besides, the subject and the object of that consciousness are undoubtedly identical [as regards God]; for according to our opinion, He is not composed of an element that apprehends, and another that does not apprehend; He is not like man, who is a combination of a conscious soul and an unconscious body. If, therefore, by “wisdom” we mean the faculty of self-consciousness, wisdom and life are one and the same thing. They, however, do not speak of wisdom in this sense, but of His power to apprehend His creatures. There is also no doubt that power and will do not exist in God in reference to Himself; for He cannot have power or will as regards Himself; we cannot imagine such a thing. They take these attributes as different relations between God and His creatures, signifying that He has power in creating things, will in giving to things existence as He desires, and wisdom in knowing what He created. Consequently, these attributes do not refer to the essence of God, but express relations between Him and His creatures.

[16] Therefore we, who truly believe in the Unity of God, declare, that as we do not believe that some element is included in His essence by which He created the heavens, another by which He created the [four] elements, a third by which He created the Forms, in the same way we reject the idea that His essence contains an element by which He has power, another element by which He has will, and a third by which He has a knowledge of His creatures. On the contrary, He is a simple essence, without any additional element whatever; He created the universe, and knows it, but not by any extraneous force. There is no difference whether these various attributes refer to His actions or to relations between Him and His works; in fact, these relations, as we have also shown, exist only in the thoughts of men. This is what we must believe concerning the attributes occurring in the books of the Prophets; some may also be taken as expressive of the perfection of God by way of comparison with what we consider as perfections in us. […]

Chapter 58

[17] This chapter is even more recondite than the preceding. Know that the negative attributes of God are the true attributes: they do not include any incorrect notions or any deficiency whatever in reference to God, while positive attributes imply polytheism, and are inadequate, as we have already shown. It is now necessary to explain how negative expressions can in a certain sense be employed as attributes, and how they are distinguished from positive attributes. Then I shall show that we cannot describe the Creator by any means except by negative attributes. An attribute does not exclusively belong to the one object to which it is related; while qualifying one thing, it can also be employed to qualify other things, and is in that case not peculiar to that one thing. E.g., if you see an object from a distance, and on enquiring what it is, are told that it is a living being, you have certainly learnt an attribute of the object seen, and although that attribute does not exclusively belong to the object perceived, it expresses that the object is not a plant or a mineral. Again, if a man is in a certain house, and you know that something is in the house, but not exactly what, you ask what is in that house, and you are told, not a plant nor a mineral. You have thereby obtained some special knowledge of the thing; you have learnt that it is a living being, although you do not yet know what kind of a living being it is. The negative attributes have this in common with the positive, that they necessarily circumscribe the object to some extent, although such circumscription consists only in the exclusion of what otherwise would not be excluded. In the following point, however, the negative attributes are distinguished from the positive. The positive attributes, although not peculiar to one thing, describe a portion of what we desire to know, either some part of its essence or some of its accidents; the negative attributes, on the other hand, do not, as regards the essence of the thing that we desire to know, in any way tell us what it is, except it be indirectly, as has been shown in the instance given by us.

[18] After this introduction, I would observe that — as has already been shown — God’s existence is absolute, that it includes no composition, as will be proved, and that we comprehend only the fact that He exists, not His essence. Consequently it is a false assumption to hold that He has any positive attribute; for He does not possess existence in addition to His essence; it therefore cannot be said that the one may be described as an attribute [of the other]; much less has He [in addition to His existence] a compound essence, consisting of two constituent elements to which the
attribute could refer; still less has He accidents that could be
described by an attribute. Hence it is clear that He has no
positive attribute whatever. The negative attributes, how-
ever, are those that are necessary to direct the mind to the
truths that we must believe concerning God; for, on the one
hand, they do not imply any plurality, and, on the other,
they convey to man the highest possible knowledge of God;
e.g., it has been established by proof that some being must
exist besides those things that can be perceived by the
senses, or apprehended by the mind; when we say of this
being, that it exists, we mean that its nonexistence is impos-
sible. We then perceive that such a being is not, for instance,
like the four elements, that are inanimate, and we therefore
say that it is living, expressing thereby that it is not dead.

We call such a being incorporeal, because we notice that it
is unlike the heavens, that are living, but material. Seeing
that it is also different from the intellect that, though incor-
poral and living, owes its existence to some cause, we say
it is the first, expressing thereby that its existence is not due
to any cause. We further notice, that the existence, that is
the essence, of this being is not limited to its own existence;
many existences emanate from it, and its influence is not
like that of the fire in producing heat, or that of the sun in
sending forth light, but consists in constantly giving them
stability and order by well-established rule, as we shall
show: we say, on that account, it has power, wisdom, and
will, i.e., it is not feeble or ignorant, or hasty, and does not
abandon its creatures; when we say that it is not feeble, we
mean that its existence is capable of producing the existence
of many other things; by saying that it is not ignorant, we
mean “it perceives” or “it lives” — for everything that per-
ceives is living — by saying “it is not hasty, and does not
abandon its creatures,” we mean that all these creatures pre-
serve a certain order and arrangement; they are not left to
themselves; they are not produced aimlessly, but whatever
condition they receive from that being is given with design
and intention. We thus learn that there is no other being like
unto God, and we say that He is One, i.e., there are not more
Gods than one.

[19] It has thus been shown that every attribute predicated of
God either denotes the quality of an action, or — when the
attribute is intended to convey some idea of the Divine Be-
ing itself, and not of His actions — the negation of the op-
posite. Even these negative attributes must not be formed
and applied to God, except in the way in which, as you
know, sometimes an attribute is made negative in reference
to a thing, although that attribute can naturally never be ap-
plied to it in the same sense, as, e.g., we say, “This wall
does not see.” Those who read the present work are aware

that, notwithstanding all the efforts of the mind, we can ob-
tain no knowledge of the essence of the heavens — a re-
volving substance that has been measured by us in spans
and cubits, and examined even as regards the proportions of
the several spheres to each other and respecting most of
their motions — although we know that they must consist of
matter and form; but the matter not being the same as sub-
liminary matter, we can only describe the heavens in terms ex-
pressing negative properties, but not in terms denoting posi-
tive qualities. Thus we say that the heavens are not light, not
heavy, not passive and therefore not subject to impressions,
and that they do not possess the sensations of taste and
smell; or we use similar negative attributes. All this we do,
because we do not know their substance. What, then, can be
the result of our efforts, when we try to obtain a knowledge
of a Being that is free from substance, that is most simple,
whose existence is absolute, and not due to any cause, to
whose perfect essence nothing can be superadded, and
whose perfection consists, as we have shown, in the absence
of all defects. All we understand is the fact that He exists,
that He is a Being to whom none of His creatures is similar,
who has nothing in common with them, who does not in-
clude plurality, who is never too feeble to produce other
beings, and whose relation to the universe is that of a steers-
man to a boat; and even this is not a real relation, a real sim-
ple, but serves only to convey to us the idea that God rules
the universe; that is, that He gives it duration, and preserves
its necessary arrangement. This subject will be treated more
fully. Praised be He! In the contemplation of His essence,
our comprehension and knowledge prove insufficient; in the
examination of His works, how they necessarily result from
His will, our knowledge proves to be ignorance, and in the
endeavor to extol Him in words, all our efforts in speech are
mere weakness and failure!

Chapter 59

[20] The following question might perhaps be asked: Since
there is no possibility of obtaining a knowledge of the true
essence of God, and since it has also been proved that the
only thing that man can apprehend of Him is the fact that He
exists, and that all positive attributes are inadmissible, as
has been shown; what is the difference among those who
have obtained a knowledge of God? Must not the knowl-
dge obtained by our teacher Moses, and by Solomon, be
the same as that obtained by any one of the lowest class of
philosophers, since there can be no addition to this knowl-
dge? But, on the other hand, it is generally accepted among
theologians and also among philosophers, that there can be a
great difference between two persons as regards the knowl-
dge of God obtained by them. Know that this is really the
case, that those who have obtained a knowledge of God differ greatly from each other, for in the same way as by each additional attribute an object is more specified, and is brought nearer to the true apprehension of the observer, so by each additional negative attribute you advance toward the knowledge of God, and you are nearer to it than he who does not make negative, in reference to God, those qualities that you are convinced by proof must be made negative. There may thus be a man who after having earnestly devoted many years to the pursuit of one science, and to the true understanding of its principles, till he is fully convinced of its truths, has obtained as the sole result of this study the conviction that a certain quality must be made negative in reference to God, and the capacity of demonstrating that it is impossible to apply it to Him. Superficial thinkers will have no proof for this, will doubtfully ask, Is that thing existing in the Creator, or not? And those who are deprived of sight will positively ascribe it to God, although it has been clearly shown that He does not possess it. E.g., while I show that God is incorporeal, another doubts and is not certain whether He is corporeal or incorporeal; others even positively declare that He is corporeal, and appear before the Lord with that belief. Now see how great the difference is between these three men; the first is undoubtedly nearest to the Almighty; the second is remote, and the third still more distant from Him. If there be a fourth person who holds himself convinced by proof that emotions are impossible in God, while the first who rejects the corporeality, is not convinced of that impossibility, that fourth person is undoubtedly nearer the knowledge of God than the first, and so on, so that a person who, convinced by proof, negatives a number of things in reference to God, which according to our belief may possibly be in Him or emanate from Him, is undoubtedly a more perfect man than we are, and would surpass us still more if we positively believed these things to be properties of God. It will now be clear to you, that every time you establish by proof the negation of a thing in reference to God, you become more perfect, while with every additional positive assertion you follow your imagination and recede from the true knowledge of God. Only by such ways must we approach the knowledge of God, and by such researches and studies as would show us the inapplicability of what is inadmissible as regards the Creator, not by such methods as would prove the necessity of ascribing to Him anything extraneous to His essence, or asserting that He has a certain perfection, when we find it to be a perfection in relation to us. The perfections are all to some extent acquired properties, and a property that must be acquired does not exist in everything capable of making such acquisition.

[21] You must bear in mind, that by affirming anything of God, you are removed from Him in two respects; first, whatever you affirm, is only a perfection in relation to us; secondly, He does not possess anything superadded to this essence; His essence includes all His perfections, as we have shown. Since it is a well-known fact that even that knowledge of God that is accessible to man cannot be attained except by negations, and that negations do not convey a true idea of the being to which they refer, all people, both of past and present generations, declared that God cannot be the object of human comprehension, that none but Himself comprehends what He is, and that our knowledge consists in knowing that we are unable truly to comprehend Him. All philosophers say, “He has overpower us by His grace, and is invisible to us through the intensity of His light,” like the sun that cannot be perceived by eyes that are too weak to bear its rays. Much more has been said on this topic, but it is useless to repeat it here. The idea is best expressed in the book of Psalms, “Silence is praise to Thee” (lxv. 2). It is a very expressive remark on this subject; for whatever we utter with the intention of extolling and of praising Him, contains something that cannot be applied to God, and includes derogatory expressions; it is therefore more becoming to be silent, and to be content with intellectual reflection, as has been recommended by men of the highest culture, in the words “Commune with your own heart upon your bed, and be still” (Ps. iv. 4). […]

[22] I have already told you that all these attributes, whatever perfection they may denote according to your idea, imply defects in reference to God, if applied to Him in the same sense as they are used in reference to ourselves. Solomon has already given us sufficient instruction on this subject by saying, “For God is in heaven, and thou upon earth; therefore let thy words be few” (Eccles. v. 2).