[2012]  Kant Bibliography 2013  [2014]

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[top]Kant    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Editions and translations of the writings of Immanuel Kant

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[See also the items listed under Collections]

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Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels (1755)

 ——. Himlens allmänna naturhistoria och teori eller essä om beskaffenheten av och det mekaniska ursprunget till hela världsalltet, avhandlade enligt Newtonska grundsatser. [Swedish] Translated, and with an introduction and commentary, by Gunnar Welin. Möklinta: Gidlund, 2013. [159 p.] [WC]

Nachricht von der Einrichtung seiner Vorlesungen in dem Winterhalbenjahre von 1765-1766 (1765)

 ——. “Obavijest g. Immanuela Kanta o ustroju njegovih predavanja u zimskome polugodištu 1765.-1766.” [Croation] Translated by Ljudevit Fran Ježić. Čemu: časopis studenata filozofije 11.21 (2013): 241-46. [WC]

Träume eines Geistersehers, erläutert durch Träume der Metaphysik (1766)

 ——. カント「視霊者の夢」/ Kanto shireisha no yume. [Japanese] Translated by Seiya Kanamori. Tokyo: Kodansha, 2013. [173 p.] [WC]

 ——. Rêves d'un visionnaire. [French] Translated, and with an introduction and notes, by Francis Courtès. Paris: J. Vrin, 2013. [256 p.] [WC]

Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1781)

 ——. Kritik av det rena förnuftet. [Swedish] Translated by Jeanette Emt; introduction by Markku Leppäkoski. Stockholm: Thales, 2013. [743 p.] [WC]

 ——. Puhtaan järjen kritiikki. [Finnish] Translated by Markus Nikkarla and Kreeta Ranki. Helsinki: Gaudeamus, 2013. [599 p.] [WC]

 ——. Crítica de la razón pura. [Spanish] Translated, with introduction and notes, by Pedro Ribas. Madrid: Taurus, 2013. [lxxvii, 688 p.] [WC]

 ——. ביקורת התבונה הטהורה / Biḳoret ha-tevunah ha-ṭehorah. [Hebrew] Translated by Yirmiyahu Yovel. Tel Aviv: ha-Ḳibuts ha-meʼuḥad, 2013. [654 p.] [WC]

 ——. Krytyka czystego rozumu. [Polish] Translated by Mirosław Żelazny. Toruń: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika, 2013. [769 p.] [WC]

Prolegomena (1783)

 ——.  프롤레고메나. [Korean] Translated by Seung Jun. Publisher, 2013. [229 p.] [WC]

 ——.  未来形而上学导论: 注释本 / Wei lai xing er shang xue dao lun: Zhu shi ben. [Chinese] Translated by Qiuling Li. Beijing: Zhong guo ren min da xue chu ban she, 2013. [119 p.] [WC]

“Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?” (1784)

 ——. Risposta alla domanda: che cos'è l'illuminismo? [Italian] Translated and edited by Matteo Bensi, afterword by Alfonso Iacono. Pisa: ETS, 2013. [67 p.] [WC]

 ——. Qu'est-ce que les Lumières? Traité de philosophie politique. [French] Translated by Anne-Laure Romeur. Paris: Larousse, 2013. [94 p.] [WC]

“Erinnerungen des Rezensenten der Herderschen Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit über ein im Februar des Teutschen Merkur gegen diese Rezension gerichtetes Schreiben” and “Rezension zu Johann Gottfried Herder, Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit (Zweiter Teil)” (1785)

 ——. “Kant e a segunda recensão a Herder: comentário, tradução e notas.” [Portuguese] Translated, with introduction and notes, by Joel Thiago Klein. Studia Kantiana 11.14 (2013): 190-214. [M]

Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (1785)

 ——. Intemeierea metafizicii moravurilor. Critica ratiunii practice. [Romanian] Translated by Rodica Croitoru. Bucarest: Antet XX Press, 2013. [264 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Also includes a translation of the Kritik der praktischen Vernunft.

Kritik der praktischen Vernunft (1788)

 ——. 実践理性批判 / Jissen risei hihan. [Japanese] Translated by Gen Nakayama. Tokyo: Kōbunsha, 2013. [362 p.] [WC]

“Über den Gebrauch teleologischer Principien in der Philosophie” (1788)

 ——. “Sobre o Uso de Princípios Teleológicos na Filosofia, de Kant.” [Portuguese] Translated, and with an introduction and notes, by Marcio Pires. Trans/Form/Ação: Revista de Filosofia 36.1 (2013): 211-38. [M]

Kritik der Urteilskraft (1790)

 ——. Crítica del juicio. [Spanish] Translated, edited, and with an introduction by Manuel García Morente. Barcelona: Espasa, 2013. [462 p.] [WC]

 ——. Kritika moći suđenja. Serbian Translation by Nikola Popović. Podgorica: Oktoih, 2013. [299 p.] [WC]

 ——. Critica del giudizio. [Italian] Translated by Francesco Valagussa. Brescia: La Scuola, 2013. [155 p.] [WC]

Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft (1793)

 ——. Nábozenství v hranicích pouhého rozumu. [Czech] Translated by Karel Sprunk, introduction and commentary by Stanislav Sousedík. Prague: Vysehrad, 2013. [285 p.] [WC]

Welches sind die wirklichen Fortschritte, die die Metaphysik seit Leibnitzens und Wolf’s Zeiten in Deutschland gemacht hat? (1793)

 ——. Les progrès de la métaphysique. [French] Translated, and with an introduction and notes by Antoine Grandjean. Paris: Flammarion, 2013. [274 p.] [WC]

“Über den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht für die Praxis” (1793)

 ——. Over de gemeenplaats: dat kan in theorie wel juist zijn, maar deugt niet voor de praktijk. [Dutch] Translated, and with an introduction, by Thomas Mertens. Amsterdam: Boom, 2013. [121 p.] [WC]

Zum ewigen Frieden (1795)

 ——. Vers la paix perpétuelle: texte intégral. [French] Translated by Michaël Foessel. Paris: Hatier, 2013. [159 p.] [WC]

Die Metaphysik der Sitten (1797)

 ——. Metafizica moravurilor. [Romanian] Translated by Rodica Croitoru. Bucarest: Antet XX Press, 2013. [317 p.] [WC]

 ——. Metaphysikḗ tōn ēthṓn. [Greek] Translated by Kōstas Andrulidakēs. Athens: Smílē, 2013. [421 p.] [WC]

Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht abgefaßt (1798)

 ——. Antropologia din perspectiva pragmatica. [Romanian] Translated by Rodica Croitoru. Bucarest: Antet XX Press, 2013. [204 p.] [WC]

 ——. 实用人类学(外两种): 注释本 / Shi yong ren lei xue (wai liang zhong): Zhu shi ben. [Chinese] Translated by Qiuling Li. Beijing: Zhong guo ren min da xue chu ban she, 2013. [250 p.] [WC]

Über Pädagogik (1803)

 ——. Pedagogika tugrisida. [Uzbek] Translated by Mirzli Akbarov, with an introduction by A. Ch. Saidov. Taschkent: Niso Poligraf, 2013. [232 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Described in Kant-Studien, 106.2 (2015), p. 369.

 ——. 康德論教育 / Kang de lun jiao yu. [Chinese] Translated by Fuming Jia. Tai bei shi: Wu nan, 2013. [169 p.] [WC]

Nachlaß

 ——. Riflessioni sul gusto. [Italian; Reflections on taste] Translated and with an introduction by Oscar Meo. Palermo: Centro Internazionale Studi di Estetica, 2013. [89 p.] [WC]

 ——. “Opus postumum.” (selection) [Polish] Translated by Mirosław Żelazny. Studia z Historii Filozofii 4.1 (2013): 9-32. [WC]

 ——. “Opus postumum.” (selection) [Polish] Translated by Mirosław Żelazny. Studia z Historii Filozofii 4.2 (2013): 9-18. [WC]

 ——. “Opus postumum.” (selection) [Polish] Translated by Tomasz Kupś. Studia z Historii Filozofii 4.3 (2013): 9-31. [WC]

 ——.  “Opus postumum.” (selection) [Polish] Translated by Tomasz Kupś. Studia z Historii Filozofii 4 (2013): 9-25.

Lecture Notes

 ——. Metafizikai és teológiai előadásai. [Hungarian; Lectures on metaphysics and theology] Translated by Miklós Mesterházi. Budapest: Atlantisz, 2013. [523 p.] [WC] [contents]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Translations into Hungarian from several sets of notes on Metaphysics: [an-Pölitz 1] [an-Pölitz 3.2] [Mrongovius 2] [Volckmann 3] [an-Königsberg 5].

 ——. “«Do carácter da humanidade em geral» [das “Lições sobre Antropologia” (1775/76)].” [Portuguese] Translated by Fernando M. F. Silva, with an introduction by Leonel Ribeiro dos Santos. Estudos Kantianos 1.1 (2013): 255-82. [M]

Miscellaneous

 ——. Studie k dějinám a politice [Czech; studies in history and politics]. Edited by Milan Sobotka and Karel Novotný; translated by Jaromír Loužil, Petra Stehlíková, and Karel Novotný. Prague: OIKOYMENH, 2013. [191 p.] [WC]

Collections

[Croitoru 2013] Visurile unui vizionar interpretate prin visurile metafizicii; Lui Sömmerring. Despre organul sufletului; Despre puterea sufletului de a îşi stăpâni sentimentele maladive doar printr-o decizie; Scrisoare profesorului Hufeland. [Romanian] Translated by Rodica Croitoru. Bucarest: Antet XX Press, 2013. [116 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Translations of Träume eines Geistersehers, erläutert durch Träume der Metaphysik (1766), “Bemerkungen zu Sömmering’s Über das Organ der Seele” (1796), and “Von der Macht des Gemüths durch den blossen Vorsatz seiner krankhaften Gefühle Meister zu seyn” (1798).

[Jin 2013] 康德政治著作选 / Kang de zheng zhi zhu zuo xuan [Chinese; Kant: political writings]. Translated by Wei Jin, of Reiss/Nisbet 1991. Beijing: Zhong guo zheng fa da xue chu ban she, 2013. [371 p.] [WC]

[Kumano 2013] 実践理性批判; 倫理の形而上学の基礎づけ / Jissen risei hihan; rinri no keijijōgaku no kisozuke. [Japanese; Critique of Practical Reason; Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals] Translated by Sumihiko Kumano. Tokyo: Sakuhinsha, 2013. [iv, 386 p.] [WC]

[Li.M 2013] 康德歷史哲學論文集 (增訂版) / Kangde li shi zhe xue lun wen ji (zeng ding ban) [Chinese; Kant’s essays on the history of philosophy] Translated by Minghui Li. Taibei Shi: Lian jing chu ban shi ye gu fen you xian gong si, 2013. [xlii, 316 p.] [WC]

[Li.Q 2013] 康德著作全集. 第1卷, 前批判时期著作I 1747-1756 [Chinese; Complete Works of Kant. Volume 1, Pre-critical Period Writings I 1747-1756] Translated by Qiuling Li. Beijing: Zhongguo ren min da xue chu ban she, 2013. [489 p.] [WC]

[Mikkelsen 2013] Kant and the Concept of Race: Late Eighteenth-Century Writings. [English] Translated and edited by Jon M. Mikkelsen. Albany: SUNY Press, 2013. [x, 377 p.] [M] [review]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents:
Immanuel Kant, Of the Different Human Races: An Announcement for Lectures in Physical Geography in the Summer Semester 1775;
Immanuel Kant, Of the Different Human Races;
E.A.W. Zimmerman, From Geographical History of Human Beings and the Universally Dispersed Quadrupeds;
Immanuel Kant, Determination of the Concept of a Human Race;
Georg Forster, Something more about the human races;
Immanuel Kant, On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy;
Christoph Meiners, Of the Varieties and Deviate Forms of Negroes;
Christoph Girtanner, From Concerning the Kantian principle in Natural History: An Attempt to Treat this Science Philosophically.

[Visser 2013] Het ontstaan van het heelal en de goede God. [Dutch] Translated by Willem Visser. Amsterdam: Sjibbolet, 2013. [240 p.][WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Translation into Dutch of Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels (1755) and Der einzig mögliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes (1763).

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[top]A    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Abaci, Uygar. “The Coextensiveness Thesis and Kant’s Modal Agnosticism in the ‘Postulates’.” European Journal of Philosophy (pre-print online, posted 27 Aug 2013). [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the Critique of Pure Reason, following his elucidation of the ‘postulates’ of possibility, actuality, and necessity, Kant makes a series of puzzling remarks. He seems to deny the somewhat metaphysically intuitive contention that the extension of possibility is greater than that of actuality, which, in turn, is greater than that of necessity (A230/B283). Further, he states that the actual adds nothing to the possible (B284). This leads to the view, fairly common in the literature, that Kant holds that all modal categories, in their empirical applications, are coextensive. I diverge from the common view. First, Kant is not committed to the coextensiveness thesis, understood as above. Instead, he espouses a weaker, epistemological version of the coextensiveness thesis, namely that what we can assert to be really possible is coextensive with what we cognize to be actual. Second, Kant's remarks are not intended to introduce a positive ontological thesis about the extensions of modal categories. Rather, he means to criticize a certain conception of modalities that was prevalent among his rationalist predecessors, i.e., the conception of modalities as various determinations that enter the intensions of concepts of things.

 ——. “Leibniz and Kant on Existence and the Syntheticity of Existential Statements.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 5. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 297-307. [M]

Abela, Paul. Rev. of Transcendental Philosophy and Naturalism, ed. by Joel Smith and Peter Sullivan (2011). Kantian Review 18.1 (2013): 148-54. [M]

Acosta, Emiliano. “Forms of Intersubjectivity in Kant’s ‘An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?’.” Objectivity after Kant. Eds. Gertrudis Van De Vijver and Boris Demarest (op cit.). 157-77. [M]

Agam-Segal, Reshef. “Is Self-Legislation Possible?” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 3-13. [M]

 ——. “A Splitting ‘Mind-Ache’: Challenge to Kantian Self-Legislation.” Journal of Philosophical Research 38 (2013): 43-68. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: I problematize the notion of self-legislation. I follow in Elizabeth Anscombe’s footsteps and suggest that on a plausible reading of Kant, he does not so much misidentify the sources of moral normativity, as fail to identify any such sources in the first place: The set of terms with which the Kantian is attempting to do so is confused. Interpreters today take Kant’s legal language to be merely metaphorical. The language of ‘self-legislation,’ in particular, is replaced by such interpreters with a language of ‘self-constitution.’ I challenge that, and claim that the language of legislation and judgment was, for Kant, more than a metaphor: The recognition of the moral law, he says, motivates us as if it were “the bidding of another person.” Legislation is typically remote in this way. It typically requires a distance between lawgiver and law-receiver—a distance that allows, for instance, for self-inspection and judgment. For Kant, these are the terms in which to explain the forms of the moral judgment and the sources of moral normativity. It is questionable, however, whether we can be remote from our own actions in the way required—whether we can observe our own actions. We cannot, for example, raise our hand and wonder how far it will go up. I develop this claim into an Anscombean challenge to Kant, and I call upon Kantians to take it seriously.

Ahlhaus, Svenja. “The Democratic Paradox of International Human Rights Courts: A Kantian Solution?” Kantian Theory and Human Rights. Eds. Andreas Føllesdal and Reidar Maliks (op cit.). 113-29. [M]

Aichele, Alexander. “Was heisst "ein Prädikat sein"? Zu Kants Kritik des ontologischen Gottesbeweises.” Glaube und Vernunft in der Philosophie der Neuzeit. Eds. Dietmar H. Weidemann and Raoul Weicker (op cit.). 1-17. [M]

Allais, Lucy. “Kitcher on the Deduction.” Philosophy & Phenomenological Research 87.1 (2013): 229-36. [PI]

Allison, Henry E. “The Singleness of the Categorical Imperative.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 1. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 37-53. [M]

 ——. “Autonomy in Kant and German idealism.” Kant on Moral Autonomy. Ed. Oliver Sensen (op cit.). 129-45. [M]

 ——. “Kant’s Practical Justification of Freedom.” Kant on Practical Justification. Eds. Mark Timmons and Sorin Baiasu (op cit.). 284-99. [M]

Almeida, Guido Antonio de. “Zu Kants Widerlegung des Idealismus.” Das Leben der Vernunft: Beiträge zur Philosophie Kants. Eds. Dieter Hüning, Stefan Klingner, and Carsten Olk (op cit.). 131-52. [M]

Altman, Matthew C., and Cynthia D. Coe. The Fractured Self in Freud and German Philosophy. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. [x, 247 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: See chapter one (“Kant: The Inscrutable Subject,” pp. 8-26).

Altmann, Sílvia. “Geometrie und objektive Realität der Idee der Sittlichkeit in der Kritik der praktischen Vernunft.” Das Leben der Vernunft: Beiträge zur Philosophie Kants. Eds. Dieter Hüning, Stefan Klingner, and Carsten Olk (op cit.). 354-63. [M]

Altuner, Ilyas. “Conceptual Determination of the Criticism of Metaphysics in Kant’s Philosophy.” Beytulhikme: An International Journal of Philosophy 3.2 (2013): 13-24. [online] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper it will be dwelt on the conceptual groundwork of analyses by Kant in the matter of metaphysics, which is the oldest philosophical discipline and the queen of sciences, on why it cannot be understood within the limits of reason. According to Kant, metaphysical judgments do assert a claim that they had given knowledge of the truth, by connoting logical themselves. However, this case is nothing short of the logic of illusion. That the relation between metaphysics and logic has the real but not the ideal character, states that it consists of an illusion.

Ameriks, Karl. “Kant’s Ambivalent Cosmopolitanism.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 1. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 55-72. [M]

 ——. “Vindicating Autonomy: Kant, Sartre, and O’Neill.” Kant on Moral Autonomy. Ed. Oliver Sensen (op cit.). 53-70. [M]

 ——. “On ‘Kritik und Moral’.” Ubergänge — diskursiv oder intuitiv? Essays zu Eckart Försters Die 25 Jahre der Philosophie. Eds. Johannes Haag and Markus Wild (op cit.). 59-80. [M]

 ——, ed. The Impact of Idealism: The Legacy of Post-Kantian German Thought, Volume I: Philosophy and Natural Sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. [447 p.] [WC] [review]

 ——. “Is Practical Justification in Kant Ultimately Dogmatic?” Kant on Practical Justification. Eds. Mark Timmons and Sorin Baiasu (op cit.). 153-75. [M]

Amoroso, Leonardo. “Primat der ästhetischen Vernunft?” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 4. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 3-11. [M]

 ——. “Schiller interprete di Kant.” [Italian] Schiller lettore di Kant. Eds. Alberto L. Siani and Gabriele Tomasi (op cit.). 11-30. [M]

An, Yoon Ki. Transzendentale und empirische Subjektivität im Verhältnis: das reziproke Seinsverhältnis der beiden Subjektivitäten in Kants Transzendentalphilosophie. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2013. [204 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Originally appeared as Ph.D dissertation (Uni-Tübingen, 2011).

Andaluz Romanillos, Ana María. Las armonías de la razón en Kant: libertad, sentimiento de lo bello y teleología de la naturaleza. [Spanish] Salamanca: Universidad Pontificia de Salamanca, 2013. [368 p.] [WC]

Anderson, Abraham. “The Dreams of a Spirit Seer and the Method of Hypotheses.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 5. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 423-28. [M]

Anderson, Pamela Sue. “Immanuel Kant.” The Routledge Companion to Modern Christian Thought. Eds. Chad Meister and James Beilby (London/New York: Routledge, 2013). 5-16. [M]

Anderson-Gold, Sharon. “Progress and Prophecy – The Case for a Cosmopolitan History.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 4. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 567-75. [M]

Andersson, E. Roland, Bjarne Jansson, and Jan Lundblad. “Immanuel Kant Revisited — A Note on the U.S. Innovation Policy.” International Journal of Innovation Science 5.3 (2013): 137-42. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: A fundamental discussion is lacking in the current document on U.S innovation policy from the National Research Council of how invalid innovation styles and business cultures in different combinations discriminates innovation in science and industry. With credit to the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, we redefine innovation as similar to a research process and argue for improvements in the innovation literature to avoid poor results and failed innovation in the future; i.e. the innovation paradox. A critical review of the U.S. innovation policy document originates from our own university-based research and innovation in the occupational safety and health area, which is an area where both research and industry have failed thus far. Our article includes both proposals for a revised national mission based on Kant, as well as examples of how investment in research and innovation can translate and transform innovation ideas into commercial products in networks and eco-systems; and also how collaborative channels might be opened between independent inventors and universities. Our findings are important for both scientists and politicians, as well as for individuals — in industry and in society — who want to commercialize inventions.

Andrzejewski, Bolesław. “Transcendental Philosophy and Communication.” Dialogue and Universalism 23.2 (2013): 115-31. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The paper discusses the philosophy of language and communication based on Immanuel Kant’s transcendental method. Firstly, the basic assumptions of methodical rationalism are presented. Subsequent sections analyse Kant’s intellectual successors: Wilhelm von Humboldt and Ernst Cassirer. Both the intellectuals adopted Kant’s point of views and both treated language as an active, cultural factor participating in the creation of reality. The article ends with a suggestion that the transcendental approach will be present in the 21th-century researches on language and communication.

Angeli, Oliviero. “Das Volk als Transzendenz? Die ‘Erfindung’ des Volkes in Kants rechts- und geschichtsphilosophischen Schriften.” Transzendenz, Praxis und Politik bei Kant. Eds. Angeli, Rentsch, Schneidereit, and Vorländer (op cit.). 41-55. [M]

 —— and Nele Schneidereit. “Einleitung: Transzendente Geltungsgründe von Politik und praktische Gültigkeit von Transzendenz.” Transzendenz, Praxis und Politik bei Kant. Eds. Angeli, Rentsch, Schneidereit, and Vorländer (op cit.). 9-19. [M]

 ——, Thomas Rentsch, Nele Schneidereit, and Hans Vorländer, eds. Transzendenz, Praxis und Politik bei Kant. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2013. [209 p.] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: The articles stem from two Dresden conferences (2010, 2011) with the titles: Transzendenz bei Kant and Zwischen Liberalismus und Republikanismus. Über die transzendenten Ressourcen der kantischen Republik.
Contents: Oliviero Angeli and Nele Schneidereit (Transzendente Geltungsgründe von Politik und praktische Gültigkeit von Transzendenz), Christoph Binkelmann ((Con)sensus communis: Kants Theorie der ästhetischen Vergemeinschaftung), Oliviero Angeli (Das Volk als Transzendenz? Die "Erfindung" des Volkes in Kants rechts- und geschichtsphilosophischen Schriften), Enno Rudolph (Die politische Vernunft der Teufel: Kant zwischen Hobbes und Rousseau), Georg Kohler (Docta spes. Zu Kants politischer Theorie begründeter Hoffnung und kollektiven Lernens), Burkhard Nonnenmacher (Wie soll nach Kant das, was für die spekulative Vernunft transzendent ist, in der praktischen Vernunft immanent sein?), Rudolf Langthaler (Eine "neo-theologisch" erweiterte Ethiktheologie? Perspektiven der "absoluten Transzendenz" beim späten Kant), Friedo Ricken (Religion als Pflicht des Menschen gegen sich selbst), Thomas Rentsch (Kants Analyse der Sünde — das radikale Böse und sein Transzendenzbezug), Reiner Wimmer (Kants Religionsphilosophie im Opus postumum), Nele Schneidereit (Praktiken der Sinngebung: Immanenz der Transzendenz bei Kant).

Angelova, Emilia. “Desubjectivation of Time and Self-Affection.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 5. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 653-64. [M]

Anzalone, Mariafilomena. “Kant e la coscienza di sé.” [Italian] Sentire e pensare: tra Kant e Husserl. [Italian] Eds. Maria Teresa Catena and Anna Donise (op cit.). 45-59. [M]

Aportone, Anselmo. “Ausformungen des Apriori der Sinnlichkeit.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 3-14. [M]

Aramayo, Roberto R. “Politik und Geschichstphilosophie bei Kant.” [German] Kant e-Prints 8.1 (2013): 1-24. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article aims to demonstrate that the history of politics philosophy in Kant is the exercise of a historian philosopher of politics, since this story is organized by an idea of reason. Thus, it is not simply a narrative based on historical events; rather, it is the organizer of such events ordered by a conductor thread that in a panoramic view of Kantian production was called by purpose of nature, providence or fate and conductor thread. The presentation of the idea of reason that organizes the history of the politics will be presented in chronological order of Kantian production, thus demonstrating the different ideas of reason that organize the narrative of politics history of humankind and as such organizer idea was a purpose of the nature and becomes a kind of republican enthusiasm. Finally, showing that such change of organizer idea of humankind history do not imply contradictions in aligning them, on the contrary, signal to such history as an outline of a history of politics philosophy.

Arango, Rodolfo. “Republicanismo kantiano.” [Spanish; Kantian Republicanism] Ideas y Valores (Colombia) 62, Suppl. #1 (2013): 49-72. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: On the basis of the interpretations of Peter Niesen and Reinhard Brandt, this study contrasts Kantian and civic republicanism, in order to evaluate whether Kant’s methodological amorality is sufficient to motivate a people of demons to establish and maintain a republican constitution. The best reasons seem to speak in favor of Kant, but his proposal requires a greater differentiation of the reasons why such a constitution should be accepted, as well as a greater precision regarding the conditions necessary to maintain it.

Araujo, Saulo de Freitas. “The Question of Empirical Psychology in the Pre-Critical Period. A Case for Discontinuity in Kant’s Thought.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 4. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 359-66. [M]

Archard, David, Monique Deveaux, Neil Manson, and Daniel Weinstock, eds. Reading Onora O’Neill. New York: Routledge, 2013. [x, 250 p.] [M][review]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: See the essays by Marcia Baron (“Moral Worth and Moral Rightness, Maxims and Actions”), Melissa Barry (“Constructivist Practical Reasoning and Objectivity”), Thomas E. Hill, Jr. (“Varieties of Constructivism”), Katrin Flikschuh (“Hope as Prudence: Practical Faith in Kant’s Political Thinking”), and Neil Manson (“Informed Consent and Referential Opacity”).

Arndt, Andreas. “Herders Kritik der transzendentalen Dialektik.” Herders “Metakritik”: Analysen und Interpretationen. Ed. Marion Heinz (op cit.). 149-62. [M]

Aronson, Danil. “The justification of legal punishment in Kant’s philosophy.” [Russian] Kantovsky Sbornik 45.3 (2013): 50-58. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The subject matter of the article is the problem of justification of punishment within Kant’s practical philosophy. Modern interpretations tend to reduce this problem to the issue of “retributivism”: To what extent is Kant’s theory of punishment to be regarded as retributivist? While acknowledging the significance of this question the author stresses a more fundamental one lying behind it: Is a non-contradictory theory of punishment conceivable at all within Kant’s philosophy? It is demonstrated that a solution of this question largely determines a justification of the doctrine of right as such as well as a solution of the problem of relation between right and ethics in Kantian philosophy. Some recent interpretations of Kant’s theory of punishment are examined, particularly those by O. Hoeffe and B. Byrd. It is demonstrated that neither is actually compatible with Kant’s statement that punishment is a categorical imperative. Futhermore, it is shown that this statement is crucial and necessary for Kant’s universalist project of justification of right. At the same time, it is shown that it is the universalism of Kant’s practical philosophy that leads to a kind of paradox of punishment: the categorical imperative of punishment might well demand those very actions which the categorical imperative as we know it from the “Groundwork” seems to forbid. It is proposed to see this paradox as another antinomy of practical reason. The hypothesis is offered that the separation of the principles of virtue directed to an individual will and right covering the public sphere can be considered as an attempt to solve this very antinomy.

Assiter, Alison. “Kant and Kierkegaard on Freedom and Evil.” Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 72 (2013): 275-96. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant and Kierkegaard are two philosophers who are not usually bracketed together. Yet, for one commentator, Ronald Green, in his book Kierkegaard and Kant: The Hidden Debt, a deep similarity between them is seen in the centrality both accord to the notion of freedom. Kierkegaard, for example, in one of his Journal entries, expresses a ‘passion’ for human freedom. Freedom is for Kierkegaard also linked to a paradox that lies at the heart of thought. In Philosophical Fragment Kierkegaard writes about the ‘paradox of thought’: ‘the paradox is the passion of thought […] the thinker without the paradox is like the lover without the passion.’

Auweele, Dennis Vanden. “The Lutheran Influence on Kant’s Depraved Will.” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 73.2 (2013): 117-34. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Contemporary Kant-scholarship has a tendency to allign Kant’s understanding of depravity closer to Erasmus than Luther in their famous debate on the freedom of the will (1520–1527). While, at face value, some paragraphs do warrant such a claim, I will argue that Kant’s understanding of the radical evil will draws closer to Luther than Erasmus in a number of elements. These elements are (1) the intervention of the Wille for progress towards the good, (2) a positive choice for evil, (3) the inscrutability of moral progress, (4) the rejection of prudence as a means for salvation and (5) the rejection of moral sentimentalism. I believe that Kant-scholarship mistakenly pegs Kant’s rational Enlightenment optimism for an existential optimism while Kant’s view of fallen nature draws closer to Lutheran than Erasmusian depravity. A tacit Lutheran influence pervades Kant’s moral philosophy which could explain the influence Kant’s has had on some more pessimistic 19th century philosophers such as Arthur Schopenhauer and Friedrich Nietzsche.

Azevedo Granato, Marcelo de. “Wicked Happiness?” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 4. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 677-82. [M]

[top] B    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Babacz, Jan. “Moralnosc w ujeciu Immanuela Kanta.” [Polish] Swidnickie Studia Teologiczne 10 (2013): 45-54. [WC]

Bachmann, Viktoria. Der Grund des guten Lebens: eine Untersuchung der paradigmatischen Konzepte von Sokrates, Aristoteles und Kant. Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 2013. [266 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Revised doctoral dissertation (Freie Universität-Berlin, [year?]).

Bacin, Stefano. “The Perfect Duty to Oneself Merely as a Moral Being (TL 6:428-437).” Kant’s Tugendlehre. Eds. Trampota, Sensen, and Timmermann (op cit.). 245-68. [M]

 ——. “Kant on the Relation between Duties of Love and Duties of Respect.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 15-27. [M]

 ——. “Legge e obbligatorietà: la struttura dell'idea di autolegislazione morale in Kant.” [Italian] Studi Kantiani 26 (2013): 55-70. [PW]

 ——, Alfredo Ferrarin, Claudio La Rocca, and Margit Ruffing, eds. Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, 5 volumes. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2013. [xviii, 817; xviii, 1029; xviii, 983; xviii, 951; xviii, 899 p.] [M] [contents]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: See the attached link for a complete table of contents of the five volumes (from the publisher’s website). The five volumes group the papers under the following headings:
Volume One
Plenarvorträge
Kants Begriff der Philosophie
Volume Two
Erkenntnistheorie und Logik
Ontologie und Metaphysik
Religionsphilosophie
Volume Three
Ethik
Recht und Gerechtigkeit
Volume Four
Ästhetik
Anthropologie und Psychologie
Politik und Geschichte
Volume Five
Wissenschaft, Mathematik, Naturphilosophie
Kant und der Leibnizianismus
Kant und die philosophische Tradition
Kant und Schopenhauer
Kant und die Folgen

Bader, Ralf M. “Self-knowledge in §7 of the Transcendental Aesthetic.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 531-39. [M]

Bagnoli, Carla. “Respect and Obligation.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 29-40. [M]

 ——, ed. Che fare? Nuove prospettive etiche sull'azione. Rome: Carocci, 2013. [207 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: See especially the chapters by Stefano Bacin (Kant: ragioni e limiti del costruttivismo morale) and Bagnoli (Il ruolo epistemico delle norme costitutive).

Baiasu, Roxana. “Heidegger and Kant. Space, Time and the Problem of Objectivity.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 541-52. [M]

Baiasu, Sorin. “The Deontic Force of the Formula of Universal Law.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 41-50. [M]

 ——. “Introduction: Practical Justification in Kant.” Kant on Practical Justification. Eds. Mark Timmons and Sorin Baiasu (op cit.). 1-21. [M]

 ——. “Kant’s Rechtfertigung and the Epistemic Character of Practical Justification.” Kant on Practical Justification. Eds. Mark Timmons and Sorin Baiasu (op cit.). 22-41. [M]

 ——. Rev. of Self-Improvement: An Essay in Kantian Ethics, by Robert N. Johnson (2011). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (Apr 2013, #20). [M] [online]

 ——, ed. See: Timmons, Mark, and Sorin Baiasu, eds.

Baile, Giovanni Pietro. “Die Ausgangsfrage von Kants übergangsprojekt und die reflektierende Urteilskraft.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 1. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 451-64. [M]

Bailey, Tom. “Kant’s Perpetual Peace: Against Moralising Readings.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 4. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 577-88. [M]

Banaszkiewicz, Artur. Między światem dostępnym zmysłom a transcendencją: Kanta krytyka rozumu jako próba nowego ufundowania metafizyki. Łódź: Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, 2013. [416 p.] [WC]

Bandyopadhyay, Tirthanath. Three Essays on Morality: Kant, Mill, Rawls. Kolkata: Ebang Mushayera, 2013. [120 p.] [WC]

Banham, Gary. “Regulative Principles and Regulative Ideas.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 15-24. [M]

 ——. Rev. of Kant’s Observations and Remarks: A Critical Guide, ed. by Susan Meld Shell and Richard Velkley (2012). British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21.2 (2013): 409-12. [M]

 ——. Rev. of Essays on Kant, by Henry Allison (2012). British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21.3 (2013): 619-23. [PW]

Barale, Massimo. “Kant e le filosofie della mente.” [Italian] Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 5. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 665-78. [M]

Baratta, Joseph Preston. “The Complementarity of the Thinking of Kant and Hamilton in the United States.” Immanuel Kant and Alexander Hamilton, the Founders of Federalism. Ed. Roberto Castaldi (op cit.). 253-69. [M]

Barkhatkov Anton S. “Maimon’s critique of I. Kant’s theory of analytic judgements.” [Russian] Kantovsky Sbornik 45.3 (2013): 7-15. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article deals with Maimon’s critical reinterpretation of Kant’s theory of analytic judgments. Maimon contributed to the history of the German Idealism primarily through his criticism of Kant’s theoretical philosophy, which largely predetermined some ideas of Fichte and later exerted a certain influence on the thinkers of some very different schools (from Marburg Neo-Kantianism to Deleuze). Maimon’s attitude toward Kant’s views on the nature of analytic judgments underwent an essential change in the process of his theoretical evolution: while in “Essay on Transcendental Philosophy” (1790) he had generally agreed with the definitions given to them by Kant, in “Essay Towards a New Logic or Theory of Thought” (1794) he already accomplished a detailed criticism of Kant’s differentiation between analytic and synthetic judgments. According to Maimon, the definition given to analytic judgments by Kant deprived these judgments of the status of thinking at all, since it reduced them to the extraction of something, which the thinking had already ins erted in to the concept, from the same concept. Maimon proposed his own formulation of the difference between analytic and synthetic judgments, based on his theory of a real cognition as of a connection of a definable (subject) and a definition (predicate). According to this formulation, he defined analytic judgments as the ones in which thinking proceeded from a given definite to the definable that is contained in it. Therefore in his philosophy analytic judgments became full-fledged cognitive acts, which differed from the synthetic ones only in that they provided cognition not of some new objects, but of the ones which had already been thought of. Thereby Maimon substantially broadened the area of analytic judgments at the cost of the synthetic ones, which ultimately allowed him to reinterpret the relation of the formal and transcendental logic, and also to subject the formal logic itself to a thorough revision.

Baron, Marcia. “Friendship, Duties Regarding Specific Conditions of Persons, and the Virtues of Social Intercourse (TL 6:468-474).” Kant’s Tugendlehre. Eds. Trampota, Sensen, and Timmermann (op cit.). 365-82. [M]

 ——. “Moral Worth and Moral Rightness, Maxims and Actions.” Reading Onora O’Neill. Ed. David Archard, Monique Deveaux, Neil Manson, and Daniel Weinstock (op cit.). 11-16. [M]

Barry, Melissa. “Constructivist Practical Reasoning and Objectivity.” Reading Onora O’Neill. Ed. David Archard, Monique Deveaux, Neil Manson, and Daniel Weinstock (op cit.). 17-36. [M]

Barthelmé, Bruno. “Esthétique et théologie. Quel édifice religieux pour la «véritable Église visible»?” Kant, théologie et religion. Ed. Robert Theis (op cit.). 297-307. [M]

Basile, Giovanni Pietro. Kants Opus Postumum und Seine Rezeption. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2012. [xv, 536 p.] [PW] [contents]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Kantstudien Ergänzungshefte, vol. 175.

 ——. “Die Ausgangsfrage von Kants Übergangsprojekt und die reflektierende Urteilskraft.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 1. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 451-63. [M]

Bassoli, Selma Aparecida. “Le mal radical et la grâce.” Kant, théologie et religion. Ed. Robert Theis (op cit.). 253-60. [M]

Battaglia, Fiorella. “Phänomenales Bewusstsein bei Kant.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 4. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 367-78. [M]

Baum, Manfred. “Prior Concepts of the Metaphysics of Morals (MS 6:221-228).” Kant’s Tugendlehre. Eds. Trampota, Sensen, and Timmermann (op cit.). 113-37. [M]

 ——. “Sittengesetz und Freiheit. Kant 1785 und 1788.” Kants Rechtfertigung des Sittengesetzes in Grundlegung III: Deduktion oder Faktum? Ed. Heiko Puls (op cit.). 209-26. [PW]

 ——. “Freiheit und Recht bei Kant.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 1. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 73-92. [M]

 ——. “Herder über Kants ‘Verfehlte Kritik der reinen Vernunft’.” Herders “Metakritik”: Analysen und Interpretationen. Ed. Marion Heinz (op cit.). 209-28. [M]

 ——. “Burkhard Tuschling (1937–2012)” Kant-Studien 104.2 (2013): 141-44. [M]

Baum, Tomas. “How the Critical Achievements Inform the Idea of Eternal Peace.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 4. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 589-600. [M]

Baumgarten, Alexander. Metaphysics. A Critical Translation with Kant’s Elucidations, Selected Notes, and Related Materials. Translated and edited with an introduction by Courtney D. Fugate and John Hymers. London: Bloomsbury, 2013. [xvii, 471 p.] [M]

Beade, Ileana Paola. “En torno al sentido epistémico de la distinción crítica entre lo sensible y lo inteligible. Un análisis de la doctrina kantiana del doble carácter” [Spanish; On the epistemic sense of the critical distinction between the sensible and the intelligible. An analysis of the Kantian doctrine of the double character] Studia Kantiana 11.14 (2013): 100-26. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper analyzes the Kantian distinction between the empirical character and the intelligible character in relation to the distinction between appearance and thing-in-itself, with the aim of showing that both distinctions are epistemic in nature, and not ontological. The analysis of both distinctions will allow us to see that none of the terms opposed in each of them has ontological primacy over the other, which provides us with conceptual elements for a solid defense of the epistemic interpretation of Transcendental Idealism. We shall see, however, that the reference within the double character doctrine to the specific case of human actions does not allow us to interpret that doctrine as a mere projection of the appearance / thing-in-itself distinction, since in this case we cannot affirm that the intelligible dimension of Human beings can be reduced to that which remains when we consider their empirical dimension disregarding the conditions of our sensible representation.

 ——. “El concepto kantiano de voluntad pública y su relación con la noción rousseauniana de voluntad general.” [Spanish] Estudos Kantianos 1.2 (2013): 59-83. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper I analyze the concept of a public will formulated in Kant’s Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre (1797), with the aim of considering its connection with the notion of a general will presented by Rousseau in Du contrat social (1762). The analysis and reconstruction of the Kantian argument concerning the demand for a representation or personification of the public will in the figure of a Head of State will allow us to reflect on a doctrinal aspect which not only appears to establish an irreducible distance between both philosophers but also has an impact in the Kantian treatment of important political and juridical issues (particularly, in his impugnation of the Right of Resistance [Widerstandsrecht]).

 ——. “The thing-in-itself and its role in the constitution of objectivity: a critical reading of Onof’s reconstruction of transcendental affection.” Studi Kantiani 26 (2013): 107-24. [PW]

Beckenkamp, Joãosinho. “Kant e a analogia teleológica nos primórdios da biologia.” [Portuguese; Kant and teleological analogy in the beginnings of biology] Kant e-Prints 8.1 (2013): 40-70. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper applies results of my earlier paper, already published in Kant e-prints, on Kant’s methodological rescue of analogical procedures, continuing an ongoing research on analogy and simbolism in Kant’s critical philosophy. Main issue is to clarify how analogy is operational in teleological explanations used to understand nature. Three instances were identified, and are analysed in these paper, viz., analogy in sustaining a subjective finality of nature vis-à-vis our search for systematical unity, analogy in the reflexion on objective teleology observed in the capacity of species to adequate to environment and analogy in the reflexion on objective and material teleology of organized beings as natural ends.

Beever, Allan. “Kant on the Law of Marriage.” Kantian Review 18.3 (2013): 339-62. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The account of marriage Kant presents in the Rechtslehre strikes most readers as cold, legalistic and obsessed with sex. It seems to ignore at least nearly all of the morally valuable aspects of marriage. Consequently, most have felt that this is a feature of Kant's theory best ignored. Against this view, this article argues that Kant's focus is appropriate, that his understanding of marriage is much more romantic than is commonly thought and that it presents a thought-provoking alternative to the picture of marriage found in the modern law.

Belás, Ľubomír. Kant a Machiavelli: historicko-filozofická analýza a komparácia. Prešov: Filozofická fakulta Prešovskej univerzity v Prešove, 2013. [125 p.] [WC]

 ——, and Ľudmila Belásová. “Kultúrno-výchovný aspekt Kantovej filozofie dejín.” [Slovak; Cultural and Educational Aspect of Kant’s Philosophy of History] Studia Philosophica Kantiana 2013.2 (2013): 63-74. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The present article discusses some basic aspects of Kant’s concept of philosophy of history which is considered by many authors as legitimate and at the same time a topical part of his philosophical-theoretical legacy. The basic thought axis is located within Kant’s philosophy of history with a possible indication of its forms and functions. In this connection, the issue of culture and education in the context of the idea of cosmopolitanism is thematised in particular.

Belásová, Ľudmila. See: Belás, Ľubomír, and Ľudmila Belásová.

Bellotti, Luca. “A Neo-Kantian Approach in the Philosophy of Mathematics.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 5. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 3-6. [M]

Belov, Vladimir. “The foundations of I. Kant’s and V. Solovyov’s moral philosophies .” [Russian] Kantovsky Sbornik 45.3 (2013): 16-23. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The grounds of construction of ethical systems of Kant and Solovjev are comparatively tested in this article. Noting the obvious strenghts of Kant’s ethics, Solovjev finds, that because of its absolute formalism it doesn’t have the complete implementation in the objective world. Solovjev also sees as unsuccessful Kant’s attempt at overcoming subjectivism in the moral sphere. In Solovjev’s opinion, Kant’s postulates of practical reason don’t overcome subjectivism, but bring to the foundation of Kant’s ethic the double meaning and uncertainty. The author notes, that for all his respect to Kant’s ethic, Russian philosopher constructs ethic on his own principles. In the foundation of his moral philosophy Solovjev puts down the idea of Good, characterizing it as lawful, autonomous and all-united (vseedinoje). Solovjev proposes to regard the feelings of shame, pity and reverence as the primary data of human moral, disregarding the warnings of Kant about the unacceptability of natural foundations for our morals. Such distinction in the primary data of human moral of the concerned authors reposes on distinction in appraisal of human primary nature: Kant considers it as evil, Solovjev — as good. Thus, in contrast to I. Kant V. Solovjev affirms the heteronomy of morals and its religiousness, which, however, has little in common with Christianity.

Berg, Hein van den. “The Wolffian Roots of Kant’s Teleology.” Studies in History & Philosophy of Biological & Biomedical Sciences 44.4 (2013): 724-34. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Highlights: Highlights the importance of Wolffian teleology for understanding — Kant’s teleology. — Wolffian teleology and physiology are based on theology. — Rationalist philosophers could not reconcile teleology with eighteenth-century biology. — Kant demarcated biology and theology. — Kant attempted to reconcile teleology with eighteenth-century biology.

 ——. “Wolff and Kant on Scientific Demonstration and Mechanical Explanation.” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 95.2 (2013): 178-205. [HIC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper analyzes Immanuel Kant’s views on mechanical explanation on the basis of Christian Wolff’s idea of scientific demonstration. Kant takes mechanical explanations to explain properties of wholes in terms of their parts. I reconstruct the nature of such explanations by showing how part-whole conceptualizations in Wolff’s logic and metaphysics shape the ideal of a proper and explanatory scientific demonstration. This logico-philosophical background elucidates why Kant construes mechanical explanations as ideal explanations of nature.

Berg, Jan. Die theoretische Philosophie Kants. Unter Berücksichtigung der Grundbegriffe seiner Ethik. Stuttgart frommann-holzboog, 2013. [264 p.] [WC]

Berk, Jonathan H. Rev. of Kant’s Organicism: Epigenesis and the Development of Critical Philosophy, by Jennifer Mensch (2013). Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 34.2 (2013): 487-91. [PW]

Bernhard, Thomas. Immanuel Kant. Translated into Romanian from the German by Eleonora Ringler-Pascu. Timisoara: Diacritic, 2013. [170 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This comedic play was first published by Bernhard in 1978, and first performed on 15 April 1978, directed by Claus Peymann at the Staatstheater Stuttgart (Wikipedia).

Bernstein, Alyssa R. Rev. of Kant and the End of War: A Critique of Just War Theory, by Howard Williams (2012) and Kant and Cosmopolitanism: The Philosophical Ideal of World Citizenship, by Pauline Kleingeld (2012). Ethics and International Affairs 27.3 (2013): 354-57. [PW]

Bertani, Corrado. “Equity Presumptions versus Maxim of Distributive Justice in the Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre, §§36–40.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 783-95. [M]

Binkelmann, Christoph. “(Con)sensus communis: Kants Theorie der ästhetischen Vergemeinschaftung.” Transzendenz, Praxis und Politik bei Kant. Eds. Angeli, Rentsch, Schneidereit, and Vorländer (op cit.). 23-40. [M]

Bird, Graham. The Revolutionary Kant: a Commentary on the Critique of Pure Reason. New York: Open Court, 2013. [1486 p.] [WC]

 ——. “Reply to Edward Kanterian.” Kantian Review 18.2 (2013): 289-300. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The reply to Kanterian offers a rebuttal of his central criticisms. It reaffirms the difference between Kant's arguments in the Aesthetic and at B 148-9; it rejects the alleged error of logic in Fischer's (and my) arguments; and it rejects Kanterian's reading of passages in the Preface (A xx-xxii) and of the Amphiboly. Beyond these specific points Kanterian assumes that Kant's project in the first Critique cannot be understood as a ‘descriptive metaphysics’ and so begs the question at issue.

 ——. Rev. of The Cambridge Companion to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, ed. by Paul Guyer (2010). Kantian Review 18.1 (2013): 137-43. [M]

Bird-Pollan, Stefan. “Kant, Genius and Moral Development.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 4. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 601-10. [M]

Blackmann, Larry Lee. “Kant and Dembski on Intelligent Design, Artistic Wisdom, and the Problem of Theodicy.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 823-33. [M]

Blaszke, Marek. “Projekt wiecznego pokoju: de Saint-Pierre, Rousseau, Kant.” [Polish] Sofia 13 (2013): 93-108. [WC]

Blazan, Sladja. “Immanuel Kant’s ‘One Great Republic’ – From Spirit Theory to Moral Philosophy.” Discovering the Human: Life Science and the Arts in the Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries. Eds. Ralf Haekel and Sabine Blackmore (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2013). 69-82. [PW]

Blecher, Ian S. “Kant on Formal Modality.” Kant-Studien 104.1 (2013): 44-62. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: I propose to explain Kant’s novel claim, in the Critique of Pure Reason, that all judgments have a formal modality. I begin by distinguishing the modality of a judgment’s form from the modality of its content, and I suggest that the former is peculiar in merely affecting the subject’s understanding of his own act of judging. I then contrast the modal account of such an understanding (in terms of the possibility and actuality of a judgment) with the traditional, non-modal understanding of it (in terms of the giving and withholding of assent). I conclude by suggesting that Kant prefers the former because he conceives of knowledge on Aristotle’s model: as a progress in the mind from capacity to act.

Blok, Johan. “The Analogies of Experience as Premises of the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 5. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 7-18. [M]

 ——. “Können wir den ursprünglichen Raum erkennen?” Das Leben der Vernunft: Beiträge zur Philosophie Kants. Eds. Dieter Hüning, Stefan Klingner, and Carsten Olk (op cit.). 30-39. [M]

Blomme, Henny. “Dieu en vue du système. Le statut de l'«ens summum» dans l'Opus postumum de Kant.” Kant, théologie et religion. Ed. Robert Theis (op cit.). 107-16. [M]

 ——. “Können wir den ursprünglichen Raum erkennen?” Das Leben der Vernunft: Beiträge zur Philosophie Kants. Eds. Dieter Hüning, Stefan Klingner, and Carsten Olk (op cit.). 30-29. [M]

 ——. “On Kiyoshi Chiba’s Kants Ontologie der raumzeitlichen Wirklichkeit.” Critique (blog posted: 12 Sep 2013) n.p. [PW] [online]

Blöser, Claudia. “Grade der Tugend und Rigorismus.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 51-62. [M]

Bochicchio, Vincenzo. “Criticism and Neurosciences. Doctrines of Space as a Practice of Cosmopolitanism in Between ‘Two Cultures’.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 25-36. [M]

Bojanowski, Jochen. “Evil by Nature.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 63-74. [M]

 ——. “Kants Disjunktivismus in GMS 446f.” Kants Rechtfertigung des Sittengesetzes in Grundlegung III: Deduktion oder Faktum? Ed. Heiko Puls (op cit.). 189-208. [PW]

Bonaccini, Juan A. “On Kant’s Concept of Analogy.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 37-52. [M]

Bondeli, Martin. “Möglichkeit der Erfahrung.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 5. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 679-90. [M]

 ——. “‘Ohn’ alle Erfahrung’: Herders Kritik an Kants Formalismus.” Herders “Metakritik”: Analysen und Interpretationen. Ed. Marion Heinz (op cit.). 105-25. [M]

Borges, Maria de Lourdes. “Kant on Emotions and Williams’ Criticism.” Veritas 58.1 (2013): 131-50. [WC] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Bernard Williams blames Kant’s morality for a crucial flaw in contemporary ethics. In Problems of the Self, he claims that British philosophers limit themselves to acknowledging emotions as a potentially destructive component for morality and consistency.1 In opposition to it, he struggles to dismiss several Kantian views about emotions, such as the one according to which emotions are supposed to be only a product of natural causation, as well as too capricious and passively experienced. I shall show that Kant has a place for emotions in his moral theory. However, he asserts that we can act morally without any sensible incentive. I show that Williams and Kant have different models concerning moral motivation and that Kant does not agree with Williams’ claim that “Only motivations motivate”, since moral law could trigger a moral action without any sensible motive.

Botez, Angela. “Kantianismul în filosofia dreptului. Mircea Djuvara.” [Romanian; Kantianism in Philosophy of Law. Mircea Djuvara] Revista de Filosofie 60.4 (2013): 361-80. [RC]

Bouriau, Christophe. Le comme si: Kant, Vaihinger et le fictionalisme. Paris: Éd. du Cerf, 2013. [245 p.] [WC]

Brague, Rémi. “Kant et la tentation gnostique.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 1. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 93-105. [M]

Braider, Christopher. “Groping in the Dark: Aesthetics and Ontology in Diderot and Kant.” Word & Image 29.1 (2013): 105-27. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The essay develops the implicit dialogue between the aesthetic theories of Denis Diderot and Immanuel Kant. The key to the dialogue is recognition of the underlying ontological grounds of the two philosophers’ respective systems of aesthetics and of their different yet related reasons for turning to aesthetics in the first place. I argue that we reach a deeper grasp of what at once links and opposes Diderot and Kant by unpacking the ontological as well as aesthetic stakes of Michael Fried’s classic portrayal of the rise of an aesthetic of “absorption” in eighteenth-century France — a phenomenon to which Fried’s central period guide is the new-model art writing featured in Diderot’s Salons. Where Fried interprets the “absorptive” pictorial effects of painters like Chardin, Greuze, or Vernet as laying the ontological foundation of modern art, the author claims that the prior condition for this transformation lies in the ontology of the modern itself as a whole. The consequences of this revision of Fried’s insight are then worked out by linking Diderot’s Salon criticism to the metaphysics of sense perception articulated in the Lettre sur les aveugles, and both to the way the contrast between scientific “limits” and metaphysical “bounds” in Kant’s Prolegomena illuminates the German’s motives for the aesthetic turn he takes in the Critique of Judgment. The result is to show that Diderot and Kant represent twin horns of the same historical dilemma addressed less from antithetical than from dialectically complementary sides.

Brandhorst, Mario. “Über das Recht, aus Menschenliebe zu lügen.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 75-86. [M]

Brandom, Robert. “From German Idealism to American Pragmatism – and Back.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 1. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 107-25. [M]

 ——, and Francesco Lanzillotti. “Kant and philosophy in a cosmopolitan sense: Kant's normative turn and its hegelian development. An interview by Francesco Lanzillotti.” Studi Kantiani 26 (2013): 17-26. [PW]

Brandt, Reinhard. “Kants ewiger Friede als Natur- und Vernunftzweck.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 1. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 127-45. [M]

 ——. “Ein neues Kant-Blatt.” Kant-Studien 104.1 (2013): 13-15. [M]

 ——. “Zu Eckart Försters Die 25 Jahre der Philosophie. Eine systematische Rekonstruktion.” Kant-Studien 104.3 (2013): 367-85. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Although Eckart Förster’s work contains many advanced scholarly accounts, it also has weaknesses. As Förster’s central attempt to make Goethe a Spinozan unfortunately ended in failure, we must recur to previous research (e.g. that of Albrecht Schöne). The same holds for several of the interpretations of Kant.

Breitenbach, Angela. “Beauty in Proofs: Kant on Aesthetics in Mathematics.” European Journal of Philosophy (pre-print online, posted 16 Apr 2013). [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: It is a common thought that mathematics can be not only true but also beautiful, and many of the greatest mathematicians have attached central importance to the aesthetic merit of their theorems, proofs and theories. But how, exactly, should we conceive of the character of beauty in mathematics? In this paper I suggest that Kant's philosophy provides the resources for a compelling answer to this question. Focusing on §62 of the ‘Critique of Aesthetic Judgment’, I argue against the common view that Kant's aesthetics leaves no room for beauty in mathematics. More specifically, I show that on the Kantian account beauty in mathematics is a non-conceptual response felt in light of our own creative activities involved in the process of mathematical reasoning. The Kantian proposal I thus develop provides a promising alternative to Platonist accounts of beauty widespread among mathematicians. While on the Platonist conception the experience of mathematical beauty consists in an intellectual insight into the fundamental structures of the universe, according to the Kantian proposal the experience of beauty in mathematics is grounded in our felt awareness of the imaginative processes that lead to mathematical knowledge. The Kantian account I develop thus offers to elucidate the connection between aesthetic reflection, creative imagination and mathematical cognition.

 ——. “Kant on Biology and the Experience of Life.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 5. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 19-29. [M]

 ——. Rev. of Kant’s Construction of Nature: A Reading of the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, by Michael Friedman (2013). Times Literary Supplement (29 November 2013): 36. [PI]

Briesen, Jochen. “Is Kant (W)right? - On Kant’s Regulative Ideas and Wright’s Entitlements.” Kant Yearbook: Kant and Contemporary Theory of Knowledge 5 (2013): 1-32. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper discusses a structural analogy between Kant’s theory of regulative ideas, as he develops it in the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic, and Crispin Wright’s theory of epistemic entitlements. First, I argue that certain exegetical difficulties with respect to the Appendix rest on serious systematic problems, which - given other assumptions of the Critique of Pure Reason - Kant is unable to solve. Second, I argue that because of the identified structural analogy between Kant’s and Wright’s views the project Kant pursues in the Appendix can be rehabilitated by recourse to Wright’s theory.

Brock, Lothar. “The legitimation and criticism of violence in international law. A political science perspective.” [Russian; translated from the German] Kantovsky Sbornik 46.4 (2013): 30-41. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article considers the practice of justification of arbitrary use of force, which poses a paradox and was not foreseen in Kant’s peace project. It is paradoxical because modern international law — unlike classical law — is aimed not at regulating wars but maintaining peace. However, the UN Charter provides for the right to self-defence before the collective resolution is adopted. Despite rather strict legal restrictions and international court procedures, cases of abuse of this right occur on a frightening scale. A considerable threat is posed by that it is ‘indirect’ self-defence manifested in interventions, be it ‘humanitarian’ interventions to protect a diaspora (human rights) or the fight for the sphere of influence (in the name of sovereignty) wellknown since the Cold War. Thus, both variants considered by Kant proved to be vulnerable; the ambiguities, which were almost unnoticeable in his ban on intervention, have come to the fore. An attempt was made to justify humanitarian intervention through the ban to use force for the purposes contradicting the goals of the UN Charter, whereas human rights protection is one of them. Thus, any formulation of conditions for admissible violence can be used for its justification, since exceptions come hand in hand with rules. This article considers the advantages and disadvantages of the concept of “responsibility to protect”, which proves to be dominant today. The author also poses the question about the transition to a new focus of international law — from maintaining peace to meeting social requirements.

 ——. “Kants Friedensplan und die heutige Debatte über den ‘Demokratischen Frieden’.” Kant’s Project of Perpetual Peace in the Context of Contemporary Politics. Eds. Andrey Zilber and Alexei Salikov (op cit.). 101-3. [M]

Brown, Garrett Wallace. Grounding Cosmopolitanism: from Kant to the Idea of a Cosmopolitan Constitution. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013. [xiii, 234 p.] [WC]

Brucher, Rosemarie. Subjektermächtigung und Naturunterwerfung: künstlerische Selbstverletzung im Zeichen von Kants Ästhetik des Erhabenen. Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, 2013. [280 p.] [WC]

Brumlik, Micha. “Religion und Intersubjektivität — Hermann Cohens Ethik.” Kant und die Biblische Offenbarungsreligion / Kant a biblické Zjevené Náboženství. Eds. Norbert Fischer, Jakub Sirovátka, and David Voprada (op cit.). 123-36. [M]

Bryushinkin, Vladimir N. “The Transcendental Synthesis of World Models in Intellectual Systems.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 5. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 691-702. [M]

Bubbio, Paolo. “Kant on Nativism, Scepticism and Necessity.” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 73.2 (2013): 97-115. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper addresses the role of the notion of sacrifice in Kant’s theoretical philosophy, practical philosophy, and in his account of religion. First, I argue that kenotic sacrifice, or sacrifice as ‘withdrawal’, plays a hidden and yet important role in the development of Kant’s transcendental philosophy. Second, I focus on Kant’s practical philosophy, arguing that the notion of sacrifice that is both implied and explicitly analyzed by Kant is mainly suppressive sacrifice. However, Kant’s account is fundamentally ambiguous, as sometimes the kenotic meaning of sacrifice seems to resurface, especially in the context of Kant’s discussion of the happiness of others as an end in itself. Because religious notions are regarded by Kant as necessary transitional forms (Darstellungen) to be used to make moral ideas applicable to the world, I then scrutinize Kant’s view of sacrifice as an improper symbol, and I analyze Kant’s arguments for such a dismissal and discuss the subject matter in recent literature. Finally, I examine the role of sacrifice in Kant’s account of Christ as the prototype of pure moral disposition. I conclude by arguing that Kant indeed grasped the importance of including kenotic dynamics in practical philosophy but was somehow unable or unwilling to integrate it into the formal grounding of his ethics. This tension, however, effectively provides an entry point for features that can be found in the post-Kantians.

 ——. “Kant’s Sacrificial Turns.” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 73.2 (2013): 97-115. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper addresses the role of the notion of sacrifice in Kant’s theoretical philosophy, practical philosophy, and in his account of religion. First, I argue that kenotic sacrifice, or sacrifice as ‘withdrawal’, plays a hidden and yet important role in the development of Kant’s transcendental philosophy. Second, I focus on Kant’s practical philosophy, arguing that the notion of sacrifice that is both implied and explicitly analyzed by Kant is mainly suppressive sacrifice. However, Kant’s account is fundamentally ambiguous, as sometimes the kenotic meaning of sacrifice seems to resurface, especially in the context of Kant’s discussion of the happiness of others as an end in itself. Because religious notions are regarded by Kant as necessary transitional forms (Darstellungen) to be used to make moral ideas applicable to the world, I then scrutinize Kant’s view of sacrifice as an improper symbol, and I analyze Kant’s arguments for such a dismissal and discuss the subject matter in recent literature. Finally, I examine the role of sacrifice in Kant’s account of Christ as the prototype of pure moral disposition. I conclude by arguing that Kant indeed grasped the importance of including kenotic dynamics in practical philosophy but was somehow unable or unwilling to integrate it into the formal grounding of his ethics. This tension, however, effectively provides an entry point for features that can be found in the post-Kantians.

Bunch, Aaron. “The Body as Instrument and as ‘Person’ in Kant’s Moral Philosophy.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 87-96. [M]

Buroker, Jill Vance. Rev. of How is Nature Possible?: Kant’s Project in the First Critique, by Daniel N. Robinson (2012). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (Jan 2013, #31). [M] [online]

Busch, Werner. “Philosophie lernen — ein realistisches Weltprogramm?” Das Leben der Vernunft: Beiträge zur Philosophie Kants. Eds. Dieter Hüning, Stefan Klingner, and Carsten Olk (op cit.). 751-63. [M]

[top] C    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Cacciatore, Giuseppe. Problemi di filosofia della storia nell'età di Kant e Hegel: filologia, critica, storia civile. [Italian] Roma: Aracne, 2013. [169 p.] [WC]

Cachel, Andrea. “A noção de "regra" na segunda analogia e a "resposta" kantiana ao problema humeano da indução.” [Portuguese; The notion of "rule" in the second analogy and the Kantian "response" to the Humean problem of induction] Kant e-Prints 8.2 (2013): 22-42. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article intends to discuss the notion of ruleinvolved in the Kantian "response" exposed in the Second Analogy of the Critique of Pure Reason to the problems presented by Hume on induction. Particularly, this analysis is focused on the investigation on the extention of the same-causes-same-effectsprinciple of deduction postulated by Kant to the every-event-some-causeprinciple, from what it means to follow a ruleas a presupposition of the possibility to determine the irreversibility of the order of a given temporal sequence. Specially, this research intends to approach the concerning theme aboutthe possible methods by which the Kantian philosophy can confer legitimacy for the principle of same-causes-same-effects, without resorting to the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic and to the Critique of the Power of Judgment. This article will focus on two distinct propositions, namely those presented by Friedman (1992) and Longenesse (2005; p.143-183; 1993; p.167-197). Then, respectively, the text exposes a difference between the comprehension of that successive states are determined, themselves, by universal causal laws that represents a unified system of Nature and of the vision by which the perception of these sequences, while involving regularities from whichemerges the irreversibility, it is product of a judgment of experience that assumes the construction of causal rules by the subsumption of the diverse to the category of cause.

Cafagna, Emanuele. “Die zwei neuen metaphysischen Grundsätze der Nova Dilucidatio und die Definition der Philosophie.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 1. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 465-77. [M]

Caimi, Mario. “Das Schema der Qualität bzw. der Realität.” Das Leben der Vernunft: Beiträge zur Philosophie Kants. Eds. Dieter Hüning, Stefan Klingner, and Carsten Olk (op cit.). 95-108. [M]

 ——. “La imaginación en la Antropología en sentido pragmático. Estructura del texto y estructura del concepto.” [Spanish; Imagination in Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. Structure of the Text and of the Concept] La razón y sus fines. Eds. Rosemary Rizo-Patrón de Lerner and María Jesús Vázquez Leibeiras (op cit.). 29-53. [M]

 ——. “Der Gegenstand, der nach der Lehre vom Schematismus unter die Kategorien zu subsumieren ist.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 1. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 147-62. [M]

 ——. “The Schema of the Category of Existence.” Objectivity after Kant. Eds. Gertrudis Van De Vijver and Boris Demarest (op cit.). 209-19. [M]

Calabi, Lorenzo. “Filosofia della storia in Kant e Schiller. Riflessioni su di un confronto.” [Italian] Schiller lettore di Kant. Eds. Alberto L. Siani and Gabriele Tomasi (op cit.). 239-62. [M]

Callanan, John J. Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: An Edinburgh Philosophical Guide. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013. [vii, 138 p.] [M]

 ——. “Kant on Nativism, Scepticism and Necessity.” Kantian Review 18.1 (2013): 1-27. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant criticizes the so-called ‘preformation’ hypothesis – a nativist account of the origin of the categories — at the end of the B-Deduction on the ground that it entails scepticism. I examine the historical context of Kant’s criticism, and identify the targets as both Crusius and Leibniz. There are two claims argued for in this paper: first, that attending to the context of the opposition to certain forms of nativism affords a way of understanding Kant’s commitment to the so-called ‘discursivity thesis’, by contrasting the possession conditions for the categories with those for innate ideas; secondly, it provides an insight with regard to Kant’s understanding of the dialectic with scepticism. Kant’s claim is that a certain explanatory lacuna that attaches to Humean empiricism can be seen to apply equally to any nativist theory. The lacuna concerns the explanation of the modal purport of a priori necessity, i.e., how it is that our consciousness can even distinguish contents that are represented as necessary features of objects.

 ——. “Kant on Innate Ideas. Another Look at B 167–168.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 53-64. [M]

Callender, Lenval A. “Puzzle Maxims and the Formula of Universal Law.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 97-107. [M]

Camera, Francesco. “„Sich der heiligen Urkunde als Karte bedienen“. Über die Anfänge der Bibelauslegung bei Kant.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 835-46. [M]

Campagna, Norbert. “De la religion comme objet d'un devoir envers soi-même.” Kant, théologie et religion. Ed. Robert Theis (op cit.). 195-205. [M]

Cannon, Joseph. “Why Does a Child Cry at Birth without Tears? Kant on Freedom and Radical Evil in Infancy.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 4. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 379-88. [M]

Cannon, Patrick. “Kant at the Bar. Transcendental Idealism in Daily Life.” Philosophy Now Mar/Apr (2013): 15-17. [HIC]

Cantillo, Giuseppe. “Ragione e Sentimento nella filosofia della religione di Kant.” [Italian] Sentire e pensare: tra Kant e Husserl. Eds. Maria Teresa Catena and Anna Donise (op cit.). 13-23. [M]

Capozzi, Mirella. “The Quantity of Judgments and the Categories of Quantity. A Problem in the Metaphysical Deduction.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 65-75. [M]

Caranti, Luigi. “What’s Wrong With a Guarantee of Perpetual Peace?” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 4. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 611-22. [M]

 ——. “Perpetual Peace and Liberal Peace: Three Misunderstandings.” Kant’s Project of Perpetual Peace in the Context of Contemporary Politics. Eds. Andrey Zilber and Alexei Salikov (op cit.). 103-13. [M]

 ——. “Two Faces of Republicanism: Rousseau and Kant.” Estudos Kantianos 1.2 (2013): 129-44. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The relation between Rousseau’s and Kant’s political philosophies has attracted the attention of different generations of scholars. This is hardly surprising not only because of the stature of the two philosophers, but also because they offer two similar and perhaps complementary versions of republicanism. Despite the abundance of studies, however, the impression is that the real similarities and the real differences between the two philosophers have not been fully grasped. On points that Rousseau and Kant are traditionally cited for their philosophical distance, this paper argues a much closer proximity. In addition, areas considered overlapping are highlighted as points of genuine disagreement. Three theses of the first kind (apparent dissimilarities) and three theses of the second kind (apparent similarities) are offered as examples. The paper thus naturally falls in two parts and six sections. In the first part, we discuss the following apparent dissimilarities: a) Rousseau’s idea that sovereignty cannot be divided vs Kant’s idea that the republican state must be founded on the division of powers, b) Rousseau’s dismissal of representative government in favour of direct democracy vs Kant’s harsh criticism of democracy, c) Rousseau’s allegedly illiberal idea of “forcing individuals to be free” vs Kant’s liberal commitment to the protection of individuals’ pre-political rights. In the second part, we analyze the following apparent similarities: a) Rousseau’s and Kant’s allegedly identical notions of moral freedom/autonomy, b) their accounts of the reasons why individuals “ought to” leave the state of nature, often considered as nearly indistinguishable, c) the notion of general will seemingly borrowed by Kant from Rousseau without significant modifications. The overall analysis should serve to draw two different, yet complementary faces of republicanism. The composition of the two faces construes a position in political philosophy halfway between standard republicanism and standard liberalism that may have some value on its own terms.

Carel, Havi, Darian Meacham, and Alison Assiter. “Kant and Kierkegaard on Freedom and Evil.” Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 72 (2013): 275-96. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant and Kierkegaard are two philosophers who are not usually bracketed together. Yet, for one commentator, Ronald Green, in his book Kierkegaard and Kant: The Hidden Debt, a deep similarity between them is seen in the centrality both accord to the notion of freedom. Kierkegaard, for example, in one of his Journal entries, expresses a ‘passion’ for human freedom. Freedom is for Kierkegaard also linked to a paradox that lies at the heart of thought. In Philosophical Fragment Kierkegaard writes about the ‘paradox of thought’: ‘the paradox is the passion of thought […] the thinker without the paradox is like the lover without the passion.’

Carl, Wolfgang. “Kants kopernikanische Wende.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 1. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 163-77. [M]

 ——. “The Copernican Turn and Stroud’s Argument from Indispensability.” Self, World, and Art: Metaphysical Topics in Kant and Hegel. Ed. Dina Emundts (op cit.). 79-92. [M]

Carrano, Antonio. “A chi è rivolta la filosofia in senso cosmopolitico?” [Italian] Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 1. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 479-90. [M]

Carrasco Conde, Ana. “La cara B de la razón u otra vuelta (schellingiana) de tuerca (kantiana).” [Spanish] Estudos Kantianos 1.1 (2013): 227-42. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The text presents the development and reformulation of some of the elements of the Kantian philosophy in Schelling’s philosophy, to draw the line that links Kant with Freud and with Lacan. Schelling tried to go, his way, beyond Kant to expose the cracks of the Kantian building throught which he should go more deeply to recount the real ground of the system and to point out the indivisible remainder that stay in the subject.

Carrillo Canán, Alberto J. L., and Débora A Vázquez Reyes. Kant y la obra de arte. [Spanish] Puebla, Pue.: Benemérita Universidad Autónoma, 2013. [137 p.] [WC]

Carvalho Chagas, Flávia. “Normatividade moral?” [Portuguese; Moral normativity?] Studia Kantiana 11.15 (2013): 121-34. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract:This article intends to offer reasonable arguments for the thesis that one of the characteristic aspects of ethics or moral philosophy is to provide normative criteria of evaluation and moral motivation. Thus, Kant's ethics and the various contemporary theoretical currents that claim to rehabilitate, somehow, the spirit of Kant’s moral philosophy, will serve as the lead of this research according as that such theories seek to answer the classic question asked from the moral conscience of agent: “what should I do?”

Casado Méndez, Rubén. “Sobre el estatuto anómalo de la tercera antinomia.” [Spanish; On the Anomalous Status of the Third Antinomy] La razón y sus fines. Eds. Rosemary Rizo-Patrón de Lerner and María Jesús Vázquez Leibeiras (op cit.). 55-73. [M]

Castaldi, Roberto, ed. Immanuel Kant and Alexander Hamilton, the Founders of Federalism: a political theory for our time. Brussels: Peter Lang, 2013. [308 p.] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: See essays by Massimo Mori ("Alexander Hamilton and Immanuel Kant: A Comparison of Two Federalisms," 59-70), Murray Forsyth ("The Scope and Limits of the Political: Hamilton and Kant," 71-89), Joseph Preston Baratta ("The Complementarity of the Thinking of Kant and Hamilton in the United States," 253-69), Corrado Malandrino ("The 'Invention' of Complementarity of the Federalist Thought of Kant and Hamilton in Italy," 271-301).

Castillo, Monique. “The Policy of Cosmopolitisam: From Universalism to Pluralism.” [Russian (translated from the original French)] Kantovsky Sbornik 44.2 (2013): 19-32. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article is devoted to the search for an adequate justification for the modern policy of cosmopolitism. The author maintains that the legitimation of cosmopolitism is of rather cultural than political nature. Liberal cultural pluralism based on universal political and legal principles (Kant and Rawls) proves to be insufficient. However, it provides the means to solve the problems and to avoid the extremes of cultural cosmopolitism, such as the European “negative identity”, juridification, and new modern forms of identity-centred political moralism akin to the “hyperdemocracy of the masses”.

 ——. “Der kantische Kosmopolitismus in der zeitgenössischen Kultur der Identität.” [Translated from the French by T. Börger] Kant’s Project of Perpetual Peace in the Context of Contemporary Politics. Eds. Andrey Zilber and Alexei Salikov (op cit.). 113-22. [M]

 ——. “Philosophisches Erbe Immanuel Kants und die Gegenwart. Philosophia et res publica.” Studia Philosophica Kantiana 2013.1 (2013): 3-12. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: For us, Europeans, a republic has realised in the form of a national state. But today European political governance systems deal only with individuals and the common good in the broadest sense of the word remains unnoticed. There has developed a dispute between republic (if defined by the priority put on the common good) and democracy (if defined by the priority put on individual interests), in which democracy is preferred to republic.
How can we discuss this question philosophically? There lives a double legacy in the memory of philosophers – Hegelian one and Kantian one. The first one (Hegelian) allows us to understand what cannot be reduced to national characteristics, as they are realized by the republic, as an ethical force, which is able to embody in history. The second one (Kantian) emphasizes purely rational, abstract and ideal dimension of republican model, as it wants to place the idea of republic over national characteristics towards a global criterion that is able, both legally and politically, to develop their universal validity.
The paper tries to show how the Kantian thesis, if we want it to be understood and accepted by contemporary Europeans, cannot be separated from anthropology, which gives a concrete sense to their hopes.

Cataldi Madonna, Luigi. “Zur Unmöglichkeit der logica probabilium – Kant und Fries.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 77-88. [M]

Catena, Maria Teresa. “Kant e il cosmopolitismo del sentimento.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 4. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 13-24. [M]

 ——. “Io sono dove sento: Kant e il sentimento tra riflessione antropologico-trascendentale (e ritorno).” [Italian] Sentire e pensare: tra Kant e Husserl. Eds. Maria Teresa Catena and Anna Donise (op cit.). 33-44. [M]

 —— and Anna Donise, eds. Sentire e pensare: tra Kant e Husserl. [Italian] Milano: Mimesis, 2013. [177 p.] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Content: Cantillo (Ragione e Sentimento nella filosofia della religione di Kant), Ivaldo (Sul momento ‘materiale’ della ragione pura pratica. Riflessioni sul sentimento morale nella critica della ragione pratica), Catena (Io sono dove sento: Kant e il sentimento tra riflessione antropologico-trascendentale (e ritorno)), Anzalone (Kant e la coscienza di sé), Donise (Sentire il dovere e percepire il valore. Un percorso tra Kant e Husserl), Masi (La “bilancetta” di pensiero ed esperienza. Grandezza equantità nella formazione della fenomenologia), Costa (Prima del sentire e del giudicare: la comprensione), Masullo (Laddove si dà qualcosa che sente, s’insinua la probabilità di un significato), D’Anna (‘Sentire’ l’esterno a priori. Nicolai Hartmann tra neokantismo e fenomenologia), Fimiani (Quando sappiamo cosa sentire. Credenze, retoriche ed esperienze estetiche).

Cattaneo, Fabrizio. L'idea di repubblica da Kant a Habermas, with a preface by Ermanno Vitale. Torino: Giappichelli, 2013. [xvii, 167 p.] [WC]

Cauchi, Fracesca. “Nietzsche and Kant: Self-Legislation and the Rational Will in Zarathustra’s Ethics.” Oxford German Studies 42.3 (2013): 280-95. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Friedrich Nietzsche’s wonted derision of Immanuel Kant has long-obscured striking parallels between the two philosophers’ moral thought. In this essay it will be argued that the autonomous, self-legislating, rational will is as pivotal to the ethical project at the heart of Nietzsche’s ‘Thus Spake Zarathustra’ as it is to Kantian ethics. Indeed, it will be seen just how closely Kant’s concept of the ‘good will’ can be mapped onto Zarathustra’s vision of a creative will that, through the faculty of discernment (‘Erkenntniss’) and its attendant powers of judgment and understanding, has not only the ability and the right to devise and implement new values but the discipline to obey its self-imposed, rationally-guided laws. By means of a radical re-evaluation and re-appropriation of the three Christian ‘evils’ of voluptuousness (‘Wollust’), lust for power (‘Herrschsucht’), and selfishness (‘Selbstsucht’), Zarathustra teaches how the genuinely free man can assume sovereignty over subjective motivation and direct his will towards an uncompromised and uncompromising ethical goal.

Cecchinato, Giorgia. “L'ingenuo è interessante? Riflessioni sull'ingenuo e il sentimentale a partire da alcune note riferite a Kant.” [Italian] Schiller lettore di Kant. Eds. Alberto L. Siani and Gabriele Tomasi (op cit.). 109-30. [M]

Centi, Beatrice. “Formale Ontologie und reflektierte Wahrnehmung bei Kant.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 89-101. [M]

Chaly, Vadim A. “John Rawls’ Interpretation of Categorical Imperative in Theory of Justice.” [Russian] Kantovsky Sbornik 44.2 (2013): 33-38. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: John Rawls’s interpretation of Kant’s categorical imperative is reviewed, some significant aspects of Rawls’ treatment of key notions of rationality, interests and ends are revealed, which limit the possibilities of application of Kantian ethics within Rawls’ liberal egalitarianism.

 ——, and Alexander Kuteynikov. “Kant’s Political Ideas and Contemporary Theories of International Organization.” Kant’s Project of Perpetual Peace in the Context of Contemporary Politics. Eds. Andrey Zilber and Alexei Salikov (op cit.). 123-29. [M]

Chamberlin, Heidi. “Moral Growth and Relapse: A Puzzle for Kantian Accounts of Moral Transformation.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 109-15. [M]

Chance, Brian A. “Causal Powers, Hume’s Early German Critics, and Kant’s Response to Hume.” Kant-Studien 104.2 (2013): 213-36. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Eric Watkins has argued on philosophical, textual, and historical grounds that Kant’s account of causation in the first Critique should not be read as an attempt to refute Hume’s account of causation. In this paper, I challenge the arguments for Watkins’ claim. Specifically, I argue (1) that Kant’s philosophical commitments, even on Watkins’ reading, are not obvious obstacles to refuting Hume, (2) that textual evidence from the Discipline of Pure Reason suggests Kant conceived of his account of causation as such a refutation, and (3) that none of Hume’s early German critics provided responses to this account that would have satisfied Kant. Watkins’ reading of Kant’s account of causation is thus more compatible with traditional views about Kant’s relationship to Hume than Watkins believes.

 ——. “Kant and the Discipline of Reason.” European Journal of Philosophy (pre-print online, posted 23 Dec 2013). [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant's notion of ‘discipline’ has received considerable attention from scholars of his philosophy of education, but its role in his theoretical philosophy has been largely ignored. This omission is surprising since his discussion of discipline in the first Critique is not only more extensive and expansive in scope than his other discussions but also predates them. The goal of this essay is to provide a comprehensive reading of the Discipline that emphasizes its systematic importance in the first Critique. I argue that its goal is to establish a set of rules for the use of pure reason that, if followed, will mitigate and perhaps even eliminate our tendency to make judgments about supersensible objects. Since Kant's justification for these rules relies crucially on claims he has defended in the Doctrine of Elements, I argue further that, far from being a dispensable part of the Critique as commentators have tended to claim, the Discipline is, in fact, the culmination of Kant's critique of metaphysics.

 ——. Rev. of Kant’s Observations and Remarks: A Critical Guide, ed. by Susan Meld Shell and Richard Velkley (2012). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (February 2013, #30). [M] [online]

Chandler, David H. “Kant on Prayer.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 847-58. [M]

Chen, Xunwu. “Law, Humanity, and Reason: The Chinese Debate, the Habermasian Approach, and a Kantian Outcome.” Asian Philosophy 23.1 (2013): 100-14. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper explores the subject-matter of the relationship between law and humanity, filling a significant lacuna in philosophy of law in the West today. Doing so, the paper starts with recasting the traditional Chinese conflict — in particular, the conflict between legalism and Confucianism — over law in a new light of the contemporary call for stopping crimes against humanity. It then explores Habermas’ insight into and illusion of law. Finally, it examines the internal relationship between law and humanity, contending that law must always treat humanity as an end, not as a tool to other ends, functioning to build a community of humanity; while a distinction exists between justice and benevolence, law must not be inhumane.

Chernov, Sergey A. T. “The Categorical Imperative of the Karma-Yogin.” [Russian] Kantovsky Sbornik 43.1 (2013): 23-32. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article offers a comparison of certain fundamental ethical ideas of Eastern philosophical traditions with Kant's categorical imperative aiming to corroborate the thesis about the moral unity of humanity and give a moral assessment of the state of Russian society.

Chevalier, J. M. C. “Peirce’s First Critique of the First Critique: A Leibnizian False Start.” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 49.1 (2013): 1-26. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: We argue that until the end of the 1860s, Peirce's unorthodox reading of Kant was determined by a Leibnizian background. Though a true supporter of transcendental philosophy, Peirce blurred the a priori/a posteriori and analytic/synthetic distinctions and rejected the noumenon in order to realize a synthesis of rationalist dogmatism with Kantian philosophy, because transcendental limitations did not fit his metaphysical project.

Chiba, Kiyoshi. “Précis of Kants Ontologie der raumzeitlichen Wirklichkeit.” Critique (blog posted: 12 Apr 2013) n.p. [PW] [online]

 ——. “Reply to Chris Onof.” Critique (blog posted: 13 Dec 2013) n.p. [PW] [online]

 ——. “Reply to Henny Blomme.” Critique (blog posted: 20 Dec 2013) n.p. [PW] [online]

Chignell, Andrew. “Ogilby, Milton, Canary Wine, and the Red Scorpion: Another look at Kant’s Deduction of Taste.” Self, World, and Art: Metaphysical Topics in Kant and Hegel. Ed. Dina Emundts (op cit.). 261-82. [M]

 —— and Peter Gilgen. Rev. of Neo-Kantianism in Contemporary Philosophy, ed. by Rudolf A. Makkreel and Sebastian Luft (2009). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (Jan 2013, #30). [M] [online]

Chmieliński, Maciej. “Deliberatives Rechtsetzungsverfahren als Gewährleistung der juridischen Autonomie nach Immanuel Kant.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 797-808. [M]

Cholbi, Michael. “The Constitutive Approach to Kantian Rigorism.” Ethical Theory & Moral Practice 16.3 (2013): 439-48. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Critics often charge that Kantian ethics is implausibly rigoristic: that Kantianism recognizes a set of perfect duties, encapsulated in rules such as ‘don’t lie,’ ‘keep one’s promises,’ etc., and that these rules apply without exception. Though a number of Kantians have plausibly argued that Kantianism can acknowledge exceptions to perfect duties, this acknowledgment alone does not indicate how and when such exceptions ought to be made. This article critiques a recent attempt to motivate how such exceptions are to be made, namely, the constitutive approach developed by Tamar Schapiro. I argue that the constitutive approach is vulnerable to the objection that it is too permissive, justifying many morally dubious exceptions to perfect duties. I conclude by briefly outlining an alternative ‘fine print’ approach to the rigorism objection that appears to avoid the objection leveled at Schapiro’s approach, focusing on how modifying the constituents of agents’ maxims can change the deontic status of an act of a generally impermissible kind.

Chou, Chiayu. “A Pseudo Dichotomy: Hobbism and Kantianism in Political Philosophy.” Political Studies 61.4 (2013): 799-815. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article examines the nature of a common tendency in studies of the political philosophies of Hobbes and Kant to presume that a dichotomy exists between them. In order to investigate this tendency, the two prevailing approaches in current scholarship on Kant and Hobbes are explored, and the content of two ideologies on which these studies heavily rely, Hobbism and Kantianism, are revealed. In the final section, a discussion of Hobbes’ and Kant’s theories of international politics will be used to point to how this tendency functions and what consequences it has for the study of political philosophy. The article closes by drawing attention to the wider implications of this tendency when it is applied to studies of Western political thought.

Clewis, Robert R. “Kant’s Conception of Philosophy, 1764–1765.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 1. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 491-502. [M]

 ——. “Reply to Melissa Zinken.” Critique (blog posted: 10 Feb 2013) n.p. [PW] [online]

 ——. “Reply to Paul Guyer.” Critique (blog posted: 10 Apr 2013) n.p. [PW] [online]

 ——. “Précis of The Kantian Sublime and the Revelation of Freedom.” Critique (blog posted: 30 Sep 2013) n.p. [PW] [online]

Cobben, Paul. “Hegel’s Critical Reception of Kant’s Conception of Objectivity.” Objectivity after Kant. Eds. Gertrudis Van De Vijver and Boris Demarest (op cit.). 235-47. [M]

Coe, Cynthia D. See: Altman, Matthew C., and Cynthia D. Coe.

Coenen, Ludwig. Immanuel Kant: "Sparsamkeit ist keine Tugend". Münster: ATE, 2013. [837 p.] [WC]

Cohen, Alix. “Kant on the Possibility of Ugliness.” British Journal of Aesthetics 53.2 (2013): 199-209. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article focuses on the philosopher Immanuel Kant’s thoughts on aesthetic judgment, including his writing on the concepts of beauty and ugliness. The article discusses Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment, the claim that Kant’s work acknowledges the existence of ugliness as well as form a distinction between beauty and ugliness, and the difference between pure and impure ugliness. The article goes on to discuss the judgment of taste, how beauty is judged differently for males and females and how the representation of distasteful objects can have the same effect as an actual distasteful object.

 ——. “Kant’s Categories of Ugliness.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 4. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 25-35. [M]

 ——. “Kant on Doxastic Voluntarism and its Implications for Epistemic Responsibility.” Kant Yearbook: Kant and Contemporary Theory of Knowledge 5 (2013): 33-50. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper shows that Kant’s account of cognition can be used to defend epistemic responsibility against the double threat of either being committed to implausible versions of doxastic voluntarism, or failing to account for a sufficiently robust connection between the will and belief. Whilst we have no direct control over our beliefs, we have two forms of indirect doxastic control that are sufficient to ground epistemic responsibility. It is because we have direct control over our capacity to judge as well as the epistemic principles that govern belief-acquisition that we have indirect control over the beliefs we thereby acquire.

Cohen-Halimi, Michèle. “Paradoxe implosif, paradoxe explosif: Kant et Rousseau. Une révolution dans la pensée de l’ordre naturel.” Estudos Kantianos 1.2 (2013): 145-59. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Cet article vise à montrer que la notion d’”influence” dont usent inconsidérément les historiens de la philosophie est une notion qui, loin d’éclairer la manière dont les idées d’un philosophe (ici Rousseau) contribuent à la genèse ou à la transformation des idées d’un autre philosophe (ici Kant), est une “notion-écran”, qui arrête l’analyse au lieu de la susciter. Que signifie pour un philosophe être tributaire de la lecture d’un autre philosophe ? Cette étude tente de s’enfoncer dans l’analyse du “tribut” que Kant doit à Rousseau relativement au bouleversement que ce dernier introduit dans la pensée de l’ordre naturel. “Paradoxe explosif ” et “paradoxe implosif ” servent à qualifier le rapport d’incidence de la contingence

Conceição, Jorge Vanderlei Costa da.  “Anthopologie Transscendentalis: uma reorientação da teoria dos juízos em Kant.” [Portuguese; Anthropologie transscendentalis: a reorientation of kantian’s theory of judgment]  Kant e-Prints 8.2 (2013): 131-49. [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: On reflection 903, Kant argued that the transcendental anthropology enables a kind of self-knowledge of understanding’s and reason’s operations. This essay aims to present the interpretative hypothesis of self-knowledge of understanding’s and reason’s operations as the research of what and how discursive forms a priori are applied to intuitive contents. Thus, the reflection 903 signals a reorientation of Kantian’s theory of judgment around an idea of human nature, to the extent that such should be investigated from its capacity of enforceability of a priori synthetic propositions. Finally, the reorientation of Kantian’s theory of judgments around a human nature implies interpret it as the executor of sententious operations and not merely as a biological product.

Congdon, Matthew. Rev. of Understanding Moral Obligation: Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard, by Robert Stern (2012). Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 34.1 (2013): 230-34. [PW]

Cordeiro, Renato Valois. “Der anscheinende Konflikt zwischen Mechanismus und Teleologie in der Kritik der Urteilskraft.” Estudos Kantianos 1.1 (2013): 207-15. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Meine Arbeit betrifft einen Teil des Kapitels „Dialektik der teleologischen Urteilskraft“ in der Kritik der Urteilskraft. In diesem Buch behandelt Kant den angeblichen Widerspruch zwischen den Prinzipien, die den mechanischen und teleologischen Naturerklärungen zugrunde liegen: Die Antinomie der teleologischen Urteilskraft. Meiner Interpretation nach ist dieser Konflikt jedoch nicht offenkundig. Denn in der „Zweiten Analogie“ beweist Kant, dass das in der Antinomie vorgestellte Prinzip der Kausalität der Natur für ein transzendentales Verstandesprinzip gehalten werden muss, welches die Erfahrung konstituiert. In diesem Sinne ist es eines der Hauptziele dieser Arbeit, die These zu verteidigen, dass das Prinzip der mechanischen Kausalität in der dritten Kritik als ein Prinzip der reflektierenden Urteilskraft vorgestellt wird, weswegen man es nicht als das Prinzip der „Zweiten Analogie“ ansehen darf. Zudem versuche ich auch die These zu vertreten, dass die förmliche „Vorstellung der Antinomie“ eigentlich keinen Konflikt darstellt, sondern ihre Auflösung, welche in Wahrheit auf der Verwendung des Begriffes der Maxime beruht.

Costa, Vincenzo. “Prima del sentire e del giudicare: la comprensione.” [Italian] Sentire e pensare: tra Kant e Husserl. Eds. Maria Teresa Catena and Anna Donise (op cit.). 103-20. [M]

Costello, Diarmuid. “Kant and the Problem of Strong Non-Perceptual Art.” British Journal of Aesthetics 53.3 (2013): 277-98. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: I argue that Kant’s theory of art meets the challenge of strong non-perceptual art, an idea I extrapolate from James Shelley’s account of non-perceptual art. I endorse the spirit of Shelley’s account, but argue that his examples fail to support his case because he does not distinguish between strong and weak non-perceptual art. The former has no perceptible properties relevant to its appreciation as art; the latter is not exhausted by appreciation of those perceptible properties it does have. I show this by comparing Marcel Duchamp’s Fountain and Robert Barry’s All the things I know.
For Kant, appreciating art aesthetically as art requires: (1) awareness that it is art and (2) responsiveness to the ideas presented. Taken together, this allows Kant to accommodate strong non-perceptual art. I consider three challenges to this view: (a) Kant is committed to a representational theory of art; (b) Kant is committed to a restrictive formalism about aesthetic judgements of art; (c) Kant’s understanding of aesthetic pleasure commits him to a perceptual theory of art. I reply that: (i) this is grounded in empirical generalizations external to Kant’s theory; (ii) Kant’s strong formalist views are at odds with his account of ‘subjective purposiveness’, and the latter has priority; (iii) Kant is offering a general theory of art, which must accommodate both literature and strong non-perceptual art.

Croitoru, Rodica. “Reguli de ordonare a priori a existenței fenomenelor în Critica rațiunii pure.” [Romanian; Rules to Order a priori the Existence of Phenomena in the Critique of Pure Reason] Studii de istoria filosofiei universale 21 (2013): 46-59. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Different types of rules used by Kant to subordinate a priori the existence of phenomena are analyzed. First come the rules which synthesize the principles of intuition and perception, whose part is to unify experience. They are completed by rules resulted from the three modes of time: permanence, succession, and simultaneity, which are rules of the relations of time, according to which the existence of each phenomena could be determined as regards the unity of each mode of time. They precede experience making it possible and, at the same time, they ground the rules of the understanding, which are a priori true, being the source of every truth; the agreement of our knowledge with objects, achieved by these rules, offers the ground of the possibility of experience. Advancing with experience, Kant reveals us the utility of regulative principles, which subordinate a priori the existence of phenomena, coming to a necessary relation of perceptions in a mode of time. The postulates of empirical thinking are, as well, rules relative to the modality of experience, respectively to its possibility, reality and necessity.

 ——. “The Morals of the “Starry Heavens” and of the Invisible Self.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 117-22. [M]

 ——. “Raţiunea practică. Concepte şi moşteniri.” [Romanian; Practical Reason. Concepts and Inheritances] Revista de Filosofie 60.4 (2013): 465-67. [RC]

 ——. “Deduţia şi schematismul conceptelor a priori în Critica raţiunii pure.” [Romanian; The Deduction and the Schematism of a priori Concepts in the Critique of Pure Reason] Studii de Teoria Categoriilor 5 (2013): 35-55. [M]

Crowell, Steven. Rev. of Understanding Moral Obligation. Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard, by Robert Stern (2012). Philosophy in Review 33.5 (2013): 410-14. [M] [online]

Csingár, Péter. Auswirkungen der Erkenntnistheorie und Ethik Kants auf seine Rechtsphilosophie. Berlin: LIT, 2013. [viii, 245 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Also appeared as a doctoral dissertation (Uni-Regensburg, 2013).

Cubo Ugarte, Óscar. “Kants normatives Modell der Demokratie.” Das Leben der Vernunft: Beiträge zur Philosophie Kants. Eds. Dieter Hüning, Stefan Klingner, and Carsten Olk (op cit.). 416-35. [M]

 ——. “Razón práctica y arbitrio humano en la ética de Kant.” [Spanish; Practical Reason and Human Will in Kant's Ethics] La razón y sus fines. Eds. Rosemary Rizo-Patrón de Lerner and María Jesús Vázquez Leibeiras (op cit.). 101-12. [M]

Cunha, Bruno. “Sonhos de um Visionário e suas contribuições para a ética de Kant.” [Portuguese] Cadernos de Filosofia Alemã: Crítica e Modernidade 22 (2013): 83-106. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper, I argue that the main aspects of the metaphysics of morals were already developed in Kant’s thought in 1764-1766. Based on the Dreams of a Spirit-seer elucidated by Dreams of Metaphysics, published in 1766, I will try to demonstrate the first traces of a new understanding about the metaphysics as the problem of the will in Kantian thought from a analysis of the spiritual world. Accordingly, this conception will present the first published evidences about the concepts of autonomy, freedom, formalism, categorical imperative, kingdom of endsand moral sentiment.

Cunico, Gerardo. “Das hermeneutische Problem und die religiösen Traditionen.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 859-69. [M]

Cureton, Adam. “A Contractualist Reading of Kant’s Proof of the Formula of Humanity.” Kantian Review 18.3 (2013): 363-86. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant offers the following argument for the formula of humanity (FH): Each rational agent necessarily conceives of her own rational nature as an end in itself and does so on the same grounds as every other rational agent, so all rational agents must conceive of one another's rational nature as an end in itself. As it stands, the argument appears to be question-begging and fallacious. Drawing on resources from the formula of universal law (FUL) and Kant's claims about the primacy of duties to oneself, I propose a contractualist reconstruction of this puzzling line of reasoning.

Curran, Kyle. “Change and Moral Development in Kant’s Ethics.” Stance 6 (2013): 21-28.[M]

Curtis-Wendlandt, Lisa. “Legality and morality in the political thought of Elise Reimarus and Immanuel Kant.” Political Ideas of Enlightenment Women: Virtue and Citizenship. Eds. Lisa Curtis-Wendlandt, Paul Richard Gibbard, and Karen Green (Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing, 2013). 91-107. [M]

Czarnecki, Lukasz. “La razón kantiana vs. la acción Heideggeriana en el pensamiento de Hannah Arendt y la cuestión mexicana.” [Spanish] Revista del CESLA 16 (2013): 179-93. [WC]

[top] D    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

D'Alessandro, Giuseppe. “Orizzonte del mondo e libertà dell’uomo nello sviluppo del pensiero kantiano tra ragion pura e declinazioni della filosofia pratica.” [Italian] Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 1. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 503-15. [M]

 ——. “Kant et l'herméneutique.” Kant, théologie et religion. Ed. Robert Theis (op cit.). 309-16. [M]

d’Alfonso, Matteo Vincenzo. “Il confronto con G. E. Schulze nella critica di Schopenhauer alla morale kantiana.” [Italian] Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 5. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 535-46. [M]

Dall’Agnol, Darlei. “Was Kant a naturalist? Further reflections on Rauscher’s idealist meta-ethics.” Studia Kantiana 11.14 (2013): 142-59. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper, I examine Rauscher’s interpretation of Kant as a metaphysical naturalist and a methodological anti-naturalist. Moreover, I discuss the meta-ethical implications of considering Kant as a naturalist of some kind. I argue that Kant cannot be seen as a naturalist in the metaphysical sense, although there is a sense in which he is a methodological non-naturalist. I then point out that Rauscher’s naturalist reading of Kant may be one of the main reasons he considers Kant’s meta-ethics to be idealist. I argue against Rauscher’s interpretation of Kant as a metaphysical naturalist hoping to show also that he is not a full blooded idealist in meta-ethical terms.

D’Anna, Giuseppe. “‘Sentire’ l’esterno a priori. Nicolai Hartmann tra neokantismo e fenomenologia.” [Italian] Sentire e pensare: tra Kant e Husserl. Eds. Maria Teresa Catena and Anna Donise (op cit.). 139-51. [M]

Dashitshev, Viacheslav. “Traktat von Immanuel Kant Zum ewigen Frieden und internationale Beziehungen der Neuzeit.” Kant’s Project of Perpetual Peace in the Context of Contemporary Politics. Eds. Andrey Zilber and Alexei Salikov (op cit.). 57-70. [M]

Davies, Luke J. “A Kantian Defense of the Right to Health Care.” Kantian Theory and Human Rights. Eds. Andreas Føllesdal and Reidar Maliks (op cit.). 70-88. [M]

Dean, Richard. “Humanity as an Idea, as an Ideal, and as an End in Itself.” Kantian Review 18.2 (2013): 171-95. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant emphasizes that moral philosophy must be divided into two parts, a ‘purely rational’ metaphysics of morals, and an empirical application to individuals, which Kant calls ‘moral anthropology’. But Kant gives humanity (die Menschheit) a prominent role even in the purely rational part of ethics — for example, one formulation of the categorical imperative is a demand to treat humanity as an end in itself. This paper argues that the only concepts of humanity suited to play such a role are the rational idea of humanity, and the rational ideal derived from this idea, which Kant discusses in Critique of Practical Reason and other texts.

De Bianchi, Silvia. Rev. of Immanuel Kant: Natural Science, edited by Eric Watkins (2012). Journal for the History of Astronomy 44.4 (2013): 487-88. [PI]

 ——. See: Massimi, Michela and Silvia De Bianchi.

De Federicis, Nico. “Kant’s Defense of a World Republic between 1793 and 1795.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 4. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 623-34. [M]

De Jong, Johan E. “The Modesty of Kant’s Metaphysics.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 553-62. [M]

De Kock, Liesbet. “Helmholtz and the Problem of Externality in Perception.” Objectivity after Kant. Eds. Gertrudis Van De Vijver and Boris Demarest (op cit.). 25-40. [M]

Deligiorgi, Katerina. Rev. of Hegel’s Critique of Kant: From Dichotomy to Identity, by Sally Sedgwick (2012). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (Apr 2013, #1). [M] [online]

Demarest, Boris. “System and Organism: in Defense of an Analogy.” Objectivity after Kant. Eds. Gertrudis Van De Vijver and Boris Demarest (op cit.). 99-113. [M]

 ——. See: Van De Vijver, Gertrudis, and Boris Demarest.

 ——, ed. See: Van De Vijver, Gertrudis, and Boris Demarest, eds.

Denis, Lara. “Virtue and Its Ends (TL 6:394-398).” Kant’s Tugendlehre. Eds. Trampota, Sensen, and Timmermann (op cit.). 159-81. [M]

De Pascale, Carla. “Against Kant’s Process of Abstraction.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 5. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 703-12. [M]

De Quincey, Thomas. Les derniers jours d'Emmanuel Kant. Transl. into French by Marcel Schwob. Paris: l'Herne, 2013. [117 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Thomas de Quincey's Last Days of Immanuel Kant was originally published in 1827; it appeares in vol. 3 of his Works (Edinburgh: Adam and Chalres Black, 1862), pp. 99-166.

 ——. Els últims dies d'Immanuel Kant. Transl. into Catalan by Josep M. Muñoz i Lloret. Barcelona: L'Avenç, 2013. [75 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Thomas de Quincey's Last Days of Immanuel Kant was originally published in 1827; it appeares in vol. 3 of his Works (Edinburgh: Adam and Chalres Black, 1862), pp. 99-166.

Dercová, Marta. “Odkaz Kantovej pragmatickej antropológie v súcasnosti Komentár k práci Gernota Böhmeho Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht.” Studia Philosophica Kantiana 2013.1 (2013): 52-55. [M] [online]

Derenbach, Rolf. Weltkenntnis und Lebensklugheit - wie es uns Immanuel Kant empfiehlt. Quintessenzen und Nachgedanken aus der "Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht". Berlin: Freie Universität Berlin Universitätsbibliothek, 2013. [108 p.] [WC]

De Risi, Vincenzo. “La dimostrazione kantiana del Quinto Postulato di Euclide.” [Italian] Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 5. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 31-42. [M]

Desjardin, Arnaud. Kant, "Fondements de la métaphysique des moeurs". Paris: Ellipses, 2013. [85 p.] [WC]

Deveaux, Monique, ed. See: Archard, David, Monique Deveaux, Neil Manson, and Daniel Weinstock, eds.

De Warren, Nicolas. “Refutations of Idealism in Kant and Husserl.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 5. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 713-26. [M]

DeWitt, Janelle. “Respect for the Moral Law: the Emotional Side of Reason.” Philosophy (Published online: 14 Oct 2013): 32 pp. [PW] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Respect, as Kant describes it, has a duality of nature that seems to embody a contradiction – i.e., it is both a moral motive and a feeling, where these are thought to be mutually exclusive. Most solutions involve eliminating one of the two natures, but unfortunately, this also destroys what is unique about respect. So instead, I question the non-cognitive theory of emotion giving rise to the contradiction. In its place, Idevelop the cognitive theory implicit in Kant’s work, one in which emotions takethe form of evaluative judgments that determine the will. I then show that, as a purely rational emotion, respect is perfectly suited to be a moral motive.

Dhillon, Pradeep Ajit. “A Kantian approach to writing a global art history: the case from Indian modern art.” The Many Faces of Beauty. Ed. Vittorio Hösle (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2013). 302-26. [PI]

Di Bella, Stefano. “The Myth of the Complete Concept.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 5. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 309-22. [M]

DiCenso, James J. “The Concept of Urbild in Kant’s Philosophy of Religion.” Kant-Studien 104.1 (2013): 100-32. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The term Urbild (translated variously as archetype, prototype, or original image) is used throughout Kant’s critical writings to designate particular representations that convey universal ideas. I explain how this term plays a crucial role in Kant’s endeavors to mediate between the abstract ideas of practical reason and phenomenal reality as historically and culturally informed. Focusing on the role of Urbilder allows us to deepen our understanding of the role of historical representations in Kant’s ethics and philosophy of religion, and to show the consistency of the critical project in addressing these cultural representations. The manner in which Kant draws upon specific cultural representations for pedagogical purposes, and critically assesses them in light of ideals, is explained and clarified.

Diehl, Ulrich. Kants ursprüngliche Einsicht: zur Entstehung seiner kritischen Philosophie. Halle (Saale): Universitätsverl. Halle-Wittenberg, 2013. [51 p.] [WC]

di Giovanni, George. “On Kantianism as a New Form of Cultural Clericy.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 4. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 635-45. [M]

Dimitriu, Cristian. “The practical interpretation of the categorical imperative: a defense.” Ideas y Valores (Colombia) 62 (2013): 105-13. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article compares two different interpretations of Kant’s categorical imperative — the practical and the logical one — and defends the practical one, arguing that it is superior because it rejects cases of free riding without necessarily rejecting cases of coordination or timing. The logical interpretation, on the other hand, leads to the undesirable outcome that it does not reject immoral cases of free riding, and to the desired outcome that it does not reject maxims of coordination/timing. Given that neither of them rejects maxims of coordination/timing (they are similar in that sense) and only the practical interpretation rejects free riding, the logical interpretation should be rejected.

DiSalle, Robert. “The Transcendental Method from Newton to Kant.” Studies in History & Philosophy of Science, Part A 44.3 (2013): 448-56. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant’s transcendental method, as applied to natural philosophy, considers the laws of physics as conditions of the possibility of experience. A more modest transcendental project is to show how the laws of motion explicate the concepts of motion, force, and causal interaction, as conditions of the possibility of an objective account of nature. This paper argues that such a project is central to the natural philosophy of Newton, and explains some central aspects of the development of his thinking as he wrote the Principia. One guiding scientific aim was the dynamical analysis of any system of interacting bodies, and in particular our solar system; the transcendental question was, what are the conceptual prerequisites for such an analysis? More specifically, what are the conditions for determining “true motions” within such a system—for posing the question of “the frame of the system of the world” as an empirical question? A study of the development of Newton’s approach to these questions reveals surprising connections with his developing conceptions of force, causality, and the relativity of motion. It also illuminates the comparison between his use of the transcendental method and that of Euler and Kant.

Dispersyn, Eléonore. “Philosophie et mal radical – l’importance des parerga dans la Religion dans les limites de la simple raison.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 871-81. [M]

 ——. “Kant et la foi réfléchissante: une alternative au désespoir moral?” Kant, théologie et religion. Ed. Robert Theis (op cit.). 227-36. [M]

Dohrn, Daniel. “Das Regelregressproblem in Kants praktischer Philosophie.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 123-33. [M]

Domski, Mary. “Kant and Newton on the A Priori Necessity of Geometry.” Studies in History & Philosophy of Science, Part A 44.3 (2013): 438-47. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant explicitly rejects Newton’s absolutist position that space is an actually existing thing; however, Kant also concedes that the absolutist successfully preserves the a priori necessity that characterizes our geometrical knowledge of space. My goal in this paper is to explore why the absolutist can explain the a priori necessity of geometry by turning to Newton’s De Gravitatione, an unpublished text in which Newton addresses the essential features associated with our representation of space and the relationship between our geometrical investigation of space and our knowledge of the form of space that is a part of the natural order. Attention to Newton’s account of space in De Gravitatione offers insight into the sense in which absolutist space is a priori and reveals why, in the Aesthetic, Kant could concede a priori geometrical knowledge to his absolutist opponent. What I highlight in particular is that, by Kant’s standards, Newton employs the very constructive method of mathematics that secures the a priori necessity of geometry, even though, as an absolutist, and as emphasized in the arguments of the Aesthetic, Newton fails to provide a metaphysics of space that explains the success of his mathematical method.

Donath, Christian R. “Liberal Art: Art and Education for Citizenship in Kant’s Critique of Judgment.” The Review of Politics 75.1 (2013): 3-23. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: While most political theorists focus on the role of reflective judgment in Kant’s Critique of Judgment, the political dimensions of art itself have been overlooked. Kant’s treatment of art suggests a consistent political message: art, as an analogy, can teach basic values for citizenship. I examine his hierarchy of the arts, as well as his treatment of genius and taste, arguing that each is informed by Kant’s belief in the heuristic capacity of art.

Donise, Anna. “Sentire il dovere e percepire il valore. Un percorso tra Kant e Husserl.” [Italian] Sentire e pensare: tra Kant e Husserl. Eds. Maria Teresa Catena and Anna Donise (op cit.). 61-76. [M]

Dörflinger, Bernd. “Ethische methodenlehre: Didaktik und Asketik (TL 6:477-485).” Kant’s Tugendlehre. Eds. Trampota, Sensen, and Timmermann (op cit.). 383-410. [M]

 ——. “Eine neuere Religionsauffassung im Licht einer älteren – Habermas und Kant.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 1. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 179-96. [M]

 ——. “La teología ética de Kant y el deber de fomentar el bien supremo.” [Spanish; translated from the German: Kants Ethikotheologie und die Pflicht zur Beförderung des höchsten Guts (2012)] La razón y sus fines. Eds. Rosemary Rizo-Patrón de Lerner and María Jesús Vázquez Leibeiras (op cit.). 113-41. [M]

 ——. “Kants Ethikotheologie und die Pflicht zur Beförderung des höchsten Guts.” Kant und die Biblische Offenbarungsreligion / Kant a biblické Zjevené Náboženství. Eds. Norbert Fischer, Jakub Sirovátka, and David Voprada (op cit.). 59-72. [M]

Döring, Sabine, and Eva-Maria Düringer. “Being Worthy of Happiness: Towards a Kantian Appreciation of Our Finite Nature.” Philosophical Topics 41.1 (2013): 123-42. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: We say of people who act morally that they deserve to be happy, especially when acting morally comes at the price of happiness. We find this thought, especially in a Kantian framework, puzzling. If we define morality and its value independently of happiness, how can it be that we deserve happiness when we act morally? We seek to answer these questions by first looking at Kant’s discussion of a causal connection of morality and happiness in the highest good, which we do not find explanatorily satisfying, before examining possible good-makers of happiness that might explain why happiness is, even for a Kantian, a proper reward for moral behaviour.

Doude van Troostwijk, Chris. “«Weniger konsequent, aber tiefer». La dissertation d'Albert Schweitzer comme déconstruction de la philosophie kantienne de la religion.” Kant, théologie et religion. Ed. Robert Theis (op cit.). 381-89. [M]

Drăghici, Marius Augustin. “A Kuhnian Reconstruction of Kant’s Concept of ‘Copernican Revolution’.” Rev. roum. phil. 57.2 (2013): 215-38. [RC]

Drăgoi, Ioan. “Fenomen şi categorie. Interpretare fenomenologică a nimicului kantian.” [Romanian; Phenomenon and Category. A Phenomenological Interpretation of the Kantian Nothing] Studii de Teoria Categoriilor 5 (2013): 213-39. [RC/M]

Drogalis, Christina. Rev. of Virtue, Rules, and Justice: Kantian Aspirations, by Thomas E. Hill, Jr. (2012). Philosophy in Review 33.4 (2013). [M] [online]

Drolet, Jean-François. “Nietzsche, Kant, the Democratic State, and War.” Review of International Studies 39.1 (2013): 25-47. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article offers a reconstruction of Nietzsche’s critique of Kant’s scheme for perpetual peace distilled from his life-long confrontation with Kant’s critical philosophy. Through this reading strategy, it sheds light on Nietzsche’s controversial and yet surprisingly under-researched reflections on the problem of conflict and war in human affairs. Although Nietzsche embraced many of the basic premises of Kant’s critical philosophical project, he considered the ethico-political conclusions Kant drew from these to be both irrational and nihilistic. From Nietzsche’s perspective, Kant’s thoughts on politics and International Relations rest on a fundamental misunderstanding of the phenomena of agency, statehood, and war that elides both the tragic relationship between politics and culture, and the violence which Nietzsche believes to be latent in all attempts at reconciling individual with collective autonomy. According to Nietzsche, Kant’s influential association between liberal republicanism, freedom, and peace contributed unwittingly in ushering in the cult of the nation-state, which Nietzsche warned would engulf Europe into a wholly new kind of organised violence in the coming decades. Although clearly not without their uncritical assumptions and hubristic tendencies, Nietzsche’s reflections on war and peace draw attention to some of the more insidious risks and difficulties attending liberal attempts at accommodating cosmopolitan values and principles within the framework of the modern nation state.

Duarte Pardo, Ángela María. See: Rojas Berrío, María Juliana, and Ángela María Duarte Pardo.

Dudchik, Andrey. “Hegel’s critique of eternal peace project.” Kant’s Project of Perpetual Peace in the Context of Contemporary Politics. Eds. Andrey Zilber and Alexei Salikov (op cit.). 37-39. [M]

Dunlop, Katherine. “Mathematical Method and Newtonian Science in the Philosophy of Christian Wolff.” Studies in History & Philosophy of Science, Part A 44.3 (2013): 457-69. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper aims to illuminate Christian Wolff’s view of mathematical reasoning, and its use in metaphysics, by comparing his and Leibniz’s responses to Newton’s work. Both Wolff and Leibniz object that Newton’s metaphysics is based on ideas of sense and imagination that are suitable only for mathematics. Yet Wolff expresses more regard (than Leibniz) for Newton’s scientific achievement. Wolff’s approval of the use of imaginative ideas in Newtonian mathematical science seems to commit him to an inconsistent triad. For he rejects their use in metaphysics, and also holds that every scientific discipline must follow mathematics’ method. A facile resolution would be to suppose Wolff identifies the method of mathematics with the order in which propositions are deduced, or with “analysis” that reveals the structure of concepts. This would be to assimilate Wolff’s view to Leibniz’s (on which all mathematical propositions are ultimately derived from definitions, and definitions are justified by conceptual analysis). On this construal, mathematical reasoning involves only the understanding. But Wolff conceives mathematics’ method more broadly, to include processes of concept-formation which involve perception and imagination. Thus my way of resolving the tension is to find roles for perception and imagination in the formation of metaphysical concepts.

 ——. Rev. of From Kant to Husserl: Selected Essays, by Charles Parsons (2012). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (Jun 2013, #3). [M] [online]

Düringer, Eva-Maria. See: Döring, Sabine, and Eva-Maria Düringer.

Düsing, Klaus. Immanuel Kant, Klassiker der Aufklärung: Untersuchungen zur kritischen Philosophie in Erkenntnistheorie, Ethik, Ästhetik und Metaphysik. Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 2013. [viii, 367 p.] [WC]

Dykhanov, Viacheslav, and Andrey Zilber. “‘Democratic Peace’ and Kant’s precondition of non-intervention in internal affairs: irreconcilable contradiction?” Kant’s Project of Perpetual Peace in the Context of Contemporary Politics. Eds. Andrey Zilber and Alexei Salikov (op cit.). 70-77. [M]

[top] E    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Ebels-Duggan, Kyla. Rev. of Virtue, Rules, and Justice: Kantian Aspirations, by Thomas E. Hill, Jr. (2012). Mind 122.488 (2013): 1098-1102. [PW]

Edwards, Jeffrey. “Kurze Bemerkungen zu den englischen Übersetzungen von Kants Rechtslehre.” Kants “Metaphysik der Sitten” in der Diskussion. Eds. Werner Euler and Burkhard Tuschling (op cit.). 21-24. [M]

 ——. “A Tale of Two Ends: Obligatory Ends and Material Determining Grounds in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals.” Kants “Metaphysik der Sitten” in der Diskussion. Eds. Werner Euler and Burkhard Tuschling (op cit.). 147-75. [M]

Ehrsam, Raphaél. “La conscience morale comme voix: Une Ølucidation kantienne.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 135-46. [M]

 ——. “La critique sans l'herméneutique. Principes kantiens pour l'étude des religions.” Kant, théologie et religion. Ed. Robert Theis (op cit.). 317-27. [M]

Elizondo, E. Sonny. “Reason in its Practical Application.” Philosophers’ Imprint 13.21 (2013): 1-17. [M][online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Is practical reason a cognitive faculty? Do practical judgments make claims about a subject matter that are appropriately assessed in terms of their agreement with that subject matter? According to Kantians like Christine Korsgaard, the answer is no. To think otherwise is to conflate the theoretical and the practical, the epistemic and the ethical. I am not convinced. In this paper, I motivate my skepticism through examination of the very figure who inspires Korsgaard's rejection of cognitivism: Kant. For as I read him, Kant does not construe the distinction between theoretical and practical reason in terms of a distinction between cognitive and non-cognitive faculties but in terms of two distinct applications of a single faculty of reason, which is through-and-through cognitive. Thus, practical, no less than theoretical, reason cognizes a subject matter, and so practical, no less than theoretical, reason is straightforwardly subject to familiar epistemic standards of truth, warrant, and knowledge. Of course, even if I am right about Kant, this does not show that Korsgaard is wrong about reason; and I will offer no direct argument against her position here. Nonetheless, I believe that reflection on Kant's true view, with its careful treatment of and respect for both the practicality and rationality of reason, should perhaps lead us to rethink what it means to be a rationalist in ethics.

Elsenhans, Theodor. Fries und Kant: ein Beitrag zur Geschichte und zur systematischen Grundlegung der Erkenntnistheorie. Hamburg: Severus, 2013. [xxvii, 347 p.] [WC]

Emundts, Dina. “Kant über Wahrheit.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 563-74. [M]

 ——. “Kant über Selbstbewusstsein.” Self, World, and Art: Metaphysical Topics in Kant and Hegel. Ed. Dina Emundts (op cit.). 51-77. [M]

 ——. “Kants Grenzziehung in der Kritik der reinen Vernunft.” Ubergänge — diskursiv oder intuitiv? Essays zu Eckart Försters Die 25 Jahre der Philosophie. Eds. Johannes Haag and Markus Wild (op cit.). 39-57. [M]

 ——, ed. Self, World, and Art: Metaphysical Topics in Kant and Hegel. Berlin / Boston: De Gruyter, 2013. [347 p.] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Notes: This anthology originated in a 2011 Berlin conference (“Metaphysical Themes in Kant and Hegel”) organized by Dina Emundts in honor of Rolf-Peter Horstmann’s 70th birthday. See essays by Rolf-Peter Horstmann, Barry Stroud, Dina Emundts, Wolfgang Carl, Béatrice Longuenesse, Hannah Ginsborg, Stefanie Grüne, Ulrich Schlösser, Eckart Förster, Tobias Rosefeldt, Andrew Chignell, Paul Guyer, Anton Friedrich Koch, Gary Hatfield.

Encinar Romero, Pilar. “Notas para una valoración de la "crítica de la razón instrumental" como contribución a una nueva antropología.” [Spanish; Notes for an Appraisal of the "Critique of Instrumental Reason" as a Contribution to a New Anthropology] La razón y sus fines. Eds. Rosemary Rizo-Patrón de Lerner and María Jesús Vázquez Leibeiras (op cit.). 143-62. [M]

Engelhard, Kristina. “Kant’s Theory of Causality. Categories, Laws and Powers.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 575-86. [M]

Engstrom, Stephen. “Unity of apperception.” Studi Kantiani 26 (2013): 37-54. [PW]

Ertl, Wolfgang. “‘Nothing but representations’ – A Suárezian Way out of the Mind?” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 5. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 429-40. [M]

 ——. “‘Ludewig’ Molina and Kant’s Libertarian Compatibilism.” A Companion to Luis de Molina. Eds. Alexander Aichele and Mathias Kaufmann (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2013). 405-45. [PW]

Espinet, David. “Read thyself! Hobbes, Kant und Husserl über die Grenzen der Selbsterfahrung.” International Yearbook for Hermeneutics. Ed. Günter Figal (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck). 126-46. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Summary: The present essay focuses on the paradigm of reading oneself as the constitution of self-knoweldge within the frameworks of Hobbes, Kant, and Husserl. It also establishes a link to the Kantian and Husserlian phenomenalism of self-knowledge. It shows that and how the process of reading oneself intends the concrete self, yet without ever reaching a unique individual source of the self beyond the multiplicity of signs that constitute it.

Esposito, Costantino. “Kant and the Problem of Modern Ontology.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 5. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 441-54. [M]

Esser, Andrea M. “The Inner Court of Conscience, Moral Self-Knowledge, and the Proper Object of Duty (TL 6:437-444).” Kant’s Tugendlehre. Eds. Trampota, Sensen, and Timmermann (op cit.). 269-91. [M]

 ——. “Die Urteilskraft in der Praxis – Reflexion und Anwendung.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 147-59. [M]

Esteves, Julio. “O papel da intuição e dos conceitos nas teorías kantianas da geometria.” [Portuguese; The role of intuition and concepts in the Kantian theories of geometry] Studia Kantiana 11.14 (2013): 34-54. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The study of Kant’s texts allows us to disentangle two distinct theories of geometry. The first and more discussed by the interpreters is that one that requires the construction of the concepts of the Euclidian geometry, the only one with which Kant could have been acquainted, in the pure intuition a priori of space, as a condition of possibility of the a priori synthetic propositions in the geometrical knowledge. Thus, this theory of the presuppositions of geometry would provide an indirect proof of the Metaphysical exposition in the Critique of pure reason. Now, since the non-Euclidian geometries arose, both have no appeal nowadays. In Kant’s defense, I would like to show that he entertains another theory, in opposition to the former, that equally requires the construction of geometrical concepts, but in which the geometrical concept plays the main role, while the intuition, above all the pure intuition a priori of space, plays a secondary role. If so, this theory would turn out to be independent from the Metaphysical exposition

Eterovic, Igor. “Biological Roots of Kant’s Concept of Culture.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 4. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 389-401. [M]

 ——. “Mjesto Immanuela Kanta u mišljenju ideje univerziteta.” [Croatian] Filozofska istraživanja 33.3 (2013): 473-92. [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The idea of the university is taken as fundamental in the articulation of the concept of the university and the possibility of its institutional realization. In such a context, Immanuel Kant is in the forefront as an unavoidable thinker of this idea. For easier understanding of Kant’s articulation of the idea of the university, at the beginning basic features of Humboldt’s vision of the university are presented, and this enables us to follow Kant’s contribution and influence upon the articulation of these features. Thereby The Conflict of the Faculties is the central Kant’s text in which he did not just offer the concept of the university as an institution fundamental for the development of scholarship, but he was the last thinker, according to some authors, of the very idea of the university. As the analysis shows, this idea is, in a historical sense, the articulation of classical idea of the modern, Humboldtian university, but there are also a number of interwoven elements wrought in this idea which possess the lasting actuality (e.g. jurisdiction of the particular fields of knowledge, pretensions of the particular sciences, autonomy of the sciences and the faculties, relations between the faculties etc.). It is shown that if we take the whole Kant’s opus into consideration, The Conflict of the Faculties can be seen as an extension of his enlightenment project, supplement of his philosophy of politics and law (private and public use of reason) and his philosophy of history (universities as an important link in the progress of the mankind in general), addition to his philosophical anthropology (universities as a medium of the progress of human capacities) and philosophy of education (universities as an indispensable dimension of education of man as a person, citizen and human being in general). On the other side, the necessity of all those other parts of his philosophical opus is demonstrated as needed for the complete understanding of his thought of the idea of the university. Instead of the conclusion, the results of the previous analysis are evaluated in the context of an attempt of answering the question of Kant’s permanent actuality and his special place in the history of ideas, considering the thinking of the idea of the university.

Euler, Werner. “Kants Philosophiebegriff in der „Architektonik der reinen Vernunft“. (KrV, B 865 –879/A 837– 851).” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 1. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 517-33. [M]

 ——. “Die Tugendlehre im System der praktischen Philosophie Kants.” Kants “Metaphysik der Sitten” in der Diskussion. Eds. Werner Euler and Burkhard Tuschling (op cit.). 221-299. [M]

 ——. “A felicidade alheia, os pobres e os mendigos na Doutrina da Virtude de Kant.” [Portuguese; The happiness of others, the poor and the beggars in Kant’s Doctrine of Virtue] Studia Kantiana 11.14 (2013): 160-79. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This treatise pursues three aims: First, it should be demonstrated against a widespread perplexity that there will be a plausible explanation of the application of the criterion of narrow obligation for the division of duties in Kant’s Doctrine of virtue. Second, the interest is directed to the origin (derivation) of the duties of virtue for others (as duties for their happiness) from the duties to oneself as well as from the supreme principle of the Doctrine of virtue. By this the necessity of duties for beneficence will be justified. Third, the task of interpreting is to find out exactly what it is that is prescribed by the duty of virtue for others and how far its validity reaches. The answer to this question will bring about an explanation of Kant’s attitude towards questions of social content like the help for the poor and the treatment with beggars. The thesis to this end will say that according to Kant’s Doctrine of virtue there is an unconditioned objective duty for beneficence, which demands the morally motivated support of poor fellows and (within certain boundaries) even of beggars.

 ——, and Burkhard Tuschling, eds. Kants “Metaphysik der Sitten” in der Diskussion: ein Arbeitsgespräch an der Herzog August Bibliothek Wolfenbüttel 2009. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2013. [325 p.] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Philosophische Schriften, vol. 79; papers given at a 2009 conference at the Herzog August Bibliothek in Wolfenbüttel.
Contents: Nelly W. Motroschilowa (Kants Metaphysik der Sitten im Kontext der russischen Kant-Rezeption und der Ubersetzungen), Jeffrey Edwards (Kurze Bemerkungen zu den englischen Ubersetzungen von Kants Rechtslehre), Michael Wolff (Kant über Freiheit und Determinismus), Heiner F. Klemme (Der Transzendentale Idealismus und die Rechtslehre: Kant über den Zusammenhang von moralischer Verbindlichkeit, Recht und Ethik), Michael Wolff (Trias politica: Erläuterungen zu Kants Verfassungstheorie in seinen Metaphysischen Anfangsgründen der Rechtslehre), Burkhard Tuschling (Recht aus dem Begriff: Schwerpunkte einer Einführung in Kants "Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre"), Alexei N. Krouglov (Die frühe Rezeption der Konzeption des Naturrechts Kants in Russland), Jeffrey Edwards (A tale of two ends: obligatory ends and material determining grounds in Kant's metaphysics of morals), Paul Guyer (Kant über moralische Gefühle: von den Vorlesungen zur Metaphysik der Sitten), Andrej Sudakow (Person und Persönlichkeit: Ansätze zum konkreten Personalismus in Kants Metaphysik der Sitten), Werner Euler (Die Tugendlehre im System der praktischen Philosophie Kants).

[top] F    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Fabbrizi, Chiara. “Praktische Logik und angewandte Logik.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 103-16. [M]

Faggion, Andrea. See: Marques, José Oscar de Almeida and Andrea Faggion.

Fahmy, Melissa Seymour. “Understanding Kant’s Duty of Respect as a Duty of Virtue.” Journal of Moral Philosophy 10.6 (2013): 723-40. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the Doctrine of Virtue Kant declares that ”Only an end that is also a duty can be called a duty of virtue” (MS 6:383). In the same text Kant refers to the duty of respect for others as a duty of virtue. It follows that the duty of respect must correspond to some end that is also a duty. What is this end? This paper endeavors to answer this question. Though Kant explicitly identifies two obligatory ends — one’s own perfection and the happiness of others (MS 6:385) — neither is a good candidate for the end which corresponds to the duty of respect. This paper examines two plausible candidates — others’ humanity and others’ self esteem — arguing that the latter is preferable insofar as it accords better with what Kant says about the vice of defamation, respecting others in the logical use of their reason, and respectful beneficence.

 ——. Rev. of Self‐Improvement: An Essay in Kantian Ethics, by Robert N. Johnson (2011). The Philosophical Quarterly 63.251 (2013): 382-84. [PW]

Feldhaus, Charles. “Liberdade da Willkür e fraqueza da vontade em Kant.” [Portuguese; Willkür’s liberty and weakness of will in Kant] Kant e-Prints 8.2 (2013): 77-84. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article reconstructs and examines the main attempts to reconcile the morally neutral conception of freedom, which Kant presents in his later work, Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der Vernunft blossen, called the incorporation thesis by Henry Allison, with the moral phenomenon of the weakness of will, the first degree of moral evil in Kant’s ethical thought. This objection was first presented by Marcia Baron in her article Freedom, Frailty, and Impurity. This study shows that the main attempts to reconcile this conception of freedom with moral phenomenon of the weakness of the will are not successful, since either they deny the existence of weakness of will or they are inconsistent with the core elements of Kant’s ethical thought. Finally, the study suggests that an alternative solution to the problem could be more successful if it took into account the conception of virtue that Kant has developed mainly in his last major work of practical philosophy, namely Die Metaphysik der Sitten.

Falduto, Antonino. “The Two Meanings of ‘moralisches Gefühl’ in Kant’s Doctrine of Virtue.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 161-71. [M]

Feloj, Serena. Il sublime nel pensiero di Kant. Brescia: Morcelliana, 2013. [270 p.] [WC]

 ——. “Towards an Alternative: Crisis of the System or Mediation between Nature and Freedom? The Concept of Einheit der Erfahrung in the Erste Einleitung.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 1. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 535-42. [M]

Ferdori, Donato. “La saggezza del ‘politico morale’.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 4. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 647-58. [M]

Fernández Herrero, Beatriz. “Aproximación a la utopía kantiana.” [Spanish; Approach to Kantian Utopia] La razón y sus fines. Eds. Rosemary Rizo-Patrón de Lerner and María Jesús Vázquez Leibeiras (op cit.). 163-83. [M]

Ferrari, Jean. “Le cosmopolitisme de Kant et les fins ultimes de la raison humaine.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 1. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 197-211. [M]

 ——. “Foi doctrinale et foi rationnelle dans l'oeuvre de Kant.” Glaube und Vernunft in der Philosophie der Neuzeit. Eds. Dietmar H. Weidemann and Raoul Weicker (op cit.). 41-50. [M]

 ——. “Théologie transcendantale et religion de la raison.” Kant, théologie et religion. Ed. Robert Theis (op cit.). 13-30. [M]

Ferrari, Massimo. Rev. of Kant’s Transcendental Arguments. Disciplining Pure Reason, by Scott Stapleford (2008). [German] Kant-Studien 104.2 (2013): 254-56. [M]

Ferrarin, Alfredo. “The Unity of Reason: On Cyclopes, Architects, and the Cosmic Philosopher’s Vision.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 1. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 213-28. [M]

Ferrarin, Alfredo, ed. See: Bacin, Stefano, Alfredo Ferrarin, Claudio La Rocca, and Margit Ruffing, eds. Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht Akten des XI. Kant-Kongresses 2010 5 vols. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2013.

Ferraris, Maurizio. Goodbye, Kant! What Still Stands of the Critique of Pure Reason. Translated from the Italian by Richard Davies. Albany: SUNY Press, 2013. [ix, 136 p.] [WC] [review]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Originally published in Italian as Goodbye, Kant!.

 ——. “Kant and Social Objects.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 587-96. [M]

Ferreira, M. Jamie. “Hope, virtue, and the postulate of God: a reappraisal of Kant’s pure practical rational belief.” Religious Studies (Online: 22 Feb 2013). [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: After identifying contrasting formulations of the practical postulates of reason in Kantt’s second critique, I analyse the context of each formulation, showing both how the postulate of the ‘possibility’ of God is consistent with Kantt’s understanding of a significant transition arising from practical needs as well as how the postulate of the existence of God can be seen as a ‘practical belief’ acting out a ‘hope’. My goal is to re-examine Kantt’s view of the relation between the practical and theoretical employments of reason in order to distinguish clearly between what Kant sees as required of the moral believer as opposed to permitted.

Ferretti, Giovanni. “Ontologie et théologie chez Kant.” Kant, théologie et religion. Ed. Robert Theis (op cit.). 31-42. [M]

Ferron, Isabella. “Il pensiero antinomico nella KU.” [Portuguese; The antinomic though in the KU] Kant e-Prints 8.2 (2013): 67-76. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The present paper aims at investigating a particular aspect of Kant's thought, i.e. the antinomic thought in the third Critique, and more precisely in the paragraphs 69-70-71. In these paragraphs – so the theses – Kant presents the antinomies of the reflecting Judgement, but he also tries to explain how to get over these antinomies. For this reason these three pragraphs are basic, as they work as connection between the first and the second part of the third Critique, but also because they introduce us in the argumentation of the second part.

Ferry, Luc. Kant et les lumières: la science et la morale. Paris: Le Figaro, 2013. [96 p.] [WC]

Fetisova, Darya. “The principle of sufficient reason in German philosophy of the Enlightenment.” [Russian] Kantovsky Sbornik 46.4 (2013): 64-75. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the 18th century, a philosophical dispute over the Principle of sufficient reason arose in Germany. Despite the fact that this Principe was explicitly formulated by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz only at the end of the 17th century, a major dispute about it was triggered by Christian Wolff who had considerable influence on the German philosophy of Enlightenment. In German Metaphysic, he presented the “strong” definition of the principle and its proof. As a result, freedom was restricted, because the principle of sufficient reason implies the unlimited necessity of all things and excludes the possibility of any happenstance, at least in the real world. It had an adverse effect on philosophy in general and ethics in particular. However, the total elimination of the principle of sufficient reason was impossible. Thus, the main focus of the dispute was the maintaining of freedom without abandoning the sufficient reason. These efforts resulted in various interpretations of this Principle. The most prominent perspectives developed within this dispute were those of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Christian Wolff, his main philosophical opponent — Christan August Crusius, and Immanuel Kant. The aim of this article is to demonstrate the differences between these perspectives and identify the philosophical problems arising from the Principle of sufficient reason in metaphysics and practical philosophy.

Ficara, Elena. “Kant e il rapporto dello scetticismo con la filosofia.” [Italian] Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 1. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 543-54. [M]

Figueiredo, Vinicius de. “La funzione sistematica del sublime.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 4. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 37-46. [M]

Filho, Edgard José Jorge. “Error and Transcendental Illusion in Kant.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 165-76. [M]

Fimiani, Filippo. “Quando sappiamo cosa sentire. Credenze, retoriche ed esperienze estetiche.” [Italian] Sentire e pensare: tra Kant e Husserl. Eds. Maria Teresa Catena and Anna Donise (op cit.). 153-68. [M]

Fincham, Richard. “Kant’s early critics: Jacobi, Reinhold, Maimon.” Kant, Kantianism, and Idealism: The Origins of Continental Philosophy. Ed. Thomas Nenon (op cit.). 49-82. [M]

Fischer, Klaus. “Realismus und Fiktionalismus in der Wissenschaft des späten 19. Jahrhunderts.” Das Leben der Vernunft: Beiträge zur Philosophie Kants. Eds. Dieter Hüning, Stefan Klingner, and Carsten Olk (op cit.). 661-90. [M]

Fischer, Norbert. “Kants vollständiges System philosophisch begründeter Theologien.” Das Leben der Vernunft: Beiträge zur Philosophie Kants. Eds. Dieter Hüning, Stefan Klingner, and Carsten Olk (op cit.). 506-30. [M]

 ——. “Zum Problem der Geschichtlichkeit in der Philosophie Kants. Eine Auslegung zum Bild der "konzentrischen Kreise" in Kants Religionsschrift.” Kant und die Biblische Offenbarungsreligion / Kant a biblické Zjevené Náboženství. Eds. Norbert Fischer, Jakub Sirovátka, and David Voprada (op cit.). 45-57. [M]

 ——, Jakub Sirovátka, and David Voprada, eds. Kant und die Biblische Offenbarungsreligion / Kant a biblické Zjevené Náboženství. Prague: Karolinum Press, 2013. [136 p.] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: This volume stemmed from a 2012 conference in Mainz on Kant and Biblical revelation. Papers include: Thomas Hanke, "Kein Wunder und keine Instruktion. Kants Umgang mit dem Offenbarungsbegriff vor und in der Religionsschrift als Beitrag zu dessen diskreter Transformation"; Ruben Schneider, "Die transsubjektive Existenz Gottes bei Kant"; Norbert Fischer, "Zum Problem der Geschichtlichkeit in der Philosophie Kants. Eine Auslegung zum Bild der "konzentrischen Kreise" in Kants Religionsschrift"; Bernd Dörflinger, "Kants Ethikotheologie und die Pflicht zur Beförderung des höchsten Guts"; Maximilian Forschner, "Die Gemeinschaft im Glauben. Bemerkungen zu Kants Begriff der Kirche"; Christian Sturm, "Zur rechtlichen Verfassung der Kantischen Tugendgemeinschaft"; Zu Kants Auslegung grundlegender christlicher Theologumena; Jakub Sirovátka; Laura Anna Macor, "Das Erbe der Aufklärungstheologie bei Kant: Vorüberlegungen zum Einfluss Johann Joachim Spaldings"; Micha Brumlik, "Religion und Intersubjektivität -- Hermann Cohens Ethik".

Fistioc, Mihaela C. “Schopenhauer on the Kantian Thing-In-Itself as Platonic Idea.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 5. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 547-56. [M]

Fleischacker, Samuel. What is Enlightenment? Hoboken: Taylor and Francis, 2013. [237 p.] [WC]

Flikschuh, Katrin. “Personal autonomy and public authority.” Kant on Moral Autonomy. Ed. Oliver Sensen (op cit.). 169-89. [M]

 ——. Rev. of Kant and Cosmopolitanism. The Philosophical Ideal of World Citizenship, by Pauline Kleingeld (2011). Philosophical Quarterly 63 (2013): 804-7. [PI]

 ——. “Hope as Prudence: Practical Faith in Kant’s Political Thinking.” Reading Onora O’Neill. Ed. David Archard, Monique Deveaux, Neil Manson, and Daniel Weinstock (op cit.). 55-76. [M]

Florescu, Sari Maarit. “Fundamentele filosofice ale consensului politic în Critica facultăţii de judecare a lui Kant.” [Romanian; Philosophical Foundations of the Political Consensus in Kant’s Critique of Judgment] Revista de Filosofie 60.4 (2013): 381-89. [RC]

Føllesdal, Andreas. “Kant, Human Rights, and Courts.” Kantian Theory and Human Rights. Eds. Andreas Føllesdal and Reidar Maliks (op cit.). 193-202. [M]

 ——. See: Maliks, Reidar, and Andreas Føllesdal.

 —— and Reidar Maliks, eds. Kantian Theory and Human Rights, with a preface by Thomas Pogge. New York: Routledge, 2013. [xxii, 209 p.] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents:
Reidar Maliks and Andreas Føllesdal (Kantian Theory and Human Rights),
Howard Williams (Kantian Underpinnings for a Theory of Multirights),
Ariel Zylberman (Kant’s Juridical Idea of Human Rights),
Sofie Møller (Human Rights Jurisprudence Seen through the Framework of Kant’s Legal Metaphors),
Luke J. Davies (A Kantian Defense of the Right to Health Care),
Özlem Ayse Özgür (Human Rights Duties are Collective Duties of Justice),
Svenja Ahlhaus (The Democratic Paradox of International Human Rights Courts: A Kantian Solution?),
Markus Patberg (Extraordinary Politics and the Democratic Legitimacy of International Human Rights Courts),
Reidar Maliks (Kantian Courts: On the Legitimacy of International Human Rights Courts),
Aviva Shiller (Why Kant Is Not a Democratic Peace Theorist),
Andreas Føllesdal (Kant, Human Rights, and Courts).

Fonnesu, Luca. “Entwicklung und Erweiterung der praktischen Absicht.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 173-84. [M]

Fonseca, Renato Duarte. “Aparência, presentação e objeto. Notas sobre a ambivalência de ‘Erscheinung’ na teoria kantiana da experiência.” [Portuguese; Appearance, presentation, and object. Notes on the ambivalence of ‘Erscheinung’ in Kant’s theory of experience] Studia Kantiana 11.14 (2013): 80-99. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The paper considers Kant’s characterization of appearance (Erscheinung) as the “indeterminate object of an empirical intuition”, at the beginning of the Transcendental Aesthetic, in order to explore an ambivalence in his use of the term. My purpose is to clarify the distinction between two senses of the word in the Kantian corpus, during the so-called critical period. In the empirical sense, I propose, the term designates the sensory presentation of an object of experience. In the transcendental sense, on the other hand, the term designates an object of possible experience, categorically determinate and capable of being recognized under suitable concepts. Although not extensionally exclusive, the empirical and transcendental senses of ‘appearance’ are not coextensive. As to the first point, every sensory presentation is an object of possible (inner) experience. As to the second, although objects of outer experience can only be recognized through sensory presentations, they cannot be counted as such.

Forero Mendoza, Sabine, and Pierre Montebello. Kant, son esthétique: entre mythes et récits. Dijon: les Presses du réel, 2013. [214 p.] [WC]

Forgione, Luca. “Kant and the I as Subject.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 117-27. [M]

Forman, David. “Appetimus sub ratione boni.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 5. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 323-34. [M]

Formosa, Paul. “Kant’s Conception of Personal Autonomy.” Journal of Social Philosophy 44.3 (2013): 193-212. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article presents information on German philosopher Immanuel Kant’s conception of personal autonomy. It examines the role that socialization plays in the conception and situate Kant’s conception in the contemporary taxonomy of personal autonomy theories. It is concluded that personal and moral autonomy should not be seen as at odds with one another.

 ——. “Is Kant a Moral Constructivist or a Moral Realist?” European Journal of Philosophy 21.2 (2013): 170-96. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The dominant interpretation of Kant as a moral constructivist has recently come under sustained philosophical attack by those defending a moral realist reading of Kant. In light of this, should we read Kant as endorsing moral constructivism or moral realism? In answering this question we encounter disagreement in regard to two key independence claims. First, the independence of the value of persons from the moral law (an independence that is rejected) and second, the independence of the content and authority of the moral law from actual acts of willing on behalf of those bound by that law (an independence that is upheld). The resulting position, which is called not ‘all the way down’ constructivism, is attributed to Kant.

 ——. “Kant on the Moral Ontology of Constructivism and Realism.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 185-96. [M]

Forschler, Scott. “Kantian and Consequentialist Ethics: The Gap Can Be Bridged.” Metaphilosophy 44 (2013): 88-104. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Richard Hare argues that the fundamental assumptions of Kant’s ethical system should have led Kant to utilitarianism, had Kant not confused a norm’s generality with its universality, and hence adopted rigorist, deontological norms. Several authors, including Jens Timmermann, have argued contra Hare that the gap between Kantian and utilitarian/consequentialist ethics is fundamental and cannot be bridged. This article shows that Timmermann’s claims rely on a systematic failure to separate normative and metaethical aspects of each view, and that Hare’s attempt to bridge the gap between Kantian and consequentialist ethics is immune to Timmermann’s criticisms. Furthermore, the term ‘Kantian ethics’ is often misleading, and should typically be qualified as either ‘Kantian rationalism’ or ‘Kantian deontology’ in order to avoid confusions of the sort Timmermann falls into.

 ——. “Two Dogmas of Kantian Ethics.” Journal of Value Inquiry 47.3 (2013): 255-69. [M]

Forschner, Maximilian. “Die Gemeinschaft im Glauben. Bemerkungen zu Kants Begriff der Kirche.” Kant und die Biblische Offenbarungsreligion / Kant a biblické Zjevené Náboženství. Eds. Norbert Fischer, Jakub Sirovátka, and David Voprada (op cit.). 73-84. [M]

Förster, Eckart. “Grenzen der Erkenntnis?” Self, World, and Art: Metaphysical Topics in Kant and Hegel. Ed. Dina Emundts (op cit.). 207-20. [M]

Förster-Beuthan, Yvonne. Rev. of Zeit — Wirklichkeit — Persistenz. Eine präsentistische Deutung der Raumzeit, by Cord Friebe (2012). Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 61.1 (2013): 162-66. [PW]

Forsyth, Murray. “The Scope and Limits of the Political: Hamilton and Kant.” Immanuel Kant and Alexander Hamilton, the Founders of Federalism. Ed. Roberto Castaldi (op cit.). 71-89. [M]

Franke, Mark. “A Critique of the Universalisability of Critical Human Rights Theory: The Displacement of Immanuel Kant.” Human Rights Review 14.4 (2013): 367-85. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: While the critically oriented writings of Immanuel Kant remain the key theoretical grounds from which universalists challenge reduction of international rights law and protection to the practical particularities of sovereign states, Kant’s theory can be read as also a crucial argument for a human rights regime ordered around sovereign states and citizens. Consequently, universalists may be tempted to push Kant’s thinking to greater critical examination of ‘the human’ and its properties. However, such a move to more theoretical rigour in critique only solidifies the subversive statism of Kant’s apparent universalism, as long as it remains embedded in his prior theory of critical philosophy that privileges a singular form of reason. Universalist theories of human rights can break with this contradiction only insofar as they also displace the right to philosophy from the subject and site of ‘civil’ man to a politics of theory where no such subject or site is guaranteed.

Fragelli, Isabel. “Sobre as Resenhas de Kant às Ideias para uma filosofia da história da humanidade, de Herder.” [Portuguese] Cadernos de Filosofia Alemã: Crítica e Modernidade 21 (2013): 47-60. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: It is intended to propose, in this paper, a reading of Kant’s Reviews to Herder’s Outlines of a philosophy of the history of man. By understanding some of Kant’s main objections to this work, we will be able to comprehend the most essential differences between the philosophical projects of both authors. We shall see that, unlike Kant’s opinions (whose interpretation of the Outlines is indeed very ungenerous), Herder also contributed, in his way, to the reconsideration of metaphysics.

Franzel, Sean. “A ‘Popular’, ’Private’ Lecturer?: Kant's Theory and Practice of University Instruction.” Eighteenth-Century Studies 47.1 (2013): 1-18. [M]

Fréchette, Guillaume. “Kant, Brentano and Stumpf on Psychology and Anti-Psychologism.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 5. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 727-36. [M]

Freer, Alexander. “Musicality and the Limits of Meaning in Wordsworth and Kant.” Paragraph 36.3 (2013): 324-43. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: I argue that the difficulty Kant encounters in evaluating music in the third Critique is caused by his problematic attempt to separate sound (the physical phenomenon) from meaning. Analogously, Wordsworth attempts in the Preface to divide metrical pleasure and the feeling derived from the semantic meaning of poems. In both cases, this separation can be overcome by a radical, Romantic understanding of musicality, whereby music not only participates in meaning but becomes its grounds. While this remains latent in Kant, Wordsworth’s ‘Tintern Abbey’ can assert the centrality of listening to thinking, which has important implications for his poetics.

Frey, Dieter. Philosophie der Führung: gute Führung lernen von Kant, Aristoteles, Popper & Co. Berlin: Springer, 2013. [341 p.] [WC]

Fricke, Christel. “Moral Dignity and Moral Vulnerability in a Kantian Perspective.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 197-205. [M]

Friebe, Cord. “War Kant ein B-Theoretiker der Zeit?” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 597-603. [M]

Friedman, Michael. Kant’s Construction of Nature: A Reading of the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. [xix, 624 p.] [WC]

Frierson, Patrick R. What is the Human Being? Abingdon/New York: Routledge, 2013. [ix, 322 p.] [WC] [review]

Friesen, Viktor. Die Idee der Verallgemeinerung in der Ethik: eine kritische Untersuchung der moralphilosophischen Entwürfe von I. Kant, M. G. Singer und R. M. Hare. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2013. [187 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Based on the author's doctoral dissertation (Uni-Hagen).

Fremstedal, Roe. “The Moral Argument for the Existence of God and Immortality: Kierkegaard and Kant.” Journal of Religious Ethics 41.1 (2013): 50-78. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This essay tries to show that there exist several passages where Kierkegaard (and his pseudonyms) sketches an argument for the existence of God and immortality that is remarkably similar to Kant’s so-called moral argument for the existence of God and immortality. In particular, Kierkegaard appears to follow Kant’s moral argument both when it comes to the form and content of the argument as well as some of its terminology. The essay concludes that several passages in Kierkegaard overlap significantly with Kant’s moral argument, although Kierkegaard ultimately favors revealed faith over natural theology in general and Kant’s moral faith in particular. Whereas Kant uses the moral argument to postulate the existence of God and immortality, Kierkegaard mainly uses it as a reductio ad absurdum of non-religious thinking.

Frericks, Hanns. Kant und seine Relevanz für ethische Probleme der Gegenwart: Vorträge und Aufsätze. Stuttgart: Opus Magnum, 2013. [343 p.] [WC]

Frilli, Enrico. “Per una filosofia del senso: Eric Weil interprete di Kant.” [Italian] Studi Kantiani 26 (2013): 93-106. [PW]

Froeyman, Anton. “The Other and the Subject: On the Conditions of Possibility of the Problem of Values in the Humanities and Social Sciences.” Objectivity after Kant. Eds. Gertrudis Van De Vijver and Boris Demarest (op cit.). 179-87. [M]

Fugate, Courtney. “Teleology, Freedom and Will in Kant’s Moral Philosophy.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 207-18. [M]

Fukuda, Kiiricho. Untersuchungen zu Kants Religionslehre. Marburg: Verlag Blaues Schloss, 2013. [43 p.] [WC]

Fulkerson-Smith, Brett A. “Bacon’s Illuminating Experiments and Kant’s Experiment of Pure Reason.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 5. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 455-66. [M]

[top] G    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Galeazzi, Umberto. “Sulla ragione kantiana separata dal reale: Legge morale, passioni, azioni concrete, felicità e bene.” [Italian] Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 219-31. [M]

Gallois, Laurent. “De la doctrine de la vertu à la religion: le fondement critique d'un passage.” Kant, théologie et religion. Ed. Robert Theis (op cit.). 57-73. [M]

Gamberini, Paola. “Guilt and Repentance: Kant on the Experience of Moral Responsibility in the Retrospective Evaluation of Actions.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 233-44. [M]

Gare, Arran. “From Kant to Schelling: The Subject, the Object, and Life.” Objectivity after Kant. Eds. Gertrudis Van De Vijver and Boris Demarest (op cit.). 129-40. [M]

Garrison, James. “Revolution in Kant’s Relation of Aesthetics to Morality. Regarding Negatively Free Beauty and Respecting Positively Free Will.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 4. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 47-57. [M]

Gaston, Sean. The Concept of World from Kant to Derrida. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013. [241 p.] [WC] [review]

Gava, Gabriele. “Kant’s Synthetic and Analytic Method in the Critique of Pure Reason and the Distinction between Philosophical and Mathematical Syntheses.” European Journal of Philosophy (Published online: 6 Mar 2013). [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article addresses Kant’s distinction between a synthetic and an analytic method in philosophy. I will first consider how some commentators have accounted for Kant’s distinction and analyze some passages in which Kant defined the analytic and the synthetic method. I will suggest that confusion about Kant’s distinction arises because he uses it in at least two different senses. I will then identify a specific way in which Kant accounts for this distinction when he is differentiating between mathematical and philosophical syntheses. I will examine Kant’s arguments in the Critique of Pure Reason with the latter sense of the distinction in mind. I will evaluate if he uses the analytic or the synthetic method and if the synthetic method is able to identify, without a previous consideration of some sort of given knowledge, sufficient conditions for deriving some aspects of our knowledge.

 ——. See: Searle, John, and Gabriele Gava.

Geiger, Ido. “Can Universal History Underwrite Kant’s Substantive Conception of Moral Value?” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 245-55. [M]

Gelfert, Axel. “Communicability and the Public Misuse of Communication: Kant on the Pathologies of Testimony.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 257-68. [M]

Geonget, Brigitte. “Délimitation et dépassement. La dynamique de l'excès et le «supplementum» religieux.” Kant, théologie et religion. Ed. Robert Theis (op cit.). 177-85. [M]

Gerardi, Giovanni. “La critica di Hegel al cosmopolitismo kantiano.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 5. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 737-48. [M]

Gerhardt, Volker. “Bewusstsein als Funktion der Mitteilung.” Das Leben der Vernunft: Beiträge zur Philosophie Kants. Eds. Dieter Hüning, Stefan Klingner, and Carsten Olk (op cit.). 733-50. [M]

 ——. “Öffentlichkeit bei Kant.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 4. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 659-75. [M]

 ——. “The Concept of Life in Kant and Nietzsche.” New Nietzsche Studies 9.1-2 (2013): 35-45. [PW]

Gerlach, Burkhard. Rev. of Kant und kein Ende, Bde. 1-3, by Georg Geismann (2009). [German] Kant-Studien 104.2 (2013): 237-50. [M]

Gheoghian, Maria. “Review of Kant-Studien, vol. 98, no. 1, 2007.” [Romanian] Revista de Filosofie 60.4 (2013): 452-62. [RC]

Giannetto, Giuseppe. Tempo e rappresentazione in Kant. Con uno Studio sul Tempo come struttura ontologica dei mondi possibili in Leibniz. [Italian] Pomigliano D'Arco: Diogene, 2013. [130 p.] [M]

Giannini, Heidi Chamberlin. “Korsgaard and the Wille/Willkür Distinction: Radical Constructivism and the Imputability of Immoral Actions.” Kant Studies Online (2013): 72-101; posted August 8, 2013. [M][online]

Gilgen, Peter. See: Chignell, Andrew and Peter Gilgen.

Gilmanov, Vladimir Hamitovic. I. G. Gaman i I. Kant: bitva za cistyj razum. [Russian; Hamann and Kant] Kaliningrad: Izdatel'stvo Baltijskogo federal'nogo universiteta, 2013. [226 p.] [WC]

 ——. “Thinking and Faith. An Afterword to the Correspondence Regarding Relations Between Hamann and Kant.” [Russian] Kantovsky Sbornik 44.2 (2013): 93-101. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article is somewhat of an afterword to the publication of Georg Hamann’s text — including his correspondence with Immanuel Kant, earlier not available to Russian readers and related to their complicated “philosophical” relation — on the pages of Kantovsky Sbornik. These materials have comprised a book entitled Hamann and Kant: a Struggle for Pure Reason, which will be published this year by Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University Press.

Ginsborg, Hannah. “Kant’s Perceiver.” Philosophy & Phenomenological Research 87.1 (2013): 221-28. [M]

 ——. “The Appearance of Spontaneity: Kant on Judgment and Empirical Self-Knowledge.” Self, World, and Art: Metaphysical Topics in Kant and Hegel. Ed. Dina Emundts (op cit.). 119-44. [M]

Giordanetti, Piero Emilio. “Kants neue Kritik der reinen Vernunft.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 1. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 555-65. [M]

Giovannini, Eduardo. “Reflections on Kant’s Theory of Geometrical Concepts Formation.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 5. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 43-54. [M]

Giusti, Miguel. “Zoología ético-política. Notas sobre una metáfora de Kant en Hacia la paz perpetua.” [Spanish; Ethical-Political Zoology. Notes on a Kantian Metaphor in Toward Perpetual Peace] Ideas y Valores (Colombia) 62, Suppl. #1 (2013): 37-47. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article provides an analysis of the zoological metaphor employed by Kant in Toward Perpetual Peace to characterize the appropriate conduct for politicians: that they be both “wise as serpents” and “guileless as doves”. While this metaphor has given rise to extensive and systematic interpretations of the relation between morality and politics in Kant’s thought, in this article the zoological reference is taken to express an archetypal reading of human conduct in political affairs, which could shed light on the problem that the metaphor attempts to illustrate.

Glazer, Trip. Rev. of Hegel’s Critique of Kant: From Dichotomy to Identity, by Sally Sedgwick (2012). Review of Metaphysics 66.3 (2013): 600-02. [M]

Glezer, Tal. “Kant on Existence and the Impossibility of an Ontological Proof.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 605-19. [M]

Godlove, Jr., Terry F. “The Objectivity of Regulative Principles in Kant’s Appendix to the Dialectic.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 129-40. [M]

Görg, Erdmann. “Kant und Fries: Kritik des Newtonschen Raumes.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 5. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 55-63. [M]

Golob, Sacha. “Heidegger on Kant, Time, and the ‘Form’ of Intentionality.” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21.2 (2012): 345-67. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Between 1927 and 1936, Martin Heidegger devoted almost one thousand pages of close textual commentary to the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. This article aims to shed new light on the relationship between Kant and Heidegger by providing a fresh analysis of two central texts: Heidegger’s 1927/8 lecture course Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and his 1929 monograph Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. I argue that to make sense of Heidegger’s reading of Kant, one must resolve two questions. First, how does Heidegger’s Kant understand the concept of the transcendental? Second, what role does the concept of a horizon play in Heidegger’s reconstruction of the Critique? I answer the first question by drawing on Cassam’s model of a self-directed transcendental argument (‘The role of the transcendental within Heidegger’s Kant’), and the second by examining the relationship between Kant’s doctrine that ‘pure, general logic’ abstracts from all semantic content and Hume’s attack on metaphysics (‘The role of the horizon within Heidegger’s Kant’). I close by sketching the implications of my results for Heidegger’s own thought (‘From Heidegger’s Kant to Sein und Zeit’). Ultimately, I conclude that Heidegger’s commentary on the Critical system is defined, above all, by a single issue: the nature of the ‘form’ of intentionality.

Gomes, Anil. “Kant and the Explanatory Role of Experience.” Kant-Studien 104.3 (2013): 277-300. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: We are able to think of empirical objects as capable of existing unperceived. What explains our grasp of this conception of objects? In this paper I examine the claim that experience explains our understanding of objects as capable of existing unperceived with reference to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. I argue that standard accounts of experience’s explanatory role are unsatisfactory, but that an alternative account can be extracted from the first Critique – one which relies on Kant’s transcendental idealism.

Gonnelli, Filippo. “Moral Teleology and Moral Theology in the Kritik der Urteilskraft.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 269-80. [M]

González Fisac, Jesús. “Ilustración y mecanismo. Metafísica del uso privado de razón.” [Spanish] Estudos Kantianos 1.1 (2013): 183-205. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the Beantwortung the Enlightenment is related to the freedom of the public use of reason. However, this freedom cannot be separated from mechanism, as well as the public use of reason cannot be separated from the private use. In this paper we want to show some aspects of this mechanism and of its very need for freedom itself, which will reveal the essential pragmatic condition of the Enlightenment. The mechanism is ultimately — and therefore metaphysically — a condition of the being of man (which is active and passive at the same time), of the logical use of his faculties (which can be reflective and determinative) and of the form of government (which can be republican and despotic).

Gorner, Paul. Rev. of Johann Gottlieb Fichte: Ein deutscher Philosoph 1762-1814, by Manfred Kuehn (2012). Kantian Review 18.3 (2013): 483-87. [M]

Gorodeisky, Keren. “Schematizing without a Concept? Imagine that!” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 4. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 59-70. [M]

Gottschlich, Max. “Welche „Natur“ gibt der Kunst die Regel? – Zur Präsenz des spekulativen Vernunftbegriffs in Kants Kunstphilosophie.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 4. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 71-83. [M]

Goy, Ina. “Virtue and Sensibility (TL 6:399-409).” Kant’s Tugendlehre. Eds. Trampota, Sensen, and Timmermann (op cit.). 183-206. [M]

 ——. “Die Deduktion des Sittengesetzes in den Jahren 1785, 1788 und 1788–90 und der Wandel in Kants Naturbegriff.” Kants Rechtfertigung des Sittengesetzes in Grundlegung III: Deduktion oder Faktum? Ed. Heiko Puls (op cit.). 167-88. [PW]

 ——. “On Judging Nature as a System of Ends.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 5. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 65-76. [M]

Grandjean, Antoine. “«Rien pour nous», «Moins qu’un rêve», «autant que rien du tout». Le nerf de la Déduction transcendantale des catégories.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 141-52. [M]

Grapotte, Sophie. “Le concept d'«ens realissimum» dans «l'Idéal transcendantal». La persistance d'un concept dogmatique au sein du criticisme?” Kant, théologie et religion. Ed. Robert Theis (op cit.). 97-105. [M]

 ——. “Validité et réalité de l'idée de Dieu dans l'usage théorique et pratique de la raison pure.” Glaube und Vernunft in der Philosophie der Neuzeit. Eds. Dietmar H. Weidemann and Raoul Weicker (op cit.). 51-64. [M]

 ——. Rev. of Kant and the Early Moderns, edited by Daniel Garber and Béatrice Longuenesse (2008). [French] Kant-Studien 104.2 (2013): 260-65. [M]

Grenberg, Jeanine. Kant’s Defense of Common Moral Experience: A Phenomenological Account. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. [xi, 300 p.] [WC] [review]

Gressis, Robert A. “The Relationship Between the Gesinnung and the Denkungsart.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 4. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 403-12. [M]

Griswold, Charles. See: Kuehn, Manfred, and Charles Griswold.

Grüne, Stefanie. “Kant and the Spontaneity of the Understanding.” Self, World, and Art: Metaphysical Topics in Kant and Hegel. Ed. Dina Emundts (op cit.). 145-76. [M]

Grünewald, Bernward. “Kant und die Grundlegung der Geisteswissenschaften.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 5. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 77-88. [M]

Gubman, Boris Lvovich. “Kant and Derrida on Philosophy in a Cosmopolitan Sense.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 4. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 683-94. [M]

Guenova, Ludmila L. “Leibniz, Kant, and the Doctrine of a Complete Concept.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 5. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 335-46. [M]

Guyer, Paul. “A Declaration of Interdependence.” European Journal of Philosophy 21.3 (2013): 495-505. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: This is a review article of Kant’s Thinker by Patricia Kitcher (2011).

 ——. “Kant über moralische Gefühle: Von den Vorlesungen zur Metaphysik der Sitten.” Kants “Metaphysik der Sitten” in der Diskussion. Eds. Werner Euler and Burkhard Tuschling (op cit.). 177-209. [M]

 ——. “Progress toward autonomy.” Kant on Moral Autonomy. Ed. Oliver Sensen (op cit.). 71-86. [M]

 ——. “Freedom and the Essential Ends of Mankind.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 1. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 229-44. [M]

 ——. “The End of Art and the Interpretation of Geist.” Self, World, and Art: Metaphysical Topics in Kant and Hegel. Ed. Dina Emundts (op cit.). 283-306. [M]

 ——. “Constructivism and Self-constitution.” Kant on Practical Justification. Eds. Mark Timmons and Sorin Baiasu (op cit.). 176-200. [M]

 ——. “On Robert Clewis’s The Kantian Sublime and the Revelation of Freedom.” Critique (blog posted: 10 Mar 2013) n.p. [PW] [online]

 ——. “Kant’s Legacy.” The Philosophers’ Magazine 63.4 (2013): 36-43. [PW]

 ——. Rev. of Kant’s Elliptical Path, by Karl Ameriks (2012). Mind 122.488 (2013): 1053-61. [PW]

[top] H    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Haag, Johannes. “Grenzbegriffe und die Antinomie der teleologischen Urteilskraft.” Ubergänge — diskursiv oder intuitiv? Essays zu Eckart Försters Die 25 Jahre der Philosophie. Eds. Johannes Haag and Markus Wild (op cit.). 141-72. [M]

 —— and Markus Wild, eds. Ubergänge — diskursiv oder intuitiv? Essays zu Eckart Försters Die 25 Jahre der Philosophie. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 2013. [364 p.] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Notes: These papers were first presented at a conference held at the Humboldt University (Berlin) in June 2012.
Contents: Tobias Rosefeldt (Die 36 Jahre der Philosophie: zum transzendentalphilosophischen Potential von Kants Inauguraldissertation), Dina Emundts (Kants Grenzziehung in der Kritik der reinen Vernunft), Karl Ameriks (0n "Kritik und Moral"), Eric Watkins (Shifts and Incompleteness in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason?), Yitzhak Melamed (Mapping the Labyrinth of Spinoza's Scientia Intuitiva), Ulrich Schlösser (Kants Begriff des Transzendentalen und die Grenzen der intelligiblen und der sinnlichen Welt), Johannes Haag (Grenzbegriffe und die Antinomie der teleologischen Urteilskraft), Gunnar Hindrichs (Subjektivität und System oder anschauender Verstand?), Johannes Haag (Fichtes Schwebende Einbildungskraft), Daniel Breazeale (Das Praktische in the Early Wissenschaftslehre), Dalia Nassar (Intellectual Intuition and the Philosophy of Nature), David E. Wellbery (Zur Methodologie des intuitiven Verstandes), Terry Pinkard (From Schelling's Naturalism to Hegel's Naturalism), Michael Rosen (Should the History of Systematic Philosophy he Systematically Reconstructed?), Rolf-Peter Horstmann (Die Phänomenologie, der intuitive Verstand und das neue Denken), Markus Wild (Welches Ende der Philosophie?), Eckart Förster (Eine systematische Rekonstruktion?).

Hahmann, Andree. “Pflichtgemäß, aber töricht! Kant über Spinozas Leugnung der Vorsehung.” Das Leben der Vernunft: Beiträge zur Philosophie Kants. Eds. Dieter Hüning, Stefan Klingner, and Carsten Olk (op cit.). 477-505. [M]

 ——. “Weltbürger und Philosoph im Garten – Wie stoisch ist die kantische Geschichtsphilosophie?” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 4. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 695-706. [M]

 ——. Rev. of Kants Lösung des Theodizeeproblems. Eine Rekonstruktion, by Volker Dieringer (2009). [German] Kant-Studien 104.2 (2013): 268-70. [M]

Haines, Simon. Redemption in Poetry and Philosophy: Wordsworth, Kant, and the making of the post-Christian imagination. Waco, Texas: Baylor University Press, 2013. [xx, 249 p.] [M]

Hajime, Tanabe and Cody Staton. “An Essay on Kant’s Theory of Freedom from the Early Works of Tanabe Hajime.” Comparative & Continental Philosophy 5.2 (2013): 150-56. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper presents the first English translation of one of Tanabe’s early essays on Kant. Tanabe marks the occasion of the first translation of the Critique of Practical Reason into Japanese by providing his reflections on Kant’s theory of freedom in this essay. This creative essay by Tanabe represents the hallmark Kyoto School interpretation of Kant. Tanabe weaves his account of Kant with elements from other philosophers in an attempt to think systematically about the nature of freedom. He agrees with Kant that morality itself “rises and falls” with the idea of freedom; however, Tanabe also tries to rescue some of the pitfalls he sees in Kant’s theory by reconstructing Kant’s account. In this brief, but rich essay,Tanabe unfolds one of the more creative aspects of his philosophy through Kant.

Hall, Bryan. “Kant and Quine on the Two Dogmas of Empiricism.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 5. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 749-60. [M]

Hamm, Christian. “'Erkenntnis nach der Analogie': zu Form und Funktion indirekter Argumentation bei Kant.” Das Leben der Vernunft: Beiträge zur Philosophie Kants. Eds. Dieter Hüning, Stefan Klingner, and Carsten Olk (op cit.). 208-18. [M]

 ——. “Freies Spiel der Erkenntniskräfte und ästhetische Ideen.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 4. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 85-95. [M]

 ——. “A natureza ‘inatural’ da razão em Kant.” [Portuguese; The ‘unnatural’ nature of reason in Kant] Studia Kantiana 11.15 (2013): 153-64. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Reflecting upon the “nature” of reason in Kant means, first of all, reflecting upon something entirely “unnatural”, that is something which, strictly speaking, does not belong to what, in Kant’s view, represents “the nature”. Basing on the well-known kantian definition according to which “nature” means “the existence of things as determined by universal laws” (Prol., § 14), it is evident that – notwithstanding the possibility or even the necessity of considering it the source of such universal laws – reason as such does not belong to the “things” whose “existence” can be determined by those laws. Belonging to such kind of nature reason would turn an object of possible empirical knowledge and, accordingly, have to correspond to something in the world of phenomena – what obviously is not the case. Consequently, saying that the nature of reason is unnatural implies that reason not can be an object of possible knowledge or, in other words, that it merely represents an empty conception without any “real signification”. – My paper aims at analyzing this paradoxical situation and intends to point out, at least, one possible approach in order to understand the peculiar character of what can signify “nature of reason” within the scope of the kantian transcendental system on the whole.

Hancock, Curtis. Rev. of Kant and Milton, by Sanford Budick (2010). Review of Metaphysics 66.4 (2013): 828-30. [M]

Hanke, Thomas. “Kein Wunder und keine Instruktion. Kants Umgang mit dem Offenbarungsbegriff vor und in der Religionsschrift als Beitrag zu dessen diskreter Transformation.” Kant und die Biblische Offenbarungsreligion / Kant a biblické Zjevené Náboženství. Eds. Norbert Fischer, Jakub Sirovátka, and David Voprada (op cit.). 15-28. [M]

Hanna, Robert. “Kant, Hegel, and the Fate of Non-Conceptual Content.” Hegel Bulletin 34.1 (2013): 1-32. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper, I argue that if you want to be a consistent Kantian transcendental idealist, then you have to defend the strongest possible version of Non-Conceptualism; but if you want to be a consistent Conceptualist, then Hegel was absolutely right that you have to go all the way to absolute idealism and what I call ‘super-Conceptualism’, because the strongest possible version of Non-Conceptualism trumps any weaker version of Conceptualism. So you cannot consistently split the difference between Conceptualism and super-Conceptualism in the way that, e.g., contemporary neo-Hegelians like John McDowell and Robert Brandom attempt to do.

 ——. “Forward to Idealism: On Eckart Förster’s The Twenty-Five Years of Philosophy.” Kantian Review 18.2 (2013): 301-15. [M]

Hare, John. “The Place of Kant’s Theism in His Moral Philosophy.” Kant on Practical Justification. Eds. Mark Timmons and Sorin Baiasu (op cit.). 300-14. [M]

Hatfield, Gary. “Russell’s Progress: Spatial Dimensions, the From-Which, and the At-Which.” Self, World, and Art: Metaphysical Topics in Kant and Hegel. Ed. Dina Emundts (op cit.). 321-44. [M]

Haumesser, Matthieu. “L’ancrage de la philosophie transcendantale dans l’usage empirique des facultas.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 1. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 567-74. [M]

Hay, Carol. Kantianism, Liberalism, and Feminism: Resisting Oppression. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. [xiv, 202 p.] [PW] [review]

Hedrick, Todd. Rev. of Kant and Cosmopolitanism: The Philosophical Idea of World Citizenship, by Pauline Kleingeld (2012). British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21.3 (2013): 623-27. [PW]

Heflik, Włodzimierz. Problem formy w perspektywie transcendentalnej u Kanta i Wittgensteina: analiza porównawcza na podstawie "Krytyki czystego rozumu" i "Traktatu logiczno-filozoficznego". [Polish] Kraków: Wydawnictwo Antykwa, 2013. [428 p.] [WC]

 ——. “Kants Theorie der Affinität und das Prinzip der prästabilierten Harmonie.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 5. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 347-58. [M]

Heidegger, Martin. Seminare Kant - Leibniz - Schiller, ed. by Günther Neumann. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2013. [xxxviii, 894 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Vol. 84 of the Heidegger Gesamtausgabe.

Heidemann, Dietmar H. “‘Daß ich bin’. Zu Kants Begriff des reinen Existenzbewusstseins.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 153-64. [M]

 ——. “Skeptizismus und Metaphysikkritik. Untersuchungen zu Kant und Hegel.” Das Leben der Vernunft: Beiträge zur Philosophie Kants. Eds. Dieter Hüning, Stefan Klingner, and Carsten Olk (op cit.). 153-70. [M]

 ——, ed. Kant and Non-Conceptual Content. London/New York: Routledge, 2013. [ix, 227 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Most of the contributions were originally published in the International Journal of Philosophical Studies, vol. 19 (2011) — see for individual articles and abstracts.
Content: Dietmar H. Heidemann (Introduction. Kant and non-conceptual content: the origin of the problem), Robert Hanna (Beyond the myth of the myth: a Kantian theory of non-conceptual content), Robert Hanna (Kant's non-conceptualism, rogue objects, and the gap in the B deduction), Brady Bowman (A conceptualist reply to Hanna's Kantian non-conceptualism), Terry F. Godlove, Jr. (Hanna, Kantian non-conceptualism, and Benacerraf's dilemma), Stefanie Grüne (Is there a gap in Kant's B deduction?), Tobias Schlicht (Non-conceptual content and the subjectivity of consciousness), Hannah Ginsborg (Was Kant a nonconceptualist?).

 ——, ed. Kant Yearbook: Kant and Contemporary Theory of Knowledge. Berlin / Boston: De Gruyter, 2013. [168 p.] [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Kant Yearbook 2013, vol. 5.
Content: Jochen Briesen (Is Kant (W)right? - On Kant’s Regulative Ideas and Wright’s Entitlements),
Alix Cohen (Kant on Doxastic Voluntarism and its Implications for Epistemic Responsibility),
Patricia Kitcher (Kant versus the Asymmetry Dogma),
Ansgar Seide (Kant on Empirical Knowledge and Induction in the Two Introductions to the Critique of the Power of Judgment),
Markos Valaris (Spontaneity and Cognitive Agency: A Kantian Approach to the Contemporary Debate),
Kenneth R. Westphal (Kant’s Cognitive Semantics, Newton’s Rule 4 of Experimental Philosophy and Scientific Realism Today).

 —— and Raoul Weicker, eds. Glaube und Vernunft in der Philosophie der Neuzeit / Foi et raison dans la philosophie moderne: Festschrift für Robert Theis / Recueil en hommage à Robert Theis. Hildesheim/Zürich/New York: George Olms Verlag, 2013. [xiv, 267 p.] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Vol. 85 of Studien und Materialien zur Geschichte der Philosophie. See essays by Alexander Aichele (Was heisst "ein Prädikat sein"?: zu Kants Kritik des ontologischen Gottesbeweises), Jean Ferrari (Foi doctrinale et foi rationnelle dans l'oeuvre de Kant), Sophie Grapotte (Validité et réalité de l'idée de Dieu dans l'usage théorique et pratique de la raison pure), Claude Piché (La conscience morale en matière de foi chez Kant), Raoul Weicker (Kants Kryptoanthropologie), Günter Zöller (Hoffen-Dürfen: Kants kritische Begründung des moralischen Glaubens).

Heinz, Marion. “Vernunft ist nur Eine: Untersuchungen zur Vernunftkonzeption in Herders Metakritik.” Herders “Metakritik”: Analysen und Interpretationen. Ed. Marion Heinz (op cit.). 163-94. [M]

 ——, ed. Herders “Metakritik”: Analysen und Interpretationen. Stuttgart: frommann-holzboog, 2013. [276 p.] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: The papers originated from a conference held at the Universität-Siegen (July 2009): Herders Metakritik. Transformationen vorkritischer — Figurationen nachkantischer Philosophie.
Contents: Angelica Nuzzo (Sensibility in Kant and Herder’s Metakritik), Petra Lohmann (Herders Begriff des "Lebendigen Daseyns": zum Verhätnis von Sein und Bewusstsein in der Metakritik und deren Bedeutung für die ästhetische Diskussion am Beispiel der zeitgenössischen Architektur), Oswald Bayer (Wider die Sprachvergessenheit transzendentaler Vernunftkritik: eine Einführung in Hamanns Metakritik über den Purismum der Vernunft), Violetta Stolz (Der Nonsense der Metaphysik: Kant, Herder und Horne Tooke), Martin Bondeli ("Ohn' alle Erfahrung": Herders Kritik an Kants Formalismus), Pierluigi Valenza (Wege des Realismus: Herder, Reinhold und Bardili im Vergleich), Andreas Arndt (Herders Kritik der transzendentalen Dialektik), Marion Heinz (Vernunft ist nur Eine: Untersuchungen zur Vernunftkonzeption in Herders Metakritik), Markus Buntfuss ("Protestantismus ist also die Metakritik": zu Herders nach-theistischer Religionstheologie), Manfred Baum (Herder über Kants "Verfehlte Kritik der reinen Vernunft"), Rainer Wisbert (Die Idee der philosophischen Selbstbildung: Herders pädagogische Auseinandersetzung mit Kant in der Metakritik), Günter Zöller (Mensch und Erde: die geo-anthropologische Parallelaktion von Herder und Kant).

Henschen, Tobias. “Kant’s Pragmatism.” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21.1 (2012): 165-76. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article offers a definition of the term ‘pragmatic’, as it is used in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. The definition offered does not make any reference to the affinities between Kant’s pragmatism and the philosophies of the American or other pragmatists but draws its definiens entirely from the Kantian conceptual framework. It states that the term ‘pragmatic’ denotes imperatives, laws and beliefs of a specific type: an imperative is pragmatic if and only if it is concerned with the choice of means to individual or universal happiness; a law is pragmatic if and only if our willingness to presuppose it results from our obedience to a pragmatic imperative; and a belief is pragmatic if and only if it relates to the objective validity of pragmatic laws. This article also discusses two rival definitions of the term ‘pragmatic’ (as used by Kant) that have been brought forward by Sidney Axinn and Nicholas Rescher.

Herman, Barbara. “Making Exceptions.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 1. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 245-61. [M]

Hernández Marcos, Maximiliano, and Tatiana Vaquero Alameda. “Kant's criminal wisdom: a critical reconstruction.” Archiwum Historii Filozofii i Mysli Spolecznej 58 (2013): 93-106. [WC]

Herrera Noguera, Mónica. “Kant’s Exemplary Art – a Philosophy of Art Beyond Rules.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 4. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 97-106. [M]

Herrera, Wilson. “Una interpretación constructivista del principio kantiano del derecho y de la idea del contrato original.” [Spanish; A Constructivist Interpretation of the Kantian Principle of Right and of the Idea of the Original Contract] Ideas y Valores (Colombia) 62, Suppl. #1 (2013): 85-108. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The main purpose of this article is to carry out a constructivist analysis of the concept of law regarding two of the most important principles in Kant’s political philosophy: the principle of right and the idea of the original contract. The article starts out with a brief presentation of the meaning of Kantian constructivism, and then goes on to analyze the concept of right and of the attributes that define citizenships: freedom, equality, and civil independence. Finally, it examines the Kantian conception of the original contract in order to demonstrate that, according to Kant, there are political duties of both right and virtue.

Hespe, Franz. “Kants Prinzip der Zweckmäßigkeit und Hegels Begriff der Subjektivität.” Das Leben der Vernunft: Beiträge zur Philosophie Kants. Eds. Dieter Hüning, Stefan Klingner, and Carsten Olk (op cit.). 263-84. [M]

 ——. “Rechtsbegründung und Sicherung des Meinen nach Kants Einteilung der Rechtslehre.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 809-23. [M]

Hicks, Amanda. “Kant’s Response to the Principle of Sufficient Reason.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 5. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 359-70. [M]

Hill, Thomas. “Imperfect Duties to Oneself (TL 6:444-447).” Kant’s Tugendlehre. Eds. Trampota, Sensen, and Timmermann (op cit.). 293-308. [M]

 ——. “Kantian Autonomy and Contemporary Ideas of Autonomy.” Kant on Moral Autonomy. Ed. Oliver Sensen (op cit.). 15-31. [M]

 ——. “Varieties of Constructivism.” Reading Onora O’Neill. Ed. David Archard, Monique Deveaux, Neil Manson, and Daniel Weinstock (op cit.). 37-54. [M]

Hiltscher, Reinhard. “Gegenstandsbegriff und funktionale Reflexivität in Kants Transzendentaler Deduktion.” Das Leben der Vernunft: Beiträge zur Philosophie Kants. Eds. Dieter Hüning, Stefan Klingner, and Carsten Olk (op cit.). 40-61. [M]

Himmelmann, Beatrix. “Vom Umgang mit Widersprüchen – Aufrichtigkeit und ihre Bedeutung für Kants Begriff der Philosophie.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 1. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 575-87. [M]

Hindrichs, Gunnar. “Subjektivität und System oder anschauender Verstand?” Ubergänge — diskursiv oder intuitiv? Essays zu Eckart Försters Die 25 Jahre der Philosophie. Eds. Johannes Haag and Markus Wild (op cit.). 173-90. [M]

Hinske, Norbert. “Kants Verankerung der Kritik im Weltbegriff. Einige Anmerkungen zu KrV B 866 ff.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 1. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 263-75. [M]

 ——. “The wasted years. Another take on the achievements, problems, and shortcomings of the academic collection of Kant’s works.” [Russian; translated from the German] Kantovsky Sbornik 45.3 (2013): 103-11. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The possibilities for improvement of the first volumes of the Academic edition of Kant’s works are discussed. The collegiality and deliberativeness of the researchers and institutions, involved in Kantian studies, which allowed for the high quality of early volumes, is absent today. The responsible institutions and publishers do not react to information regarding even the most obvious shortcomings and mistakes that could be easily corrected, while the plans for future reprints are based predominantly on commercial interests. The problems of unification of orthography, correction of mistakes in recent reprints, incorrect abbreviations of names, differences in printed editions are discussed in detail.

Ho, Tsung-Hsing. “Kant and McDowell on Skepticism and Disjunctivism.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 5. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 761-70. [M]

Hodgson, Louis-Philippe. “Needs and External Freedom in Kant’s Doctrine of Right.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 825-33. [M]

Hofer, Michael, and Christopher Meiller, Hans Schelkshorn, Kurt Appel, and Rudolf Langthaler. Der Endzweck der Schöpfung: zu den Schlussparagraphen (§§84-91) in Kants Kritik der Urteilskraft. Freiburg: Verlag Karl Alber, 2013. [432 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents:Klaus Düsing (Ethische Metaphysik: Anfänge bei Platon und Ausführungen bei Kant), Hans-Dieter Klein (Analogia entis und absolute Dialektik), Wolfdietrich Schmied-Kowarzik ("Von dem Endzwecke — der Schöpfung selbst": einige bruchstückhafte Reflexionen zu Schellings lebenslangem Ringen mit Kants Kritik der Urteilskraft), Christian Danz (Der Lehrer des Evangeliums und der Endzweck der Schöpfung: Religionsbegründung und Christentumstheorie bei Immanuel Kant), Ulrich Barth (Kant und Habermas: die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft aus der Sicht der Diskurstheorie), Walter Raberger (" -- wer einmal Kritik gekostet hat, -- ": Prolegomenon haud magnum), Christian Illies (Kann die teleologische Urteilskraft naturalisiert werden?), Norbert Fischer (Endzweck Mensch: zum Sinn der Schöpfung nach Immanuel Kant), Ludwig Nagl (Erkundungsversuche des "großen Höffens": Kants Religionsphilosophie und der Hoffnungsbegriff von "Kant's children, the Cambridge pragmatists" (James und Royce)) Herta Nagl-Docekal (Ein säkularer Trost?: Sterblichkeit als Thema des nachmetaphysischen Denkens), Hans-]oachim Höhn (Handeln unter Ungewissheit: Skizzen zu einer postsäkularen "Ethico-Theologie"), Violetta L. Waibel (Kants Widerlegung von Spinozas teleologischem Idealismus und der Realismus seiner spekulativen Teleologie), Klaus Müller (Kants Ideen und die Ontologie: Gedanken im Anschluss an Rudolf Langthalers Radikalisierung der Postulatenlehre), Thomas Rentsch (Urteilskraft, Dialektik, Sprachkritik: ein Essay zu Kant, Hegel und Wittgenstein), Wilhelm Lütterfelds (Der moralische Gottesbeweis: ein pragmatischer Glaube der Vernunft (Kant) und die Paradoxien des Beweis-Diskurses), Volker Gerhardt (Die geschichtliche Gegenwart Gottes: ein Versuch zur Deutung von Kants Ethikotheologie).

Höffe, Otfried. Kant: crítica da razão pura os fundamentos da filosofia moderna. [Portuguese] Translated from the German by Roberto Hofmeister Pich. São Paulo: Edições Loyola, 2013. [355 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Originally published as Otfried Höffe, Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft: Die Grundlegung der modernen Philosophie (C. H. Beck, 2003).

 ——. “Anthropology and Metaphysics in Kant’s Categorical Imperative of Law. An Interpretation of Rechtslehre §§B and C.” Kant on Practical Justification. Eds. Mark Timmons and Sorin Baiasu (op cit.). 110-24. [M]

Hoffer, Noam. “Kant’s Religion and the Reflective Judgment.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 883-97. [M]

Hogan, Desmond. “Metaphysical Motives of Kant’s Analytic–Synthetic Distinction.” Journal of the History of Philosophy 51.2 (2013): 267-307. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The paper identifies metaphysical motives underwriting Kant’s analytic-synthetic distinction. Kant denies the reducibility of his synthetic to analytic judgments by conceptual analysis. Leibniz upholds general reducibility, presenting the Principle of Sufficient Reason as its instrument. I argue that Kant’s irreducibility doctrine involves a threefold metaphysical critique of Leibniz’s PSR. First, this principle is described as incompatible with the metaphysics of experience. Second, Kant claims it is incompatible with the metaphysical contingency of free agency. I find here a crucial and neglected motivation underpinning Kant’s doctrine of synthetic causal judgment. Finally, Leibniz’s principle supposedly entails an untenable metaphysics of divine necessity.

Holtman, Sarah. “Justice, Ethics and the Lessons of Context-Sensitivity.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 835-47. [M]

 ——. Rev. of Kant and the End of War: A Critique of Just War Theory, by Howard Williams (2012). Kantian Review 18.2 (2013): 334-38. [M]

Horstmann, Rolf-Peter. “Propositional Activity in Kant and Hegel.” Self, World, and Art: Metaphysical Topics in Kant and Hegel. Ed. Dina Emundts (op cit.). 17-39. [M]

Höwing, Thomas. Praktische Lust: Kant über das Verhältnis von Fühlen, Begehren und praktischer Vernunft. Berlin / Boston: De Gruyter, 2013. [x, 272 p.] [M]

 ——. “Das Verhältnis der Vermögen des menschlichen Gemüts zu den Sittengesetzen (MS 6:211-214).” Kant’s Tugendlehre. Eds. Trampota, Sensen, and Timmermann (op cit.). 25-58. [M]

Hruschka, Joachim. “Immanuel Kant.” Wörterbuch der Würde. Eds. Rolf Gröschner, Antje Kapust, and Oliver W. Lembcke (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 2013). 40. [M]

Hühn, Helmut and James Vigus, eds. Symbol and Intuition: Comparative Studies in Kantian and Romantic-Period Aesthetics. London: Legenda, 2013. [xiii, 214 p.] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Stephan Meier-Oeser, "Kant's transformation of the symbol-concept"; Jane Kneller, "'Mere nature in the subject': Kant on symbolic representation of the absolute"; Jutta Heinz, "'Neither mere allegories nor mere history': multi-layered symbolism in Moritz's Andreas Hartknopf"; Helmut Heinz, "Comparative morphology and symbolic mediation in Goethe"; Jan Urbich, "Friedrich Schlegel's symbol-concept"; Cecilia Muratori, "Bread, wine and water: Hegel's distinction between mystical and symbolical in The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate"; James Vigus, "'All are but parts of one stupendous whole'?: Henry Crabb Robinson's dilemma"; James Vigus, "The spark of intuitive reason: Coleridge's 'On the Prometheus of Aeschylus'"; Jeffrey Einboden, "Emerson's exegesis: transcending symbols"; Temilo Van Zantwijk, "Pointing at hidden things: intuition and creativity"; Gottfried Gabriel, "Aesthetic cognition and aesthetic judgment".

Hulshof, Monique. “Die transzendentale Reflexion und der Begriff des Noumenon in negativer Bedeutung.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 621-31. [M]

 ——. “La réalité objective de l'idée de Dieu: un «schématisme analogique»?” Kant, théologie et religion. Ed. Robert Theis (op cit.). 135-43. [M]

Hüning, Dieter. “Humes Wunderkritik und das Problem des Zeugnisses anderer.” Das Leben der Vernunft: Beiträge zur Philosophie Kants. Eds. Dieter Hüning, Stefan Klingner, and Carsten Olk (op cit.). 453-76. [M]

 ——. “Utilitarismus und Gerechtigkeit im Strafrecht.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 5. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 467-80. [M]

 ——. “Kant’s Theory of Criminal Law and the jus talionis.” Estudos Kantianos 1.1 (2013): 139-60. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant‘s theory of criminal Right was already criticized by his contemporaries. His manner of speaking of the „blood debt“ and his rehabilitation of the jus talionis were considered a relapse into the Middle Ages. The essay tries to show against this the reasons that Kant had in order to discharge the principle of retaliation: the dominant theory of punishment as a deterrent (in Pufendorf, Wolff, Beccaria and many other representatives of the criminal political Enlightenment) leads to increase the punishment arbitrarily and to threaten with tougher penalties, because only in this way can the purpose of deterrence be achieved. Kant, however, thinks that the degree of the punishment must be appropriate to the weight of the crime. Such a consistency between crime and punishment is only guaranteed within the frame of the jus talionis.

 ——. “‘Rousseau set me aright’ – The Legacy of Rousseau in Kant’s legal and political philosophy and the idealization of the volonté générale.” Estudos Kantianos 1.2 (2013): 107-120. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article tries to expose the relationship between Rousseau and Kant with regard to the concept of the general will. In part I, it is analyzed, what is the central theme in Rousseau’s Contrat social, i.e., the reconciliation of freedom to authority. Then (in part II) the article is concerned with the question how Rousseau’s concept of the general will has influenced the constitutional law of Immanuel Kant. In part III it is discussed how Kant has changed the theory of the general will in order to combine it with a representative constitution of the republic.

 ——. “Beccaria, Kant und die kriminalpolitische Aufklärung.” Studia Philosophica Kantiana 2013.1 (2013): 36-51. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The paper investigates some aspects of the critique which was presented by the criminal-political Enlightenment, particularly connected with the name Cesare Beccaria, and aimed against the prevalent practice in criminal law. Beside torture it was particularly death penalty that became the object of the enlightened critique. However, a more thorough research shows that from the point of view of humanity there were much fewer objections raised against the cruelty of criminal practice than there were thoughts about its utility. According to this, reform proposals focus on changes of criminal judiciary in the form of utilitarianism. In the last part the author outlines the opposite views of I. Kant who definitely overcame the theoretical utilitarianism of the Enlightenment in criminal law.

 ——, Stefan Klingner, and Carsten Olk, eds. Das Leben der Vernunft: Beiträge zur Philosophie Kants. Berlin / Boston: De Gruyter, 2013. [xi, 805 p.] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents: [Festschrift on the occasion of Bernd Dörflinger's 60th birthday]
Gerold Prauss: Das Kontinuum bei Kant und Aristoteles
Henny Blomme: Können wir den ursprünglichen Raum erkennen?
Reinhard Hiltscher: Gegenstandsbegriff und funktionale Reflexivität in Kants Transzendentaler Deduktion
Carsten Olk: Das Transzendentale Schema: ein Produkt der Einbildungskraft?
Mario Caimi: Das Schema der Qualität bzw. der Realität
Jacinto Rivera de Rosales: Versuch, den Begriff des eigenen Körpers in die Kritik der reinen Vernunft einzuführen
Guido Antonio de Almeida: Zu Kants Widerlegung des Idealismus
Dietmar H. Heidemann: Skeptizismus und Metaphysikkritik: Untersuchungen zu Kant und Hegel
Nuria Sanchez Madrid: Die Anwendung der skeptischen Methode auf die Auflösung der Antinomien und das Leben theoretischer Vernunft
Thomas M. Seebohm: Kants Theorie einer eigentlich rationalen Naturwissenschaft und die Revolutionen der Mathematik und der Physik im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert
Christian Hamm: "Erkenntnis nach der Analogie": zu Form und Funktion indirekter Argumentation bei Kant
Giuseppe Motta: Kants Begriff der "exemplarischen Notwendigkeit" innerhalb der modalen Architektur der Analytik des Schönen
Stefan Klingner: Zum Problem der objektiven Realität von Kants Naturzweckbegriff
Franz Hespe: Kants Prinzip der Zweckmäßigkeit und Hegels Begriff der Subjektivität
María Jesús Vázquez Lobeiras: Vorurteile als Grenzen der auszuübenden Vernunft
Benedikt Strobel: αγαθον ("gut"): ein Ausdruck für viele Eigenschaften? Eine logisch-semantische Untersuchung im Hinblick auf Arist. EN 1096a23-29
Ubirajara Rancan de Azevedo Marques: Philologische Bemerkungen zum Gebrauch der Begriffe "angeboren" und "ursprünglich" in Kants praktischer und theoretischer Philosophie
Sílvia Altmann: Geometrie und objektive Realität der Idee der Sittlichkeit in der Kritik der praktischen Vernunft
Claudio La Rocca: Kant on Self-knowledge and Conscience
Günter Krück: "Verträge ohne das Schwert sind bloße Worte ...": zur unterschiedlichen Begründung des wangscharakters des Rechts
Ricardo Terra: Die Freiheit der Alten und die Freiheit der Heutigen: eine Antinomie?
Óscar Cubo Ugarte: Kants normatives Modell der Demokratie
Margit Ruffing: Das eigentlich Politische bei Kant
Dieter Hüning: Humes Wunderkritik und das Problem des Zeugnisses anderer: Mit einem Ausblick auf Kant
Andree Hahmann: Pflichtgemäß, aber töricht! Kant über Spinozas Leugnung der Vorsehung
Norbert Fischer: Kants vollständiges System philosophisch begründeter Theologien
Clélia Aparecida Martins: Teleologie, Subjekt und Gott
Mikiko Tanaka: "Eitle Großthuerei". Kants Auseinandersetzung mit seinen zeitgenössischen Gegnern (Feder, Meiners, Tittel, Flatt, Eberhard und Rehberg) in der Kritik der teleologischen Urteilskraft
Rudolf Langthaler: Der Ort des "Zweifelglaubens" innerhalb einer differenzierten Idee der kantischen Ethikotheologie: Anmerkungen zu Bernd Dörflingers Interpretation eines wichtigen kantischen Lehrstückes
Gerhard Krieger: Zweifelsglaube oder religiöser Glaube? Zum Verhältnis von Vernunftglaube und Religion
Heike Panknin-Schappert: Moral und Religion. Kants Rezeption der Moral-Sense-Philosophie von Françis Hutcheson
Matthias Koßler: Schopenhauers Weg vom transzendentalen Subjekt zum willenlosen Subjekt des Erkennens
Günter Zöller: The Musically Sublime. Richard Wagner's Post-Kantian Philosophy of Modern Music
Klaus Fischer: Realismus und Fiktionalismus in der Wissenschaft des späten 19. Jahrhunderts
Ernst Wolfgang Orth: Ernst Cassirer und die Philosophie der Renaissance
Detlef Thiel: Der kritische Krimi. Friedlaender/Mynona als Kantianer
Volker Gerhardt: Bewusstsein als Funktion der Mitteilung
Werner Busch: Philosophieren lernen: ein realistisches Weltprogramm?

Hunter, Ian. “Kant and Vattel in Context: Cosmopolitan Philosophy and Diplomatic Casuistry.” History of European Ideas 39.4 (2013): 477-502. [HIC]

Hurson, Didier. “L'inhérence de Dieu chez Kant.” Kant, théologie et religion. Ed. Robert Theis (op cit.). 77-85. [M]

Hurtado, Alexandra. “La educación del carácter moral.” [Spanish; The Moral Character Education] Franciscanum: Revista de las Ciencias del Espíritu 55 (2013): 155-97 [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper, we resume the general framework for pedagogical reflection from Kant, in order to show the scope and limits of the philosophies of education that currently have dealt with the moral character education, and so, to be able to suggest some general guidelines that allow us to take the «moral work» of education, as the cultivation and formation of consistent thinking.

Huseyinzadegan, Dilek. “Teleology and Its Risks for Reason. A Closer Look at the Antinomy of Teleological Judgment.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 899-910. [M]

Hutchings, Kimberly. Kant, Critique and Politics. London: Taylor and Francis, 2013. [175 p.] [WC]

[top] I    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Iacobelli, Natalia. See: Mori, Massimo, and Natalia Iacobelli.

Insole, Christopher J. Kant and the Creation of Freedom: A Theological Problem. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. [xiv, 264 p.] [WC]

Invernizzi, Giuseppe. “Schopenhauer und die Antinomien bei Kant.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 5. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 557-68. [M]

Ivaldo, Marco. “Habitus libertatis. Jacobi e Kant sulla virtù.” [Italian] Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 281-92. [M]

 ——. “Sul momento ‘materiale’ della ragione pura pratica. Riflessioni sul sentimento morale nella critica della ragione pratica.” [Italian] Sentire e pensare: tra Kant e Husserl. Eds. Maria Teresa Catena and Anna Donise (op cit.). 25-32. [M]

Iwasa, Noriaki. “Reason Alone Cannot Identify Moral Laws.” Journal of Value Inquiry 47.1-2 (2013): 67-85. [M]

[top] J    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

James, David. “Fichte’s Critical Reappraisal of Kant’s Cosmopolitanism.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 4. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 707-17. [M]

Jankowiak, Tim. “Kant’s Argument for the Principle of Intensive Magnitudes.” Kantian Review 18.3 (2013): 387-412. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the first Critique, Kant attempts to prove what we can call the ‘principle of intensive magnitudes’, according to which every possible object of experience will possess a determinate ‘degree’ of reality. Curiously, Kant argues for this principle by inferring from a psychological premise about internal sensations (they have intensive magnitudes) to a metaphysical thesis about external objects (they also have intensive magnitudes). Most commentators dismiss the argument as a failure. In this article I give a reconstruction of Kant's argument that attempts to rehabilitate the argument back into his broader transcendental theory of experience. I argue that we can make sense of the argument's central inference by appeal to Kant's theory of empirical intuition and by an analysis of the way in which Kant thinks sensory matter constitutes our most basic representations of objects.

Jansson, Bjarne. See: Andersson, E. Roland, Bjarne Jansson, and Jan Lundblad.

Jarzombek, Mark. “PUBLICS: Kant and the modernity of the absent public.” Threshold: Revolution! Ed. Ana María León (Cambridge, Mass.: SA+P Press, 2013). pages. [WC]

Jauernig, Anja. “The Synthetic Nature of Geometry, and the Role of Construction in Intuition.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 5. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 89-100. [M]

Jesus, Paulo. “La psycho-logique de l'hypothèse-Dieu ou la nécessité d'une possibilité.” Kant, théologie et religion. Ed. Robert Theis (op cit.). 125-33. [M]

Jiang, Lu. Das Schematismuskapitel in der Kritik der reinen Vernunft: seine transzendental psychologische Bedeutung für Kants Erkenntnistheorie. Munich: AVM, 2013. [211 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Originally a Master’s thesis (Uni-Heidelberg, 2004).

Jiménez, Erick Raphael. “Dimensions of Subjectivity in Kant: Notes on Two Recent Studies.” Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 34.1 (2013): 205-25. [PW]

Joerden, Jan C. “Kooperationsregeln und der kategorische Imperativ.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 293-305. [M]

Johnston, James Scott. Kant’s Philosophy: A Study for Educators. New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013. [vi, 268 p.] [WC]

Jones, Rachel. “Kant, Irigaray, and Earthquakes: Adventures in the Abyss.” Symposium: Canadian Journal of Continental Philosophy 17.1 (2013): 273-99. [HIC]

Josivofic, Sasa. “The Crucial Role of Pure Apperception within the Framework of Kant’s Theory of Synthesis and Cognition.” Objectivity after Kant. Eds. Gertrudis Van De Vijver and Boris Demarest (op cit.). 221-33. [M]

[top] K    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Kaag, John. ““Merely” Aesthetic: The Centrality of Aesthetic Judgments of Taste.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 4. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 107-17. [M]

Kahn, Samuel. “Reconsidering RGV, AA 06: 26n and the Meaning of ‘Humanity’.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 307-15. [M]

Kakol, Tomasz. “Idealizm transcendentalny dzis?: od Kantowskiej metafizyki substancji i czasu w "Krytyce czystego rozumu" do sporu o istnienie swiata.” [Polish] Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia 8.4 (2013): 7-18. [WC]

Kaldis, Byron. “Worldhood. Between Scholasticism and Cosmopolitanism.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 1. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 589-601. [M]

Kalinnikov, Leonard A. “A. A. Fet and Kant’s Stars-and-Morals Motif in Russian Philosophical Poetry.” [Russian] Kantovsky Sbornik 43.1 (2013): 46-62. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article maintains that the founder of the “stars-and-morals” cycle in Russian philosophical poetry of the 1840s is A. A. Fet. From the poems “I stood a long time without moving” (1843) and “To Le Verrier's Neptune” (1846) to “To extinguished stars” (1890), i.e., over half a century, Fet created lyrical miniatures under the influence of Kant’s and Schopenhauer’s ideas.

 ——. “Kant’s philosophy of history and the idea of World Federative Union of Nations and States.” Kant’s Project of Perpetual Peace in the Context of Contemporary Politics. Eds. Andrey Zilber and Alexei Salikov (op cit.). 5-9. [M]

Kannisto, Toni. “Modality and Metaphysics in Kant.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 633-45. [M]

Kante, Bozidar. “Leibniz in Kant o popolnosti in pojem piktoresknega pri Kantu.” [Slovenian] Analiza Ljubljana 17.4 (2013): 5-23. [WC]

Kanterian, Edward. “The Ideality of Space and Time: Trendelenburg versus Kant, Fischer and Bird.” Kantian Review 18.2 (2013): 263-88. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Trendelenburg argued that Kant's arguments in support of transcendental idealism ignored the possibility that space and time are both ideal and real. Recently, Graham Bird has claimed that Trendelenburg (unlike his contemporary Kuno Fischer) misrepresented Kant, confusing two senses of ‘subjective/objective’. I defend Trendelenburg's ‘neglected alternative’: the ideas of space and time, as a priori and necessary, are ideal, but this does not exclude their validity in the noumenal realm. This undermines transcendental idealism. Bird's attempt to show that the Analytic considers, but rejects, the alternative fails: an epistemological reading makes Kant accept the alternative, while an ontological reading makes him incoherent. As I demonstrate, Trendelenburg acknowledged the ambiguity of ‘subjective/objective’, focusing on the transcendental, not the empirical sense. Unlike Fischer, Bird denies Kant's commitment to things-in-themselves in favour of a descriptivist, non-ontological reading of transcendental idealism as an inventory of ‘immanent experience’. But neither Bird's descriptivism, nor Fischer's commitment to things-in-themselves, answers Trendelenburg's sceptical worry about transcendental idealism.

 ——. “Bodies in Prolegomena §13: Noumena or Phenomena?” Hegel Bulletin 34.2 (2013): 181-202. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article discusses Kant's transcendental idealism in relation to his perplexing use of ‘body’ and related terms in Prolegomena §13. Here Kant admits the existence of bodies external to us, although unknown as what they might be in themselves. It is argued that we need to distinguish between a phenomenal and a noumenal use of ‘body’ to make sense of Kant's argument. The most important recent discussions of this passage, i.e., Prauss (1977), Langton (1998) and Bird (2006), are presented and shown to suffer from both systematic and exegetical shortcomings. The article is a contribution to understanding the nature of Kant's transcendental idealism, defending the view, especially against Prauss and Bird, that Kant is committed to the existence of things in themselves.

 ——. Rev. of How Is Nature Possible? Kant's Project in the First Critique, by Daniel N. Robinson (2012). Review of Metaphysics 66.3 (2013): 597-99. [M]

Karásek, Jindřich. “Synthetische Einheit des Mannigfaltigen. Textanalytische Überlegungen zu einem Schlüsselbegriff von Kants Erkenntnistheorie.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 177-87. [M]

Kawamura, Katsutoshi. “Kants Stellung zum Urheber des moralischen Gesetzes.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 317-27. [M]

 ——. “Zum Tod von Fumiyasu Ishikawa” Kant-Studien 104.3 (2013): 275-76. [M]

Keller, Pierre.  “Ideas, Freedom, and the Ends of Architectonic.”  Internationales Jahrbuch des Deutschen Idealismus/International Yearbook of German Idealism: Freiheit/Freedom, eds. Jürgen Stolzenberg and Fred Rush. 9 (2013): 51-78. [PW]

Kerstein, Samuel J. How to Treat Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. [x, 230 p.] [WC]

 ——. Rev. of Virtue, Rules, and Justice: Kantian Aspirations, by Thomas E. Hill, Jr. (2012). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (February 2013, #19). [M] [online]

Kersting, Wolfgang. “Das ‘Ideal des hobbes’, der Kampf und die Anerkennung. Kants und Hegels Auseinandersetzung mit Hobbes.” Estudos Kantianos 1.1 (2013): 11-43. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Im Mittelpunkt dieser umfassenden Studie steht der unterschiedliche Charakter der Kantischen und Hegelschen Auseinandersetzung mit Hobbes’ Naturzustandstheorie. Während Kant Hobbes aus der Perspektive des normativen Rechtsphilosophen liest, integriert Hegel den Hobbesschen Naturzustand in seine dynamischteleologische Entwicklungsgeschichte des Bewußtseins. Kant würdigt den systematischen Wert der Naturzustandstheorie, kritisiert aber die normativen Konsequenzen der Hobbesschen Naturrechtskritik. Hegel hingegen verfremdet Hobbes völlig, löst das Naturzustandskonzept aus seinem systematischen Kontext und gibt ihm eine völlig neue Funktion. Diese Umdeutung ist jedoch nicht ohne Suggestionskraft. Zumindest Leo Strauss hat sich so sehr von ihr beeinflussen lassen, daß er nun seinerseits Hobbes in ein hegelianisiertes Gewand gesteckt hat.

 ——. “Die Vertragsidee des Contrat social und Kants contractus originarius.” Estudos Kantianos 1.2 (2013): 85-105. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Im Contrat social zeichnet Rousseau die Umrisse einer normativen Gegenwelt zur zeitgenössischen Gesellschaft der Unsittlichkeit, Ungleichheit und in Rechtsform gegossenen Gewalt. Das einzige Werk der politischen Philosophie der Neuzeit, das den Vertrag im Titel führt, bricht paradoxerweise mit der kontraktualistischen Moderne und gibt dem Gesellschaftsvertrag eine republikanische Lesart. Es stellt dem Vertragsstaat, der politischen Organisation des modernen ökonomischen, gesellschaftlichen und politischen Individualismus, eine Republik der Tugend gegenüber. Das Herzstück dieser Konzeption ist das Freiheitsrecht, das von Rousseau radikal ausgelegt wird und im wesentlichen ein unveräußerliches Recht auf materiale Selbstbestimmung und Selbstherrschaft ist. Daher ist nur eine Herrschaftsform legitim, in der die Herrschaftsunterworfenen zugleich die Herrschaftsausübenden sind. Und damit in dieser direkten Demokratie auch wirklich der allgemeine Wille zum Ausdruck kommt, bedarf es einer ethischen Überformung der Bürger, die ihre Gleichheit im Denken, Fühlen und Handeln sichert. Kants Vertragskonstruktion nun revidiert diese antimodernistische Ausrichtung, die der Kontraktualismus bei Rousseau erhalten hat. Gleichwohl hält er an der Idee der Herrschaft des allgemeinen Willens als der einzig legitimen Herrschaftsform fest. Beides – die Remodernisierung des Rousseauschen Vertrages und die Orientierung an der demokratischen Herrschaftsform – gelingt ihm, indem er den Vertrag in den Rang einer Vernunftidee erhebt, die als normatives Vorbild für jede politischen Organisationsform gilt, zur Republikanisierung der Herrschaftsausübung verpflichtet und den Weg aufzeigt, auf dem die Republik im Sinne einer repräsentativen Demokratie Wirklichkeit gewinnen kann.

Kerszberg, Pierre. “Kant on the Idea of Science.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 5. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 101-12. [M]

Kharitonova, Alyona. “The concept of body and the problem of demarcation in new European metaphysics: from Descartes to Kant.” Kantovsky Sbornik: Selected Articles (Kaliningrad), pp. 4-16. [PW] [online (English)]

 ——. “The Machine and the Body in the Transcendental Cosmology of Chr. Wolff and Chr. A. Crusius.” [Russian] Kantovsky Sbornik 43.1 (2013): 7-22. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The 18th century philosophy actively used the notion of machine in its extended meaning, especially when describing both the world as a whole and its constituent bodies. Consequently, the initial meaning of that notion underwent peculiar changes: not only an artificial mechanism but also a natural organic body were defined as machines. A metaphysical comprehension of the notion of machine was developed predominantly in the framework of cosmology.

Khurana, Thomas. “Schema und Bild: Kant, Heidegger und das Verhältnis von Repräsentation und Abstraktion.” Zeitschrift für Ästhetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft 58.2 (2013): 203-24. [WC]

Kibanda, Wilfrid K. L'idée de paix perpétuelle au risque de la sélection naturel: discussion des déterminants de la paix. Louvain-la-Neuve: publ, 2013. [249 p.] [WC]

Kinlaw, C. Jeffery. Rev. of Hegel’s Critique of Kant: From Dichotomy to Identity, by Sally Sedgwick (2012). International Philosophical Quarterly 53.2 (2013): 211-14. [PW]

Kinnaman, Ted. “Kant and McDowell on the Purposiveness of Nature.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 5. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 771-80. [M]

Kisser, Thomas. Rev. of Reality and Negation – Kant’s Principle of Anticipations of Perception. An Investigation of its Impact on the Post-Kantian Debate, by Marco Giovanelli (2011). Internationales Jahrbuch des Deutschen Idealismus/International Yearbook of German Idealism: Freiheit/Freedom, eds. Jürgen Stolzenberg and Fred Rush. 9 (2013): 291-300. [PW]

Kitcher, Patricia. “Précis of Kant’s Thinker.” Philosophy & Phenomenological Research 87.1 (2013): 200-12. [PI]

 ——. “Replies to Rödl, Ginsborg, and Allais.” Philosophy & Phenomenological Research 87.1 (2013): 237-47. [PI]

 ——. “Arguing for Apperception.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 189-98. [M]

 ——. “Kant versus the Asymmetry Dogma.” Kant Yearbook: Kant and Contemporary Theory of Knowledge 5 (2013): 51-78. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: One of the most widely accepted contemporary constraints on theories of self-knowledge is that they must account for the very different ways in which cognitive subjects know their own minds and the ways in which they know other minds. Through the influence of Peter Strawson, Kant is often taken to be an original source for this view. I argue that Kant is quite explicit in holding the opposite position. In a little discussed passage in the Paralogisms chapter, he argues that cognitive subjects have no way of understanding the minds of others except by using their own minds as a model for others.

Kjosavik, Frode. “A Synthesis into a Whole which Is not a Synthesis out of Parts. On the Original Transcendental Figurative Synthesis of Imagination.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 199-209. [M]

 ——. Rev. of The Continuum Companion to Kant, edited by Gary Banham, Dennis Schulting and Nigel Hems (2012). Kant Studies Online, posted April 2, 2013 (2013): 39-44. [M] [online]

Kleber, Karsten. Der frühe Schelling und Kant: zur Genese des Identitätssystems aus philosophischer Bewältigung der Natur und Kritik der Transzendentalphilosophie. Würzburg: Königshausen et Neumann, 2013. [190 p.] [WC]

Klein, Joel Thiago. “Die Weltgeschichte im Kontext der Kritik der Urteilskraft.” Kant-Studien 104.2 (2013): 188-212. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper, I shall defend the thesis that the idea of a universal history in Kant’s third Critique is not legitimated from a theoretical and systematic point of view but instead from a practical point of view. In order to sustain this interpretation, I shall reconstruct parts of arguments from the entire Critique of Teleological Judgment. First, I shall argue that in the Analytic as in the Dialectic, the external purposiveness can legitimize only a teleological history of nature but not a universal history. Second, I defend that in the Methodology, the idea of a universal history is grounded in an interest of pure practical reason.

 ——. “Kant e a segunda recensão a Herder: comentário, tradução e notas.” [Portuguese; Kant and the second critique of Herder: commentary, translation and notes] Studia Kantiana 11.14 (2013): 190-214. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper presents a translation of Kant’s answer to Reinhold and Kant’s second review of Herder’s Ideas for a philosophy of history of humanity. It also offers an examination about the critiques that were formulated in the reviews.

 ——. “Kant sobre o progresso na história.” [Portuguese; Kant on Progress in History] ethic@ 12.1 (2013): 67-100. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The objective of this paper is to analyze the meaning of the central thesis of Kantian philosophy of history: that humanity is in constant progress. However, although it seems simple at first glance, the question of the meaning of this thesis is still a topic for intense debate. The originality of this paper is to present, for the first time, a general, systematic and exhaustive chart of the different interpretations and criticisms this thesis has received throughout history. Thus, any interpretation that aims to be minimally satisfactory needs to consider all arguments and positions presented here.

 ——. “A dedução do juízo teleológico na terceira Crítica.” [Portuguese; The deduction of teleological judgment in Third critique] Kant e-Prints 8.1 (2013): 71-98. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper reconstructs the Kantian foundation of the teleological judgment from the formal-logical ground to the deduction of the reflective teleological judgment. An intricate logical argumentation is put forth, which is not as linear as the text would suggest. It is defended that the internal or the intrinsic purposiveness of nature is transcendental legitimated, whereas the external or relative purposiveness remains only as useful and problematic.

Klemme, Heiner F. Oblicza wolności. Studia z praktycznej filozofii Kanta i jej historia. [Polish; Dimensionen der Freiheit. Studien zu Kants praktischer Philosophie und ihrer Entwicklung] Translated from the German by Dariusz Pakalski. Toruń (Polen): Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Mikolaja Kopernika, 2013. [258 p.] [WC]

 ——. “Der Transzendentale Idalismus und die Rechtslehre: Kant über den Zusammenhang von moralischer Verbindlichkeit, Recht und Ethik.” Kants “Metaphysik der Sitten” in der Diskussion. Eds. Werner Euler and Burkhard Tuschling (op cit.). 43-53. [M]

 ——. “Freiheit oder Fatalismus? Kants positive und negative Deduktion der Idee der Freiheit in der Grundlegung (und seine Kritik an Christian Garves Antithetik von Freiheit und Notwendigkeit).” Kants Rechtfertigung des Sittengesetzes in Grundlegung III: Deduktion oder Faktum? Ed. Heiko Puls (op cit.). 59-102. [PW]

 ——. “Zweckmäßigkeit mit Endzweck: Über den Übergang vom Natur- zum Freiheitsbegriff in Kants Kritik der Urteilskraft.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 5. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 113-24. [M]

 ——. “Moralized nature, naturalized autonomy: Kant’s way of bridging the gap in the third Critique (and in the Groundwork).” Kant on Moral Autonomy. Ed. Oliver Sensen (op cit.). 193-211. [M]

 ——. “Kant, Hume a aristotelovské antiosvietenstvo Kritika.” [Slovak; Kant, Hume and Aristotelian Anti-Enlightenment. A Critique] Studia Philosophica Kantiana 2013.1 (2013): 13-26. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this article the author discusses the premise represented by John McDowell according to which the philosophy of enlightenment shows deficits and fallacies especially with regard to differentiating between facts and values, which make the return to an ethical position necessary, namely the one that is labelled by McDowell and others as the “Greek naturalism”. I will show that this premise is not prone to convince in regard to the writings by Hume and Kant. McDowell not only fails to interpret both of these philosophers in an adequate manner but he also fails to draw attention to the qualities of their theories, which are still of a systematic interest these days.

 ——. “A liberdade do arbítrio e o domínio do mal: a doutrina de Kant do mal radical entre moral, religião e direito.” [Portuguese; Freedom of the will and the domain of evil: Kant’s doctrine of radical evil among moral, religion and right] Studia Kantiana 11.15 (2013): 5-37. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: We look forward to clarify the main aspects of the doctrine of radical evil in the text Religion, in order then to focus its main function in the idea of an ethical community. With the differentiation between the most free selfdetermination and the obligatory moral law, we look forward to show that, with his doctrine of radical evil, Kant, although he treats a moral-philosophical problem trusted by the platonic tradition, that is, or free-will is already under the moral law or its autonomy is morally neutral, did not intend to solve it, once this doctrine serves, rather, as an introduction to the thought of a virtuous community under the domain of God, therefore, to the clarification of the question: why the passage from ethics to religion from ethical fundaments is inevitable and how does it present itself concretely? Such as it is thought the public right to pressure in the ambit of law, in the ambit of ethics, for certain, virtuous community has inserted freely the function of overcoming the status (ethical) naturalis.

 ——.  “Kants Erörterung der „libertas indifferentiae“ in der Metaphysik der Sitten und ihre philosophische Bedeutung.”  Internationales Jahrbuch des Deutschen Idealismus/International Yearbook of German Idealism: Freiheit/Freedom, eds. Jürgen Stolzenberg and Fred Rush. 9 (2013): 22-50. [PW]

Kley, Andreas. Kants republikanisches Erbe: Flucht und Rückkehr des freiheitlich-republikanischen Kant - eine staatsphilosophische Zeitreise. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2013. [80 p.] [WC]

Klingner, Stefan. Technische Vernunft: Kants Zweckbegriff und das Problem einer Philosophie der technischen Kultur. Berlin / Boston: De Gruyter, 2013. [xii, 334 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note]Note: Kantstudien Ergänzungshefte, vol. 172. Originally appeared as the author’s Ph.D. dissertation (Universität-Trier, 2012).

 ——. “Zum Problem der objektiven Realität von Kants Naturzweckbegriff.” Das Leben der Vernunft: Beiträge zur Philosophie Kants. Eds. Dieter Hüning, Stefan Klingner, and Carsten Olk (op cit.). 238-62. [M]

 ——. “Kultur als Gegenstand der Transzendentalphilosophie?” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 1. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 603-15. [M]

 ——. Rev. of Kant Yearbook: Teleology, edited by Dietmar H. Heidemann (2009).  Kant-Studien 104.4 (2013): 555-58. [M]

 ——, ed. See: Hüning, Dieter, Stefan Klingner, and Carsten Olk, eds.

Knappik, Franz, and Erasmus Mayr. “Gewissen und Gewissenhaftigkeit beim späten Kant.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 329-41. [M]

Kneller, Jane. “Aesthetic Reflection and Cultural Judgments.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 4. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 119-29. [M]

 ——. “‘Mere Nature in the Subject’: Kant on Symbolic Representation of the Absolute.” Symbol and Intuition: Comparative Studies in Kantian and Romantic-Period Aesthetics. Eds. Helmut Hühn and James Vigus (op cit.). 44-59. [M]

Koch, Anton Friedrich. “Metaphysik bei Hegel oder analytische, synthetische und hermeneutische Philosophie.” Self, World, and Art: Metaphysical Topics in Kant and Hegel. Ed. Dina Emundts (op cit.). 307-19. [M]

Koch, Lutz. “Kants kosmopolitische Erziehungsidee.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 4. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 719-28. [M]

Kögler, Hans-Herbert. “Interpretation as Reflective Judgment? Toward a Critique of Hermeneutic Experience.” Objectivity after Kant. Eds. Gertrudis Van De Vijver and Boris Demarest (op cit.). 189-205. [M]

Kohler, Georg. “Docta spes. Zu Kants politischer Theorie begründeter Hoffnung und kollektiven Lernens.” Transzendenz, Praxis und Politik bei Kant. Eds. Angeli, Rentsch, Schneidereit, and Vorländer (op cit.). 69-84. [M]

Kohnen, Josef. “A Königsberg society of friends without Kant.” [Russian; translated from the German] Kantovsky Sbornik 46.4 (2013): 76-86. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The legends about dinner parties of Immanuel Kant’s friends have been known since the times of his first biographers and other contemporaries. However, there were other communities of friends in Königsberg. Gathering friends at a dining table for the purpose of intellectual communication became a tradition in Königsberg in the 17th/18th centuries. This tradition created a sub-system of creative communication and leisure bringing together both nobility and aristocracy and ordinary curious citizens. The reasons behind this phenomenon were the geographical, geopolitical, and cultural and historical position of Königsberg — a large provincial trade and cultural centre of East Prussia. The focus of the article is the historical and documentary analysis of the group ‘portrait’ of the participants of Königsberg meetings described in the novel Lebensläufe nach aufsteigender Linie by Theodor Gottlieb von Hippel, who served as a longstanding burgomaster of Königsberg, anonymously authored several books, and held friendly meetings at home. The author juxtaposes the epic portrait of Hippel as one of the novel’s characters — the host featured in the Lebensläufe — with the picture of Emil Doertsling showing a dinner party held by Kant, which brought together local celebrities, among whom Kant’s friend Hippel is depicted in the foreground. A copy of this picture is exhibited in Kant’s Museum at the Kaliningrad Cathedral. The article makes an interesting and convincing attempt at identifying the historical figures shown in both group portraits —Lebensläufe and the picture by Emil Doerstling.

Kok, Arthur. Kant, Hegel, und die Frage der Metaphysik: über die Möglichkeit der Philosophie nach der kopernikanischen Wende. Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 2013. [287 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Revised doctoral dissertation (Uni-Tilburg, 2012).

Kolen, Filip. “Symmetry: the Co-Constitutive Between.” Objectivity after Kant. Eds. Gertrudis Van De Vijver and Boris Demarest (op cit.). 57-63. [M]

Korsgaard, Christine M. “Kantian Ethics, Animals, and the Law.” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 33.4 (2013): 629-48. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Legal systems divide the world into persons and property, treating animals as property. Some animal rights advocates have proposed treating animals as persons. Another option is to introduce a third normative category. This raises questions about how normative categories are established. In this article I argue that Kant established normative categories by determining what the presuppositions of rational practice are. According to Kant, rational choice presupposes that rational beings are ends in themselves and the rational use of the earth’s resources presupposes that human beings have rights. I argue that rational choice also presupposes that any being for whom things can be good or bad must be regarded as an end in itself, and that the use of the world’s resources presupposes that any being who depends on those resources has rights. Although the other animals do not engage in rational practice, our own rational practice requires us to give them standing.

Koßler, Matthias. “Schopenhauers Weg vom transzendentalen Subjekt zum willenlosen Subjekt des Erkennens.” Das Leben der Vernunft: Beiträge zur Philosophie Kants. Eds. Dieter Hüning, Stefan Klingner, and Carsten Olk (op cit.). 623-34. [M]

 ——. “„Ein kühner Unsinn“ – Anschauung und Begriff in Schopenhauers Kant-Kritik.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 5. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 569-78. [M]

Krasnoff, Larry. “Constructing Practical Justification. How Can the Categorical Imperative Justify Desire-Based Actions?” Kant on Practical Justification. Eds. Mark Timmons and Sorin Baiasu (op cit.). 87-109. [M]

Kraus, Katharina Teresa. “Quantifying Inner Experience?—Kant's Mathematical Principles in the Context of Empirical Psychology.” European Journal of Philosophy (pre-print online, posted 5 Dec 2013). [abstract] [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper shows why Kant's critique of empirical psychology should not be read as a scathing criticism of quantitative scientific psychology, but has valuable lessons to teach in support of it. By analysing Kant's alleged objections in the light of his critical theory of cognition, it provides a fresh look at the problem of quantifying first-person experiences, such as emotions and sense-perceptions. An in-depth discussion of applying the mathematical principles, which are defined in the Critique of Pure Reason as the constitutive conditions for mathematical-numerical experience in general, to inner sense will demonstrate why it is in principle possible to justify a quantitative structure of psychological judgments on the grounds of Kant's critical thinking. In conclusion, it will propose how Kant's critique could be used in a constructive way to develop first steps towards a transcendental foundation of psychological knowledge.

 ——. “Kants Zwei Standpunkte und die Möglichkeit der Naturerkenntnis.” Die Natur Denken. Eds. Myriam Gerhard and Christine Zunke (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2013). 143-67. [WC]

Krause, Joachim. “Kant und seine Zeit — die Schrift „Zum ewigen Frieden” vor der Hintergrund der Französischen Revolution und der nachfolgenden Kriege.” Kant’s Project of Perpetual Peace in the Context of Contemporary Politics. Eds. Andrey Zilber and Alexei Salikov (op cit.). 9-23. [M]

Krieger, Gerhard. “'Factum der Vernunft': Zu einer Parallele zwischen Kant und mittelalterlichem Denken (Johannes Buridan).” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 343-54. [M]

 ——. “Zweifelsglaube oder religiöser Glaube? Zum Verhältnis von Vernunft glaube und Religion.” Das Leben der Vernunft: Beiträge zur Philosophie Kants. Eds. Dieter Hüning, Stefan Klingner, and Carsten Olk (op cit.). 593-604. [M]

Krijnen, Christian. “Geschichtsphilosophie bei Kant.” Der Begriff der Geschichte im Marburger und südwestdeutschen Neukantianismus. Eds. Christian Krijnen and Marc de Launay (op cit.). 29-57. [M]

 ——, and Marc de Launay, eds. Der Begriff der Geschichte im Marburger und südwestdeutschen Neukantianismus. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2013. [214 p.] [M]

Krouglov, Alexei N. “Tetens und die Deduktion der Kategorien bei Kant.” Kant-Studien 104.4 (2013): 466-89. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Quite a lot of parallels could be found between works by J. N. Tetens written in the 1770es and Kant’s deduction of the categories. Some of them were inspired by Kant’s Dissertation 1770, the others influenced Critique of Pure Reason. The philosophical position of Tetens in Über die allgemeine speculativische Philosophie and Philosophische Versuche über die menschliche Natur und ihre Entwickelung is much closer to the one stated in Critique of Pure Reason than Kant’s own position in 1770 due to researching transcendent principles, considering the transcendent concepts as a priori concepts and setting the problem of their realization. However, the major step towards the transcendental deduction of the categories has been taken by Kant himself in terms of content and methodology.

 ——. “Das Problem des Friedens am Ende des 19. — am Anfang des 20. Jh. im Dialog der drei Zaren: I. Kant, Nikolaus II. und L. N. Tolstoj.” Kant’s Project of Perpetual Peace in the Context of Contemporary Politics. Eds. Andrey Zilber and Alexei Salikov (op cit.). 40-44. [M]

 ——. “Die frühe Rezeption der Konzeption des Naturrechts Kants in Russland.” Kants “Metaphysik der Sitten” in der Diskussion. Eds. Werner Euler and Burkhard Tuschling (op cit.). 129-43. [M]

 ——. “Bulhakow i Kant.” [Polish] Studia z Historii Filozofii 4.4 (2013): 81-101. [WC]

Kruck Günter. “'Verträge ohne das Schwert sind bloße Worte...'. Zur unterschiedlichen Begründung des Zwangscharakters des Rechts.” Das Leben der Vernunft: Beiträge zur Philosophie Kants. Eds. Dieter Hüning, Stefan Klingner, and Carsten Olk (op cit.). 386-400. [M]

 ——. “Eine Verrücktheit des Geistes oder der Natur der Vernunft eingeschrieben. Zu Kants Antinomienlehre.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 211-20. [M]

Kruglow, Aleksiej Nikołajewicz. “Bułhakow i Kant.” [Polish] Studia z Historii Filozofii 4.4 (2013): 81-101. [PW] [online]

Kryshtop, Ludmila. “Postulaty w filozofii Kanta.” [Polish; Postulates in Kant’s Philosophy] Studia z Historii Filozofii 4.1 (2013): 69-84. [PW] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Translated from the Russian by Tomasz Kupś.
Abstract: The article concerns one of the principal and most important concepts of Kant’s philosophy, namely the concept of postulate. Kant’s understanding of this term differs from the previous tradition. For Kant, postulates are originally subjective propositions necessarily supposed as objective ones. Otherwise, systematic theoretical cognition and compliance with the moral law become impossible. However, this peculiarity of Kant’s terminology is often ignored, which causes misunderstanding of the role and functions of Kant’s doctrine of postulates as a whole.

Krzymuski, Edmund, and Jan Widacki. Teoria karna Kanta: ze stanowiska jego ogólnej nauki o rozumie praktycznym. [Polish] Kraków: Krakowskie Towarzystwo Edukacyjne, 2013. [vii, 113 p.] [WC]

Kuehn, Manfred, and Charles Griswold. “Obituary for John R. Silber (1926–2012)” Kant-Studien 104.4 (2013): 419-20. [M]

Kühnemund, Burkhard. “Die systematische Stellung der Eigentumslehre in Kants praktischer Philosophie.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 849-59. [M]

Kukla, Todd. “Assessing the Anti-Skeptical Results of Kant’s Refutation of Idealism.” Southwest Philosophy Review 29.1 (2013): 145-53. [PW]

Kumar, Apaar. Rev. of Kant’s Idealism: New Interpretations of a Controversial Doctrine, ed. by Dennis Schulting and Jacco Verburgt (2011). Journal of the History of Philosophy 51.3 (2013): 492-94. [PI]

Kuneš, Jan. “Heidegger und Kants Weltbegriff.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 5. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 781-92. [M]

Kuplen, Mojca;. “Kant and the Problem of Pure Judgments of Ugliness.” Kant Studies Online (2013): 102-43; posted December 12, 2013. [M] [online]

Kups, Tomasz. “Czy Immanuel Kant jest prekursorem "idealu osobowosci"? (na marginesie opracowan Franciszka Sawickiego).” [Polish] Studia Philosophiae Christianae 49.1 (2013): 49-69. [WC]

Kuteyniko, Alexander. See: Chaly, Vadim, and Alexander Kuteynikov.

[top] L    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Lahat, Golan. The Political Implications of Kant’s Theory of Knowledge: Rethinking Progress. Houndsmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. [xvi, 298 p.] [WC]

Land, Thomas. “Intuition and Judgment. How Not To Think about the Singularity of Intuition (and the Generality of Concepts) in Kant.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 221-31. [M]

Landolfi Petrone, Giuseppe. “La lotta per la ragione.” [Italian] Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 5. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 793-804. [M]

Landy, David. “What Incongruent Counterparts Show.” European Journal of Philosophy 21.4 (2013): 507-24. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In a recent paper, Robert Hanna argues that Kant's incongruent counterparts example can be mobilized to show that some mental representations, which represent complex states of affairs as complex, do so entirely non-conceptually. I will argue that Hanna is right to see that Kant uses incongruent counterparts to show that there must be a non-conceptual component to cognition, but goes too far in concluding that there must be entirely non-conceptual representations that represent objects as existing in space and time. Kant is deeply committed to the thesis that no representation of a complex state of affairs as complex can be entirely non-conceptual. For Kant, all representations of complex states of affairs as complex (including those of incongruent counterparts) are conceptually structured. I present an interpretation of the Transcendental Aesthetic according to which Kant not only aims at Leibnizian and Newtonian accounts of space and time, but also Hume's. Hume's account fails to make representations of complex states of affairs sufficiently determinate. Kant offers an account later in the Critique that is meant to correct this failing by requiring that all representations of complex states of affairs as complex be conceptually (inferentially) structured.

 ——. Rev. of Hegel’s Critique of Kant: From Dichotomy to Identity, by Sally S. Sedgwick (2012). Kantian Review 18.1 (2013): 157-62. [M]

Langlois, Luc. “Wolff and the Beginnings of Kant’s Moral Philosophy.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 355-69. [M]

Langthaler, Rudolf. “Der Ort des ‘Zweifelglaubens’ innerhalb einer differenzierten Idee der kantischen Ethikotheologie. Anmerkungen zu Bernd Dörflingers Interpretation eines wichtigen kantischen Lehrstückes.” Das Leben der Vernunft: Beiträge zur Philosophie Kants. Eds. Dieter Hüning, Stefan Klingner, and Carsten Olk (op cit.). 564-92. [M]

 ——. “Eine ‘noo-theologisch’ erweiterte Ethiktheologie? Perspektiven der ‘absoluten Transzendenz’ beim späten Kant.” Transzendenz, Praxis und Politik bei Kant. Eds. Angeli, Rentsch, Schneidereit, and Vorländer (op cit.). 107-33. [M]

 ——. “„… unseren Horizont zur Absicht der species zu erweitern“ – Aspekte einer erweiterten geschichtsphilosophischen Konzeption bei Kant?” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 1. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 617-29. [M]

Lanzillotti, Francesco. See: Brandom, Robert, and Francesco Lanzillotti.

Laos Igreda, Claudia María. “Das Erfahrungsurteil. Nebensächliche Anekdote oder Schlüssel des Kantischen Denkens?” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 233-44. [M]

 ——. “La "libertad de crítica" como medio y fin de la "razón humana universal".” [Spanish; "Freedom of Critique" as Means and End of the "Uiversal Human Reason"] La razón y sus fines. Eds. Rosemary Rizo-Patrón de Lerner and María Jesús Vázquez Leibeiras (op cit.). 185-211. [M]

Larmore, Charles.  “Kant and the Meanings of Autonomy.”  Internationales Jahrbuch des Deutschen Idealismus/International Yearbook of German Idealism: Freiheit/Freedom, eds. Jürgen Stolzenberg and Fred Rush. 9 (2013): 3-21. [PW]

La Rocca, Claudio. “Kant on Self-Knowledge and Conscience.” Das Leben der Vernunft: Beiträge zur Philosophie Kants. Eds. Dieter Hüning, Stefan Klingner, and Carsten Olk (op cit.). 364-85. [M]

 ——. “Methode und System in Kants Philosophieauffassung.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 1. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 277-97. [M]

 ——. “Conciencia moral y Gesinnung.” [Spanish; Moral Consciousness and Gesinnung] Ideas y Valores (Colombia) 62, Suppl. #1 (2013): 133-52. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant always emphasized the problematic nature of self-knowledge in the fields of anthropology and psychology. Ever since his first works, he insisted on the impossibility of knowing with certainty, on the basis of actions, the subjective moral disposition of the agent, which alone gives action a moral value. This difficulty is not mitigated when moral judgment is directed at the subject itself. To these cognitive problems there is now added a tendency to self-deceit that is active in any moral life. If the importance of this argument is maintained, it is possible to envisage a characterization of Gesinnung that distinguishes it from any subjective “intention”. Thus, it could be understood rather as an “objective” structure, independent of subjective consciousness and similar to a regulative idea, which requires that moral actions be interpreted on the basis of a necessarily assumed but impossible to know principle.

 ——. “La formazione dei concetti in Kant: su un'interpretazione recente.” [Italian] Studi Kantiani 26 (2013): 137-46. [PW]

 ——, ed. See: Bacin, Stefano, Alfredo Ferrarin, Claudio La Rocca, and Margit Ruffing, eds.

Lawler, James M. The Intelligible World: Metaphysical Revolution in the Genesis of Kant’s Theory of Morality. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013. [478 p.] [WC]

Lazos, Efraín. “Idealidad y subjetividad en la estética trascendental de Kant.” [Portuguese; Ideality and subjectivity in Kant’s transcendental aesthetic] Kant e-Prints 8.1 (2013): 152-83. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This essay concerns Kant's argument for the ideality and subjectivity of space in the Metaphysical Exposition of Space in the Critique of Pure Reason. It holds that Kant’s argument has the form of a reduction on substantivism (Newton) and relationalism (Leibniz) - the two conceptions of space predominant in Kant’s time - and, that using the premise of the apriority of space simultaneously concludes both the ideality and subjectivity of space. This shows that some allegations (by influential Anglo-Saxon commentators) about the justificatory priority of ideality over subjectivity, and of the latter over the former, are unfounded. The essay also suggests an answer to the so-called neglected alternative objection.

Leder, Andrzej. “Strangeness and Unity. Freud and the Kantian Condition of Synthetic Unity of Apperception.” Dialogue and Universalism 23.2 (2013): 55-72. [PW]

Leduc, Christian. “Les critères kantiens de validité de l’hypothèse physique.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 5. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 125-37. [M]

Lee, Michael G. The German Mittelweg: Garden Theory and Philosophy in the Time of Kant. London: Routledge, 2013. [x, 335 p.] [WC]

Lee, Ming-huei. Konfuzianischer Humanismus: transkulturelle Kontexte. Bielefeld: Transcript, 2013. [170 p.] [WC]

Lequan, Mai. “Foi morale et foi historique: du conflit des Facultés à la définition criticiste iréniste de l'Université.” Kant, théologie et religion. Ed. Robert Theis (op cit.). 215-26. [M]

Lerussi, Natalia. “La teoría kantiana de las razas y el origen de la epigénesis.” [Spanish; Kantian theory of races and the origin of epigenesis] Studia Kantiana 11.15 (2013): 85-102. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: From an assessment of the meaning of “epigenesis” in §§ 81 and 80 of the Critique of the power of judgment (1790), in the present paper I show that the conception of the organic production implied by epigenesis is already present in and is made intelligible through the Kantian theory of races that the philosopher develops in the middle of the decade of 1770 (1775/1777) and then he ratifies in two more opportunities (1785/1788). Thus we shall see that the three elements contained in the organic production according to the school of epigenesis in 1790, that is to say, the geographical context, the formative force and certain virtual or generic dispositions are those which allow explain the origin of the permanent variations inside the species, the races. The theory of races is then the origin and the source of intelligibility of the Kantian conception of epigenesis.

Leserre, Daniel Oscar. “The Use of Words in Philosophy as Self-Examination of Pure Reason.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 245-55. [M]

Leśniewski, Norbert. “Ontologization of Transcendentalism. Historical-Intentional Aspect of Heidegger’s Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.” Dialogue and Universalism 23.2 (2013): 87-99. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The paper aims to reconstruct Heidegger’s historical-intentional assumptions in his ontological interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. The paper presents young Heidegger’s project of the “metaphysical-teleological interpretation of consciousness.” The project indicates the direction of his further ontological interpretation of transcendentalism: Heidegger stands up to the traditional, well known neo-Kantian interpretation of the Critique, and offers a new conception of ontological knowledge and cognition. According to this conception, cognition is grounded in transcendental imagination where a threefold synthesis takes place. Heidegger’s original temporal interpretation of transcendental schematism is also recalled to stress the significance of his new ontological approach to Kant’s theoretical philosophy.

Leszczak, Oleg. “Socialinė ir empirinė. I. Kanto transcendentinio antropocentrizmo prigimtis — žmonijos problemos esmė.” [Polish; On the social and empirical nature of Kant's transcendental anthropocentrism: the problem of human nature] Respectus Philologicus 24.29 (2013): 21-34. [HIC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper presents a conceptual-discursive analysis of Immanuel Kant’s texts from the viewpoint of the ontological essence of humanity (the so-called human nature). On the basis of a functional-pragmatic methodology, the author proposes a metalanguage for a pragmatic conceptual analysis of Kant’s philosophical discourse, together with his own idea of a human as a person, human being, individual, character, and bearer of human traits. The paper consists of two parts. Part One presents the principles by which the human personality is structured, as well as the fundamental methodological questions of the essence of humanity. Part Two analyzes Kant’s notion of “human nature” in both the formal aspect and that of systematic localization. It also considers the issues of social pragmatics and the empirical motivation of “human nature,” which arise from a discursive analysis of texts by Kant. The author attempts to demonstrate that Kant was one of the first philosophers to discern the specificity of human nature in social relations of human personality, which he presented neither in a causal-deterministic form (as a spiritual substance handed down from generation to generation) nor an essentialist one (as a timeless transcendental essence), but rather as a function of social experience for a particular human being (both pragmatic-teleological and transcendental-a posteriori).

Lettow, Susanne. “Modes of Naturalization: Race, sex and biology in Kant, Schelling and Hegel.” Philosophy & Social Criticism 39.2 (2013): 117-31. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Strategies of naturalization have pervaded throughout the course of modernity. In order to understand both the stability and the discontinuities of modes of naturalization that refer to the knowledge of the life sciences, it is worth going back to the time when biology and related forms of naturalizing sex and race first emerged. The article explores philosophical articulations of biological knowledge at the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th centuries. Immanuel Kant, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling and Georg Friedrich Wilhelm Hegel not only conceptualize ‘sex’ and ‘race’ in different ways but they also attribute a different status to biological knowledge. In order to understand how ‘naturalization’ works, I argue, the modes of making references to ‘biological’ knowledge and their underlying assumptions about science and philosophy must be scrutinized.

Li, Haifeng. 康德 = Kant. [Chinese] Changchun Shi: Changchun chu ban she, 2013. [180 p.] [WC]

Licht dos Santos, Paulo R. “The Real Use of the Understanding and Ontology in Kant’s Inaugural Dissertation.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 64758. [M]

Likanen, Ray. “Beyond Kant and Hegel: In Answer to the Question, ‘How are Synthetic Cognitions A Priori Possible?’” Review of Metaphysics 66.3 (2013): 469-93. [M]

Linguiti, Gennar Luigi. “Aspetti del concetto di storia della natura in Kant.” [Italian] Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 5. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 139-46. [M]

Linnebo, Øystein. “Freges oppfatning av logikk: fra Kant til Grundgesetze.” [Norwegian; Frege’s conception of logic: From Kant to Grundsätze] Norsk filosofisk tidsskrift 48.3-4 (2013): 219-28. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: I first argue that Frege started out with a conception of logic that is closer to Kant’s than is generally recognized, after which I analyze Frege’s reasons for gradually rejecting this view. Although conceding that the demands posed by Frege’s logicism played some role, I argue that his increasingly vehement anti-psychologism provides a deeper and more interesting reason for rejecting his earlier view.

Lisak, Andrzej. “Neoneo-Kantianism—Transcendental Philosophy as a Reflection on Validity (Geltung).” Dialogue and Universalism 23.2 (2013): 101-14. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article presents the philosophical thought of Rudolf Zocher, Wolfgang Cramer and Hans Wagner, whose theoretical stance can be dubbed Neoneo-Kantianism. The article investigates their philosophical output and argues that they developed a transcendental reflection of a different kind than that of Baden Neo-Kantianism. The transcendental reflection of Neoneo-Kantianism, especially in the work of Hans Wagner, takes on the topic of phenomenological inquiry and treats consciousness as a source of subject- object distinction, unlike Rickert and Windelband, who were developing transcendental reflection focused on aprioristic forms of cognition, much in the post-Fichtean vein, thus giving primacy to the subjective conditions of possible experience.

Litvin, T. V. Vremja, vosprijatie, voobrazenie: fenomenologiceskie studii po probleme vremeni u Avgustina, Kanta i Gusserlja. [Russian] Sankt-Peterburg: Gumanitarnaja Akademija, 2013. [206 p.] [WC]

Liu, Jing. “Kant’s Virtue as Strength.” Frontiers of Philosophy in China 8.3 (2013): 451-70. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The revival of virtue ethics has been accompanied by an increasing interest in Kant’s theory of virtue. Many scholars claim that virtue plays an important role in Kant’s moral theory. However, some worries and disagreements have arisen within the camp of contemporary virtue ethics concerning the Kantian concept of virtue. Some scholars have pointed out that Kantian virtue is at best nothing more than Aristotelian continence, that is, strength of will in the face of contrary emotions and appetites, and hence not a real virtue. In response to these criticisms and worries concerning Kant’s concept of virtue, this paper examines the question of whether Kant’s account of virtue is only a reformulation of Aristotle’s idea of continence. My analysis focuses on Kant’s concept of inner freedom, his ideas about latitude in the imperfect duties of virtue, and his notion of the perfection of virtue. I thus attempt to provide some evidence of the significant differences between Aristotelian continence and Kant’s virtue as strength. Then I explore the significance of Kant’s virtue as strength. Finally, I argue that Kant’s virtue as strength not only is not Aristotle’s idea of continence but also is located at a much higher level, that is, the state of inner freedom and the mental attitude of a human being’s soul.

Lockhart, Jennifer Ryan. “Kierkegaard’s Indirect Communication of Kant’s Existential Moment.” Res Philosophica 90.4 (2013): 503-23. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper distinguishes between two rationalist readings of Either/Or: (1) the Rational Argument Interpretation, according to which the aim of the book is ultimately to offer a rational argument in favor of living ethically, and (2) the Rational Presupposition Interpretation, according to which the pseudonymous authors presuppose that it is rational to live ethically. The paper argues in favor of (2). In particular, it argues that the fundamental presuppositions of Either/Or are those of Kant’s moral philosophy and rational religion. At the heart of Kant’s arguments for the practical postulates lies an “existential moment”: Kant’s practical arguments are subjectively valid in virtue of the personal decision of the individual to do his duty. According to the Rational Presupposition Interpretation advanced here, Either/Or is best understood as an attempt to communicate indirectly and to confront the reader with the significance of personal choice for inhabiting a hopeful moral life-view.

Lomonaco, Fabrizio. “The Biblical Text in the Philosophy of History of the 1780s.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 4. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 729-39. [M]

Loncar, Samuel. “Converting the Kantian Self: Radical Evil, Agency, and Conversion in Kant’s Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason.” Kant-Studien 104.3 (2013): 346-66. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article argues that Kant’s doctrine of radical evil and the doctrine of conversion which is its consequent reflect developments in Kant’s thinking about moral agency and his realization that his theory of freedom was inadequate to the problem of moral evil; that the changes Kant makes to accommodate evil result in a significant though subterranean shift in his concept of agency, resulting in two incompatible concepts, one explicit but inadequate, the other implicit yet necessary; and that the problems Kant encounters with radical evil and conversion and the concept of agency they push him towards provide an important link between Kant and German Idealism.

Longuenesse, Béatrice. “Kant and Freud on ‘I’.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 1. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 299-320. [M]

 ——. “Kant and Hegel on the Moral Self.” Self, World, and Art: Metaphysical Topics in Kant and Hegel. Ed. Dina Emundts (op cit.). 93-117. [M]

Look, Brandon C. “Matter, Inertia, and the Contingency of Laws of Nature in Leibniz and Kant – Some Points of Comparison.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 5. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 147-57. [M]

Lorenz, Andreas. Gewißheit versus Hypothese: postmetaphysische Untersuchungen zur Philosophieauffassung bei Kant, Newton und Schopenhauer. Würzburg: Königshausen et Neumann, 2013. [386 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Originally appeared as a doctoral dissertation (Uni-Düsseldorf, 2001).

Lorenz, Hilmar. “Le tournant copernicien chez Kant: du savoir à la foi.” Kant, théologie et religion. Ed. Robert Theis (op cit.). 207-14. [M]

Lories, Danielle. “De la portée des parerga dans la Religion.” Kant, théologie et religion. Ed. Robert Theis (op cit.). 329-37. [M]

Lorini, Gualtiero. “Raum und Zeit als Bedingungen für Kants neue Definition der Ontologie.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 659-68. [M]

 ——. “Die Rolle der Vorlesungen über Metaphysik in Kants stillem Jahrzehnt (1770-1781): Der Begriff Ontologie.” Estudos Kantianos 1.1 (2013): 105-24. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Der Beitrag bezieht sich auf die Rolle von Kants Vorlesungen über Metaphysik zur Erklärung der theoretischen Entwicklung, die von der Veröffentlichung der Dissertatio (1770) zur ersten Auflage der Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1781) führt. Es handelt sich um eine sowohl historische als auch theoretische Betrachtung: einerseits wird der genaue Zeitpunkt des Hauptkurses dieses Jahrzehnts untersucht, andererseits werden Kants Aussagen über die Zusammensetzung der Urteils- und Kategorientafel und den ontologischen Status von Raum und Zeit vertieft, um ihren tatsächlichen Wert für die kritische Wende zu schätzen. Die gemeinsame Zuschreibung der reinen Verstandesbegriffe (die Kategorien) und der reinen a priori Anschauungen (Raum und Zeit) zum transzendentalen Bereich wird durch den Vergleich mit den Vorlesungen erklärt, und die Vertiefung der Definition von „Transzendentalphilosophie“, die bei der zweiten Auflage der Kritik der reinen Vernunft vorhanden ist, wird schon in diesen Vorlesungen antizipiert.

Louden, Robert B. “Reply to Pablo Muchnik.” Kantian Review 18.3 (2013): 473-77. [M]

 ——. “El Kant de Foucault.” [Spanish] Translated from the English by Nuria Sánchez Madrid. Estudos Kantianos 1.1 (2013): 163-82. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this essay I analyze and evaluate Michel Foucault’s interpretation of Kant’s anthropology, particularly as presented in his early work, Introduction à l’Anthropologie (first published posthumously in 2008). While agreeing with him on a number of key points, and while acknowledging his deep familiarity with all of Kant’s published works as well as a wide body of eighteenth-century German literature that forms part of the historical context for the development of Kant’s project in the human sciences, I argue that in the end Foucault approaches Kant’s anthropology too much through the lens of Nietzsche (and perhaps also Heidegger). Foucault’s impressive Introduction works best when read not as a commentary on Kant’s Anthropology for a Pragmatic Point of View, but rather as a verdict on the consequences of continental philosophy’s affair with anthropology.

 ——. “Unidade cosmopolítica: o destino final da espécie humana.” [Portuguese; Cosmopolitical unity: the final destiny of human species] Translated from the English by Alexandre Hahn Kant e-Prints 8.1 (2013): 201-22. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article aims at examining the assertions of the predisposition of mankind towards the "cosmopolitan unit" across the various annotations about Kant’s anthropology which are considered to be the basis of Kant's Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view. Thus, the author shows an historic panorama of these assertions, which, whether as a purpose of the nature, considering it to an end to the human species, or instead, as an end to the human genre, since it demands the exercise of freedom. Lastly, this cosmopolitan unit which corresponds to "nature's most prized objective", becomes “the matrix in which all of the Anlagen originals of the human species are to be developed (IaG, AA 08: 28; cf. 22). This is also something that we are biologically set to accomplish. However, this endeavour will depend on our choices and also those of ours descendants. Hence, affirming the existence of a biological determination of the human species does not imply reducing its behavior to a phenomena which can be merely explain by the laws of biology.

 ——. Rev. of The Scope of Autonomy: Kant and the Morality of Freedom, by Katerina Deligiorgi (2012). British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21.2 (2013): 412-15. [M]

 ——. Rev. of What is the Human Being?, by Patrick R. Frierson (2013). Philosophy in Review 33.6 (2013): 461-63. [M] [online]

Ludwig, Bernd. “Die Einteilungen der Metaphysik der Sitten im Allgemeinen und die der Tugendlehre im Besonderen (MS 6:218-221 und RL 6:239-242 und TL 6:388-394, 410-413).” Kant’s Tugendlehre. Eds. Trampota, Sensen, and Timmermann (op cit.). 59-84. [M]

 ——. “Die Freiheit des Willens und die Freiheit zum Bösen. Inhaltliche Inversionen und terminologische Ausdifferenzierungen in Kants Moralphilosophie zwischen 1781 und 1797.” Kants Rechtfertigung des Sittengesetzes in Grundlegung III: Deduktion oder Faktum? Ed. Heiko Puls (op cit.). 227-68. [PW]

 ——. “Kants Bruch mit der schulphilosophischen Freiheitslehre im Jahre 1786 und die 'Consequente Denkungsart der speculativen Critik'.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 371-84. [M]

Lundblad, Jan. See: Andersson, E. Roland, Bjarne Jansson, and Jan Lundblad.

Lutz-Bachmann, Matthias. “Responsabilidad cosmopolita: sobre la ética y el derecho en un mundo global.” [Spanish] Revista de Estudios Sociales (Bogota) 46 (2013): 178-83. [WC]

[top] M    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Machado Santos, Ricardo. “Kant, Foucault e o cuidado de si.” [Portuguese; Kant, Foucault and the care of the self] Kant e-Prints 8.2 (2013): 85-101. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article aims to show how Kant articulates his conception of human nature, arguing that it is linked to the attempt to show that morality is feasible to free human beings, i.e., that it is not a chimera. At the same time, we intend to analyze the closeness of the later philosophy of Kant with the ethics of care of the self of Foucault, arguing that such proximity rests on the thesis shared by both of a self-training or self-construction of man.

Maciejczak, Marek. “Ideas and Principles in Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.” Dialogue and Universalism 23.2 (2013): 161-80. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In his response to the question about the conditions of the possibility of dependable cognition Kant first points to the faculties of the cognitive powers and subsequently lists the criteria and normative foundations of knowledge — a system of forms, concepts and principles. Kant primarily seeks the possibilities of experience — independent cognition, the logical criteria governing the possibility of cognition as such. The paper outlines the creation of the systemic union of the primal concepts and principles of pure reason, which is necessary for the creation of knowledge. In other words, it follows the constitution phases of the cognition system: apperception, experience, self-consciousness and the principles of reason. The principles of reason ultimately give systemic unity to human cognitive powers — and, in effect, the human world of experience and cognition. It is this systemic unity which makes cognition science — or, in other words, pure reason — as it constitutes a specific system and is able to create science understood as the systemicunity of specific fields.

Macor, Laura Anna. Die Bestimmung des Menschen (1748-1800). Eine Begriffsgeschichte. Stuttgart: frommann-holzboog Verlag, 2013. [433 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Forschungen und Materialien zur deutschen Aufklärung, Division II (Monographien zur Philosophie der deutschen Aufklärung), General editors: Norbert Hinske and Clemens Schwaiger.

 ——. “I fondamenti concettuali del cosmopolitismo kantiano – pensiero autonomo, egoismo logico e universale ragione umana.” [Italian] Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 1. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 631-42. [M]

 ——. “‘Intendere un autore meglio di quanto egli stesso si sia inteso’. Schiller interprete dell'etica kantiana.” [Italian] Schiller lettore di Kant. Eds. Alberto L. Siani and Gabriele Tomasi (op cit.). 185-203. [M]

 ——. “Kant and Schiller on Pure Ethics: Why Philosophers Should Concern Themselves with German Literature (and vice versa).” Estudos Kantianos 1.1 (2013): 125-38. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This essay deals with Kant’s and Schiller’s ethical views in order to show that there was far more agreement between them than is usually admitted. Kant and Schiller did not propose the same ethical system, yet their convictions were not completely antithetical, especially regarding the issue of purism and emotions. Striking, Schiller can be rather considered as the first supporter of the so-called ‘method of isolation’ which was elaborated by Herbert J. Paton in the 1940s and which renewed the interest in Kantian ethics in the second half of the twentieth century. I suggest that the reason of the misunderstanding of Schiller’s pivotal role is the high degree of specialization of the academic system which, on the one hand, led (and still leads some of) the Schiller experts to see in Kant the philosophical personification of an abstract and one-sided rejection of feelings and, on the other hand, gave to Kant scholars the occasion to maintain the prejudice according to which Schiller is the starting point in a long tradition of misinterpretations. The final scope of this paper is, therefore, to prove that a true interdisciplinary approach is the only solution.

 ——. “Kant’s Universal Human Reason. A Polyphonic, Functional, and Open Concept.” Kant e-Prints 8.1 (2013): 184-200. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper aims to investigate Kant’s concept of ‘universal human reason’ (allgemeine Menschenvernunft) by delving into his both published and unpublished writings. Relying on Georg Friedrich Meier’s logical and anthropological views, Kant developed a model of reason which met the Enlightenment’s demands for increasing knowledge and fight against prejudices, without however succumbing to the perversion of absolute truth. Reason can be found in everybody since it is non-exclusive, but everybody has access to it only in part since human beings unavoidably follow, without however being aware of it, preconceptions and private views. Insofar, Kantian reason requires both autonomy and communication, and is of persistent cultural and theoretical validity, as is proved by Hannah Arendt’s thought.

 ——. “Das Erbe der Aufklärungstheologie bei Kant: Vorüberlegungen zum Einfluss Johann Joachim Spaldings.” Kant und die Biblische Offenbarungsreligion / Kant a biblické Zjevené Náboženství. Eds. Norbert Fischer, Jakub Sirovátka, and David Voprada (op cit.). 107-21. [M]

Madore, Joël. Difficult Freedom and Radical Evil in Kant: Deceiving Reason. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013. [viii, 184 p.] [WC]

Magrì, Elisa. Rev. of Diritto e storia in Kant e Hegel, edited by Valerio Rocco Lozano and Marco Sgarbi (2011). Estudos Kantianos 1.2 (2013): 193-98. [M]

Maharaj, Ayon. The Dialectics of Aesthetic Agency: Revaluating German Aesthetics from Kant to Adorno. New York: Bloomsbury, 2013. [xv, 212 p.] [WC]

Mahootian, Farzad. “Paneth’s epistemology of chemical elements in light of Kant’s Opus postumum.” Foundations of Chemistry 15.2 (2013): 171-84. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Friedrich Paneth’s conception of ‘chemical element’ has functioned as the official definition adopted by the International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry since 1923. Paneth maintains a distinction between empirical and ‘transcendental’ concepts of element; furthermore, chemical science requires fluctuation between the two. The origin of the empirical-transcendental split is found in Immanuel Kant’s classic Critique of Pure Reason (1781/1787). The present paper examines Paneth’s foundational concept of element in light of Kant’s attempt, late in life, to revoke key distinctions made in his Critique, including that of regulative and constitutive functions of reason. In a section of his Opus postumum devoted to the ‘Transition from the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science to Physics,’ Kant bends his philosophical system to address the newly emerging sciences of matter of his time. Specifically, he tried, without success, to develop the transcendental ground for microscale motions of bodies encountered in physical, electrical and chemical processes. Paneth’s discussion of chemical element does not take the Opus postumum into account, which is why it begins with a rejection of Kant’s rejection (in his earlier writings) of chemistry’s status as science. I make the case that Paneth’s definition of element effectively maintains something very like Kant’s critical separation of regulative and constitutive principles, while a advancing the concept of chemical science.

Makeeva, Lolita B. “Analytic Philosophy, its History, and Kant.” [Russian] Kantovsky Sbornik 44.2 (2013): 56-68. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The paper is devoted to the contemporary discussions about the history of analytic philosophy, the criteria of its distinguishing as a philosophical movement and its present status. It is emphasized that its ambivalent attitude to Kant’s philosophy is important for understanding the character of analytic philosophy.

Makino, Eiji. “Weltbürgertum und die Kritik an der postkolonialen Vernunft.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 1. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 321-37. [M]

Makino, Eiji, and Kazuhiko Uzawa. “Bericht über die japanische Edition von Kants Gesammelten Schriften. Immanuel Kant: Gesammelte Schriften. Herausgegeben von Megumi Sakabe (†), Kougaku Arifuku und Eiji Makino. Tokio/Japan: Iwanami Shoten-Verlag, 1999–2006.” Kant-Studien 104.3 (2013): 386-94. [M]

Makkreel, Rudolf A. “Differentiating Wordly and Cosmopolitan Senses of Philosophy in Kant. According to a World-Concept and his Cosmopolitanism.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 1. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 643-52. [M]

Malandrino, Corrado. “The 'Invention' of Complementarity of the Federalist Thought of Kant and Hamilton in Italy.” Immanuel Kant and Alexander Hamilton, the Founders of Federalism. Ed. Roberto Castaldi (op cit.). 271-301. [M]

Maliks, Reidar. “Kant, the State, and Revolution.” Kantian Review 18.1 (2013): 29-47. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper argues that, although no resistance or revolution is permitted in the Kantian state, very tyrannical regimes must not be obeyed because they do not qualify as states. The essay shows how a state ceases to be a state, argues that persons have a moral responsibility to judge about it and defends the compatibility of this with Kantian authority. The reconstructed Kantian view has implications for how we conceive authority and obligation. It calls for a morally demanding definition of the state and asserts that the primary personal responsibility is not to evaluate the morality of every single law but to evaluate the moral standing of the polity.

 ——. “Kant and the Debate over Theory and Practice.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 4. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 741-51. [M]

 ——. “Kantian Courts: On the Legitimacy of International Human Rights Courts.” Kantian Theory and Human Rights. Eds. Andreas Føllesdal and Reidar Maliks (op cit.). 153-74. [M]

 ——. Rev. of Kant’s Theory of Virtue: The Value of Autocracy, by Anne Margaret Baxley (2010). The Philosophical Quarterly 63.252 (2013): 616-18. [PW]

 ——, and Andreas Føllesdal. “Kantian Theory and Human Rights.” Kantian Theory and Human Rights. Eds. Andreas Føllesdal and Reidar Maliks (op cit.). 1-7. [M]

 ——, ed. See: Føllesdal, Andreas, and Reidar Maliks, eds.

Manson, Neil. “Informed Consent and Referential Opacity.” Reading Onora O’Neill. Ed. David Archard, Monique Deveaux, Neil Manson, and Daniel Weinstock (op cit.). 79-93. [M]

 ——, ed. See: Archard, David, Monique Deveaux, Neil Manson, and Daniel Weinstock, eds.

Maraguat, Edgar. “Kant’s Underlying Metaphysics of Mind.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 669-76. [M]

Marciniak, Milena. “Die Rezeption der Philosophie Immanuel Kants in Polen um die Wende des 18. und 19. Jahrhunderts.” [German; The reception of the philosophy of Immanuel Kant in Poland near the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries] Studia z Historii Filozofii 4.4 (2013): 103-12. [PI] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article is devoted to the earliest reception and the first interpretative attempts of Kant’s philosophy on Polish lands; it also gives an outline of the first Polish Kantians, who had the opportunity to meet the Königsberg philosopher. Two of them deserve particular attention: Józef Bychowiec and Krzysztof Celestyn Mrongowiusz. Who both attended Kant’s lectures and were the first Polish experts at his philosophy and translators of his works. Other Polish thinkers, such as Jan Śniadecki or Józef Kalasanty Szaniawski, whose knowledge of Kant was narrowed to his works, are also mentioned in the article.

Marey, Macarena. “Kant’s Law of Peoples and the League of Democracies: How to Reconcile Human Rights with National Borders.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 861-71. [M]

Marino, Stefano. “Giudizio estetico e Giudizio etico-politico. Gadamer e Arendt interpreti di Kant.” [Italian] Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 4. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 131-40. [M]

Marques, António. “Imputation Judgment in Kant’s Practical Philosophy.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 385-93. [M]

Marques, José Oscar de Almeida and Andrea Faggion. “Causality, antinomies, and Kant’s way to the Critique.” [Portuguese] Studia Kantiana 11.15 (2013): 72-84. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: According to the Prolegomena, Kant was awakened from his “dogmatic slumber” not once but twice. In the Preface, he referred to the impact of Hume’s criticism of causality in his metaphysical investigations, but in the Third Part of the Main Transcendental Question, he credited his awakening to the discovery of the Antinomies as a product of reason in its transcendent use. These two accounts have traditionally led to two mutually exclusive explanations of the origin of Kant’s critical philosophy, one that places great importance on Hume’s influence, and other in which this influence is seen as minimal or even non-existent. In this paper we will propose that both these subjects – antinomies and causality – can be referred to Hume and have a complementary role in Kant’s critical development, as distinct questions that gave rise, each, to a distinct stage in the long way that led to the Critique of pure reason.

Marques, Ubirajara Rancan de Azevedo. “Philologische Bemerkungen zum Gebrauch der Begriffe "angeboren" und "ursprünglich" in Kants praktischer und theoretischer Philosophie.” Das Leben der Vernunft: Beiträge zur Philosophie Kants. Eds. Dieter Hüning, Stefan Klingner, and Carsten Olk (op cit.). 344-53. [M]

 ——. “Osservazioni sull’innato in Kant.” [Italian] Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 321-29. [M]

 ——. “Consideraciones filológicas a propósito del “genio” en Kant.” [Portuguese] Philosophica 41 (2014): 147-61. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: To clarify the definition of “Genius” which Kant employs in the §46 of the Critique of Judgment is the motto of the considerations of the present article about the meaning of the “innate” in the transcendental philosophy.

Marschall-Bradl, Beate. “Wahrhaftigkeit und Menschenwürde.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 395-405. [M]

Marshall, Colin. “Kant’s Appearances and Things in Themselves as Qua-Objects.” Philosophical Quarterly 63.252 (2013): 520-45. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The one-world interpretation of Kant’s idealism holds that appearances and things in themselves are, in some sense, the same things. Yet this reading faces a number of problems, all arising from the different features Kant seems to assign to appearances and things in themselves. I propose a new way of understanding the appearance/thing in itself distinction via an Aristotelian notion that I call, following Kit Fine, a ‘qua-object.’ Understanding appearances and things in themselves as qua-objects provides a clear sense in which they can be the same things while differing in many of their features.

 ——. “Kant’s One Self and the Appearance/Thing-in-itself Distinction.” Kant-Studien 104.4 (2013): 421-41. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant’s transcendental idealism hinges on a distinction between appearances and things in themselves. The debate about how to understand this distinction has largely ignored the way that Kant applies this distinction to the self. I argue that this is a mistake, and that Kant’s acceptance of a single, unified self in both his theoretical and practical philosophy causes serious problems for the ‘two-world’ interpretation of his idealism.

Marthaler, Ingo. Bewusstes Leben: Moral und Glück bei Immanuel Kant. Berlin / Boston: De Gruyter, 2013. [x, 155 p.] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Kantstudien Ergänzungshefte 176.
Abstract: This study shows for the first time that it is possible to describe the connections between morality and happiness in Immanuel Kant's philosophy in structural terms. Ultimately, Kant's ethical philosophy teaches that goodness is a never-ending task in a conscious life, a life that remains aware of its own proclivities, engages with them wisely, and regards morality as the final reference point.

Martinelli, Riccardo. “Vom Ich zur Welt. Formen der Weltbeziehung in Kants Anthropologie.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 4. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 413-23. [M]

 ——. Rev. of Kant und die Wissenschaften vom Menschen , by Thomas Sturm (2009). The Philosophical Quarterly 63.250 (2013): 178-80. [PW]

Martins, Clélia Aparecida. “Teleologie, Subjekt und Gott.” Das Leben der Vernunft: Beiträge zur Philosophie Kants. Eds. Dieter Hüning, Stefan Klingner, and Carsten Olk (op cit.). 531-44. [M]

 ——. “Bemerkungen zum philosophisch-historischen Aspekt der Kritik der Urteilskraft.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 4. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 753-63. [M]

 ——. “Die Antinomie zwischen Mechanismus und Finalismus in den spekulativen Überlegungen über die Natur.” Studia Philosophica Kantiana 2013.2 (2013): 3-26. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: According to some interpretations of Kant (Mathieu, Lehmann), there is a strict relationship between the last part of the Critique of Judgment and the Opus Postumum. It seems, therefore, also coherent to suppose that the antinomy of teleological judgment is present in Kant’s posthumous work. In the Opus Postumum, instead of seeking a subjective principle (the concept of end) for reflective judgment, Kant seeks an objective principle of conformity to an end in nature itself, which, in a certain sense, makes it so that reflective judgment is not present in the principle. How is it possible, then, to understand the connection between the two works if the antinomy of teleological judgment is characteristically preponderant in the second part of the third Critique? If the antinomy of teleological judgment is between mechanism and finalism, and this judgment is not present in the Opus Postumum, how does Kant think of the relationship between mechanism and final cause in this work? In the posthumous work, is the antinomic thought of Kant with respect to speculation on nature not present? If not, how can we then understand Kant’s statements (e.g., AA 22: 50; 21: 558) about the concept of end, about the immaterial principal that all organic bodies contain, and in relation to the independence that science has from experience (AA 22: 490)? The purpose of this paper, however, is not to make an analysis of the above-mentioned antinomy, even though in the first part the antinomy is explained along with the arguments supporting it. The objective here is to show how this antinomy is manifested, and in what form, in Kant’s analyses and speculative reflections on nature in the Opus Postumum. Given that the antinomic thought of the Critique of Judgment is also present in the reflections on nature found in the posthumous work, we present, as a basis for the analysis given here, some reflections on the status of the antinomy in regard to the relation between the philosophy of nature and practical philosophy.

Marty, François. “Dieu, le monde et l'homme dans l'Opus postumum.” Kant, théologie et religion. Ed. Robert Theis (op cit.). 117-23. [M]

Marwah, Inder. “Elateres Motiva: From the Good Will to the Good Human Being.” Kantian Review 18.3 (2013): 413-37. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant's ethics has long been bedevilled by a peculiar tension. While his practical philosophy describes the moral obligations incumbent on all free, rational beings, Kant also understands moral anthropology as addressing ‘helps and hindrances’ to our moral advancement. How are we to reconcile Kant’s Critical account of a transcendentally free human will with his developmental view of anthropology, history and education as assisting in our collective progress towards moral ends? I argue that Kant in fact distinguishes between the objective determination of moral principles and subjective processes of moral acculturation developing human beings’ receptivity to the moral law. By differentiating subjective and objective dimensions of moral agency, I argue (1) that we better interpret the relationship between Kant's transcendental and anthropological accounts as a division of labour between principles of obligation and principles of volition, and so, as complementary rather than contradictory; and (2) that this counters the view of Kant's ethics as overly formalistic by recognizing his ‘empirical ethics’ as attending to the unsystematizable facets of a properly human moral life.

 ——. “What Nature Makes of Her: Kant’s Gendered Metaphysics.” Hypatia 28.3 (2013): 551-67. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Women’s exclusion from political enfranchisement in Kant’s political writings has frequently been noted in the literature, and yet has not been closely scrutinized. More often than not, commentators suggest that this reflects little more than Kant’s sharing in the prejudices of his era. This paper argues that, for Kant, women’s civil incapacities stem from defects relating to their capacities as moral agents, and more specifically, to his teleological account of the conditions within which we, as imperfect beings, develop our moral capacities. Women are not incidentally or tangentially excluded from the boundaries of political and moral agency, but rather must adopt an explicitly nonmoral character if we are to understand humanity as moving toward its naturally given, moral ends. I argue (1) that Kant’s teleological view of human development requires women to develop an explicitly nonmoral character; (2) that this teleology is inextricable from his view of the moral agency that human- and not merely rational-beings are capable of; and (3) that taken together, these suggest that women’s subordinate status is internally connected to Kant’s view of moral personhood.

Marwede, Florian. “Die moralische Notwendigkeit des höchsten Guts.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 407-17. [M]

Marzolf, Hedwig. Libéralisme et religion: réflexions autour de Habermas et Kant. Paris: les Éd. du Cerf, 2013. [271 p.] [WC]

Masi, Felice. “La “bilancetta” di pensiero ed esperienza. Grandezza e quantità nella formazione della fenomenologia.” [Italian] Sentire e pensare: tra Kant e Husserl. Eds. Maria Teresa Catena and Anna Donise (op cit.). 77-102. [M]

Massimi, Michela. “Philosophy of Natural Science from Newton to Kant.” Studies in History & Philosophy of Science, Part A 44.3 (2013): 393-95. [M]

 —— and Silvia De Bianchi. “Cartesian Echoes in Kant’s Philosophy of Nature.” Studies in History & Philosophy of Science, Part A 44.3 (2013): 481-92. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper, we take the cue from a recent observation of Dan Warren about pre-Newtonian elements in Kant’s philosophy of nature to argue that there are two puzzles concerning Kant’s claim that mechanical laws presuppose dynamical laws in Chapter Three of Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. We offer responses on Kant’s behalf to these puzzles. These responses take us through a journey via Kant’s first pre-Critical work, True Estimation of Living Forces, and the then lively debate between Cartesians and Leibnizians. We show how some important Cartesian echoes, clearly evident in True Estimation, have played a role in shaping some seminal ideas of Kant on dynamical forces.

Masullo, Paolo Augusto. “Laddove si dà qualcosa che sente, s’insinua la probabilità di un significato.” [Italian] Sentire e pensare: tra Kant e Husserl. Eds. Maria Teresa Catena and Anna Donise (op cit.). 121-38. [M]

Matherne, Samantha. “The Inclusive Interpretation of Kant’s Aesthetic Ideas.” British Journal of Aesthetics 53.1 (2013): 21-39. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant offers a theory of artistic expression in which he claims that a work of art is a medium through which an artist expresses an ‘aesthetic idea’. While Kant’s theory of aesthetic ideas often receives rather restrictive interpretations, according to which aesthetic ideas can either present only moral concepts, or only moral concepts and purely rational concepts, in this article I offer an ‘inclusive interpretation’ of aesthetic ideas, according to which they can present not only moral and purely rational concepts but also empirical concepts and emotions related to our ordinary experience. Although this latter class of experience-oriented aesthetic ideas has been neglected, I argue that recognizing the role it plays in Kant’s account is crucial for understanding his views not only of artistic production and our experience of art but also of the value he takes art to have for our ordinary experience of the world, others, and our own selves. What is more, insofar as the inclusive interpretation brings to light Kant’s acknowledgement of the close connection between experience and art, it reveals that his overall view of art is more plausible than is often thought, and recommends it as worthy of further consideration.

Mathieu, Frédéric. Kant et la subjectivité: un commentaire critique du 24 de la Déduction transcendentale. Saint-Denis: Édilivre, 2013. [109 p.] [WC]

Matsuno, Koichiro. “Naturalizing the Kantian Regulative Principle.” Objectivity after Kant. Eds. Gertrudis Van De Vijver and Boris Demarest (op cit.). 65-79. [M]

Mattos, Fernando Costa. “Repensando a presença de Rousseau na filosofia moral kantiana: seria Kant um piedoso?” [Portuguese] Estudos Kantianos 1.2 (2013): 121-28. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper aims to inquire, based on certain passages from Rousseau and Kant, if the bringing together of these philosophers could be fruitful in order to think a notion of human being compatible with that of dignity, which is evidently important in contemporary political philosophy. We shall begin by reconstructing Cassirer’s arguments, showing why Kant turns into the direction of reason instead of feeling, and making a parallel between both philosophers in regard to the founding of morality. In the end, we shall question if Rousseau’s comprehension of human subjectivity, centered on the notion of piety, could be a good source of inspiration to, in association with Kant’s moral philosophy, think human subjectivity and that which, within the latter, would motivate us to act morally.

Mayr, Erasmus. See: Knappik, Franz, and Erasmus Mayr.

McAndrew, Matthew. Rev. of The Scope of Autonomy: Kant and the Morality of Freedom, by Katerina Deligiorgi (2012). Journal of the History of Philosophy 51.4 (2013): 682-83. [PI]

McCumber, John. Understanding Hegel’s Mature Critique of Kant. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013. [xiii, 216 p.] [WC]

McGaughey, Douglas. “Historical and Pure Religion: A Response to Stephen Palmquist.” Journal of Religion 93.2 (2013): 151-76. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article discusses the meaning of the two kinds of faith such as the historical and pure religion. It highlights the theory of German philosopher Immanuel Kant on the difference of the two kinds of faith and mentions how they unite with shared morality. It also mentions the theory of professor Stephen Palmquist and his interpretation of Kant's religion with dogmatic assumptions of grace.

McLaughlin, Peter. “Actualism and the Archaeology of Nature.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 5. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 159-70. [M]

McMullin, Irene. “Kant on Radical Evil and the Origin of Moral Responsibility.” Kantian Review 18.1 (2013): 49-72. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The notion of radical evil plays a more important role in Kant’s moral theory than is typically recognized. In Religion Within the Limits of Mere Reason, radical evil is both an innate propensity and a morally imputable act — a paradoxical status that has prompted commentators to reject it as inconsistent with the rest of Kant’s moral theory. In contrast, I argue that the notion of radical evil accounts for the beginning of moral responsibility in Kant’s theory, since the act of attributing radical evil to one’s freedom is an inauguration into the autonomous stance.

McQuillan, Colin. Rev. of The Continuum Companion to Kant, ed. by Gary Banham, Dennis Schulting, and Nigel Hems (2012). Kantian Review 18.1 (2013): 162-66. [M]

 ——. Rev. of The Kantian Aesthetic: From Knowledge to the Avant-Garde, by Paul Crowther (2010). Mind 122.488 (2013): 1075-78. [PW]

McWherter, Dustin. The Problem of Critical Ontology: Bhaskar Contra Kant. Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. [xi, 187 p.] [WC]

Meattini, Valerio. “Im margine al ‘Ding an sich’.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 5. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 579-90. [M]

Mehigan, Timothy J. Heinrich von Kleist: Writing after Kant. New York: Boydell & Brewer Group, 2013. [416 p.] [WC]

Meier-Oeser, Stephan. “Kant’s Transformation of the Symbol-Concept.” Symbol and Intuition: Comparative Studies in Kantian and Romantic-Period Aesthetics. Eds. Helmut Hühn and James Vigus (op cit.). 21-43. [M]

Melnick, Arthur. “Two Charges of Intellectualism against Kant.” Kantian Review 18.2 (2013): 197-219. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The contemporary discussion of non-conceptual content inaugurated by Gareth Evans and John McDowell has generated a range of differing views as to Kant's position on the issues raised. I argue that for Kant perception is prior to thought and that it is as being prior that perception connects us to reality in outer intuition. I then argue that for Kant thought relates to perception by being the rule for perceptual procedures. This accounts for thought's extending in scope beyond what we actually perceive to all that is manifest in space and time. As against Merleau-Ponty this Kantian understanding of thought beyond perception does not distort the nature of reality which remains essentially that which can be engaged.

Mendonça, Marta. “Les erreurs de Hume et le dépassement du scepticisme.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 257-71. [M]

Mensch, Jennifer. Kant’s Organicism: Epigenesis and the Development of Critical Philosophy. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2013. [xi, 246 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents: Introduction: Kant's organicism — Generation and the task of classification — Buffon's natural history and the founding of organicism — Kant and the problem of origin — Kant's eclecticism — The rebirth of metaphysics — From the unity of reason to the unity of race — Empirical psychology in Tetens and Kant — Kant's architectonic: system and organism in the Critique of pure reason.

Meo, Oscar. “Logik und Pragmatik der ästhetischen Kommunikation. Bemerkungen zum zweiten Moment des Geschmacksurteils.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 4. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 141-52. [M]

Merle, Jean-Christophe. “Envy and Interpersonal Dependence in Kant’s Conception of Economic Justice.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 4. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 765-75. [M]

 ——. “Como os argumentos de Kant sobre o estado de necessidade são refutados quando traduzidos em um experimento mental de duplo nível.” [Portuguese] Estudos Kantianos 1.1 (2013): 69-80. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the very short “Appendix to the introduction to the Doctrine of Right” devoted to the so-called right of necessity (ius necessitates), Kant formulates two theses about a two-tiered thought experiment. This paper analyzes and criticizes these two theses in light of Lon Fuller’s thought experiment of the Speluceans, which presents for a counterpart to Kant’s two-tiered thought experiment of the shipwrecked. Kant’s first thesis refers to Carneades’ plank: Kant denies that there can be any right of necessity. But, in reality, Kant goes further. Instead of merely stating that such law is not competent for such a situation of “necessity”, since – as one must logically conclude from his concept of right – there can be neither law nor rights in such a situation, Kant also asserts a legal prohibition, which makes such an action out of necessity a violation of the law. Kant’s second thesis concerns the sentence that a court of justice would pronounce against the perpetrator of such an action out of necessity. According to Kant, the court of justice would find him guilty, but it would not punish him. On the basis of a close analysis of Kant’s argumentation, this paper will eventually reject both of Kant’s theses.

Mertens, Thomas. Rev. of Kant’s Doctrine of Right. A Commentary, edited by B. Sharon Byrd and Joachim Hruschka (2010). ethic@ 12.2 (2013): 355-58. [M] [online]

Mikalsen, Kjartan Koch. “Kant and Habermas on International Law.” Ratio Juris 26.2 (2013): 302-24. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The purpose of this article is to present a critical assessment of Jürgen Habermas’ reformulation of Kant’s philosophical project Toward Perpetual Peace. Special attention is paid to how well Habermas’ proposed multi-level institutional model fares in comparison with Kant’s proposal — a league of states. I argue that Habermas’ critique of the league fails in important respects, and that his proposal faces at least two problems. The first is that it implies a problematic asymmetry between powerful and less powerful states. The second is that it entails creating a global police force that has an obligation to intervene against egregious human rights violations worldwide, and that this seems incompatible with the idea that every person has an innate right to freedom. There are important normative constraints relevant for institutional design in the international domain that Habermas does not take sufficiently into account. However, this does not mean that Kant’s league cannot be supplemented with more comprehensive forms of institutional cooperation between states. On the basis of my assessment of the multi-level model, I propose a hybrid model combining elements from Kant and Habermas.

Mikkelsen, Jon M., ed., tr. See: Kant, Immanuel.

Mikolajczyk, Hubert. Kantowskie a priori i problem jego uhistorycznienia. [Polish] Slupsk: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Akademii Pomorskiej, 2013. [217 p.] [WC]

Miksa, Joanna. “Religia i granice uprawnien instytucji panstwa wobec jednostki w filozofii Immanuela Kanta.” [Polish] Etyka 46 (2013): 50-64. [WC]

Milkov, Nikolay. “Kant’s Transcendental Turn as a Second Phase in the Logicization of Philosophy.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 1. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 653-66. [M]

Milstein, Brian. “Kantian Cosmopolitanism beyond ‘Perpetual Peace’: Commercium, Critique, and the Cosmopolitan Problematic.” European Journal of Philosophy 21.1 (2013): 118-43. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Most contemporary attempts to draw inspiration from Kant’s cosmopolitan project focus exclusively on the prescriptive recommendations he makes in his article, ‘On Perpetual Peace’. In this essay, I argue that there is more to his cosmopolitan point of view than his normative agenda. Kant has a unique and interesting way of problematizing the way individuals and peoples relate to one another on the stage of world history, based on a notion that human beings who share the earth in common ‘originally’ constitute a ‘commercium’ of thoroughgoing interaction. By unpacking this concept of ‘commercium’, we can uncover in Kant a more critical perspective on world history that sets up the cosmopolitan as a specific kind of historical-political challenge. I will show that we can distinguish this level of problematization from the prescriptive level at which Kant formulates his familiar recommendations in ‘Perpetual Peace’. I will further show how his particular way of framing the cosmopolitan problematic can be expanded and expatiated upon to develop a more critical, reflexive, and open-ended conception of cosmopolitan thinking.

Milz, Bernhard. “Kants Deduktion des kategorischen Imperativs in entwicklungsgeschichtlicher Perspektive.” Kants Rechtfertigung des Sittengesetzes in Grundlegung III: Deduktion oder Faktum? Ed. Heiko Puls (op cit.). 133-66. [PW]

Minazzi, Fabio. “Actualité philosophique et civile du droit cosmopolitique de Kant – le problème de la paix perpétuelle selon Immanuel Kant.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 4. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 777-88. [M]

Mishra, Samir Kumar. Gita and Kant: an ethical study. Varanasi: Chaukhamba Surbharati Prakashan, 2013. [xxxi, 338 p.] [WC]

Mitchell, Albert. The Concept of Religious Passion. According to Immanuel Kant. Bloomington, Indiana: Xlibris Corp., 2013. [378 p.] [WC]

Mittelstrass, Jürgen. Leibniz, Kant und die Welt im Kopf des Philosophen. Hannover: Wehrhahn Verlag, 2013. [39 p.] [WC]

Møller, Sofie. “Human Rights Jurisprudence Seen through the Framework of Kant’s Legal Metaphors.” Kantian Theory and Human Rights. Eds. Andreas Føllesdal and Reidar Maliks (op cit.). 52-69. [M]

 —— “The Court of Reason in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.” Kant-Studien 104.3 (2013): 301-20. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The aim of the present paper is to discuss how the legal metaphors in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason can help us understand the work’s transcendental argumentation. I discuss Dieter Henrich’s claim that legal deductions form a methodological paradigm for all three Critiques that exempts the deductions from following a stringent logical structure. I also consider Rüdiger Bubner’s proposal that the legal metaphors show that the transcendental deduction is a rhetorical argument. On the basis of my own reading of the many different uses of legal analogies in the first Critique, I argue that they cannot form a consistent methodological paradigm as Henrich and Bubner claim.

Mohr, Georg. “Kant über Musik als schöne Kunst.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 4. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 153-67. [M]

Moledo, Fernando. “Bemerkungen hinsichtlich des Arguments über die objektive Gültigkeit der Relationskategorien im Duisburgischen Nachlass von Immanuel Kant.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 273-82. [M]

 ——. “El antropocentrismo moral kantiano. Enfoque sistemático e histórico-evolutivo.” [Spanish; Kantian Moral Anthropocentrism] La razón y sus fines. Eds. Rosemary Rizo-Patrón de Lerner and María Jesús Vázquez Leibeiras (op cit.). 213-24. [M]

Molina Cantó, Eduardo. “Kant y el ideal del sabio.” [Spanish; Kant and the Ideal of the Sage] Ideas y Valores (Colombia) 62, Suppl. #1 (2013): 171-83. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article analyzes the possible influence of Stoicism on certain specific aspects of Kant’s ethics. It argues in defense of the thesis that although Kant often criticizes Stoic ethics, particularly its eudaimonism, he also adopts certain Stoic positions in his ethics and incorporates them into key aspects of his Doctrine of Virtue. Specifically, the article attempts to show how Kant adopts the ideal of the Stoic sage and one of its most salient characteristics: apathy.

 ——. “Finalidad y Contingencia: La Concepción Kantiana de los Organismos.” [Spanish] Anuario Filosófico 46.3 (2013): 523-41. [PW]

Molloy, Seán. “An ‘All-Unifying Church Triumphant’: A Neglected Dimension of Kant's Theory of International Relations.” International History Review 35.2 (2013): 317-36. [HIC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The purpose of this article is to examine the religious and theological elements of Immanuel Kant's work. This is an area of Kant's oeuvre that has been neglected in the history of international thought; this is problematic as it is in these works that Kant addresses many themes which are important to his international-relations project, for example, human nature, the corruption of society, the possibility of ethical community, and cosmopolitanism.

Montebello, Pierre. See: Forero Mendoza, Sabine, and Pierre Montebello.

Monod, Jean-Claude. “Toward Perpetual War? The Stakes and Limits of Schmitt’s Critique of Kant’s Cosmopolitanism.” The New Centennial Review 13.1 (2013): 137-60. [M]

Moore, A. W. “Freedom, Temporality, and Belief. A Reply to Hare.” Kant on Practical Justification. Eds. Mark Timmons and Sorin Baiasu (op cit.). 315-18. [M]

Moran, Kate. “For Community’s Sake – A Self-Respecting Kantian Account of Forgiveness.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 419-30. [M]

Mordacci, Roberto. “Kantian Naturalism in Moral Theory.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 431-42. [M]

Mori, Massimo. “Reine Vernunft und Weltburgertum – Recht, Politik und Geschichte in Kants Kosmopolitismus.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 1. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 339-56. [M]

 ——. “Alexander Hamilton and Immanuel Kant: A Comparison of Two Federalisms.” Immanuel Kant and Alexander Hamilton, the Founders of Federalism. Ed. Roberto Castaldi (op cit.). 59-70. [M]

 ——, and Natalia Iacobelli. “Kant and Historical Knowledge.” Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 34.1 (2013): 21-42. [PW]

Moretto, Antonio. “Con Euclide e contro Euclide: Kant e la geometria.” [Italian] Studi Kantiani 26 (2013): 71-92. [PW]

Morris, Michael. “Realism and Representation: The Case of Rembrandt’s Hat.” European Journal of Philosophy (pre-print online, posted 14 Apr 2013). [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Some artistic representations—the painting of a hat in a famous picture by Rembrandt is an example—are able to present vividly the character of what they represent precisely by calling attention to their medium of representation. There is a puzzle about this whose structure, I argue, is analogous to that of a familiar Kantian problem for traditional realism. I offer a precise characterization of the puzzle, before arguing that an analogue for the case of representation to the Kantian solution to the problem for traditional realism is implausible. I offer an alternative solution to the puzzle about representation which also explains why we should be interested in artistic representation in the first place. I close with the outline of a possible realist response to the traditional Kantian problem.

Morrison, Scott. “Jupiter and the god of morality: the paradox of individual autonomy and national self-determination in Kant.” Studia Kantiana 11.14 (2013): 55-79. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article articulates, and seeks to resolve, a paradox yielded by juxtaposing the ethical and the political philosophy of Immanuel Kant. Individualism and autonomy in Kant’s ethics contrast with the inviolable sovereignty he accords the state in his political philosophy. As history demonstrates there is no certainty that the state will observe the rights of its citizens. The proposed resolution of the paradox reads Perpetual peace (PP) through the Metaphysics of morals (MM). It places PP in the broader context of Kant’s (inter-related) political and moral writings in order to oppose a quietistic, conservative reading of PP, while advancing a chastened interpretation of MM that is more fully consistent with Kant’s understanding of republicanism and its teleological global evolution. The purpose of this intervention is to furnish a Kantian position on the current (and continuing) debate in international relations concerning the conflict between human rights and national self-determination.

Mosayebi, Reza. Das Minimum der reinen praktischen Vernunft: Vom kategorischen Imperativ zum allgemeinen Rechtsprinzip bei Kant. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2013. [viii, 274 p.] [PW] [contents]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Kantstudien Ergänzungshefte, vol. 173. Originally appeared as the author’s Ph.D. dissertation (Universität-Tübingen, 2008).
Publisher’s Note: What is the founding relationship between Kant’s general principle of rational law and his categorical imperative? On the one hand, Mosayebi answers this question by showing how Kant consistently developed the general principle of law from his moral philosophy. On the other hand, he demonstrates those transcendental critical moments that characterize this principle in contrast to the categorical imperative.

 ——. “Die „Antinomie“ des §3 der Tugendlehre.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 443-55. [M]

Motorina, Ľubov E. “I. Kant on the Anthropological Era, Man and his Attitude towards the World.” Studia Philosophica Kantiana 2013.1 (2013): 27-35. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article is focused upon the anthropological crisis as one of the most important foundations of the global cultural crisis caused by the rapid development of modern technologies, including human technologies; it demonstrates the contents of the anthropological paradigm which dominated the culture throughout the 20th century, its essence is reduced to the total domination of man over the things in existence; it reveals the methodological importance of anthropological ideas regarding the anthropological era, the relation between man and the world, and the moral categorical imperative as suggested by I. Kant; it substantiates the statement saying that man’s status should be changed in the 21st century, while anthropologism as a world outlook should give way to the post-anthropological paradigm, which includes the awareness of the impossibility of further total domination of man over the world. The new paradigm is aimed at overcoming the opposition of subject and object, man and culture, man and society, and man and nature; it opens the way to the environmental dimension of human existence, restoring its integrity, harmonious relationship with oneself, the others, and the world. Man can no longer exist outside of the world as its transformer (master) and user. He has to return to the world, coordinating his actions with the laws of nature to find a new home. Perhaps the world as a Universe and peace as a Union will become this new home.

Motroschilowa, Nelly W. “Kants Metaphysik der Sitten im Kontext der russischen Kant-Rezeption und der Übersetzungen.” Kants “Metaphysik der Sitten” in der Diskussion. Eds. Werner Euler and Burkhard Tuschling (op cit.). 11-9. [M]

Motta Giuseppe. “Kants Begriff der exemplarischen Notwendigkeit innerhalb der modalen Architektur der Analytik des Schönen.” Das Leben der Vernunft: Beiträge zur Philosophie Kants. Eds. Dieter Hüning, Stefan Klingner, and Carsten Olk (op cit.). 219-37. [M]

 ——. “‘Was mit den formalen Bedingungen der Erfahrung übereinkommt, ist möglich’ (Kritik der reinen Vernunft, A 216/B 265). Vorgeschichte und Bedeutung einer Definition.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 677-88. [M]

Moutsopoulos, Evanghélos. “L'emprise du bien sur le mal dans les limites de la religion d'après Kant.” Kant, théologie et religion. Ed. Robert Theis (op cit.). 247-52. [M]

 ——. Formă şi subiectivitate în estetica kantiană. [Romanian; Form and Subjectivity in Kantian Aesthetics] Translated from the Greek by Rodica Croitoru. Bucharest: Antet, 2013. [223 p.] [WC]

 ——. Rev. of Religia doar în limitele raţiunii, transl. of Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft into Romanian by Rodica Croitoru (2007); Critica facultăţii de judecare, transl. of Kritik der Urteilskraft into Romanian by Rodica Croitoru (2007); Observaţii asupra sentimentului de frumos şi sublim, transl. of Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen into Romanian by Rodica Croitoru (2008); Spre pacea eternă, transl. of Zum ewigen Frieden into Romanian by Rodica Croitoru (2008). [French] Kant-Studien 104.1 (2013): 133-39. [M]

Moyar, Dean. Rev. of Hegel’s Critique of Kant: From Dichotomy to Identity, by Sally Sedgwick (2012). Mind 122.488 (2013): 1188-92. [PW]

Muchnik, Pablo. “Reflections on Robert Louden’s Kant’s Human Being: Essays on His Theory of Human Nature.” Kantian Review 18.3 (2013): 461-71. [M]

 ——. Rev. of Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals: A Critical Guide, ed. by Lara Denis (2010). Kantian Review 18.1 (2013): 143-48. [M]

 ——. Rev. of Kant’s Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason: A Commentary, by James J. DiCenso (2012). International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 73.2 (2013): 151-55. [M]

Mühlmann, Heiner. Kants Irrtum: Kritik der Neuroästhetik. Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 2013. [171 p.] [WC]

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Nadai, Bruno. “Le mal radical et l'insociable sociabilité.” Kant, théologie et religion. Ed. Robert Theis (op cit.). 261-69. [M]

Naeve, Nico. Naturteleologie bei Aristoteles, Leibniz, Kant und Hegel: eine historisch-systematische Untersuchung. Freiburg: Alber, 2013. [487 p.] [WC]

Nakamura Hiroo. “Kant’s way to the perpetual peace in the XXIst century.” [Russian; translated from the German] Kantovsky Sbornik 46.4 (2013): 7-14. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article presents the key ideas of the book Für den Frieden, in which the author scrutinises the basic principles of the Japanese constitution with the help of the works of Erasmus of Rotterdam, Kant, and Salomo Friedländer. The article develops the following theses: the human being has a right to pin their hopes on the future; the task of establishing perpetual peace rests with the human being themselves; as a result, everything depends on the development of personality, since it is that acts in the real world as an agent of freedom and ratio essendi of morality, whereas freedom is the ‘cornerstone’ for people striving for peace with all their hearts. The author of the article believes that the idea of perpetual peace formulated by Saint-Pierre, Rousseau, and Kant is always relevant for the humanity. At the same time, the author stresses that more significant results in establishing peace and politics were achieved in the second half of the 20th century than ever before. Kant played the decisive role in this process being the only philosopher who took the issue of philosophical justification of perpetual peace to the logical conclusion. One can say that the humanity is now firmly on the path towards perpetual peace, whose philosophical justification was given by Kant. It was Kant who gave the discussions the Archimedean ‘place to stand’, which made it possible to show the philosophers the possibility of perpetual peace.

Nance, Michael. “The Categorical Imperative and the Universal Principle of Right.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 873-83. [M]

Naragon, Steve, and Werner Stark. “Ein Geschenk für Rose Burger. Notizen und Hinweise zu einem neu aufgefunden Kant-Blatt.” Kant-Studien 104.1 (2013): 1-12. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This is a discussion and transcription of a “lose Blatt” of Immanuel Kant’s that was recently located in the Dibner Library of the Smithsonian Institute in Washington D.C. It briefly comments on (1) religious delusion [Andachtswahn], (2) Kant’s pedagogical aims, (3) virtue and the general will, and (4) perceptual relativism of magnitude. The sheet may have belonged to a group stemming from Kant’s copy of his Observations on the Beautiful and Sublime (1764), and its provenance can be traced to Rudolf Reicke, the Königsberg librarian and Kant scholar of the late 19th century.

Nedoh, Bostjan. “Kantova estetizacija prostora.” [Slovenian] Znanstveni simpozij mladih raziskovalcev 3 (2013): pages??. [WC]

Nehring, Robert. Kritik des Common Sense gesunder Menschenverstand, reflektierende Urteilskraft und Gemeinsinn — der Sensus communis bei Kant. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2013. [294 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Originally presented as the author's dissertation — Humboldt-Universität Berlin, 2008.

Nenon, Thomas. “Immanuel Kant’s turn to transcendental philosophy.” Kant, Kantianism, and Idealism: The Origins of Continental Philosophy. Ed. Thomas Nenon (op cit.). 15-47. [M]

 ——, ed. Kant, Kantianism, and Idealism: The Origins of Continental Philosophy. Durham, England: Acumen, 2013. [xv, 343 p.] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Volume One of The History of Contental Philosophy, general editor: Alan D. Schrift. See esp. the essays by Nenon and Fincham.

Newton, Alexandra Mary. “Kant on the Form of Aesthetic Judgment.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 4. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 169-79. [M]

Nickl, Peter. “Lügenverbot und Liebespflicht.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 457-69. [M]

Noller, Jörg U. Rev. of Kant’s Human Being. Essays on His Theory of Human Nature, by Robert C. Louden (2011).  Kant-Studien 104.3 (2013): 414-18. [M]

Nonnenmacher, Burkhard. “‘Vom Fürwahrhalten aus einem Bedürfnisse der reinen Vernunft.’ Zum Verhältnis von theoretischer und praktischer Vernunft in Kants Postulatenlehre.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 911-24. [M]

 ——. “Wie soll nach Kant das, was für die spekulative Vernunft transzendent ist, in der praktischen Vernunft immanent sein?” Transzendenz, Praxis und Politik bei Kant. Eds. Angeli, Rentsch, Schneidereit, and Vorländer (op cit.). 87-106. [M]

Noras, Andrzej Jan. “Debata Trendelenburg - Fischer: problem obiektywnosci Kantowskich form zmyslowosci.” [Polish] Przeglad Filozoficzny 22.1 (2013): 267-97. [WC]

Novembre, Alessandro. “Il circolo vizioso nella deduzione trascendentale delle categorie.” [Italian] Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 5. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 591-602. [M]

Nuzzo, Angelica. “Moral Space and the Orientation of Practical Reason.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 471-82. [M]

 ——. “Sein und Sinnlichkeit — Sensibility in Kant and Herder’s Metakritik.” Herders “Metakritik”: Analysen und Interpretationen. Ed. Marion Heinz (op cit.). 17-42. [M]

Nyholm, Sven. “On Kant’s Idea of Humanity as an End in Itself.” European Journal of Philosophy (pre-print online, posted 30 Aug 2013). [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Writers like Christine Korsgaard and Allen Wood understand Kant's idea of rational nature as an end in itself as a commitment to a substantive value. This makes it hard for them to explain the supposed equivalence between the universal law and humanity formulations of the categorical imperative, since the former does not appear to assert any substantive value. Nor is it easy for defenders of value-based readings to explain Kant's claim that the law-giving nature of practical reason makes all beings with practical reason regard the idea of a rational nature as an end in itself. This article seeks to replace these value-based readings with a reading of the idea of rational nature as an end that fits better with the overall argument of the Groundwork.

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Obadia, Claude. Kant prophète? Éléments pour une europhilosophie. Nice: Ovadia, 2013. [245 p.] [WC]

Oggionni, Eva. “Hat Kant die Sinnlichkeit aus der Moralität je ausgeschlossen? Eine Studie zu Kants moralischer Psychologie.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 4. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 425-34. [M]

Ognyov, A. “On Hartmann’s transcendental realism.” [Russian] Kantovsky Sbornik 45.3 (2013): 91-102. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This text is a compilation of fragments from A. I. Ognev’s 1910 PhD thesis, which was awarded a gold medal. The personal archive of Father Savva (Mikhalevich) held two versions of the thesis – the hand-written (132 pages) and typed (141 pages) ones; the latter contains the author’s corrections. Some pages of the manuscript are missing. The front page of the typed version has L.M. Lopatin’s inscription: “The work of A.I. Ognev is most satisfactory. Professor Lev Lopatin”. The text is published according to the typed version by the kind permission of Father Savva. In doubtful cases (omission, mismatched word endings, etc.), the text was checked against and corrected according to the manuscript. All page-by-page notes are made by the publisher. The offered fragments are thematically linked to E. von Hartmann’s theory of cognition of Kant and Neo-Kantianism. A.I. Ognev’s photograph apparently dating back to 1906 – the year he was enrolled at the Philosophical Department of the Historical-Philological Faculty of Moscow University – is published for the first time (Moscow Central Historical Archive. Fund 418, Inventory 317, Case 784, Page 7 (narrow)/Page 8 (wide)).

Olesti Vila, Josep. “Quelques considérations sur la notion kantienne de duratio noumenon.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 689-96. [M]

Olk, Carsten. “Das Transzendentale Schema: Ein Produkt der Einbildungskraft?” Das Leben der Vernunft: Beiträge zur Philosophie Kants. Eds. Dieter Hüning, Stefan Klingner, and Carsten Olk (op cit.). 62-94. [M]

 ——. See: Hüning, Dieter, Stefan Klingner, and Carsten Olk, eds.

Olmedo, Pablo. “El Kant del joven Nietzsche. Una discusión sobre el problema de la teleologia.” [Portuguese; Kant of young Nietzsche. A discussion about teleogy’s problem] Kant e-Prints 8.2 (2013): 113-31. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The purpose of this paper is emphasizing some aspects of the Nietzsches’s early critique to the Kant’s teleology concept, postulated in the second part of the Critique of Judgment. To achieve this goal we’ll have to consider the mediations between Kant´s work and Nietzsche´s reading. Especially, we’ll consider F. A. Lange, who makes a physiological reading of Kant’s transcendental Philosophy. Guided by Lange’s considerations, Nietzsche will propose his own arguments against Kant’s affirmation of a need in human intellect to introduce final causes to understand the process of organic world. At once, he will search explicative models of nature, which not introduce moral elements in his considerations. This research will be reflected in his reading of preplatonics philosophers, principally, of Empedocles’s and Democritus’s systems. We’ll see that in these early considerations become visible some aspects that will be decisive in his later work: especially, the express intention of reach a point of view about word, in which there are no remains of moral optimisms.

O’Neill, Onora. “Cosmopolitanism Then and Now.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 1. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 357-67. [M]

 ——. “Postscript: heteronomy as the clue to Kantian autonomy.” Kant on Moral Autonomy. Ed. Oliver Sensen (op cit.). 282-88. [M]

Onnasch, Ernst-Otto. “Der Zweck von Kants Übergangswerk.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 1. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 667-78. [M]

 —— and Werner Stark. “Ein neuer Brief Immanuel Kants an Samuel Gottlieb Wald.” Kant-Studien 104.1 (2013): 16-22. [M]

Onof, Christian. “The Cost of Discarding Intuition – Russell’s Paradox as Kantian Antinomy.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 5. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 171-83. [M]

 ——. “On Kiyoshi Chiba’s Kants Ontologie der raumzeitlichen Wirklichkeit.” Critique (blog posted: 12 May 2013 / 12 Jun 2013) n.p. [PW] [Online: part one / part two]

 ——. Rev. of Kant and Sartre: Rediscovering Critical Ethics, by Sorin Baiasu (2011). Kantian Review 18.2 (2013): 323-28. [M]

Orlov, Alexander. “The problem of reasonable peace order in I. Kant’s treatise To the Eternal Peace.” Kant’s Project of Perpetual Peace in the Context of Contemporary Politics. Eds. Andrey Zilber and Alexei Salikov (op cit.). 24-26. [M]

Orsi, Rocío. Rev. of Body and Justice, by Maria de Lourdes Borges and Cinara Nahra (2011). Estudos Kantianos 1.2 (2013): 199-206. [M]

Orth, Ernst Wolfgang. “Ernst Cassirer und die Philosophie der Renaissance.” Das Leben der Vernunft: Beiträge zur Philosophie Kants. Eds. Dieter Hüning, Stefan Klingner, and Carsten Olk (op cit.). 691-703. [M]

Ortiz de Landázuri, Carlos. Rev. of Kant and Phenomenology, by Tom Rockmore (2011). [Spanish] Anuario Filosofico 46.2 (2013): 464-66. [HIC]

Osborne, Gregg David. “Dryer and Allison on Kant’s Move to Absolute Permanence in the First Analogy.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 697-706. [M]

O’Shea, Tom. “A Law of One’s Own: Self-Legislation and Radical Kantian Constructivism.” European Journal of Philosophy (pre-print online, posted 25 Aug 2013). [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Radical constructivists appeal to self-legislation in arguing that rational agents are the ultimate sources of normative authority over themselves. I chart the roots of radical constructivism and argue that its two leading Kantian proponents are unable to defend an account of self-legislation as the fundamental source of practical normativity without this legislation collapsing into a fatal arbitrariness. Christine Korsgaard cannot adequately justify the critical resources which agents use to navigate their practical identities. This leaves her account riven between rigorism and voluntarism, such that it will not escape a paradox that arises when self-legislation is unable to appeal to external normative standards. Onora O’Neill anchors self-legislation more firmly to the self-disciplining structures of reason itself. However, she ultimately fails to defend sufficiently unconditional practical norms which could guide legislation. These endemic problems with radical constructivist models of self-legislation prompt a reconstruction of a neglected realist self-legislative tradition which is exemplified by Christian Wolff. In outlining a rationalist and realist account of self-legislation, I argue that it can also make sense of our ability to overcome anomie and deference in practical action. Thus, I claim that we need not make laws but can make them our own.

Ostaric, Lara. “Aesthetic Judgment and the Completion of Kant’s Critical System.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 1. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 679-90. [M]

Ottaviani, Osvaldo. “Metaphysical vs. Transcendental Moment. Note on the Deduction of Categories.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 707-18. [M]

Otterman, Steven. See: Palmquist, Stephen R. and Steven Otterman.

Ottonello, Irene. “‘Psychologizing’ Practical Reason.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 5. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 805-16. [M]

Ovídio Romero, Eduardo, and Rafael da Silveira Falcão. “Kant e a escritura da fundamentação última. Reflexões sobre uma tentativa de esclarecer desde um ponto de vista ético normativo os problemas do início da vida humana.” [Portuguese; Kant and the scripture of ultimate foundation. Reflections on an attempt to clarify from an ethical normative point of view the problems from the beginning of human life] Kant e-Prints 8.2 (2013): 151-59. [M] [online]

Özgür, Özlem Ayse. “Human Rights Duties are Collective Duties of Justice.” Kantian Theory and Human Rights. Eds. Andreas Føllesdal and Reidar Maliks (op cit.). 89-112. [M]

[top] P    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Pakalski, Dariusz. “Opozycja logiki i estetyki w tradycji leibnizjanskiej i jej wplyw na koncepcje Kanta.” [Polish] Ruch Filozoficzny 70.4 (2013): 703-17. [WC]

 ——. “Pytanie o ontologiczny status Kantowskich idei regulatywnych.” [Polish Humanistyka i Przyrodoznawstwo 19 (2013): 221-37. [WC]

Palacios, Juan Miguel. El idealismo transcendental. [Spanish] Madrid: Avarigani,, 2013. [160 p.] [WC]

Palermo, Sandra V. “Der intuitive Verstand in der Architektonik der menschlichen Vernunft. Überlegungen zu den §§76 und 77 der Kritik der Urteilskraft.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 283-95. [M]

Pallikkathayil, Japa. “Kant and the Limits of Global Governance.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 885-92. [M]

Palmer, Linda C. “An Old Approach to a New Riddle – Kantian Purposiveness and Goodman’s Projectibility.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 5. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 185-96. [M]

Palmquist, Stephen. “The Idea of Immortality as an Imaginative Projection of an Indefinite Moral Future.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 925-35. [M]

 ——. “Kantian Causality and Quantum Quarks: The Compatibility between Quantum Mechanics and Kant’s Phenomenal World.” Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 28.2 (2013): 283-302. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Quantum indeterminism seems incompatible with Kant’s defense of causality in his Second Analogy. The Copenhagen interpretation also takes quantum theory as evidence for anti-realism. This article argues that the law of causality, as transcendental, applies only to the world as observable, not to hypothetical (unobservable) objects such as quarks, detectable only by high energy accelerators. Taking Planck’s constant and the speed of light as the lower and upper bounds of observability provides a way of interpreting the observables of quantum mechanics as empirically real even though they are transcendentally (i.e., preobservationally) ideal.

 —— and Steven Otterman. “The Implied Standpoint of Kant’s Religion: An Assessment of Kant’s Reply to (and an English Translation of) an Early Book Review of Religion Within the Bounds of Bare Reason.” Kantian Review 18.1 (2013): 73-97. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the second edition Preface of Religion Within the Bounds of Bare Reason Kant responds to an anonymous review of the first edition. We present the first English translation of this obscure book review. Following our translation, we summarize the reviewer’s main points and evaluate the adequacy of Kant’s replies to five criticisms, including two replies that Kant provides in footnotes added in the second edition. A key issue is the reviewer’s claim that Religion adopts an implied standpoint, described using transcendental terminology. Kant could have avoided much confusion surrounding Religion, had he taken this review more seriously. We therefore respond to three objections that Kant failed to address: how the Wille–Willkür distinction enables the propensity to evil to be viewed as coexisting with freedom of choice; how moral improvement is possible, even though the propensity to evil is necessary and universal; and how a ‘deed’ can be regarded as ‘noumenal’.

Paltrinieri, Gian Luigi. “Die Ausnahme bestätigt nicht die Regel. Kant zwischen Phronesis und Klugheit.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 4. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 789-800. [M]

Pandolfi, Carmelo. Kant, Hegel, Heidegger in Cornelio Fabro. [Italian] Roma: Ateneo Pontificio Regina Apostolorum, 2013. [367 p.] [WC]

Panknin-Schappert, Helke. “Moral und Religion. Kants Rezeption der Moral-Sense-Philosophie von Francis Hutcheson.” Das Leben der Vernunft: Beiträge zur Philosophie Kants. Eds. Dieter Hüning, Stefan Klingner, and Carsten Olk (op cit.). 605-20. [M]

Papish, Laura. “Moral Feeling and Moral Conversion in Kant’s Religion.” Idealistic Studies 43.1-2 (2013): 11-26. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant’s account of moral feeling is continually disputed in the secondary literature. My goal is to focus on the Religion and make sense of moral feeling as it appears in this context. I argue that we can best understand moral feeling if we note its place in Kant’s concerns about the possibility of moral conversion. As Kant notes, if the new, morally upright man is of a different character than the man he used to be, then it remains unclear how the new man can properly bear the debts of his old self. To address this issue, we need the presupposition that a person is both continually conscious of her empirical, bodily identity and capable of experiencing a felt recognition of the moral law; without this presupposition, I argue that fair punishment and the just payment of evil debts is impossible.

Park, Peter K. J. Arica, Asia, ad the History of Philosophy: Racism in the Formation of the Philosophical Canon, 1780-1830. Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2013. [xv, 237 p.] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] See Ch. 1: “The Kantian School and the Consolidation of Modern Historiography of Philosophy” (pp. 11-29).

Parszutowicz, Przemyslaw. “On the transcendental philosophy in the light of the Kantian aggregate-system opposition.” Archiwum Historii Filozofii i Mysli Spolecznej 58 (2013): 253-66. [WC]

Pascoe, Jordan. “To Love, Honor, and Contract: Engagement and Domesticity in Kant’s Rechtslehre.” Women’s Studies Quarterly 41.3-4 (2013): 195-209. [M]

Pasternack, Lawrence. Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Kant on Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. Abingdon/New York: Routledge, 2013. [xv, 272 p.] [WC]

 ——. Rev. of Kant’s Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason: A Commentary, by James J. DiCenso (2012). Kantian Review 18.3 (2012): 479-83. [M]

Patberg, Markus. “Extraordinary Politics and the Democratic Legitimacy of International Human Rights Courts.” Kantian Theory and Human Rights. Eds. Andreas Føllesdal and Reidar Maliks (op cit.). 130-52. [M]

Patellis, Ioli. “Kant on Independence, Ideal and Empirical.” Kant-Studien 104.4 (2013): 442-65. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article examines Kant’s Principle of Independence, which awards the vote on condition that one is independent. It argues that we should distinguish between the idea of independence and its empirical form; that Kant equates the former with the idea of freedom as the real, non-nominal exercise of choice and the idea of equality as the absence of all overt and covert coercion; and that, as construed, both ideas are intrinsically connected with conditions which must be satisfied if consent to a law is to be real rather than merely nominal. Further, it examines the empirical forms that independence takes in Gemeinspruch and in the Rechtslehre, relating them to its idea and to Kant’s historical circumstances as he seems to perceive them.

Patrone, Tatiana. “Making Sense of Kant’s Casuistry.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 483-94. [M]

Patton, Lydia. Rev. of Immanuel Kant, Natural Science, ed. by Eric Watkins (2012). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (May 2013, #31). [M] [online]

Pavão, Aquinaldo. “Mal radical e psicologia moral em Kant segundo John Rawls.” [Portuguese; Radical evil and moral psychology by Kant according to John Rawls] ethic@ 12.1 (2013): 101-11. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In his Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy, Rawls defends the interpretation that Kant would be compromised, especially in the Groundwork, with “Manichean moral psychology”. However, his initial approach would be abandoned, in Religion, in favor of an “Augustinian moral psychology." This psychology assigns exclusively to the freedom of choice the source of moral evil and rejects the idea that evil would has as cause our desiderative or even social nature. It can be argued that, by making use of the phrase "Augustinian moral psychology," Rawls only draws attention with another name the more well-known, “Incorporation Thesis” (so called from Henry Allison). This seems uncontroversial point, or overwhelmingly accepted by commentators on Kant. However, it does not seem to be the case with reference to the presence in Kant's moral philosophy of what Rawls calls Manichean moral psychology. Such psychology asserts the existence of two selves, a good, that we have while we belong to the intelligible world, and the other bad, that we have while we belong to the sensible world. Rawls rightly points out the difficulties that immediately emerge from the Manichean moral psychology, namely related to the theory of moral evil in general and, correspondingly, to the understanding of moral responsibility. The aim of the article will be to discuss if Rawls is right to attribute to Kant's moral thought in Groundwork such Manichean moral psychology. I will argue that the reading of Rawls, in its most general aspects, is well founded. Nevertheless, I will argue that certain considerations that Rawls makes about the intelligible world and sensible world, especially about its possible ineffectiveness, or abandonment of this distinction in Religion, cannot be accepted fully. I will defend also that Rawls’s reading resents the absence of an appeal to internal conceptual resources presents in Groundwork. This presence can authenticate the Augustinian moral psychology.

 ——. “Notas preliminares para uma possível crítica à teoria da justiça como equidade de Rawls a partir da filosofia jurídica de Kant.” [Portuguese; Preliminary notes for a possible criticism to Rawls’ theory of justice as fairness from the legal philosophy of Kant] Kant e-Prints 8.1 (2013): 24-39. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper, I intend to discuss whether Rawls offers a more solid justification than Kant on political and legal principles we evoke when judging human sociality. This paper argues that Kant’s liberal conception on justice (liberal in the classical meaning) provides a more solid foundation for the defense of the freedom of individuals and therefore the legitimacy of political power than the theory of Rawls.

 ——. See: Stobbe, Emanuel Lanzini, and Aguinaldo Pavão.

Peeters, Marc. Discrépance et simulacre: Kant, Lesniewski et l'ontologie. Bruxelles: Lamiroy, 2013. [350 p.] [WC]

Pelletier, Arnaud. “Les catégories sont-elles définissables?” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 719-29. [M]

Pereda, Carlos. “La autonomía y dos de sus patologías más recurrentes.” [Spanish; Autonomy and Its Two Most Recurrent Pathologies] Ideas y Valores (Colombia) 62, Suppl. #1 (2013): 153-70. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article explores the Kantian concept of moral autonomy on the basis of its conceptual framework, highlighting the differences and similarities with the concepts of personal independence and authenticity. In the light of Kant’s moral philosophy, authenticity and personal independence seem to be ideals of life closely related to autonomy; however, a more detailed analysis reveals that they are pathologies of autonomy. Kantian autonomy is defined as the capacity for self-legislation of the human animal according to the best reasons, which are always open to critique and whose only limitation is the dignity of persons.

Pérez, Berta M. “Die Kantische Ästhetik und das Denken der Endlichkeit.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 4. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 181-90. [M]

Perni, Romina. “Un’analisi della repubblica kantiana in una prospettiva cosmopolitica.” [Italian] Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 4. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 801-14. [M]

Petrescu, Alexandru. “Unele semnificații ale imaginației în filosofia kantiana.” [Romanian; Some Meanings of Imagination in Kant’s Philosophy] Studii de istoria filosofiei universale 21 (2013): 60-78. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In what follows, we have in view to consider some meanings of imagination in the Kantian philosophy. We refer to the following aspects: a) the function of imagination in the Transcendental Deduction of categories (first edition, second section) and of the “transcendental schematism”; b) the transcendental synthesis of imagination – understood as “self-affectation”; c) meanings of imagination in the theory of sublime from the Critique of Judgement.

Picardi, Roberta. “The “Guiding Thread” of Universal History.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 5. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 817-30. [M]

Piché, Claude. “Kant et l’esprit de secte en philosophie.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 1. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 691-714. [M]

 ——. “La conscience morale en matière de foi chez Kant.” Glaube und Vernunft in der Philosophie der Neuzeit. Eds. Dietmar H. Weidemann and Raoul Weicker (op cit.). 153-67. [M]

Pickle, Jonathan. Rev. of The Origins of the Philosophy of Symbolic Forms: Kant, Hegel, and Cassirer, by Donald Phillip Verene (2011). Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 34.1 (2013): 234-38. [PW]

Pierobon, Frank. “Quelques considérations sur l'analogie faite par Kant entre les mystères de la liberté, de la foi et de la pesanteur universelle dans la Religion dans les limites de la simple raison.” Kant, théologie et religion. Ed. Robert Theis (op cit.). 187-96. [M]

 ——. “A Shift in Paradigms: Kant’s Intuition and Newton’s Science.” Objectivity after Kant. Eds. Gertrudis Van De Vijver and Boris Demarest (op cit.). 3-23. [M]

Pietropaoli, Matteo. Ontologia fondamentale e metaontologia: una interpretazione di Heidegger a partire dal Kantbuch. [Italian] Milan: Mimesis, 2013. [331 p.] [WC]

Pinna, Giovanna. “Metamorfosi del sublime. Schiller e Kant.” [Italian] Schiller lettore di Kant. Eds. Alberto L. Siani and Gabriele Tomasi (op cit.). 167-83. [M]

Pinzani, Alessandro. “In the beginning was the deed. On the origin of property and society in Rousseau and Kant.” Estudos Kantianos 1.2 (2013): 11-24. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper aims at confronting the two different accounts given by Rousseau and Kant on the origin of private property. Firstly, I shall present briefly the context in which Rousseau tells his story of this event and regrets its consequences (I). Secondly, I shall present summarily the way in which Kant tells the same episode (II), in order to make two kinds of remarks: the first one refers to the legal subject emerging from the Doctrine of Right (III), while the second one refers to the wrong interpretation according to which Kant would justify the existence of the State with the necessity of guaranteeing private property. Against this interpretation, I shall try to show that, actually, in Kant the exeundum e statu naturali has a different theoretical and motivational basis (IV).

Piper, Adrian M. S. “Practical Action – First Critique Foundations.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 495-507. [M]

Pirni, Alberto. “Freedom of the Will in Communitarian Perspective.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 509-19. [M]

Placencia, Luis. “Die Subjektivität der Maximen bei Kant.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 521-32. [M]

Platz, Jeppe von. “Freedom as both Fact and Postulate.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 533-45. [M]

 ——. Rev. of Kant’s Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals: A Commentary, by Henry E. Allison (2011). Kantian Review 18.2 (2013): 317-22. [M]

 ——. Rev. of Kant on Moral Autonomy, ed. by Oliver Sensen (2013). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (Jun 2013, #34). [M] [online]

Pluder, Valentin. Die Vermittlung von Idealismus und Realismus in der Klassischen Deutschen Philosophie: eine Studie zu Jacobi, Kant, Fichte, Schelling und Hegel. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: frommann-holzboog, 2013. [684 p.] [WC]

Pogge, Thomas. “Kants Vision einer gerechten Weltordnung.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 1. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 369-86. [M]

Poggi, Davide. “Kant and Locke: 'Das: Ich denke' and I think. Between Transcendental Apperception and Empirical Consciousness.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 297-306. [M]

Poljakova, Ekaterina. Differente Plausibilitäten: Kant und Nietzsche, Tolstoi und Dostojewski über Vernunft, Moral und Kunst. Berlin: de Gruyter, 2013. [x, 560 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Revised doctoral dissertation (Uni-Greifswald, 2011).

Pollok, Konstantin. “Naturalism and Kant’s Resolution of the Third Antinomy.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 731-42. [M]

Polyanskiy, Dmitriy. “Kant and contemporary international relations philosophy: between idealism and realism.” Kant’s Project of Perpetual Peace in the Context of Contemporary Politics. Eds. Andrey Zilber and Alexei Salikov (op cit.). 130-32. [M]

Porcheddu, Rocco. “Der Zweck an sich selbst und die Deduktion des kategorischen Imperativs.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 547-58. [M]

 ——.  “Das Verhältnis von theoretischer und praktischer Freiheit in der Deduktion des kategorischen Imperativs.”  Internationales Jahrbuch des Deutschen Idealismus/International Yearbook of German Idealism: Freiheit/Freedom, eds. Jürgen Stolzenberg and Fred Rush. 9 (2013): 79-99. [PW]

Potocnik, Aljaz. “Diabolicno pripoznanje pri Kantu.” [Slovenian; Diabolical recognition in Kant] Phainomena Ljubljana 22.86/87 (2013): 155-71. [WC]

Poznyakova, Оlga. “Kant’s idea of a “cosmopolitan state” as a fundamental worldview universal of the contemporary civilization.” Kant’s Project of Perpetual Peace in the Context of Contemporary Politics. Eds. Andrey Zilber and Alexei Salikov (op cit.). 132-35. [M]

Pozzo, Riccardo. “Homo Noumenon – Intellectual Property Abuse and Kant.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 893-903. [M]

Pradelle, Dominique. Généalogie de la raison: essai sur l'historicité du sujet transcendantal de Kant à Heidegger. Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2013. [458 p.] [WC]

Prange, Martine. “Two Cosmopolitan Paradoxes. The Productive Role of ‘conflict’ in Kant and Nietzsche’s Cosmopolitan Theories.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 4. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 815-25. [M]

Prantenda, Maria Antonietta. “Lust, Schmerz, Apathie: Über einige Quellen der vorkritischen Psychologie Kants.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 5. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 481-96. [M]

Prauss, Gerold. “Das Kontinuum bei Kant und Aristoteles.” Das Leben der Vernunft: Beiträge zur Philosophie Kants. Eds. Dieter Hüning, Stefan Klingner, and Carsten Olk (op cit.). 3-29. [M]

Pringe, Hernán. “On the Metaphysical Principles of Quantum Theory.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 5. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 197-207. [M]

Proulx, Jeremy. “Art and the Fecundity of Nature.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 4. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 191-201. [M]

Prunea-Bretonnet, Tinca. “Kant et le mysticisme. La relecture des Rêves d'un visionnaire à la lumière des leçons kantiennes de métaphysique.” Kant, théologie et religion. Ed. Robert Theis (op cit.). 349-57. [M]

Puls, Heiko. Funktionen der Freiheit: die Kategorien der freiheit in Kants “Kritik der praktischen Vernunft”. Berlin / Boston: De Gruyter, 2013. [viii, 148 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Kantstudien Ergänzungshefte, vol. 174. Originally appeared as the author’s Ph.D. dissertation (Universität-Hamburg, 2012).

 ——. Rev. of Kant und die „Eigentliche Methode der Metaphysik“, by Karsten M. Thiel (2008). [German] Kant-Studien 104.2 (2013): 256-60. [M]

[top] Q    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Quarfood, Marcel. “Discursivity and Transcendental Idealism.” Kant’s Idealism. Eds. Schulting and Verburgt (op cit.). 143-58. [M]

 ——. “Interpretations of Kantian Disjunctive Judgment in Propositional Logic.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 307-19. [M]

Quintana, Laura. “The Judgment of Taste in a Cosmopolitan Sense.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 4. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 203-13. [M]

[top] R    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Rampazzo Bazzan, Marco. “‘Kant’ contro Kant nella Dottrina del diritto di Fichte.” [Italian] Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 5. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 831-44. [M]

Rancadore, Maria Antonia. “La religion de Kant dans les lettres à Lavater.” Kant, théologie et religion. Ed. Robert Theis (op cit.). 341-48. [M]

Raser, Gerald. Kwasi Wiredu statt Immanuel Kant. Diskurs ob der Notwendigkeit einer interkulturellen Philosophiedidaktik. Saarbrücken: AV Akademikerverlag, 2013. [#, # p.] [WC]

Rauscher, Frederick. “Chaos and Control – The Nature of Practical Philosophy.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 559-70. [M]

 ——. “Os limites externos da filosofia prática e as limitações da Dedução na Fundamentação III.” [Portuguese; The outer boundary of practical philosophy and the limitations of the Deduction in Groundwork III] Studia Kantiana 11.14 (2013): 127-41. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The latter half of Groundwork III is often overlooked by commentators but contains Kant’s own evaluation of the status of his earlier claims in the deduction. The final section before the concluding paragraph discusses the nature of practical reason and its outermost boundary. I show that Kant intends the claims in the deduction to have the status of mere ideas of reason rather than an ontological claims about our real selves. The outermost boundary of practical reason also provides a limitation in that reason can never provide complete explanations and can never be satisfied in its quest for an unconditioned, whether practical or speculative, but simply assumes an idea of an unconditioned, in this case the unconditioned moral law. Groundwork III provides only a partial justification of a practical view of humans as moral beings.

Reath, Andrews. “‘The ground of practical laws’.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 571-81. [M]

 ——. “Kant’s Conception of Autonomy of the Will.” Kant on Moral Autonomy. Ed. Oliver Sensen (op cit.). 32-52. [M]

 ——. “Formal Approaches to Kant’s Formula of Humanity.” Kant on Practical Justification. Eds. Mark Timmons and Sorin Baiasu (op cit.). 201-28. [M]

Reboul, Olivier. “Nietzsche’s Critique of Kant.” New Nietzsche Studies 9.1-2 (2013): 21-34. [PW]

Rechter, Ofra. “On Kant on Arithmetic, Time, and Irrationals.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 5. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 209-21. [M]

Recki, Birgit. “Deduktion oder Faktum? Kants Freiheitstheorie im dritten Abschnitt der Grundlegung.” Kants Rechtfertigung des Sittengesetzes in Grundlegung III: Deduktion oder Faktum? Ed. Heiko Puls (op cit.). vii-xiv. [PW]

Refsdal, Kari. “Kant’s Theory of Rational Agency as Free Agency.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 583-95. [M]

Rehberg, Andrea. “Nietzsche Beyond Kant: From Critique to Physiological Thinking.” New Nietzsche Studies 9.1-2 (2013): 121-33. [PW]

Rentsch, Thomas. “Kants Analyse der Sünde — das radikale Böse und sein Transzendenzbezug.” Transzendenz, Praxis und Politik bei Kant. Eds. Angeli, Rentsch, Schneidereit, and Vorländer (op cit.). 149-64. [M]

 ——, ed. See: Angeli, Oliviero, Thomas Rentsch, Nele Schneidereit, and Hans Vorländer, eds.

Repa, Luiz. “A cooriginariedade entre direitos humanos e soberania popular: a crítica de Habermas a Kant e Rousseau.” [Portuguese; The co-originality between human rights and popular sovereignty: Habermas’s critique of Rousseau and Kant] Trans/Form/Ação: Revista de Filosofia 36, special issue (2013): 103-20. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This text analyzes and evaluates the influence of the political philosophies of Rousseau and Kant in Habermasian thought. It stresses the fundamental idea of Faktizität und Geltung, according to which there is a logical co-originality of human rights, interpreted as fundamental rights of individual liberty, and popular sovereignty, understood as political rights of participation and communication in the process of public formation opinion and will. It is argued that Habermas' critique of Rousseau and Kant is due to Habermas' project of the radicalization of democracy, to which the contributions of the two philosophers present some obstacles. Nevertheless, it may be said that, according to Habermas, the contribution of each one serves to solve the problems in the contribution of the other.

Ribeiro Vollet, Lucas. “The transcendental problem of space and time.” Studia Kantiana 11.15 (2013): 135-52. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article aims to discuss the character of the transcendental concept of space and time – found in the Transcendental Aesthetic – and its importance in the following issues: the phenomenological problem of the form of intuitive donation, the scientific and metaphysical interpretation of space-time, the question of the content of space-time occurrences and their experimental contribution, and the question of the form of relations and associations of experimental content. The goal of the article is to radicalize an interpretive approach to Kant’s doctrine of Space-Time in order to demonstrate possible confrontations with current issues of Analytic Philosophy, which will be done, although superficially, in the final section.

Richter, Philipp. Kants “Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten”: ein systematischer Kommentar. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2013. [184 p.] [WC]

Ricken, Friedo. “Die Religionslehre als Lehre der Pflichten gegen Gott liegt außerhalb der Grenzen der reinen Moralphilosophie (TL 6:486-491).” Kant’s Tugendlehre. Eds. Trampota, Sensen, and Timmermann (op cit.). 411-30. [M]

 ——. “Religion als Pflicht des Menschen gegen sich selbst.” Transzendenz, Praxis und Politik bei Kant. Eds. Angeli, Rentsch, Schneidereit, and Vorländer (op cit.). 135-48. [M]

Riefling, Markus. Die Kultivierung der Freiheit bei der Macht. Eine pädagogische Betrachtung von Grenzziehung und Grenzüberschreitung. Wiesbaden: Springer, 2013. [208 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Doctoral dissertation (Uni-Würzburg, 2012).

Riha, Rado. “Drugi kopernikanski obrat Kantove filozofije.” [Slovenian] Filozofski vestnik 34.1 (2013): 25-46. [WC]

Rivera Castro, Faviola. “A Substitute for Coercion – Kant and Rawls on Compliance with International Laws of Justice.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 905-14. [M]

Rivera de Rosales, Jacinto. “Versuch, den Begriff des eigenen Körpers in die Kritik der reinen Vernunft einzuführen.” Das Leben der Vernunft: Beiträge zur Philosophie Kants. Eds. Dieter Hüning, Stefan Klingner, and Carsten Olk (op cit.). 109-30. [M]

 ——. “Die vierfache Wurzel des Dings an sich.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 743-53. [M]

 ——. “Heidegger and Kant’s ‘Refutation of Idealism’.” Objectivity after Kant. Eds. Gertrudis Van De Vijver and Boris Demarest (op cit.). 249-78. [M]

 ——. “A finalidade na Natureza e a biologia: relendo Kant.” [Portuguese] Estudos Kantianos 1.1 (2013): 45-67. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article explains the aims of Kant’s “Critique of Teleological Judgment”, in terms of its Analytic but above all of its Dialectic, for which a new interpretation is offered. The purpose of this is to clarify the role and the scope of finality in the understanding and way of being of Nature.

 ——. Rev. of Die Form der Erkenntnis. Immanuel Kants theoretische Einbildungskraft, by Karl Hepfer (2006). [German] Kant-Studien 104.2 (2013): 250-54. [M]

Rizo-Patrón de Lerner, Rosemary. “Husserl, lector de Kant: la razón y sus límites.” [Spanish; Husserl Reading Kant: The Limits of Reason] La razón y sus fines. Eds. Rosemary Rizo-Patrón de Lerner and María Jesús Vázquez Leibeiras (op cit.). 225-45. [M]

 —— and María Jesús Vázquez Leibeiras, eds. La razón y sus fines. Elementos para una antropología filosófica en Kant, Husserl y Horkheimer [Spanish]. Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 2013. [295 p.] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Studien und Materialien zur Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. 86.
Contents: Christian Bermes (Acerca de las causas y las razones. La teleología en la fenomenología de Edmund Husserl), Mario Caimi (La imaginación en la Antropología en sentido pragmático. Estructura del texto y estructura del concepto), Rubén Casado Méndez (Sobre el estatuto anómalo de la tercera antinomia), Francisco Conde Soto (La fenomenología de Husserl como teleología de la razón), Óscar Cubo Ugarte (Razón práctica y arbitrio humano en la ética de Kant), Bernd Dörflinger (La teología ética de Kant y el deber de fomentar el bien supremo), Pilar Encinar Romero (Notas para una valoración de la "crítica de la razón instrumental" como contribución a una nueva antropología), Beatriz Fernández Herrero (Aproximación a la utopía kantiana), Claudia María Laos Igreda (La "libertad de crítica" como medio y fin de la "razón humana universal"), Fernando Moledo (El antropocentrismo moral kantiano), Rosemary Rizo-Patrón de Lerner (Husserl lector de Kant. La razón y sus límites), Manuel Sánchez Rodríguez (La humanidad como fin suprasensible de la razón humana en la estética y la antropología de Immanuel Kant), María Jesús Vázquez Lobeiras (Racionalidad, libertad y finalidad: elementos para una antropología filosófica en Kant y Husserl).

Robinson, Hoke. “Empirical Intuitions, Schemata, and Concepts in Kant’s Critical Epistemology.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 331-43. [M]

 ——. Rev. of Blinde Anschauung: Die Rolle von Begriffen in Kants Theorie sinnlicher Synthesis, by Stephanie Grüne (2009).  Kant-Studien 104.4 (2013): 550-55. [M]

Rocha Oliveira, Ivo da. “Kant and the Map of Perceptions.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 5. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 371-80. [M]

Roche, Andrew F. “Transcendental Idealism: A Proposal.” Journal of the History of Philosophy 51.4 (2013): 589-615. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant holds that (1) his theory of transcendental idealism does not imply that our experiences are systematically illusory, that (2) appearances are not numerically distinct from things as they are in themselves, and that (3) his idealism is, in some important sense, idealist. In this paper, I produce a reading of transcendental idealism that accounts for each of these claims. I recommend that we model the mind-world relationship according to transcendental idealism on an understanding of how certain of our judgments refer to the contents of our illusions and dreams. I also present the implications that my analysis has for the “problem of affection” and for Kant’s views on freedom.

 ——. “Kant’s Theory of Perception.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 345-56. [M]

Rodríguez Aramayo, Roberto. “La política y su devenir histórico en el pensamiento de Kant.” [Spanish; Politics and Its Historical Development in Kant’s Thought] Ideas y Valores (Colombia) 62, Suppl. #1 (2013): 15-36. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The reading of Rousseau marks a “political turn” in Kantian thought, and political issues permeate not only the “silent decade” but also the first and third Critiques. In fact, Kant dedicates the third of his famous questions to clarifying this issue through his “philosophical history” or philosophy of history. It is in this context that what I have called an elpidological imperative takes shape, because self-confidence is fundamental in order not to give in to the discouragement provoked by the absurd spectacle of human history. The conflicts of our selfish inclinations, the antagonisms of unsociable sociability, will serve to deploy our best natural dispositions, as if guided by a plan established indistinctly by Nature, Providence, or Fate. In sum, politics is regarded as a condition of possibility of our moral life and not as its corollary.

Rölli, Marc. “Reiner und empirischer Charakter. Kritische Überlegungen zur kantischen Anthropologie.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 4. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 435-46. [M]

Rödl, Sebastian. “Self-Consciousness and Knowledge.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 357-69. [M]

 ——. “The Single Act of Combining.” Philosophy & Phenomenological Research 87.1 (2013): 213-20. [PI]

 ——. “Why Ought Implies Can.” Kant on Practical Justification. Eds. Mark Timmons and Sorin Baiasu (op cit.). 42-56. [M]

Rössner, Christian. “Pour une religion d'adultes. Kant et Levinas.” Kant, théologie et religion. Ed. Robert Theis (op cit.). 391-98. [M]

Roff, Heather. Global Justice, Kant and the Responsibility to Protect: A Provisional Duty. London/New York: Routledge, 2013. [ix, 201 p.] [WC]

Rogerson, Kenneth. “Kant on Negative Judgments of Taste.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 4. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 215-24. [M]

Rohden, Valerio. “Facoltà appetitiva e razionalità.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 4. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 447-57. [M]

Rohlf, Michael. “Emotion and Evil in Kant.” Review of Metaphysics 66.4 (2013): 749-73. [M]

 ——. “Promissory Notes – Kant’s Argument for Transcendental Idealism.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 371-81. [M]

 ——. “The Rationality of Induction in Kant (and Hume).” Idealistic Studies 43.3 (2013): 153-69. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper argues that Kant agrees with the substance of Hume’s critique of induction but without following Hume in characterizing induction as non-rational. I begin in part one by situating the problem of induction within the context of Kant’s theoretical philosophy, and by comparing Hume’s view that inductive inferences are based on custom or habit with Kant’s view that they are based on reason’s assumption that nature is systematic. Part two examines Kant’s view of the mental process by which reason leads us to assume that nature is systematic—a process that involves, I argue, reflecting on conditions of experience and then extending this reflection to an unconditioned idea. Part three then turns to addressing why and in what sense Kant thinks that we are justified in assuming that nature is systematic. Finally, in part four I flesh out my interpretation by arguing that it makes sense of Kant’s description of reason’s principle of the systematicity of nature as both transcendental and regulative.

 ——. “Happiness in Kant and Rousseau.” Estudos Kantianos 1.2 (2013): 25-42. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Most modern philosophers understand happiness fundamentally in terms of the subjective states of pleasure or desire satisfaction; while pre-modern philosophers tend to understand happiness fundamentally in terms of possessing certain objective goods like virtue, which do not reduce to pleasure or desire satisfaction, or engaging in objectively worthwhile activities like doing philosophy76. This paper investigates two modern conceptions of happiness: namely, Kant’s and Rousseau’s. I argue that their subjectivist conceptions of happiness do not prevent them from recognizing certain objective goods that help us to become happy. In fact, I argue that they both hold that some of the same objective goods that Aristotle thinks happiness consists in – including virtue, the development of our rational powers, and love of others – are either necessary for or at least tend to promote one’s own happiness.

Roinila, Markku. “Kant and Leibniz on the Singularity of the Best of All Possible Worlds.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 5. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 381-90. [M]

Rojas Berrío, María Juliana, and Ángela María Duarte Pardo. Rev. of El imperativo de la humanidad. La fundamentación estética de los derechos en Kant, by Juan Manuel Garrido. (2012).  Ideas y Valores (Colombia) 62, Suppl. #1 (2013): 205-10. [M]

Roldán, Concha. “Ni virtuosas ni ciudadanas: inconsistencias prácticas en la teoría de Kant.” [Spanish; Neither Virtuous nor Citizens: Practical Inconsistencies in Kant's Theory] Ideas y Valores (Colombia) 62, Suppl. #1 (2013): 185-203. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Orthodox Kantian circles tend to excuse the philosopher’s inconsistencies by saying that he was a “child of his time”. It is true that in his time women throughout Europe were excluded from active citizenship, depriving them of the right to be political and, consequently, ethical and even historical subjects. But it is also true that in that same period a movement was emerging in defense of gender equality (querelle des femmes), in which Kant regrettably did not participate. After a historical introduction that contrasts the critical Kant with his predecessors and contemporaries regarding the issue of women’s equality, the article goes on to defend the thesis that true morality is unthinkable without an idea of genuine universality, that is, without gender equality, since only on that basis can individuality and autonomy be thought.

Rollmann, Veit-Justus. Rev. of Kant und die Zukunft der europäischen Aufklärung, by Heiner F. Klemme (2009).  Kant-Studien 104.4 (2013): 541-45. [M]

Rolweski, Jarosław. Pojęcie prawdy u Kanta i "późnego" Husserla. [Polish] Toruń: Wydawnictwo Tako, 2013. [164 p.] [WC]

Romano, Bruno. Giudizio giuridico e giudizio estetico: da Kant verso Schiller. Torino: G. Giappichelli, 2013. [224 p.] [WC]

Rosefeldt, Tobias. “Subject-Dependence and Trendelenburg’s Gap.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 755-64. [M]

 ——. “Dinge an sich und der Außenweltskeptizismus: Über ein Missverständnis der frühen Kant-Rezeption.” Self, World, and Art: Metaphysical Topics in Kant and Hegel. Ed. Dina Emundts (op cit.). 221-59. [M]

 ——. “Die 36 Jahre der Philosophie: zum transzendentalphilosophischen Potential von Kants Inauguraldissertation.” Ubergänge — diskursiv oder intuitiv? Essays zu Eckart Försters Die 25 Jahre der Philosophie. Eds. Johannes Haag and Markus Wild (op cit.). 23-37. [M]

Rosenkoetter, Timothy. “A Non-Embarrassing Account of the Modal Functions of Judgment.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 383-94. [M]

Rossi, Caterina. “Libertà come libertà nel fenomeno. La rivisitazione estetica del concetto kantiano di libertà nei Kallias-Briefe.” [Italian] Schiller lettore di Kant. Eds. Alberto L. Siani and Gabriele Tomasi (op cit.). 217-37. [M]

Rossi, Philip J. “Cosmopolitanism – Kant’s Social Anthropology of Hope.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 4. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 827-37. [M]

Rovina, Rogelio. “Kant’s Division of Philosophy – An Attempt at a Systematic Reconstruction.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 1. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 715-26. [M]

Roy, Manuel. “Kant condamne-t-il la métaphysique?” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 765-74. [M]

 ——. “Le finalisme de Kant.” Kant, théologie et religion. Ed. Robert Theis (op cit.). 145-53. [M]

Rudolph, Enno. “Die politische Vernunft der Teufel: Kant zwischen Hobbes und Rousseau.” Transzendenz, Praxis und Politik bei Kant. Eds. Angeli, Rentsch, Schneidereit, and Vorländer (op cit.). 57-67. [M]

Rueger, Alexander. “Beauty as a Symbol and the Deduction of Judgments of Taste.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 4. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 225-35. [M]

Ruffing, Margit. “La filosofia della religione in Kant e Schopenhauer.” [Italian] Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 5. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 603-14. [M]

 —— “Kant-Bibliographie 2011.” Kant-Studien 104.4 (2013): 499-540. [M]

 ——. “Das eigentlich Politische bei Kant.” Das Leben der Vernunft: Beiträge zur Philosophie Kants. Eds. Dieter Hüning, Stefan Klingner, and Carsten Olk (op cit.). 436-49. [M]

 ——. “‘Pensar por sí mismo’ y ‘Publicidad’.” [Spanish; ‘Thinking for Oneself’ and ‘Publicity’] Ideas y Valores (Colombia) 62, Suppl. #1 (2013): 73-84. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: “Thinking for oneself” and “publicity” are characteristic traits of the Enlightenment since they vindicate the use of reason by relating it to the “progress” of both the individual and society. According to Kant, the development of man’s cognitiverational capacity is but one aspect of “thinking for oneself”. The fact that reason is developed as the awareness of the moral capacity entails the need of thinking “beyond oneself”. Thus, “thinking for oneself” opens up the possibility of comprehensive judgment as a capacity aimed at the “community”, both in the sense of a formal category of logical judgment and of the rational idea of an ideal republic.

 ——. “M'est-il, au fait, permis d'espérer?” Kant, théologie et religion. Ed. Robert Theis (op cit.). 237-45. [M]

 ——, ed. See: Bacin, Stefano, Alfredo Ferrarin, Claudio La Rocca, and Margit Ruffing, eds.

Rumore, Paola. L'ordine delle idee: la genesi del concetto di rappresentazione in Kant attraverso le sue fonti wolffiane (1747-1787). Firenze: Le Lettere, 2013. [306 p.] [WC]

 ——. “La concezione kantiana della psicologia razionale.” [Italian] Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 4. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 459-72. [M]

Rumyantseva, Tatiana. “The Hegelian idea of moral significance of wars versus the Kantian idea of perpetual peace.” Kant’s Project of Perpetual Peace in the Context of Contemporary Politics. Eds. Andrey Zilber and Alexei Salikov (op cit.). 45-50. [M]

Rush, Fred. “Art and Sociality in Kant.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 4. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 237-47. [M]

Rusnock, Paul. “Kant and Bolzano on Analyticity.” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 95.3 (2014): 298-335. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The history of speculation on a notion or notions called analyticity, now usually characterized as truth in virtue of meanings and independently of fact, is often viewed from the perspective of the Quine-Carnap dispute. Previous characterizations, due to Kant, Frege and others, are then seen as being of a piece with Carnap’s various definitions of analyticity, and thus open to Quine’s objections. Seen from this point of view, Bolzano’s claims about analyticity appear downright bizarre: for on his conception, analyticity is not only non-linguistic, but also independent of both apriority and necessity. In this paper, it is argued that the problem lies not with Bolzano, but rather with the received historical account, especially its interpretation of Kant.

Rutnik, Vedran. “Kantov pojam genija i smisao umjetnosti.” [Croation; Kant’s Concept of Genius and the Meaning of Art]  Filozofska istraživanja 33.1 (2013): 69-81. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Being the birthplace of artistic beauty, genius is found by Kant in a free play of understanding and imagination. Two species of beauty are identified: the natural and the artistic. Beauty is not seen as a quality of an object in observation, but as a peculiar act within the subject. Determinant principle of aesthetic evaluation is found in reflective judgment whereas its concept of formal purposiveness of nature becomes a mediator between the fields of human nature and human freedom. The autonomy of the aesthetic judgment is provided by means of avoiding both the legislation of understanding and the legislation of reason. By this way it can be shown that art is an end in itself. Taking into consideration that Kant’s conception of the origin and the essence of art is grounded in his philosophical system as a whole, the paper examines the conditions under which the philosophy of art is possible. Guided by Kant’s definition of the sense of freedom in its prior-to-art viewpoint, the paper analyzes the possibility of understanding beauty outside of art. What is hereby questioned is the meaning of art in general and the purpose of its being theoretically discussed in particular.

[top] S    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Sá Pereira, Roberto de. “What is nonconceptualism in Kant's philosophy?” Philosophical Studies 164.1 (2013): 233-54. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The aim of this paper is to critically review several interpretations of Kantian sensible intuition. The first interpretation is the recent construal of Kantian sensible intuition as a mental analogue of a direct referential term. The second is the old, widespread assumption that Kantian intuitions do not refer to mind-independent entities, such as bodies and their physical properties, unless they are brought under categories. The third is the assumption that, by referring to mind-independent entities, sensible intuitions represent objectively in the sense that they represent in a relative, perspective-independent manner. The fourth is the construal of Kantian sensible intuitions as non-conceptual content. In this paper, I support the alternative view that Kantian sensible representation is to be seen as iconic de re presentation of objects without representational content.

Sadler, Brook J. “Marriage: A Matter of Right or of Virtue? Kant and the Contemporary Debate.” Journal of Social Philosophy 44.3 (2013): 213-32. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article presents information on a debate over marriage as a matter of right or of virtue with reference to German philosopher Immanuel Kant’s ethical theory. Kant’s theory focuses on the distinction between doctrine of right and doctrine of virtue. The author explains why Kant placed marriage in the state regulation sphere and then proceeded to undermine the placement by challenging the view of sexuality. According to the author, marriage appears to be morally optional.

Salikov, Alexsej Nikolaevic. “Kant’s perpetual peace project and the project of the European Union.” [Russian] Kantovsky Sbornik 45.3 (2013): 24-32. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article examines the following problems: 1) How well-founded is the comparison of the ideas of Kant's treatise «Towards Perpetual Peace», written in late XVIII century, with the implementation of nowadays project of European Union? 2) If such parallels are possible, to what extent the structure of the EU corresponds to Kant's vision? 3) Which Kantian ideas are of the foremost importance to future development of the EU? Basing on the analysis of Kant's treatise and of the current structure of the EU, the author arrives to the conclusion that the two projects can suitably be compared. However, such comparison requires viewing the EU as an intermediate stage in the establishment of global peace union. The comparative analysis of Kant's theory and the European project, the EU in its curent form suits Kant's definition of a federtion of souvereign states, united for the purpose of securing peace, and in some respects went even further. The process of European integration has transformed Europe’s regional build up from the arena of regular war conflicts into the society of peace, prosperity, liberty and right. It is obvious that it its development the EU will undergo difficulties and crises. However, the general direction, chosen by the union of European states, aiming at the development of rights and liberties, at good-will and cooperation between individuals, societies and states perfectly corresponds to the spirit of Kant’s philosophy and should guarantee of success in establishing global peace in the future.

 ——. “Kants Friedensprojekt und die Ansätze zur Lösung des Sicherheitsdilemmas in der modernen Theorie der internationalen Beziehungen.” Kant’s Project of Perpetual Peace in the Context of Contemporary Politics. Eds. Andrey Zilber and Alexei Salikov (op cit.). 135-44. [M]

 ——, and AndreY Sergeevic Zilber. Kantovskij proekt vecnogo mira v kontekste sovremennoj politiki, 20-22 aprelâ 2012 r., Kaliningrad: materialy mezdunarodnogo seminara. [Russian] Kaliningrad: Izdatel'stvo Baltijskogo federal'nogo universiteta, 2013. [196 p.] [WC]

 ——, ed. See: Zilber, Andrey, and Alexei Salikov, eds.

Sánchez, Manuel. “The Conclusion of the Deduction of Taste in the Dialectic of the Power of Judgment Aesthetic in Kant.” Trans/Form/Ação: Revista de Filosofia 36.2 (2013): 45-62. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: in this paper, it is argued that only in the section on dialectic in the Critique of Judgment does Kant reach a definitive and conclusive version of deduction, after discovering the concept of the supersensible. in the section on the deduction of pure aesthetic judgments, Kant does not satisfactorily explain the critical distinction between the sensible nature of humanity and the supersensible nature of human reason presupposed in the concept of universal communicability. While the concept of the supersensible illustrates this distinction, it is only through this concept that Kant that can justify the specific possibility of claiming subjective validity in taste. The priority of the solution found in the dialectic is illustrated not only by a comparative analysis of the two sections, but also by a historical reconstruction of the process of the formation of the work, which shows that the first formulation of the concept of validity coincides with the use of the concept of the supersensible.

Sánchez Madrid, Nuria. “Die Anwendung der skeptischen Methode auf die Auflösung der Antinomien und das Leben theoretischer Vernunft.” Das Leben der Vernunft: Beiträge zur Philosophie Kants. Eds. Dieter Hüning, Stefan Klingner, and Carsten Olk (op cit.). 171-86. [M]

 ——. “Legislazione negativa, ostacoli e disprezzo. La funzione della disciplina nell’idea di un’educazione dal punto di vista cosmopolitico.” [Italian] Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 4. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 473-85. [M]

 ——. “Las pasiones y sus destinos. El examen de las emociones en las Lecciones de antropología de Kant.” [Spanish; Passions and Their Fate. An Examination of Emotions in Kant’s Lectures on Anthropology] Ideas y Valores (Colombia) 62, Suppl. #1 (2013): 109-32. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article carries out an analysis of Kant’s examination of passions in the 1798 Anthropology and the courses taught on the subject, in which passion and the cultivation of practical reason display an ambiguous relationship, to the point of thinking that perhaps no moral culture can permanently suppress the perversion of projecting selfish statements as a universal point of view. On the other hand, it contrasts the association established by Kantian anthropology between the discourse of passion and the imposition of the irrevocable authority of reason with Freud’s meta-psychological study of the manifestations of the super-ego. Thus, the article focuses specifically on the capacity of practical freedom to annul itself, on the capacity of passion to supersede reason as the faculty that issues mandates, and, finally, on the pernicious effects that passion’s mode of reasoning has on the application and extension of law in a human community.

 ——. “Private property and a priori general united will in Kant’s Rechtslehre. Some troubles with Kant’s alleged foundation of liberalism.” Studia Kantiana 11.15 (2013): 103-20. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The paper argues against the general liberal account of the main theses of Kant’s Rechtslehre. I move from the tenet that according to Kant the duty to set up a civil state beyond a society has nothing to do with the pursuit of happiness carried out by all human beings, since the first one refers to a commandment of practical reason, which gives form to a duty that grounds the property rights. I will tackle first the meaning of the lex permissiva in Kant’s Rechtslehre. Secondly, I will argue Flikschuh’s interpretation of the indemonstrability of the postulate of public Right. Third, I will consider the function that general will fulfils in the system of Right, which only cosmopolitan Right could successfully top. I claim that cosmopolitan right belongs to the juridical duties which practical reason commands to the human species, what dissuades from considering it an emotional expression of human pursuit of justice.

 ——. “Bemerkungen zur Kants Auffassung der menschlichen Würde.” Studia Philosophica Kantiana 2013.2 (2013): 27-47. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article deals primarily with a traditional and widespread interpretation of Kant’s idea of human dignity and humankind, according to which the cornerstones of Kant’s practical philosophy are based on intuitive knowledge or an emotional value without being a direct consequence of the moral autonomy of the rational being. From the point of view of argumentation, the article leans in its crucial points on the theses as defended by O. Sensen in his book Kant on Human Dignity (Berlin / New York, W. de Gruyter, 2011); a monograph which inspired a research into the role of dignity in Kant’s morality by its acute observations and objections. Last but not least, the article aspires to assess Kant’s observations of human dignity based on a critical treatment of these basic rights in O. O’Neill and K. Flikschuh.

 ——. Rev. of Ideia de uma heurística transcendental, by Leonel Ribeiro dos Santos (2012). Estudos Kantianos 1.1 (2013): 247-53. [M]

Sánchez Rodríguez, Manuel. “Witz und reflektierende Urteilskraft in Kants Philosophie.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 4. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 487-96. [M]

 ——. “La humanidad como fin suprasensible de la razón humana en la estética y la antropología de Immanuel Kant.” [Spanish; Humanity as the Supra-sensible End of Human Reason in Immanuel Kant's Aesthetics and Anthropology] La razón y sus fines. Eds. Rosemary Rizo-Patrón de Lerner and María Jesús Vázquez Leibeiras (op cit.). 247-61. [M]

Sandford, Stella. “Spontaneous Generation: The Fantasy of the Birth of Concepts in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.” Radical Philosophy 179 (2013): 15-26. [M]

Sandkühler, Hans Jörg. “Moral, Recht und Staat in weltbürgerlicher Perspektive. Überlegungen im Anschluss an Kant.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 1. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 387-405. [M]

 ——. Idealismus in praktischer Absicht: Studien zu Kant, Schelling und Hegel. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2013. [237 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Philosophie und Geschichte der Wissenschaften, vol. 75.

Sans, Georg. Sintesi a priori: la filosopfia critica di Immanuel Kant. [Italian] Napoli Ed. Scientifiche Italiane, 2013. [183 p.] [WC]

 ——. Rev. of Gestalten der transzendentalen Einheit. Bedingungen der Synthesis bei Kant, by Anselmo Aportone (2009).  Kant-Studien 104.3 (2013): 395-400. [M]

 ——. “Wissen und Glauben bei Kant – ein historisches Missgeschick?” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 937-47. [M]

Santi, Marco. “Kant and Leibniz on Relations and Their Place in the Monadology.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 5. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 391-404. [M]

Santini, Barbara. “La critica a Kant nei Fragmente aus Schillers ästhetischen Vorlesungen: una strategia argomentativa sospetta.” [Italian] Schiller lettore di Kant. Eds. Alberto L. Siani and Gabriele Tomasi (op cit.). 91-108. [M]

Santos, Leonel Ribeiro dos. “Breve apresentação de: «Do carácter da humanidade em geral» [das “Lições sobre Antropologia” [1775/76].” [Portueguese] Estudos Kantianos 1.1 (2013): 255-64. [M]

Santos, Robinson dos. “Considerações sobre a perfectibilidade humana a partir de Rousseau e Kant.” [Portuguese] Estudos Kantianos 1.2 (2013): 43-58. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The natural man, the reference to human progress through culture, the moral improvement of man and his ultimate destiny are common elements in the philosophy of Rousseau and Kant. These questions lead us to the scope in which they are defined but, at the same time, also distinguished their anthropological conceptions. The aim is to trace the contours of his more general positions and for such we will take here to the notion of human perfectibility. This concept, insofar as it is present in their works, allows us to identify elements that relate and at the same time, understand their peculiarities.

Santozki, Ulrike. Rev. of La Kritik der reinen Vernunft nel contesto della tradizione logica aristotelica, by Marco Sgarbi (2010).  Kant-Studien 104.4 (2013): 545-50. [M]

Sardinha, Diogo. L'émancipation de Kant à Deleuze. Paris: Hermann, 2013. [243 p.] [WC]

Sassen, Brigitte. “Common Sense as the Answer to the Paradox of Taste.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 4. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 249-59. [M]

Satne, Paula. “Kant’s Two Internalist Claims.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 597-607. [M]

 ——. “Reliability of motivations and the moral value of actions.” Studia Kantiana 11.14 (2013): 5-33. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant is often interpreted as maintaining that a) only actions performed from a sense of duty are morally worthy whereas b) actions in conformity with duty are wrong or morally impermissible. In addition, it is often claimed that c) the possession of a good Gesinnung (i.e. virtuous character) is a necessary condition of the action of an agent possessing moral worth. This means that only the dutiful actions of a virtuous agent can be taken to possess moral worth. This paper argues that this influential interpretation is incorrect by showing that Kant is committed to a) but not b) or c). It is argued that actions can be right but lack moral worth and actions can possess moral worth even when the agent lacks a virtuous character. It follows that three levels of moral assessment can be distinguished in Kant’s system: (i) virtue which is reserved for agents possessing a good character or Gesinnung, (ii) moral worth which pertains to actions performed from a sense of duty and (iii) rightness, which pertains to actions performed on maxims that can be willed as universal laws. This means that Kantian ethics is not merely concerned with the rightness or wrongness of particular actions nor is Kantian ethics primarily an ethic of virtue. Instead, Kant’s system is complex and allows for different levels of moral assessment in which both an action-centred and agent-centred perspective can be integrated.

Saunders, Joe. Rev. of Kant’s Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals: A Commentary, by Henry Allison (2011). British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21.3 (2013): 616-19. [PW]

Savi, Marina. “Filosofia kantiana e neuroscienze.” [Italian] Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 5. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 845-58. [M]

Schadow, Steffi. Achtung für das Gesetz: Moral und Motivation bei Kant. Berlin / Boston: De Gruyter, 2013. [xvii, 328 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Kantstudien Ergänzungshefte, vol. 171. Originally appeared as the author’s Ph.D. dissertation (Goethe-Universität, Frankfurt/Main, 2009).

 ——. “Recht und Ethik in Kants Metaphysik der Sitten (MS 6:218-221 und TL 6:390f.).” Kant’s Tugendlehre. Eds. Trampota, Sensen, and Timmermann (op cit.). 85-111. [M]

Schalow, Frank. Departures: At the Crossroads between Heidegger and Kant. Berlin / Boston: De Gruyter, 2013. [ix, 243 p.] [M]

Schepelmann, Maja. “Seele – Welt – Gott. Kants Neuordnung der traditionellen Gliederung der Metaphysik und der damit verbundene methodologische Status des Kantischen Zweckbegriffs.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 775-86. [M]

Schliesser, Eric. “On Reading Newton as an Epicurean: Kant, Spinozism and the Changes to the Principia.” Studies in History & Philosophy of Science, Part A, 44.3 (2013): 416-28. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper argues for three distinct, albeit mutually illuminating theses: first it explains why well informed eighteenth-century thinkers, e.g., the pre-critical Immanuel Kant and Richard Bentley would have identified important aspects of Newton’s natural philosophy with (a species of modern) Epicureanism. Second, it explores how some significant changes to Newton’s Principia between the first (1687) and second (1713) editions can be explained in terms of attempts to reframe the Principia so that the charge of “Epicureanism” can be deflected. In order to account for this, the paper discusses the political and theological changes in the wake of the Glorious Revolution (1688); Bentley plays a non-trivial role in these matters. Third, the paper argues that there is an argument in Kant’s (1755) Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens that undermines a key claim of Newton’s General Scholium that was used to discredit Spinozism by Clarke in A demonstration of the being and attributes of God.

Schlösser, Ulrich. “Concept Formation, Synthesis and Judgment: Kant’s Theory of the Logical and Cognitive Activities of the Mind.” Self, World, and Art: Metaphysical Topics in Kant and Hegel. Ed. Dina Emundts (op cit.). 177-205. [M]

 ——. “Kants Begriff des Transzendentalen und die Grenzen der intelligiblen und der sinnlichen Welt.” Ubergänge — diskursiv oder intuitiv? Essays zu Eckart Försters Die 25 Jahre der Philosophie. Eds. Johannes Haag and Markus Wild (op cit.). 117-39. [M]

Schmitz, Friederike. “On Kant's Conception of Inner Sense: Self-Affection by the Understanding.” European Journal of Philosophy (pre-print online, posted 8 May 2013). [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Among the extensive literature on the first Critique, very few commentators offer a thorough analysis of Kant's conception of inner sense. This is quite surprising since the notion is central to Kant's theoretical philosophy, and it is very difficult to provide a consistent interpretation of this notion. In this paper, I first summarize Kant's claims about inner sense in the Transcendental Aesthetic and show why existing interpretations have been unable to dissolve the tensions arising from the conjunction of these claims. Secondly, I present my own reconstruction of Kant's model of inner sense, relying essentially on Kantian considerations found in the B-version of the Transcendental Deduction. My main idea is that inner sense, for Kant, is a passive faculty that gets affected by the understanding performing its figurative synthesis on material given in outer sense. In the remainder of the paper, I highlight a few consequences of my interpretation and outline ways to deal with some objections.

Schneewind, J. B. “Autonomy after Kant.” Kant on Moral Autonomy. Ed. Oliver Sensen (op cit.). 146-68. [M]

Schneider, Ruben. “Die transsubjektive Existenz Gottes bei Kant.” Kant und die Biblische Offenbarungsreligion / Kant a biblické Zjevené Náboženství. Eds. Norbert Fischer, Jakub Sirovátka, and David Voprada (op cit.). 29-44. [M]

Schneidereit, Nele. “Praktiken der Sinngebung: Immanenz der Transzendenz bei Kant.” Transzendenz, Praxis und Politik bei Kant. Eds. Angeli, Rentsch, Schneidereit, and Vorländer (op cit.). 183-204. [M]

 ——, ed. See: Angeli, Oliviero, Thomas Rentsch, Nele Schneidereit, and Hans Vorländer, eds.

Schönecker, Dieter. “Kant’s Moral Intuitionism: The Fact of Reason and Moral Predispositions.” Kant Studies Online (2013): 1-38; posted September 19, 2011. [M] [online]

 ——. “‘A free will and a will under moral laws are the same’: Kant’s concept of autonomy and his thesis of analyticity in Groundwork III.” Kant on Moral Autonomy. Ed. Oliver Sensen (op cit.). 225-45. [M]

 ——. “Warum es in der Grundlegung keine Faktum-These gibt. Drei Argumente.” Kants Rechtfertigung des Sittengesetzes in Grundlegung III: Deduktion oder Faktum? Ed. Heiko Puls (op cit.). 1-14. [PW]

 ——. “Quare errat disceptator. Eine Erwiderung auf Heiko Puls.” Kants Rechtfertigung des Sittengesetzes in Grundlegung III: Deduktion oder Faktum? Ed. Heiko Puls (op cit.). 35-44. [PW]

 ——. “Kant’s Argument for the Existence of Duties to Oneself in § 2 of the Tugendlehre.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 609-21. [M]

 ——. “Duties to Others from Love (TL 6:448-461).” Kant’s Tugendlehre. Eds. Trampota, Sensen, and Timmermann (op cit.). 309-41. [M]

 ——. Rev. of Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. A German-English Edition, ed./transl. by Mary Gregor and Jens Timmermann (2011). Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie. 95.2 (2013): 238-43. [M]

Schönfeld, Martin. “The Thing-in-itself in Nietzsche and Kant: Analysis of a Misunderstanding.” New Nietzsche Studies 9.1-2 (2013): 71-83. [PW]

Schönrich, Gerhard. “Kants Werttheorie? Versuch einer Rekonstruktion.” Kant-Studien 104.3 (2013): 321-45. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In Kant’s writings there is no worked out theory of values. Nonetheless,he has given some hints as to what such a Kantian theory of value might look like. I argue for the claim that his theory should be classified as a version of a fitting-attitude theory of value that is nowadays advocated by several philosophers. Values are, according to Kant, dependent on proper pro-attitudes (Kant’s term for pro-attitudes is Wohlgefallen). In order for a pro-attitude to be apt, the pro-attitude must be explained by reasons that are grounded in properties the attitude is about. One problem for this view is the so-called “wrong kinds of reasons problem”. According to my view, this problem can be solved by delivering distinct definitions of aptness for first- and second-order pro-attitudes. I try to show that Kant has hinted at this solution for the “wrong kinds of reasons problem”.

Schorn, Remi. “Da metafísica à metodologia: Kant e Popper.” [Portuguese; From metaphysics to methodology: Kant and Popper] Kant e-Prints 8.2 (2013): 43-66. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper we argue that the Kant´s Philosophy completes itself with the Popper Copernican revolution. We support that the most relevance in both philosophies is in the investigation of the investigation of the conditions of the objective knowledge possibility and the kantian response related to the problem between the natural world and to that we assure to know about it was correct, nonetheless, insufficient. Kant proposed a philosophical project for the natural science that consisted in converting the metaphysics in critical methodology. He unveiled principles that judged necessary to the scientific knowledge and searched response for the evident paradox between the empiricist principle of which we cannot have knowledge a priori of the world and the noncontradictory rational principles and incompleteness. His theoretical project for the natural sciences was not concluded and Popper with his acute fallibillism accomplished it.

Schulting, Dennis. “Kant’s Transcendental Religious Argument – The Possibility of Religion.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 949-61. [M]

Schulze, Peter. “Europäische Sicherheit jenseits der NATO: Bauelemente einer Gesamteuropäischen Friedensordnung.” Kant’s Project of Perpetual Peace in the Context of Contemporary Politics. Eds. Andrey Zilber and Alexei Salikov (op cit.). 78-84. [M]

Schüssler, Ingeborg. “L’interprétation pratico-morale de la Trinité chez Kant.” Kant, théologie et religion. Ed. Robert Theis (op cit.). 285-96. [M]

Schwaiger, Clemens. “Kant über den Begriff des Güìcks.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 623-32. [M]

Schwarz, Gerhard. “Intuitive Rationalität in Kants Transzendentalphilosophie?” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 1. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 727-38. [M]

Schwember Augier, Felipe. Libertad, derecho y propiedad: el fundamento de la propiedad en la filosofía del derecho de Kant y Fichte. [Spanish] Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 2013. [423 p.] [WC]

Sciacca, Fabrizio. “Focusing Rights through a Kantian Lens.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 4. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 839-46. [M]

Searle, John R. “Reconciling the Basic Reality and the Human Reality – Post Kantian Themes.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 1. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 407-29. [M]

 ——, and Gabriele Gava. “Kant and philosophy in a cosmopolitan sense: intentional and social phenomena, and their place in nature. An interview by Gabriele Gava.” Studi Kantiani 26 (2013): 27-36. [PW]

Seeberg, Ulrich. “Ästhetik in weltbürgerlicher Absicht. Kants Erklärung des Schönen als Brücke zwischen Natur und Freiheit.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 4. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 261-72. [M]

Seebohm, Thomas, M. “Kants Theorie einer eigentlich rationalen Naturwissenschaft und die Revolutionen der Mathematik und der Physik im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert.” Das Leben der Vernunft: Beiträge zur Philosophie Kants. Eds. Dieter Hüning, Stefan Klingner, and Carsten Olk (op cit.). 189-207. [M]

Seel, Gerhard. “'Ich bin mir meiner Selbst als Weltwesens unmittelbar und ursprünglich bewust'. The Leningrad-Reflection 'On Inner Sense' and Kant’s Refutation of Idealism.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 395-407. [M]

Seide, Ansgar. “Kant on Empirical Knowledge and Induction in the Two Introductions to the Critique of the Power of Judgment.” Kant Yearbook: Kant and Contemporary Theory of Knowledge 5 (2013): 79-106. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In their interpretations of the two introductions to the Critique of the Power of Judgment, Juliet Floyd and Henry Allison argue that Kant’s account of the reflecting power of judgment can be read as his vindication of inductive inference and as an answer to Hume’s worries concerning induction. Paul Guyer, on the other hand, argues that Kant’s account in these passages falls short of providing an adequate answer to Hume’s arguments. In this paper, I want to show that the strongest account of Kant’s vindication of inductive inference appears when we combine a reading of Kant’s account of the reflecting power of judgment in the first introduction along the lines suggested by Floyd and Allison with Guyer’s interpretation of Kant’s account in the second introduction. As we will see, Kant’s vindication of inductive inference is stronger than Guyer suspects, although it does not amount to a straightforward refutation of Hume’s worries concerning the uniformity of nature.

Sensen, Oliver. “Kant’s Other Arguments For Freedom.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 633-43. [M]

 ——. “Introduction.” Kant on Moral Autonomy. Ed. Oliver Sensen (op cit.). 1-12. [M]

 ——. “The moral importance of autonomy.” Kant on Moral Autonomy. Ed. Oliver Sensen (op cit.). 262-81. [M]

 ——, ed. Kant on Moral Autonomy. Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013. [xii, 301 p.] [M] [review]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents:
Introduction / Oliver Sensen
Part I. Kant's Conception of Autonomy
1. Kantian autonomy and contemporary ideas of autonomy / Thomas E. Hill
2. Kant's conception of autonomy of the will / Andrews Reath
3. Vindicating autonomy / Karl Ameriks
4. Progress toward autonomy / Paul Guyer
Part II. The history and Influence of Kant's Conception of Autonomy
5. Transcending nature, unifying reason: on Kant's debt to Rousseau / Richard Velkley
6. Kant and the 'paradox' of autonomy / Susan Meld Shell
7. Autonomy in Kant and German idealism / Henry E. Allison
8. Autonomy after Kant / J.B. Schneewind
9. Personal autonomy and public authority / Katrin Flikschuh
Part III. The relevance of Kant's Conception for Contemporary Moral Philosophy
10. Moralized nature, naturalized autonomy / Heiner F. Klemme
11. Autonomy and moral regard for ends / Jens Timmermann
12 . 'A Free Will and a Will Under Moral Laws are the Same' / Dieter Schönecker
13. Morality and autonomy / Philip Stratton-Lake
14. The moral importance of autonomy / Oliver Sensen
Postscript: heteronomy as the clue to Kantian autonomy / Onora O’Neill.

 ——. “Duties to Others from Respect (TL 6:462-468).” Kant’s Tugendlehre. Eds. Trampota, Sensen, and Timmermann (op cit.). 343-63. [M]

 ——, ed. See: Trampota, Andreas, Oliver Sensen, and Jens Timmermann, eds.

Sepper, Dennis Lee. “Cognitive Pluralism as Obligation?” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 4. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 497-506. [M]

Serban, Claudia-Cristina. Philosophie transcendantale, phénoménologie, déconstruction. Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2013. [(159)-259 p.] [WC]

 ——. “L’idéal de la raison pure et la fracture du fonctionnement ontothéologique du possible dans la philosophie critique de Kant.” Kant-Studien 104.2 (2013): 167-87. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article inquires into the reasons that led Kant to part from rational theology in the Critique of Pure Reason, following the transcendental metamorphosis undertaken by the concept of possibility. By analyzing the genesis of the ideal of pure reason, it is shown how possibility is diverted from its theological investment while becoming relative to phenomena and experience: any totalization attempt is now forbidden; the nerve of the pre-critical ontotheological proof is severed, precluding all critical alliance between ontology and theology. Emphasis is also put on the corresponding transformation of two other ontotheological key concepts: reality and existence, and on the double orientation of Kant’s critique of the ontological argument: against Leibniz no less than against Descartes.

 ——. “Le possible pratique selon Kant – qu’est-ce qui est ‘en mon pouvoir (in meiner Gewalt)’ et qu’est-ce qui ne l’est pas?” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 645-56. [M]

 ——. “L'ontothéologie du possible. Kant critique de Leibniz.” Kant, théologie et religion. Ed. Robert Theis (op cit.). 87-95. [M]

 ——. “Plus haut que la possibilité se tient l’effectivité: la critique hégélienne du statut du possible dans la philosophie transcendantale de Kant.” La Philosophie et le sens de son histoire: Études l'histoire de la philosophie autour de Jean-François Marquet et Jean-Luc Marion. Ed. Patrick Cerutti (Bucarest: Zeta Books, 2013). 205-25. [WC]

 ——. “La réforme transcendantale du possible, de l’Analytique des concepts à l’Analytique des principes.” Révue de Métaphysique et de Morale 80.4 (2013): 557-80. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article follows the elaboration of the new, transcendental comprehension of possibility in Kant's critical philosophy, elaboration which is parallel to the passage from formal to transcendental logic. Insofar the transcendental difference between understanding and sensibility is taken into account, the possible is no longer exclusively defined in relationship to the formal conditions of the concept (non-contradiction): the crucial reference to intuition makes that, beyond a mere ens rationis, it names the object of possible experience, the phaenomenon that can be given in time and space. How is the possible then to be ranged in respect to the noumenon and to the figures of Nothing that Kant presents at the end of the Transcendental Analytic?

Şerban, Henrieta Anişoara. “Review of Kant-Studien, vol. 104, no. 1, 2013.” [Romanian] Revista de Filosofie 60.4 (2013): 462-64. [RC]

Serck-Hanssen, Camilla. “The Significance of Infinite Judgment.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 409-19. [M]

Setton, Dirk. “Absolute Spontaneity of Choice: The Other Side of Kant’s Theory of Freedom.” Symposium: Canadian Journal of Continental Philosophy 17.1 (2013): 75-99. [HIC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant’s concept of autonomy promises to solve the problem of the actuality of freedom. The latter has actuality as a practical capacity insofar as the will is objectively determined through the form of law. In later writings, however, Kant situates the actuality of freedom in the “absolute spontaneity” of choice, and connects the reality of autonomy itself to the condition of a “radical” act of free choice. The reason for this resides in the fact that his first solution is marked by a certain defect: it does not contain a sufficient concept of the actuality of Kant’s concept of freedom in light of this insight. The argument is that we need to distinguish force and faculty in order to understand the actuality of a capacity. Only on this basis can we introduce the idea of imagination as a pre-reflexive force of practical reason and the idea of reflective judgment as a power of practical judgment in order to realize how free choice is capable of generating a maxim that has the form of a law spontaneously and of its own accord. In this way, we see that the actuality of freedom necesasarily includes the spontaneity of choice, and that human freedom manifests a certain paradoxicality; the universality of the will is bound to a subjective ground of determination to a pre-reflexive act of “radical” choice.

Sgarbi, Marco. Kant e l'irrazionale. Milano/Udine: Mimesis, 2013. [200 p.] [WC]

 ——. “Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason Within the Tradition of Modern Logic.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 5. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 497-508. [M]

 ——. “Immanuel Kant, universal understanding and the meaning of Averroism in the German enlightenment.” Renaissance Averroism and its Aftermath: Arabic Philosophy in Early Modern Europe. Eds. Anna Akasoy and Guido Giglioni (Dordecht: Springer, 2013). 255-69. [WC]

 ——. “The University of Königsberg in transition (1689-1722): aristotelianism and eclecticism in Johann Jakob Rohde’s Meditatio philosophica.” Studi Kantiani 26 (2013): 125-36. [PW]

Shaddock, Justin B. “Why is Kant’s Transcendental Deduction So Difficult?” Southwest Philosophy Review 29.1 (2013): 155-62. [PW]

Shapshay, Sandra. “Schopenhauer and the Trendelenburg Objection.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 5. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 615-26. [M]

Shell, Susan Meld. “Autonomy, Personhood and the Moral Limits of Contemporary Liberal Theory.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 4. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 847-61. [M]

 ——. “Kant and the “paradox” of autonomy.” Kant on Moral Autonomy. Ed. Oliver Sensen (op cit.). 107-28. [M]

 ——. Rev. of The Scope of Autonomy: Kant and the Morality of Freedom, by Katerina Deligiorgi (2012). Kantian Review 18.2 (2013): 328-34. [M]

 ——. Rev. of Kant and Cosmopolitanism: The Philosophical Ideal of World Citizenship,, by Pauline Kleingeld (2011). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (August 2012, #17). [M] [online]

Shiller, Aviva. “Why Kant Is Not a Democratic Peace Theorist.” Kantian Theory and Human Rights. Eds. Andreas Føllesdal and Reidar Maliks (op cit.). 175-92. [M]

Shimono, Masatoshi. “Kant’s Conception of Internal Purposiveness Revisited.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 5. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 223-32. [M]

Siani, Alberto L. “Kant, Schiller, Hegel e la parabola dell'estetica.” [Italian] Schiller lettore di Kant. Eds. Alberto L. Siani and Gabriele Tomasi (op cit.). 147-66. [M]

 —— and Gabriele Tomasi. “Introduzione.” [Italian] Schiller lettore di Kant. Eds. Alberto L. Siani and Gabriele Tomasi (op cit.). 5-10. [M]

 —— and Gabriele Tomasi, eds. Schiller lettore di Kant. [Italian] Pisa: ETS, 2013. [264 p.] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents:
Alberto L. Siani and Gabriele Tomasi (Introduzione),
Leonardo Amoroso (Schiller interprete di Kant),
Violetta L. Waibel (Il libero gioco di immaginazione e intelletto di Kant e l'impulso al gioco di Schiller),
Salvatore Tedesco (Dominio dello spirito e vivificazione dell'animo: sul rapporto fra volontario e involontario nel saggio schilleriano Grazia e dignità),
Gabriele Tomasi (Schiller, Kant e l'oggettività della bellezza),
Barbara Santini (La critica a Kant nei Fragmente aus Schillers ästhetischen Vorlesungen: una strategia argomentativa sospetta),
Giorgia Cecchinato (L'ingenuo è interessante? Riflessioni sull'ingenuo e il sentimentale a partire da alcune note riferite a Kant),
Günter Zöller (Potere musicale. Filosofia della musica come filosofia politica),
Alberto L. Siani (Kant, Schiller, Hegel e la parabola dell'estetica),
Giovanna Pinna (Metamorfosi del sublime. Schiller e Kant),
Laura Anna Macor (‘Intendere un autore meglio di quanto egli stesso si sia inteso’. Schiller interprete dell'etica kantiana),
Federica Trentani (Per difendere Kant: «sympathia moralis» e «humanitas practica» nella Dottrina della virtù),
Caterina Rossi (Libertà come libertà nel fenomeno. La rivisitazione estetica del concetto kantiano di libertà nei Kallias-Briefe),
Lorenzo Calabi (Filosofia della storia in Kant e Schiller. Riflessioni su di un confronto).

Sieroka, Norman. “A Post-Kantian Approach to the Constitution of Matter.” Objectivity after Kant. Eds. Gertrudis Van De Vijver and Boris Demarest (op cit.). 41-55. [M]

Sikora, Ondřej. “Kant a metafyzika K reakci Stanislava Sousedíka na článek „K pozitivnímu významu Kantovy kritiky metafyziky“.” [Czech] Studia Neoaristotelica 10.3 (2013): 99-108. [PW]

Silveira Falcão, Rafael da. See: Ovídio Romero, Eduardo, and Rafael da Silveira Falcão.

Simon, Robert. Freiheit - Geschichte - Utopie: Schellings positive Philosophie und die Frage nach der Freiheit bei Kant. Freiburg im Breisgau: Alber, 2013. [224 p.] [WC]

Sirovátka, Jakub. “Zu Kants Auslegung grundlegender christlicher Theologumena.” Kant und die Biblische Offenbarungsreligion / Kant a biblické Zjevené Náboženství. Eds. Norbert Fischer, Jakub Sirovátka, and David Voprada (op cit.). 95-105. [M]

 ——. Rev. of Mensch und Unbedingtes im Denken Kants. Eine kritische Darlegung, by Margot Fleischer (2009).  Kant-Studien 104.3 (2013): 400-5. [M]

 ——, ed. See: Fischer, Norbert, Jakub Sirovátka, and David Voprada, eds.

Sisáková, Oľga. “Immanuel Kant v kontexte kritiky „antropologizmu“ v 20. storocí.” [Slovak; Immanuel Kant in the Context of the “Anthropologism” Critique in the 20th Century] Studia Philosophica Kantiana 2013.2 (2013): 48-62. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article focuses on the so-called anthropological turn in philosophy, which meant that man became the object of the philosophical knowledge and at the same time he gained a privileged status in the entire knowledge. This tendency was intensified in the 20th century philosophy in various manifestations of anthropologism and reached its peak by the emergence of philosophical anthropology. I. Kant is customarily credited with an extraordinary role in the history of anthropological thinking. The author of this article analyses two crucial critiques of the modern anthropologism in the 20th century philosophy, especially those issues which are heading towards the assessment of Kant’s anthropology in forming the anthropological paradigm in philosophy as well as modern culture. The first critic under investigation is Martin Heidegger, his refusal of Kant’s establishment of metaphysics and treatment of the analytics of the finitude as his very own alternative, in particular. The second critique of paramount importance is Michel Foucault’s standpoint in the Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology where he pays heed to the connection between the concept of the transcendental subject and the philosophical concept of man, i.e. a possible source of the future deformations of anthropological thinking.

Siyar, Jamsheed. “The Conditionality of Hypothetical Imperatives.” Kantian Review 18.3 (2013): 439-60. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant famously distinguishes between the categorical imperative (CI) – the fundamental principle of morality – and hypothetical imperatives (HIs), which are instrumental norms. On the standard reading, Kant subscribes to the ‘disjunctive reading’ of HIs, which takes HIs to be consistency requirements that bind agents in exactly the same way whether or not agents are subject to CI and whether or not they conform their choices to CI. I argue that this reading cannot be squared with Kant's account of an agent's disposition, in particular his claim that cognition of CI is a necessary condition of willing a maxim. I further argue that Kant could not accept an account of HIs as consistency requirements. Finally, I outline Kant's conception of HIs as non-disjunctive requirements that arise when and only when agents will permissible ends. This account can help recapture Kant's conception of the unity of rational norms.

Skorupski, John. Rev. of Understanding Moral Obligation: Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard, by Robert Stern (2011). The Philosophical Quarterly 63.252 (2013): 603-7. [PW]

Smit, Houston. “Kant on the Apriority and Discursivity of Philosophy.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 1. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 739-50. [M]

 ——, and Mark Timmons. “Kant’s Grounding Project in The Doctrine of Virtue.” Kant on Practical Justification. Eds. Mark Timmons and Sorin Baiasu (op cit.). 229-68. [M]

Smith, Sheldon R. “Kant’s Picture of Monads in the Physical Monadology.” Studies in History & Philosophy of Science, Part A. 44.1 (2013): 102-11. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Many discussions of Kant’s picture of monads in his early Physical Monadology highlight the similarities between the view in it and Roger Joseph Boscovich’s view. Though I find this comparison interesting, I argue in this paper that Kant shows significant strands of having a fundamentally non-Boscovichian view in this work. Moreover, I trace the various strands that, I believe, pushed Kant to think about things in a non-Boscovichian way.

 ——. “Does Kant Have a Pre-Newtonian Picture of Force in the Balance Argument? An Account of How the Balance Argument Works.” Studies in History & Philosophy of Science, Part A 44.3 (2013): 470-80. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper, I discuss whether the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science version of Kant’s argument that space-filling matter requires both attractive and repulsive forces betrays a pre-Newtonian picture of forces as Warren (2010) argues. More generally, I discuss Kant’s overall strategy for securing the possibility of space-filling matter and I describe what motivates Kant to think of the argument in the way, I believe, he does. Ultimately, I argue that Kant’s argument does not suggest a pre-Newtonian picture of forces. Along the way, I discuss the status of quantity of matter and the nature of forces in the Dynamics chapter of that work so as to better clarify what is at work in the balance argument.

Soboleva, Maja. “Kant on evil in the human nature.” [Russian] Kantovsky Sbornik 46.4 (2013): 15-29. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article focuses on the analysis of the problem of evil in Kant’s works. The author attempts at reconstructing the key stages of Kant’s logic of ethics and, on this basis, reconstructs his idea of evil. Of special importance is the analysis and criticism of the anthropology-focused study of the sources of good and evil in the work Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. The author sees the key to understanding Kant’s approach to the problem of evil in the differentiation of the levels of the existing and the due in his theory. The article has the following structure: first, the author emphasis that, for Kant, evil is a practical moral phenomenon unlike, for example, metaphysically interpreted evil. It is shown that the problem of evil is closely connected to that of the nature or essence of a human being. The article presents an analysis of Kant’s notion of human ‘nature’. It is emphasised that Kant understands ‘human nature’ as mere “subjective grounds” of the exercise of freedom. Further, the author analyses the factors determining the actions of humans as moral beings. First, the article addresses the “predispositions to the good”, which describes a human being as a natural being, cultural being, and a personality. In this connection, different types of reason identified by Kant are stressed and the features of “pure practical reason” as a necessary condition of human morality are analysed. Further, the article considers Kant’s definition of evil as a deviation of rules regulating the actions of a human being from their principle of morality. The author analyses the factors underlying the “predisposition” to evil. It is emphasised that Kant measures wickedness not by deeds but solely by the way of thinking. The author discusses the question as to whether the intelligible good, i. e. the critical verification of rules regulating the actions against the categorical imperative, necessarily entail the empirically good. The conclusion is made that, in Kant’s works, the problem of evil is transferred from the empirical to noumenal sphere, from the real to intelligible world. Since Kant formulates the problem of evil in relation not to the empirical but the “intelligible character”, his solution proves to be idealistic. The next step is an analysis of Kant’s notion of “radical evil” and its causes. Since Kant sees the source of radical evil in the wrong subordination of motives dictated by sensibility and reason when choosing rules for actions, which Kant calls the “reversal of incentives”, there arises the question as to the role of sensibility in justifying morals. It is emphasised that, on the one hand, sensibility — as well as reason — is a necessary element constructing the being of humans. In this context, it is interpreted as either ethically indifferent or even a “predisposition to the good”. On the other hand, he sees sensibility as a ground for “self-love” or striving for happiness despite the moral requirements. The author analyses the reasons behind Kant’s exclusion of sensibility as a possible ground for morals relating to its subjectivity. The negative effect of sensibility of human behaviour emphasised by Kant is critically analysed. When choosing between subjective and material sensibility and objective and formal reason, Kant gives preference to reason as the ground for morals. In this function, reason should be necessarily interpreted as reason connected with good will. The consideration of this principle of Kant’s ethical theory concludes the article. The author makes an assumption that the creation of a moral world based on the principle of the free legislation of reason, which consists in that the criteria for the significance of provisions of such legislation is the possibility of transforming them into a universal law, is possible only under the condition that the notion of freedom as relating to practical reason is necessarily understood as freedom aimed at the good. In the sphere of the ideal, i. e. the sphere of logical bases of ethics, there should be no freedom aimed at evil; such freedom exists only in the real, empirical world. One can assume that the notion of freedom of will as freedom aimed at the good, being a condition for the possibility of morals, relates to the notion of a sentient being in general, including the notion of ‘human being’, whereas the notion of freedom as freedom of choice relates to a real human individual. However, the latter is capable of moral improvement through a “revolution in the disposition” and can correspond to the human determination — the ideal — despite one’s weaknesses.

Soni, Raji Singh. “In the Letter of Mere Reason: Rethinking the Universal Secular Intellectual with Immanuel Kant, Jacques Derrida and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak.” Culture and Religion 14.2 (2013): 146-79. [HIC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article reconsiders a question, ‘Is Critique Secular?’, which ostensibly polarised Saba Mahmood and Stathis Gourgouris in the 2008 exchange forum of Public Culture. After positing that Mahmood and Gourgouris are mutually invested in challenging and overcoming the intransigence of epistemic secularism, the article canvasses Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak's deconstruction of the Kantian ‘universal secular intellectual’. The article suggests that Spivak's reading of Kant's Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone constitutes a vital exercise in democratic criticism that sets into relief an important convergence between Mahmood and Gourgouris as interlocutors. Delineating imbrications among Critique of Pure Reason, Critique of Judgment and Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, the article synthesises Jacques Derrida's work on Kantian aesthetics and Spivak's recalibration of the Kantian intellectual as a means to unsettle the recalcitrance of epistemic secularism in academic debate and public culture.

Sørli, Richard. “Logisk fremmed tenkning: Frege (og Kant).” [Norwegian; Logically Alien Thought: Frege (and Kant)] Norsk filosofisk tidsskrift 48.3-4 (2013): 208-17. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Frege defends a factualist conception of logical laws. He argues that the laws of logic are descriptive, since they tell us something about how the world is. According to some of Frege’s interpreters – among them, James Conant and Hilary Putnam – Frege inherits the Kantian view of logic, which holds that accord with the laws of logic is constitutive of the possibility of thought. From the Kantian view, it follows that sense cannot be made of the idea of disagreeing with a principle of logic: illogical thought is not, properly speaking, thought at all. In this paper I focus on Conant’s reading of Frege. According to Conant, Frege’s commitment to the Kantian view of logic reveals itself in Frege’s attack on psychologism in the Preface to Grundgesetze der Arithmetik. If Conant is right in ascribing the Kantian view of logic to Frege, then there is a conflict in Frege’s conception of logic. The reason for this is that it is difficult to see how logical laws can have the status of being substantive truths about the world unless their falsity can be entertained. The aim of this paper is twofold: In the first part, I explain what the Kantian view of logic amounts to and argues that it is reasonable to ascribe the Kantian view to Kant himself. In the second part, I argue that Frege’s polemic against «die psychologischen Logiker» in Grundgesetze does not commit Frege to the Kantian view of logic and therefore that Conant’s reading of Frege is a misreading.

Sosoe, Lukas K. “«Du Golgotha, viens siéger à ma droite».” Kant, théologie et religion. Ed. Robert Theis (op cit.). 359-70. [M]

Southgate, Henry. “Kant’s Critique of the Identity of Indiscernibles.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 5. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 405-20. [M]

Sowiński, Józef Edmund. Filozofia prawa Immanuela Kanta: wybrane zagadnienia. [Polish] Warszawa: Instytut Wiedzy i Umiejętności, 2013. [104 p.] [WC]

Specht, Roman. “Pojęcie wzniosłości w filozofii Kanta.” [Polish; The Notion of the Sublime in Kant’s Philosophy] Studia z Historii Filozofii 4.2 (2013): 167-84. [PW] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article is an attempt not only to refer again, but also interpret some pivotal elements of the concept of sublimity presented in Kant’s Critique of Judgment. Kant presented a source interpretation of the category referring to sublime phenomena of nature or simple works of art, but such delineating of the field of interest was caused by the epistemological aims of the third Critique. In this presentation I would like to widen Kant’s interpretation of the conception and add some references of the sense of freedom to the content of psychological character. This problems are a subject of intensive research among Torun aestheticians.

Speidel, Markus. Erziehung zur Mündigkeit und Kants Idee der Freiheit. Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2013. [236 p.] [WC]

Spetschinsky, Sergueï. “Leopold II, Transcendental Philosopher: Reason and Race in Kant.” Objectivity after Kant. Eds. Gertrudis Van De Vijver and Boris Demarest (op cit.). 115-27. [M]

Spinelli, Letícia Machado. “A religião nos limites da simples razão.” [Portuguese; Religion within the boundaries of mere reason] Kant e-Prints 8.1 (2013): 127-51. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The text that follows is intended to address the Kant's book on religion, seeking to identify its genesis and investigative purpose. For this, the following argumentative steps are presented: i) historical aspects related to publication this book; ii) reconstruction of the four parts that make up the text and iii) what is the relationship between them.

Städtler, Michael. “Kants Religionsbegriff als kosmopolitisches Modell der Moral.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 963-74. [M]

 ——. Rev. of Immanuel Kant – Was bleibt?, by Reinhard Brandt (2010).  Kant-Studien 104.3 (2013): 409-14. [M]

Stan, Marius. “Kant's Third Law of Mechanics: The Long Shadow of Leibniz.” Studies in History & Philosophy of Science, Part A 44.3 (2013): 493-504. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper examines the origin, range and meaning of the Principle of Action and Reaction in Kant’s mechanics. On the received view, it is a version of Newton’s Third Law. I argue that Kant meant his principle as foundation for a Leibnizian mechanics. To find a ‘Newtonian’ law of action and reaction, we must look to Kant’s ‘dynamics,’ or theory of matter.
I begin, in part I, by noting marked differences between Newton’s and Kant’s laws of action and reaction. I argue that these are explainable by Kant’s allegiance to a Leibnizian mechanics. I show (in part II) that Leibniz too had a model of action and reaction, at odds with Newton’s. Then I reconstruct how Jakob Hermann and Christian Wolff received Leibniz’s model. I present (in Part III) Kant’s early law of action and reaction for mechanics. I show that he devised it so as to solve extant problems in the Hermann-Wolff account. I reconstruct Kant’s views on ‘mechanical’ action and reaction in the 1780s, and highlight strong continuities with his earlier, pre-Critical stance. I use these continuities, and Kant’s earlier engagement with post-Leibnizians, to explain the un-Newtonian features of his law of action and reaction.

Stang, Nicholas. “Freedom, Knowledge and Affection: Reply to Hogan.” Kantian Review 18.1 (2013): 99-106. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In a recent paper, Desmond Hogan aims to explain how Kant could have consistently held that noumenal affection is not only compatible with noumenal ignorance (the doctrine that we have no knowledge of things in themselves) but also with the claim that experience requires causal affection of human cognitive agents by things in themselves. Hogan’s argument includes the premise that human cognitive agents have empirical knowledge of one another’s actions. Hogan’s argument fails because the premise that we have empirical knowledge of one another’s actions is ambiguous. On one reading, the argument is valid but its conclusion trivial. On the other, it is unsound on Kant’s own view.

 ——. “Adickes on Double Affection.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 787-98. [M]

Stanković, Saša. “Kant’s Deduction of Morality: The Actualization of Freedom.” Kant Studies Online (2013): 45-71; posted May 23, 2013. [M][online]

Stark, Werner. “Naturgeschichte bei Kant.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 5. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 233-48. [M]

 ——. See: Naragon, Steve and Werner Stark.

 ——. See: Onnasch, Ernst-Otto and Werner Stark.

Staton, Cody. See: Hajime, Tanabe and Cody Staton.

Stegemann, Ekkehard W. “Paulus, die antike Philosophie und Immanuel Kant.” Paulus unter den Philosophen. Eds. Christian Strecker and Joachim Valentin (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2013). 31-47. [M]

Steigerwald, Joan. “Natural Purposes and the Purposiveness of Nature: The Antinomy of the Teleological Power of Judgment.” Objectivity after Kant. Eds. Gertrudis Van De Vijver and Boris Demarest (op cit.). 83-97. [M]

Steinmann, Michael. “‘Geläuterte Emperie’: Johann Christian Reils (1759-1813) Versuch zur Grundlegung der Medizin im Spannungsfeld von Tradition, Kantianismus und spekulativer Philosophie.” Medizinhistorisches Journal 48.2 (2013): 186-216. [WC]

Stern, Robert. “Kant, Moral Obligation, and the Holy Will.” Kant on Practical Justification. Eds. Mark Timmons and Sorin Baiasu (op cit.). 125-52. [M]

 ——. Rev. of Hegel's Critique of Kant: From Dichotomy to Identity, by Sally Sedgwick (2012). British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21.4 (2013): 807-10. [PI=W]

Stilz, Anna. Rev. of Kant and Cosmopolitanism: The Philosophical Ideal of World Citizenship, by Pauline Kleingeld (2012). Social Theory and Practice 39.3 (2013): 548-54. [PW]

Stingl, Alexander I. Rev. of The Body Problematic: Political Imagination in Kant and Foucault, by Laura Hengehold (2007). Foucault Studies 15 (2013): 199-202. [M]

Stobbe, Emanuel Lanzini, and Aguinaldo Pavão. “A dignidade da pessoa humana em Kant relacionada à teoria da justiça de Rawls.” [Portuguese; The dignity of the human person in Kant related to Rawls’ justice theory] Kant e-Prints 8.2 (2013): 102-12. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper aims to indicate some relation topics between the concepts of dignity of humanity (Menschenwürde) and autonomy, in Kant's philosophy (especially in Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten), and John Rawls' theory of justice (in A Theory Of Justice). We have compared both theories, associating (1) the autonomy to the mutual disinterestedness, (2) Kant's concept of freedom to Rawls' fundamental liberties, and (3) the categorical imperative to the two principles of justice. Once those main aspects are considered, it should be possible to ponder how much Rawls takes Kant's concepts into account.

Stolz, Violetta. “Der Nonsense der Metaphysik: Kant, Herder und Horne Tooke.” Herders “Metakritik”: Analysen und Interpretationen. Ed. Marion Heinz (op cit.). 81-104. [M]

Storrie, Stefan. “Kant’s 1768 Attack on Leibniz’ Conception of Space.” Kant-Studien 104.2 (2013): 145-66. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper examines two features of Kant’s 1768 critique of Leibniz’ conception of space. Firstly, Leibniz’ proposed geometrical calculus called ‘analysis situs’; secondly, Leibniz’ relational conception of space. The main thesis of the paper is that Kant’s arguments are more powerful than generally recognized. With regard to the analysis situs, I will show that Kant was quite well informed about this proposed science and that his arguments severely undermine Leibniz’ claims to what it could perform. With regard to the relational theory of space, Kant’s argument would require Leibniz to present a complex story about the relation between God’s act of creation and our spatial experience to defend his relational view, rather than using the simple principle of sufficient reason.

 ——. “Kant’s Understanding of ‘idealism’ in the Metaphysik Herder.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 5. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 509-18. [M]

Stratton-Lake, Philip. “Morality and autonomy.” Kant on Moral Autonomy. Ed. Oliver Sensen (op cit.). 246-61. [M]

Strobel, Benedikt. “αγαθον (‘gut’): ein Ausdruck für viele Eigenschaften?: eine logisch-semantische Untersuchung im Hinblick auf Arist. EN 1096a23-29.” Das Leben der Vernunft: Beiträge zur Philosophie Kants. Eds. Dieter Hüning, Stefan Klingner, and Carsten Olk (op cit.). 307-43. [M]

Strohmeyer, Ingeborg. “Kausalität und Freiheit.” Kant-Studien 104.1 (2013): 63-99. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: According to Kant, all events in nature are subject to the principle of causality. Nevertheless, free actions are possible, because freedom and the universal law of causality are compatible without contradiction. Quantum mechanics is indeterministic, i.e. it implies a violation of causality. It is shown that: 1) this indeterminism can be understood by means of a continuation of Kant’s transcendental philosophy, as it is, like determinism, just a special type of universal causality, occurring when objects are not completely determined, 2) quantum mechanical indeterminacy must not be identified with freedom, because it occurs only within the realm of sensible appearances existing in space and time, whereas freedom belongs to an intelligible substratum that is not part of the sensuous world.

Stroud, Barry. “Judgement, Self-Consciousness, Idealism.” Self, World, and Art: Metaphysical Topics in Kant and Hegel. Ed. Dina Emundts (op cit.). 41-50. [M]

Sturm, Christian. “Zur rechtlichen Verfassung der Kantischen Tugendgemeinschaft.” Kant und die Biblische Offenbarungsreligion / Kant a biblické Zjevené Náboženství. Eds. Norbert Fischer, Jakub Sirovátka, and David Voprada (op cit.). 85-93. [M]

Sturm, Thomas. “What Did Kant Mean by and Why Did He Adopt a Cosmopolitan Point of View in History?” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 4. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 863-75. [M]

 ——. Rev. of Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Anthropology, ed. by Allen W. Wood and Robert B. Louden (2012). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (Dec 2013, #5). [M] [online]

Sudakow, Andrej. “Person und Persönlichkeit: Ansätze zum konkreten Personalismus in Kants Metaphysik der Sitten.” Kants “Metaphysik der Sitten” in der Diskussion. Eds. Werner Euler and Burkhard Tuschling (op cit.). 211-220. [M]

 ——. “The Ethical and Philosophical Antinomy of Foundations of Kant’s Theory of Family Law.” [Russian] Kantovsky Sbornik 44.2 (2013): 7-18. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The present paper focuses on the ethical and anthropological foundations of Kant’s philosophy of family law conceived as a “personal right that is real in kind”: the possibility of possessing a person as a property item presets the antinomy of moral and legal principles, which reproduces the conflict between Roman naturalistic legal theory and the contractual philosophy of natural law. The author also considers the ways to overcome this antinomy, as well as ensuing solutions to the problems relating to the legal foundations and the subject of family law.

 ——. “The communication of persons: Kant’s theory of marriage law held captive by pagan anthropology.” [Russian] Kantovsky Sbornik 45.3 (2013): 33-49. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The paper analyzes Kant’s philosophy of matrimonial law. It focuses on the idea of this law as “possession of a person as a thing and its use as a person”: Kant conceives marriage as an interpersonal relation in an external form of real possession, in the aspect of the objective and subjective goal of such relation, but primarily in the aspect of its legal and ethical possibility. Given the naturalistic interpretation of the constitutive act for this kind of law, the legal deduction of marriage comes in a desperate contradiction with Kant’s ethics of personal dignity, because it seems to lead to a mutual instrumentalization of persons; as a matter of fact, Kant's deduction of marriage rules out the possibility of mutual personal obligations of family members. The naturalistic premise of Kant's family law, provenient from the ancient Roman property law, is as follows: marriage is mutual possession of the other's person as a thing and the use of it as a person for mutual pleasure; it seems to predetermine a necessary connection between legal use and legal posession of a person, the latter presupposing primary acquisition. This premise causes in Kantian family law an antinomy of private law and personalist ethics, which can hardly be eliminated by the own theoretical means of Kant's legal philiosophy. According to the essentials of Kant's ethics, the dignity of the other person, which is (allegedly) acquisited in matrimony, allows no possible equivalent, and its loss cannot be compensated at all events by the fact of mere mutuality of the instrumentalizing relation. The doubtfulness of this naturalistic premise of Kant's family theory means in terms of legal philosophy the doubtfulness of the premise which states the title-establishing status of primary acquisition in the field of personal law. References to the ethical idea of the absolute unity of personality, as well as the accent on “pleasure” as the necessary subjective goal of marital union, which leads the moralist an the philosopher of law upon a false trail, cannot provide a real solution of the problem. The naturalistic premise, in consequence of which the meaning of love is conceived in terms of pleasure, perpetuates the Roman contractualism in matrimonial law by understanding marriage as an external relation of persons, and prepares the soil for the seeds of a nihilistic philosophy of marriage and family. Kant's opinions about the reasons of inacceptability of false and, as a matter of fact, contractually based forms of matrimonial unions, proceed in undermining still more the basics of his positive philosophy of family, and supply additional arguments for a reform of Kantian philosophy of matrimonial law. In the expositions of Kant’s philosophy of marriage, when purified from this naturalistic premise, there can be traced some more integral notion of family union, seen as a moral unity of persons as such, in regard to which the marriage as external union of physical persons is a mere consequence and legal form. The personal union in matrimonial communication creates a relation in which there are two physical persons, but only one moral personality of the family and one legal person; not only a personal and at the same time property-related union, but a personaltranspersonal union. The specific person as an absolute monadical unity is here absolved by the personality of the family, as the absolute unity of active... between persons, which has no other goal besides of and out of this union itself. When seen that way, it doesn't seem necessary any more to identify the “real-right form” of legal matrimonial union with the essence of the personal union itself, and therefore a merely contractual vision of family law can be overcome. The personalist philosophy of family retains the fruitful contents of Kant's matrimonial law theory: the notion that the matrimonial union is necessary “due to the law of humanity”, and not due to mere natural necessity; the notion of matrimonial acquisition as one accomplished neither factually, nor contractually, but “according to a law”, as a consequence of an obligation to enter a family unity. And yet, just as in Kant’s theory of law there is no ethically enriched concept of this genuine kind of union, in the individual ethics of Kant’s later years there is no ethical notion of family as a personality. Its elaboration became a task for German classical idealism.

Sugasawa, Tatsubumi. “Kant und das Problem des Lügens: Über Nebeneinanderbestehen der moralischen Pflichten.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 657-68. [M]

Šustar, Predrag. “Normativity and Biological Lawlikeness – Three Variants.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 5. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 249-60. [M]

Sweet, Kristi E. Kant on Practical Life: From Duty to History. Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013. [xi, 223 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Contents: Introduction — 1. Freedom of the self as such: the good will, duty, and moral feeling — 2. Freedom of the self over time: virtue — 3. Freedom of the self and the moral world: the highest good — 4. Enacting the moral world: founding and promoting a civil condition — 5. Enacting the moral world: joining the ethical community — 6. Human finitude undone: culture and history — Conclusion: practical reason's 'peculiar fate'.

Szczepański, Jakub. “Perpetual Peace: Philosophical Jest or Serious Proposal?” Kant’s Project of Perpetual Peace in the Context of Contemporary Politics. Eds. Andrey Zilber and Alexei Salikov (op cit.). 33-34. [M]

Szendy, Peter. Kant in the Land of Extraterrestrials: Cosmopolitical Philosofictions. Translated from the French by William Bishop. New York: Fordham University Press, 2013. [184 p.] [WC]

[top] T    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Tafani, Daniela. “The Boundaries of Law: Kant and the Secularity of the State.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 915-27. [M]

Tai, Terence Hua. “Kant’s Transcendental Strategy in the First Critique.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 421-29. [M]

Tanaka, Mikiko. “'Eitle Großthuerei'. Kants Auseinandersetzung mit seinen zeitgenössischen Gegnern (Feder, Meiners, Tittel, Flatt, Eberhard und Rehberg) in der Kritik der teleologischen Urteilskraft.” Das Leben der Vernunft: Beiträge zur Philosophie Kants. Eds. Dieter Hüning, Stefan Klingner, and Carsten Olk (op cit.). 545-63. [M]

 ——. “‘Instinct, that voice of God’ Rousseau’s influence on Kant’s interpretation of the Genesis.” Estudos Kantianos 1.2 (2013): 183-92. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In my paper I investigate Rousseau’s influence on Kant’s interpretation of the Genesis and his philosophy of history. In his essay Conjectural Beginning of Human History Kant interpreted the Genesis from the perspective of the conflict between natural instinct and human reason, i.e. the conflict between the theological doctrine and his philosophy of reason. Opposing Rousseau’s opinion that man is entirely satisfied with living according to natural instinct, Kant claims that reason should overcome instinct, which he considers to be the voice of God. Man, therefore, should step out of the state of nature (the Garden of Eden) by his own reason, as Kant regards the release from the rule of instinct and the transition to the guidance of reason as the beginning of human moral history.

Tedesco, Salvatore. “Dominio dello spirito e vivificazione dell'animo: sul rapporto fra volontario e involontario nel saggio schilleriano Grazia e dignità.” [Italian] Schiller lettore di Kant. Eds. Alberto L. Siani and Gabriele Tomasi (op cit.). 51-66. [M]

Telegdi-Csetri, Aron. Kant’s Cosmopolitanism: Politics and Philosophy in a Global Debate. Bucharest: Zeta Books, 2013. [### p.] [WC]

Terra, Ricardo. “Die Freiheit der Alten und die Freiheit der Heutigen: eine Antinomie?” Das Leben der Vernunft: Beiträge zur Philosophie Kants. Eds. Dieter Hüning, Stefan Klingner, and Carsten Olk (op cit.). 401-15. [M]

 ——. “Hat die kantische Vernunft eine Hautfarbe?” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 1. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 431-47. [M]

 ——. “Notes sur la position systématique de la Religion dans les limites de la simple raison.” Kant, théologie et religion. Ed. Robert Theis (op cit.). 165-76. [M]

Teruel, Pedro Jesús. “Die äußere Schaale der Natur. Eine Fußnote zum Versuch über die Krankheiten des Kopfes (1764).” Kant-Studien 104.1 (2013): 23-43. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper we examine the issues of the 1764 published essay – specially of its third section – which help us to reconstruct Kant’s position in the mind-body problem. The philosopher explores here the roots of pathological diseases and refers to a theory, exposed by Johann August Unzer in the weekly Der Arzt, which relates the Kantian point of view with the contemporary Functionalism in Philosophy of Mind. In this way we are pursuing a train of thought previously not taken into account in the Kantian research.

 ——. “Significato, senso e ubicazione strutturale del termine Gemüt nella filosofia kantiana.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 4. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 507-17. [M]

Teskey, Gordon. Rev. of Kant and Milton, by Sanford Budick (2010). Eighteenth-Century Studies 46.2 (2013): 315-17. [PI]

Teufel, Thomas. “‘Merely Mechanistic Laws’ – Causal Mechanism and Kant’s Antinomy of the Teleological Power of Judgment.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 5. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 261-70. [M]

Theis, Robert. “Le Christ comme archétype de toute moralité.” Kant, théologie et religion. Ed. Robert Theis (op cit.). 271-84. [M]

 ——, ed. Kant, théologie et religion. Paris: J. Vrin, 2013. [402 p.] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Proceedings of the 10th Congrès de la Société d'études kantiennes at the Université du Luxembourg (October 2011).
Contents: [Plenary papers] Jean Ferrari (Théologie transcendantale et religion de la raison), Giovanni Ferretti (Ontologie et théologie chez Kant), Günter Zöller («Religion libre». La Religion dans les limites de la simple raison de Kant comme traité théologico-politique), Laurent Gallois (De la doctrine de la vertu à la religion: le fondement critique d'un passage), [Theology] Didier Hurson (L'inhérence de Dieu chez Kant), Claudia Serban (L'ontothéologie du possible. Kant critique de Leibniz), Sophie Grapotte (Le concept d'«ens realissimum» dans «l'Idéal transcendantal». La persistance d'un concept dogmatique au sein du criticisme?), Henny Blomme (Dieu en vue du système. Le statut de l'«ens summum» dans l'Opus postumum de Kant), François Marty (Dieu, le monde et l'homme dans l'Opus postumum), Paulo Jesus (La psycho-logique de l'hypothèse-Dieu ou la nécessité d'une possibilité), Monique Hulshof (La réalité objective de l'idée de Dieu: un «schématisme analogique»?), Manuel Roy (Le finalisme de Kant), Rachel Zuckert (Antinomies cachées de la raison pratique), [Religion] Ricardo Terra (Notes sur la position systématique de la Religion dans les limites de la simple raison), Brigitte Geonget (Délimitation et dépassement. La dynamique de l'excès et le «supplementum» religieux), Frank Pierobon (Quelques considérations sur l'analogie faite par Kant entre les mystères de la liberté, de la foi et de la pesanteur universelle dans la Religion dans les limites de la simple raison), Norbert Campagna (De la religion comme objet d'un devoir envers soi-même), Hilmar Lorenz (Le tournant copernicien chez Kant: du savoir à la foi), Mai Lequan (Foi morale et foi historique: du conflit des Facultés à la définition criticiste iréniste de l'Université), Éléonore Dispersyn (Kant et la foi réfléchissante: une alternative au désespoir moral?), Margit Ruffing (M'est-il, au fait, permis d'espérer?), Evanghélos Moutsopoulos (L'emprise du bien sur le mal dans les limites de la religion d'après Kant), Selma Aparecida Bassoli (Le mal radical et la grâce), Bruno Nadai (Le mal radical et l'insociable sociabilité), Robert Theis (Le Christ comme archétype de toute moralité), Ingeborg Schüssler (L'interprétation pratico-morale de la Trinité chez Kant), Bruno Barthelmé (Esthétique et théologie. Quel édifice religieux pour la «véritable Église visible»?), Giuseppe D'Alessandro (Kant et l'herméneutique), Raphaël Ehrsam (La critique sans l'herméneutique. Principes kantiens pour l'étude des religions), Danielle Lories (De la portée des parerga dans la Religion), [Context and Reception] Maria Antonia Rancadore (La religion de Kant dans les lettres à Lavater), Tinca Prunea-Bretonnet (Kant et le mysticisme. La relecture des Rêves d'un visionnaire à la lumière des leçons kantiennes de métaphysique), Lukas K. Sosoe («Du Golgotha, viens siéger à ma droite»), Francesco Valerio Tommasi (Du saint au sacré. La réception du schématisme de l'analogie kantien chez Otto (Fries et Apelt)), Chris Doude van Troostwijk («Weniger konsequent, aber tiefer». La dissertation d'Albert Schweitzer comme déconstruction de la philosophie kantienne de la religion), Christian Rössner (Pour une religion d'adultes. Kant et Levinas).

 ——. De Wolff a Kant: etudes = Von Wolff zu Kant: Studien. Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 2013. [xix, 201 p.] [WC]

Theunissen, L. Nandi, and Nandi Theunissen. “Kant's Commitment to Metaphysics of Morals.” European Journal of Philosophy (pre-print online, posted 27 Aug 2013). [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: A definitive feature of Kant's moral philosophy is its rationalism. Kant insists that moral theory, at least at its foundation, cannot take account of empirical facts about human beings and their circumstances in the world. This is the core of Kant's commitment to ‘metaphysics of morals’, and it is what he sees as his greatest contribution to moral philosophy. The paper clarifies what it means to be committed to metaphysics of morals, why Kant is committed to it, and where he thinks empirical considerations may enter moral theory. The paper examines recent work of contemporary Kantians (Barbara Herman, Allen Wood, and Christine Korsgaard) who argue that there is a central role for empirical considerations in Kant's moral theory. Either these theorists interpret Kant himself as permitting empirical considerations to enter, or they propose to extend Kant's theory so as to allow them to enter. With some qualifications, I argue that these interpretive trends are not supported by the texts, and that the proposed extensions are not plausibly Kantian. Kant's insistence on the exclusion of empirical considerations from the foundations of moral theory is not an incidental feature of his thought which might be modified while the rest remains unchanged. Rather, it is the very centre of his endeavours in moral philosophy. If we disagree with it, I argue, we have grounds for moving to a distinctly different theoretical framework.

Thiel, Detlef. “Der kritische Krimi. Friedlaender/Mynona als Kantianer.” Das Leben der Vernunft: Beiträge zur Philosophie Kants. Eds. Dieter Hüning, Stefan Klingner, and Carsten Olk (op cit.). 704-32. [M]

Thielke, Peter. “Recent Work on Early German Idealism (1781–1801).” Journal of the History of Philosophy 51.2 (2013): 149-92. [PI]

Thisted, Marco A. “Le concept d’imagination dans les Rêves d’un Visionnaire.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 4. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 519-28. [M]

Thomason, Krista K. “Shame and Contempt in Kant's Moral Theory.” Kantian Review 18.2 (2013): 221-40. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Attitudes like shame and contempt seem to be at odds with basic tenets of Kantian moral theory. I argue on the contrary that both attitudes play a central role in Kantian morality. Shame and contempt are attitudes that protect our love of honour, or the esteem we have for ourselves as moral persons. The question arises: how are these attitudes compatible with Kant's claim that all persons deserve respect? I argue that the proper object of shame and contempt is not the humanity within a person, but rather her self-conceit, or the false esteem that competes with love of honour.

Thompson, Michael L. Imagination in Kant’s Critical Philosophy. Berlin / Boston: De Gruyter, 2013. [225 p.] [WC]

Thumfart, Johannes. “Kolonialismus oder Kommunikation: Zu Kants Auseinandersetzung mit Francisco de Vitorias ius communicationis.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 929-39. [M]

Timmermann, Jens. “Kantian Dilemmas? Moral Conflict in Kant’s Ethical Theory.” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 95.1 (2013): 36-64. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper explores the possibility of moral conflict in Kant’s ethics. An analysis of the only explicit discussion of the topic in his published writings confirms that there is no room for genuine moral dilemmas. Conflict is limited to non-conclusive ‘grounds’ of obligation. They arise only in the sphere of ethical duty and, though defeasible, ought to be construed as the result of valid arguments an agent correctly judges to apply in the situation at hand. While it is difficult to determine in theory what makes some of them stronger than others, these ‘grounds’ can account for practical residue in conflict cases and for a plausible form of agent regret. The principle that ‘ought implies can’ survives intact.

 ——. “Divine Existence and Moral Motivation.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 669-78. [M]

 ——. “Duties to Oneself as Such (TL 6:417-420).” Kant’s Tugendlehre. Eds. Trampota, Sensen, and Timmermann (op cit.). 207-19. [M]

 ——. “Autonomy and moral regard for ends.” Kant on Moral Autonomy. Ed. Oliver Sensen (op cit.). 212-24. [M]

 ——, ed. See: Trampota, Andreas, Oliver Sensen, and Jens Timmermann, eds.

Timmons, Mark. “The Perfect Duty to Oneself as an Animal Being (TL 6:421-428).” Kant’s Tugendlehre. Eds. Trampota, Sensen, and Timmermann (op cit.). 221-243. [M]

 ——. See: Smit, Houston, and Mark Timmons.

 ——, and Sorin Baiasu, eds. Kant on Practical Justification. Interpretive Essays. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013. [xi, 324 p.] [M] [review]

Tinguely, Joseph J. “Kantian Meta-Aesthetics and the Neglected Alternative.” British Journal of Aesthetics 53.2 (2013): 211-35. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this article, firstly, I begin by articulating four logically different positions Kant has been argued to hold concerning the nature and meaning of ‘aesthetic judgement’ so that, secondly, I may endorse the alternative that has been almost entirely neglected: that is, aesthetic judgement should be understood to be both ‘internalist’ in that the pleasure of taste is a constitutive element of the judgement itself (rather than its external effect or prior referent) and ‘objective’ insofar as the pleasure of taste not only reflects the mental state of the judging subject but discriminates features or properties of the object judged. Ultimately I believe that this ‘internal objectivism’ is a compelling meta-aesthetic position in its own right with interesting parallels to recent trends in aesthetic theory, but presently I am concerned to demonstrate that one way to get clear about how such judgements are possible and to become comfortable with their significance is to see how this position arises and is resisted in the Critique of Judgment and, accordingly, in the contemporary scholarship on Kantian aesthetics.

 ——. “What is Orientation Not in Thinking? Aesthetics, Epistemology, and the “Kantian Circle”.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 4. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 273-85. [M]

Toepfer, Georg. “Wechselseitigkeit – Organisation – Teleologie.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 5. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 271-82. [M]

Tolley, Clinton. “The Non-Conceptuality of the Content of Intuitions: A New Approach.” Kantian Review 18.1 (2013): 107-36. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: There has been considerable recent debate about whether Kant’s account of intuitions implies that their content is conceptual. This debate, however, has failed to make significant progress because of the absence of discussion, let alone consensus, as to the meaning of ‘content’ in this context. Here I try to move things forward by focusing on the kind of content associated with Frege’s notion of ‘sense (Sinn)’, understood as a mode of presentation of some object or property. I argue, first, that Kant takes intuitions to have a content in this sense, and, secondly, that Kant clearly takes the content of intuitions, so understood, to be distinct in kind from that possessed by concepts. I then show how my account can respond to the most serious objections to previous non-conceptualist interpretations.

 ——. “Kant on the Generality of Logic.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 431-41. [M]

Tomasi, Gabriele. “Kant on the Reality of Beauty.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 4. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 287-300. [M]

 ——. “Schiller, Kant e l'oggettività della bellezza.” [Italian] Schiller lettore di Kant. Eds. Alberto L. Siani and Gabriele Tomasi (op cit.). 67-89. [M]

 ——. See: Siani, Alberto L. and Gabriele Tomasi.

 ——, ed. See: Siani, Alberto L. and Gabriele Tomasi, eds.

Tomaszewska, Anna. “Transcendental Idealism, Intuitions and the Contents of Perceptual Experience.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 443-55. [M]

 ——. “Etyka Spinozy a problem poznania transcendentalnego.” [Polish] Studia z Historii Filozofii 4.4 (2013): 113-25. [WC]

Tommasi, Francesco Valerio. “Tra male radicale e comunità morale cosmopolitica. La chiesa visibile come schema efficace in Kant.” [Italian] Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 975-86. [M]

 ——. “Du saint au sacré. La réception du schématisme de l'analogie kantien chez Otto (Fries et Apelt).” Kant, théologie et religion. Ed. Robert Theis (op cit.). 371-79. [M]

Tonetto, Milene Consenso. “A perfeição própria e a felicidade alheia na Doutrina da Virtude.” [Portuguese; One’s own perfection and the happiness of others in the Doctrine of Virtue] Studia Kantiana 11.14 (2013): 180-89. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The aim of this paper is to investigate why duties of virtue are directed at one’s own perfection and the happiness of others. Firstly, I examine the concept of an end which is also a duty introduced by Kant in the Doctrine of virtue. Secondly, I show how this concept is related to the positive sense of treating humanity as an end in itself taking into consideration the examples of imperfect duties in the Groundwork.

 ——. “The concept of dignity and duties of virtue in Kant.” Estudos Kantianos 1.1 (2013): 217-25. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The aim of this paper is to analyse the role of human dignity to justify the ethical duties presented by Kant in the Doctrine of Virtue. First, I will examine the meaning of treating the humanity of a person as an end in itself. I will highlight Kant’s position that a person does not have a price but an absolute worth, that is, dignity. Thus, in the second and third parts of this work, I will comment on the justification of some of the duties of virtue in order to clarify the concept of dignity.

Torralba, José M. “The Two Objects of Practical Reason.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 679-91. [M]

Trampota, Andreas, Oliver Sensen, and Jens Timmermann, eds. Kant’s Tugendlehre: A Comprehensive Commentary. Boston: De Gruyter, 2013. [xiii, 442 p.] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Essays by Zöller, Höwing, Ludwig, Schadow, Baum, Trampota, Denis, Goy, Timmermann, Timmons, Bacin, Esser, Hill, Schönecker, Sensen, Baron, Dörflinger, Ricken.

 ——. “The Concept and Necessity of an End in Ethics (TL 6:379-389).” Kant’s Tugendlehre. Eds. Trampota, Sensen, and Timmermann (op cit.). 139-57. [M]

Tredanaro, Emanuele. “Sul rapporto tra Io penso e soggetto pratico.” [Italian] Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 457-69. [M]

Trentani, Federica. “Per difendere Kant: «sympathia moralis» e «humanitas practica» nella Dottrina della virtù.” [Italian] Schiller lettore di Kant. Eds. Alberto L. Siani and Gabriele Tomasi (op cit.). 205-16. [WC]

 ——. “La concretezza dell’esperienza morale nella filosofia pratica di Kant.” [Italian] Estudos Kantianos 1.1 (2013): 81-103. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article analyses the role of practical judgment in the mediation between pure practical reason and the concrete practice of virtue: §1 presents the main elements of this topic. In §2 I reflect on the concept of maxim in order to show that the determination of the concrete content of maxims is the moment in which pure practical reason ‘touches’ reality; §3 analyses the role of practical judgment in the resolution of moral conflicts. In §4 I try to reflect on the description of the context of action, i.e., on the individuation of the moral relevant aspects of an action and of the situation in which it is performed; §5 outlines the topics of symbolic schematism and practical imagination. In §6 I analyse the pages of the Tugendlehre concerning the so called sympathia moralis in order to explain the role of emotions and feelings in the realization of the ends of ethics.

 ——. “Kant e il dibattito sulle questioni di fine vita.” [Italian; Kant and the debate on end-of-life questions] ethic@ 12.2 (2013): 227-37. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this article I claim that in a Kantian perspective the rational capacity of human beings can be considered as the core of moral life and, more generally, of human experience. On this basis I try to answer the following question: how should we conceive the value of life when the specifically human features are missing? More precisely, I suggest an antinaturalistic interpretation of Kantian theory concerning duties to oneself: my aim is to show that the ends of nature cannot work as a criterion for judging the correct use of our own dispositions. This reading can be applied to Kant’s reflections on suicide, stressing that the Kantian view is a quite complex one and requires therefore careful consideration. Indeed, Kant does not conceive life a merely biological concept; this is the reason why I would like to point out that the Kantian perspective on these topics can provide an interesting conceptual background for the contemporary debate on end-of-life questions.

Trotsak, Alexey. “Kant und sein Traktat Zum ewigen Frieden — Historische Voraussetzungen und philosophische Gründe.” Kant’s Project of Perpetual Peace in the Context of Contemporary Politics. Eds. Andrey Zilber and Alexei Salikov (op cit.). 26-33. [M]

Troxell, Mary. “Kant and the Problem of Ugliness.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 4. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 301-10. [M]

Trullinger, Joseph S. “Kant’s Two Touchstones for Conviction: The Incommunicable Dimension of Moral Faith.” The Review of Metaphysics 67.2 (2013): 369-403. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper uncovers a much-neglected ambiguity in Kant’s conception of rational religion, namely, a confusion regarding the public communicability of moral faith, which would in turn render faith and knowledge indistinguishable. The few scholars who have noticed this ambiguity pursue its epistemic dimensions, but this paper explores its ramifications for Kant’s claim that coherent moral agency requires religious faith, taking issue with Lawrence Pasternack’s recent interpretation. Once one notices Kant has two methods (or “touchstones”) for distinguishing conviction from persuasion, one is better able to understand the connection he draws between religious conviction and conscientious character, and the corresponding connection between mere persuasion and spurious faith. While Kant does not explicitly acknowledge this parallel, this paper reveals that it is in play across the Kantian corpus, and is especially perspicuous in his analysis of the biblical figures of Job (the paragon of Kantian faith) and his comforters (men of pseudo-conviction).

Tucker, Irene. The Moment of Racial Sight: A History. Chicago/London: The University of Chicago Press, 2013. [xiv, 274 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: See chapter one: "Kant's Dermatology; or, The Racialization of Skin".

Tuschling, Burkhard. “Recht aus dem Begriff: Schwerpunkte einer Einführung in Kants Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre.” Kants “Metaphysik der Sitten” in der Diskussion. Eds. Werner Euler and Burkhard Tuschling (op cit.). 71-128. [M]

 ——, ed. See: Euler, Werner, and Burkhard Tuschling, eds.

[top] U    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Uleman, Jennifer. “Everyday Noumena – The Fact and Significance of Ordinary Intelligible Objects.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 799-807. [M]

Unna, Yvonne. “The Philosopher’s and the Physician’s Business. Kant and Gaub on Matters of Health.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 4. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 529-38. [M]

Utteich, Luciano Carlos. “Entre moral e religião: destinação e afeto desinteressado no debate Kant-Schiller.” [Portuguese; Between morality and religion: destination and uninterested affection in the Kant-Schiller debate] Studia Kantiana 11.15 (2013): 38-71. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In a note in Religion within the limits of reason alone (1793), Kant comments Schiller’s utterance, contained in On grace and dignity (1793), as having associated the aesthetic element (grace) to the purely moral element (dignity). However, such an approach is impracticable due to the dignity of the law. From other texts by Schiller, such as the fragment of the Lectures on aesthetics (1792-3), On the sublime (1793), On the usefulness of moral customs aesthetic (1793) and Letters on the aesthetic education of man (1795) one can show that he does not thought the interaction between grace and dignity in the form it was imputed him by Kant. Without attracting to itself the aesthetic element (grace), in Schiller’s understanding the dignity does not reject it, in the face of it should not leave involve itself in the extremes of the human condition, to the savage and the barbarian. We demonstrate this by thematising the notions of allocation and disinterested affection.

 ——. “Kant e Fichte e a ‘corrida de estafetas’ da questão do idealismo transcendental.” [Portuguese] Revista Filosófica de Coimbra 22.43 (2013): 165-86. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Fichte developed the foundations of transcendental reason according to Kant’s transcendental Idealism. In articles from 1797, the First and the Second Introduction to the ‘Wissenschaftslehre’, Fichte refuted the dogmatic and empiricist perspectives, which were developed based on Kant’s criticism. Both perspectives adopted the primacy of the thing-in-itself (Ding‐an‐sich), as though the act of knowledge depended on it. Fichte reformulates this issue, arguing that the foundations of transcendental reason should be placed on the subject. Therefore, the primacy of the subject is the only way to establish the system of transcendental reason.

 ——. “Às expensas da intuição intelectual: para uma fundamentação da atividade da razão transcendental.” [Portuguese; At the expenses of intellectual intuition: towards a rationale for the activity of transcendental reason] Kant e-Prints 8.1 (2013): 99-126. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant pointedly criticized in the Critique of Pure Reason (1787) the attempt to keep the notion of intellectual intuition as a valid concept to modern procedures of scientific argumentation. In an unequivocal sense, the assumption of such Intuition as intellectual and immediate knowledge of the objects disregarded the actual limited human conditions of knowledge, dependent on synthesis acts to constitute objects. At a different argumentative script, from the point of view of the systematization of transcendental reason, Fichte gives both in the Doctrine of Science (1794) and in the Second Introduction to the Doctrine of Science (1797) an activity to intellectual intuition, not for a immediate intellectual binding of the sensitive but to highlight the acts originated on the reflection of self (apperception), as constitutors of the system of transcendental philosophy. We expose the difference of register in the Kant’s and Fichte’s conceptions of the notion of intellectual intuition.

Uzawa, Kazuhiko. See: Makino, Eiji, and Kazuhiko Uzawa.

[top] V    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Valaris, Markos. “Spontaneity and Cognitive Agency: A Kantian Approach to the Contemporary Debate.” Kant Yearbook: Kant and Contemporary Theory of Knowledge 5 (2013): 107-26. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Cognitive agency - the idea that our judgments and beliefs are manifestations of agency on our part - is a deeply entrenched aspect of our self-conception as persons. And yet it has proven hard to give a satisfying account of what such agency might consist in. In this paper I argue that getting clear about Kant’s notion of spontaneity might help us make progress in that debate. In particular, I argue that the very same assumption - namely, that agency must be understood on the model of production - has been holding us back in both areas.

Valdez, Edgar. “Kant, Augustine, and Room for Faith.” Forum Philosophicum 18.1 (2013): 19-33. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this paper I argue for a notion of conversion in Kant’s critical philosophy by drawing a connection between the conversions to be found in Kant and the intellectual, moral, and religious conversions of Augustine. I liken Augustine’s Platonic metaphysics of God to Kant’s antinomy of Pure Reason as an intellectual conversion. I link Augustine’s moral conversion with Kant’s metamaxim to commit to a use of reason that is free from the influence of inclination. I connect Augustine’s religious conversion with Kant’s recognition of God as the postulated condition for the highest good. There are advantages to understanding the conversions in Kant for understanding how his critical philosophy views faith more generally. The conversions in Kant point to the practical necessity of faith as Kant understands it. Such an interpretation also unifies Kant’s contribution to the conversation on the relationship between faith and reason. For Kant faith, much like knowledge, is a form of holding true and as such is reasonable.

Vandenabeele, Bart. “Disinterested Pleasure and the Universal Voice of Beauty. Kant’s Response to Burke.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 4. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 311-23. [M]

Vanden Auweele, Dennis. “The Lutheran Influence on Kant’s Depraved Will.” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 73.2 (2013): 117-34. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Contemporary Kant-scholarship has a tendency to allign Kant’s understanding of depravity closer to Erasmus than Luther in their famous debate on the freedom of the will (1520-1527). While, at face value, some paragraphs do warrant such a claim, I will argue that Kant’s understanding of the radical evil will draws closer to Luther than Erasmus in a number of elements. These elements are (1) the intervention of the Wille for progress towards the good, (2) a positive choice for evil, (3) the inscrutability of moral progress, (4) the rejection of prudence as a means for salvation and (5) the rejection of moral sentimentalism. I believe that Kant-scholarship mistakenly pegs Kant’s rational Enlightenment optimism for an existential optimism while Kant’s view of fallen nature draws closer to Lutheran than Erasmusian depravity. A tacit Lutheran influence pervades Kant’s moral philosophy which could explain the influence Kant’s has had on some more pessimistic 19th century philosophers such as Arthur Schopenhauer and Friedrich Nietzsche.

Van der Linden, Harry. Rev. of Kant and the End of War: A Critique of Just War Theory, by Howard Williams (2012). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (February 2013, #18). [M] [online]

Van De Vijver, Gertrudis, and Boris Demarest. “Objectivity: its Meaning, its Limitations, its Fateful Omissions.” Objectivity after Kant. Eds. Gertrudis Van De Vijver and Boris Demarest (op cit.). vii-xxviii. [M]

 ——, and Boris Demarest, eds. Objectivity after Kant: its meaning, its limitations, its fateful omissions. Hildesheim/Zürich/New York: Georg Olms Verlag, 2013. [xxviii, 286 p.] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: These papers were presented at a symposium (Yes we Kant! Critical Reflections on Objectivity) held in Ghent (2010).

Vanhaute, Liesbet. “Kant’s Enlightenment Ideal and the Concerns of ‘the Public, i. e. the World at Large’.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 4. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 877-89. [M]

Van Impe, Stijn. “Kant’s Realm of Ends and Realm of Grace Reconsidered.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 693-704. [M]

Van Poucke, Joris. “Transcendental Epistemology in Biological Theory.” Objectivity after Kant. Eds. Gertrudis Van De Vijver and Boris Demarest (op cit.). 141-54. [M]

Vanzo, Alberto. “Kant on Empiricism and Rationalism.” History of Philosophy Quarterly 30.1 (2013): 53-74. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper aims to correct some widely held misconceptions concerning Kant's role in the formation of a widespread narrative of early modern philosophy. According to this narrative, which dominated the English-speaking world throughout the twentieth century, the early modern period was characterized by the development of two rival schools: René Descartes's, Baruch Spinoza's, and G. W. Leibniz's rationalism; and John Locke's, George Berkeley's, and David Hume's empiricism. Empiricists and rationalists disagreed on whether all concepts are derived from experience and whether humans can have any substantive a priori knowledge, a priori knowledge of the physical world, or a priori metaphysical knowledge. The early modern period came to a close, so the narrative claims, once Immanuel Kant, who was neither an empiricist nor a rationalist, combined the insights of both movements in his new Critical philosophy. In so doing, Kant inaugurated the new eras of German idealism and late modern philosophy

 ——. “La formazione dei concetti in Kant: Risposta a Claudio La Rocca.” [Italian; Kant on Concept Formation: Reply to Claudio La Rocca] Studi kantiani 26 (2013): 147-51. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper replies to Claudio La Rocca's criticisms of the account of Kant's views on concept formation that I developed in Kant e la formazione dei concetti. On my account, Kant holds that, although all conscious experiences of adult human beings are informed by the categories, it is possible to represent objects by means of non-conceptualized intuitions. La Rocca rejects this claim. He holds that, for Kant, it is possible to represent objects only by employing the categories. In the first part of this paper, I discuss the passages cited by La Rocca. In the second part, I argue that Kant's account of the formation of the categories presupposes that it is possible to represent and group objects without employing any concepts.

Varden, Helga. Rev. of Kant’s Political Theory: Interpretations and Applications, ed. by Elisabeth Ellis (2012). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (Jan 2013, #33). [M] [online]

 ——. Rev. of Kantianism, Liberalism, and Feminism: Resisting Oppressions, by Carol Hay (2013). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (Nov 2013, #5). [M] [online]

Vasconi, Paola. “Giustizia internazionale ed elementi di diritto umanitario nella filosofia del diritto di Kant.” [Italian] Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 941-52. [M]

Vasilescu, Oana. “Umanitatea ca scop în sine la Kant.” [Romanian; Humanity as a Purpose in Itself in Kant] Revista de Filosofie 60.4 (2013): 390-94. [RC]

Vázquez Lobeiras, María Jesús. “Vorurteile als Grenzen der auszuübenden Vernunft.” Das Leben der Vernunft: Beiträge zur Philosophie Kants. Eds. Dieter Hüning, Stefan Klingner, and Carsten Olk (op cit.). 285-304. [M]

 ——. “Racionalidad, libertad y finalidad: elementos para una antropología filosófica en Kant y Husserl.” [Spanish; Rationality, Freedom, and Finality: Elements for a Philosophical Anthropology in Kant and Husserl] La razón y sus fines. Eds. Rosemary Rizo-Patrón de Lerner and María Jesús Vázquez Leibeiras (op cit.). 263-90. [M]

 ——. “Zwischen Wissenschaft und Weisheit. Die Hinwendung zum Praktisch-Anthropologischen in Kants Verständnis der Philosophie.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 1. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 751-62. [M]

 ——. Rev. of Immanuel Kant, Primera Introducción de la Crítica del Juicio, edited and translated by Nuria Sánchez Madrid (2011). Estudos Kantianos 1.1 (2013): 243-45. [M]

Vázquez Reyes, Débora A. See: Carrillo Canán, Alberto J. L., and Débora A Vázquez Reyes.

Velkley, Richard. “Transcending nature, unifying reason: on Kant’s debt to Rousseau.” Kant on Moral Autonomy. Ed. Oliver Sensen (op cit.). 89-106. [M]

Vigus, James. See: Hühn, Helmut and James Vigus.

Villacañas Berlanga, J. L. Dificultades con la Ilustración: variaciones sobre temas kantianos. Madrid: Verbum, 2013. [292 p.] [WC]

Villarán, Alonso. “Overcoming the Problem of Impossibility in Kant’s Idea of the Highest Good.” Journal of Philosophical Research 38 (2013): 27-41. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The goal of this article is to defend Kant’s idea of the highest good as part of his ethics, particularly in relation to the alleged problem of impossibility, according to which it would be impossible to promote it, due to the obscurity of moral intentions and of the relative nature of happiness. As a preliminary step, a singular definition of the highest good is unfolded, one that sees the highest good as a moral world where virtue will be rewarded with happiness, which is a duty and an object of hope, individually and collectively. Regarding the defense itself, a distinction is made between fallible and infallible duties, and a soft interpretation of the “ought implies can” principle (as developed by Stern) is used. The article also points out what is yet required for an overarching defense of the highest good, namely, a response to the other problems at stake, which are here labeled as those of heteronomy (the highest good undermines the principle of autonomy, since it as an object includes happiness), deduction (the highest good is not contained and does not follow from the moral law), and irrelevance (the highest good is irrelevant for ethics).

Vinci, Tom. “Solving the Triviality Problem in the B-Edition Transcendental Deduction.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 471-82. [M]

 ——. “Why the ‘Concept’ of Spaces is not a Concept for Kant.” ProtoSociology 30 (2013): 238-50. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the “Metaphysical Exposition” Kant argues that our representation of space is a pure intuition. Kant also claims there that “Space is not an empirical concept that has been drawn from outer experiences.” However, it is not clear how these two claims fit into the overall structure of Kant’s argument. I maintain that the second claim is a premise for the first and that Kant has an independent argument for the premise. By considering the question whether the notion that Kant calls “the general concept of spaces in general” is derived by abstraction for Kant—deciding that it is not—I arrive at a formulation of this argument. Finally, I argue that this notion is not a concept in Kant’s technical sense but something related to it he calls elsewhere “declaration” (Declarationen) (Akad. IX, 142). A Declarationen is a statement of the meaning of a general term that does not express a general concept in Kant’s precise sense. My main thesis is that the meaning of the general term “spaces” for Kant is given by a Declarationen rather than a concept.

Völker, Jan. “Das Werk des Urteils: zu Kants ästhetischer Wiederholung.” Konturen des Kunstwerks. Ed. Frédéric Döhl (Munich: Fink, 2013). 263-74. [WC]

Volpe, Medi Anne. “Immanuel Kant (1724-1804).” The Student’s Companion to the Theologians. Ed. Ian S. Markham (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013). 287-89. [WC]

Voprada, David, ed. See: Fischer, Norbert, Jakub Sirovátka, and David Voprada, eds.

Vorländer, Hans, ed. See: Angeli, Oliviero, Thomas Rentsch, Nele Schneidereit, and Hans Vorländer, eds.

[top] W    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Wagner, Helmut. “Das Kant Dilemma — Sein ‘Weltstaat’. Wie lässt sich heute eine Weltgemeinschaft denken?” Kant’s Project of Perpetual Peace in the Context of Contemporary Politics. Eds. Andrey Zilber and Alexei Salikov (op cit.). 85-98. [M]

Waibel, Violetta L. “Die Notwendigkeit der Verbindung von Ursache und Wirkung.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 5. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 519-32. [M]

 ——. “Il libero gioco di immaginazione e intelletto di Kant e l'impulso al gioco di Schiller.” [Italian] Schiller lettore di Kant. Eds. Alberto L. Siani and Gabriele Tomasi (op cit.). 31-50. [M]

Waleszczuk, Zbigniew. “Die Ökologie der Person - Kantische Motive des Personbegriffs in Karol Wojtylas Person und Tat.” Logos i Ethos 2 (2013): 235-58. [WC]

Walker, John, ed. The Impact of Idealism: The Legacy of Post-Kantian German Thought, Volume II: Historical, Social and Political Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. [397 p.] [WC]

Walter, Martin. “Welche Aristotelesausgabe befand sich im Besitz Kants?” Kant-Studien 104.4 (2013): 490-98. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: It was a widely spread anachronism in Kantian exegesis that Kant himself actually never read the works of Plato and Aristotle. The recent publication of lecture notes taken by students of Kant has shown that for Plato this thesis does not hold any longer since Kant recommended Gedike’s translation of Plato. How ever it is also known that Kant was influenced by some concepts and the terminology of the so called Koenigsberger Aristotelians. Among his books, as they where described by A. Warda, based on an auction catalogue, an edition of the works of Aristotle belonged to Kant. Which edition exactly belonged to Kant was until now uncertain since the title page of the edition was missing. But concerning the influence of Aristotelian thinking in Kant it is an important question which edition exactly was in Kant’s library. With some certainty in this paper it will be shown that it was only the first volume of Johann Gottlieb Buhle’s Aristotelis Opera omnia, appeared in Zweibruecken, 1791.

Ware, Owen. Rev. of Virtue, Rules, and Justice: Kantian Aspirations, by Thomas E. Hill (2012). British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21.5 (2013): 1005-8. [PW]

Warren, Daniel. Reality and Impenetrability in Kant's Philosophy of Nature. Hoboken: Taylor and Francis, 2013. [114 p.] [WC]

Watkins, Brian. “How Kant Explains the Delusion that Some Actions are Supererogatory.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 705-12. [M]

 ——. Rev. of Kant’s Observations and Remarks: A Critical Guide, edited by Susan Meld Shell and Richard Velkley (2012). Kantian Review 18.3 (2013): 487-91. [M]

Watkins, Eric. “The Early Kant’s (Anti-) Newtonianism.” Studies in History & Philosophy of Science, Part A 44.3 (2013): 429-37. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: It is well known that during his pre-Critical period, Kant was a major proponent of Newtonian physics, for the project of the Theory of the Heavens explicitly uses “Newtonian principles” to explain the formation of the various bodies that constitute our solar system as well as those that lie beyond. What has not been widely noted, however, is that the early Kant also developed a major criticism of Newton, one that is based on subtle metaphysical issues pertaining to God, which are most at home in philosophical theology. Interestingly, this criticism is neither an inchoate precursor of his later criticisms of Newton’s account of absolute space, nor isolated to the abstract realm of metaphysics, but has a wide range of implications for the way in which a scientific account of the formation and constitution of the heavenly bodies ought to be developed, that is, for the kind of argument Newton offered in the Principia. That Kant remained interested in this set of issues later in his Critical period suggests that, alongside the revolutionary changes that comprise transcendental idealism, there are deep continuities not only in his Newtonian commitments, but in his anti-Newtonian tendencies as well.

 ——. “Kant on Infima Species.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 5. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 283-94. [M]

 ——. “Shifts and Incompleteness in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason?” Ubergänge — diskursiv oder intuitiv? Essays zu Eckart Försters Die 25 Jahre der Philosophie. Eds. Johannes Haag and Markus Wild (op cit.). 81-98. [M]

Waxman, Wayne. Kant’s Anatomy of the Intelligent Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. [582 p.] [WC]

Weicker, Raoul. “Kants Kryptoanthropologie.” Glaube und Vernunft in der Philosophie der Neuzeit. Eds. Dietmar H. Weidemann and Raoul Weicker (op cit.). 231-44. [M]

 ——, ed. See: Heidemann, Dietmar H. and Raoul Weicker, eds.

Weidenfeld, Matthew C. “Visions of Judgment: Arendt, Kant, and the Misreading of Judgment.” Political Research Quarterly 66.2 (2013): 254-66. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Hannah Arendt’s conceptualization of judgment may only drive political theorists further from the phenomenon. Throughout her life, Arendt’s work on judgment was guided by Kant’s thought. Arendt’s reading of Kant’s work raises two difficulties to which contemporary political scientists should attend. First, Arendt’s reading of Kant is a systematic misreading of his texts. Second, Arendt’s misreading of Kant pushes her toward a misreading of the phenomenon of judgment. More important, Arendt’s misreading has led political theorists to assume a divide between the points of view of the actor and of the spectator, which cannot be reconciled given the resources of Arendt’s thought

Weil, Eric. Probleme des Kantischen Denkens. Transl. and introduction by Hector Wittwer. Duncker & Humblot, 2013. [151 p.] [WC]

Weinstock, Daniel, ed. See: Archard, David, Monique Deveaux, Neil Manson, and Daniel Weinstock, eds.

Welchman, Alistair. “The Art of Willing.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 5. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 627-38. [M]

Weltecke, Manfred. “How Robust is Kant’s Realism?” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 809-19. [M]

Wennersten, Annika. “Kant’s Non-Egoistic Hedonism.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 713-24. [M]

Wesche, Tilo. “Moral in weltbürgerlicher Absicht. Kant über moralischen Fortschritt.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 4. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 891-900. [M]

Westphal, Kenneth R. “Kant’s Cognitive Semantics, Newton’s Rule 4 of Experimental Philosophy and Scientific Realism Today.” Kant Yearbook: Kant and Contemporary Theory of Knowledge 5 (2013): 127-68. [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason contains an original and powerful semantics of singular, specifically cognitive reference which has important implications for epistemology and for philosophy of science (and which is entirely independent of Transcendental Idealism). Here I argue that Kant’s cognitive semantics directly and strongly supports Newton’s Rule 4 of Experimental Philosophy in ways which support Newton’s realism about gravitational force. I begin with Newton’s Rule 4 and its role in Newton’s justification of realism about gravitational force (§ 1). I then briefly summarize Kant’s semantics of singular cognitive reference (§ 2), and show that it is embedded in, and strongly supports, Newton’s Rule 4, and that it rules out not only Cartesian physics (per Harper) but also Cartesian, infallibilist presumptions about empirical justification generally (§ 3). This result exposes a key fallacy in Bas van Fraassen’s main argument for his anti-realist Constructive Empiricism, and in many common objections to realism (§ 4). These problems reveal yet a further important regard in which Constructive Empiricism is not (so to speak) ‘empirically’ adequate, not even to Classical Newtonian Mechanics (§ 5). This inadequacy of Constructive Empiricism highlights a chronic empiricist misunderstanding of Newton’s mechanics (§ 6). Finally, Kant’s cognitive semantics improves upon the semantic interpretation of scientific theories, and rectifies the presumption that laws of physics literally ‘lie’ (§ 7). Thus Kant and Newton still have invaluable lessons for contemporary philosophy and history of science (§ 8).

White, Gabrielle D. V. “Should We Take Kant Literally? On Alleged Racism in Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime.” Philosophy & Literature 37.2 (2013): 542-53. [M]

Wicks, Robert. European Aesthetics: a critical introduction, from Kant to Derrida. London: Oneworld, 2013. [xii, 347 p.] [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: See chapter one: "Immanuel Kant: The beauty of universal agreement," pp. 11-37.

Wike, Victoria S. “Reconsidering Kant’s Concept of Friendship: A Comparison with the Highest Good.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 725-32. [M]

Wild, Markus, ed. See: Haag, Johannes, and Markus Wild, eds.

Willaschek, Marcus. “Kant’s Two Conceptions of (Pure) Reason in the Critique of Pure Reason.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 483-92. [M]

 ——. “"Spontanicznosc poznania": zaleznosc "Analityki transcendentalnej" od rozwiazania trzeciej antynomii.” [Polish] Transl. from the German by Wojciech Hanuszkiewicz Argument 3.2 (2013): 491-511. [WC]

Wille, Katrin. “Moralische Kompetenzen des Weltbürgers: Die drei Ebenen der praktischen Urteilskraft.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 733-44. [M]

Williams, Howard. “Kant and Libertarianism.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 4. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 901-12. [M]

 ——. “Kantian Underpinnings for a Theory of Multirights.” Kantian Theory and Human Rights. Eds. Andreas Føllesdal and Reidar Maliks (op cit.). 8-26. [M]

 ——. “Kant and Libertarianism.” Kant on Practical Justification. Eds. Mark Timmons and Sorin Baiasu (op cit.). 269-83. [M]

 ——. Rev. of Kant’s Human Being: Essays on his Theory of Human Nature, by Robert B. Louden (2011). Kantian Review 18.1 (2013): 154-57. [M]

Williams, Robert R. “Overcoming the Kantian Frame: Tragedy, Recognition, and the Death of God.” The Owl of Minerva 45.1-2 (2013): 85-100. [PW]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This paper has three sections. 1) For Hegel, the true infinite is the fundamental concept of philosophy. The true infinite challenges current non-metaphysical interpretations of Hegel, as it challenged Kant’s restriction of cognition to finitude and attack on metaphysics. The consciousness of limit (finitude) implies a transcendence of limit, and an infinite opposed to the finite shows itself to be finite. 2) Hegel accepts Kant’s approach to the God-question through practical reason, but rejects Kant’s postulates as incoherent. The content of the God-postulate contradicts the subject-relative form of the postulate. Kant’s moral God is a spurious infinite. The true infinite is a self-determining, self-realizing, inclusive whole which sublates the subjective ‘ought to be’ of the postulate. 3) For both Hegel and Nietzsche the moral god is dead; both pursue the question of theology after the death of God. I explore Hegel’s account of tragedy and his conception of tragic reconciliation. The latter is not a comic, but an “anguished reconciliation, a disquieted bliss in disaster.” The death of God and reconciliation include negation and suffering, and are closer to tragic reconciliation than to Dante’s Divine Comedy with its impassible absolute that lacks serious opposition.

 ——. Rev. of Kant and the Subject of Critique: On the Regulative Role of the Psychological Idea, by Avery Goldman (2012). Review of Metaphysics 67.1 (2013): 164-65. [M]

Williams, Seán M. “Kant’s Novel Interpretation of History.” seminar — A Journal of Germanic Studies 49.2 (2013): 171-90. [M]

Williamson, Diane. “‘Let There Be Light’ – Reconsidering Kant’s Philosophy of Emotion.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 4. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 539-50. [M]

Wilson, Eric Entrican. “Kant on Autonomy and the Value of Persons.” Kantian Review 18.2 (2013): 241-62. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This essay seeks to contribute to current debates about value in Kant's ethics. Its main objective is to dislodge the widely shared intuition that his view of autonomy requires constructivism or some other alternative to moral realism. I argue the following. Kant seems to think that the value of persons is due to their very nature, not to what anyone decides is the case (however rational or pure those decisions may be). He also seems to think that when we treat persons as ends in themselves we are responding appropriately to the fact that their very nature elevates them above all other concerns. Neither of these beliefs is incompatible with his view of autonomy. So it is a mistake to think that Kant's ethics requires constructivism or any other form of anti-realism.

 ——. Rev. of Understanding Moral Obligation: Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard, by Robert Stern (2012). Kantian Review 18.3 (2013): 492-96. [M]

 ——. Rev. of Kant and the Limits of Autonomy, by Susan Meld Shell (2009). Journal of the History of Philosophy 51.2 (2013): 322-23. [M]

Wilson, Holly L. “Is Kant’s Worldly Concept of Philosophy really “Regional Philosophy”?” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 1. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 763-72. [M]

Wimmer, Reiner. “Kants Religionsphilosophie im Opus postumum.” Transzendenz, Praxis und Politik bei Kant. Eds. Angeli, Rentsch, Schneidereit, and Vorländer (op cit.). 165-82. [M]

Winegar, Reed. “An Unfamiliar and Positive Law: On Kant and Schiller.” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 95.3 (2013): 275-97. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: A familiar post-Kantian criticism contends that Kant enslaves sensibility under the yoke of practical reason. Friedrich Schiller advanced a version of this criticism to which Kant publicly responded. Recent commentators have emphasized the role that Kant’s reply assigns to the pleasure that accompanies successful moral action. In contrast, I argue that Kant’s reply relies primarily on the sublime feeling that arises when we merely contemplate the moral law. In fact, the pleasures emphasized by other recent commentators depend on this sublime feeling. These facts illuminate Kant’s views regarding the relationship between morality, freedom, and the development of moral feelings.

Wines, Ryan H. “The Importance of the Third Proposition in Groundwork I’s Analysis of Duty.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 745-56. [M]

Winkelman, Steven J. “Duties to the Deceased in Kant.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 757-68. [M]

Wisbert, Rainer. “Die Idee der philosophischen Selbstbildung: Herders pädagogische Auseinandersetzung mit Kant in der Metakritik.” Herders “Metakritik”: Analysen und Interpretationen. Ed. Marion Heinz (op cit.). 231-52. [M]

Wittwer, Héctor. Rev. of Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. An Introduction, by Sally Sedgwick (2008). [German] Kant-Studien 104.2 (2013): 265-68. [M]

 ——. Rev. of Menschenwürde, Recht und Staat bei Kant. Fünf Untersuchungen, by Dietmar von der Pfordten (2009).  Kant-Studien 104.3 (2013): 405-9. [M]

Wolff, Michael. “Kant über Freiheit und Determinismus.” Kants “Metaphysik der Sitten” in der Diskussion. Eds. Werner Euler and Burkhard Tuschling (op cit.). 27-42. [M]

 ——. “Trias politica: Erläuterungen zu Kants Verfassungstheorie in seinen Metaphysischen Anfangsgründen der Rechtslehre.” Kants “Metaphysik der Sitten” in der Diskussion. Eds. Werner Euler and Burkhard Tuschling (op cit.). 57-70. [M]

Wood, Allen W. “Kant on Practical Reason.” Kant on Practical Justification. Eds. Mark Timmons and Sorin Baiasu (op cit.). 57-86. [M]

 ——. “Kant, Immanuel.” The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Ed. Hugh LaFollette (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013). ##-##. [PW]

Woodard, Christopher. “The Common Structure of Kantianism and Act-Utilitarianism.” Utilitas (Online: 9 May 2013): 1-20. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This article proposes a way of understanding Kantianism, act-utilitarianism and some other important ethical theories according to which they are all versions of the same kind of theory, sharing a common structure. I argue that this is a profitable way to understand the theories discussed. It is charitable to the theories concerned; it emphasizes the common ground between them; it gives us insights into the differences between them; and it provides a method for generating new ethical theories worth studying. The article briefly discusses the relationship between these ideas and some other recent proposals that emphasize the common ground between Kantianism and versions of consequentialism.

Woolley, J. Patrick. “Kaufman’s Debt to Kant: The Epistemological Importance of the ‘Structure of the World Which Environs Us’.” Zygon 48.3 (2013): 544-64. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Gordon Kaufman’s ‘constructive theology’ can easily be taken out of context and misunderstood or misrepresented as a denial of God. It is too easily overlooked that in his approach everything is an imaginary construct given no immediate ontological status — the self, the world, and God are ‘products of the imagination.’ This reflects an influence, not only of theories on linguistic and cultural relativism, but also of Kant’s ‘ideas of pure reason.’ Kaufman is explicit about this debt to Kant. But I argue there are other aspects of Kant’s legacy implicit in his method. These center around Kaufman’s engagement with ‘observed patterns’ in nature. With Paul Tillich’s aid, I bring this neglected issue to the fore and argue that addressing it allows one to more readily capitalize upon the Kantian influence in Kaufman’s method. This, in turn, encourages one to tap more deeply into the epistemic underpinnings of Kaufman’s approach to the science-religion dialogue.

Wu, Feng-Wei. “The Significance of Taste – Does Kant Celebrate Humanity Itself?” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 4. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 325-31. [M]

Wuerth, Julian. “Sense and Sensibility in Kant's Practical Agent: Against the Intellectualism of Korsgaard and Sidgwick.” European Journal of Philosophy 21.1 (2013): 1-36. [PI]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Drawing on a wide range of Kant’s recorded thought beyond his Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, this essay presents an overview of Kant’s account of practical agency as embodied practical agency and argues against the intellectualized interpretations of Kant’s account of practical agency presented by Christine Korsgaard and Henry Sidgwick. In both Kant’s empirical-psychological and metaphysical descriptions of practical agency, he presents a recognizably human practical agent that is broader and deeper than the faculty of reason alone. This agent chooses action from a reflective distance, but not from the complete affective distance of reason. We choose neither as reason alone, nor even as the sum of all of our ‘higher’ faculties, of cognition (including reason), feeling, and desire, in Kant’s view. Instead, we choose as an agent that also has ‘lower’, ‘sensible’ faculties, of cognition (including sense), feeling, and desire, which together comprise our ‘sensibility’. These mental states of sensibility are not merely confused versions of our higher cognitions, feelings, or desires, and so different from them in degree only, but are instead distinct from our higher states in kind also; and these distinct sensible states are not dependent on our higher states and so on a commitment to the value of humanity, for example. For this reason, a choice in favour of sensible states and in opposition to the moral law need in no way undermine its own foundations and thus be incoherent, as Korsgaard and Sidgwick argue, but instead only immoral. Because Kant does not reduce the problem of immoral choice to one of insufficient reflection and ensuing confusion, he does not view moral progress in cognitive terms alone, whether in the form of a clearer understanding of the moral law, improved judgment in applying it, or deeper insight into our own nature as practical agents. Kant instead recognizes the crucial importance of cultivating our feelings and desires over the course of a lifetime both as a way to make ourselves worthy of the humanity within us directly and also as a way to facilitate future moral choices.

Wunderlich, Falk. “Kant and Hume contra Materialist Theories of the Mind.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 493-504. [M]

Wunsch, Matthias. “Zum ,Schematismus‘ der reinen Verstandesbegriffe in Kants Inauguraldissertation von 1770.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 505-16. [M]

Wyrwich, Thomas. “Kants Galgen-Beispiel und Adornos Verurteilung.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 3. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 769-80. [M]

[top] X    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Xhignesse, Michel-Antoine. “Willingly Disinterested.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 5. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 639-50. [M]

[top] Y    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Yamane, Yuichiro. “Mystik, Mystizismus und Kritizismus bei Kant.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 987-97. [M]

Yermolayev Vladimir. “On the logical inconsistency of Kant’s critique of the cosmological argument.” [Russian] Kantovsky Sbornik 45.3 (2013): 86-90. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The paper shows that the Kantian critique of cosmological argument does not take into account the existential presuppositions of Aristotelian syllogistic, so it is logically untenable. The basic idea of Kant is that the cosmological proof does not rely on the empirical premise (i.e. the existence of the world). Instead, it resorts covertly to the ontological proof. This is the second stage of the proof, when from the notion of a necessary being (ens necessarium) they move to the concept of a most real being (ens realissimum), i.e. God. According to Kant, this transition is logically equivalent to the reverse transition from ens realissimum to ens necessarium, which is the essence of the ontological argument. Demonstrating this equivalence, Kant resorts to conversion by lim itation, or per accidens. Such a conversion is possible in the Aristotelian syllogistic, because of its existential presuppositions, i.e. provided that the notion of ens necessarium is not empty. But this means that the conclusion still uses empirical premise of the cosmological proof. Consequently, Kant's argument is logically untenable.

Ypi, Lea. “The Problem of Systematic Unity in Kant’s Two Definitions of Philosophy.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 1. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 773-85. [M]

[top] Z    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Zagirnyak, Mickhail. “Rezeption der Kantischen Idee des ewigen Friedens im rechtsphilosophischen Konzept von S. I. Hessen.” [Translated from the Russian by Andrey Zilber] Kant’s Project of Perpetual Peace in the Context of Contemporary Politics. Eds. Andrey Zilber and Alexei Salikov (op cit.). 51-54. [M]

Zagzebski, Linda. “Intellectual Autonomy.” Philosophical Issues 23.1 (2013): 244-61. [HIC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: According to a standard interpretation of philosophical history, Immanuel Kant revolutionized ethics by making the ultimate moral authority one’s own rational will. I take that to be the heart of the idea of autonomy. In this essay I will describe a view of the self according to which autonomy properly applies in the intellectual domain on the same grounds as it applies in the practical domain. I will explain why I believe that the power of reflective self-consciousness is more basic than any epistemic reasons—anything that indicates to a reasonable person that some proposition is true. The argument is epistemological, not moral. The conclusion is that what we mean by reason in its theoretical sense derives from reflective self-consciousness. The authority of the self over the self is the natural right of the self to reflect, which is to say, the natural right of the self to be a self. The authority of reason over a person’s belief-forming activities, like the authority of reason over a person’s practical action, is derivative from the natural authority of the self.

Zákutná, Sandra. “Civil Society in Kant’s Philosophy of History.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 4. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 913-20. [M]

Zinkin, Melissa. “Kant’s Supersensible Substratum of Humanity.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 4. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 333-42. [M]

Zangwill, Nick. “Nietzsche on Kant on Beauty and Disinterest.” History of Philosophy Quarterly 30.1 (2013): 75-91. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: How good is Friedrich Nietzsche's critique of Immanuel Kant's doctrine that pleasure in the beautiful is disinterested? I shall confine my attention to one short passage in the Genealogy of Morals where Nietzsche turns his attention specifically to Kant's writings on disinterest, rather than those of other philosophers such as Arthur Schopenhauer. I want to examine and assess Nietzsche's critique of Kant in this passage. We will see that Nietzsche's criticisms are interesting.

Zheng, Jiliang. 王陽明與康德道德哲學的比較研究 / Wang Yangming yu Kangde dao de zhe xue de bi jiao yan jiu. [Chinese; "A comparative study of Wang Yangming and Kantian moral philosophy"] Taibei Shi: Wen shi zhe chu ban she, 2013. [244 p.] [WC]

Zilber, Andrey. See: Dykhanov, Viacheslav, and Andrey Zilber.

 ——, and Alexei Salikov, eds. Kant’s Project of Perpetual Peace in the Context of Contemporary Politics: proceedings of international seminar. Kalingrad: Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University Press, 2013. [147 p.] [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: This book contains the proceedings in English and in German, based on working papers of international conference «Kant’s Project of Perpetual Peace in the Context of Contemporary Politics» (Kaliningrad, 20—22 of April, 2012).

Zimmermann, Stephan. “Faktum statt Deduktion. Kants Lehre von der praktischen Selbstrechtfertigung des Sittengesetzes.” Kants Rechtfertigung des Sittengesetzes in Grundlegung III: Deduktion oder Faktum? Ed. Heiko Puls (op cit.). 103-32. [PW]

Zinkin, Melissa. “On Robert Clewis’s The Kantian Sublime and the Revelation of Freedom.” Critique (blog posted: 10 Jan 2013) n.p. [PW] [online]

Zinkstok, Job. “Indemonstrable Propositions and Analysis in Kant’s Preisschrift.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 2. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 517-27. [M]

Zöller, Günter. “‘Religion libre’. La Religion dans les Limites de la simple raison de Kant comme traité théologico-politique.” Kant, théologie et religion. Ed. Robert Theis (op cit.). 43-56. [PI]

 ——. “Hoffen-Dürfen: Kants kritische Begründung des moralischen Glaubens.” Glaube und Vernunft in der Philosophie der Neuzeit. Eds. Dietmar H. Weidemann and Raoul Weicker (op cit.). 245-57. [M]

 ——. “Idee und Notwendigkeit einer Metaphysik der Sitten (MS 6:205-209, 214-218 und TL 6:375-378).” Kant’s Tugendlehre. Eds. Trampota, Sensen, and Timmermann (op cit.). 11-24. [M]

 ——. “The Musically Sublime. Richard Wagner’s Post-Kantian Philosophy of Modern Music.” Das Leben der Vernunft: Beiträge zur Philosophie Kants. Eds. Dieter Hüning, Stefan Klingner, and Carsten Olk (op cit.). 635-60. [M]

 ——. “Genesis und Klima. Geo-Anthropologie bei Herder und Kant.” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 4. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 551-63. [M]

 ——. “Entre Rousseau e Freud: Kant sobre o mal-estar cultural.” [Portuguese; translated from the English: “Between Rousseau and Freud. Kant on Cultural Uneasiness”]Estudos Kantianos 1.2 (2013): 161-82. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The paper aims at the sketch of a comprehensive reading of Immanuel Kant’s philosophical project, as it manifests itself under the twofold guise of a critical theory of reason and a natural history of reason. Section 1 presents the distinctly modernist character of Kant’s idealist conjunction of scientific naturalism and supra-natural rationalism. Section 2 details the anthropologically based, developmentally structured and historically oriented other half of Kant’s account of human reason. Section 3 investigates the peculiar position of Kant’s account of cultural anthropogenesis in its productive engagement with Jean-Jacques Rousseau and its foreshadowing of the much later and quite differently motivated assessment of the relation between human nature and human culture in Sigmund Freud.

 ——. “Potere musicale. Filosofia della musica come filosofia politica.” [Italian] Schiller lettore di Kant. Eds. Alberto L. Siani and Gabriele Tomasi (op cit.). 131-46. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Originally published as “‘Musikalische Macht’. Musikphilosophie als politische Philosophie.” Musikphilosophie, edited by Ulrich Tadday. Munich: edition text + kritik, 2007). 152-66.

 ——. “Not seeing and seeing nothing. Kant on the twin conditions of objective reference.” Kant e-Prints 8.2 (2013): 1-21. [M] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The article deals with the status and significance of Kant's distinction between intuition and concept as the two essential prerequisites for the objective reference of cognitions in the Critique of Pure Reason. More specifically, the article is concerned with Kant's account of the objective reference of cognitions a priori and with the conditions of the possibility of non-empirical knowledge in general and of metaphysical knowledge in particular. Section 1 presents Kant's transcendental project in its strategic role of providing the theoretical foundations for moral freedom. Section 2 elucidates the ground and function of the dualism that permeates Kant's critical philosophy. Section 3 details Kant's innovative account of sensuous intuition as one of the two basic elements of cognition. Section 4 addresses the original limitation of sensuous intuition as a mode of cognition and the latter's functional enhancement by the conceptual mode of cognition.

 ——. “«Religion libre». La Religion dans les limites de la simple raison de Kant comme traité théologico-politique.” Kant, théologie et religion. Ed. Robert Theis (op cit.). 43-56. [M]

 ——. “Mensch und Erde: die geo-anthropologische Parallelaktion von Herder und Kant.” Herders “Metakritik”: Analysen und Interpretationen. Ed. Marion Heinz (op cit.). 253-71. [M]

Zuckert, Rachel. “Is There Kantian Art Criticism?” Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol. 4. Eds. Bacin, Ferrarin, La Rocca, and Ruffing (op cit.). 343-56. [M]

 ——. “Antinomies cachées de la raison pratique.” Kant, théologie et religion. Ed. Robert Theis (op cit.). 155-62. [M]

 ——. Rev. of Kant and the Subject of Critique: On the Regulative Role of the Psychological Idea, by Avery Goldman (2012). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (February 2013, #26). [M] [online]

Żuromski, Daniel. “Podmiot i przedmiot poznania jako efekt syntezy transcendentalnej jedności apercepcji w sformułowaniu neopragmatycznym. Stanowisko Roberta B. Brandoma.” [Polish; The subject and object of knowledge as a result of the synthesis of the transcendental unity of apperception. The neopragmatic reading of Robert B. Brandom] Diametros 37 (2013): 169-92. [PW] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: One of the characteristic theses of the classical American pragmatism (in short TP) and contemporary neopragmatism (in short TNP) with regard to the question: "How do the mind and language relate to the world?" is that the concepts of the subject and object of knowledge are not primitive and autonomus. Rather, these concepts were construed by the pragmatists and the neo-pragmatists as a result of a process which, in the order of philosophical explanation, reflected e.g. in conceptual analysis or ontological reduction, was considered to be more basic. Today, one of the most original and widely discussed neopragmatists, who can reasonably be recognized as belonging to TNP, is an American philosopher Robert B. Brandom. What is surprising in Brandom’s theory is that it is formulated against the background of a semantic-pragmatic interpretation of Kant's famous thesis about the transcendental unity of apperception. The purpose of this article is, firstly, to present Robert Brandom’s theory as a version of TNP and, secondly, to provide an interpretation, according to which there is a reason to describe Brandom’s neopragmatism as transcendentalism.

Zylberman, Ariel. “Kant’s Juridical Idea of Human Rights.” Kantian Theory and Human Rights. Eds. Andreas Føllesdal and Reidar Maliks (op cit.). 27-51. [M]

[top] Dissertations    [ Kant  —  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  —  Dissertations ]

Addison, Daniel Stephen. Hegel’s Critique of Kant’s Standpoint of Finitude. Ph.D. diss. University of Pittsburgh, 2013. [149 p.] Advisor: Stephen Engstrom. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: My central aims here are (1) to explicate and defend the claim made by Hegel and other post-Kantians that there is a contradiction at the heart of Kant’s theoretical philosophy, and (2) to provide insight into the nature of Hegel’s system by seeing how it is formed in response to this real problem in Kant. Kant is committed to a real contradiction, I claim, with his appeal to affection by the thing in itself. This appeal amounts to the claim that our reception of empirical content is unconditioned by the understanding’s activity. The claim that contradicts this emerges in Kant’s clearest explanation of how the categories make experience possible. We can see that they do so, he argues, by seeing that our reception of empirical content is conditioned by the understanding’s activity. Kant’s followers J.S. Beck and Fichte champion Kant’s latter thought. I claim that their readings are true of Kant’s best thought, even though Kant rejects them. He only rejects their interpretations because he cannot abandon the former thought. But Beck and Fichte see, as Kant does not, that a commitment to thing-in-itself affection in light of Kant’s explanation of how the categories make experience possible would constitute what Hegel later calls “a self-contradictory ambiguity.” Hegel’s critique of Kant’s “standpoint of finitude” diagnoses why Kant is led to affirm both of these incompatible thoughts. The philosophical motivation behind the shape Hegel’s system takes comes to light through an examination of this diagnosis.

Antonini, David. The Conception of the Productive Imagination in the Critique of Pure Reason: Kant and Heidegger. Master’s thesis. Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, 2013. [70 p.] Advisor: Sara Beardsworth. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The primary objective of this thesis is to provide an account of productive imagination in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason using Heidegger’s interpretation in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. Kant’s account of productive imagination largely remains in the context of his own project to establish the conditions for the possibility of experience which can ground a theory of knowledge. Thus, Kant’s project can largely be read as a work of epistemology leaving an account of experience that is limited to knowledge of empirical objects. Therefore, in turning to Heidegger, I seek to provide an account of experience in the Critique that is not merely epistemic. Rather, in focusing on productive imagination in the Critique, as Heidegger has, one can obtain an account of experience that is revelatory of human finitude.
Therefore, the thesis proceeds as follows. First, I offer an introduction providing proper context for the project. In Chapter 1, I offer a reading of both the A and B deductions from Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason in order to establish the role and limits of productive imagination. Chapters 2 and 3 follow Heidegger through a large section of Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics in order to highlight the role of productive imagination and to move beyond the limits present in Kant’s account. Lastly, I offer a conclusion.

Archer, Crina. Time For Democracy: Continuity and Rupture in the Political Thought of Kant, Tocqueville, and Arendt. Ph.D. diss. Northwestern University, 2013. [258 p.] Advisor: Linda Zerilli. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Is it possible, or even desirable, to speak of a temporality appropriate to democratic politics? For more than two centuries, this question has been dominated by two lines of thought organized around competing and sharply opposed views of democracy. One side imagines democracy as a set of institutions and norms that order political time into a pattern of rational, continuous development. The other finds democracy in moments of revolutionary resistance that inaugurate a rupture with the political past. This project investigates the temporal dimension of democracy against the grain of the binary thinking that presses us to align ourselves with only one of these lines of thought, while casting the other as depoliticizing or anti-democratic. To theorize political time beyond the terms of this binary, I recover unfamiliar entanglements of rupture and continuity from the work of thinkers who are commonly read as allied with one side or the other of the continuity/rupture opposition.
Advocates and critics alike have viewed Immanuel Kant’s universal-progressive history and Alexis de Tocqueville’s inexorable “march” of equality as exemplary metanarratives of democratic continuity. However, I find investments in revolutionary rupture animating Kant’s theory of history’s uncertain telos and Tocqueville’s unorthodox figuration of providential history. On the other side of the binary, Hannah Arendt’s theory of free action as “new beginning” is commonly read as affirming revolutionary rupture as the proper time concept of democracy. I unsettle this view via a reading of the politics of legendary storytelling in Arendt’s theory and practice of historical judgment, which attends to the political need to relate moments of origination to their pasts and futures in order to forge new narratives of continuity.
These readings forge a path toward a conception of the temporal register as an arena of democratic theory and practice in which relative continuity and relative novelty are contingent, and related, political achievements. I contend that the production of these temporalities is crucial to the political task of rendering the conditions of collective life available to democratic actors as both given and available for change.

August, Karan. Building Beauty: Kantian aesthetics in a time of dark ecology. Ph.D. diss. Technische Universiteit Delft, 2013. [xii, xviii, 254 p.] Advisor: Arie Graafland. [M][online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the aftermath of a normalized Foucaultian world with an all encompassing web of power relations, one remaining hope is to cultivate nimbleness. Nimbleness is an embodied aesthetic sensitivity to the material presence. Cultivating nimbleness is a particular style of cultivation; it is to willfully gather together one’s self in the wake of a formative force far richer than the derivative web of living power relationships of human embeddness within a horizon of social, economical, political and historical subjectivating power relations; which are chronicled and labeled by Michel Foucault as the normalizing practices of power relations. In other words to have freedom, one must start by rejecting the categories and labels normally internalized in order to relearn to learn from the material presence. Such a style of cultivation is a means of resisting normalizing power relations which co-opt cultivating practices to engross their own dominance which has had the by-product of an impotence to negate the gross material injustices present. This normalizing style of cultivation is a prevalent, corrupted, semblance which denies the importance of beauty for that of efficiency, rejects non-human purposiveness, and limits its measure of ethics to short term economical pragmatism.
The thesis acknowledges that something is awry with the world and that giving care to beauty might help. The aim is to examine the aesthetic event as depicted by the philosopher Immanuel Kant and to apply this characterization to elective architectural spaces such that it may motivate individuals to cultivate their own nimbleness in relation to a formative force of nature. However given the revealed need for sensitivity to the particular material presence, the thesis can not be a rule book or catalog for beautiful design. Rather it is a rehabilitation for architects who are already heterospatially curious, with the desired outcome of architects cultivating their own nimbleness to reflectively judge as a ground up, multi-node, rhizomatic means of resistance to normalizing power practices as manifest in bad architecture.

Bachour, Omar. Kantian Ethics and the Formula of Humanity: Towards Virtues and Ends. Master’s Thesis. University of Ottawa, 2013. [# p.] Advisor: ??. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The aim of this work is to show that criticisms of Kantian ethics from the field of virtue ethics misfire because they rely on a widespread reading of Kant which centers on the Groundwork and the Formula of Universal Law as the key elements in his moral philosophy. This reading, I argue, is susceptible both to charges of “empty formalism” and moral “rigorism” as well as the complaint voiced by virtue ethicists that Kantian ethics lacks a full-blooded account of the virtues, along with the attendant desiderata of sociality, character and the emotions. In response, I defend the proposal that the Formula of Humanity and the Doctrine of Virtue in the Metaphysics of Morals represent the final form of Kant’s ethical thought. If this is accurate, a rich and novel ethical theory emerges, and many of the criticisms from the field of virtue ethics are subsequently disarmed.

Baghai, Farshid. The Epigenesis of Pure Reason: Systematicity in Kant’s Critical Philosophy. Ph.D. diss. University of Toronto, 2013. [346 p.] Advisor: Paul Franks. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant's critical philosophy explicitly aspires to be systematic. Whether it achieves this aspiration is another question. Comparing pure reason to "an organized body," Kant requires a critique of pure reason to be "entirely complete down to the least elements," and regards this completeness or systematicity as a matter of " all or nothing" (Prol 4:263). He even speaks of critique as "a system of the epigenesis of pure reason" (KrV B167), i.e., an organic whole or system of possible ends that pure reason generates and also organizes entirely out of itself. Nonetheless, the epigenetic model of systematicity, which underlies critical philosophy, remains buried in Kantfs corpus. Neither Kant nor any interpreter of critical philosophy makes clear why and how pure reason generates and organizes itself as a self-standing operating system or whole of possible ends. They also do not explicate what this epigenetic conception of systematicity entails for the functioning of theoretical reason, practical reason, and the power of judgement.
This dissertation investigates the question of the systematicity of pure reason in Kantfs critical philosophy, presenting an epigenetic interpretation of Critique of Pure Reason through the lens of the transcendental doctrine of method. It argues that, in its primary sense, a critique of pure reason is the methodological epigenesis . i.e., self-generation and self-organization – of pure reason as an organic system or embryonic whole of possible ends. The dissertation proceeds by discussing: 1) what motivates pure reason to generate itself as a system or whole of possible ends; 2) how pure reason generates itself as a whole of possible ends; 3) how pure reason structures this whole into organic parts; and 4) how pure reason's self-generation and self-organization make the table of judgements transcendentally systematic.
In contrast to prevalent readings of Kant, this methodological interpretation articulates the most basic – i.e., disciplinary – sense of critique, and accounts for the epigenetic systematicity of critical philosophy. In a broader philosophical sense, the account demonstrates how critique – or transcendental negativity – is the generative ground of all positivity. It suggests new ways to conceive the relation between Kantfs critical philosophy and post-Kantian philosophies in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. More specifically, this interpretation reveals that Kantfs critical philosophy is closer to German Idealism than usually thought, and yet very different when their common focus on systematicity is better understood.

Blazej, Adam. Second Nature in Kant’s Theory of Artistic Creativity. Master’s thesis. University of Wisconsin/Milwaukee, 2013. [46 p.] Advisor: William Bristow. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: One of the central claims of John McDowell’s Mind and World is that, in reconciling an apparent opposition between the normative and the natural, philosophers should look to a notion of second nature: the idea that nature includes a species of animals (namely, human beings) who, through their socialization, transform themselves into rational beings capable of thinking about and acting in the world in response to reasons. McDowell argues that Kant lacks a notion of second nature and thereby fails to overcome the relevant problem of reconciliation. My aim in this paper is to show that ( pace McDowell) Kant does possess and employ a notion of second nature in his theory of artistic creativity. More precisely, I try to show that Kant’s conception of genius as the expression of aesthetic ideas employs a notion of second nature that is similar to, albeit importantly distinct from, the one to which McDowell appeals.

Brewer, Cameron David. Kant, Hume, and the Notion of Material Substance. Ph.D. diss. University of Illinois at Chicago, 2013. [206 p.] Advisor: Sally Sedgwick. [PQ]

Bruno, G. Anthony. The Bounds of Life: The Role of Death in Schelling’s Internal Critique of German Idealism. Ph.D. diss. University of Toronto, 2013. [214 p.] Advisor: Paul Franks. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: What conditions the possibility of existentially valuable experience? Against nihilism, the threat that philosophical cognition undermines the very idea of purposiveness, German idealism posits that we are unconditionally conditioned by life, construed as the infinite purposive activity of reason. I reconstruct Schelling’s critique of this project as defending the idea that death conditions or puts into question our rational activity.
Scholars tend to read the idealists as rejecting Kant’s idea of an unknowable thing in itself by grounding philosophy on a knowable first principle and tend to situate Schelling as a phase between or a late attack on Fichte and Hegel. Part I gives a systematic account missing on the former, arguing that idealism is an instance of immortalism, which holds that life is the unconditioned condition of rational activity, while death is unconditionally conditioned. Part II gives a historical account missing on the latter, arguing that Schelling is an early and continual critic of idealism on behalf of mortalism, which holds that death unconditionally conditions rational activity. My first argument modifies typical readings of German idealism, revealing a deep connection between its rejection Kant’s idea and its refusal to let death put us into question. My second complicates typical readings of Schelling, casting his mortalism as rehabilitating the idea that something radically outstrips rational activity while representing a regulative ideal.
Although Schelling’s mortalism anticipates Heidegger’s, they differ: Schelling aligns death with the goal of systematic knowing, Heidegger with taking over one’s history as care. But Schelling overcomes immortalism, enabling Heidegger’s idea of death. Part III shows this idea is structurally analogous to Kant’s idea of the thing in itself. Immortalism’s failure leaves unsolved two antinomies I argue are formally identical and only solvable by thinking these ideas as boundary concepts the thought of which is necessary for the unity, respectively, of finite being and finite understanding. By reconstructing the role of death in Schelling’s internal critique of German idealism, then, my thesis also brings into closer contact Kant’s transcendental and Heidegger’s existential projects.

Choi, Yoon Hee. Kant's Theory of Self-Consciousness. Ph.D. diss. University of Cambridge, 2013. [# p.] Advisor: ??. [PQ]

Chou, Elaine. A Strategy for American Innovation: Applying Immanuel Kant’s Theory ofKknowledge to Tech Patent Law. M.A.L.S. thesis. Georgetown University, 2013. [104 p.] Advisor: John Reuscher. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: An investigation of Kant’s theory of aesthetic creativity to the mechanical principles of causal productivity allows for the redesigning of regulatory and legislative attitudes toward innovation. Part of the contemporary issues in tech patent law stem from misconceptions about epistemological basis for intellectual property. More precisely, different functions of the mind allow for creative innovation. The faculty of understanding leads to conceptual designs that in turn imply the structure and boundaries of property. The other issue entails treating conceptual designs as external tangible assets for which private controls may be claimed.
Reframing the broken patent law system in the spirit of Kant’s critical theories and value structure, Kant’s theory of knowledge identifies the root to proper intellectual property application, and the fundamental underpinnings to encourage innovation in a technological interactive design environment. The theoretical philosophy of Kant’s theory of knowledge provides a practical dimension to policy design and implementation. Thoroughly comprehending Kant’s concept of aesthetic creativity and his explanation of the mechanical principles for causal productivity provides universal epistemological solutions to contemporary tech patent issues.
Actively attempting to create property out of creative insight inherently causes confusions in the courts. Because aspects of the faculty of reason, involve an essence of “innate plasticity,” the aesthetic idea cannot be treated like property. Concepts, on the other hand, are externalizations - temporal constructs bound by space and time. Property rights may be reasonably claimed over forms bound by clarity and scope. In applying Kant’s theories of knowledge and metaphysics, we may rethink the role of intellectual property’s “business-method process” in relation to technological interactive design processes that best allows humans the ability to socially, intellectually, and economically flourish across borders.

Conarroe, Roger Graydon. In futuro: a sketch of the task of logic in Immanuel Kant and Charles Peirce. Master’s thesis. University of Virginia, 2013. [# p.] Advisor: ??. [PQ]

Daily, Micah. Pleasures, Principles and Lies an Ascension from Manners to Morals in the Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant. Ph.D. diss. The New School, 2013. [287 p.] Advisor: Jay M. Bernstein. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In my dissertation, I argue that while traditionally overlooked, Kant provides a substantive account of manners, social life and agreeable pleasures. I make a conjecture about what a formal account of manners might look like had Kant provided one, calling it the doctrine of etiquette. It contains the general rules for making judgments about agreeable pleasures in social life. In addition, I argue that Kant has an ascension theory from manners to morals that unites agreeable pleasure with moral principles. Relying on a close textual analysis of Kant's fully developed commentary on lies, I offer a solution to his seemingly contradictory claims. Reading Kant as a metaphysician interested in virtue, instead of merely a deontologist, I maintain that his philosophy must understood as organized by his architectonic science of philosophy, which is founded upon the notion that our everyday experience is one. Kant's distinction between manners in social life and morals in cultural life makes for a relevant and provocative study of etiquette, ultimately revealing that Kant's moral principles have a very real and practical place in our everyday experience.

Deimling, Wiebke. Kant’s Theory of Emotions. Ph.D. diss. University of Pennsylvania, 2013. [230 p.] Advisor: Paul Guyer. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Immanuel Kant’s philosophical framework poses question about his perspective on our emotional lives. What role do emotions play in Kant’s philosophy? How can emotions play a positive role in an account that is focused on pure (practical) reason? On Kant’s account, how should we respond to the emotions of ourselves and others? These questions are more easily answered once we answer a more fundamental question. Namely, what are emotions for Kant? This dissertation gives a reading of Kant’s theory of emotions and of affective states in general. I show that he has a philosophically and psychologically rich account. To lay out his theory this dissertation mainly draws on his anthropological works. The main results I reach can be summed up as follows:
1) This dissertation analyzes the different terms Kant uses for affective states and provides a taxonomy. This helps us understand what exactly Kant claims about our emotional responses in different contexts. 2) I argue that even though Kant does not use the term “emotion”, there is a concept implicit in his project of an anthropology “from a pragmatic point of view”. I show that this concept maps closely onto our contemporary concepts of emotions. What I call “Kant’s pragmatic concept of emotions” subsumes states that are especially important for us to consider when deciding how to act. 3) I show that a theory of emotions as we find it in Kant’s anthropology would take up an interesting place if we were to locate it among contemporary theories.

DeWitt, Janelle A. The Structure and Function of Emotion in Kant’s Moral Theory. Ph.D. diss. University of California, Los Angeles, 2013. [112 p.] Advisor: Barbara Herman. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The familiar terrain of Kant’s account of the mind involves a two-fold distinction: between the two major faculties of cognition and desire, and between the higher and lower sub-faculties of each. But Kant’s account of the mind contains a third major faculty that is missing from this picture — the faculty of feeling of pleasure and displeasure. Roughly, this is the faculty responsible for subjective sensation and feeling/emotion. However, at this point, a tension emerges. Just as the higher faculties of cognition and desire are identified with a function of reason, so, too, is the higher faculty of feeling. But if this is the case, does it mean that reason has or produces its own emotions? And if so, what could these emotions be like? Furthermore, wouldn’t they conflict with the dichotomy thought to exist in Kant between reason and emotion (due in part to the metaphysical constraints of his theory)? In my dissertation, I argue that Kant (implicitly) conceives of emotion in functional terms. That is, emotions are evaluative judgments that initiate action. These judgments can manifest themselves in a variety of forms, depending on the objects and principles involved. This turn to a functional conception thus gives Kant the flexibility to account for emotions across a wide spectrum, from the instinctual emotions of non-rational, embodied animals to the purely rational emotions of a non-embodied god. My dissertation first develops the basic functional structure of emotion implicit in Kant’s work (found especially in the Lectures on Metaphysics). It then shows the implications this cognitive structure has for understanding several central features of Kant’s practical theory, including the nature of animal versus human non-moral motivation, happiness, and finally, the moral feeling of respect.

Diosan, Alexandru Cristian. Imaginatia transcedentala în cadrul proiectului criticist kantian. Ph.D. diss. Universitatea "Babes-Bolyai", 2013. [188 p.] Advisor: Virgil Ciomos. [WC]

Drogalis, Christina. Kant's Change of Heart: Radical Evil and Moral Transformation. Ph.D. diss. Loyola University/Chicago, 2013. [194 p.] Advisor: Victoria Wike. [PQ] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (1793), Kant makes the claim that all humans are radically evil, both by nature and through a free choice. This radical evil, which is the state of having a Gesinnung (disposition) that commits oneself to prioritizing incentives of inclination above incentives of duty, throws into question whether humans can ever become morally good. For this reason, many commentators have dismissed the Religion as not cohesive with Kant’s corpus and do not consider it to play an important role in his ethical theory, in particular. Contrary to this traditionally-held interpretation, I show in my project that the Religion in fact helps to clarify and justify major components of Kant’s ethical theory, such as the question of the source of evil and how a person can freely choose evil. I then claim that there is another important way that the Religion further develops Kant’s ethics, insofar as it plays a transformative role in the development of his theory of moral improvement. I argue that the need to overcome radical evil introduces a new and distinct stage of moral development: the need to undergo a singular revolution of Gesinnung prior to the gradual improvement of the moral worth of our actions. In making this argument, I address many popular misunderstandings regarding the overcoming of radical evil, such as the idea that it is morally impossible for humans to achieve on their own and that it cannot occur in a sequence of events in time.

Falkenberg, Dana. Practical Reason, Character and Morality. Ph.D. diss. The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2013. [163 p.] Advisor: Thomas E. Hill. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this work, I investigate a class of cases which pose a challenge to Kant’s moral theory. These are cases of practical necessities in which agents judge not that they ought or ought not to act in a given manner, but that they must or can’t. It appears Kant would need to understand these cases either as ones in which agents feel compelled because they recognize they are morally required to act in a given way, or as cases in which agents are compelled in a way that removes their powers as agents. However, I argue neither of these ways of understanding such cases is appropriate. Instead these cases show the ways in which the deep commitments that constitute our characters can compel us to act without removing our powers as agents. Bernard Williams thought cases of practical necessities challenged the ways in which Kant thought moral requirements were unique, as well as Kant’s contention that it is always unconditionally rational and good for us to do as morality requires.
In responding to these challenges, I argue Kant did think that all practical necessities were moral necessities. But, Kant’s conception of moral requirements is different from Williams’. As a result, many cases of practical necessities can be understood as moral in Kant’s sense and so do not pose a problem for his theory. However, not all cases of practical necessities can plausibly be understood as moral even in Kant’s sense. It then seems that the deep commitments which give rise to practical necessities must be regarded by Kantians as merely discretionary, and therefore ones it is possible as well as unqualifiedly good and rational for us to give up when they conflict with what ordinarily would be morally required. I argue we should, and a Kantian can, deny this. In addition to moral necessities, these cases also reveal our autonomy as agents and so are entitled to a special form of respect.

Fang, Bo. Politischer Reformismus: ein philosophischer Entwurf Immanuel Kants. Ph.D. diss. Berlin, Freie Universität, 2013. [iii, 216 p.] Advisor: ??. [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Also published in 2014 (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann).

Fedorko, Joshua. Kant and Hegel on Things in Themselves: Critical and Exegetical Issues. Ph.D. diss. University of Sheffield, 2013. [205 p.] Advisor: Robert Stern and Christopher Hookway. [PQ] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This dissertation attempts to determine what Kant's notoriously obscure conception of things in themselves, which not only played a key role in Kant's transcendental philosophy but also proved to be a central focus for Hegel's critique of that philosophy, ultimately consists in and how it can best be understood. This suggests, I would argue, that the overall plausibility of both Kantian transcendental idealism as such, as well as Hegel's critique of Kantian transcendental idealism, turns on how the transcendental distinction between appearances and things in themselves (TD) can best be understood. It is therefore the principal aim of my dissertation to come to terms with this particularly obscure conception lying at the heart of Kant's philosophy, and to consider how it shapes Hegel's critique of Kant. To begin with, I identify four major ways of reading Kant's TD, which have all been endorsed by at least one major Kant scholar in recent years. Of these four readings, it will become clear that the methodological reading, espoused by the likes of Henry Allison, Graham Bird, and Robert Pippin, among others, is the only one that can be said to both fit the texts, and also remain systematically defensible on philosophical grounds. On the basis of the methodological reading, I then outline and assess Hegel's foremost objections to the Kantian notion of things in themselves to see if this particular aspect of the Hegelian critique is either just the result of a basic misunderstanding, on Hegel's part, of the Kantian conception of things in themselves, or perhaps an accurate representation of some inherently problematic issues Kant never fully resolved with his transcendental idealism. Ultimately, I will show that the methodological reading, in addition to being the only plausible reading of Kant's TD, is also the most promising when it comes to rebutting Hegel's critique of things in themselves in light of the fact that it prima facie averts some, but not all, of Hegel's criticisms.

Ferguson, Mark Smith. A Prolegomenon on Evil: “What Does It Mean to Be Evil?”. Master’s thesis. Oklahoma State University, 2013. [139 p.] Advisor: Lawrence Pasternack. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This thesis is an open-ended inquiry exploring the thought processes within evil actions as it relates to agent judgment and motivation. Largely theoretical in nature, the goal is to better understand the inner workings of evil agency. It is not the purpose of this thesis to ascertain or support a normative ethical theory of evil but rather investigate through metaethics, moral psychology, and ultimately Kantian ethical theory, how evil surfaces in action. That being said, the question which occupies this thesis is “What does it mean to be evil?” Everyone is familiar with the term “evil,” but the notion has many connotations in moral discourse. Chapter one establishes a working definition of evil by considering the ways in which people are generally motivated to act. Evil is conceptualized into two distinct categories: perverse and pure evil. This distinction incites considerable debate—especially the latter conceptualization. Whether purely evil motivations are possible or conceptually coherent will serve to dominate a large part of this chapter and the rest of this thesis. Chapter two supplies a metaethical context to evaluating evil motivations in agents—motivation internalism and externalism. These metaethical positions explore whether moral motivations are fundamentally inherent to one’s expressed judgments. In other words, is it possible that moral judgments can fail to motivate someone to act? This added dimension, though, only seems to heighten the controversy because pure evil involves principally choosing to do evil for itself. Motivation internalism seems at odds with certain motivational structures, especially the purely evil agent. By highlighting the conflict between internalism and externalism, the subtleties of agent motivation and judgment lead to a more nuanced account of evil. Chapter three introduces Immanuel Kant’s account of evil in Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason and how it may provide a possible solution to the troubles of motivation internalism. Kant’s three grades of evil and subsequent views on diabolism are susceptible to an interpretation that frames pure evil as a quasi-diabolism in which the moral law is motivationally inverted. This solution attempts to expand Kant’s account while preserving his fundamental a priori principles.

Filcheva, Krasimira Dimitrova. Kant’s Transcendental Schematism of the Understanding. Master’s thesis. The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2013. [66 p.] Advisor: Alan Nelson. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the Schematism chapter in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant introduces a key element in his analysis of experience — the transcendental schema that mediates the application of the categories to phenomenal objects. In this paper, I seek to develop an interpretation of the doctrine of the schematism with a view to solving three significant problems that arise for that part of the critical system. I show the systematic unity of Kant’s various descriptions of the nature of the transcendental schemata and their connection to the preceding deductions, thereby dispelling a possible charge of obscurity. I demonstrate how Kant’s doctrine can withstand criticism about the apparent lack of justification of his schemata. Finally, I argue that a close study of the original grounds on which Kant introduces the transcendental schematism can remove the threat of regress generated by the demand for homogeneity, which opens this chapter in the Critique.

Giannini, Heidi Chamberlin. Neo-Kantian Wickedness: Constructivist and Realist Responses to Moral Skepticism. Ph.D. diss. Baylor University, 2013. [151 p.] Advisor: Robert C. Roberts and Kyla S. Ebels Duggan. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Neo-Kantian constructivism aspires to respond to moral skepticism by compelling agents to act morally on pain of irrationality. According to Christine Korsgaard, a leading proponent of constructivism, we construct all reasons for action by following correct deliberative procedures. But if we follow these procedures we will find that we only have reasons to act in morally permissible ways. Thus, we can show the skeptic that he is rationally constrained to act morally. Unfortunately, as I argue in my first chapter, this strong response to moral skepticism renders deliberate immoral action unintelligible. This result is problematic since we often do interpret ourselves and others as deliberately choosing to do wrong. I further suggest that this problem follows from central commitments of Korsgaard’s constructivism, so that any adequate account of immoral action must abandon constructivist metaethics in favor of moral realism, a suggestion reinforced by the argument of my second chapter. There, I call attention to Kant’s solution to a similar problem in his own account of morality. I argue that Korsgaard’s constructivist commitments prevent her from embracing Kant’s solution. I proceed in my third chapter to argue that there is a further tension between Korsgaard’s response to moral skepticism and her work in non-ideal theory. In particular, Korsgaard maintains that, when confronted with injustice, the virtuous person may have reason to do what is wrong in the name of morality. She thus relies on the assumption that one can deliberately do wrong. I argue that this assumption undermines the response to skepticism that motivated Korsgaard’s constructivism in the first place. But despite the problems with constructivism, we may worry that moral realism fails to offer an adequate response to moral skepticism. Indeed, Korsgaard rejects realism in part because she believes that realists simply refuse to respond to moral skepticism. I thus conclude by arguing that moral realists can offer adequate responses to moral skepticism. In fact, I believe Korsgaard’s response is no more effective than those suggested by some moral realists.

Giladi, Paul. Hegel’s Critique and Development of Kant: The Passion of Reason. Ph.D. diss. University of Sheffield, 2013. [162 p.] Advisor: Bob Stern and Chris Hookway. [PQ] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This is a study of Hegel’s critique and development of Kant’s theoretical philosophy. The main purpose of this thesis is to do justice to both of these aspects of Hegel’s complex and notoriously difficult philosophical relationship with Kant. My aim in Part I is to present in a sympathetic light Hegel’s various objections and negative response to certain Kantian doctrines. My aim in Part II is to argue that Hegel’s positive relationship with Kant does not consist in accepting and merely carrying through Kant’s transcendental philosophy, but rather in him hoping to derive from Kant clues to a superior form of logic; an understanding of how to make transcendental claims; an account of conceptual form; and a conception of philosophical enquiry as involving self-transformation. Understood in this way, we can make better sense of Hegel’s critique of Kant and also his fundamental debt to him as well.

Gofton, B. Tyson. Analysis, Systematicity and the Transcendental in Hermann Cohen’s System of Critical Idealism. Ph.D. diss. University of Toronto, 2013. [338 p.] Advisor: ??. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The dissertation provides a systematic, critical analysis of Hermann Cohen’s System of Critical Idealism. The first chapter establishes Cohen’s reading of the a priori of Kant’s Transcendental Aesthetic as founding the possibility of intuition in mathematics, rather than the possibility of mathematics in intuition. The second chapter then investigates the problem of the unity of the transcendental object, or, more specifically, the conditions under which the intelligible predicates of the functions of judgment can be applied to an objective unity.
Chapters three and four compare the idealist responses of Salomon Maimon and G.W.F. Hegel to the problem of objective unity. Both Maimon and Hegel attempt to provide a logic (and a manifold of reality) grounded in the Spinozistic principle of determinability. Ultimately, this leads to the conflation of the totality of intuition with the domain of the intelligible thereby reducing Kant’s infinite judgment to a positive assertion. Cohen, however, rejects this solution, and insists that the manifold of reality (or the real continuum of calculus) is the product of continuous thinking. Cohen’s principle of production implies an indeterminably determinable manifold, thus providing the intelligible foundations for the eventual set-theoretic foundation of arithmetic and analysis.
The final chapter of the dissertation investigates the consequences of Cohen’s innovation for the prospects of systematic idealism as a framework within which normative, theoretical and aesthetic claims may be raised and justified. Since logic does not determine a priori the structure of the intelligible whole, Cohen cannot assume a convergence between natural and ethical representations. The free production of laws, Cohen argues, is the practice of jurisprudence, or, the construction and reconstruction of assertoric statements (universal claims) with the aim of limiting contradictions. If, in the natural sciences, we call this aim truth, in ethics, we call it the good, guided by the idea of the end of humanity.

Harrison, Rebecca D. The Failure of Desire: A Critique of Kantian Cognitive Autonomy in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. Master’s thesis. Georgia State University, 2013. [vi, 61 p.] Advisor: Sebastian Rand. [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the Critique of Pure Reason, Immanuel Kant offers a revolutionary approach to cognition, wherein cognition can be understood as an action carried out by a cognitive agent. But giving the subject such an active role raises questions about Kant’s ability to account for objective cognition. In this paper, I will argue that the cognitive autonomy thesis central to Kant’s model renders it unable to account for the normativity required for objective cognition, and that G.W.F. Hegel makes just this criticism in the Desire section of his Phenomenology of Spirit. Hegel proposes an alternative: some basic intersubjective structure must be built into cognition on a fundamental level. For Hegel, the possibility of disagreement is an a priori requirement for objective cognition in general.

Hewitt, Howard Harris, II. Kantian Constructivism and Practical Authority. Ph.D. diss. University of Nebraska, 2013. [97 p.] Advisor: Mark van Roojen. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The aim of this dissertation is to examine two theses and assess the attempt to combine them into a unique metanoramtive account of practical reasons. The first, constitutivism, is the thesis that there are norms written into the exercise of practical agency such that a commitment to these norms on the part of any practical agent is entailed by the fact that one is such an agent. Many have thought that such commitments a way to establish the authority of first order normative principles, and provide a compelling answer to normative skepticism. I will show that constitutivist claims, even if true, have limited normative significance in that those commitments would only condition what considerations can count as reasons for action. The constitutive commitments themselves do not provide those reasons. And so the constitutive commitments of agency alone cannot hope to answer the normative skeptic.
The second thesis, constructivism, holds that normative facts are constituted by the output of a deliberative procedure. Constructivists claim that an agent's reasons for action are not facts he discovers by employing the procedure, but instead they are facts that are created by following the procedure. Christine Korsgaard and Sharon Street have put forward constructivist accounts of practical reasons in their recent work, which characterize the deliberative procedure, the outcome of which determines the normative facts, in terms of the constitutivist features of action, or agency. Street and Korsgaard claim that their constructivism is a metanormative theory that allows us to avoid the metaphysical postulates of realism, and allows us to maintain that our normative judgments can be true or false, thereby avoiding non-cognitivist accounts of normative judgment. Using these two philosophers as my foil, I assess the prospects for combining the constitutivist claims mentioned above and constructivism in a metanormative account of practical reasons, and conclude that constructivism, if it is to be a metanormative theory, must be interpreted as natural reduction of normative facts to the psychological facts of agents in ideal epistemic conditions. This view is cognitivist and non-realist, but not a view distinct from other natural reductions of the same sort.

Ivanova, Velia. Twelve-Tone Identity: Adorno Reading Schoenberg through Kant. Master’s thesis (Musicology). University of Ottawa, 2013. [v, 110 p.] Advisor: Murray Dineen. [M]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Theodor Adorno's view of Arnold Schoenberg can be seen in light of his criticism of Immanuel Kant. Critiquing Kant's concept of Enlightenment and his dualist philosophy, Adorno also critiques common misconceptions about Kant's work in bourgeois society. Similarly, in Schoenberg's oeuvre Adorno finds radical musical creation but also a reversion to formulaic composition in its reception by Richard Hill among others. In both Kant and Schoenberg, Adorno identifies a tripartite movement: (1) A radical work (philosophical or musical) is created by a member of bourgeois society. (2) The work adopts the function of a societal critique. (3) However, bourgeois society is incapable of understanding the work as critique and erases its radical nature. Seen in light of Adorno's thought, the thesis explores the transactional nature of idea production and reception in society.

James, Seferin. The Closure of the Opening: Derrrida and the idea in the Kantian sense. Ph.D. diss. University College Dublin, 2013. [x, 341 p.] Advisor: ??. [WC]

Janssen, Brian David. Kant’s Natural Law. Master’s thesis. Iowa State University, 2013. [67 p.] Advisor: Alex Tuckness. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant’s philosophy can be interpreted being either minimalist or welfarist. Kant’s political philosophy can be connected to his moral philosophy in a way that highlights natural law themes in his writing. This provides evidence for the minimalist interpretation.

Kaldewaij, Frederike Emma. The Animal in Morality: justifying duties to animals in Kantian moral philosophy. Ph.D. diss. Uni-Utrecht, 2013. [316 p.] Advisor: ??. [PQ]

Kazarinov-Hawk, Christopher Daniel. Constructivism and the Question of Objectivity: Fichte’s Ethics as Critique of Kant’s. Ph.D. diss. University of London, King's College, 2013. [89 p.] Advisor: John Callanan, Andrea Sangiovanni, and John Milton. [PQ] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Central to Kant’s moral philosophy are the notions of autonomy and spontaneity, and their relation to reason and the understanding. Recent ‘constructivist’ readings of Kant’s ethics thus emphasise the role of the subject’s reflection in moral actions - reason is the only guarantor of the moral, and the right action must be worked out by the subject and consciously assented to. In contrast, for Fichte the moral is simply self-evident and immediately known to the subject. If Kant views the moral as requiring reflection and Fichte views the moral as immediate certainty, then it seems at first glance that the two are at loggerheads. Yet Fichte regarded himself as completing Kant’s Critical project by simply following through Kant’s thought to its fullest conclusions. Rather than dismissing Fichte’s claim to complete Kant’s philosophy, I suggest that paying close attention to Kant’s ethics reveals him to be closer to Fichte than is often recognized.

Kelsey, Matthew Allen. The Mother of Chaos and Night: Kant’s Metaphilosophical Attack on Indifferentism. Ph.D. diss. Loyola University/Chicago, 2013. [719 p.] Advisor: Andrew Cutrofello. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant positions the Critical philosophy as a response to the crisis of metaphysics - a crisis that is still with us. But his diagnosis of that crisis in terms of a struggle between dogmatism, skepticism, and indifferentism is given short shrift in the secondary literature, despite its promise to help us understand Kant’s claim that transcendental philosophy represents a radical alternative to these philosophical modi vivendi. After a consideration of Kant’s remarks on what philosophy is in general, I argue that all four of these mutually-exclusive ways of philosophizing are best understood as metaphilosophical stances: ways of conceiving of the ends or aims of philosophy, which collectively determine the legitimate moves in philosophical argumentation, thereby setting the terms of success for such inquiry.
I then make these four competing stances explicit, by drawing on Kant’s scattered remarks on them and their history. This involves articulating and defending Kant’s complex and surprisingly sophisticated relationship to dogmatism and skepticism, and hence a general assessment of Kant’s attempts to incorporate these stances’ insights, and so subvert their appeal, in the course of developing his transcendental philosophy. Readings of Kant which myopically take him to be focused on bluntly refuting the dogmatist (e.g., Allison), or the skeptic (e.g., Guyer), fall into characteristic errors as a result. Even more importantly, I show that Kant’s central target is in fact the much-neglected indifferentist, whose metaphilosophical stance is defined by a denial of the distinctness and autonomy of philosophy, in a way antithetical to Kant’s attempt to ground his philosophical activity on the fact of human agency. Indifferentism has numerous adherents, though naturally not under that name, both in Kant’s day (e.g., the so-called Popularphilosophen) and in our own (e.g., the Wittgenstein of On Certainty). Reading Kant against these thinkers sharply clarifies his aims and methods in the Critical philosophy, in a way that the predominant anti-dogmatic and anti-skeptical readings fail to do.
Kant’s assault on indifferentism centrally employs a set of arguments designed to put us in a position to rationally endorse our high-order normative principles without risk of (indifferentistically) ascribing that endorsement either to passive uptake from the wider culture, or to the oracular dictates of “common sense.” Thus, it is only by means of Kant’s distinctive “transcendental proofs” that can we invoke the authority of reason in philosophy without making one of two fatal errors: making reason utterly transcendent, which produces skepticism; or casting reason as wholly immanent, which yields dogmatism. Taken together, Kant’s metaphilosophical views promise a revitalization of transcendental philosophy for our contemporary age.

Kirkby, David James. On Judgement: Psychological Genesis, Intentionality and Grammar. Ph.D. diss. University of Durham, 2013. [216 p.] Advisor: Wolfram Hinzen. [PQ] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This thesis explores conceptions of judgement which have been central to various philosophical and scientific traditions. Beginning with Hume, I situate his conception of judgement within his overarching constructivist program, his science of man. Defending Hume from criticism regarding the naturalistic credentials of this program, I argue that Hume’s science of man, along with the conception of judgement which is integral to it, is appropriately understood as a forerunner to contemporary cognitive science. Despite this, I contend that Hume’s conception of judgement prompts a problem regarding the intentionality of judgement – a problem which he does not adequately address. In the second part of my thesis I show how the intentionality problem which Hume grapples with is also crucial, constituting a point of departure, for Kant’s transcendental undertaking. Following Kant’s reasoning, I illustrate how an original concern with this intentionality issue leads Kant to a distinct conception of judgement, according to which concepts only exist in the context of a judgement. Having arrived at Kant’s conception of a judgement, the remainder of the thesis is devoted to the issue of judgement forms. Kant’s postulation of these forms is closely related to his conception of judgement, and I seek to establish both how these forms ought to be understood and how they might be derived. In relation to this latter issue, I suggest that there may a role for contemporary work in Generative Grammar. Specifically, I suggest that it may be viable to understand the forms of judgement as grammatical in nature, thereby securing an interdisciplinary connection between a philosophy of judgement and the empirical investigation of grammar.

Komasinski, Andrew James. Moral Selfhood from Kant to Kierkegaard. Ph.D. diss. Fordham University, 2013. [250 p.] Advisor: Merold Westphal. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this dissertation, I look at the accounts of moral knowledge and moral selfhood in Kant, Confucius, Levinas, and Kierkegaard. By moral knowledge, I mean that which tells a moral self what would be right or wrong. By the moral self, I mean a self with moral knowledge, sufficient freedom to act on this knowledge, and who could be held responsible for these actions. From these considerations, I maintain that moral knowledge must include a relational component and then consider three different ways of accomplishing this.
In the first chapter, I present a “front-to-back” reading of Kant’s account of the moral self where G and CPR frame the account and Kant’s moral self is a self that has a free will, possesses reason (by which I mean formal absolute, universal a priori reason), and can determine the right action through the use of this reason. In the second chapter, I apply a Hegelian critique to this account arguing that Kant’s “abstract” account fails insofar as it lacks relational dimensions of moral knowledge that are necessary for human moral selves.
I then turn to the relational accounts of moral knowledge in Confucius, Levinas, and Kierkegaard. In each case, I explain how they see the self and his moral knowledge as relational, then look at what they mean by common moral ideas such as the “Golden Rule” and “love your neighbor” and, finally, how each view handles moral conflict. In my view, each account has a weakness. The limit of the Confucian account of moral knowledge is its limited resources to move past its strong cultural dependency. The difficulty I see for Levinas’s account is the question of how to integrate his account of “responsibility” as the origin of moral knowledge with an account of justice without losing the pure nature of “responsibility” received in inverted intentionality. The largest limit of Kierkegaard’s account of the moral self is the centrality of the God-relation and the questions that follow from this about voluntarism in God’s commands and whether this makes the self non-relational towards her neighbors

Kump, Ziga. "Hegel skozi Kanta": Heglova recepcija Kantove filozofije v zgodnjih jenskih spisih. [Slovenian; "Kant through Hegel": Hegel's reception of Kant's philosophy in the early Jena writings] Ph.D. diss. University of Ljubljana, 2013. [85 p.] Advisor: Zdravko Kobe. [WC]

Lincoln, James William. Kant, Infinity and His First Antinomy. Master’s Thesis. Boston University, 2013. [35 p.] Advisor: Manfred Kuehn and Judson C. Webb. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant's antinomies are exercises designed to illustrate the limits of human reasoning. He skillfully juxtaposes pairs of arguments and exposes the dangerous propensity for human reasoning to stretch beyond the conditioned and into the transcendental ideas of the unconditional. Kant believes this is a natural process and affirms the limits of pure reason in so much as they should prevent us from believing that we can truly know anything about the unconditional. His first antimony addresses the possibility of a beginning in time or no beginning in time. This thesis will focus on this first antinomy and critically assesses it in set theoretic terms. It is this author's belief that the mathematical nuances of infinite sets and the understanding of mathematical objects bear relevance to the proper interpretation of this antinomy. Ultimately, this composition will illustrate that Kant's argument in the first antinomy is flawed because it fails to account for infinite bounded sets and a conceptualization of the infinite as a mathematical object of reason.

Lithgow, Michael Andrew. Beautiful & Ambiguous News: An Aesthetic Approach to the Limits of Discursive “Truth”. Ph.D. diss. Carleton University (Canada), 2013. [244 p.] Advisor: ??. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: ‘Speaking truth to power’ remains a hallmark of quality journalism reflecting two important elements of news discourse: an unshaken belief in the indexical relationship between news-truth and the world; and a desire to limit the influence of domination when putting forward these descriptions. But a genealogical critique of knowledge vis-à-vis Michel Foucault suggests that “truth” and knowledge are discursive outcomes whose circulation depends on the extent to which they reflect conditions of power. This dissertation makes the claim that journalism is engaged in the production of discursive (rather than indexical) “truth”, and that news techniques obscure the epistemic enigma inherent in the production of discursive meanings through aesthetic strategies; that is, through categories of experience that encompass the non-rational and affective dimensions of cultural communication.
Through a reinterpretation of Immanuel Kant’s four moments of beauty in The Critique of Judgment, I propose a four-part framework for understanding the role of aesthetic experience in the production of discursive legitimacy. My study focuses on four examples of cultural production, the authors of which who engage aesthetic tactics to both challenge legitimacies of power and to assert alternatives within larger structures of public understanding. In each case (including a radical citizen’s journalism project, a public art initiative, a sculpture/installation exhibited in a public art gallery and an experimental community), authors/creators asserted their own subjective integrities within competing structures of legitimacy (including hegemonic legitimacies) and identifiable through their expected audiences. Aesthetic experience was used tactically to challenge dominant structures of legitimacy - their legibilities, the credibility of conditions giving rise to their instigation, and their appropriateness - in ways that resisted outright condemnation as false or folly. These tactics suggest possibilities for new aesthetic practices within formal discourses of public knowledge such as journalism and possible techniques for culturally challenging conditions of power.

Lundestad, Øystein. The Realm of Right: on the development and final formulation of Kant’s legal philisophy. Ph.D. diss. Norges teknisk-naturvitenskapelige universitet/Trondheim, 2013. [435 p.] Advisor: ??. [WC]

MacKenzie, Jordan. Self-Knowledge in Kant’s Practical Philosophy. Master’s thesis. University, 2013. [53 p.] Advisor: Thomas E. Hill. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the Doctrine of Virtue, Kant claims that the first command of all self-regarding duties is “know thyself”. This duty seems to be expressly aimed at combatting our strong propensity towards self-deception. Given this, and given the fact that we have a duty to pursue our moral perfection (MM 6:444-6), the duty of self-knowledge seems to be an intuitive command. And yet, a broader view of Kant’s ethical corpus exposes a deep skepticism about the possibility of morally-relevant self-knowledge. In this thesis, I argue that the duty to know ourselves is consistent with Kant’s skepticism about practical self-knowledge. On my account, the duty to “know thyself” is aimed at getting us to understand ourselves as rational agents to whom the moral law applies categorically. Only when we arrive at the proper conception of our ‘moral selves’ can we understand the deep problem of self-deception and the demandingness of our self-regarding duties.

Maldonado, Dylan. The Universal Law of Nature Formulation of the Categorical Imperative. Master’s thesis. University of Arizona, 2013. [27 p.] Advisor: A. Houston Smit. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant gives several formulations of the categorical imperative, one being the universal law of nature formulation. One question that can be raised is why Kant formulates the categorical imperative in terms of universal laws of nature at all. In this paper, I will argue that it is necessary for Kant to formulate the categorical imperative in terms of universal laws of nature in order to demonstrate the applicability of the moral law to our maxims and hence the possibility of the moral law as a functional practical principle.

Matherne, Samantha Marie. Art in Perception: Making Perception Aesthetic Again. Ph.D. diss. University of California/Riverside, 2013. [221 p.] Advisor: Pierre Keller. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Although separated by a century and a half, the relationship between Immanuel Kant and Maurice Merleau-Ponty has more recently come into sharper focus. It is now common to read Kant and Merleau-Ponty as offering two competing characterizations of perceptual experience. In the present work, however, I argue that pitting Kant against Merleau-Ponty in this way leads us to overlook the important and philosophically illuminating continuity between their views of perception. In particular, I show that Kant and Merleau-Ponty share a key commitment: both regard aesthetic experience, including both the production and appreciation of a work of art, as an invaluable resource for understanding the nature of perceptual experience more generally. It is, in particular, reflection on the role of what Kant calls the ‘productive imagination‘ and its creative and projective activities that both philosophers think sheds light on our more mundane perceptions. This work is, in part, an effort to clarify the development of this aesthetically inflected theory of perception from Kant’s philosophy, through Neo-Kantians like Ernst Cassirer and Pierre Lachièze-Rey, and into Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology. However, once we expose the development of this line of thought between Kant and Merleau-Ponty, we shall find we have reason to revise the standard interpretation of the relationship between these two figures. As I argue in the first part of this work, rather than thinking of Kant as an anti-phenomenological ‘intellectualist’, we find he is, as Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty took him to be, a forefather of the phenomenological movement of the 20 th century. So too, as I argue in the second part of this work, instead of reading Merleau-Ponty as anti-Kantian, we should recognize that he self-consciously appropriated aspects of Kant’s philosophy of perception and is, to this extent, a Neo-Kantian. Ultimately, what this revised understanding of Kant’s and Merleau-Ponty’s theories of perception offers us is a unified, subtle, and promising theory of perceptual experience that places the productive imagination and aesthetic experience at its very heart.

McAndrew, Matthew. Kant’s Theory of Judgment: The Concept of Judgment in Kant’s Logic and Metaphysics. Ph.D. diss. Emory University, 2013. [324 p.] Advisor: Rudolf A. Makkreel. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This dissertation traces the development of Kant’s conception of judgment, starting with the logic of German rationalism, or Schulphilosophie, and concluding with his third Critique. I begin by summarizing the theory of judgment that was widely accepted by German Schulphilosophie. I focus primarily on the work of two figures: Christian Wolff and Georg Friedrich Meier. These philosophers initially informed Kant’s views about logic and judgment. I argue that Kant adopts a new theory of judgment in the Critique of Pure Reason. It differs from his earlier views, as well as those of his predecessors, in two important respects. First, Kant broadens his definition of judgment, and second, he begins to describe judgments in a new way. He characterizes them as a cognitive relationship between a concept and an object, as opposed to a merely logical relationship between concepts. I examine this new theory of judgment and its role in Kant’s critical philosophy. I address Kant’s published works, as well as his Nachlass and Vorlesungen, i.e. Kant’s notes and notes taken by students in his lectures. I show that Kant’s Nachlass actually contains two competing accounts of judgment, a distinction that has previously gone unrecognized by scholars. Only one of these two accounts is compatible with Kant’s distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments. I also attempt to solve some of the questions and interpretative problems that are raised by Kant’s new theory of judgment. For example, I explain the difference between two key expressions, Vermögen zu urtheilen and Urtheilskraft, or the “capacity to judge” and the “power of judgment.” I also explain the possibility of subjective judgments. Kant appears to rule out such judgments in the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason when he asserts that all judgments, by definition, are objectively valid, i.e. representative of objects. In both cases, I answer these questions by drawing a distinction between two senses of judgment: a judgment regarded as a thought or representation and a judgment regarded as an act.

Mohrmann, Judith. Affekt und Revolution: Politisches Handeln nach Arendt und Kant. Ph.D. diss. University?, 2013. [230 p.] Advisor: ??. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract:
Published: (Frankfurt: Campus-Verlag, 2013).

Nance, Zach. An Evaluation of Plantinga’s Critique of Kant’s Metaphysic: an exercise in apriorism. Master’s thesis. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 2013. [viii, 108 p.] Advisor: ??. [WC]

Newhouse, Marie E. Kant’s Typo, and the Limits of the Law. Ph.D. diss. Harvard University, 2013. [143 p.] Advisor: Arthur Applbaum. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This dissertation develops a Kantian philosophical framework for understanding our individual obligations under public law. Because we have a right to do anything that is not wrong, the best interpretation of Immanuel Kant’s Universal Principle of Right tracks the two ways—material and formal—in which actions can be wrong. This interpretation yields surprising insights, most notably a novel formulation of Kant’s standard for formal wrongdoing. Because the wrong-making property of a formally wrong action does not depend on whether or not the action in question has been prohibited by statute, Kant’s legal philosophy is consistent with a natural law theory of public crime. Moreover, because the law can obligate us only by establishing a universal external incentive to obey its commands, statutes that impose only fines on nominal violators do not constrain our lawful options. Instead, if they are otherwise just, such statutes must be regarded as rightful permissive laws, according to which we may incur liabilities through our voluntary choices.

Olson, Michael J. Kant’s Transcendental and Metaphysical Idealism. Ph.D. diss. Villanova University, 2013. [271 p.] Advisor: Julie R. Klein. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this dissertation, I argue that the now-common understanding of Kant’s transcendental idealism, which holds that Kant displaces metaphysics with the more sober work of epistemology, overlooks the implicit metaphysical underpinnings of Kant’s supposedly metaphysically-neutral epistemology. By reading Kant alongside the writings of Wolff and the Wolffian school, the continuity between transcendental idealism and rationalist metaphysics emerges. The proximity of Kant’s position to those of his rationalist predecessors, I argue, undermines interpretations of the former that take transcendental idealism to be merely a propaedeutic to metaphysical investigations. More specifically, I show that Kant’s transcendental idealism maintains two principles central to the idealist tradition: (1) a metaphysical exceptionalism that identifies transcendental subjectivity as the ground of a distinct form of activity found nowhere outside of the thinking subject, and (2) an opposition between the ahistorical nature of logical form and the pure concepts of the understanding and the historical objects of whose intelligibility they condition. These two principles are necessary features of Kant’s transcendental analysis of the conditions and limits of knowledge, and exhibit a metaphysical idealism implicit in Kant’s transcendental idealism.

Panjwani, Imranali. Exploring the role of the self in the Islamic-Western human rights discourse: a comparative examination of foundational texts of key scholars from the Shi'i-Muslim and Western philosophical tradition - 'Ali b. Abi Talib, Zayn al-'Abidin, Søren Kierkegaard and Immanuel Kant.. Ph.D. diss. King’s College London (Theology and Religious Studies), 2013. [247 p.] Advisor: Carool Kersten and Clemens Sedmak. [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The goal of my thesis is to explore the role of the self in the current Islamic-Western discourse on human rights. This discourse is about whether the Islamic and Western worldviews on human rights are compatible with each other. It is my contention that the dominant voices in this discourse that aim to reform Islamic human rights or find ways for it to engage with Western human rights are primarily legal. I aim to shift the discourse and consider the way in which the concept of the self can play a role in informing this discourse but more importantly, offer a potential framework by which human rights are understood and implemented. Here, the self becomes a unifying concept for both worldviews and offers a different line of enquiry for the discourse.
I aim to do this by basing my thesis on keys works of four scholars from the Shī‘ī-Muslim and Western philosophical tradition. These are Nahj al-Balāgha (Peak of Eloquence), which contains the sermons, letters and sayings of the first Shī‘ī Imām and cousin and son-in-law of Prophet Muḥammad, ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib; Risālat al-Ḥuqūq (Treatise of Rights) by Zayn al-‘Ābidīn, the fourth Shī‘ī Imām and great grandson of Prophet Muḥammad; Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses by the Danish philosopher, Søren Kierkegaard and finally, The Metaphysics of Morals by the German philosopher, Immanuel Kant. By engaging in a comparative analysis of these texts, I aim to construct a role for the self that is appropriate for the human rights discourse and introduce a framework to access it. I argue that human beings from whatever religious background they originate need a way to understand their identity, personhood and the rights they claim for. This is particularly important today where human rights are not merely legal and political entities but show the endless empowerment of human beings to demand whichever right they wish for. This is dangerous as there is a lack of enforcement machinery on curtailing this empowerment which can lead to pursuing base desires through rights as well as causing harm to others. Thus, this thesis aims to carve out a practical framework for the self that can be sieved through human rights in order to help solve human rights conflicts, break the oppositional discourse between ‘Islām’ and the ‘West’ as well as bring the intellectual traditions of Shī‘ī-Muslim and Western philosophy closer together.

Parekh, Mihir Surya. The Cosmopolitics of Race, Gender, and Indigeneity in Kant. Ph.D. diss. University of California/Santa Cruz, 2013. [283 p.] Advisor: Angela Y. Davis and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant’s notion of cosmopolitanism is influential to a range of topical issues, from multiculturalism and human rights to globalization and an ethical society. Cosmopolitanism promises a conception of the rational subject not constrained by commitments to the nation or the self. The universality of this conception has been challenged by feminist and critical race philosophers. The Cosmopolitics of Race, Gender, and Indigeneity in Kant offers a new approach towards investigating these promises and limits. By examining the deep background of the production of the rational subject, it argues that there is a political-epistemological paradox at the heart of Kant’s notion of cosmopolitanism. An impasse is generated between the pure, practical reason that motivates Kant’s critical philosophy and the empirical framing of historical reason at play in accounts of political autonomy and cosmopolitan subjectivity. I claim that this paradoxical dimension of Kant’s cosmopolitanism has not been sufficiently interrogated.
The central argument of my project is that Kant treats this paradox through a complex movement of identity and difference between the concepts of the human and humanity. I demonstrate that exclusions of race, gender, and indigeneity are needed by Kant to establish this movement as coherent. Drawing on recent scholarship that combines philosophical analysis with a historical and literary approach, the dissertation’s arc makes this argument across a series of discourses. Chapter 1 revisits the relationship of Kant’s concept of race to his moral philosophy by placing Kant’s notion of cosmopolitan destiny alongside an original moment in the 18 th century invention of the concept of race. Chapters 2 and 3 argue the centrality of gender to ideas of cosmopolitan subjectivity by examining Kant’s account of political autonomy alongside his participation in a discourse of gender in German civil society. Chapter 4 demonstrates the significance of indigeneity to Kant’s cosmopolitan vision by exploring his use of source material from an influential polemic on indigeneity in the New World. This project concludes that discourses of race, gender, and indigeneity qualify inclusion in the constituency of a future cosmopolitan society and form the horizon upon which the impasse between epistemology and politics is elaborated.

Peine, Daniela. Moralische Motivation bei Kant. Eine philosophisch-psychologische Studie. Ph.D. diss. Aachen Technische Hochschule, 2013. [xiv, 251 p.] Advisor: ??. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Note: Also published that year (Marburg: Tectum-Verlag).

Pickering, Mark. A Phenomenalist Interpretation of the “Critique of Pure Reason”. Ph.D. diss. Boston University, 2013. [228 p.] Advisor: Manfred Kuehn. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: I argue that Kant’s transcendental idealism is best understood as a form of phenomenalism. I understand ‘phenomenalism’ to be the thesis that “objects are nothing but actual or possible perceptions.” In Kant’s terms, an empirical object is what a set of all of the actual and possible judgments of experience that refer to its particular empirical object have in common. Judgments of experience are the application of concepts to sensation passively received, making empirical objects mind-dependent but intersubjective.
I argue for this view by showing first that Kant holds knowledge of things in themselves is impossible. All putative references to them in the text presuppose assumptions that we are not justified in making. Our reason necessarily requires us to make these assumptions and hence ascribe existence to things in themselves, but these assumptions are unwarranted.
Therefore, there can be no real basis in Kant’s texts for saying that things in themselves constitute a world of their own that affects the world of appearances (the Two-World View), that they are sets of unknowable properties of empirical objects (the ontological One-World View), or that they are aspects of empirical objects regarded apart from sensible intuition (the epistemological One-World View). Rather, only agnosticism about things in themselves is appropriate.
Kant defines an ‘actual’ or ‘real’ thing as a thing either being given in experience or as being entailed by a given experience in conjunction with empirical laws. According to Kant, ‘possible experience’ has both formal (transcendental) and material (empirical) constraints. Any experience must accord with the formal conditions in order to count as experience in the first place, but any experience according with the material conditions, even if it never occurs, must be regarded as equally real as those that do.
If my argument succeeds, then the Critique does not appeal to unknowable things to make sense of the world. Rather, it restricts our knowledge to the very class of objects that are within the bounds of possible experience, and it renders them completely transparent and accessible to the human mind.

Polla, Cauê Cardoson. O ABC do cosmopolitismo: Kant e a educação. [Portuguese; The abc of cosmpolitanism: Kant and education] Ph.D. diss. Universidade de São Paulo, 2013. [220 p.] Advisor: Ricardo Ribeiro Terra. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Our study aims at carrying out an investigation of the Kantian idea of a cosmopolitan education. Contextualizing Kants proposal of a cosmopolitan education within the broader scenario of the Enlightenment movement, we try to differentiate Kant’s education for its cosmopolitan trait. Firstly, we draw a short panorama of the Enlightenment and its relation with education, based on the concept of climate of opinion. Then, by contrasting Rousseau and Kant, we try to show their diverging proposals of education, based on a distinction current and the history of education between a private and a public education. By showing Kant’s support of a public education, we try to indicate that this very bias is a way of demanding a cosmopolitan education. In a third moment, we sketch Kant’s conception of education, then analyzing its relation with his philosophy of history. As a conclusion, we will try to summarize Kants cosmopolitanisms in order to debate Kant’s cosmopolitan education as a necessity.

Psilojannopoulos, Anastassios. Von Thomasius zu Tetens: eine Untersuchung der philosophiegeschichtlichen Voraussetzungen der theoretischen Philosophie Kants in repräsentativen Texten der Deutschen Aufklärung. Ph.D. diss. Berlin, Humboldt-Universität, 2013. [541 p.] Advisor: ??. [WC]

Renton, Paul. Synthesis and harmony: a study of Kant’s theory of sensible experience in the Critique of Pure Reason. Ph.D. diss. University of Aberdeen, 2013. [146 p.] Advisor: Beth Lord. [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this thesis I argue that Kant's model of cognition is best considered as a modified version of Locke's representationalism. My argument presents a balanced approach to reading Kant, which acknowledges that in practice the systematic nature in which we represent the world is the result of a combination of internal and external factors. The possibility of cognition rests, not only on the nature of the cognitive faculties and our capacity to represent in general, but also upon the nature of the metaphysical world and its relation to sensibility. As I present Kant, the possibility of representing a world is dependent upon our general capacity to combine, the suitability of the given content of the manifold in sensibility to combination of this kind, and the nature of the metaphysical world that determines the content of the manifold. Initially I draw the parallel between Locke and Kant on the suggestion of Kant himself in the Prolegomena. Much of what Locke says is easily found in Kant, except for claim that ideas are reducible to their causes or that ideas are isomorphic to the things that produce the ideas in us. I think we can find isomorphism in Kant and I present a reading of his main doctrines that is, not only consistent with an isomorphic relation between representation and the metaphysical world, but the most appropriate reading given the general task he sets for the Critique.

Roberts, Debbie Lee. A Kantian Defense of Regulatory Law and Penalty: Consumer Protection in the Canadian Automotive Industry. Ph.D. diss. York University, 2013. [344 p.] Advisor: ??. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This dissertation asks "How can we justify and set reasonable limits to the government regulation of consumer contracts for goods and services?" Compared to the vast amount of literature on morally defending criminal law and punishment, there is relatively little approaching morally defending regulatory legislation and penalty. However, it will be maintained in this thesis that a) there is no morally significant reason for demarcating between criminal laws and punishment, and regulatory legislation and penalty, b) that similar moral qualification and limits must be applied to the creation of regulatory laws and the imposition of penalties because regulatory legislation is often just as freedom-limiting and its penalties as punitive and, c) that Kantian principles of Justice and Respect establish the groundwork for a moral justification of regulatory legislation and penalty in the same way as they do for criminal law and punishment. After rejecting the most common moral distinctions asserted between criminal law and regulatory law, this dissertation will offer an alternative based on the method most efficacious for enforcing the Principle of Justice in particular contexts. The regulatory focus is on consumer contracts, a necessary feature of juridical society and that which best illustrates Kant's principles. The automotive industry is used as an example as it is the largest industry in Ontario, and follows some of the most comprehensive consumer protection laws in the province.
Part One of the thesis establishes the moral basis for legislation including a normative ground for the imposition of penalty. Part Two focuses on applying Kantian principles to regulating consumer contracts and to sentencing principles in relation to penalty.
Limiting regulatory legislation and identifying appropriate penalties is not the primary focus of this dissertation, but to develop a foundation for further discussion on the serious matter of recognizing that establishing a normative basis for regulatory legislation, and the imposition of proscriptions and penalties under it, is as important to the regulatory system as it is to the criminal system.

Ryall, Julian. Worlds Apart: A Copernican Critique of Kantian Idealism. Ph.D. diss. Cardiff University, 2013. [# p.] Advisor: ??. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In spite of his claim to have established with certainty and without omission the many transcendental grounds of experience, there is something fundamental pertaining to every possible experience which the ‘critical’ philosophy of Immanuel Kant fails to explain. The obstacle blocking the path to a solution is the critical method itself and the ingenious but misguided orientation which informed the Kantian enterprise from its inception. Kant compared this new orientation to ‘the first thoughts of Copernicus’ and indeed, ever since, ‘The Copernican Revolution in Philosophy’ has stood as title for that seismic shift in philosophical consciousness. Yet it is to Copernicus that we owe our problem and it is the Copernican world–view, acknowledged by Kant to be ‘true’, which requires us to reverse his dictum that ‘objects conform to our cognition’. The necessity for this rests on the most basic of observations: human beings – together with their faculties of apprehension – travel through space and time in a non–apprehensible way, implying that spatiotemporality exists independently of the observing subject since it is in virtue of this true movement alone that all apparent motion is generated, which appearances, however, ‘contradict’ the reality. The ‘something’ which Kant cannot explain, therefore, is the phenomenon of observer motion (in contrast to observed motion, the most his approach accommodates) since his ontological denial regarding space and time and his equivalence thesis in respect of ‘experience’ and ‘objectivity’ requires that he discount this phenomenon on principle. In determining, therefore, the ontological and epistemological implications of the opposing Copernican principle that it is our cognition that conforms to objects, it is argued that space and time are transcendentally real and the apprehending subject physically (rather than ‘empirically’ or ‘noumenally’) constituted, leaving the reader with a simple choice: Kant or Copernicus, but not both.

Saemi, Amir. On the Nature of Practical Reasons. Ph.D. diss. University of California/Santa Barbara, 2013. [210 p.] Advisors: Kevin Falvey and Matthew Hanser. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: My dissertation pursues the reverse order of explanation. I propose that we should ground the notion of being a reason in the notion of rational agency. To delineate such a view, we need a more substantive account of rational agency. I favor a constitutivist approach to rational agency according to which actions and beliefs are subject to certain norms (i.e. rational norms) simply in virtue of being the sort of things they are. I argue that the Aristotelian form of constitutivism I develop is preferable to Kantian constitutivism, as defended by C. Korsgaard and S. Engstrom.
On a Kantian picture, practical norms can be derived from the form of practical reason. According to Kantian constitutivism, this is because rational agency is constituted by practical norms, similar to the way that chess is constituted by its norms, i.e., its rules. Chapter I discusses Korsgaard’s version according to which an action is the kind of thing it is because it performs its function, which is to make an agent a unified person. An agent constitutes herself through her actions. However, I argue that Korsgaard is committed to the implausible view that an agent loses its capacity to act when she does not exercise it properly. I also argue that her account of agency is not substantial enough to ground substantial norms. Moreover, associating one’s capacity to act with sophisticated norms, Korsgaard is committed to a hyper-intellectualized account of action. This is a problem she shares with Engstrom.
Chapter II discusses Engstrom’s view. According to Engstrom, practical norms are constitutive of one’s capacity for practical knowledge (i.e. knowledge of what to do). That is, Engstrom thinks that to will is to exercise the capacity for practical knowledge (i.e. to will involves the judgment that the action is good) and one does not exercise one’s capacity for practical knowledge properly (i.e. one’s practical judgment does not amount to knowledge) if one’s will does not conform to its form. Following Kant, Engstrom thinks that one has an implicit cognition of the form of one’s will and is guided by it when one exercises one’s capacity for practical knowledge. Discussing various forms of implicit knowledge, I argue that it is implausible to think that the form of the will is present in one’s psychology even implicitly. Consequently, one cannot be guided by the form of the will.
The second part of this study concerns my positive account of the nature of practical reasons. Chapter III, which set the stage for my positive account in chapter IV, concerns the notions of function and the good. I argue that the notion of function cannot be reduced to biological or causal notions. The function of an item is usually its characteristic activity. I argue that the notion of function has a close connection to the notion of essence or life-form. The notion of life-form can be explained by facts about an organism’s nature and environment which can ground an objective conception of that organism’s good.
In chapter IV, I argue that actions aim at the good. Many philosophers, among them G.E.M. Anscombe, J. Raz, B. Willams and D. Davidson, who defend the doctrine of the guise of the good understand it as the idea that the object of intention is taken by the agent to be good. I argue that this is implausible. Further, I argue that the doctrine of the guise of the good should be understood in the same manner that we understand the thesis that beliefs aim at the truth. That is, we should understand it as saying that the formal object of a practical attitude is to bring about the good. This requires a teleological conception of practical attitudes. I argue for this teleological conception of practical attitudes on the grounds that it can explain why practical attitudes need rationalization. If so, a practical state is defective if it does not bring about the good i.e. if it does not bring about its object or if its object is not good.

Santos, Gustavo Adolfo P. D. Practical Reason and the Metaphysics of Human Dignity: A Dialogue between Christian Personalists and Kantian Liberalism. Ph.D. diss. The Catholic University of America, 2013. [280 p.] Advisor: David J. Walsh. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This dissertation aims to correct the critical interpretation of Immanuel Kant’s metaphysics and ethics developed by Thomistic thinkers as part of their critique of liberal politics, an interpretation that was adopted by Christian personalists such as Karol Wojtyla. According to the Thomistic interpretation, Kant’s transcendental idealism negates traditional realistic metaphysics, and consequently the traditional ethics based on the guidance of the human will by the intellect’s grasp of the teleological structure of reality or the created order of ends. This implies the construction of a subjectivist, formalist, and proceduralist ethics based on a radical notion of individual autonomy that is at the basis of the modern liberal and secular state. In contrast to this view, which is shared by some influential Neo-Kantian thinkers, this dissertation will argue that Kant is more adequately understood as proposing a different kind of metaphysics, based on the primacy of the practical use of reason. Once cognition is understood to be restricted to objects of possible (theoretical) experience and traditional “dogmatic” metaphysics is rendered impossible, a new sort of metaphysics must be primarily moral and found through the participation of human beings in the moral law as pure practical reason. Thus, in Kant’s concept of the unconditionally good will (that grounds the categorical imperative) the idea of duty for duty’s sake translates for sensible beings the moral priority of the constitution of the good as an existential participation in the order of being. In this way, teleology is not negated but has its innermost moral ground disclosed. Kant also recovers the moral core of faith in God and in the immortality of the soul, whose characterization as postulates of practical reason points to their metaphysical status beyond the fixities of empirical being rather than to a doubtful claim about their existence. Finally, autonomy of reason, or the self-legislation of morality, is understood as the only proper instantiation in rational beings of an order that is primarily moral and thus not reducible to the attraction of the will by external objects. By choosing autonomously, i.e. morally, human beings display their dignity as participants in a rational, supersensible nature that can ground their political relations on more than mere isolated subjectivity or willfulness.

Schmidt, Elke Elisabeth. Kants Begriff der Demütigung in der Kritik der praktischen Vernunft. Master’s Thesis. Uni-Siegen, 2013. [80 p.] Advisors: Dieter Schönecker and Marion Heinz. [M][online]

Smith, Simon David. The Role of Concepts in Kant’s Account of Aesthetic Experience. Ph.D. diss. University of London, University College London, 2013. [169 p.] Advisor: ??. [PQ] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: The thesis begins by exploring Kant's account of cognition as it is presented within the Critique of Pure Reason, particularly with reference to the conceptualist/non-conceptualist debate as it has developed over recent years. I argue that there is an important non-conceptualist position within Kant's account that concerns the unity of space and time as non-conceptual intuitive wholes. This argument will be used in discussing and exploring Kant's account of both aesthetic receptivity and aesthetic creativity as presented within the Critique of Judgement. My exploration of this third Critique will begin by looking at Kant's account of the harmony of the faculties and how we should understand the sense in which our aesthetic response is a non-conceptually determined one. The same concern will apply to an analysis of Kant's account of the mathematical sublime, and in the later stages of this discussion we will find an interesting relation between Kant's account of the role of infinity (space and time as unified wholes), and our earlier argument concerning space and time as formal intuitive wholes. After this focus upon the conditions of aesthetic receptivity my focus shifts towards aesthetic creativity as presented in Kant's account of fine art and genius. The main focus here will be with Kant's remark that art, in order to be art, must seem like nature. I will argue that this statement must be understood in two interdependent ways, where the first element concerns the formal construction of a representation so that it looks like nature in the sense of being a unified and readable representation. I will argue that artistic creativity at this level is the precondition of the second sense in which art must seem like nature, which concerns the content of a representation, and that a non-conceptual intuitional base is essential to this end.

Snow, Mathew J. The Modal Status of Kant’s Postulate of God’s Existence. Master’s Thesis. The University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee, 2013. [58 p.] Advisor: Julius O. Sensat. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Kant is traditionally read as arguing that moral agents are rationally required to postulate the actual existence of God, but contemporary commentators' reconstructions of the argument only seem sufficient to warrant postulating the merely possible existence of God. There have been three attempts to address this seeming lacuna between what the argument is supposed to justify and what it does justify. Allen Wood defends the traditional interpretation - that Kant postulated the actual existence of God. M Jamie Ferreira proposes a revisionary interpretation - that Kant postulated the possible existence of God. Finally, Paul Guyer simply criticizes Kant for postulating the actual existence of God when his argument only justifies postulating the possible existence of God. I argue that Allen Wood's defense is insufficient to ground the appropriate propositional attitude toward the postulates while M Jamie Ferreira's proposal cannot pass as a reading of Kant. Nonetheless, I argue that Kant need not be criticized because the seeming lacuna does not arise if we are sufficiently sensitive to the modality of the judgment Kant takes to be required for rational pursuit of the highest good.

Steen-Mikkelsen, Morten. På Kant med den æstetiske erfaring: En undersøgelse af Alexander Gottlieb Baumgartens og Immanuel Kants filosofiske æstetik. [Danish] Ph.D. diss. Institut for Uddannelse og Pædagogik, Aarhus Universitet, 2013. [102 p.] Advisor: Sune Frølund. [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this thesis, I argue the main aspects of the philosophical aesthetics of Baumgarten (1714-1762) and Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). The term aesthetics originates from the Greek word Aesthesis, which means an approach to cognition based on feelings and assumptions. The aim of this work is to examine the premises and possibilities of aesthetic experience and to clarify the significance of the senses as a valuable approach to a distinctive form of comprehension and acknowledgement. Aesthetics was as a philosophical discipline founded by the German philosopher Baumgarten during the first half of the eighteenth century. As many authors tend to consider, Baumgarten did not primarily develop his aesthetics as a philosophy of art, but rather as a science of sensible cognition (cognitionis sensativae). In distinction to Wolff’s characteristics of the lower faculties (gnoseologia inferior) as of no epistemological relevance, Baumgarten argued that our sensibility is parallel to reason in its own order. Baumgarten’s aesthetics is the science of the sensible cognition and it includes both traditional and novel coherence. The balance between the aesthetical and the logical (ars analogi rationis) shows that the sensible cognition of the particular phenomenon is analogous to the actions of reason. This assertion of analogy is a continuity of Leibniz’ notion of small perceptions (les petites perceptiones), according to the Danish philosopher Jørgen Holmgaard. The aim of Baumgarten’s aesthetics is the perfection of sensible cognition. When this perfection is in close coherence with the art of beautiful thinking (ars pulcre cogitandi), then the cognition of beauty (pulcritudo cognitionis) occurs. In other words the postulation shows a connection between truth and beauty. Kant does not apply with the rules of reason to be merely empirical data, and nor can there be aesthetics that is science. In opposition to Baumgarten, Kant insists on keeping cognition and beauty apart. There can be no rules of taste, according to Kant, as his aesthetics is concerned with feelings of pleasure and displeasure, which can never become cognition. Kant’s aesthetics deals with beauty, the sublime, fine arts and aesthetic ideas. The judgment of taste (of beauty) is uninterested, which means that the subject has no desire for the object. In order to provide the judgment of taste with a universal validity, Kant postulates the idea of sensus communis as an ideal common norm, where everybody in their judgment can agree and share one’s pleasure by making the same representations. Beauty is not based on a concept, but on a feeling, which proves to be a problem for Kant, as it cannot be communicated logically. However, Kant’s idea of sensus communis shows an ability to relate to others representations and compare one’s judgment to be equal to others. Kant’s intention to relate beauty with the good is recognised by exceeding the judgment of taste. The idea of the beautiful nature, the genius, and the sublime gives a possibility (a hint) to involve nature in man’s own moral requirement.

Stephenson, Andrew Charles. Kant’s Theory of Experience. Ph.D. diss. University of Oxford, 2013. [viii, 212 p.] Advisors: Ralph C. S. Walker and Adrian W. Moore. [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: n this thesis I present and defend an interpretation of Kant’s theory of experience as it stands from the viewpoint of his empirical realism. My central contention is that Kant’s is a conception of everyday experience, a kind of immediate phenomenological awareness as of empirical objects, and although he takes this to be representational, it cannot itself amount to empirical knowledge because it can be non-veridical, because in such experience it is possible to misrepresent the world. I outline my view in an extended introduction. In Part I I offer a novel interpretation of Kant’s doctrine of sensibility and sensation.

Tester, Steven Eric. Georg Christoph Lichtenberg: Reflections on Knowledge, Nature, and the Self. Ph.D. diss. Northwestern University, 2013. [442 p.] Advisor: Peter Fenves. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Georg Christoph Lichtenberg (1742-1799) is often interpreted as an aphorist who addressed philosophical problems in his writings but did not hold a coherent philosophical position. I argue in contrast that an analysis of Lichtenberg's remarks from the Waste Books and his lectures on physics in the context of British empiricism and Kant's idealism reveals that he held a consistent philosophical position on knowledge, nature, and the self. I show how Lichtenberg's commitment to empiricism leads him to maintain an idealist position according to which we can know only our representations. This epistemology leads him to develop a metaphysical form of idealism, according to which objects of our experience are representations, and a coherentist theory of truth, according to which the coherence of judgments raises the probability of their truth. Lichtenberg's epistemological position also motivates his views on scientific theories. He rejects realist accounts of theories and argues for an instrumentalist account according to which theories are merely useful heuristic tools. He is also able to provide an instrumentalist response to Hume's problem of induction and the lack of necessity of causal laws and show how theories that are underdetermined by the evidence, such as the atomic and dynamic theories of gravity, should be evaluated. Lichtenberg's empiricism also leads him to reject rationalist views of the soul and to propose that we can only know the self to be an interconnected series of conscious mental states whose identity consists in the continuity of these states brought about by memory regardless of the material basis upon which consciousness supervenes. By showing how Lichtenberg synthesizes elements of empiricism and Kant's idealism into a coherent and consistent philosophical view on knowledge, nature, and the self, this interpretation solves some long-standing problems regarding how to interpret and reconcile Lichtenberg's seemingly disparate philosophical commitments. It also broadens our understanding of eighteenth-century German philosophy by providing an example of how the empiricist reception of Kant in Germany produced a line of philosophical thought distinct from the reception of Kant in later German idealists.

Thomson, Cameron Matthew. Morality, id est, worthiness to be happy: Kants retributivism, the law of unhappiness, and the eschatological reach of Kants law of punishment. Ph.D. diss. The University of Edinburgh, 2013. [# p.] Advisor: Nick Adams and Michael Purcell. [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: Throughout his work, Kant regularly glosses morality (and cognate expressions) as worthiness to be happy (Würdigkeit glücklich zu sein). As a rule, Kants commentators do not find this remarkable. Correctly understood, however, Kants gloss on morality is remarkable indeed. This thesis shows why. In it, I argue that whenever we encounter Kants gloss, we are faced with an implicit, durable cluster of unjustified commitments; that these commitments both antedate and survive his critical period; that they are fundamentally practical in nature (i.e., that they are unexamined commitments to particular practices); and that these commitments entail a number of problematic theological consequences. I argue, in particular, that Kants gloss is a habit that signals, obscurely and implicitly, his antecedent commitments to the practice of capital punishment, on the one hand, and to a particular set of practical attitudes towards the happiness and unhappiness of immoral agents, on the other. I show that this habit has key implications for Kants thinking about the agent that he calls God. My point of departure is Kants claim, in his Religion, that the human beings particular deeds are imputable to her all the way down, only on condition that the underlying disposition (Gesinnung) from which they arise (according to their kind, qua moral or immoral) is imputable to her as wellthat is, only if her (im)moral character may be regarded as the upshot of, or in some sense identical to, an utterly unassisted, unmotivated, originary deed on her part. I argue that Kant evades the question whether we really are permitted, without further ado, to regard this disposition (and with it an agents deeds) as so imputable. He simply affirms his commitment to the practice of imputing particular deeds to particular agents and, with this affirmation, affirms that he takes the warrant that it requires (the imputability of Gesinnung) to be secure. I argue, then, that the theoretical significance of imputation, as expressed in this extraordinary, evasive leap, supervenes on the urgency of the commitments that are expressed in Kant’s habitual glossing of ‘morality’ as ‘worthiness to be happy.’ The practice for which we would lack a warrant if the human being’s character were not imputable to her is the imputation of her deeds under a description (of imputation) that has immediate reference to this same ‘one’s’ punishment—specifically and only, however, to the extent that Kant takes punishments to be justifiable in none but strictly retributivist terms. These stakes and the constraining role of Kant’s habitual gloss are clearest, I argue, in his thinking about the practice of putting murderers to death — a practice, I argue, that has both a political and an eschatological significance for him.

Tuling, Kari Hofmaister. Between Maimonides and Kant: Hermann Cohen’s Religion of Reason. Ph.D. diss. Hebrew Union College-Jewish Institute of Religion, Cincinnati, 2013. [iv, 156 p.] Advisor: ??. [WC]

Vaha, Milla Emilia. The Metaphysics of Moral Subjectivity: Theory without Practice? Ph.D. diss. Florence, European University Institue/Dept. of Political and Social Sciences, 2013. [x, 237 p.] Advisor: Christian Reus-Smit. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In this work I aim to offer a theory of moral subjectivity of the state that helps to explain, in an analytically sound way, what is required for theorising about states as moral agents within a system of very different types of state-units, and, furthermore, enables one to explore what kind of consequences the practices of moral subjectivity might have for that very same system. The argument that I present has two levels. The first level consists of two theoretical claims about exploring the moral subjectivity of the state in International Relations. The first claim is that in order to argue meaningfully about the moral subjectivity of the state one has to take seriously the state's being-in-theworld qua state. By relying on Immanuel Kant's political philosophy and practical metaphysics, I will offer a theory that is applicable when one wishes to conceptualise the state as an autonomous entity in its own right, and, subsequently, allows one to argue that all states, despite their different prudential and contingent differences and characteristics, are moral agents. The second theoretical claim is that the moral personhood of the state is not in and of itself merely metaphysical – that it is, in fact, something purely intrinsic to the agent. Here I depart from Kant's original idea of essentialist moral personality of the state, and, in contrast to Kant, argue that the moral subjectivity of the state is always reciprocal. Moral subjectivity, therefore, cannot be studied without the concept of moral standing: the agent's positioning among other similar entities. Moral subjectivity proper is then constituted by recognition of other similar subjects who consider themselves as moral subjects. Moral subjectivity is always conditional and placed under scrutiny by politics of recognition. The second level of the argument maintains that when one then studies practices of moral subjectivity of the state – that is, states vis-à-vis each other in international society – it is the recognition of subjectivity that plays a central role in identifying states as moral agents in world affairs. While every state in theory qualifies as a moral person, their moral standing as fully-fledged moral subjects is constantly challenged due to their empirical differences in practice. One such difference explored in this study is the liberal/non-liberal character of the state. In order to make sense of the claims of different and sometimes even contradictory moral statuses of different types of empirical states in world politics, I argue that one has to explore the practices of moral subjectivity as well.

Valdez Oyague, Martín. El mal radical del corazón humano: problemas fundamentales de la ética de Kant. [Spanish] Master’s thesis. Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, Escuela de Posgrado, 2013. [86 p.] Advisor: ??. [WC]

Vande Veire, Frank. Tussen vrijheid en Uber Ich: de kantiaanse en lacaniaanse achtergrond van Slavoj Zizeks theorie van de ideologie. [Dutch] Ph.D. diss. Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen, 2013. [291 p.] Advisor: ??. [WC]

Vaprin, Nathanael W. Immanuel Kant and the Theory of Radical Democracy. Ph.D. diss. Vanderbilt University, 2013. [191 p.] Advisor: Gregg Horowitz. [WC]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This dissertation is intended as an intervention in the interminable and apparently antinomical philosophical exchange between political theories of radical democracy descended from Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe and liberal democracy descended from John Rawls. Radical democrats have deployed the friend-enemy distinction of Carl Schmitt to criticize liberal democracy as hypocritical and ultimately undemocratic in its refusal to critique its own ground; liberal democrats have riposted by characterizing radical democracy as dangerously anarchic. In this project, I read Immanuel Kant in dialog with the work of Ingeborg Maus to show in a novel way that contemporary radical democratic theories ultimately fall to the very critique upon which they indict liberal democracy, that they degenerate into the valorization of mere war, and that it was in fact in full recognition of this dynamic that Kant’s theory of liberal democracy begins. Kant’s theory of countervailing liberalism is ultimately discovered to be a politics of love over barbarism.

Velarde La Rosa, Gisele. Prolegomena to Kant’s Theory of the Derangement of the Cognitive Faculties. Ph.D. diss. Loyola University/Chicago, 2013. [275 p.] Advisor: Andrew Cutrofello. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: In the literature on Immanuel Kant there is no systematic account of the derangement of the constitutive cognitive faculties from an exclusively philosophical point of view. This dissertation opens the path for the development of such an account. It does so by presenting Kant’s positive account of the proper functioning of the constitutive cognitive faculties, namely, sensibility, imagination, and understanding. As such, the dissertation offers a series of “prolegomena” to a Kantian theory of the derangement of the cognitive faculties. At the foundation of Kant’s theory of cognition is the transcendental unity of apperception, the original ground of cognition. Through its power of synthesis, the transcendental subject constitutes objects of experience and discovers itself as pure self-consciousness. The distinction between the pure “I” of transcendental apperception and the “I” as object of inner sense is shown to be crucial to Kant’s account of cognition. The difficult birth of the categories as intelligible forms is analyzed, and an interpretation is presented of Kant’s controversial distinction between judgments of perception and judgments of experience. We further highlight the role played by the synthesis of the imagination in the subjective constitution of the object as a possible determinable object. With this model in place, we turn to Kant’s account of what can go wrong in human cognition, preparing the way for a future study of Kant’s full-blown theory of cognitive mental derangement.

Watt, Robert. Kant’s Deduction of the Categories. Ph.D. diss. University of Oxford, 2013. [250 p.] Advisor: Ralph Walker. [PQ] [online]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: This thesis defends an interpretation of the argument that Immanuel Kant calls his Transcendental Deduction of the Categories. It is divided into four chapters. The subject of the first chapter is the aim of Kant's Deduction of the Categories. It is argued that what Kant has set out to find is an answer to the question how it is that the Categories are able to serve as representations of objects. This chapter also includes a detailed account of what Kant thinks is required for a concept to serve as a representation of an object. The subject of the second chapter is the strategy of Kant's Deduction of the Categories. It is argued that what Kant thinks he needs to do in order to deduce the Categories is to show that an object must conform to the Categories if we are to make a judgment about this object. The third chapter is concerned with the central claim of Kant's Deduction of the Categories, viz. the Principle of the Original Synthetic Unity of Apperception. It is argued that this principle consists in the claim that if we are to make a judgment about an object then we must be able to achieve a special sort of consciousness - specifically, the consciousness of what Kant calls the necessary unity of synthesis. The fourth and final chapter of the thesis is concerned with Kant's justification for the Principle of the Original Synthetic Unity of Apperception. It is argued that Kant's commitment to this principle is based on his recognition of a key fact about an act of judgment, viz. the fact that in making a judgment about an object, part of what we think is that our representations ought to be connected in a particular way.

Yin, Jie. The I think, Self-awareness and Reflexivity: A Reconstructed Kantian Model of Self-awareness. Ph.D. diss. State University of New York at Albany, 2013. [260 p.] Advisor: Robert C. Howell. [PQ]

[Note] [Hide Note] Abstract: I aim to explore, in this dissertation, whether Kant has a plausible view on self-awareness in his Critique of Pure Reason, and that if the answer is positive, then in what way one could best appreciate his insight; and besides that, I also want to explore how Kant’s view sheds light on contemporary debate on self-awareness. I aim to consider two questions addressed by Howell (2006) as below: (A) how exactly the I think functions, designatively, to represent the self and bring it to our thought-awareness, and (B) how, the I think or I, a simple representation and a mere designation of self, nevertheless yields its possessor genuine first-person awareness? In order to answer these two questions, I shall reconstruct Kant’s model of self-awareness by interpreting his views and revising it by adding details which rely on resources from contemporary literature. Specifically, I shall reconstruct a model which fits with Kant’s framework of his view on self-awareness but integrates technical terms from contemporary literature as tools for clarifying the details of the Kantian model interpreted as such.

Yudelman, Jonathan. The Beginning of the End: Kant’s Philosophy of History and the Paths of Rational Messianism. Master’s thesis. Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2013. [iii, 104 p.] Advisor: Christoph Schmidt. [WC]

Zinkstok, Johannes Theodoor. Kant’s Anatomy of Logic: Logic and Method in the Critical Philosophy. Ph.D. diss. University of Groningen, 2013. [285 p.] Advisors: Lodi Nauta and Detlev Pätzold. [WC]

Zhouhuang, Zhengmi. Der Begriff des sensus communis bei Kant. Ph.D. diss. Ludwigs-Maximilian-Universität, Munich, 2013. [iii, 153 p.] Advisor: ??. [WC]

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Citation Source Key

[ASP] — Academic Search Premier

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[HIC] — Humanities International Complete

[JSTOR]

[M] — material copy of the book or journal

[MUSE] — Project Muse

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I thank Andrey Zilber for his kind assistance with the articles from the Russian journal Kantovskij Sbornik, Rodica Croitoru for her help with many of the items from the Romanian literature, and Elizabeth McKenney for her work as my student assistant.