Chapter 1
Reading Kant in Herder’s Lecture Notes

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It would be pleasant to imagine when reading the various student notes from Kant’s lectures – those written down by Herder, for instance, in the 1760s – that we were reading notes that Kant himself might just as well have written himself and then read aloud to the class – that the students were acting merely as stenographers of greater or lesser skill. Such pleasant thoughts are quickly dissipated by obvious worries, however. To take as an example Herder’s notes from Kant’s metaphysics lectures, the notes I wish to discuss here: Are we reading Kant’s unadulterated words (if perhaps not all of them) as spoken in the classroom? Or are we reading Herder’s thoughts about Kant or about the Baumgarten text from which Kant was lecturing? And even if these words (or at least most of them) are Kant’s, how many are just a re-hashing of Baumgarten, as opposed to Kant’s own views on the topic at hand?

These are reasonable worries, and completely disentangling the principal voices – Kant, Herder, and Baumgarten – is likely a lost cause; but by comparing Herder’s notes against Kant’s publications of that period, and Kant’s own notes jotted down in his copy of Baumgarten, as well as the Baumgarten text itself, we most definitely find unambiguous strands of Kant’s voice in the notes.

In what follows, I will offer a few general observations on the scholarly use of the student notes from Kant’s classroom, and a few more specific observations on the importance of the Herder notes in particular, before reviewing the discussion of real and logical grounds, using this as one example of how much of Kant we can find in the Herder notes. What we discover is a considerable overlap of material between the lecture notes and Kant’s published works, as well as a steady engagement with other philosophers of his day.

Kant’s discussion of ground or reason (German: Grund; Latin: ratio) first appears in his New Elucidation (1755), the first of three public Latin defenses that Kant presented during his teaching career in Königsberg, and it is here that he claims to prefer the term ‘determining ground’ over Wolff’s ‘sufficient ground’ (or ‘sufficient reason’). Kant began to use the terms ‘real ground’ and ‘logical ground’ in Negative Magnitudes (1763) and Only Possible Argument (1763), and continued to make use of them in various ways throughout his career. The connection between a real ground and its consequence is what we usually call a ‘causal relationship’, and the connection between a logical ground and its consequence we
call a ‘logical inference’. This distinction between real and logical grounds eventually made its way into the Critical philosophy, among other things marking the distinction between the synthetic and the analytic. Baumgarten’s text does not distinguish the logical from the real, and Kant’s insertions of this into his lectures is a constant thread running through the Herder notes.

Kant was not the first to discuss this concept of a real ground in his generation of philosophers – Crusius, for instance, devotes several pages to it in his Entwurf der nothwendigen Vernunft-Wahrheiten (1745) – but Kant believed that his use of the concept, and how it was to be distinguished from a logical ground, was something new under the sun – and we find all this echoed and amplified in Herder’s notes from Kant’s classroom.

1 On using the student notes

We have mention of over 160 sets of notes from Kant’s classroom, of which 126 survive in some form or other, either as fragments or in their entirety. They stem from eleven different course-subjects, although most of the notes are from Kant’s lectures on anthropology, physical geography, logic, metaphysics, and moral philosophy, and they extend from 1762 (seven years after Kant began lecturing) all the way up until his last semester in the summer of 1796. A great many of the notes are copies and compilations of other notes, and thus are somewhat removed from the classroom, and with roughly half of the notes we have no idea of the original author’s identity. Similarly, with many of these notes the semester of the source-lecture is a point of conjecture and considerable debate. Often the notes stem from different lectures, as compilations; sometimes a completed set of notes has marginalia added from the lectures of a later semester.

How closely are these notes related to Kant? As Adickes wrote about one hundred years ago:

> The copying and compiling of notebooks from Kant’s lectures (with various changes entering with their production) was a flourishing branch of industry in Königsberg, such that with no set of notes can we, without further study, assume uniformity (descent from a single set of lectures) or the reliability of any dates (found on the title page or elsewhere); nor can one assume, over a section of text of any length, that one is reading Kant’s own words. (Adickes 1913: 8)

This is not encouraging news; nor are the various accounts of these notes from Kant and others. For instance, in an October 1778 letter to his former student Marcus Herz, who had asked Kant to send him sets of notes from his logic and metaphysics lectures, Kant replied:
Those of my students who are most capable of grasping everything are just the ones who bother least to take explicit and verbatim notes; rather, they write down only the main points, which they can think over afterwards. Those who are most thorough in note-taking are seldom capable of distinguishing the important from the unimportant. They pile a mass of misunderstood stuff under what they may possibly have grasped correctly. (Br 10: 242 [Kant 1999: 170])

Kant’s former student and later biographer, Reinhold Bernhard Jachmann, provided a brief summary of the different courses offered by Kant, and had this to say about the metaphysics lectures:¹

The metaphysics course was also illuminating and pleasant, considering the difficulty of the subject for the beginning thinker. Kant was especially artful in arranging and defining metaphysical concepts, whereby he would attempt to think through the subject in front of his students, just as though he were beginning himself – gradually adding new limiting concepts, little by little improving the explanations already considered, and finally reaching the finished concept which he had thoroughly exhausted and illuminated from all sides – thus acquainting the closely attentive student not just with the subject, but also with methodical thinking. Whoever did not understand this way of his would take his first explanation as the correct and fully exhaustive one, and so would not follow him very closely after that, thus collecting mere half-truths – just as several sets of student notes have convinced me. (Jachmann 1804: 29 f.)

Given these various problems with the notes, one could not be blamed for questioning their value altogether; but my intention is to inspire caution, rather than outright dismissal. A judicious use of the notes offers all sorts of advantages, of which five come readily to mind:

- They clarify or develop points made in Kant’s published writings.
- They consider topics not discussed in any of the published writings.
- They provide a much broader philosophical context against which these writings are to be understood.
- They offer a new perspective into Kant’s intellectual development.²

¹ Jachmann matriculated at the university on 11 April 1783, and was possibly Kant’s amanuensis from 1788–94, so his acquaintance with Kant’s lectures would have stemmed from the 1780s and 90s.

² As Dilthey wrote in the preface to vol. 1 of the Akademie-Ausgabe of Kant’s writings: “This [D]ivision [of student lecture notes] offers an essential enrichment of the materials for the history of Kant’s development. From the time when Herder was his most ardent student, until the last years of his academic career, the lecture notebooks accompany the development of the Critical philosophy” (AA 1: xiv).
– And finally, they are in some sense more accessible to the non-specialist, as would have been fitting for a classroom presentation.

In what follows, however, my goal is simply to understand better the relationship between Herder’s notes, Kant’s publications, and Baumgarten’s metaphysics text.

2 Why are the Herder notes special?

Among the more than one-hundred sets of notes that we have from Kant’s class-rooms, Herder’s notes enjoy a special standing, and this for at least six reasons: (1) they are early, (2) they are the only notes that are early, (3) they are direct from the classroom, (4) they are our only notes with multiple drafts, (5) they are extensive, and (6) they are Herder’s. I will say a few words about each of these points.

(1) They are early

Johann Gottfried Herder (1744–1803) arrived in Königsberg (now: Kaliningrad, Russia) in the summer of 1762, having traveled from his birthplace of Mohrungen (now: Morag, Poland), a town of a little over 1,000 inhabitants and lying 100 kilometers south and a little west of Königsberg. The university at Königsberg was in the second half of the summer semester when Herder matriculated on 10 August 1762, and with that semester Kant was finishing up his 7th year of teaching at the university. Herder claims to have attended all of the courses that Kant offered, remaining for four full semesters and then leaving on 22 November 1764, in the middle of the winter semester (1764/65) probably not long before the month-long Christmas recess, to assume a teaching position at the cathedral school in Riga. So he could have sat in Kant’s classroom during as many as six different semesters. 

3 There is some uncertainty about when Herder actually arrived in Königsberg, but not when he first attended Kant’s lectures.
4 In the “Preface” to his Kalligone (1800; reprinted in Herder 1998: 651 f.). Kant was Herder’s most significant, but not his only, instructor. Herder also heard dogmatics with T. C. Lilienthal, church history with D. H. Arnoldt, philology with G. D. Kypke, physics with J. G. Teske, mathematics and physics with F. J. Buck, and possibly New Testament with Christoph Langhansen and F. S. Bock; see Herder (1846: 127, 137), Kühnemann (1912: 19), and Dobbek (1961: 92–5). In a letter from early 1768, Herder offered a brief account of his university course-work: “philosophy according to its parts with Magister Kant, philology with Professor Kypke, theology in its various fields with Doctor Lilienthal and Arnold [sic]” (Herder 1977–96, vol. 1: 95).
5 Following Melanchthon’s innovations, the academic calendar of the Protestant universities
Table 1: Kant’s teaching schedule during Herder’s student years

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Metaphysics</th>
<th>Physical Geography</th>
<th>Moral Philosophy</th>
<th>Mathematics</th>
<th>Logic</th>
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<tr>
<td>1762</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>1762/63</td>
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<tr>
<td>1763</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>1763/64</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>X</td>
<td>(private)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1764</td>
<td>Wed./Sat. 10–12</td>
<td>10–11</td>
<td>10–11</td>
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<tr>
<td>1764/65</td>
<td>11–12</td>
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<td>9–10</td>
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With the noted exception, meeting times occurred on Monday, Tuesday, Thursday, and Friday.

Herder first attended Kant’s classroom on 21 August 1762⁶ – Kant was lecturing on metaphysics. It is likely that the university had been in summer recess when Herder matriculated, and that classes had just resumed in late August. The metaphysics notes that Herder wrote down stem from at least two different semesters, and possibly more. Kant is presumed to have lectured on metaphysics five times during Herder’s stay: 1762, 1762/63, 1763/64, 1764, and 1764/65. We know that a few of these notes come from the end of the 1762 semester, while the vast majority of the notes come from one or two later semesters, with most of the evidence pointing to 1763/64 and 1764.

Kant was composing some interesting material in the early 1760s,⁷ and much of this is reflected in Herder’s notes. During Herder’s first month in Königsberg, Kant would have completed The False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures (1762), since it appears to have served as a lecture announcement for winter was arranged by semester, with Michaelmas (29 September) and Easter serving as the end-points for the summer and winter semesters. At Königsberg there was normally a recess of about two weeks at Michaelmas and three weeks at Easter, as well as one-month recesses near the middle of each semester (Dog Days in summer, Christmas in winter).

In the table given here, ‘X’ means that there is good evidence that the course took place. The times are given, when known. In 1764, Kant taught Metaphysics on Wednesdays and Saturdays from 10–12; the other courses were taught on the “normal days” (Monday, Tuesday, Thursday, Friday) for one hour each.

⁶ As we learn from his journal entry on page 32 of his Brown Notebook (NL-Herder XXVI.5), reprinted at AA 28: 148 (and reproduced and translated in this volume; see Fig. 1), Herder memorializes this event a second time at the top of page 123, in an otherwise isolated entry: “den 21. August bei Kant das Collegium angefangen.”

semester 1762/63, Herder’s first full semester at the university. The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God (1763) would have been completed shortly after that, probably in October of 1762, since it was published shortly after mid-December.8 The Inquiry concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality (1764) – Kant’s so-called “Prize Essay” awarded second place by the Prussian Academy of Sciences – was completed shortly before 31 December 1762, the deadline for submission;9 and the Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative Magnitudes into Philosophy (1763) was completed by 3 June 1763, the date it was handed to the philosophy dean (Christiani) for censoring. Perhaps of greatest interest for Herder was Kant’s Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime (1764), an essay Herder appreciated during his first years away from Königsberg.10 Kant’s Dreams of a Spirit-Seer (1766) was also begun during Herder’s student days, and Herder’s review of the book appeared in the 3 March 1766 issue of Kanter’s Königsbergsche Gelehrte und Politische Zeitungen.11

(2) They are the only notes that are early
These are the only notes that we have from Kant’s early years as a Privatdozent. Kant most likely began lecturing with the winter semester of 1755/56, and taught as a Privatdozent for fifteen years before accepting the Logic and Metaphysics professorship in May 1770, the summer of 1770 marking his first semester as a professor. Kant taught four to six classes each semester during the 50s and 60s – as best we can tell from the records – and this dropped down to four to five during the early 70s, and eventually to only three per semester after that (with some exceptions). Beginning with 1770, Kant alternated between a course on logic in

8 This is based on Walford’s arguments (Kant 1992: lix). Gaier (in Herder 1985: 845) views Herder’s “Essay on Being” as a criticism of Kant’s essay, and Martin (1936: 295) dates the essay to possibly the second half of 1763, but more likely 1764. See Gaier’s transcription of Herder’s essay in Herder (1985: 9–21), and his commentary and notes (Herder 1985: 844–69).
9 Beiser (1987: 151) traces influences from this essay to Herder’s Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit (1784–91).
10 This essay was completed by 8 October 1763 (the Saturday before the winter semester classes began), the date he submitted it to the philosophy dean (F.S. Bock) for censoring. See Herder’s letter of 21 May 1765, to Hamann (Herder 1977–96, vol. 1: 45): “I am noticeably profiting from this writing of my teacher, whom I value more and more ...”; and his November 1768 letter to Kant: “May your account of the Good contribute to the culture of our century as much as your account of the Sublime and the Beautiful has done” (AA 10: 77).
the summer and on metaphysics in the winter, with various other courses sprinkled in, but always including a course on physical geography in the summers and on anthropology in the winters. Prior to that, in the 50s and 60s, Kant taught a course on logic, metaphysics, physical geography, and mathematics nearly every semester (although he abruptly quit teaching mathematics in 1763). By my count, 46% of Kant’s courses occurred before he was made a full professor in 1770.12

Despite all that teaching during his years as a Privatdozent, the only notes that remain are those from Herder’s hand, thus from summer 1762 to fall 1764. The next notes that we have come from Kant’s 1770 physical geography lectures and his logic lectures from the early 1770s.

(3) They are direct from the classroom
Herder’s notes are the only notes that we have written in pencil, and very likely the only notes written in the classroom. Various other notes were written out by auditors whom we know attended Kant’s lectures – those by Mrongovius, Dohna, Volckmann, von Schön, and Vigilantius, for instance – but these are all, at best, fair copies re-written at home from notes taken down in the lecture.

Most of Herder’s notes written in pencil are in the smaller 8° format, while the 4° notes are primarily in ink, neatly written and with a wide margin on the side for additions. It seems likely that all the notes in pencil were written in the classroom, and perhaps also the 8° sheets written in ink, as these also lack margins and have a rushed appearance.

Certain features of the content of the notes suggest a closeness with the classroom as well. For instance, there is a long passage in the Ontology section at V-Met/Herder 28: 21 that concerns §159 of Baumgarten that is nearly verbatim with a note that Kant had written in his own copy of Baumgarten, next to §159. Here we have what appears to be a clear example of Kant reading a passage of a prepared note to students (and thus at least one instance of “Kant reading Kant in Herder’s notes”).

We even have several accounts of Herder sitting in Kant’s classroom, two recorded by classmates of his – Karl Gottlieb Bock and Jakob Friedrich Wilpert. Bock (1746–1829) matriculated at Königsberg a month after Herder (on 27 September 1762), and forty-three years later in 1805 offered these memories of their student days together:

12 That is, 128 courses from a career total of 279 (these are soft numbers, given the gaps in the records).
Kant offered to let him hear, free of charge, all his lectures on logic, metaphysics, moral philosophy, mathematics, and physical geography. It was here, in the years 1763 and 1764, that he made his acquaintance. We heard Kant’s lectures together and he still wrote to me about this in a letter of 11 August 1788, on his way to Italy from Nürnberg: “I can still see you before me, real as life, sitting at the table at which I also sat. Where has the time gone?”

With strained attentiveness he took in every idea, every word of the great philosopher, and at home ordered his thoughts and expression. He often shared these notes with me and we would discuss them in an isolated summerhouse in a seldom-visited public garden by the Alt-Roßgarten church. (Herder 1846: 133 f.; Herder’s letter to Bock is printed in Herder 1977–96, vol. 6: 20–22)

Bock goes on to recall an especially lively lecture where Kant quoted from his favorite poets (Pope and Haller) to illuminate certain points on the nature of time and eternity. Herder was so moved by this that he returned to his room, set Kant’s lecture down in verse, and handed it to Kant the following morning before the lecture began. Kant was so impressed by Herder’s poem that he read it aloud “with fiery praise” to the class. The poem is lost, but if Bock is correct that it “sprang out of Kant’s lecture on time and space like Minerva from Jupiter’s head,”13 then Herder presumably found poetic inspiration sitting in Kant’s metaphysics lectures – a rather stark contrast with the observation made by Herder’s widow that he “most preferred hearing Kant talk about astronomy, physical geography, and in general about the great laws of nature,” but that “he had much less taste for the metaphysics lectures .... After many of these metaphysical lectures he would hurry outside with some poet or Rousseau, or some such author, so as to free himself of the impressions that agreed so little with his mind” (Maria Herder 1830, pt. 1: 68 f.).

Jakob Friedrich Wilpert (1741–1812), later a two-time mayor of Riga, recalled attending with Herder

... Kant’s lectures on metaphysics, moral philosophy, and physical geography. We sat at a table14; at that time he was shy and quiet, his gait was stooped and quick, his eyes often sick-looking; from his appearances, one could see that he was poor; but his spirit was rich,

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13 The phrase is from Bock’s letter to Herder (now lost), dated 9 April 1788; the relevant passage is quoted in Herder (1846: 113 f.). See Emil Herder’s gloss on Bock’s story (1846: 135 f.), and also J. G. Herder’s letter to Scheffner of 31 October 1767 (Herder 1977–96, vol. 1: 94) indicating that he no longer has the poem, and that he now regards it as “a belch from a stomach overloaded with Rousseau’s writings.” Dobbek (1961: 220 n. 166) believes Bock misremembered the poem’s topic, and that it was actually the first part of Herder’s “Der Mensch.”
14 The tables in the lecture halls were generally reserved for those students wishing to take notes.
even then – and when he discussed the lectures of his teachers, it was so thorough and firm, that he commanded respect and affection from his colleagues. We all heard dogmatics together from Dr. Lilienthal; otherwise I didn’t have any closer relations with him. (Herder 1846: 137)

In Karl August Böttiger’s (1760–1835) journal entry of 2 December 1798, we find a reminiscence that Herder shared with him from his student days:

Kant shone from the lectern, a god to all. The Livland and Curland students heard him alone, as they pursued only gallant studies. But he spoke a lot of confusing things as well. Herder could make use of his lectures only by noting the main points in the classroom, and then setting out and re-working what he had heard in his own way once back home. (Böttiger 1838: 128)

Finally, near the end of his life, in the latter years of a bitter falling out with Kant, Herder offers one more glimpse of his student days with Kant:

For more than thirty years I’ve known a youth [viz., Herder himself] who heard all of the lectures, some more than once, of the founder of the Critical philosophy himself – and indeed in his early, flourishing years. The youth marveled over the teacher’s dialectical wit, his political as well as scientific acumen, his eloquence, his intelligent memory; he was never at a loss for words; his lectures were meaningful conversations with himself. But the youth soon noticed that, when he set aside the gracefulness of the presentation, he would become wrapped in one of its dialectical webs of words, within which he himself was no longer able to think. He therefore set himself the strict task, after each hour of careful listening, of changing it all into his own words, making no use of pet words or phrases of his teacher, and even diligently to avoid this. (Herder 1998: 651 f.)

(4) They are our only notes with multiple drafts
As mentioned above, some of the notes are in pencil, some in ink. Most of the 4° notes are in ink, and these are written neatly (although with frequent abbreviations) and with wide margins, but roughly half of the smaller 8° notes are also written in ink, and these are highly abbreviated and without margins, just like the notes written in pencil. It is nearly certain that the notes in pencil were written down in the classroom, and very likely that all of the notes in the 8° format. There are eight instances of overlapping text in Herder’s metaphysics notes. Some of this overlap is likely due to Herder attending the lectures over two or more different

15 This passage comes from the preface to Herder’s Kalligone (1800) and in a footnote to the first sentence of this passage, Herder adds a list of Kant’s publications from the years he studied with him.
semesters, but at least one overlap is due to one of the manuscripts (written in pencil, printed at V-Met/Herder 28: 843–49) serving as an earlier draft for the other manuscript (written in ink, printed at V-Met/Herder 28: 22–30).

(5) They are extensive
Once Herder’s metaphysics notes are sorted out and properly ordered, we find ourselves with a nearly complete set that compares quite favorably with later sets of notes in our possession. For instance, Herder’s is the third longest set of metaphysics notes from Kant’s classroom (the Metaphysik L₁ is roughly 15% longer, and the Metaphysik Mrongovius about 27% longer). The Herder notes are weighted more towards ontology and empirical psychology, while Metaphysik L₁ is weighted more towards rational psychology and natural theology, and Metaphysik Mrongovius has a much larger introductory section, and relatively larger sections on ontology and empirical psychology.

(6) They are Herder’s
Herder is not the only student from Kant’s classroom who would later go on to distinguish himself (one thinks of L. E. Borowski, Theodor von Hippel, Marcus Herz, and Theodor von Schön, among others), but Herder is still one of a small number, and of these he was certainly the most significant in the world of letters.

3 Five brief cautions on using the Herder notes
There are four basic problems with the notes as they currently appear in volume 28 of the Akademie-Ausgabe, as well as a fifth general worry about Herder. The four problems are a result of Lehmann’s editorial efforts: he duplicated the material between the two parts of volume 28, he included material that is likely not from Kant’s lectures, he was careless in his transcription, and the editorial apparatus is wanting. The fifth general worry is that Herder was a budding genius, and that he might therefore have included his own reflections in his notes.

(1) Duplication of material
Volume 28 of the Akademie-Ausgabe was published in two partial volumes: one in 1968 and one in 1970. While preparing the 1968 volume, Lehmann lacked the manuscripts included in NL-Herder XXV. 46a (now housed in Berlin at the Staatsbibliothek Preußischer Kulturbesitz), but much of this missing material had been
copied out by Paul Menzer in the first decade of the last century, and so Lehmann included Menzer’s copy in the 1968 volume. This was unfortunate, however, for two reasons. First, Menzer’s copy was extremely rough and certainly not intended for publication (those passages that Menzer incorporated into his own published writings are much more accurately transcribed). Second, included in Menzer’s copy are occasional stray notes intended for his own use, which Lehmann inadvertently included as part of Herder’s notes (e.g., V-Met/Herder 28: 85, 101).

Once the missing set of Herder manuscripts was located, Lehmann prepared a new transcription and included it in the 1970 volume. While Lehmann’s new transcription is nearly always superior to Menzer’s rough transcription, it is not uncommon to find scholars citing the Menzer copy published in the 1968 volume, apparently unaware of the better transcription.

(2) Inclusion of material not clearly stemming from Kant’s lectures
Other than the extranea inserted with Menzer’s copy of Herder’s notes, one also finds Lehmann including material that is most likely not from Kant’s classroom: a variety of pages from a student note book that are either almost certainly from some other lecturer, or were early drafts of an essay of Herder’s, but in any event most likely do not stem from Kant’s metaphysics lectures (cf. V-Met/Herder 28: 935–46, as well as V-Met/Herder 28: 53–5, which appears to be a study by Herder of Kant’s *New Elucidation* of 1755).

(3) Poor transcription
The Herder manuscripts are often difficult to read. A majority of the words are abbreviated, most are hastily written, and some of the penciled text has been rubbed away. Unlike many of the other student notes from Kant’s classroom, these were not prepared by a professional copyist, and consequently a good transcription requires extraordinary care. This in part explains why there are, on average, two to three transcriptional errors on every page of Lehmann’s published text in the *Akademie-Ausgabe*. Some of the errors are trivial, but many are not, and result in a deformation of the meaning. A different sort of error occurs at the manuscript page break indicated on V-Met/Herder 28: 930, where Lehmann splices together two broken sentences across the break. A closer inspection of the text makes it clear that one or more pages of missing text stand between these two sentence fragments.
(4) Poor editorial apparatus

Finally, the introductory material explaining the metaphysics notes borders on the opaque, his “Textänderungen und Lesearten” are riddled with errors large and small, and the marginal pagination that is supposed to reflect the pagination of the various manuscripts is often arbitrarily sequenced. If we remove the duplicated material and other foreign matter, a proper ordering of the notes would look something like this (using the Akademie-Ausgabe pagination): (A) 5–53, (B) 850–75, 875–86, 137–38, 922–23, and (C) 886–922 form three core sections of the notes, to which additional material, perhaps stemming from other semesters, can be added. With (A) belongs the material from 155–58 and 843–49, with (B) the material from 924–28, 143–44, 145–48, and 928–31, with (C) the material from 144–45, and 148–51. From this list of page numbers one can appreciate the difficulties that any scholar faces when attempting to make an appropriate use of these notes as they presently stand in the Akademie-Ausgabe.

(5) Herder’s own authorial insertions

As for assessing the content of these notes and how closely they correspond with what Kant actually said in his lectures, it will do well to recall those three comments made near the end of Herder’s life, quoted above, that suggested that Herder would write down only the main points in class, and then at home re-write the notes in his own words.

4 Baumgarten’s Metaphysica

Professors were required to lecture from textbooks, and Kant chose to base his metaphysics lectures on Alexander Baumgarten’s successful and widely used Latin textbook Metaphysica (4th edition: 1757; 1st edition: 1739). Kant used the 4th edition during most of his career (this is the edition reprinted at AA 15: 5–54 and AA 17: 5–226). Several other popular metaphysics textbooks were available to Kant – he made use of a text by Baumeister for a few semesters during his early years of teaching, and Crusius wrote a textbook often used by other professors at Königsberg – but Kant strongly preferred Baumgarten and by 1759 was

16 Fortunately for the non-Latin reader, this text has recently been made available in both a Latin-German edition (Baumgarten 2011) and in an English edition (Baumgarten 2013).
using that exclusively and for the remainder of his forty-year teaching career. Kant called it the “most useful and foundational of all textbooks of its kind” (TW 1: 503).

Baumgarten was a professor at Halle (from 1737–40) and then at Frankfurt/Oder (from 1740–62), and was intellectually aligned with Christian Wolff’s rationalism, although he emphasized certain aspects of Leibniz’s metaphysics that were downplayed or rejected by Wolff – for instance, in his offering a proof of the doctrine of pre-established harmony. Kant clearly held Baumgarten in high regard. In the New Elucidation (1755) Kant characterized “the penetrating Baumgarten” (PND 1: 397) as the “chief of the metaphysicians” (PND 1: 408); in his lecture announcement for winter semester 1765/66, Kant praised Baumgarten’s metaphysics text for “the richness of its contents and the precision of its method” (NEV 2: 308); in the Logik Pölitz (dated c. 1780), Kant said of Baumgarten that “Wolff’s logic was distilled by Baumgarten, a man who has contributed much here” (V-Lo/Pölitz 24: 509); and in the Menschenkunde anthropology notes (dated 1781–82), Baumgarten is characterized as “a man quite rich in material and succinct in its execution” (V-Anth/Mensch 25: 859).

Baumgarten divided his Metaphysica into 1,000 sections: §§ 1–3 presents a brief introduction to metaphysics, followed by the ontology ( §§ 4–350), cosmology ( §§ 351–500), psychology ( §§ 501–799), and natural theology ( §§ 800–1000). The psychology was further divided into two main sections: empirical psychology ( §§ 504–739) and rational psychology ( §§ 740–799). Kant later used this section on empirical psychology as a basis for his anthropology lectures (which he began offering with the 1772/73 winter semester).

5 Real grounds in Herder’s notes

Baumgarten’s textbook on metaphysics often stands front and center in Herder’s notes and is rarely far from view. It determines for the most part the topics presented and their order of presentation. But there is also much material in the notes not found in Baumgarten, and these additions are typically made with no indication that Kant is disagreeing with Baumgarten or in some way amending him.

Kant also wrestles with other philosophers in these notes. Apart from Baumgarten – who is normally referred to as “the author” – Kant discusses Leibniz, Wolff, and Crusius in about a dozen different places. Newton and Descartes each receive seven mentions, Locke four, Malebranche three, Rousseau two, and rather interestingly, Hume makes only one appearance, and that in a discussion
of moral sentiment.\textsuperscript{17} This neglect of Hume is somewhat strange, if his account of causality really was troubling Kant’s mind during this period as much as is generally claimed.\textsuperscript{18}

And this brings me to my last topic, as well as providing an opportunity to acknowledge a debt. It was while reading Eric Watkins’s \textit{Kant and the Metaphysics of Causality} (2005) that I was led to consider more closely the theme of real grounds in the Herder notes. A central thread in the first half of Watkins’ book is the emergence and evolution of Kant’s understanding of the concept of a real ground:

After Hume’s \textit{Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding} was translated into German in 1755,\textsuperscript{19} Kant reacted by introducing a new metaphysical distinction between real and logical grounds, reinterpreting the ontological principles he had developed earlier in terms of real grounds and making the notion of a real ground fundamental to several principles that became central parts of his overall position in the early 1760s. (Watkins 2005: 10; Watkins elaborates and defends this claim on 166–70)

A bit later, Watkins writes:

Hume helped Kant to see that, as a proponent of physical influx, he could not understand grounds as purely logical (as Wolff and Baumgarten had). As a result, he introduced the notion of a “real ground” and attempted to work out its consequences in \textit{The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God} (1763), the \textit{Negative Magnitudes} (1763), and various \textit{Reflexionen} of the period. (Watkins 2005: 103)

\textsuperscript{17} Herder recalled some of these figures in his homage to Kant (in his 79th “Letters on the Advancement of Humanity”): “In the same spirit with which he investigated Leibniz, Wolf, Baumgarten, Crusius, and Hume, and traced the laws of Kepler, Newton, and the physicists generally, he also examined the writings then appearing by Rousseau, namely, his \textit{Emile} and his \textit{Heloise}” (Herder 1877–1913, vol. 17: 404).

\textsuperscript{18} Hume’s influence on the early Kant has been discussed extensively by Henrich (1967), Kreimendahl (1990), and more recently by Watkins (2005); see also Falkenstein’s (1995) helpful discussion of Kreimendahl.

\textsuperscript{19} Hume discusses causality in both his \textit{Treatise of Human Nature} (1739–40) and the more succinct \textit{Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding} (1748; originally published as: \textit{Philosophical Essays Concerning Human Understanding}). A German edition of the \textit{Enquiry} appeared in 1755 (anonymously translated, and edited by Johann Georg Sulzer), and selections from the \textit{Treatise} appeared in German in 1771 and 1772; a translation of the entire \textit{Treatise} was not published until 1790–92. Kant appears not to have read texts in English, and it is unclear when Kant might have obtained a copy of the 1755 translation given the complications of the Russian occupation of Königsberg from 1758–62. Nonetheless, he had English-reading friends interested in Hume (J.G. Hamann since 1759; Joseph Green since 1765) and through whom he had ready access to Hume’s ideas.
And finally:

Kant had already explicitly accepted grounds as an integral part of his account as early as 1755 in the *Nova dilucidatio*. However, in that work Kant does not describe grounds as real. Starting around 1762 – presumably after having read Hume’s *Inquiry* in translation – and continuing up throughout the rest of his pre-Critical period, Kant draws a distinction between logical and real grounds and makes real grounds into a fundamental feature of his metaphysics as he comes to see how important they are in providing an adequate account of a series of metaphysical issues .... Real grounds are pivotal to Kant’s immediate response to Hume. (Watkins 2005: 162)\(^20\)

Baumgarten lacked any concept of a real ground. His commitment to Leibniz’s pre-established harmony meant that the ground of any change in a thing was always within that thing itself. All apparent connections between substances were logical in the sense that all predicates of a substance were inner determinations of that substance; the predicates were contained in the concept of the subject itself, allowing for all truths to be *analytically* true.\(^21\)

Real grounds, and the wider distinction between the real and the logical that is built on this concept, are discussed primarily in the ontology section of the notes, but throughout the later sections as well, and it is arguably the most important concept being developed in Kant’s early metaphysics. When reading the Herder notes, it is striking how often this topic appears, usually as an unspoken addition or amendment to a claim or definition in Baumgarten. I discuss this further below.

6 The grounds of others and Kant’s response

Wolff and Baumgarten

Christian Wolff and Alexander Baumgarten both understand a ground as closely involved with the giving of an account or explanation. Wolff offers a definition in § 29 of his *Vernünfftige Gedancken* (1720):

\(^{20}\) Longuenesse (1998: 351) also notes this new distinction between logical and real grounds and points to its occurrence in the Herder notes.

\(^{21}\) This connection between logical vs. real grounds and the analytic vs. synthetic judgments is made in Reflections 3504, 5706, and 5707. The first, dated by Adickes to the late 1770s, reads: “A ground is either analytic (logical) or synthetic (real ground)” (AA 17: 28).
What a ground is and what is called grounded. If a thing A contains in itself something from which one can understand why B is – B can be either something in A or outside A – one calls that which is to be found in A the ground of B. A itself is called the cause, and one says of B that it is grounded in A. The ground is that by which one can understand why something is, and the cause is a thing that contains the ground of another in itself.22

Wolff illustrates his definition with an example of a garden: Suppose the plants are flourishing and that this is due to the warmth of the air. In this case, the warmth of the air is what Wolff calls the ground of the flourishing, and the air itself (which is warm) is the cause. The ground of X (or of X being in a certain state) is that by which one understands X (either why it exists or why it is in a certain state).

Baumgarten appears to follow Wolff closely in his own definition in Meta-

physica (1757), § 14:

A ground (condition, hypothesis) is that from which it can be cognized why something is. Whatever has a ground, or of which something is the ground, is called the consequence, and is dependent on it. The predicate by which something is the ground or consequence or both, is the connection.

Neither of these definitions distinguishes between the real ground (the cause of a thing’s existence or change in its state), the logical ground (the cause of the thing’s possibility), or the ideal ground (the cause of our cognition of the thing).

Crusius

Crusius expanded this discussion of grounds by distinguishing real and ideal grounds in his Entwurf der nothwendigen Vernunft-Wahrheiten (1st edition: 1745).23 The real ground of X (principium essendi vel fiendi) is the cause of the existence or becoming of X, while the ideal ground of X (principium cognoscendi) is the cause of our cognition “with conviction” of X (Entwurf, § 34):

§ 34. Anything that produces something else either in whole or in part, and insofar as it is viewed as such, is called a ground or cause in the broad sense (principium, ratio). For that reason efficacious causes are one kind of ground, whose necessity is clarified by the preceding (§ 15, § 29). But they are not the only kind. Therefore we must also consider here the other

22 This book is not listed in Kant’s library (in Warda 1922), although he did have a copy of Wolff’s Latin metaphysics, the Philosophia prima sive Ontologia (1730).
23 Kant owned the 1753 second edition of this work (Warda 1922: 47).
kinds of grounds. Namely, what one calls grounded and whose production is attributed to another is either only the cognition in the understanding or else the thing itself outside of our thoughts. Therefore a ground is either a ground of cognition, which can also be called an ideal ground (principium cognoscendi), or a real ground (principium essendi vel fiendi). A ground of cognition is what produces the cognition of something with conviction and so is viewed as such. A real ground is what produces or makes possible, either in whole or in part, the thing itself, outside of our thoughts. (Crusius 1745: 52 f.)

For Crusius, the ideal ground of X is just the cognitive ground, that is, whatever causes one’s belief in X. But in the context of a Leibnizian pre-established harmony, the meaning of ‘ideal ground’ shifts: Here an ideal ground (or change or influence or connection) is where a change in one substance is caused by itself, but where this change tracks related changes in another substance (as though the first substance were influencing the second substance). This understanding of real and ideal runs parallel to Baumgarten’s definition of real and ideal influence at Metaphysica, § 212:

If the passivity of the substance influenced by another is at the same time the action of the one acted upon, the passivity and influence are said to be ideal. If, however, the passivity is not the action of the one being acted upon, the passivity and influence are said to be real. (Baumgarten 1757: 64; and see Kant’s comment on this in his Refl. 3581, 17: 71)

In the Entwurf, § 36, Crusius distinguished two kinds of real ground: efficacious causes and inefficacious or existential causes:

Further division of real grounds into efficacious causes and inefficacious real grounds or existential grounds. When a real ground produces or makes possible something outside of thought, it does so either by means of an efficacious force and, in that case, is called an efficacious cause. Or the laws of truth in general do not allow anything else other than that after certain things or certain of its properties have been posited, something else is now possible or impossible, or must be possible in this way and not otherwise. This kind of ground I will call the inefficacious real ground or also the existential ground (principium existentiale determinans). Accordingly, an existential ground is one that makes something else possible or necessary through its mere existence due to the laws of truth. E.g., the three sides of a triangle and their relations to each other constitute a real ground of the size of its angle, but only an inefficacious or existential ground. By contrast, fire is an efficacious cause of warmth. (Crusius 1745: 54 f.)

An efficacious cause requires some action on the part of the cause while an existential cause exerts its influence simply by virtue of existing. For example, the sides of a triangle, as they are in the triangle, constitute an existential real ground of the angles of that triangle. Fire, on the other hand, is an efficacious real ground of the warmth that results.
Kant’s response to Wolff, Baumgarten, and Crusius

Kant engages with both of these accounts in his published writings as well as in the classroom. The first discussion occurs in the *New Elucidation* (1755), where section two\(^\text{24}\) begins with an account of ground: “That which determines a subject in respect of any of its predicates, is called the *ground*” (PND 1: 391), after which Kant distinguishes between antecedent grounds (or “ground of being/becoming”; the reason *why*) and consequent grounds (or “ground of knowing”; the reason *that*).\(^\text{25}\) The antecedent ground gives an account for why something is (Kant’s example: the elasticity in Descartes’ “elastic globules” for explaining the finite speed of light), while the consequent ground is what makes our knowledge of the thing actual (e.g., the eclipses of the satellites of Jupiter give us evidence of the finite speed of light).

Kant follows this brief discussion with a criticism of the definition of ‘ground’ given by Wolff (and so *a fortiori* Baumgarten), which Kant finds to be circular. It is unhelpful, Kant writes, to define “the ground of X” as that which explains why X exists or why X has a certain predicate – for the word ‘why’ just means “for which ground” – turning Wolff’s definition into the less-than-illuminating: “a ground is that by reference to which it is possible to understand *for which ground* something should be rather than not be” (PND 1: 393).\(^\text{26}\)

This same criticism is repeated in Kant’s classroom some eight years later, in a passage discussing Baumgarten, § 14:

The author’s description of *ground* is insufficient because of the word ‘why’ [*cur*], which just means ‘from which ground.’ Thus it is a hidden circle. (V-Met/Herder 28: 11)

Kant also favorably mentions Crusius in this passage of the *New Elucidation*, whom Kant invokes as support to drop all talk of “sufficient ground” (= “suffi-

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\(^\text{24}\) Section Two bears the title: “Concerning the principle of the determining ground, commonly called the principle of the sufficient ground.”

\(^\text{25}\) See also the recapitulation of this distinction in the Herder notes (V-Met/Herder AA 28: 54 f.).

\(^\text{26}\) Kant also criticized Wolff’s claim that it is possible for something (e.g., God) to be the ground of its own existence. Proposition Six of the *New Elucidation* (AA 1: 394) reads: “To say that something has the ground of its existence within itself is absurd.” Kant does not name Wolff here, but it is presumably directed at his *Philosophia Prima* (§ 309) and *Theologia naturalis* (§ 28), and the Herder notes *do* mention Wolff: “Wolff is mistaken when he says: a thing has its ground in itself or in another” (V-Met/Herder AA 28: 13). Self-grounding is also implied in Baumgarten’s *Metaphysica*, § 20, which argues that everything (and therefore God as well) has a ground, and we find in Kant’s 3rd edition copy a note rejecting this notion of self-grounding.
cient reason”) in favor of “determining ground” – and this is again repeated in the Herder notes (in a comment on Baumgarten, § 21):

Therefore it would be better and more determinate to call it the determining ground (with Crusius), rather than, with Wolf, the sufficient ground. (V-Met/Herder 28: 54)

7 An insight of Negative Magnitudes

Real grounds can conflict with each other

In a passage from the “Natural Theology” section of Herder’s metaphysics notes, when Kant discusses the perfection of God, we come across the following complaint:

The author [i.e., Baumgarten], Wolff, and almost no philosophers have paid attention here to the logical and real ground and conflict; and [they] viewed everything as logical. – Much is self-contradictory and impossible. Much conflicts with itself and is not impossible and not contradictory. Now one reality can conflict with another without contradicting it. (V-Met/Herder 28: 912)

Kant makes a similar point earlier in the notes during a discussion of Baumgarten’s definition of ground (§ 14), where Kant notes that “there is no [logical] contradiction with pure positing or negating” (V-Met/Herder 28: 11).

Kant could have had his younger self in mind as well in his complaint above, for back in 1755 Kant also neglected to distinguish between logical and real grounds, a distinction that makes its first appearance in his Negative Magnitudes essay of 1763 – and this brings us up to the years when Herder was studying at the university.

What I find especially striking in the Herder notes is how constantly Kant remarks on this distinction between the logical and the real, especially throughout the ontology section, but later as well. Often without any indication that Baumgarten is being amended, Kant will insert various instances of this contrast between the logical and the real that was the centerpiece of the Negative Magnitudes essay.

27 Zinkin (2012) discusses yet another insight in the Negative Magnitudes (1763) essay, namely, that Kant’s examples of negative magnitude with respect to our cognitive activity (e.g., of apparent mental repose, as discussed at AA 2: 199, or of desire at AA 2: 201) reveals an effort of the mind that – pace Hume – counts as an awareness or impression of a real force.
Chapter 1

Magnitudes. While Baumgarten is the occasion for the notes and Herder is the note taker, the insertions making their way into the notes are all clearly Kant’s.

Kant began his Negative Magnitudes (1763) with an extensive discussion of logical and real opposition, claiming that “attention has been exclusively and uniquely concentrated until now” upon logical opposition alone (NG 2: 171). A logical opposition is “where two contradictory predicates are ascribed to the same thing, resulting in “nothing at all” (a nihil negativum) – for instance, a two-dimensional figure that is both a square and a circle. In contrast, real opposition is “where two predicates of a thing are opposed to each other, but not through the law of contradiction” – for instance, two different motive forces pushing against an object, and resulting in what Kant calls a nihil privativum – the object does not disappear, but something is missing because of this opposition that otherwise would be present. Walking east on a train that is traveling west results in a nihil privativum; both motions are real, but they oppose each other. Kant is introducing here what he understands to be a new distinction and he takes great pains in that essay to explain it.

**Real grounds are not based on the principle of identity**

In the “General Remark” that concludes the Negative Magnitudes, Kant introduces a further distinction between logical and real grounds:

> I call the first kind of ground a logical ground because its relation to the consequence is logical, namely, it can be distinctly seen to follow according to the rule of identity. The second kind of ground I call a real ground because, although this relation belongs to my true concepts, this kind of relation cannot at all be judged. (NG 2: 202)

In other words, the connection between a logical ground and its consequence can easily be found by analyzing the subject (or ground), which reveals the presence of the predicate (or consequence). But no such analysis is available for real grounds and their consequences; these relationships are simple, brute facts about the world.

Kant offers an argument for this distinction between logical and real grounds in a comment on a student essay. The student had written that, for all he knew,

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28 In The Only Possible Argument (1763) we find logical and real ground being used, but not introduced or defined as such.

29 Kant wrote four comments in all on this essay (Refl 3718–21), which Adickes dated to possibly the early 1760s, but which more probably stems from the 1780s, when Michael Friedländer was
the distinction between logical and real grounds was just a product of our “short-sightedness,” and that if we had a better grasp of the real essence of things, then we would be able to analyze out every predicate, so that in the end all consequences would be logical, and not real. To this Kant replied:

If the real consequence is contained in the real ground, and were posited through that according to the rule of identity, then it would be contemporaneous with it. All alterations are possible, therefore, only through the real relations of the grounds to their consequences, and the logical grounds are therefore distinguished from real grounds not by the limits of my cognition, but rather in themselves. (Refl 3719, 17: 266)

Kant illustrates the opacity of the relationship between real grounds and their consequences with three brief examples in the *Negative Magnitudes* essay (NG 2: 202):

[1] The will of God contains the real ground of the existence of the world. The will of God is something. The world that exists is *something completely different*. Nonetheless, the one is posited by the other.

[2] The state of mind in which I hear the name *Stagirite* is something, and it is in virtue of that something that something else, namely my thought of a philosopher, is posited.

[3] A body A is in motion; another body B, lying in the direct path of A, is at rest. The motion of A is something; the motion of B is something else; and yet the one is posited by the other.

Kant delivers up essentially these same three examples in Herder’s notes in order to make the same point – namely, that they portray relations not reducible to the principle of identity:

[1 + 2] The connection between the logical ground and consequence can be grasped, but not that between the real ground, that when something is posited, something else is posited at the same time. Example: God wills! – The world comes about! – Julius Caesar! The name brings to mind the thought of the ruler of Rome. (V-Met/Herder 28: 12)

[2 + 3] All our experience of how bodies affect each other is simply: one moving body moves another. No one doubts this, but the cause of the preceding strong motive power is in the laws of nature, which are inexplicable. With *each* interaction the cause is therefore inexplicable and especially when I apply this to the soul. (V-Met/Herder 28: 886)

[1 + 3] Every determination of a thing that requires a real ground, however, is posited through something else, and the connection of a real ground with a real consequence is
therefore not to be understood through the rule of identity, and also cannot be expressed with a judgment; it is rather a simple concept. E.g., the will of God is the real ground of the existence of the world, it is not a logical judgment using the rule of identity. For the world is not one and the same with God, but rather is a simple concept. This concept is called power, e.g., bodies pushing each other. (V-Met/Herder 28: 24)

Real grounds are knowable either empirically or not at all

In the passage immediately following the quote above, Kant notes that the connections between real grounds and their consequences sometimes have the appearance of being logical (or analytic), but they are in fact cognizable only on the basis of experience:

Our power of imagination produces again distinct concepts that one already had. This appears at first to be a logical proposition, but it is not; rather the predicate itself is here the relation of the real ground, etc. Only through experiences, not logically, can we comprehend the connection of the real ground. (V-Met/Herder 28: 24)

Kant will make the same point a few years later in his *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer* (1766):

It is impossible ever to comprehend through reason how something could be a cause or have a force; rather, these relations must be taken from experience. For the rule of our reason extends only to comparison in accordance with identity and contradiction.... That my will moves my arm is no more intelligible to me than were someone to claim that my will could halt the moon in its orbit. The only difference between the two cases is this: I experience the former, whereas my senses have never encountered the latter. (TG 2: 370; see also Refl 3756, 17: 284 f., dated 1764–66)

Kant’s grounds are not Crusius’s grounds

After making the distinction between logical and real grounds in the *Negative Magnitudes*, Kant then describes Crusius’ distinction between real and ideal grounds, noting that this is something entirely different:

The division made by Crusius between the ideal and the real ground is entirely different from my own. For his ideal ground is identical with the ground of cognition; and here it

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30 And in the discussion on Natural Theology, we find in a discussion of real and logical grounds that with the former, “we cannot comprehend the connection,” which is why “physics is more difficult than arithmetic, and theology the most difficult” (V-Met/Herder AA 28: 911).
is easy to see that if I already regard something as a ground, I can infer from it the consequence. Therefore, according to his principles, the west wind is a real ground of rain clouds, and at the same time is also an ideal ground, since I am able to recognize and expect the latter by way of the former. But according to our concepts, the real ground is never a logical ground, and the rain is not posited by the wind in virtue of the rule of identity. The distinction between logical opposition and real opposition that we mentioned above is parallel to the distinction between the logical ground and the real ground under discussion here. (NG 2: 203)

This point is also echoed in the Herder notes in several places:

Crusius separates grounds into ideal and real. This division is entirely different, e. g., the world is the ideal ground of God. For the ideal ground is merely the ground of cognition. They are therefore subordinated in such a way that a real ground could at the same time be an ideal ground; but no real ground can be a logical ground and vice versa. For they are exactly opposed.

In all demonstrations and in mathematics the proofs are logical grounds. Crusius’s bringing forth [das Hervorbringen] is just a real ground, e. g., God is a real ground of the world; the latter is not logically posited per regulam identitatis [through the rule of identity] because the world is not in God. (V-Met/Herder 28: 12)

With Crusius, the ideal ground, from which I can infer something, is therefore different than the logical – quod continent rationem logicam per regulam identitatis [which contains the logical ground through the rule of identity]: every logical ground is ideal, not every ideal ground is logical. The real consequences give the cognitive ground to the real ground. Adaequater [adequate] cognitive ground, e. g., mathematics has this. E. g., self-interest is not a principium adaequatum [adequate principle] of vice. (V-Met/Herder 28: 37)

In the text just preceding this, Kant criticizes Crusius’s definition of a ground as “anything that brings about something else” and then introduces his own division of grounds into logical and real:

Crusius describes a ground as that through which something is brought about. The word to bring about [hervorbringen] is much too composite [zusammengesetzt]: for not all effects are consequences, and not all powers are grounds.

Every ground is either logical, through which the consequence that is one and the same with it is posited as a predicate per regulam identitatis [through the rule of identity], or real, through which the consequence that is not one and the same with it is not posited per regulam identitatis. (V-Met/Herder 28: 11)

To support my claim about the ubiquity of this distinction between the logical and the real in Herder’s notes, let me list a dozen more examples (where ‘§’ refers to the Baumgarten paragraph under discussion):
§ 14: As part of his long commentary on Baumgarten's definition of 'ground', and in which Kant had already drawn the distinction between logical and real grounds (V-Met/Herder 28: 11), Kant also notes that repugnance can be either logical or real (V-Met/Herder 28: 12), thus echoing the opening pages of *Negative Magnitudes* (NG 2: 172).

§ 23: Baumgarten’s argument that “everything has a consequence” brings Kant to add that “every consequence is either logical or real” (V-Met/Herder 28: 14).

§ 36: Baumgarten’s discussion of affirmative and negative determination as realities and negations leads Kant to counter that some negations are in fact real, e.g., the real repugnance as discussed in *Negative Magnitudes* (V-Met/Herder 28: 14).

§ 81: Baumgarten defines ‘opposites’ as when something is posited and something else is thereby denied, which Kant then glosses with a distinction between logical and real opposition, which Kant further describes as positing the negative nothing and the privative nothing (V-Met/Herder 28: 14).

§ 101: Baumgarten offers a brief definition of ‘necessary thing’ (viz., that thing “whose opposite is impossible”) and ‘contingent thing’ (viz., anything that is “not necessary”), and Kant responds approvingly, adding that every positing is either logical or real (V-Met/Herder 28: 18). Related here is Kant’s Refl 3725, dated to the early 1760s and written next to Baumgarten, § 109:

Absolute necessity is either logical: on account of the principle of contradiction, or real: not on account of the principle of contradiction. The former is the necessity of judgments. Or the necessity of the relation of the predicate and the subject. The latter is the necessity of the beings. 1. God is omnipotent. 2. God exists. The latter cannot be known (in itself) through the contradiction of opposites. The opposite of existing is not-being. But not-being, alone, does not contradict itself. Existence is not a predicate, therefore its opposite is not a predicate opposed to anything (Refl 3725, 17: 270).

§ 135: Baumgarten notes that “realities and negations are opposed to one another,” and Kant continues with a distinction between logical and real cancellation (V-Met/Herder 28: 19 f.).

§ 192: Baumgarten defines ‘inherence’ as the existence of an accident, and ‘subsistence’ as the existence of a substance, to which Kant adds that the real ground of the accident is in the substance (V-Met/Herder 28: 25, and the first draft version at V-Met/Herder 28: 845).

§ 197: Baumgarten claims that the ground of an accident inhering in a substance is a “power in the wider sense” or a “sufficient ground,” to which Kant adds that they require a “real ground,” which he then distinguishes from logical
grounds that simply follow from the rule of identity (V-Met/Herder 28: 24, and the first draft version at V-Met/Herder 28: 844).

§ 210: With respect to a long paragraph devoted to the definition of ‘action’ and ‘passion’, and in which Baumgarten repeats that the sufficient ground in a substance to bring about some alteration is called ‘a power’, Kant begins his comments with the observation that power is “the relation of a real ground to an accident” (V-Met/Herder 28: 26).

§§ 265–30: In a comment on Chapter 3 of Baumgarten, which concerns “the relations of things,” Kant notes that “a distinction has been omitted here: the relation of a thing is either logical or real” (V-Met/Herder 28: 32).

§ 430: Baumgarten defines the “nature of a thing” as the sum of its internal determinations that underlie its accidents, and Kant is quick to call these the real grounds (V-Met/Herder 28: 49).

§ 806: In what appears to be a comment on this paragraph, where Baumgarten notes that “a most perfect thing is a most real thing,” Kant notes that not all realities can be in the most real thing, bringing up his distinction between logical and real repugnance, as first discussed in Negative Magnitudes (V-Met/Herder 28: 150).

8 One more oddity and a conclusion

Given the important shift between New Elucidation (1755) and the essays of the early 1760s, it is surprising to find two pages of notes on the former among Herder’s papers (printed at V-Met/Herder 28: 53–55). They were cataloged and published by Lehmann as notes from Kant’s classroom, and while it is possible that they do in fact stem from his lectures, this seems unlikely, since they consist primarily of a sketchy outline of the first six propositions of New Elucidation, and they do not read at all like lecture notes. But it is odd in any event – either for Kant to be discussing this early essay so extensively in his lectures, or for Herder to bother with it.

So are there any take-away lessons from the above? First and most importantly, the constant interplay between commentary, criticism, and silent emendation of the Baumgarten text makes clear the indispensability of familiarizing ourselves with Baumgarten before making use of these student notes. Second, the frequency with which claims and arguments made in Kant’s published writings also appear in the student notes suggests that these notes might help us to clarify those arguments. And finally, because of the one instance of multiple drafts in the Herder notes, we have some basis for discerning Herder’s own insertions – and what we discover is that he did not substantially alter the notes, not even in their
vocabulary. In general, however, disentangling student insertions from Kant’s views will always be problematic, since any deviation in the notes that strays too far from the published views will, rightly or wrongly, be attributed to the student, rather than to Kant – and similarly with anything that is unintelligible.